Bad Ecumenism: The American Culture Wars and Russia’s Hard Right Turn
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Abstract
This article examines the rise of a "right-wing international" around contemporary Russia through the lens of the concept of "bad ecumenism," explored in conjunction with the author's philosophical views and personal experience of Orthodox-Protestant interaction. In contrast to "good ecumenism," which, broadly defined, seeks interconfessional dialogue and cooperation toward the common good in our pluralist world, bad ecumenism seeks interconfessional dialogue and collaborative efforts with the goal of dominating and coercing individuals and social groups that do not conform to so-called "traditional values." Hence Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, dubs hardline American Evangelical Franklin Graham and other Western Christians who oppose LGBTQ rights "confessors of the faith," and Graham is happy to receive his blessing. This works in part because the history of the US Christian Right is bound up with anti-Communism and an equation of secularism with Communism. Russian actors are now playing into this narrative, insisting that because they survived Communism, they can help US and European Christians resist the "new totalitarianism" of so-called "political correctness."
Key takeaways
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- Bad ecumenism facilitates right-wing collaboration between American religious conservatives and Russian Orthodox leaders.
- The concept contrasts sharply with good ecumenism, which aims for interfaith cooperation for the common good.
- Shared anti-LGBTQ animus unites conservative factions in the US and Russia amidst rising cultural tensions.
- American evangelical involvement in Russia contributed to exporting US culture wars post-Soviet Union.
- The article reflects on the author's personal experiences within fundamentalist evangelicalism and critiques its political implications.
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