Hermeneutic Phenomenology

The concept of representation ideally serves as a guarantee that minority social identities be given genuine representation in a mainstream society that subscribes to “hegemonic practices of the ruling classes”. However, recognition remains a critical struggle for minorities who have limited capacity due to ostracism and other forms of marginalization based on positions of power.

This study tackles the phenomenon of the assertion of identity and navigation of representation. It examines the experiences of the Badjao urban dwellers in making themselves known as Badjaos, as who they are, in a complex multicultural locale like Isla Verde, Davao City. They have low social and political status, which highlight the concern for liberation and self-determination from the trends of imposition mainly founded on the negative biases of the mainstream society.

Michel Foucault’s Analytics of Power, postulated in his 1982 work, Subject and Power, is used as the theoretical framework of the study in discussing the relationship between power, domination and resistance in contemporary society. Moreover, interpretive-hermeneutic phenomenology is employed as the methodology in understanding the power navigations of the Badjaos.

The findings of the study suggest the retention of Badjao culture as a manifestation of their identity, but the major driving forces of otherization have affected the way they assert their voice, particularly through discourse and practices, questioning the ingenuinity of political representation in the social space. The Badjaos further suffer from intra- and inter-group conflicts, and only tries to resolve their issues on their own. Due to this premise, the Badjaos have long given up resisting dominance and have accepted representational cognizance.

The narratives of the Badjao respondents provide a comprehensive analysis on the argument of power navigation as it affects how their identity is sustained, especially on how they utilize their voice to lobby their concerns to the government and those who have the capacity to help them alleviate their poor living conditions.

What is phenomenology? That is precisely the question this book seeks to answer. In an age of information overload, complex topics must be simplified to make them accessible to a wider audience. Phenomenology: A Basic Introduction in the Light of Jesus Christ not only presents the basic building blocks of phenomenology, it also gives body to voice by putting abstract ideas in contact with the Word made flesh, Jesus of Nazareth. In five manageable chapters, Donald Wallenfang introduces major themes such as the natural attitude, givenness, interpretation, paradox, and ethics. Each subject is considered in how it applies to daily life and relates to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Several biblical scenes are tapped to harvest their sweet nectars of meaning through phenomenology. At its limit, philosophy gives way to the revelatory rationality of theology as expressed by Jesus the phenomenologist.

This essay considers Paul Ricoeur's early notion of cultural memory from 1956-1960. He discusses it in two texts: "What does Humanism Mean?" and the slightly later The Symbolism of Evil. In the former, cultural memory appears as an ongoing and dynamic process of retroaction focussed on questioning and rethinking the meaning of classical antiquity for contemporary worlds, on the one hand, that is linked to an important critical aspect as a counterweight to the flattening effects of modernity, on the other. In the latter, cultural memory expands the reach of the classical heritage, and, in addition to retroaction, further modes of orientation, such as relations of depth and breadth, are delineated. At first glance, cultural memory, in Ricoeur's sense, appears to be embodied in the singular, albeit generalized self. Yet, in reconstructing its meaning, the essay argues that Ricoeur's articulation of cultural memory relies on an implicit collective dimension. The present essay's hermeneutic reconstruction of Ricoeur's notion of cultural memory comprises a preliminary step of a broader project that aims to rearticulate Jan and Aleida Assmann's cultural memory framework along social imaginary lines. In this vein, the essay concludes with an overview of the Assmannian approach to cultural memory and considers possible bridges between Ricoeur and the Assmanns. Résumé Cet essai porte sur la notion de mémoire culturelle dans les écrits de jeunesse de Ricoeur datant de 1956-1960. Le philosophe aborde cette question dans deux textes: "Que signifie 'humanisme'?" et La symbolique du mal qui est légèrement postérieure. Dans le premier texte, la mémoire culturelle apparaît comme un processus dynamique et continu de rétroaction qui, d'un côté, est voué à questionner et à repenser le sens de l'antiquité classique pour les mondes contemporains et, de l'autre, joue un rôle critique important comme contrepoids aux effets aplatissant de la modernité. Dans le second texte, la mémoire culturelle est considérée comme une extension de la portée de l'héritage classique et, outre la rétroaction, d'autres modes d'orientation comme la profondeur et l'étendue se trouvent définis. À première vue, la mémoire culturelle, au sens où l'entend Ricoeur, semble s'incarner dans un soi singulier bien que généralisé. Cependant, en reconstruisant sa signification, cet essai défend l'idée selon laquelle la conception ricoeurienne de la mémoire culturelle repose sur une dimension collective implicite. La présente tentative de reconstruction herméneutique de la notion ricoeurienne de mémoire culturelle constitue une étape préalable pour un projet plus large visant à repenser la conception de la mémoire culturelle de Jan et Aleida Assmann dans la perspective de l'imaginaire social.

This essay unpacks Johann Arnason's theory of culture. It argues that the culture problematic remains the needle's eye through which Arnason's intellectual project must be understood, his recent shift to foreground the interplay of culture and power (as the religio-political nexus) notwithstanding. Arnason's approach to culture is foundational to his articulation of the human condition, which is articulated here as the interaction of a historical cultural hermeneutics and a macro-phenomenology of the world as a shared horizon. The essay discusses Arnason's elucidation of his theory of culture as a contribution to debates on the 'meaning of meaning'. It traces its beginnings from his critique of Habermas's theory of modernity to its development via a trialogue with Max Weber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Cornelius Castoriadis. It argues that Arnason's theory of culture moves beyond socio-centric perspectives, and, in so doing, offers a critique of what we might call sociological solipsism. In decentring society/anthropos, a more nuanced understanding of the human condition as a unity in diversity is achieved. The essay concludes with a discussion of some tensions in Arnason's understanding of culture, and argues for the importance for incorporating a qualitative notion of 'movement' in order to make sense of historical novelty and social change.

Awareness of climate change is mounting in seriousness, but what is less well explored is how climate change is provoking a profound critique on some of our philosophical traditions. The planet could shift into an epoch with conditions far too harsh for human habitation. In due course this is bound to happen, as a result of changes in our orbit, the polarity of the magnetic poles, the position of land mass in relation to the poles, and the lifetime of the sun. However, the rapid change in climate that is occurring at present has little or nothing to do with these larger cosmic forces. It is almost entirely due to feedbacks introduced by the inadvertent pollution from modern consumer industrialisation. How did we get to this impasse? The question is technological, cultural, and philosophical. It probes at the essence of modernity and at specific fault lines in the tradition of philosophy. Drawing from the history of philosophical ideas and the very modern concerns with climate change, this paper examines Heidegger's concern with the threshold of nihilism as a regenerative force in conceptualisation and our relationship with beings. Heidegger has a strong critique of modernity which takes up the finitude posed by nuclear devastation. More recently, and with even fuller dimensions, the looming boundary of climate change point to the nihilism inherent in modern thought. Somewhat surprisingly, Heidegger's approach to the zone that threatens to draw modern culture to an untimely close, is not entirely pessimistic. He regards the 'line' or boundary of the planetary conditions for human life as generating a new 'beginning.' That beginning (or the contemplation of the ending) generates the conditions for rethinking what it is to be meaningful human beings. So, it exemplifies the openness required to fully care and integrate the relationship between our planet and ourselves.

The overall aim of this article is to provide a critical exposition of the ethnocentric worldview. In order to reach this aim, I intend to explore the nature of abusive generalization which belongs to the populist images of national identity. Secondly, the main argument of the article lies in the proposition that what supplements nationalist populism is the psychological component of xenophobia. These crucial aspects of ethnocentrism, as I intend to argue, compose the ethnocentric worldview, which shapes individual commitment to national identity by omitting the member of a different ethnic identity.

Developing Pauline Christology as a Spiritual Quest for the Historical Jesus. Abstract The aim of this paper is to explore epistemologies and methodologies for making Christology relevant to theology and worship communities. It will include a development of theological scientific method that can bridge conversation with positivist methods. The Historical Critical approach and the four quests for the historical Jesus have placed Christology, the search for knowing how Christ works in our world, at risk of been seen as religious myth. However, for Paul, knowledge of the historical Jesus was not based on physical evidence, meetings with Jesus or reading texts. He based his knowing (pepeismai: persuaded through experience) on his spiritual experience at Damascus (Romans 8: 38-39). He gave us a Christian anthropology (1Cor:15) that tells us how Christ established a new basis for experiencing the spirit. I name the process of our coming to understand it: the spiritual quest for the historical Jesus. Paul did not create a theory of knowledge but his theological anthropology, based on the first and second Adam, creates the Christological basis for an epistemology, is one which restores the unity of reality which had been lost in the process of cognition. In 1 Cor: 15 Paul can be read as saying that through Christ the necessary changes in the human condition were brought about for cognition to overcome the duality of consciousness. The soma psychikon of the first Adam, as the protos, provides the physical body which is subject to the senses, sin and death, and the soma pneumatikon of Christ, as the eschatos, provides the spiritual preconditions generated by the resurrection body for a future humanity which is subject to charis, grace, reverence, freedom and beauty of the spirit. The Western Christian tradition of developing spiritual senses for perceiving God, correlate with the Eastern Christian tradition of Theosis or the Mystical Union with God. The term 'spiritual sense' is used to designate non-physical human perception, rather than the non-literal interpretation of scripture. The physical and spiritual senses could be seen as two different sets of powers or faculties, two states of the same fivefold sensorium directed at different aspects of the same object. This paper will propose that the transformation comes through Christ working within us. In this sense an epistemology correlating with Paul's saying: Not I but Christ within me (Gal 2:9-21) gives rise to a post-positivist theological scientific methodology that can provide spiritual evidence based/scientific studies of Christology.

This research project was designed to understand the lived experience of nine general practitioners teaching art; three from primary schools in the
UK and six from elementary schools in the US. It used a reflective-formative style of inquiry, relying on Dewey’s (1933) theory of knowledge
(experience + reflection = new knowledge). Teachers from the UK and the USA were observed for one art lesson, followed by a reflective discussion
of the observation. Various themes emerged from the analysis of the participants’ narratives, including challenges of teaching art relating to budget,
curriculum and training, as well as concerns over pedagogy and planning.

In this document, I intend to narrate my main experiences in a brief and personal way when I started to work as a nurse in a hospital in Tenerife (Spain). These events happened in the second half of 2009. I reflect on the experience and I also try to argue my experiences based on the knowledge that I have acquired by developing a phenomenological doctoral thesis in which I study this event with nurses who begin to work in different health institutions in Tenerife.

"Moi, les collectifs, les proches": Ricoeur désigne par-là les sujets d'attribution du souvenir pour clore le parcours de la première partie de son oeuvre, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, publiée en 2000. Ricoeur, lecteur des sciences sociales, évoque dans ce chapitre le travail d'Alfred Schütz et la sociologie phénoménologique. L'exploration d'un plan intermédiaire de la mémoire (entre la mémoire personnelle et la mémoire collective) dans la relation aux proches sera l'occasion d'un détour herméneutique vers ce lien social de la proximité. "Sur quel trajet d'attribution de la mémoire se situent les proches?" se demande Ricoeur. C'est dans un dialogue instructif avec Schütz que nous tenterons de poser des jalons. En effet, les proches sont l'occasion de penser la reconnaissance par le chemin du souvenir. Dans cette exploration de l'attribution des souvenirs s'ouvre la connexion de la mémoire à la reconnaissance à une échelle particulière du lien social, celle de la proximité. Mots-clés: proximité, mémoire, phénoménologie, sociologie, reconnaissance.
Abstract "Me, collectives, relatives": Ricoeur refers to the subject of attribution of memory to close the first part of Memory, History, Forgetting, published in 2000. Ricoeur mentions in this chapter the work of Alfred Schütz and phenomenological sociology. The exploration of an intermediate plan of memory (between personal memory and collective memory) in the relationship with loved ones will be the occasion for a hermeneutical detour towards this social link of proximity. "On which path of attribution of the memory are the relatives?" Ricoeur asks himself. Indeed, relatives are an opportunity to think about recognition by the path of remembrance. This exploration of the attribution of memories opens the connection of memory to recognition on a particular scale of the social bond, that of proximity.

A Theologian’s Guide to Heidegger provides a uniquely theological introduction to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, by focusing on not just the relationship between Heidegger and theology, or even the nature of the discourse that must occur between theological concerns and Heidegger’s philosophical errands, but by precisely exploring how theology can use Heidegger’s philosophy as a means of outlining the scope and task of postmodern theology. To do this, especially with the postmodern theologian in mind, this book considers the general relationship between Heidegger and theology, how Heidegger can be read theologically, while justifying why Heidegger must be read this way and defining the role that Heidegger must take in postmodern theology. This includes a careful consideration of Heidegger’s early theological roots from Freiburg to Marburg by examining the content of Heidegger’s lesser-known theologically-minded seminars, lectures, and talks.

The word ‘horizon’ has various meanings according to circumstances: a ‘line’ against the sky; a ‘limited range’ of a person’s experience; a ‘layer’ of soil, etc. In Husserlian phenomenology, on the other hand, the various meanings seem to be identified and unified in literal and/or metaphorical senses, in the phenomenological constitution of ‘world’ as such. This paper explores to the role ‘horizon’ plays in ‘the world’. It addresses both the individual subjective account as well as the intersubjective account for significance of ‘horizon’ in the constitution of what Husserl calls ‘life-world,’ and also understands the dynamics of horizon through considerations of a sense of normality.

This study looks at different approaches to interpretation the Bible taken by some Rabbis and some Christians since the time of Jesus Christ. It looks overview of some approaches. The seven princiules of Hillel, and the seven paths of Rabbi Abraham Abulafia are included. Also some prophecies from a modern day Charismatic are included which encourage greater revelation of understanding of the Biblical text. Also included are some insights of the Apocalypse, Fauset and Ethelbert Bullinger of the Companion Bible. There is a particular focus on the number 7.

En este artículo pretendemos dar una salida fenomenológica y escolástica al problema de la
verdad como representación. Este afectará a la comunicación en general y, en particular, a la
comunicación social, en tanto “representación” siga refiriendo a un supuesto mundo objetivo
que olvida el mundo de la vida, esencial para una hermenéutica.

El presente libro no es una introducción histórica a la hermenéutica.
No pretende solucionar las infinitas discusiones
históricas sobre qué quisieron verdaderamente decir Husserl,
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Wittgenstein (también entran
Levinas y Buber), Eco o Leocata. Menos aún pretende ser
otra visión de la hermenéutica competitiva con ellos. Solo
pretendo demostrar que el conocimiento humano y la
hermenéutica se identifican; que la hermenéutica no es una
operación sobreañadida al conocimiento; que no hay datos
ni hechos y que, sin embargo, hay realidad y verdad.
El lector juzgará por sí mismo las diversas influencias que
he recibido, y el autor espera que haya hecho de ellas una
interpretación plausible, no aberrante. Pero la verdad de la
tesis de este libro no tiene que ver con mi intentio auctoris de
los autores arriba citados, sino con un método fenomenológico
que permita ir viendo al lector la corrección de mis
conclusiones.
Creemos verdaderamente que el giro hermenéutico es la gran
revolución de la filosofía del siglo XX, y que sus alcances se
extienden a la filosofía del lenguaje, a la filosofía de las ciencias,
a la filosofía de la comunicación, a la filosofía política y a la
filosofía de la educación. Mostrar esos alcances es también
uno de los objetivos de este libro. Nadie puede coherentemente
ver la verdad del giro hermenéutico y luego seguir
hablando de hechos, datos, objetividad, etc., en todo lo demás.
El giro hermenéutico es una revolución en la concepción
del mundo, de lo real, de la ética, del lenguaje. El positivismo
cultural sigue vigente porque ni siquiera los filósofos que
hacen hermenéutica se toman en serio lo que dicen. Y más
aun, sigue latente porque el escepticismo posmoderno, que
ha intentado monopolizar el giro hermenéutico, no hace más
que retroalimentar a los bancos positivistas y neopositivistas
como los únicos que están dispuestos a recibir el depósito
de la verdad.
La hermenéutica NO es una parte más de la filosofía. La
hermenéutica es la filosofía como totalidad. En ella viven
la metafísica, la antropología, la filosofía de lo físico, la ética,
en una nueva unidad. Nueva unidad cuya dilucidación es
también uno de los objetivos de este libro.
No quiero concluir sin antes agradecer a la Facultad de
Comunicación de la Universidad Austral, por el espacio
concedido para la reflexión y la escritura de este ensayo.
Invito al lector a recorrer mi camino que es el camino que he
recorrido toda mi vida, para que él, a su vez, recorra el suyo.

Gabriel J. Zanotti
Septiembre de 2018

Die Lektüre der vorliegenden Blaga-Übersetzung kann für das deutschsprachige Publikum aus mehreren Gründen aufschlussreich sein. Für diejenigen, die sich für die rumänische und überhaupt südosteuropäische Geistesgeschichte, Literatur und Gesellschaft interessieren, ist die Kenntnis Blagas unerlässlich. Seine Kulturphilosophie, die mit seiner Metaphysik der Erkenntnis eng verwoben ist, übte einen starken Einfluss auf die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Traditionalisten und Modernisten aus, die für die neuere Geschichte Rumäniens so bedeutsam war und wohl noch ist. Aus philosophiegeschichtlicher Perspektive ist Blaga ein typischer Vertreter der produktiven Rezeption deutschsprachiger Philosophie im südöstlichen Europa, der Synthese zwischen west- und osteuropäischem Gedankengut und insbesondere der rumänischen Spielart hermeneutisch-phänomenologischer Denktraditionen. Aus systematisch-philosophischer Sicht bietet Blaga nennenswerte Beiträge zu Fragen nach dem »Anderen der Vernunft«, dem magisch-mythischen Denken, dem Geheimnisvollen, dem Mysterium und den wechselseitigen Beziehungen zwischen Metaphysik, Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Religion. Im Zusammenhang aktueller Entwicklungen, die das Verhältnis zwischen Eigenem und Fremden, Identität und Alterität, nationalen und übernationalen Konstellationen betreffen, könnte schließlich ein Vergleich mit der Problemlage der 1930er- und 1940er-Jahre, in der Blagas Denken entstand, durchaus nützlich, wenn nicht geradezu zwingend sein.

The paper has two goals. First, I propose a novel interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s theory of feelings and emotions. I draw from Husserl’s published works and his unpublished manuscripts to rethink how he distinguished feelings from emotions. In contrast to currently accepted interpretations, I show that Husserl concluded that feelings are structurally analogous to perceptions and that emotions are akin to existential beliefs. Second, I employ and work beyond Husserl’s observations to critically engage with the contemporary continental literature on feelings and emotions. I demonstrate why Husserl’s division between those two experiences is preferable to current theories, because it can be used to more accurately account for the motivation of emotions and the ontological status of values.

Summary:

This paper (in German) concerns the conditions that can improve personal knowledge: self-knowledge and knowledge of the other. The general approach is relational and dialogic. The starting point is the hermeneutic relation between text and interpreter. The next point is the dialog between two persons. In connection with this situation the paper reports the conceptions of M. Bachtin about dialogical cooperation. The end part is devoted to the problems of the psychological research on the subjectivity of the other. In this context the basic principle is the respect of the other as ethical and epistemological condition.

Zusammenfassung:

Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit der Frage der Zugänge zur Erkenntnis der Subjektivität - der eigenen wie auch der von Anderen -, die als unerschöpflicher Prozess verstanden wird. Dazu wird ein relationaler und dialogischer Ansatz gewählt. Zunächst gehen wir von einem hermeneutischen Zugang aus, bei dem der Dialog zwischen Leser/Zuhörer und einem Text stattfindet. Diese Beziehung wird als „hermeneutische Spirale“ verstanden, da „der Text mit dem Leser wächst, so wie der Leser mit dem Text wächst“. Vom metaphorischen Dialog zwischen Leser und Text kommen wir zum authentischen Dialog zwischen Personen, mit einem Schwerpunkt auf Dialoge in klinischen Situationen, in denen es möglich ist, Analysen der verschiedenen sprachlichen Funktionen durchzuführen, besonders auch jene des „Appells“. Zur Frage der Kenntnis der Subjektivität des Anderen werden die Thesen M. Bachtins über die dialogische Kooperation zwischen Erkennendem und Erkanntem dargestellt und die Bedingungen, die deren Verwirklichung begünstigen. Zum Schluss werden Probleme der Kenntnis des Anderen in der psychologischen Forschung betrachtet. Haupt-Prinzip ist das Prinzip des „Respektes“, nicht nur in ethischem sondern auch in epistemologischem Sinn. Nur der paritätische oder „demokratische“ Dialog und die Gemeinsamkeit der Ziele, wie z. B. in der Aktionsforschung, ermöglichen es der Person, sich dem Forscher zu offenbaren.