Globalization and Culture, Vol. 4: Ideologies of Globalism (2010)

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE Prilims <i>  The concept of ‘globalization’ has in an extraordinarily short time become the dominant motif of the contemporary social sciences. Central Currents in Globalization is an integrated collection of four multi-volume sets that represent the systematic mapping of globalization studies. The series sets out the contours of a field that now crosses the boundaries of all the older disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. The result is a gold-standard collection of over 320 of the most important writings on globalization, structured around four interrelated themes: Violence; Economy; Culture; and Politics. The series editor, Paul James (RMIT, Australia), is joined by sixteen internationally-renowned co-editors from around the globe who bring their subject expertise to each volume, including Jonathan Friedman, Tom Nairn, R.R. Sharma, Manfred Steger, Ronen Palan and Imre Szeman. Together the four sets provide an unparalleled resource on globalization, providing both broad coverage of the subject, historical depth and contemporary relevance. Paul James is Director of the Global Cities Institute at RMIT in Australia, an editor of Arena Journal, and on the Council of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies. He has received a number of awards including the Japan–Australia Foundation Fellowship, an Australian Research Council Fellowship, and the Crisp Medal by the Australasian Political Studies Association for the best book in the field of political studies. He is author/editor of many books including Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community (Sage Publications, 1996). His latest books are Global Matrix: Nationalism, Globalism and State-Terrorism (Pluto, 2005), and Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In (Sage Publications, 2006). His interests are threefold: first, globalism, nationalism and localism, including the changing nature of the nation-state and the effects of an emergent level of global integration; second, social theory with a concentration on theories of culture, community and social formation; and third, contemporary politics and society with an emphasis on debates over technology and social change. Manfred B. Steger is Professor of Global Studies and Director of the Globalism Institute at RMIT University. He is also Program Leader of ‘Globalization and Culture’, in the Global Cities Institute at RMIT University. He has delivered many lectures on globalization, ideology, and nonviolence in the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Australia. He serves on several editorial boards of academic journals as well as on the advisory boards of several globalization research centers around the world. His latest books include The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the War on Terror (2008) and Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (2nd Edn, 2009) and Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century (3rd Edn 2009). Prilims <ii>  CENTRAL CURRENTS IN GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE VOLUME IV Ideologies of Globalism Edited by Paul James and Manfred B. Steger Los Angeles | London | New Delhi Singapore | Washington DC Prilims <iii>  Introduction and editorial arrangement © Paul James and Manfred B. Steger 2010 First published 2010 Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers. Every effort has been made to trace and acknowledge all the copyright owners of the material reprinted herein. However, if any copyright owners have not been located and contacted at the time of publication, the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity. SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP SAGE Publications Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road New Delhi 110 044 SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-4129-1953-1 (set of four volumes) Library of Congress Control Number: 2008938650 Typeset by AV Computers, Delhi Printed on paper from sustainable resources Printed by MPG Books Group, Bodmin, Cornwall Prilims <iv>  Contents Acknowledgements vii Volume IV: Ideologies of Globalism Introduction: Ideologies of Globalism Manfred B. Steger and Paul James ix XVII. Historical Developments: From Heliocentrism to Globalism 64. Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography 3 Denis Cosgrove 65. How to Judge Globalism 33 Amartya Sen 66. Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on some Recent Literature 41 Robert W. Cox 67. ‘Where Ignorant Armies Clash by Night’: Homogeneous Community and the Planetary Aspect 81 Paul Gilroy XVIII. Dominant Ideologies of the Present: From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism 68. Globalization and the Nostalgic Paradigm 97 Roland Robertson 69. Globalization, Literacy and Ideology 115 Ruqaiya Hasan 70. Globalization and Ideology: The Competing Images of the Contemporary Japanese Economic System in the 1990s 132 Bai Gao 71. The New Feudalism: Globalization, the Market, and the Great Chain of Consumption 147 Tim Duvall 72. Americans Again, or the New Age of Imperial Reason? Global Elite Formation, its Identity and Ideological Discourses 163 Jonathan Friedman 73. In the Name of Freedom Comes a Totalizing War-Machine 169 Paul James 74. From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American Power after 9/11 178 Manfred B. Steger Prilims <v>  vi Contents XIX. Alternative Ideologies of the Present: From Anti-Capitalist Localism to Global Islam 75. Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement 197 Barbara Epstein 76. Anti-Globalization: The Global Fight for Local Autonomy 207 Amory Starr and Jason Adams 77. The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting Debates and Policies 231 Robin Broad 78. Practices of Global Capital: Gaps, Cracks and Ironies in Transnational Call Centres in India 261 Kiran Mirchandani 79. How Do We Learn to Want Less? The Globe Downshifted 278 Serge Latouche (Translated by Gulliver Cragg) 80. Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics 284 Fiona B. Adamson XX.Debating a World in Cleavage or an Emerging Global Synthesis 81. Jihad vs. McWorld 313 Benjamin R. Barber 82. Between McWorld and Jihad 323 Naomi Klein 83. Hybrid Modernities: Mélange Modernities in Asia 329 Jan Nederveen Pieterse 84. The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis 342 Amitai Etzioni XXI. Critical Projections and the Future of Globalism 85. Globalism, Ideology and Traditions 373 Interview with Jürgen Habermas 86. Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm? 381 James H. Mittelman 87. The Collapse of Globalism: And the Rebirth of Nationalism 397 John Ralston Saul 88. Theorizing Globalization 409 Douglas Kellner Prilims <vi>  Acknowledgements These volumes are framed by the work of the Global Cities Institute at RMIT Univer- sity in Melbourne. They were produced in collaboration with the Globalization Studies Network, an international collection of centres and institutes around the world, and with the profound intellectual support of individuals in the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT – in particular, Damian Grenfell, Anne McNevin, Martin Mulligan, Yaso Nadarajah, Tom Nairn, Heikki Patomäki, Peter Phipps, Andy Scerri, Victoria Stead, Manfred Steger, Anna Trembath, and Chris Ziguras. The editors are particularly grateful for the wise counsel of David Mainwaring and orga- nizational efficiency of Judi Berger at Sage Publications. Prilims <vii> Prilims <viii>  Ideologies of Globalism Manfred B. Steger and Paul James I deologies of globalization now inform social life almost everywhere across the globe. It sounds tautologous to say so, but that spread is part of a generalized historical development involving the globalization of ideas and practices. Indeed, over the last three decades – but ironically going back long before the term ‘globalization’ was first defined and had entered our dictionaries – such ‘globalisms’ have become part and parcel of discursive networks that envelope the entire globe. Various ideational constellations such as cosmopolitanism, internationalism, imperialism, transnationalism, and market liberalism have in different ways been part of the long-term contested terrain of what it means to reach out and speak across the world.1 And, all of these ‘isms’ make normative claims that reveal both historical ruptures and continuities. It is difficult to enter into the discursive frameworks of earlier periods, but in the late-nineteenth century, for example, imperialism often served as a positive ideal, presented in mainstream Europe and North America as a ‘way of life’ commensurate with a deeply racialized civilizing mission and a beneficent colonizing spirit.2 Going even further back to the sixteenth century, an emergent class of intellectuals – cartographers, philosophers and scribes – used cosmographic images of the globus in indirectly competing ideologies. Along one lineage, spherical images were used to link the early Atlantic empires to the cultural glory of Imperial Rome, and, along another lineages, map-makers projected an early form of cosmopolitanism with cartouches of cultural difference that might be seen as stylized precursors to the ‘Family of Man’.3 The difference is that today, in the early part of the twenty-first century, competing ideologies of globalization articulate a tangled, but generalizing, global imaginary that, more readily than ever before, cuts across class, gender, race, and state-based, geopolitical and cultural differences, postcolonial divides and other social boundaries. This generality was inconceivable in the nineteenth century and earlier. It is not that our latest phase of globalization processes is now uncontested, homo- genous, or totalizing. Nevertheless, for all the debates, and for all the emergence of new localisms, the global imaginary has become relatively encompassing, translated into differing political programs by competing globalisms. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this cultural shift is that many lines of what used to be called the ‘anti-globalization’ movement now describe themselves as part of the alter-globalization movement. 4 They are attuned to we will call ‘justice globalism’, an alternative vision of globalization based on egalitarian ideals of local- global solidarities, distributive justice, and ecological sustainability. Since the 1999 Prilims <ix>  x Introduction Seattle demonstrations, we have thus seen a major shift in sensibility – but this is not to make the trite accusation that the ‘anti-globalization’ movement was hopelessly in tension with itself, in addition to being ideologically incoherent and self-contradictory as suggested by hundreds of media stories that focused on ‘anarchists’ smashing Starbucks windows or ridiculing anti-globalization protesters devouring hamburgers from global fastfood chains such as McDonald’s. Our point is different: firstly, it is only relatively recently that the global imaginary has congealed sufficiently to provide the deep meaning structures for various movements for social justice and human rights to recognize themselves as part of a process of globalization, even as they continue to draw upon older ideologies such as cosmopolitanism and internationalism. Secondly, the relatively recent ascent of the buzzword ‘globalization’ (even if the term ought to refer to longer-term processes unfolding in world history) affects social practices and sensibilities. Thus, the alter-globalization movement now argues for an alternative form of globalization, but it is ‘globalization’ nevertheless. And as such, more than just another description of the world, the core concepts and central claims of justice globalism constitute, we suggest, one lineage in a family of contesting ideologies. That makes justice globalism akin to market globalism and religious globalism – at least in the sense that it draws upon a generalizing, deep-seated imaginary of global connectedness. These globalisms are, in our argument, part of a complex, roughly-woven, but patterned ideational fabric that increasingly figures the global as a defining condition of the present.5 The conceptual complexity and ideational diversity of the emerging ideological fabric of the global age can be illustrated fairly readily. Sometimes ideologically- charged statements about globalization come in the guise of gentle defences of the practice of global interconnection: ‘globalization must be managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are ensured and reinforced’.6 Sometimes they are uncompromising and direct: ‘The failure of our world is not that there is too much globalization, but that there is too little … We need more global markets, not fewer, if we want to raise the standards of the poor of the world’.7 And sometimes, they are simply written into seemingly neutral definitions: globalization is ‘the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders’.8 All of these examples, including the definition (incidentally, written by Joseph Stiglitz, a moderate critic of neoliberalism) are instances of what we call ‘market globalism’. That is, they are claims that the global capitalist market is basically ‘good’ and/or is the given (even natural) outcome of the human condition as it progresses and perfects itself. (‘Progress’ and ‘perfectability’ are some of the most ideologically-charged words in the vocabulary of modernity. We will come back to them later in the chapter.) In the case of Stiglitz’s definition, its ideological undercurrent can be seen firstly in the way that it implicitly treats boundaries to global movement as ‘artificial’, and secondly in the implicit treatment of globali- zation as a phenomenon fuelled predominantly by global market mechanisms. But where in this definition, one might ask, is there room for the globalization of the nation-state system, the globalization of culture and values, the globalization of sport, the globalization of practices of modern temporality, and so on? Intro-Vol-4 <x>  Introduction xi Such globalisms can also confound those who are critical of globalization. One writer who proclaims to be moving away ‘from acquiescence to the new theology of globalization’ to rebuilding local communities, distinguishes between globalization (bad) and internationalization (good), fails to recognize that he is calling for the globalization of support for the localized development. The twist is contained unknowingly in the subtitle of his book – Localization: A Global Manifesto.9 Maybe that is what his publisher decided, but it is indicative that the significance of the word ‘global’ has been increasing while at the same time the book industry itself – including the book’s publisher appropriately named Earthscan – is now globalizing in its aspirations. In another variation, John Ralston Saul portentously pronounces the collapse of globalization, thus conflating neoliberalism (a philosophy of market relations and one strand of globalism among many), other ideologies of globalization (globalisms such as justice and religious globalism) and globalization (intensifying social interrelations across world-space and world-time ranging from globalizing financial exchange to the global movement of tourists). Based on the alleged retreat of a particular named version of neoliberalism, Ralston Saul thus pronounces dead, a process and family of ideologies that continue to be embedded deeply in the practice and ideas of different people across the world. Certainly, one lineage of neoliberalism that reached a high-point during the administrations of President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair has come under intense scrutiny – the ‘imperial globalism’ of the New American Century. However, neoliberalism, decontested in various ways, has an obvious and continuing hold on corporate capitalism and nation-state governance across the globe, the global financial crisis notwithstanding. As a result, Ralston Saul finds himself contorting his own position to explain how the ideology is not quite dead yet: We have scarcely noticed this collapse, however, because Globalization has been asserted by its believers to be inevitable – an all-powerful god; a holy trinity of bourgeoning markets, unsleeping technology, and borderless managers. Opposition or criticism has been treated as little more that romantic paganism. It was powerless before this surprisingly angry god, who would simply strike down with thunderbolts those who faltered and reward his heroes and champions with golden wreaths.10 Here, in confronting a phenomenon that has many faces, Ralston Saul and others both overstate the ideological power of a particular ideology of global relations and understate the generalizing power of both globalization as a practice and as a patterned cluster of ideas, claims, and meanings. That is often the outcome of an ideology that elusively both works across a number of different expressions and reaches deep into the imaginary and ontological constitution of the social. The two terms – ‘the imaginary’ and ‘the ontological’ – have a special meaning in our work which require elaboration. Let us then illustrate and explore three layers of social formations by suggesting distinct ways toward understanding the complexity of ideas and meanings, sensibilities and subjectivities: 1. as contested and decontested by various ideologies; 2. as felt and woven together in social imaginaries; and 3. as lived in relation to largely taken-for-granted social ontologies. In a sense each of these can be understood as clusters of lived ideas and meanings, constituted in practice at an ever-greater generality, durability, and depth. For example, ideologies tend to Intro-Vol-4 <xi>  xii Introduction move in and out of contestation; imaginaries move at a deeper level and, in different ways, enter the commonsense of an age; and ontologies – such as how we live temporally or spatially – are the relatively enduring ground on which we walk. In other words, all these ways of understanding the world are changing, and they can even change at revolutionary speed, but the deeper the process the slower the tendency for a pattern of change to take hold as dominant and encompassing. At the risk of oversimplifying these concepts, and opening up debates or misapprehensions before we have clarified how we are going to use such concepts, they can be minimally defined as follows: 11 1. Ideologies can be defined as patterned clusters of normatively-imbued ideas and concepts, including particular representations of power relations, carrying claims to social truth – as, for example, expressed in liberalism, conservatism, and socialism.12 2. Imaginaries can be defined as patterned convocations of the social whole. These deep-seated modes of understanding provide the parameters within which people imagine their social existence – expressed, for example, in conceptions of ‘the global’, ‘the national’, ‘the moral order of our time’. 3. Ontologies can be defined as patterned ways-of-being that are lived as the grounding conditions of the social – for example, modern time, territorial space, and individualized embodiment. Globalisms as Ideologies Globalization, like other material practices, is associated with patterns of ideas related to and about those practices. As always, the relationship between those practices and ideas is extraordinarily complicated and mutually constitutive. Just as the formation of nations is associated with the ideologies of the national imaginary – that is, politically contested ideas about who should achieve the desired end of forging the ‘natural’ connection between nation and state – processes of globalization are associated with ideologies of the global imaginary that both influence and make sense of practices and patterns of practice. Here a key notion is that ideologies are patterned and conceptually ‘thick’ enough to form relatively coherent and persistent articulations of the underlying social imaginary. One or two statements of contention do not an ideology make. In this sense, ideologies of globalization are sometimes pressing and have contested claims about what it means to live in a globalizing world. They become taken-for-granted through processes of decontestation, that is, attempts to re- duce the indeterminacy of linguistically expressed meaning to fixed, authoritative definitions and statements. It may sound counter-intuitive to say that ideologies of global interconnection were prevalent even before the overt and contested recognition (the naming) of the importance of globalization as a ‘condition of our age’. But, that is just to say that ideas are not always directly and reflexively expressed in relation to a self-reflexively named set of practices. What we can say in general is that today’s competing globalisms, like the previous ideologies of the national imaginary, are always contingent, arguable, in tension with each other, and resistant to easy analysis of their affective power. Intro-Vol-4 <xii>  Introduction xiii The most effective ‘ideologues’ (we use this term in a neutral way referring to the elite codifiers of political belief systems) tend to reach across different ideologies and, at the same time, to draw deeper down in the imaginary and ontological foundations of the social. For example, when the presidential candidate Barack Obama spoke as a ‘world citizen’ in Berlin (July 2008), calling for nations to come together as in a commitment to global progress, he struggled to bring together different ideologies (from both the national and global imaginaries) into a fragile singular vision: Now is the time to build new bridges across the globe as strong as the one that bound us across the Atlantic. Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacrifice, and a global commitment to progress, to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It was this spirit that led airlift planes to appear in the sky above our heads, and people to assemble where we stand today. And this is the moment when our nations – and all nations – must summon that spirit anew.13 When does a political belief-system warrant the designation of a separate ‘ideological family’? What criteria should be used to say that a series of ideas constitutes an ideology? Michael Freeden suggests that ideologies display unique features anchored in distinct conceptual morphologies. 14 Resembling well- furnished rooms containing various articles of furniture uniquely arranged in proximity to each other, ideologies come together in creatively-made patterns.15 Freeden provides us with three useful criteria for determining the status of a particular political belief system: first, its degree of uniqueness and complexity; second, its context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and, third, its ability to produce effective conceptual chains of decontestation. The process of ‘decontestation’ – the process by which ideas come to be treated as natural or commonsensical – is a crucial process in the formation of thought systems. This is because the process of contestation and decontestation specifies the meanings of the core concepts by arranging them in a pattern that links them in an expressive and pointed way with other concepts. Michael Freeden briefly discusses ‘globalism’ as a possible contender for ideological status, but based on his rather formalistic approach to ideology, he retreats to the sceptical view that ‘it is far too early to pronounce on globalism’s status as an ideology’.16 While sharing the British philosopher’s interest in changing ideological systems, this essay seeks to establish the following counter-proposition: Proposition 1. The various ideologies in the extended family of globalisms have over the last couple of decades come to form clusters of political ideas and beliefs coherent enough to warrant the status of a set of ideologies: market globalism, justice globalism, religious globalism, and imperial globalism, to name the principal clusters. We have already defined market globalism as a cluster of ideas which suggest that, notwithstanding its short-term problems and cyclical down-turns, global laissez- faire capitalism is fundamentally good and/or is the given outcome (even natural progression) of the human condition. The ideology of market globalism tends to build upon a number of interrelated central claims: that globalization is powered by neutral techno-economic forces; that the process is inexorable; that the process is leaderless and anonymous; that everyone will be better off in the long run, and that globalization furthers the spread of equality and democracy. Justice globalism, Intro-Vol-4 <xiii>  xiv Introduction by comparison, is defined by its emphasis on justice, rights, sustainability, and diversity. It articulates a very different set of claims. It suggests that the process of globalization is powered by corporate interests; that the process can take different pathways; that the democracy carried by global processes tends to be thin and procedural; and that ‘globalization-from-above’ is associated with increasing inequities within and between nation-states, greater environmental destruction and a marginalization of the poor. The third cluster, religious globalism (its most spectacular strain being jihadist Islamism), rests on the populist evocation of an exceptional spiritual and political crisis – in the jihadist lineage expressed as an age of jahiliyya (ignorance and pagan idolatry) that calls for a renewed universalism of a global umma (a reworked meaning of a global Islamic commu- nity). A fourth cluster, imperial globalism, has faltered over the last year or two with the fracturing of the Washington Consensus. Developing out of market globalism and still retaining some of its central features, it is the publicly weakest of these ideological clusters, even though for a time it informed the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ and the joint action of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ led by the unilateralist Bush administration. Despite its waning influence since the election of Barack Obama, imperial globalism still operates as a powerful background force to the extent that its central claim – that global peace depends upon the global economic reach and military authority of an (informal) ‘American Empire’ and its allies – is still taken for granted within many governing and elite circles.17 In short, it can be seen that the different ideological clusters associated with globalization are competing doctrines with very different emphases. This ideational variance is further enhanced when we take into consideration different settings and geographical scales. For example, Bai Goa writes about the mainstream Japanese approach to globalization as diverging from the ‘Anglo-American approach’ (pre-Global Financial Crisis) in four specific ways: globalization is perceived as the cause of rather than the remedy for the bubble economy; the big bang of the finance industry is blamed for driving the economy into a liquidity trap; the assertion of a universal model of market economy conflicts with the strong desire for national identity; and the efficiency principle is contested by the widely shared belief in the ideal of economic equality.18 However, for all their complexity as ideologies, and despite the obvious tensions between them and the differences across different settings, globalisms have one thing in common. People who are caught up in them – whether from the political Right or Left – tend to accept the apparent inevitability and relative virtue of global interconnectivity and mobility across global time and space. However, one seeks to understand global history and whatever set-backs we might face in the future, intensifying social interconnections have come to define the nature of our times. Even though proponents of justice globalism may insist that ‘another world is possible’, they hardly question that growing global interconnectivity remains a central part of most, if not all, alternative futures. One sign of a maturing ideological constellation is that it comes to be represented as ‘post-ideological’. In some guises globalism is (mis)presented along these lines as just the way that things are: a transparent reality. Thus, even for a sophisticated social theorist like Jürgen Habermas, globalism has been lifted beyond the capacity of conventional, ‘Frankfurt-style’ Ideologiekritik. As he notes, Intro-Vol-4 <xiv>  Introduction xv The present situation is, in a way, so transparent that there is, first, no need for a suspicious disclosure of concealed truths – you need not even read the Financial Times or the Frankfurter Allgemeine, every middle-brow local paper contains on the front pages the necessary information. It should be clear for everybody, that the recent – or not quite so recent – acceleration in transnational trade, direct investment and flow of capital is the intended result of political agreements that have led – via several GATT Rounds – to an economic regime which is represented by institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc. That means, secondly, that globalism is not only an ideology. We in fact observe a shift in the structure of capitalism from an international to a transnational disposition.19 In short, when a sophisticated philosopher such as Jürgen Habermas says that globalization is just a ‘fact’ – that ‘we not only need to learn how to adapt to, but also to cope with the undesired consequences of the globalization processes’ – we can see how the various ideological translations of the rising global imaginary are becoming part of the commonsense of the global age. Like the aforementioned complexity of the naming process, it does not take the active use of words such as ‘inevitable’ to accept globalization culturally as an inexorable force to which we ‘need to learn how to adapt’. Over the last two decades – and especially since the onset of the 2008–09 global financial crisis – the public discourse on globalization sketching its projected path has changed. At the height of the ‘Roaring Nineties’, the master narrative was saturated with adjectives like ‘inevitable’, ‘inexorable’, and ‘irreversible’. Indeed, the elite codifiers of market globalism were insistent and blunt. For example, in a 1999 speech on United States’ foreign policy, President Bill Clinton told his audience: ‘Today we must embrace the inexorable logic of globalization … Globalization is irreversible. Protectionism will only make things worse’.20 Power elites in the global South often faithfully echoed the determinist language of globalism. For example, Manuel Villar, the Philippines Speaker of the House of Representatives, insisted that, ‘We cannot simply wish away the process of globalization. It is a reality of a modern world. The process is irreversible’.21 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the claim to inevitability came under sustained criticism by commentators who read the al- Qa’ida attacks as exposing the ‘dark side of globalization’. Some writers proclaimed the imminent ‘collapse of globalism’, worrying that the terrorist attacks would usher in a new age of cultural particularism and economic protectionism. 22 Noted neoliberal economists like Robert Samuelson argued that previous globalization processes had been stopped by similar cataclysmic events, like the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.23 Despite this fear, and enacted in the telling of the fear, the unfolding War on Terror allowed for a renewed semantic intermingling of military and economic inevitability. For example, Christopher Shays, Republican Congressman from Connecticut and Chair of the House Subcommittee on National Security, argued that the ‘toxic zeal’ of the terrorists would eventually be defeated by the combination of military and market forces – ‘the relentless inevitability of free peoples pursuing their own enlightened self-interest in common cause’.24 Thus, the capacity of people to revise ideologies of globalism and to adapt to the new realities of the post-September 11 world gives ample proof of its responsiveness to a broad range of political issues. Intro-Vol-4 <xv>  xvi Introduction In the first years of the twenty-first century, the contention that ‘globalization is inevitable’ has tended to be made with less urgency. The dominant sense became that we are now simply globalized and the question is what we are going to do about it. That is until an economic shockwave ripped through global capitalism in 2008. With the realization that the global financial system was in danger of collapsing, the language changed again. As the repercussions stretched far beyond Wall Street and Paternoster Square, and as the calamity was christened ‘the Global Financial Crisis’, the salience of again defending ‘good forms’ of globalization was renewed. Thus, President Obama sought to convince his global audience that, ‘Not only is it impossible to turn back the tide of globalization, but efforts to do so can make us worse off’.25 Or, as he put it in another recent speech: For two hundred years, the United States has made it clear that we won’t stand for foreign intervention in our hemisphere. But every day, all across the Americas, there is a different kind of struggle – not against foreign armies, but against the deadly threat of hunger and thirst, disease and despair. That is not a future that we have to accept – not for the child in Port au Prince or the family in the highlands of Peru. We can do better. We must do better. We cannot ignore suffering to our south, nor stand for the globalization of the empty stomach.26 From a justice globalism perspective, the idea of inevitablity tends to be put more tentatively and critically, but the acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the broader ‘reality’ of a globalized world still remains firmly within the framework of the global imaginary. For example, coming from this broader stance, Peter Raven in his Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science annual meeting in 2002 says: ‘Globalization appears to have become an irresistible force, but we must make it participatory and humane to alleviate the suffering of the world’s poorest people and the effective disenfranchisement of many of its nations’.27 Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) frames the third major statement (2008) of its principles since its 1919 constitution was laid out by representing the view that globalization is the basic context of productive life. Building upon the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles 1998, the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization begins with a sentence which frames all others: ‘Considering that the present context of globalization, … is reshaping the world of work in profound ways …’28 Globalisms as Woven into a Social Imaginary Whether or not the buzzword ‘globalization’ is part of common parlance, and whether or not it is habitually used to frame policy documents, there arose over the past couple of decades a quiet and generalized recognition that global processes inform social life: from the way we borrow money and source basic commodities, to the way in which we choose films to watch, keep in contact with friends and family, and understand the rise and fall of petroleum prices. This leads us to our second proposition: Proposition 2. Globalisms represent sets of political beliefs coherent and conceptually Intro-Vol-4 <xvi>  Introduction xvii rich enough to warrant the status of ‘ideology’. Moreover, a sense of ‘the global’ has come to constitute the dominant social imaginary of our time (albeit still contending with the weakening national imaginary) from within which all contemporary political belief systems must be understood and analyzed. The various ideologies associated with globalization have thus, over the last two decades, come to coalesce around a new sense of a social whole – a global social imaginary of profound, generalizing, and deep impact. At the same time, different writers have been grappling with the notion that this is more than an ideologically- contested representation of social integration and differentiation. As Claude Lefort writes, ‘In this sense, the examination of ideology confronts us with the determination of a type of society in which a specific regime of the imaginary can be identified’.29 Charles Taylor perhaps provides the most useful way forward in defining a social imaginary as ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’.30 Our definition is narrower, but it draws on a similar sense. Although the concept is not itself developed in sufficient theoretical detail in Taylor’s writings, his philosophical and historical comments on the subject are very helpful. In his terms, the modern social imaginary was built on three orientations. The first is the separating out of the economy as a distinct domain, treated as an objectified reality. The second is the simultaneous emergence of the public sphere as the place of increasingly mediated interchange and (counter-posed) the intimate or private sphere in which ‘ordinary life’ is affirmed. The third is the sovereignty of the people, treated as a new collective agency even as it is made up of individuals who see self-affirmation in the other spheres. These are three historical developments among others that are relevant to what might be called a modern ontological formation (of which more later), but listing such factors neither help us to define a social imaginary in general nor to understand what we are calling the ‘global imaginary’. The definition that we gave earlier helps to make a couple of further steps – imaginaries can be defined as patterned convocations of the lived social whole. The notion of ‘convocation’ is important: it is the calling together, the gathering (not the self-consciously defending or active decontesting activity associated with ideologies) of an assemblage of meanings, ideas, sensibilities that are taken to be relatively self-evident. The concept of ‘the social whole’ points to the way in which certain apparently simple terms such as ‘our society’, ‘we’, and ‘the market’ carry taken-for-granted and interconnected meanings. This concept allows us to define the imaginary as broader than the dominant sense of community. A social whole, in other words, is not necessarily co-extensive with a projection of community relations or ‘the ways people imagine their social existence’ (Taylor), nor does it need to be named as such. It can encompass a time, for example, when there maybe only an inchoate sense of global community, but there is today paradoxically an almost pre-reflexive sense that at one level ‘we’ as individuals, peoples, and nations have a common global fate. Thirty years ago all of these notions of the social whole, including ‘the market’, would have been largely seen as co-extensive with the nation-state and were Intro-Vol-4 <xvii>  xviii Introduction stretched across relations between nation-states (hence the use of the narrower term ‘international relations’). With notable exceptions, even when sociologists and political scientists analysed a thing called ‘society’, they tended to assume the boundaries of the nation (in the literature this is now called ‘methodological nationalism’). In other words, the social whole was a national imaginary that tended to be equated with the community of the nation. Now we find either that concepts such as ‘society’ have become terms of ambivalence (Margaret Thatcher – ‘There is no such thing as society’)31 or that they have become stretched between two imaginaries: the national and the global. In The Imaginary Constitution of Society, Cornelius Castoriadis takes the concept of the ‘imaginary’ in a direction that we do not want to travel. And yet, it provides a useful means of saying how we are not using the term. In his argument, the imaginary is that which expresses the creative excess of the human condition.32 It always exceeds the possibilities of the material conditions of life.33 Our use of the term ‘social imaginary’ is more akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the pre- reflexive habitus – that is, ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations’.34 However, for our purposes, the concept of the habitus is too normatively-driven, and the concept of the ‘social imaginary’ has a stronger sense of the social whole or of the general ‘given’ social order. It is not everything. What is important to take from Bourdieu is the sense of how patterns of practice/ideas can be seen to be objectively outside of the particular practices/ideas of persons, even as those patterns were constituted by persons as they subjectively took hold of the possibilities of acting in and through such a habitus. Drawing on Bourdieu in an article that shows how both anthropology and geography as fields of enquiry have to respond to issues of globalization, Katherine Rankin extends the term: For that part of culture in which hegemony prevails, individuals assume dispositions and orientations beyond their own horizon of meaning – ‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s lexicon – and thus collude, often unwittingly, in the production of a system that may oppress them. In these circumstances, the practices of individuals, right down to their bodily comportment, can acquire a unity and consistency without being the result of conscious obedience to rules. Thus anthropologists have documented the processes by which abstract ideologies circulating at a global scale – neoliberalism, political democracy, development, modernization – assume historically and culturally specific textures and become rooted as common sense in particular societies.35 Thus a social imaginary sets the ‘background’ lived and experienced as ‘common sense’.36 Put in different terms, the medium and the message – the practice of inter- relation on a global scale and the content or messages of global interconnection and naturalized power – have become increasingly bound up with each other. To summarize thus far, we have suggested there are several ideologies of globalization – or globalisms – and these not only have a family connection, but they also translate into concrete political programmes and agendas as a genera- lizing global imaginary. We can take this a step further, based on the question asked earlier about what Taylor calls ‘the modern imaginary’. Our deepest assumptions about globalization, we suggest, are currently grounded in basic categories of time and space, and more explicitly in the dominance of modern time-space (as such Intro-Vol-4 <xviii>  Introduction xix understandings have become unsettled by emergent postmodern temporalities and spatialities). Contemporary Globalisms as Grounded in Changing Ontological Forms The concept of ontologies is used as short-hand term for referring to the most basic framing categories of social existence: temporality, spatiality, corporeality, epistemology and so on. These are categories of being-in-the-world, historically constituted in the structures of human interrelations. To talk of ‘being’ in this way does not imply a given or unchanging human essence, nor is it confined to the generation of meaning in the sphere of selfhood. If questions of ontology are about questions of ‘being’ then in a sense everything to do with ‘being human’ is ontological. However, we are using the concept more precisely to refer categories of existence such as ‘space’ and ‘time’ that on the one hand are always talked about, and, on the other, are rarely interrogated, analyzed, or historically contextualized except by philosophers and social theorists. Brief illustrations of the themes of time and space will help bring this largely taken-for-granted connection between ontological categories and globalization to the surface. The category of spatiality is crucial – obviously ‘globalization’ is pre-eminently a spatial concept. However, to be more historically specific, contemporary globalization is predominantly lived through a modern conception of spatiality linked to abstracted territory and sovereignty,37 rather than for example as a traditional cosmological sense of spatiality held together by God, Nature or some other generalized Being. This is a claim about dominance rather than a simple epochal shift from or replacement of an older form of temporality. This accords with Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s notions of ‘hybrid’ or ‘mélange modernities’ (in this volume).38 For example, those who espouse a Jihadist or Pentecostalist variant of religious globalism tend to be stretched between a modern sense of space and a neo-traditional sense of a universalizing umma or Christendom respectively. In this neo-traditional understanding, the social whole exists in, prior to, and beyond modern global space.39 On the other hand, we also find instances of ambiguous modern spatialities sliding into postmodern sensibilities that relate to contemporary globalization. For example, there are airline advertising maps that are post-territorial (postmodern) to the extent that they show multiple abstract vectors of travel – lines that criss- cross between multiple city-nodes and travel across empty space without reference to the conventional mapping expressions of land and sea, nation-state and continental boundaries. To such a backdrop and with no global outline, an advertisement for KLM airlines states ‘You could fly from anywhere in the world to any destination’.40 The point here is that we comfortably know how to read those maps despite the limited points of orientation, and we know that they are global before reading the fine print – ‘anywhere in the world’. While the dominant representations of global spatiality tend to be highly modern – the prime example is Google Earth released in June 2005 – we no longer need the 1990s-style icons of planet earth to know that the local and the global are interconnected.41 For example, in an advertisement on the next page from the KLM advertisement just Intro-Vol-4 <xix>  xx Introduction mentioned, a picture of a country lane and an old British post-box is used as the backdrop to the words ‘It’s all about picking up your Email anywhere’. Nothing has to be said about the web being world-wide or the metal post-box with the royal emblem of ER (Elizabeth Regina II) being anachronistically local-national. Those of us who live a modern global imaginary just know how to read the imagery. The category of temporality is also important to the contemporary global imaginary even if ‘time’ is not relevant to globalization definitionally. Modern time – the demarcated disciplinary time of the calendar and clock – has been globalized both in a formal way since the negotiations over world-time in the 1870s, and informally in how people tend to work, organize their leisure. More generally, we can say that different social formations live their dominant senses of temporality in fundamentally different ways. For example, the notion that time passes at one- second-per-second is a tautological and modern convention rather than being intrinsically natural, scientifically verifiable, or continuous with older cosmological senses of time. Modern time is abstracted from nature, and verifiable only within a particular mode of modern scientific enquiry – the Newtonian treatment of time as unitary, linear and uniform. It reached one of its defining moments in 1974 when the second came to be measured in atomic vibrations, allowing the post-phenomenal concept of nano-seconds – one-billionth of a second.42 Whether or not this is common knowledge, this sense of time-precision has been globalized as the regulative framework for electronic transactions in the global market-place. That then is the first point: a modern sense of time has been globalized and overlays older ontologies of temporality. The second point is that assumed connection between modern time and modern globalization is drawn upon to project contemporary ideologies, including those of global capitalism – linked to concepts such as ‘progress’, ‘efficiency’, ‘perfectability’, and ‘just-in-time’. Concepts of ‘time’ and ‘the global’ are commonly used to sell high-end commodities from expensive watches and clothes to computers, mobile phones and music-listening devices. For example, an advertisement for Columbus Circle clothing stores, headed by the words ‘6.10pm. Think globally. Act Stylishly’, shows a woman jumping out of a taxi to go shopping, framed by the lines of a clock.43 This makes sense when you consider that the eight most commonly-used words in the English language are time, person, year, way, day, thing, man, world, (emphasis added)44 and English itself is being globalized.45 By way of background to the present approach, we should add that the concepts of ‘the traditional’, ‘the modern’ and ‘the postmodern’ are employed as provisionally useful designations of ontological difference.46 That is, forms of social being are defined in terms of how basic categories of the human condition are practised, understood and lived. Those basic categories are provisionally taken to be time, space, embodiment and knowing. Traditionalism can be characterized as carrying forward prior ontological forms from customary tribalism, 47 but reconstituted in terms of universalizing cosmologies and political-metaphorical relations. An example here is the institution of the Christian Church. It may have modernized its practices of organization and become enmeshed in a modern monetary economy, but the various denominations of the Church, and most manifestly its Pentecostal variations, remain deeply bound up with a traditional cosmology of meaning and ritual. The truth of Jesus is not Intro-Vol-4 <xx>  Introduction xxi analytically relative or a question of modern proof. In this sense, a ‘return’ to traditionalism characterizes many of the expressions of contemporary religious globalisms. Modernism can in the same way be said to carry forward prior forms of being, but fundamentally reconstituting (and sometimes turning up-side down) those forms in terms of technical-abstracted modes of time, space, embodiment and knowing. Time, in this sense, becomes understood and practised not in terms of cosmological connection with a capital ‘C’ but through empty calendrical time- lines that can be filled with the details and wonders of history – events made by us. Space is territorialized and marked by abstract lines on maps – with places drawn in by our own histories. Embodiment becomes an individualized project separated out from the mind and used to project a choosing self. And, knowing becomes an act of analytically dismembering and re-synthesizing information. In practice, modernism is associated with the dominance of capitalist production relations, commodity and finance exchange, print and electronic communication, bureaucratic-rational organization and analytic enquiry, but there is no necessary connection here. It is a historical connection that lurches from periods of thriving to periods of crisis, but in all cases naturalizes itself ideologically as the taken-for- granted pathway to development. Postmodernism can thus be similarly defined in much more fundamental ways than the ‘end of grand narratives’, a descent into disorganization, or the ironical use of pastiche. In our terms it is a formation characterized by the intersection of virtual-relativized space-time, corporeality, and epistemology.48 For example as inferred earlier, space becomes deterritorialized to the extent that its lived connection to the phenomena of landscape – actual mountains and rivers – becomes lifted into a relativized aesthetic of practice and representation. In practice in the world today, what we find are different formations of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism in complex intersection with each other. To bring this discussion to a close and to integrate the three layers of our analysis – from ideologies to ontologies – we now turn to some prominent themes in contemporary politics and culture. In what follows, we identify some core themes of globalism and offer a critical analysis of the political role of these authoritative but contested semantic chains as they absorb, alter, and rearrange ideas drawn from established ideologies, imaginaries and ontologies. Market globalism will be used as the point of departure each time because, contra Ralston Saul’s ‘death of globalism’ argument, it retains considerable semantic and practical power. Three interconnected themes will be briefly discussed in turn: globalization and the market, globalization and development, and globalization, democracy and freedom. Globalization and the Market ‘The market’ is one of the core concepts of globalism, whether as described by its critics or by the proponents of market globalism. The concept of ‘the market’ also plays an important role in two established ideologies that precede market globalism: the libertarian variant of liberalism, often referred to as neoliberalism, inspired by the ideas of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman; and the late- Intro-Vol-4 <xxi>  xxii Introduction twentieth century brand of Anglo-American conservatism, or neoconservatism, associated with the views of Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher, and Ronald Reagan. As Robert Cox in his classic article describes,49 they came together as intertwining ideological positions in the mid-twentieth century around the Trilateral Commis- sion, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. Since then, issues of globalization, and in particular free trade within the global capitalist market, have been central to their configuration. While market globalism borrows heavily from both neoliberalism and neoconservatism, it would be a mistake to reduce it to either. Moreover, these ‘neo- isms’ should not be seen as ideological opposites, for their similarities sometimes outweigh their differences. In general, neoconservatives agree with neoliberals on the importance of free markets and free trade, but they are much more inclined than the latter to combine their hands-off attitude towards big business with intrusive government action for the regulation of the ordinary citizenry, in the name of public security and traditional values. In foreign affairs, neoconservatives advocate a more assertive and expansive use of both economic and military power, although they often embrace the liberal ideal of promoting freedom and democracy around the world.50 What gives market globalism its uniqueness and morphological sophistication, then, is not merely its ability to absorb and rearrange ideas from conventional ideo- logies. Three additional factors must be taken into consideration: the depth of the concept of ‘globalization’ (no other ideology so directly goes to the heart of onto- logical claims about condensing time and space – for example, drawing upon an aphorism such as ‘time is money’); the conceptual shift of ‘market’ from its adja- cent or peripheral location in liberalism and conservatism to market globalism’s conceptual core; and the formation of a number of highly original ideological claims. Embracing the classical liberal idea of the self-regulating market, one claim seeks to establish beyond dispute ‘what globalization means’, that is, to offer an authoritative definition of globalization designed for broad public consumption. It does so by interlocking its two core concepts and then linking them to the adjacent ideas of ‘liberty’ and ‘integration’. The following two examples illustrate this process.51 The first is a passage taken from a leading Business Week article published in the late 1990s: ‘Globalization is about the triumph of markets over governments. Both proponents and opponents of globalization agree that the driving force today is markets, which are suborning the role of government’.52 The same claim is made over and over again in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman’s best-selling book on globalization. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that Friedman’s writings provide the ‘official narrative of globalization’ in the United States today.53 At one point in his narrative, the award-winning New York Times columnist insists that everybody ought to accept the following ‘truth’ about globalization: ‘The driving idea behind globalization is free-market capitalism – the more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free trade and competition, the more efficient your economy will be’.54 By forging a close semantic link between ‘globalization’, the ‘market’ and a spatially-flattened world, globalists like Friedman seek to create the impression that globalization represents primarily an economic phenomenon that puts all life on one spatial plane – The World is Flat.55 Thus unburdened from the complexity Intro-Vol-4 <xxii>  Introduction xxiii of its additional non-economic dimensions, globalization acquires the necessary simplicity and focus to convey its central normative message contained in further semantic connections to the adjacent concepts ‘liberalization’ and ‘economic integration’. Conversely, the notion of ‘integrating markets’ is draped in the mantle of all- embracing liberty, hence the frequent formulation of globalization as an imperative anchored in universal reason. Thus (re)presented as an economic project advancing human freedom in general, globalization must be applied to all countries, regardless of the political and cultural preferences expressed by local citizens. As President George W. Bush noted in a key document of his administration, ‘Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies – industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing world’.56 In Barack Obama’s words: ‘As Tom Friedman points out in his new book, The World Is Flat, over the last decade or so, these forces – technology and globalization – have combined like never before … a quiet revolution has been breaking down barriers and connecting the world’s economies.’57 Again common spatial notions are used to naturalize the ideological claims. Upon deeper reflection, one might wonder how such ideological efforts insisting on a single economic strategy for all countries can be made compatible with a process alleged to contribute to the spread of freedom, choice, and openness across the world, but this is not a query that is usually made. Finally, the semantic chain ‘globalization-market-liberty-integration’ serves to solidify as ‘fact’ what is actually a contingent political initiative. It persuades large segments of the public that its account of globalization represents an objective diagnosis of the real world, rather than a claim contributing to the emergence of the very conditions it purports to describe. To be sure, globalists offer plenty of empirical evidence for the liberalization of markets. Questions that remain are: does the spread of market principles happen because a natural connection exists between globalization and the spatial expansion of markets? Or does it occur because the globalists’ draw upon language that has enhanced their political power to shape the world largely according to their ideological claim? Globalization and Development Market globalism provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question of whether globalization represents a ‘good’ phenomenon by suggesting that it is intimately connected to development – itself a strongly temporally charged concept. The adjacent idea of ‘benefits for everyone’ is usually unpacked in material terms such as ‘economic growth’ and ‘prosperity’. However, when linked to another related temporal concept, ‘progress’ – the idea of ‘benefits for everyone’ – it taps not only into liberalism’s progressive worldview of the benefits of ever-expanding capitalist consumption, but also draws on the powerful socialist vision of establishing a progressive paradise on earth. This is another bold example of combining elements from seemingly incompatible ideologies under the master concept ‘globalization’. At the 1996 G-7 Summit, the heads of state and government of the world’s seven most powerful industrialized nations issued a joint communiqué that Intro-Vol-4 <xxiii>  xxiv Introduction exemplifies the principal meanings of globalization conveyed in the concept of ‘development’: Economic growth and progress in today’s interdependent world is bound up with the process of globalization. Globalization provides great opportunities for the future, not only for our countries, but for all others too. Its many positive aspects include an unprecedented expansion of investment and trade; the opening up to international trade of the world’s most populous regions, as well as opportunities for more developing countries to improve their standards of living; the increasingly rapid dissemination of information, technological innovation, and the proliferation of skilled jobs. These characteristics of globalization have led to a considerable expansion of wealth and prosperity in the world. Hence we are convinced that the process of globalization is a source of hope for the future.58 (Emphasis added.) More than a decade later, and after much change including the crisis of the global financial markets, the official communiqué issued at the end of the 2009 G-20 summit in London said much the same thing except with a stronger emphasis on global regulation and governance, particularly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF): ‘We believe that the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization and rising prosperity for all is an open world economy based on market principles, effective regulation, and strong global institutions’.59 Globalization, Democracy and Freedom A further decontestation chain is that which links ‘globalization’ and ‘market’ to the adjacent concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. It also plays a significant role in liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Market globalists typically decontest ‘democracy’ through its proximity to ‘market’ and the making of economic choices – a theme developed through the 1980s in the peculiar variant of conservatism linked to ‘Thatcherism’. Indeed, a careful discourse analysis of relevant texts reveals that market globalists tend to treat freedom, free markets, free trade and democracy as synonymous terms. Phrases such as ‘the space of freedom’ are used across the ideological spectrum, and tend to be used more commonly by justice globalists, but a common spatial frame for such discussions remains the global market. Francis Fukuyama, for example, asserts that there exists a ‘clear correlation’ between a country’s level of economic development and successful democracy. While globalization and capital development do not automatically produce democracies, ‘the level of economic development resulting from globalization is conducive to the creation of complex civil societies with a powerful middle class. It is this class and societal structure that facilitates democracy’.60 Praising Eastern Europe’s economic transition towards capitalism, then First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton told her Polish audience that the emergence of new businesses and shopping centres in former communist countries should be seen as the ‘backbone of democracy’.61 Fukuyama and Clinton agree that the globalization process strengthens the existing affinity between democracy and free market. However, their neoliberal argument hinges on a limited definition of democracy that emphasizes formal procedures such as voting at the expense of the direct participation of broad Intro-Vol-4 <xxiv>  Introduction xxv majorities in political and economic decision-making. This ‘thin’ definition of democracy is part of what William I. Robinson has identified as the Anglo-American ideological project of ‘promoting polyarchy’ in the developing world. For Robinson, the thin concept of polyarchy differs from the thicker concept of ‘popular democracy’, in that the latter posits democracy as both a process and a means to an end – a tool for devolving political and economic power from the hands of elite minorities to the masses. Polyarchy, on the other hand, represents an elitist and regimented model of ‘low-intensity’ or ‘formal’ market democracy. Polyarchies not only limit democratic participation to voting in elections, but also require that those elected be insulated from popular pressures, so that they may ‘govern effectively’.62 This semantic focus on the act of voting – in which equality prevails only in the formal sense – helps to obscure the conditions of inequality reflected in existing asymmetrical power relations in society. Formal elections provide the important function of legitimating the rule of dominant elites, thus making it more difficult for popular movements to challenge the rule of elites. The claim that globalization furthers the spread of democracy across the world is thus largely based on a narrow, formal-procedural understanding of ‘democracy’. The promotion of polyarchy allows globalists to advance their project of economic restructuring in a language that ostensibly supports the ‘democratization’ of the world. After September 11, the notion of global freedom became firmly linked to the Bush administration’s neoconservative security agenda. The President did not mince words in ‘Securing Freedom’s Triumph’, his New York Times op-ed article a year after the attacks: ‘As we preserve the peace, America also has an opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom and progress to nations that lack them. We seek a peace where repression, resentment and poverty are replaced with the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade’.63 Fourteen months later, he reaffirmed his unwavering ‘commitment to the global expansion of democracy’ as the ‘Third Pillar’ of the United States’ ‘peace and security vision for the world’.64 This idea of securing global economic integration through an American-led military drive for ‘democratization’ around the globe became especially prominent in the corporate scramble for Iraq following the official ‘end of major combat operations’ on 1 May 2003. Already, during the first days of the Iraq War in late March 2003, market globalists had suggested that Iraq be subjected to a radical economic treatment. For example, Robert McFarlane, former National Security Adviser to President Reagan and current chairman of the Washington, DC-based corporation Energy & Communication Solutions, LLC, together with Michael Bleyzer, CEO and president of SigmaBleyzer, an international equity-fund management company, co-authored a prominent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal bearing the suggestive title, ‘Taking Iraq Private’. Calling on ‘major U.S. corporations, jointly with other multinationals’, to ‘lead the effort to create capital- friendly environments in developing countries’, the market globalist duo praised the military operations in Iraq as an indispensable tool in establishing the ‘political, economic and social stability’ necessary for ‘building the basic institutions that make democracy possible’. In their conclusion, the two men reminded their readers that ‘the US must demonstrate that it is not only the most powerful military power on the planet, but also the foremost market economy in the world, capable of leading a greater number of developing nations to a more prosperous and stable future’.65 Intro-Vol-4 <xxv>  xxvi Introduction To be sure, throughout the 1990s there had been sinister warnings on the part of some cultural theorists that globalization was actually ‘Americanization’ or ‘McDonaldization’ in universalist disguise.66 But, the perceived US unilaterism and belligerence in the wake of 9/11 appeared to be a much more serious manifestation of the same phenomenon. In fact, the problem of globalism’s turn toward nationalism was as much conceptual as political. After all, decontesting globalization through its proximity to the idea of a necessary ‘Global War on Terror’ created serious logical contradictions. First, the globalists’ reliance on the coercive powers of the state to secure their project undermined both the idea of the ‘self- regulating market’ and the claim of historical ‘inevitability’. Second, the belligerent vision of enforcing ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ at gunpoint conflicted with the common understanding of liberty as absence of coercion. Third, the Anglo- American nationalist undertones emanating from the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ seemed to contradict the cosmopolitan, universal spirit associated with the concept ‘globalization’. Instructive examples of the logical inconsistencies inherent in the ideological discourse abound, but they are often made sense of through spatial metaphors. Take Thomas Barnett’s article ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’, first published in the March 2003 issue of Esquire magazine, and subsequently expanded into a bestselling book bearing the same title.67 Barnett, then a professor of military strategy at the US Naval War College, also served at the time as the assistant for strategic futures in the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformations. In this capacity, he has been giving his briefings regularly to the US Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community, and to high-ranking officers from all branches of the US armed forces. Barnett argues that the Iraq War marks ‘the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization’. He breaks the globe down into three distinct spatial regions. The first is characterized by ‘globalization thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security’, yielding nations featuring stable democratic governments, transparency, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than by murder (North America, most of Europe, Australia, New Zealand and a small part of Latin America). He calls these regions of the world the ‘Functioning Core’ or ‘Core’. Conversely, areas where ‘globalization is thinning or just plain absent’ constitute a region plagued by repressive political regimes, regulated markets, mass murder, and widespread poverty and disease (the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, the Middle East, and much of Southeast Asia). The breeding ground of ‘global terrorists’, Barnett refers to this region as the ‘Non-Integrating Gap’, or ‘Gap’. Between these two regions, one finds ‘seam states’ that ‘lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries’ (Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia). For Barnett, the importance of September 11 is that the attacks forced the United States and its allies to make a long-term military commitment to ‘deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment’. In other words, the desired spread of globalization requires a War on Terror. Its three main objectives are: ‘1) Increase the Core’s immune system capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations; 2) Work on the seam states to firewall the Core from the Gap’s worst Intro-Vol-4 <xxvi>  Introduction xxvii exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most important, 3) Shrink the Gap . . . The Middle East is the perfect place to start’. The third point is particularly important, because ‘the real battlegrounds in the global war on terrorism are still over there’. As Barnett emphasizes, ‘We ignore the Gap’s existence at our own peril, because it will not go away until we as a nation respond to the challenge of making globalization truly global’.68 This celebration of globalization in American nationalist terminology invites the kind of conceptual contradiction that may eventually prove to be fatal to the ‘imperial’ twist on market globalism. On the other hand, if the political issues of our time indeed call for an ideology that boldly arranges seemingly conflicting articles of various conventional political belief systems around the novel concept ‘globalization’, then globalism might actually achieve a level of ideological dominance unprecedented in history. While Islamism, nationalist populism, new forms of global egalitarianism and other competing thought-systems appear to make the prospect of market globalism’s undisputed hegemony highly unlikely, their unrelenting focus on countering the claims of their ideological nemesis highlights its abiding semantic and political power. Conclusion Ideologies of globalization are neither consistent within a particular political perspective nor across the ideological spectrum. However, we have argued that they make up an ideological family which, despite continuing points of contestation, has become naturalized within an emergent global imaginary, which, in turn, is anchored in deeply embedded ontologies. We contend that there is an emerging and increasingly dominant sense that different social categories in the world including ‘the person’ and ‘the nation’ exist most obviously in a social whole called ‘planet earth’, ‘the world’ or ‘the globe’. This global imaginary remains in continuing intersection with prior dominant imaginaries such as ‘the national’ and ‘the sacred order of things’, but it is coming slowly to reframe them. This is not to suggest, as Amitai Etzioni argues, that we are seeing an ‘emerging global normative synthesis’.69 Our point is much simpler and less utopian. Normative contestations continue, but they tend to have a common implicit point of reference – the global. Beyond that, we suggest that different globalisms gain part of their power to the extent that they draw on deeper taken-for-granted and dominant modern notions of time, space, embodiment and so. Again, this is not to suggest a homogenizing modernism. Older traditional and tribal ontological formations continue to ground the lives of many people and a postmodern layer of temporality- spatiality has recently emerged. Thus, while it is accurate to say that ‘the modern’ – read and reinterpreted through the lenses of globalization as both an objective and a subjective set of social processes – provides the dominant social frame through which across the globe people make sense of their complex lives, this is hardly a satisfactory description of the world today. A fuller understanding requires, among other things, a sense of the intersection of ideologies and imaginaries as they play across the complexities of intersecting formations from the tribal to the postmodern. Intro-Vol-4 <xxvii>  xxviii Introduction Notes 1. See Paul Gilroy, ‘When Ignorant Armies Clash at Night: Homogenous Community and the Planetary Aspect’, International Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 261–76 (reproduced in the present volume). 2. The phrase comes William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980), writing about the United States. On the racial dimension in the relation between empire and civilization see Paul Gilroy, ‘When Ignorant Armies Clash at Night: Homogenous Community and the Planetary Aspect’, International Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 261–76, reproduced in the present volume. 3. Denis Cosgrove, ‘Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 852–70, reproduced in the present volume. The ‘Family of Man’ was a photographic exhibition first displayed at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, in 1955. It comprised photographs of the human condition from 68 countries. It toured the world for eight years. 4. See Set 4 in the current series, Globalization and the Political: Volume 2: Globalizing Movements and Global Civil Society (forthcoming). 5. This argument was first developed in Manfred B. Steger, Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 3rd Edn 2009. Significantly, this third edition of Globalism presents a broader framework than the first edition (2002) which as its subtitle suggested (The New Market Ideology) had previously equated globalism with the Anglo-American free-trade doctrine. This rethinking was further developed in Steger’s The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 6. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defence of Globalization, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 35. 7. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2005, p. 4. 8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, W.W. Norton, New York, 2002, p. 9. 9. Colin Hines, Localization: A Global Manifesto, Earthscan, London, 2000. For a book which does not succumb to this tension, see Tim O’Riordan, ed., Globalism, Localism and Identity, Earthscan, London, 2001. 10. John Ralston Saul, ‘The Collapse of Globalism: And the Rebirth of Nationalism’, Harpers Magazine, March 2004, pp. 33–43, republished in the present volume. See also his The Collapse of Globalism, and the Reinvention of the World, Overlook Press, Woodstock, 2005. 11. At least one of the concepts, ideology, is understood as an ‘essentially contested concept’. The phrase, attributed to Walter Bryce Gallie writing in the 1950s, refers to open-ended and normatively-charged notions in general use such as ‘democracy’, ‘art’, ‘justice’, and ‘ideology’, where there is general agreement about their salience, but deep contention about the realized meaning and conceptual boundaries of the term. 12. On the debates in this area see for example, Jorg Lorrain, The Concept of Ideology, Hutchison, London, 1979; John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1984; David McLellan, Ideology, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2nd Edn 1995; Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. 13. Cited from www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/24/obama.words/index.html, accessed 23 April 2009. 14. These are terms employed by Freeden in Ideology, p. 98. 15. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, pp. 86–7. 16. Freeden, Ideology, p. 5. 17. See Jonathan Friedman, ‘Americans Again, or the New Age of Imperial Reason? Global Elite Formation, its Identity and Ideological Discourses’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 17, no. 1, 2000, pp. 139–46 (reproduced in the present volume) and Robin Broad, ‘The Intro-Vol-4 <xxviii>  Introduction xxix Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash’, Globalizations, vol. 1, no. 2 2004, pp. 129–54 (also reproduced in the present volume). 18. Bai Gao, ‘Globalization and Ideology: The Competing Images of the Contemporary Japanese Economic System in the 1990s’, International Sociology, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 437 (reproduced in the present volume). Ironically the global financial crisis of 2008–09 has given rise to a convergence on these themes. 19. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Globalism, Ideology and Traditions’, Thesis 11, no 63, 2000, p. 2 (reproduced in the present volume). 20. W. J. Clinton, ‘Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy’, San Francisco, 26 February 1999, <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gove.us/ 1999/3/1/3.text.1.html>. 21. M. Villar, Jr., ‘High-Level Dialogue on the Theme of the Social and Economic Impact of Globalization and Interdependence and their Policy Implications’, New York, 17 September 1998, <http://www.un.int/philippines/ villar.html>. 22. J. Gray and S. Roach, cited in ‘Is it at risk? – Globalisation’, The Economist, 2 February 2002, p. 65. 23. R. J. Samuelson, ‘Globalization Goes to War’, Newsweek, 24 February 2003, p. 41. 24. C. Shays, ‘Free Markets and Fighting Terrorism’, Washington Times, 10 June 2003. 25. Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Competitiveness’, speech in Flint, Michigan, 16 June 2008, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama- Speeches.ask (last accessed 7 June 2009). 26. Barack Obama, ‘Renewing US Leadership in the Americas’, speech in Miami Florida, 23 May 2008, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama- Speeches.ask (accessed 1 June 2009). 27. Peter H. Raven, ‘Science, Sustainability, and the Human Prospect’, Science, vol. 297. no. 5583, 2002, pp. 954–8. 28. International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, ILO, Geneva, 2008, p. 5. 29. Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 197. He is quoted here without necessarily accepting the position that frames his approach. 30. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke University Press, Durham, 2004, p. 23. 31. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, interviewed by Women’s Own magazine, 31 October 1987. 32. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Constitution of Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991. 33. See the discussion of Castoriadis in Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, ch. 1. 34. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 53. 35. Katherine N. Rankin, ‘Anthropologies and Geographies of Globalization’, Progress in Human Geography, vol. 27, no. 6, 2003, p. 715. 36. This finds an intersection without being the same as the Gramscian notion of ‘cultural hegemony’. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), International Publishers, New York, (1929–1935) 1978. 37. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006. 38. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Hybrid Modernities: Mélange Modernities in Asia’, Sociological Analysis, vol. 1, no. 3, 1998, pp. 75–86 (reproduced in this volume). 39. See Gerry Gill, ‘Landscape as Symbolic Form: remembering Thick Place in Deep Time’, Critical Horizons, vol. 3, no. 2, 2002, pp. 177–99, for a discussion of different dominant sensibilities of space in relation to Heidegger’s distinction between ‘world’, ‘earth’ and different ontologically framed ‘worldviews’. 40. Holland Herald, May 2002. Intro-Vol-4 <xxix>  xxx Introduction 41. Front-page stories about the race between Google, Microsoft and Yahoo to transform two-dimensional on-line maps into global browser-systems started to come out in late 2005. See for example, Technology Review, October 2005. 42. Postmodern time, including the time of relativity and quantum physics does not move in this way. According to Einsteinian relativity, for example, it moves in relation to the speed of the participant through space. 43. Where New York, May 2005. 44. As found in an Oxford English Dictionary project ‘English Corpus’, Australian, 23 June 2006. 45. See Ruqaiya Hasan, ‘Globalization, Literacy and Ideology’, World Englishes, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 433–48 (reproduced in the present volume). 46. The levels approach touched upon here is the subject of Paul James’s, Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism, Sage Publications, London, 2006. 47. Customary tribalism is defined by the dominance of particular socially-specific modalities of space, time, embodiment, and knowing that can be characterized by analogical, genealogical and mythological practices and subjectivities. This, for example, would include notions of genealogical placement, the importance of mythological time connecting past and present, and the centrality of relations of embodied reciprocity. 48. For example, whereas Lyotard reduces the definition of postmodernism to one of the modes of being – that is, knowledge or epistemology, with postmodernism being used to describe a condition of knowledge that is incredulous about grand narratives (Jean- François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) – the present approach defines postmodernism as an ontological formation formed in the systematic abstraction of all categories of being, including knowledge. Similarly, whereas Fredric Jameson defines postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism – with capitalism understood as a mode of production (Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London, 1991) – the present approach does not reduce the definition of an ontological formation to a single determinative mode of practice from which all else follows. 49. Robert Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order’, International Organization, vol. 33, no. 2, 1979, pp. 357–402 (reproduced in the present volume). 50. See A. Wolfson, ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’, The Public Interest, Winter, 2004, <http://www.the publicinterest.com/current/article2.html>. See also M. Lind, ‘A Tragedy of Errors’, The Nation, 23 February 2004, pp. 23–32. 51. For many more textual examples of these core claims see Manfred Steger, ‘From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American Power After 9/11’, Globalizations, vol. 2, no.1, 2005, pp. 31–46 (reproduced in the present volume). 52. Business Week, 13 December 1999, p. 212. 53. W. Bole, ‘Tales of Globalization’, America, vol. 18, no. 4, 1999, pp. 14–16. 54. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1999, p. 9. 55. Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005. 56. George W. Bush, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’, 2002, <http:// www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html>. 57. Barack Obama, ‘Knox College Commencement’, speech in Galesburg, Illinois, 4 June 2005, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama- Speeches.ask, accessed 20 May 2009. 58. Economic Communiqué, Lyon G7 Summit, 28 June 1996, <http:// library.utoronto.ca/ www/g7/96ecopre.html>. 59. http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique- 020409 accessed, 7 June 2009. 60. ‘Economic Globalization and Culture: A Discussion with Dr Francis Fukuyama’, http:// www.ml.com/woml/forum/global2.html>. Intro-Vol-4 <xxx>  Introduction xxxi 61. H. Rodham Clinton, ‘Growth of Democracy in Eastern Europe’, Speech in Warsaw, 5 October 1999, <http:/www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/First Lady/html/ generalspeeches/1999/19991005.html>. 62. W. I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 56–62. 63. George W. Bush, ‘Securing Freedom’s Triumph’, New York Times, 11 September 2002. 64. George W. Bush, Transcript of Address in London on Iraq and the Middle East, New York Times, 19 November 2003. 65. R. McFarlane and M. Bleyzer, ‘Taking Iraq Private’, Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2003. 66. See, for example, Serge Latouche, The Westernization of the World, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996; and George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life, Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, 1993. 67. T. P. M. 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