Boko Haram

Boko Haram has caused nearly 40,000 casualties in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, becoming one of the deadliest Jihadist organisations in recent history. At its current rate, Boko Haram takes part in more than two events each day, taking the lives of nearly 11 people daily. Yet, little is known concerning Boko Haram's internal structure, organisation, and its mobility. Here, we propose a novel technique to uncover the internal structure of Boko Haram based on the sequence of events in which the terrorist group takes part. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) gives the location and time of nearly 3,800 events in which Boko Haram has been involved since the organisation became violent 10 years ago. Using this dataset, we build an algorithm to detect the fragmentation of Boko Haram into multiple cells, assuming that travel costs and reduced familiarity with unknown locations limit the mobility of individual cells. Our results suggest that the terrorist group has a very high level of fragmentation and consists of at least 50-60 separate cells. Our methodology enables us to detect periods of time during which Boko Haram exhibits exceptionally high levels of fragmentation, and identify a number of key routes frequently travelled by separate cells of Boko Haram where military interventions could be concentrated.

Since the inception of the Boko Haram Islamist group in Nigeria in 2002, it has claimed responsibility for several atrocities, notable among which is the April 2014 Chibok School Girls’ kidnap which not only sustained an international outcry but birthed an international movement; the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. This movement saw the active participation of first lady Michelle Obama, former British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai who took specific interests, tweeting the campaign slogan.  Generating thousands of likes and tweets, the movement attracted different sympathizers including international celebrities, social activists, civil rights groups, students, and girls’ rights movements in Europe,  the U.S.A, Canada, Africa, and Asia who participated in online and offline protests that compelled the Nigerian government to seek regional assistance and international support from foreign nations like Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Israel, and China as well as international humanitarian organisations like the International Red Cross society in recovering some of the girls.
This study sought to examine Nigerian media representations of the kidnaping using the framing theory of the media in conjunction with feminist media theoretical dimensions. Analyzing news stories on the kidnap from April 2014 to July 2020, by two Nigerian newspapers (The Daily Punch and Vanguard based on their websites) the study revealed that the news stories were framed using the themes of welfare, politics, and developments. The news stories by both newspapers were characteristic of the three principles of feminist journalism, as the news reports privileged facts over opinion and let people speak for themselves as seen in the consistent use of direct quotes. The perception of this event as an infringement on the rights of education of the girl child and the need to empower Nigerian women especially in Northern Nigeria was also seen as consistent with contemporary African feminism which focuses on empowering African women and creating spaces for them to participate in the management of their societies.

Key words: Boko Haram, Chibok School Girls, Nigeria, Media Framing, Feminism

Northeast Nigeria in recent years has been ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram, a religious insurgent group, poses threats to (mostly) the region and its citizens. Although the Nigerian military and its allies have regained most of the areas hitherto captured, defeating the group has proved challenging despite the multi-nation joint military forces. This is partly due to lack of understanding about causes relating to the emergence and continued existence of the group on one hand and factors that contribute to the growth of the group on the other. Poverty has been attributed to both the cause of the emergence and one of the most important factors that contribute to the growth of the group. Thus, drawing from two poverty theories, culture of poverty and ghetto poverty, this article examines how the interaction of internal and external poverty conditions within individuals explains the emergence and continued existence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. In addition, as various poverty elimination policies have been developed and used without success, the article hypotheses that effective poverty elimination policies laid down in the Quran and Sunnah, here termed Poverty-Haram policies, are needed to eliminate poverty and prevent emergence of groups, like Boko Haram. To develop these policies, technical and empirical understanding of contextual poverty is essential. Therefore, using a well-developed and tested questionnaire, data on individual experiences were obtained from 500 respondents who are adjudged poor (living under US$1.5/day and with a family of at least 3) in 3 cities. This data was operationalised and analysed. The result of the SPSS analysis indicates that internal poverty conditions may lead to cognitive poverty whereas external conditions may lead to material poverty. Using these results, the article explains use poverty-haram policies in eliminating both cognitive and material poverty is proposed.

En la última semana, la atención de las principales agencias de noticias del mundo se volvió hacia Nigeria para dar cuanta de nuevas acciones del grupo armado Boko Haram. Sin embargo, los profundos problemas políticos y económicos del país africano preceden por décadas al surgimiento de esta organización en 2002.

In 2015, the jihadist movement known as Boko Haram became the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world – at least in terms of the number of murders. The group, which its founder called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad – "Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad" – has undergone turbulent developments from an insurgent correctional movement, through a terrorist organization (at least formally) linked to al-Qaeda, to its transformation into an offshoot of the Islamic State (in West Africa) by recognition of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's authority. The paper will focus on the development of Boko Haram's Jihad and the influences that had a major impact on it: How much is Jihad by the Sword applied and promoted by the Boko Haram movement generally Islamic and to what extent specifically a Nigerian phenomenon?

La violencia en África: Aproximaciones y datos Resumen: La violencia en África lleve décadas. Desde los procesos de descolonización, golpes de estado hasta la aparición de la insurgencia islamista. Los motivos de estas violencias son variados. Pero puede mencionarse motivaciones yihadistas, independentistas y étnicas. Se propone en este artículo, analizar integralmente la violencia en este continente; tanto las motivaciones ideológicas, patrones geográficos y medios utilizados. El objetivo es poder sacar conclusiones a partir de relevamientos propios. Par ello, se presentan dichos datos en gráficos y tablas. Tambien se presentan algunas fuentes de información para quienes estén interesados/adas en el asunto. Palabras clave: Terrorismo-África-Yihadismo-Sahel-Seguridad La violencia en África no es nueva. La historia de los últimos 500 años ha estado salpicada por hechos oscuros y lamentables. Desde la colonización por parte de países europeos, pasando por las dos guerras mundiales y los procesos de descolonización, hasta llegar a la actualidad; como por ejemplo milicias como Al-Shabaab, ISIS o Boko Haram. Algunas consideraciones El continente africano, como es sabido, es pobre e inseguro. No tan solo por las armas. También lo es por la falta de sanidad, educación y un desarrollo socio-económico a futuro. Cierto es también, que es un continente rico en recursos naturales. Desde el petróleo del Magreb, las grandes fuentes de agua dulce y las vírgenes selvas del África central, hasta las minas de metales preciosos y diamantes de Angola y Sudáfrica. Y otros países (especialmente los europeos) han sabido aprovecharse de esto. En síntesis, la violencia en África parece no tener fin. Ya sea por atentados de grupos islamistas, independentistas o guerras civiles. Es un asunto de todos los días. Posiblemente en este momento esté sucediendo un atentado, o quizás dentro de una hora. O sucedió hace 45 minutos. Luego, los veremos en las noticias. Puede parecer exagerado e ingenuo, el hecho de que todos los días haya muertes relacionadas con conflictos políticos o religiosos. Pero, como veremos, tristemente no es así. Es importante definir qué es lo que se entiende por violencia, ya que es un concepto muy general. Para los fines de este artículo, se entiende como violencia a todo hecho que tengan como consecuencia víctimas fatales y/o heridas. Estas víctimas pueden ser tanto civiles como militares (ejércitos estatales y organizaciones paramilitares).

This essay aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of women in jihadist movements and argues that jihadist organisations employ women mainly for opportunistic reasons. The first section of the essay summarises different approaches that scholars have adopted on the topic, suggesting a more holistic analysis is needed. In light of this, the second section combines anthropological, sociological and political arguments to discuss the role of women in six different jihadist organisations-al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Hamas, Boko Haram and the ISIL. The third part of the essay presents a comparative analysis of the results of the precedent section, and engages in a dialogue with the literature. It points out similarities and differences between the organisations and identifies patterns to provide possible explanations to the employment of women in jihad, such as opportunism. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that religious arguments do not sufficiently explain jihadism. There are a multitude of concurrent causes.

Boko Haram zyskało etykietę jednej z najbardziej śmiercionośnych grup terrorystycznych w historii. W 2018 r. dokonało najwięcej samobójczych ataków spośród wszystkich organizacji terrorystycznych. W tym nie-chlubnym rankingu wyprzedziło Państwo Islamskie, Al-Kaidę i Talibów. Swoje fundamenty zbudowało na nienawiści, nie tylko do wyznawców innych, nieislamskich religii, ale także do wszelkich niesunnickich, a raczej niesalafickich odłamów islamu. Kluczową przesłanką w działalności nigeryjskich dżihadystów jest pogarda, agresja i przemoc. Uwagę światowych mediów przyciągnęli brutalnymi i krwawymi atakami na ludność cywilną, w tym masowymi porwaniami, m.in. uprowadzeniem 276 uczennic z miasta Chibok w 2014 r. oraz ponad 300 uczniów w miejscowości Kanakra 14 grudnia 2020 r. Boko Haram słynie również z ataków samobójczych na targi, meczety i obozy dla przesiedleńców. Powszechnie wykorzystuje kobiety i dzieci jako zamachowców-samobójców. dr Marta Sara Stempień, adiunkt w Instytucie Nauk o Bezpieczeństwie na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach, doktor nauk o bezpieczeństwie. Autorka monografii: Państwo Islamskie: nowe oblicze terroryzmu? oraz Bliski Wschód: ciągle w ogniu (wspól-nie z Maliną Kaszubą). Jest zastępcą redaktor naczelnej czasopisma nauko-wego "De Securitate et Defensione. O Bezpieczeństwie i Obronności". Jej zainteresowania badawcze koncentrują się na problematyce: terroryzmu, globalnego ruchu dżihadystycznego, bezpieczeństwa Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu oraz wojen i konfliktów zbrojnych. Cena 33,60 zł (w tym 5 % VAT)

The volume, the first on the Boko-Haram insurgency, is dedicated to all those affected by Boko Haram in their socio-cultural, economic and political lives, and divided into three parts, two of which are devoted to poetry, while the third offers eight texts gathered under the title “fiction / non-fiction”, revealing the reality hidden under the fiction.

Scholars have critiqued the incorporation of gender into counterterrorism and countering violent extremism programs, noting they have instrumentalized the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda toward state-centric goals and essentialized the women (and men) they encounter. Furthermore, as Huckerby has outlined, the explicit inclusion of gender in security policy can produce specific gendered security harms: coercive and noncoercive practices, securitization of women's rights, and lack of attention to the gendered effects of seemingly gender-neutral policy. This article engages Huckerby's work to explore the gendered security harms produced in Nigeria's counterinsurgency against “Boko Haram.” It suggests first that a simplistic approach to ‘women’, rather than gendered power relations, leaves Nigeria ill-equipped to respond to the complex gendered dynamics of jihadist actors in the Northeast. Second, a neglect of human rights and the role of state actors in abuses actively enables gendered security harms. The article concludes that Nigeria is therefore still failing to protect women.

This article argues that ‘detraditionalisation’ as a response to the crisis of modernity can be successful if it is embarked upon interreligiously, within the Northern Nigerian context. Otherwise, the process will be considered as another instance of ‘Western/Christian’ hegemony.  There are already attempts made within the Islamic tradition in this regard. Nasr Abû Zayd, for instance, argues that Islam can embrace modernity without much difficulty because the meaning of the Qur’an is not incompatible with the progress of the natural sciences. Abû Zayd is from a socially conservative context like Nigeria.  He can serve as a model on how to make sense of Islam’s pathos towards Western modernity, exemplified in movements like Boko Haram, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Taliban. He shows Muslims how to move beyond this pathos without sliding into fundamentalism or anti-religious secularism.

The vast issues that Nigeria faces today are not crafted out of surprise, as they were glaring to the few who chose not to believe in the fancy promises that were made after Nigeria got her independence in 1960. In fact, Frantz Fanon in his book titled “The Wretched of the Earth” foresaw these as if he lives and wrote his book in the present-day Nigeria. After several eras of on-and-off military regimes, Nigeria returned to democratic ruling in 1999, with new hopes for forward movement that will guarantee freedom, security, fairness, justice and liberty, which were much needed for the economic development and sustainability of the country.

Nigeria has been laced with a plethora of security challenges, which goes to show that the optimism was a myth. This is marred by religious violence but beyond it, with others such as kidnappings, armed robbery, political violence, and so on. Particularly, religious violence as a key result of religious extremism has had a toll on the economic development of Nigeria over the years as a result of loss of properties, and loss of precious lives. This research paper examines religious violence in Nigeria by expatiating on what manifests its rise and its eventual impact on the economic development of Nigeria. Thus, the formal question begged from this is, to what extent does the economy of Nigeria take a hit as a result of religious violence in Nigeria.

On the night of April 14-15, 2014, Islamic extremists in northeastern Nigeria committed a heinous, unspeakable crime by abducting almost 300 girls from the “sanctuary” of the Government Secondary School in the town of Chibok.

For God’s sake who would do such a thing and why?