Conflict in Libya

Secondo l’Organizzazione Internazionale per le Migrazioni (“OIM”) e l’Alto Commissariato ONU per i Rifugiati (“UNHCR”), nel corso del 2016 oltre 5mila persone sono scomparse nel tentativo di attraversare il Mediterraneo.  Oltre 4.500 di queste stavano cercando di raggiungere l’Europa attraverso la c.d. rotta del Mediterraneo centrale, ossia quella che collega il Nord Africa e l’Italia – e più specificamente, nel 90% dei casi, la Libia e la Sicilia. 
Il 9 ottobre 2015, sulla scia delle polemiche innescate dal drammatico naufragio del canale di Sicilia del 18 aprile 2015,  il Consiglio di sicurezza dell’Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite aveva approvato – con 14 voti a favore – la risoluzione numero 2240. L’adozione di questo strumento rispondeva, secondo il CdS, all’esigenza “to put an end to the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya”. Nonostante queste premesse, le uniche azioni intraprese dal CdS consistevano nell’autorizzare per un anno gli Stati membri a intervenire nella zona di alto mare adiacente alle coste libiche, individualmente o attraverso organizzazioni regionali, ispezionando ed eventualmente confiscando le imbarcazioni coinvolte nel traffico o nella tratta di migranti.  Il 6 ottobre 2016, mediante la risoluzione numero 2312, il CdS ONU decideva di rinnovare tale autorizzazione per un anno.
Nel presentare il tredicesimo rapporto semestrale sulla situazione in Libia, l’8 maggio 2017 il Procuratore Capo della Corte penale internazionale, Fatou Bensouda, ha denunciato il peggioramento della situazione nel Paese e il rischio del ritorno ad un conflitto su ampia scala, e annunciato che il suo Ufficio valuterà la possibilità di aprire un’indagine in relazione ai gravi e sistematici abusi dei diritti umani commessi a danno di migliaia di migranti presenti sul territorio libico, compresi donne e bambini. Nel suo messaggio, Bensouda ha tra l’altro fatto proprio quanto sottolineato dal CdS nelle citate risoluzioni 2240 e 2312, cioè che il traffico e la tratta di esseri umani verso, attraverso e dalla Libia contribuiscono ad esacerbare il clima di insicurezza nel paese e possono costituire fonti di finanziamento per reti criminali transnazionali, organizzazioni terroristiche e milizie irregolari.
Alla luce di queste affermazioni, in questo contributo verranno analizzate le prospettive per la repressione dei gravi abusi dei diritti umani commessi contro i migranti in Libia, sul piano internazionale e nazionale.
Nella prima sezione ci si soffermerà sulla competenza ratione materiae dell’ICC e sulle condizioni per l’apertura di un’indagine: come sottolineato dal Procuratore, è infatti innanzitutto necessario verificare se in base allo Statuto la Corte possa effettivamente esercitare la propria giurisdizione su quelle condotte.
Tenuto conto delle stringenti condizioni per l’esercizio della giurisdizione da parte dell’ICC e della natura complementare di questa, nella seconda sezione ci si concentrerà sulle norme sull’ambito di applicazione del diritto penale italiano, allo scopo di verificare se i tribunali interni possano occuparsi dei crimini internazionali presuntivamente commessi in Libia. In particolare, ci si concentrerà perciò sulle più recenti pronunce della Corte di Cassazione in merito all’esercizio della giurisdizione sulle condotte riconducibili alla diversa fattispecie di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina e sull’applicabilità delle soluzioni ivi accolte al caso della tratta.
Nell’ultima parte dell’articolo si svolgeranno infine una serie di considerazioni sull’opportunità e le prospettive di un ampliamento dell’ambito di applicazione della legge italiana. Sulla base delle norme del diritto internazionale, il legislatore potrebbe infatti autorizzare il giudice penale ad occuparsi dei reati di tratta commessi in Libia. In tal modo, l’Italia contribuirebbe alla repressione di crimini odiosi, alla promozione della tutela dei diritti umani di soggetti particolarmente vulnerabili, e alla promozione di uno dei principi fondamentali del “diritto di Roma”: quello della complementarietà.

The article analyses the Imazighen’s role in Libyan uprising of February 2011, historically
problematizing the emergence of the ethnic issue in nowadays Libya, as well as Imazighen’s
struggle to bring the ethnic discourse on the transitional political agenda, after over
42 years of Qaddafi’s pan-Arab oppression. Amazigh communities of Jabal al-Nafusa
and Zwara have performed their mobilization within the public space of revolutionary
Libya not only as an armed revolt against Qaddafi’s regime but also as a ‘laboratory
of belonging’, inextricably linking the credibility of Libya’s democratic transition to the
constitutional recognition of their linguistic and cultural specificity. Eventually, the
cultural themes of Berberism were coupled to a nativist rhetoric, sustaining a process
of ethnic identity’s (re)construction. Arguably both local activists and town leaders
have usually preferred to strive for their particular interests in a peaceful way, despite
constantly showing an oppositional attitude toward transitional authorities. Yet, in order
to build a unitary linguistic and cultural community, ethnic categories were mobilized,
which are often inherited from the colonial past. Ultimately, ethnicity served Amazigh
leaders as a political tool for bargaining local interests with a weak political center,
eventually seeking for wider margins of autonomy and the control of local resources.

The EU has been trying to develop a robust plan to stem the tide of irregular migration that threatens European security at a large scale, including a replicated deal. Especially in the Aegean Sea, it was observed that a tremendous amount of the flow had tried to reach the Greek shores. In this context, the March 18 agreement has aimed to address the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands by all

Libya iç savaşı, bölgesel ve küresel muhtelif devlet ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin müdahaleleri doğrultusunda evrilmekte. Çeşitli çıkar tanımlamaları temelinde, Libya’daki iç istikrarsızlığın gidişatını etkileme çabasındaki bu aktörlerden birisi de Libya’nın en uzun kara sınırlarını paylaştığı Mısır.

Lorsqu'en 2011, à l'instigation de la France, et en vertu de la résolution 1973 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, les forces de l'OTAN bombardent la Libye, l'Algérie s'oppose à cette intervention qu'elle considère comme le prélude à l'éclatement du pays et à une instabilité régionale incontrôlable. Vue d'Alger, l'intervention occidentale a entraîné la militarisation à grande échelle de la société libyenne et la déstabilisation en chaîne de toute la zone sahélo-saharienne. Les impératifs sécuritaires et stratégiques deviennent alors des éléments déterminants de la position algérienne.

The intervention in Libya became the poster child of the doctrine known as Responsibility to Protect, humanitarian interventions in the Balkans being considered applications of this norm avantilettera-before it being formally adopted and encapsulated in formal documents. The initial aim of the intervention was, as the norm dictates, the protection of civilians. However, the mandate of the UN Security Council resolution 1973-which was given on humanitarian grounds-was exceeded and the focus shifted to regime change. This paper brings into focus the normative fabric accompanying humanitarian interventions and puts under discussion a derivative process that explains the emergence of new rules and norms from the international to the domestic level. The creation of a new norm regarding intervention, such as the responsibility to protect, brings as a corollary the unintentional creation of a domestic norm regarding the structure, attributes and functions of the state. At least one of the main attributes of the state, monopoly of coercion, is challenged normatively and interventions end up creating emergent political entities that challenge the very fabric of legitimate rule, its locus and its character of exclusivity. Between the Responsibility to Protect to the 'Responsibility to Govern' lies a whole cycle of normative developments whose implications for the modern state are yet to be untangled and further clarified.

Artykuł dotyczy roli interwencji zbrojnej w koncepcji „odpowiedzialności za ochronę” (R2P). Analizuje warunki uzgodnione przez państwa (członków ONZ), które muszą być spełnione, aby uzasadnić użycie siły w ramach R2P. Wskazuje przypadki, w których NZ odnosiły się do R2P, żeby uzasadnić użycie siły (wskazano na przykłady interwencji w Libii i braku interwencji w Syrii). Ponadto dokonano oceny rozwoju koncepcji R2P pod względem jej wymiaru zbrojnego, w odwołaniu do propozycji brazylijskich i chińskich. Autorka twierdzi, że koncepcja R2P jest
nadal żywa i przydatna do opisu sytuacji politycznej, w której społeczność międzynarodowa powinna reagować na naruszenia praw człowieka. Koncepcja ta nie może być jednak wykorzystywana jako samoistna podstawa uzasadniania interwencji zbrojnej, gdyż oznaczałoby to pogwałcenie Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych.

In 2019, the escalations between the two rival governments in Libya headlined international news platforms. This confrontation happens amidst the growing tensions between the UN-recognised Tripoli government on the Western side of the country, and the Eastern Benghazi-based government led by Khalifa Haftar.

In this short essay, I discuss the understanding of the state, not as hegemonic entity, but as one political field amongst many. Individuals would move in and out of this field in their daily lives, reflecting a rather fluid perception of the state.

The complete Anthropolitan issue is available here: https://indd.adobe.com/view/4f9cbdba-8538-444c-8017-8482a16004c1

Benghazi is the second city of the country with a
population estimated between 715,000 and 812,000
inhabitants within its present administrative
boundaries. Its historical districts of Old Benghazi have
experienced severe damage during the conflict. The
population of the municipality have been subject to
significant displacements (more than half of all
displaced in Libya, 1/3rd of the population of the
municipality), while receiving relatively small number
of IDPs. Most of the displaced remained in the
region/mantika/governorate/mohafaza of Benghazi
and returned to the city after the end of the conflict.

Russland zeigt nach Syrien nun auch in Libyen Präsenz. Das Vorgehen ist jedoch sehr verschieden. Die militärische Unterstützung für den ostlibyschen Machthaber Chalifa Haftar fällt deutlich schwächer aus als die für Assad in Syrien. Auch wenn es in Moskau Kräfte gibt, die eindeutig auf Haftar setzen, hält sich Russland alle Optionen offen. Es geht zum einen um ökonomische Interessen-um Waffenverkäufe und Beteiligungen im Energiesektor. Politisch präsentiert sich Russland als wichtiger Machtfaktor in Konkurrenz zu den USA-wenn auch deutlich weniger antagonistisch als in Syrien.

Abstract

In over eight years since its transitional phase began, Libya has become a state riven by political divisions and armed conflict, rather than a human rights-respecting, democratic state aligned with the goals of its 2011 revolution. Teeming with militias and violent extremist groups, human rights violations are endemic and committed with impunity, amid fragile state institutions incapable of upholding the rule of law. A consensus between the warring parties is requisite to achieving a comprehensive political resolution to end the suffering of Libyans, fatigued by conflict, insecurity, and instability; regrettably, the transitional period has lacked this direly-needed consensus. In meetings brokered by the international community, treaty after treaty is concluded then broken by the warring parties. Amid this acute political polarization and violence, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) released a draft constitution in the summer of 2017; a constitution that neither respects human rights nor was put to popular referendum. With the international community beginning to abandon the concept of needing a constitution as a first or foundational step in the transitional process in favour of focusing on elections instead, the prospects of ending the Libyan nightmare were only further dimmed by the conflict erupting on April 4th.

The international community has been trying to broker peace since 2014. The UN Sponsored National Conference has been a key endeavour in this context. The purpose of this conference is to bring together rival groups in an effort to find a long-lasting political solution to crisis. However, critics claim that this effort produced neither political consensus nor a well-articulated plan to address the country’s crisis efficiently.

Drawing on extensive research, this report analyses the European Union’s and European governments’ outsourcing of migration controls in ‘partner’ countries such as Turkey, Libya and Niger. It explores who benefits from this system, exposes its risks and explains who bears the costs. It also provides recommendations for European leaders on how to move toward a humane model for migration. (Report co-authored with David Keen for Saferworld, July 2019)