Philosophy of Psychoanalysis

This paper addresses the Freudian phylogenetic hypothesis, i.e., the thesis that the intelligibility of the psychic functioning requires the assumption of the hereditary transmission of memory traces. It aims to seize: 1- the content of this hypothesis, 2- some of the problems produced by it, 3- its meaning regarding the questions aroused by it, 4- its philosophical status. Those elements will allow us, in the second part of the paper, to endeavor a reading of the way Lacan would treat, by his turn, the tension between universality and singularity in fantasy. It will be argued that, for Lacan, contrary to Freud, what is universal in fantasy is not derived from contingency, but it does not come either from metaphysics because it is restricted to the conditions of the relationship between subject and language.

Resumo

Em meio a uma discussão sobre a localização cerebral dos fenômenos psicológicos, Freud propõe em 1891, em seu trabalho sobre as afasias, a chamada hipótese do "concomitante dependente". Segundo esta hipótese, atribuída pelo autor ao neurologista John Hughlings Jackson, os estados mentais serão considerados como distintos, não redutíveis e paralelos aos processos cerebrais, não havendo relação causal entre ambos. Entendendo que estes princípios constituem uma resposta possível ao problema mente-corpo, nosso objetivo neste artigo será situar a posição assumida por Freud no interior deste debate filosófico durante a segunda metade do século XIX. Para tal, nosso trabalho será dividido em três partes: em um primeiro momento 1) abordaremos alguns antecedentes deste debate nos dedicando ao estudo da noção de psiquismo durante as primeiras décadas do século XIX. Na sequência, considerando a emergência e a consolidação do paradigma monista e materialista a partir dos anos 1820, 2) discutiremos o surgimento de duas posições distintas, o localizacionismo e o funcionalismo. Por fim, nos aprofundando na segunda destas posições, dita funcionalista, 3) buscaremos demonstrar o vínculo da hipótese freudiana a uma determinada tradição neurológica de língua inglesa, em grande medida orientada pelos trabalhos do filósofo escocês Alexander Bain.

Paravras-chave: História da psicanálise; Problema mente-corpo; Filosofia da mente; Recepção filosófica da psicanálise.

Abstract

In the midst of a discussion on the cerebral location of psychological phenomena, Freud proposes in his work on aphasia (1891) the so-called "dependent concomitant" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, attributed by the author to the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson, mental states will be considered as distinct, not reducible and parallel to brain processes, with no causal relationship between them. Understanding that these principles constitute a possible response to the mind-body problem, our objective in this article will be to situate the position assumed by Freud within this philosophical debate during the second half of the nineteenth century. To this end, our work will be divided into three parts: first 1) we will approach some antecedents of this debate by focusing on the study of the notion of psychism during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Next, considering the emergence and consolidation of the monist and materialist paradigm from the 1820s, 2) we will discuss the emergence of two distinct positions, localizationism and functionalism. Finally, deepening in the second of these positions, the so-called functionalist, 3) we will seek to demonstrate the link of the Freudian hypothesis to a certain neurological tradition of the English language, largely guided by the works of the Scottish philosopher Alexander Bain.

Keywords: History of psychoanalysis; Mind-body problem; Philosophy of mind; Philosophical reception of psychoanalysis.

Resumo: O objetivo do presente artigo é fazer ver o caráter de Dioniso tal como subjaz às suas formulações, por Nietzsche, no início e ao final de seu percurso filosófico. Seria o mesmo Dioniso, já que o filósofo lança mão do mesmo termo? Seria outro, pois não é bem a mesma "intuição artística", como em O nascimento da tragédia, que se tem ao final, tratando-se ali de uma "psicologia do estado dionisíaco"? Seriam então excludentes o artístico de sua obra de estreia e o psicológico dos escritos de 1888? Mas em que medida não serão ambos um mesmo dispositivo linguístico com outro estofo? Até que ponto esse diferente estofo não modificará o que se pode entender pelo traço característico inicial? Para tanto vai-se abordar (a) a presença resiliente de Dioniso em seu percurso intelectual, mesmo em seus momentos de baixa vitalidade; (b) o sentido da retomada de Dioniso; (c) o estatuto de Dioniso em seu filosofar (como pathos); (d) o modus operandi de Dioniso; (e) o estofo pulsional de Dioniso retomado. Palavras-chave: Dioniso, intuição, impulsos, psicologia, protagonização. Abstract: The purpose of this article is to show the main feature of Dionysus-or of dionysiac-presented at the formulations of the theme, by Nietzsche, at the beginning and at the end of Nietzschean philosophical pathway. Would it be the very same Dionysus, since the philosopher uses the same term? Would it be another Dionysus, since it is not the same "artistic intuition", as in The Birth of Tragedy, that will appear at the end of the pathway, but a "psychology of Dionysian state"? Could it be a mutual exclusion between the artistic element of his first book and the psychological element of the texts of 1888? To what extent is the same Dionysus and another one, to what extent the different stuff of each other will not modify the essential feature that was present at the beginning? For this purpose, we will address (a) the resilient presence of Dionysus in Nietzsche´s philosophical pathway, even in his moments of decrease of vitality; (b) the meaning of the resumption of Dionysus; (c) the statute of Dionysus at his philosophizing (as a pathos mode), (d) the modus operandi of Dionysus and (e) the pulsional stuff of a resumpted Dionysus.

O presente artigo deseja evidenciar a interpretação freudiana do drama trágico através dos conceitos e estratégias próprias à psicanálise. Ao evidenciar este movimento interpretativo, oferecemos algumas indicações conceituais sobre o que seria uma estética freudiana: seu modo de proceder, de analisar, de interpretar objetos artísticos. Para tal, traçamos brevemente algumas linhas diretrizes da poética aristotélica e evidenciamos a peculiaridade da análise de Freud sobre o drama trágico.
Palavras-chave: Filosofia da psicanálise. Estética freudiana. Tragédia e psicanálise.

Lacanian psychoanalysis cannot disregard its debts to philosophy, especially continental philosophy. Lacan's conception of language is derived from multiple philosophical sources (i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard) including Heidegger's philosophy of language and pride of place. Heidegger's view of language prepares the ground for reversing the relationship between language and human beings, overcoming common sense about language and the communicative model of language. Language is much more than a set of labels; it shapes the human world and structures social relations themselves. In addition, language acts as a social link. The function of language as a social link allows us to think of it in relation to the Law and the very function of this human subjectivity. In reference to the Other of the Law and language, the subject finds her recognition, and this implies that the language is not reducible to communication. The process of technical-scientific domination of Western institutions leads to a reduction of their functions to the formal aspects, which may lead to a reification of the human as well as a state of alienation.

'Un caso di nevrosi demoniaca nel  XVII secolo'  è un testo che Freud elabora a partire da un manoscritto ritrovato presso una vecchia abbazia. Si tratta delle confessioni del pittore Haitzmann e dei suoi incontri col demonio.
Dalle riflessioni cliniche di Freud si possono estrarre già delle interessanti questioni sul piano della diagnosi di struttura del soggetto, la quale non può essere effettuata a prescindere dal contesto storico. La struttura è la dimensione invariante, ma i contenuti che la abitano variano storicamente.
L'incontro col demonio nel XVII secolo può non essere determinato dal delirio di una struttura psicotica.

Merleau-Pontyho postoj k psychoanalýze byl dvojznačný. Na jedné straně si uvědomoval, že fenomény, jimiž se psychoanalýza zabývá, si žádají překročit oblast aktové intencionality a psychoanalýza tak z jiného úhlu míří na tentýž problém jako tvarová psychologie, jež hrála v Merleau-Pontyho filozofickém projektu ústřední roli. Na druhé straně explicitně odmítal pojmy, jimiž Freud své objevy popsal. Namísto nevědomých duševních obsahů, které působí na vědomé chování, navrhl Merleau-Ponty dosadit dvojznačné vědomí. Ve Struktuře chování a Fenomenologii vnímání pak pomocí pojmů zvyk, neupřímnost, tělesný výraz, afektivní intencionalita a tělesné schéma vypracovává, jakým způsobem máme této „dvojznačnosti“ zkušenosti rozumět. Tato stať si klade za cíl představit klíčové pojmy Merleau-Pontyho raného výkladu psychoanalytického pojmu nevědomí. Dílčím úkolem je ukázat, jak se Merleau-Pontyho pojem neupřímnosti liší od téhož pojmu Sartrova a odlišit existenciální dvojznačnost od psychoanalytického pojmu předeterminace.

Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of ​​act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.

Sigmund Freuds "Entwurf einer Psychologie" von 1895 wird hinsichtlich der Verschränkung von physikalisch-ökonomischen Modellen, auf der Ebene der damals bekannten Neurologie, mit narrativen Figuren, auf der Ebene der psychotherapeutischen Erfahrungen, analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Freud von seinem anfänglichen Unterfangen, psychologische Beobachtungen auf neuronale Strukturen zurückzuführen, im Verlauf des Textes immer weiter abrückt - zugunsten einer Treue zu den komplexen und bedeutsamen Erzählungen seiner Analysant:innen und in diesem Sinne einer Treue zur - immer wieder überraschenden - Empirie. Man könnte diese subtile Entwicklung innerhalb des Textes auf das gesamte Werk Freuds übertragen, denn auch dort sind es die erlebten Konfrontationen mit den Analysanden, die seinem Streben nach einer wissenschaftlichen Rationalisierung immer wieder entgegenstehen.
Gesamtes Buch als pdf hier: https://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/ubpb/urn/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-10734

Ausgehend von Finks Unterscheidung von operativen und thematischen Begriffen der Phänomenologie Husserls, sollen diese als methodische Herangehensweise an die Erarbeitung der Bedeutung des Begriffs des „Unbewussten“ bei Husserl fruchtbar gemacht werden. Dazu ist zunächst die phänomenologische Methode Husserls nachzuvollziehen, um einen „operativen Ort des Unbewussten“ im Unmerklichen der Aufmerksamkeit und der Naivität der natürlichen Einstellung aufzeigen zu können. Daran schließt sich der methodische Nachvollzug der Möglichkeit der Bewusstmachung des zuvor Unbewussten qua phänomenologischer Epoché und Reduktion an, wobei deren Voraussetzung und Vollzug ebenso auf die Problematik des Unbewussten hin befragt werden. Nach der operativen Thematisierung des Unbewussten in der Methodik Husserls werden dessen Analysen zur passiven Synthesis als thematische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unbewussten interpretiert, dabei deren formale Voraussetzung im unbewussten Urpozess der Zeitigung dargestellt werden sollen, von wo aus die inhaltliche Thematisierung des Unbewussten ermöglicht wird.

Ο Ιπποκράτης, ιδρυτής της επιστημονικής ιατρικής, όπως κι ο Φρόιντ, ιδρυτής της ψυχανάλυσης παρήγαγαν καινοτόμα έργα, δημιουργώντας μια νέα αντίληψη για τον άνθρωπο και την κλινική του προσέγγιση. Εφηύραν μεθόδους που διέπονται από βασικές αρχές όπως ο σεβασμός στη μοναδικότητα κάθε ατόμου, η θεώρησή του σαν ψυχοσωματική ενότητα και η σπουδαιότητα της θεραπευτικής σχέσης.

Through an engagement with the notions of metapsychology and the death drive as presented in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, this paper explores the significance and different dimensions of Freud’s trope of the ‘beyond’. Against readings that reduce it to a questioning of the dominance of the pleasure principle and the introduction of an opposing principle, the death drive, I propose to understand the ‘beyond’ as (1) the transcendental condition of possibility of psychic life and (2) the occasion to articulate a critique of violence, where violence is understood to entail the foreclosure or erasure of the ‘beyond’.

This thesis is an essayistic exploration into human self-alienation, of the split or strife between the 'inner' and the 'outer', or 'mind' and 'body'. Its central aim is to open up a perspective on the problem of the life of the mind, a perspective that suggests a shift in the understanding of this problem form a purely epistemological-ontological (or structural) to a radically moral-existential one.

The thesis begins with a certain idea of the mind-body problem, which is in turn identified as confused and unclear, but out of which a certain general logic and dynamic is distilled. It then moves on to analyse this logic and dynamic and develops a specific perspective on or understanding of it. Perhaps one might say that the ‘truth’ of the perspective that is opened up lies in the way in which it is able to guide us to a radically moral-existential horizon without losing touch with the general logic and dynamics from which it sets out.

One of the central claims that the thesis makes, through the perspective it attempts to open up, is that the ‘inner-outer’ split, or human self-alienation, concerns a moral-existential displacement of desire, and more specifically, a displaced desire for (social) affirmation. The rationale of this temptation or urge to displace desire, it is argued, lies in the way in which (social) affirmation phantasmatically manage to secure a (displaced or split) desire from the other. Moreover, it is in and in relation to this logic and dynamic of desire and affirmation that the ‘body’ or the ‘outer’ enters the picture and is identified as announcing itself as the object and instrument of displaced desire. ‘Body’ is disassociated form the soul or the ‘inner’ and its desire, or, alternatively, (mis)identified with it, and thus seen as somehow the cause of the ‘mind-body strife’, or, alternatively, seen as that which somehow necessarily veils the ‘real of the soul’.

The narrative of the thesis is structured along the following lines. It begins by identifying the contemporary naturalist ‘mind-body problem’. Distilling or deciphering out of this, so it is argued, confused problem a general logic and dynamic, the thesis moves on to discuss Francis Bacon’s, and more importantly, René Descartes’ epistemological outlook and mind-body dualism. Here the discussion centrally revolves around how Bacon’s and Descartes’ mind-body dualism and the associated mind-body strife binds together epistemology with ethics; their claim that the mind-body strife essentially concerns a ‘problem of the will’.

This discussion is followed by an extensive reflection on Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. The suggestion is that the Gorgias ties together the different themes and concerns that have emerged in relation to the discussion on the mind-body strifeand helps clarify issues that remains obscure in Descartes’ philosophy and, consequently, in contemporary naturalist philosophy of mind. It is also in connection to the reading of Gorgias that one of the central claims of the thesis is developed, namely that the mind-body strife is rooted in a displaced desire for social affirmation. In the final chapter, the central questions and concerns identified throughout the thesis are re-discussed, now with the question of meaning at the epicentre. Drawing on resources identified in both Plato and Wittgenstein, the chapter develops critical perspectives on what is termed the Augustinian-Cartesian picture of the soul and meaning, as well as on Jacques Lacan's theory of (decentred) subjectivity. The final chapter ends with a sketchy account of how the central claims developed in the thesis can be illustrated in terms of ‘examples’.

This is the thirteenth in a series of Jung-Lacan Dialogues aimed at fostering an engagement between two important and creative schools of psychoanalysis. What is the common ground between them? What are the intractable differences? Is it possible to find a common language or achieve mutual understandings? And what are the implications for clinical practice?

Che cos’è un fantasma? È un evento, un gesto che accade, un assemblaggio di circostanze che assume una transitoria consistenza – come l’oggetto luminoso alla cui ricerca va l’Alice di Lewis Carroll; il mana del pensiero magico di Marcel Mauss; l’odradek di Kafka o le scatole di oggetti di Joseph Cornell. È attraverso questi fantasmi che Federico Leoni rilegge il pensiero di Jacques Lacan nel suo ultimo libro “Jacques Lacan, una scienza di fantasmi” (Orthotes).