Martin Heidegger

The following papers were presented at the Deleuze Circle, October 9, 2015, which convened at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy’s annual meeting. Each Deleuze Circle meeting is organized around a specific text of Deleuze, and the presentations attempt to cover the work in its entirety. The hope is that participants can get a sense of the whole sufficient to propel their own work. This particular Deleuze Circle focused on Difference & Repetition. Our speakers were Henry Somers-Hall, Jay Lampert, Fredrika Spindler, and Len Lawlor. Henry, Jay, and Fredrika took chapters one through three respectively, and Len spoke about chapters four and five of Difference & Repetition. As moderator, I’d like to give a brief overview of each of the papers by shamelessly borrowing from Deleuze’s preface to Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

The aim of this article is to present a phenomenological framework for approaching the university. First, the article examines the main traits of the so-called Humboldtian model of the university, Karl Jaspers’ account of the idea of the university, and Jürgen Habermas’ contributions on this subject. This results in a discussion of the meaning of the ideality that underlies the subsequent arguments. This moment also compares normative and phenomenological accounts of the university. Second, the article proposes the concept of visibility as an interpretation key of the university. This visibility is presented as the result of the way coordinates of interpretation articulate meaning at several levels of phenomenological strata. Third, the article explores different ways subjects gain visibility at the university by means of a discussion of themes, such as the university extension and Brazil’s occupations of public universities in 2016. Finally, the article concludes by relating the concept of visibility with a phenomenological account of self-understanding.

Cet article montre que le différend qui oppose Adorno à Heidegger, loin de se réduire à une simple rivalité d'école, est de nature politique - si l'on entend par là non pas une stratégie de conquête du pouvoir, mais la nécessaire inscription critique, historique et sociale d'une pensée dans son époque -, et a pour enjeu fondamental le dépassement ou le sauvetage de la métaphysique. Ce différend se cristallise autour de la lecture de Hegel à la fin des années 1950 : là où Heidegger voit dans l'expérience hégélienne de la conscience le lieu d'un dévoilement de l'être, Adorno insiste au contraire sur la dimension irréductiblement dialectique et historique du concept d'expérience chez Hegel.

Hubert L. Dreyfus, on What Computers Can’t Do (1972), became the most prominent voice against the representational approach of the early days of artificial intelligence. Using heideggerian philosophy, Dreyfus pointed out that the mere predication of objects is insufficient to reproduce the kind of non-representational existence of a being-in-the-world. The test of time revealed the relevance of Dreyfus’ critique. Thus, the article will lay out the arguments of Dreyfus through two later works, namely, the book Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (1991) and the article Why Heideggerian Artificial Intelligence failed and how fixing it would require making it more Heideggerian (2007). The use of Dreyfus’ late work is justified because of the connection made between Heidegger and Walter Freeman, indicating an example of what a  heideggerian artificial intelligence could be against an representational one.

Heidegger fails to separate beings from artifacts. Equipment (Zeug) has no being as he claims. There are no hammer beings. Being or coming-into-being is through natural law, and therefore not traceable back to a human mind as are artifacts. If a being were tracible to the mind, the mind could generate it ex nihilio. Artifacts are concretized ideas, and are not born or hatched except metaphorically. Artifacts come out of the unnatural human theater, not from nature, and trace back to a mind that constructed them from combinations of artifacts such as a wooden table. Once disturbed such as a wooden plank, it is no longer a tree, but an artifact. Artifacts cause unnatural relationships between the human species and other beings such as bulldozers.

Includes essays by internationally noted scholars, ranging from David B. Allison to Slavoj Žižek, honour the interpretive contributions of William J. Richardson's pathbreaking Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The essays move from traditional phenomenology to the idea of essential (another) thinking, the questions of translation and existential expressions of the turn of Heidegger's thought, the intersection of politics and language, the philosophic significance of Jacques Lacan, and several essays on science and technology. All show the influence of Richardson's first study. A valuable emphasis appears in Richardson's interpretation of Heidegger's conception of die Irre, interpreted as Errancy, set in its current locus in a discussion of Heidegger's debacle with the political in his involvement with National Socialism.

Explores the accusation that Leo Strauss was some sort of "Jewish Nazi," arguing instead that Strauss is mistaken for a Nazi because his philosophy belongs to the broad "Conservative Revolutionary" intellectual movement of interwar Germany, which had common roots with National Socialism and thus bore a family resemblance to it.

Comments on a note in Martin Heidegger's papers quoting Julius Evola's Revolt Against the Modern World, explaining how Heidegger and Evola have similar philosophical, cultural, and political concerns but diametrically opposed philosophical frameworks.

In this article I will discuss the relationship between the Italian ethnologist Ernesto De Martino (1908-1965) and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). In particular, my aim is to argue against the thesis for which De Martino’s philosophical thought is largely inspired by Heidegger’s existential analytic, and consequentially point out the Demartinian criticism of some fundamental Heideggerian concepts (such as Miteinandersein, Man, Angst, Schuld, Unheimlichkeit, Eigentlichkeit, and Uneigentlichkeit).


Ernesto De Martino si è a lungo confrontato con il pensiero di Martin Heidegger, sia direttamente, sia attraverso i suoi più autorevoli commentatori italiani (Abbagnano, Paci e Pareyson). Diversi studi in ambito demartiniano si sono concentrati più sulle vicinanze tra lo studioso napoletano e il filosofo tedesco, attribuendo, forse senza la dovuta prudenza, diversi debiti che il primo avrebbe contratto nei confronti del secondo. D’altra parte, altrove sono state segnalate anche le differenze e la critica che De Martino, esplicitamente e implicitamente, ha mosso contro l’autore di Essere e tempo. In questa sede, tenterò di riprendere quest’ultimo percorso e mettere in luce quello che è stato un vero e proprio rovesciamento di alcune fondamentali nozioni dell’analitica heideggeriana promosso dalla riflessione demartiniana.

O termo "visão de mundo" (Weltanschauung) tem sua origem no interior da filosofia alemã, mais especificamente na Crítica da faculdade de julgar (1790) de Kant (1724-1804), sendo decisivo para a consolidação do "idealismo alemão". Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) faz uma apropriação desse termo. Tal apropriação, porém, acontece mediante a refundação do sentido próprio de "visão de mundo". Disso decorre o seguinte: há, por um lado, uma continuidade terminológica-Heidegger ainda utiliza o termo "visão de mundo"-, o que não acontece no modo de proceder, ou seja, por outro lado, há uma mudança metodológica e esta é decisiva para a apropriação do termo, bem como para a sua fundamentação e significação. Esse movimento de apropriação pode ser visto a partir de três preleções: A ideia da filosofia e o problema da visão de mundo (1919), Os problemas fundamentais da fenomenologia (1927) e Introdução à filosofia (1928/1929). O objetivo do presente artigo, então: investigar algumas indicações percebidas nos textos de Heidegger que conduzem esse movimento de apropriação, de modo a elucidar qual seja o caráter peculiar de sua apropriação. Realizando uma hermenêutica textual há de se perceber, por fim, que Heidegger retorna à tradição filosófica-à metafísica-com o propósito de dela se distanciar, mostrando que esse movimento de apropriação em relação ao termo "visão de mundo" permite também a colocação pela pergunta do sentido de ser.
ABSTRACT: The term "worldview" (Weltanschauung) has its origins within German philosophy, more specifically in "Critique of Judgment" (1790) by Kant (1724-1804) and it was decisive for the consolidation of "German idealism". Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) appropriated himself of this term. Such appropriation, however, may happen through the refoundation of the particular sense of "worldview". Thus, there is, on the one hand, a terminological continuity-Heidegger still uses the term "worldview"-which does not happen in the way of proceeding. On the other hand, there is a methodological change and this is decisive for the term appropriation as well as for its rationale and meaning. Three lectures allow us to see this movement of appropriation: "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of the Worldview" (1919), "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (1927) and "Introduction to Philosophy" (1928/1929). The purpose of this paper is to investigate some of the indications perceived in Heidegger's texts that drive this movement of appropriation in order to elucidate the peculiar nature of its appropriation. In order to perform a textual hermeneutic, it is noticeable that Heidegger returns to the philosophical tradition-the metaphysics-with the purpose of distancing it, showing that this movement of appropriation in relation to the term "worldview" also permits the placement by the question of the sense of being.