War and violence

Basic, Goran (2018) ”Definicije počinitelja ratnog nasilja i žrtve: Sociološka analiza nasilja u koncentracijskim logorima za vrijeme rata u Bosni i Hercegovini” (Definitions of the perpetrator of war violence and the victim: Sociological analysis of violence in concentration camp during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Proceedings of the Faculty of
Law in Tuzla, 4(2): 44-73, http://pf.untz.ba/dokumenti/casopisi/2018-2/3.pdf .

In Croatian:
Ovaj članak analizira prepričana iskustva bivših logoraša koji su kao civili odvedeni u koncentracijske logore početkom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990-ih godina. Cilj je članka analizirati priče o ratnom nasilju u koncentracijskim logorima i identificirati kako se počinitelji ratnog nasilja i žrtve simbolično definiraju u pričama. Priče o nasilju u logoru definiraju počinitelja nasilja kao nekoga tko je opasan, zao, idealan neprijatelj, kao pravi ali udaljeni zločinac. Kad ispitanici u studiji naglašavaju istrebljenje i sustavnost ratnog nasilja u logorima tijekom rata, oni produciraju i reproduciraju sliku nasilja koje je organizirano i koje se provodi svakodnevno. Čini se da je cilj toga verbalnog isticanja da opisana djela nasilja u logorima poslije rata dobiju status organiziranog ratnog zločina – genocida. Definiranjem počinitelja ratnog nasilja ispitanici u studiji implicitno ističu komplementarnu suprotnost počinitelja – žrtvu nasilja. Žrtva je predstavljena kao prijeratni poznanik, prijatelji i susjed izvršitelja nasilja. Žrtva nasilja definirana je kao umorna, posustala u agoniji, kao inferiorna, dehumanizirana, žigosana i kao bespomoćna, ostavljena na milost i nemilost počiniteljima ratnog nasilja. Svođenje ljudi samo na jedan primarni (ubojit) kolektivni identitet, postoji na svakom mjestu gdje se „etnički identitet“ ljudi smatra važnijim od njihova osobnog, individualnog, građanskog, profesionalnog ljudskog identiteta. Spajanje etnonacionalnih identiteta u potpuno homogeni, masovni, jedinstveni kolektivni identitet, a koji se znatno ili (potpuno) razlikuje od nekih drugih – savršeno odgovara reprodukciji i stvaranju novih oblika nasilja.

In English:
This article analyzes the experiences retold by former concentration camp detainees who were placed in  concentration camps like civilians at the beginning of the Bosnian war in the 1990s. The article aims to analyze the narratives of war violence in concentration camp as well as identifying how the perpetrators of war violence and victims are symbolically defined in stories. In these descriptions, the perpetrator is defined as a dangerous, evil, and ideal enemy. He is portrayed as a real and powerful yet alien criminal. When informants emphasize extermination and the systematization of war violence in the camps during the war, they produce and reproduce the image of violence that is organized and conducted on a daily basis. The aim of this verbalb emphasis seems to be that the described acts of violence in the camps, after the war obtain the status of an organized war violence - genocide. By defining the perpetrators of war violence, the interviewed in the study implicitly point out the complementary opposition of the perpetrator - a victim of violence. The victim is presented as pre-war acquaintance, friends and neighbors of the perpetrators of violence. Victim of violence is defined as tired, dying in agony, inferior, de-humanized, stamped and helplessly left to the mercy of the perpetrators of war violence. Leading people to only one primary (deadly) collective identity exists at every place where the “ethnic identity” of people is considered more important than their personal, individual, civic, professional human identity. The merging of ethnonational identities into a completely homogeneous, massive, unique collective identity, which is substantially or (totally) different from some others - perfectly matches reproduction and the creation of new forms of violence.

Hoy más que nunca se asiste a la emergencia de diversas formaciones comunitarias que expresan radicalidades polimorfas y tensiones beligerantes, en medio de las seculares ilusiones comunitarias que invocan nuevas composiciones de “lo común” y lo social.
Este libro indaga sobre las condiciones agonísticas ancestrales en las conformaciones del sí-mismo, el otro y el nosotros, para hacer visibles núcleos vitales que permiten entablar una crítica de esas ilusiones.
Desde la conformación de hordas bélicas en estadios de sociabilidad atávicos, hasta el problema de las fundaciones catastróficas y sangrientas de la civilizada Roma Imperial, pasando por los contextos de las sociedades de guerra y sin Estado en Latinoamérica, este texto desarrolla el concepto de “diferenciante primario” como potencia singular de conformación social.
Se trata de una alteridad no considerada hasta ahora, que permea de manera definitiva a toda articulación comunitaria en tanto la obliga a oscilar entre la solidaridad y la beligerancia. Se descubren así dos auténticos polos de sentido originarios que se encontrarían en el corazón de toda formación colectiva y conducen a reformular los clamores por nuevas formas de organización política.

Donald Trump regrets the use of the word Crusade in his recent visit to the UK and France in remembering the soldiers of World War 2. He shudders and trembles at night at the thought of Bush and Blair going to war in Afghanistan and Iraq; Bush and Blair destroyed the cradle of civilization. Donald Trump firmly believes that the concepts of Diversity, Pluralism and One Humanity are strengths and not weaknesses. He now firmly believes that Populism, and Nationalism will bring about another Great War. And that allegiance to the United Nations, to a One Earth Nation is the best way toward Global Peace, Freedom, Liberty…where the rights of each and every Earth Citizen will be protected by a Charter of Rights… where the secular law will be applied equally and fairly to each and every Earth Citizen… Donald Trump was inspired by Imam Karim al Husseini's speech to the Canadian Parliament on 20140227

The Blood of Others begins at the bedside of a mortally wounded Résistance fighter named Hélène Bertrand. We encounter her from the point of view of Jean Blomart, her friend and lover, who recounts the story of their relationship : their first meeting, unhappy romance, bitter breakup, and eventual reunion as fellow fighters for the liberation of occupied France. The novel invites the reader to interpret Hélène and Jean’s story as one of positive ethical development. On this progressive reading, although both characters are initially mired in bad faith and ethical irresponsibility, they ultimately transform themselves into ethically exemplary figures. Through their participation in violent political resistance against the occupation, they recognize their responsibility to humanity and actualize that responsibility in the form of positive political engagement. I will argue, on the contrary, that Jean and Hélène exhibit a unique form of bad faith that Beauvoir identifies in The Ethics of Ambiguity, a dangerous form of bad faith, distinct from the Sartrean conception, that promotes the indiscriminate use of violence for political ends.

A number of Western countries such as the United States, Britain and France have been waging war continuously since the ‘terrorist’ attacks of 11 September 2001. Although these wars have resulted in a massive loss of life, only a few scholars have tried to understand the determinants and motives behind this violence. This article aims to shed some light on this blind spot by studying the interpretive ‘frames’ (Judith Butler) that mediate the Western military’s relation to violence. It does so by relying on a qualitative inquiry with the French airmen who bombed Afghanistan (2001– 2011), Libya (2011) and Mali (2013). The article argues that the classical explanation in terms of ‘de-humanization’ is only partially heuristic. Indeed, airmen sometimes see the human ‘face’ – in Levinas’ term – of the people they kill, and these moments of ‘recognition’ do not alter their will to wage war and drop bombs. I explain this apparent paradox by relying on Eyal Weizman’s notion of ‘humanitarian violence’.

In this chapter, we will shed light on how tbe Islamic State visually  presents its fight against the material representations of what it identifies as idolatry. We argue that the spectacular destruction of these objects, their visualizations, and the visual testimonies of these acts of iconoclasm are key parts of the Islamic State's strategy to bring about fundamental social change. The destruction of visual representations is a historically established and well-known means of displaying the transition from one dominion to another. Nevertheless, we argue that the Islamic State's particular commitment to visually staging its iconoclasm is unprecedented. We will furthennore show that the Islamic State does not content itself to merely remove idolatrous representations, but rather seeks to capture these moments in pictures in order to produce and perpetuate visual memories of the destruction and of the resulting empty spaces.

At least three trends mark the terrain of Christian peace studies in the Anglophone world in recent years: a renewed debate about the place of active nonviolence and the just war tradition in Catholic social teaching, the rise of restorative justice in efforts to reconcile after violence, and a turn toward indigenous peace practices for resolving local conflicts. These three trends reflect robust dialogue amongst Christian scholars, working across disciplines, to engender greater peace and justice in the world today.

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This class examines radical Jihadi discourse in both conceptual and comparative terms. As such, the class does not focus on the formation or trajectory of a specific Jihadi group or movement, but takes the general themes of Jihadi groups and movements and compares them to the general themes of radical groups and movements of other religious, ideological, or political leanings. The point of such a comparative analysis is to underscore the fact that radical Islamic justifications for violence and monstrosity are not unique only to the Islamic context. Rather, these justifications reflect broader, more universal and ubiquitous themes. In fact, the readings in this class shed light on different religious and secular (political) groups and movements that share the general themes and rationale for violence that are found in radical Islamic (Jihadi or Jihadist) groups and movements. As such, students in this class will come to appreciate the common overarching themes in radical Jewish and Christian groups, radical secular groups such as Nazi and Neo-Nazi groups, and even common themes in international conventions such as the Just War Doctrine.


In making sense of the commonalities of themes in ideologically and contextually different groups and movements, the readings in this class engage in a conceptual analysis of the themes and rationale for violence that are universal and ubiquitous. As such, the students come to appreciate the significance of notions such as ‘construction of evil’, ‘demonization’, ‘Divine justifications’ and ‘divinity’ at large; as well as notions such as ‘necessity’, ‘morality’, and ‘duty’.
In understanding of the significance and centrality of these notions in the justifying rhetoric of all radical groups and movements (beyond just Jihadi group and movements), students will come understand how these notions are used to pacify moral objections to violence on the part of both the recruited as well as the audiences (bystanders) of radical groups and movements. Through such a conceptual analysis, the class thus offers a broad look at the rationale and dynamics that lead to the perpetuation and normalization of violence worldwide, as well as to the rationale of Jihadist Strategic Thought and Practice.

High levels of violence against civilians should be considered a "default setting," not an aberration. Yet, why do some military and rebel groups commit many types of violence, creating senseless chaos, whereas others carefully control violence against civilians?

A classic catch-22 faces the leaders of armed groups and provides the title for Amelia Hoover Green’s book. Leaders need large groups of people willing to kill and maim—but to do so only under strict control. How can commanders control violence when fighters who are not under direct supervision experience extraordinary stress, fear, and anger? The Commander’s Dilemma argues that discipline is not enough in wartime. Restraint occurs when fighters know why they are fighting and believe in the cause—that is, when commanders invest in political education.

Drawing on extraordinary evidence about state and nonstate groups in El Salvador, and extending her argument to the Mano River wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Amelia Hoover Green shows that investments in political education can improve human rights outcomes even where rational incentives for restraint are weak—and that groups whose fighters lack a sense of purpose may engage in massive violence even where incentives for restraint are strong.

Table of contents :

The Commander’s Dilemma......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
List of Tables and Figures......Page 10
Acknowledgments......Page 12
List of Abbreviations......Page 14
Introduction: Repertoires and Restraint......Page 18
1. The Commander’s Dilemma......Page 42
2. Civil War in El Salvador......Page 76
3. Comparing State and FMLN Institutions and Ideologies......Page 96
4. Institutions, Ideologies, and Combatant Experiences in FMLN Factions......Page 126
5. Violence and Restraint in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–92......Page 148
6. The Commander’s Dilemma beyond El Salvador......Page 187
Conclusion: Policies for Restraint......Page 217
Appendix......Page 234
Notes......Page 244
Works Cited......Page 248
Index......Page 266

En las últimas tres décadas un fenómeno ha sido presa en la sociedad
mexicana: la desaparición forzada en sus diversas manifestaciones. En
un marco general de violencia extrema, hemos sido testigos del proceso
de revictimización de luchadores sociales, estudiantes, defensores de derechos humanos y activistas transnacionales mediante la pedagogía de terror que implica la desaparición forzada. La desaparición de 43 estudiantes de la Escuela Normal Rural Raúl Isidro Burgos ubicada en el municipio de Ayotzinapa (Guerrero, México), fue el evento histórico que visibilizó la máxima expresión de la crisis social e institucional durante el régimen de la Presidencia de Enrique Peña Nieto.
Un evento histórico que puso en debate el sujeto de la desaparición forzada, las fosas clandestinas, la crisis de los dispositivos de justicia jurídica, las políticas de seguridad nacional, el aumento de actores militares en los espacios públicos, y la emergencia de una sociedad civil que exige la aparición con vida de sus familiares.
Al respecto, hemos conversado con la antropóloga feminista Descolonial Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo para abordar la situación actual de las víctimas de desaparición forzada, y la organización de la sociedad civil como respuesta a la impunidad y el vacío institucional con relación a esta nueva economía de terror y de miedo que produce el secuestro como característica del narco estado mexicano.

In this paper I argue that Lucan's portrayal of Julius Caesar as a supernatural force of evil (Narducci 2002; Masters 1992; Marti 1945) that surpasses the boundaries of human possibilities is key to understanding the meaning of book 10 of the De Bello Civili, as well as the overall meaning of the poem.           
            In book 1, Lucan announces that great things come crashing upon themselves (in se magna ruunt): it is a destiny shared by all, from Marius and Sulla to Pompey the Great, who went from glorious victories on the battlefield to resembling an old oak. Only Caesar appears to be immune to this universal law: since his crossing of the Rubicon against the will of divinized Roma, Lucan has granted Caesar an almost omnipotent power (Henderson 20102). Episodes like Ilerda in book 4, where Caesar is said to recognize the favor of Fortune and heaven in his military and moral triumph; or like the storm of the Adriatic in book 5, where he hybristically challenges the gods and nature and yet suffers no harm; or like Pharsalus in book 7, where he dares to banquet among the corpses of his fellow-citizens without paying a price for his unprecedented impiety, all seem to corroborate the view that Caesar can do anything he wishes. Book 3 offers perhaps the most excellent example of this: Caesar cuts down a grove sacred to Druidic gods and explicitly states that he has committed a nefarious deed (... me fecisse nefas). As Keith has convincingly argued, Lucan resorts to subtle intertextual allusions to recall the impiety of Ovid's Erysichthon and Narcissus in this episode. And yet, no Ovidian nemesis strikes Caesar down. In other words, Caesar persistently contributes to creating the very subject-matter of Lucan's poem, the nefas of civil war, but never incurs a punishment. Stover, Ahl and others, who think that the poem is unfinished, believe that Lucan might have eventually portrayed the Ides of March in terms of a divine nemesis against the Roman tyrant.
            However, I believe that Caesar's punishment occurs within the boundaries of the poem as we have it, making book 10 an ideal endpoint for Lucan's epic. At the beginning of book 10, Lucan unexpectedly divests Caesar of his quasi-Jovian power and turns him into a man full of fear. Later on, after Pothinus' troops surround the palace of Alexandria, Caesar is even compared to a child (puer) and a woman (femina). This characterization of Caesar is unique not only if we compare it with that of the preceding nine books of Lucan's De Bello Civili, but also if we compare it with that of all extant historical sources (including Caesar's own commentarius). Towards the end of book 10, Caesar is paralyzed: he cannot act anymore, and he cannot even think clearly. For the first time, then, he is completely unable to create nefas. This, I believe, is an excellent endpoint for Lucan's narrative, because it allows the poet to recall the end of Caesar's own version of the civil war and to avoid recounting the far worse nefas of Caesar's final suppression of the Republic (cf. Tracy 2011).
            Against the wicked will of heaven and Fortune, who have elevated men like Caesar to the rank of the superi, it is the poet himself who chooses to put an end to the nefas he has recounted down to book 10. Thus, Lucan grants supernatural proportions to the character of Caesar only in order to strike him down most vehemently at the end: even the ultimate maker of nefas must eventually crash down upon himself. So does also Lucan's poem, an inmensum opus subject to the very destiny of his protagonists.

This article presents an Early Byzantine lamellar armour, retrieved in the excavations at the quarter built over the Roman Theatre of Cartagena. The armour has close parallels with contemporary known material from the central and eastern Mediterranean or other sites, and it is an important find which increases the body of archeological evidence about Byzantine presence in Spania.
GLADIUS
Estudios sobre armas antiguas, arte militar
y vida cultural en oriente y occidente
XXVIII (2008), pp. 195-210
ISSN: 0436-029X