shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 200 CHAPTER 10 A Jewish State, Multiculturalism, the Law of Return, and Non-Jewish Immigration Alexander Yakobson 1. A Jewish State and Multiculturalism The notions of a Jewish state and multiculturalism are usually assumed, and sometimes explicitly claimed, to belong to two opposing ideological poles. While the high level of cultural diversity actually existing in Israel is obvious and often noted, the Jewish character of the state is often regarded as severely limiting the multicultural potential of Israel’s society, if not negating it alto- gether.1 And indeed, there is an obvious tension between the idea of a state that embodies the national independence of a certain people, with its partic- ular culture – a culture that is, moreover, traditionally linked to a particular religion – and the attitude that legitimizes, and often celebrates, cultural diver- sity. This tension certainly finds expression in various aspects of the country’s life and in the public discourse. However, the tension is far from presenting the whole picture. In some ways, Israel’s character as a Jewish state (at least as it is currently understood and practiced) does indeed limit its multicultur- alism; in other ways, Israel is Jewish but nevertheless significantly multicultural. What is more interesting is that in some important ways, Israel is all the more multicultural precisely because it is Jewish. I would argue that the idea of a modern nation-state for the Jewish people is intrinsically multicultural, in four senses. Firstly, in that the Jewish people, as perceived by the Zionist movement – a people consisting of all the Jewish communities in the world, East and West – is a fundamentally multicultural and multiethnic entity. Secondly, creating a Jewish state in the territory of historical Palestine/Land of Israel has always meant creating a nation-state shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 201 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 0 1 with a very large national minority – that is, a substantial part of the citizen body of the state whose national identity and culture are distinct from that of the majority people. A Jewish state, by definition, is not, and was never going to be, a “purely” Jewish state. Thirdly, modern Jewish communities, mainly in Europe and America, are characterized by intermarriage on a large scale. Consequently, a state created by massive Jewish immigration from those countries and continuously open to such immigration, is, inevitably, a state with a large number of non-Jewish relatives of these immigrants. This potential was dramatically realized by the immigration from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. The only way to prevent this would have been to give up the idea of massive Jewish immigra- tion – at any rate from countries with high rates of intermarriage. Just as a Jewish state cannot be “purely Jewish,” so it is true to say that large-scale Jewish immigration cannot, by definition, consist solely, or almost solely, of Jews (however one defines “a Jew” for the purposes of immigration). Hence, the Jewish state is all the more multicultural and multiethnic precisely because it not simply a state whose majority people are Hebrew- speaking Israeli Jews, an ethno-national community created, historically, by immigration. Such a state might have chosen to stress its distinct identity and the cultural differences (which are quite considerable, naturally) between itself and the Jewish communities abroad (in the spirit of what the so-called “Canaanites” in Israel have argued2). It could then have adopted a (relatively) restrictive immigration policy vis-à-vis those communities. Rather, Israel is ideologically a Zionist state, not merely open to unrestricted Jewish immi- gration, but one that values and encourages it. There is no way of welcoming large-scale Jewish immigration without at the same time welcoming a large number of non-Jews. Finally, creating a state that is successful and attractive inevitably means, under contemporary conditions and norms, that such a state will sooner or later have to face the phenomenon of immigration in the ordinary sense, one that is not a by-product of the Law of Return. Whether, in what sense, and to what extent, Israel is indeed a successful and attractive country will no doubt be disputed. But beyond any political controversies and ideological disputes, it is obvious that if there were no truth at all in such a description, the whole phenomenon and dilemma of non-Jewish immigration to Israel, on a signifi- cant scale and primarily for economic reasons, would not arise – especially since the country’s security situation is not, in and of itself, one that encour- ages immigration. And indeed, the issue of non-Jewish immigration failed to arise during the first decades of the state’s independence, when its level of economic development was considerably lower than today. Israel does not consider itself a country of immigration in this sense, and official policies in this field have been quite restrictive. This is a field in which official policy, and some of the rhetoric accompanying it, clearly reflect the tension between the Jewish character of the state, as it is usually perceived, and multicultural norms. shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 202 2 0 2 ⏐ alexander yakobson Nevertheless, there have already been some sporadic efforts to tackle this phenomenon, such as the government’s decisions, under prime ministers Sharon and Olmert, to grant a status of “permanent resident” – opening a way to eventual naturalization – to specific categories of children of foreign workers born in Israel (or who have been living in the State since early child- hood) and educated in Israeli schools. More of this is bound to come in the future, though steps in this direction are also bound to be strongly opposed. The eventual scope and character of the phenomenon will depend on various factors. But it seems that the (largely successful, as I will argue here) integra- tion of non-Jewish immigrants who came under the Law of Return (because of family ties, often distant ones, with Jews) does provide a precedent for the possible integration of non-Jewish immigrants, on a significant scale, without such ties. Admittedly, the precedent is only partially relevant, but it does testify to the feasibility, in principle, of successful integration based on social and cultural factors. The Jewish state is, thus, an inherently multicultural enterprise. This is not a claim about intentions and ideological stances. Some Zionist leaders and strands within the Zionist movement, as well as Israeli politicians and groups within Israeli society, were (and are) more open to notions that in today’s terms can be defined as multicultural; others were (and are) less so, or not at all. Some of the most strident anti-multicultural rhetoric, and support for the most restrictive policies, come from Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious circles which, at the same time, are very insistent on the multicultural rights of their own communities; this is a paradox that is not unknown to interna- tional experience in the field, but is exacerbated in Israel by the Orthodox establishment’s considerable political clout. I will argue here that, regardless of anyone’s intentions, the multicultural reality created on the ground was the inevitable result of the creation of a nation-state for the Jewish people in the historic Palestine/Land of Israel in the twentieth century, given the basic char- acteristics of the people, the land, and contemporary conditions. While “multiculturalism” invariably denotes a significant degree of cul- tural pluralism de facto, and of granting legitimacy to cultural differences, the term may mean quite different things in different contexts. The more rad- ical ideological brand of multiculturalism requires a state to be “neutral” between different cultures (including, at least in principle, languages). The Jewish state, as such, clearly contradicts multiculturalism of this kind. As for the more moderate versions of multiculturalism, they are not merely com- patible with the Jewish state but, as I argue here, are its natural consequence. In recent years, the concept of multiculturalism has grown rather less popular than in the past; it has been repeatedly pronounced a failure by impor- tant European leaders in the context of large-scale immigration and the difficulties in the integration of immigrants that various European countries are facing.3 But it seems that what is questioned – and often rejected – under this headline nowadays is mainly the more radical sort of ideological multi- culturalism. This kind of multiculturalism, its opponents argue, has led in shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 203 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 0 3 some countries to situations where immigrants are in practice exempt from the need to master their new country’s language and to conform to some of its basic norms; sometimes, this also includes immunity from effective law- enforcement. Even in such cases, it seems likely that simple neglect has often actually played a bigger role than ideological multiculturalism; however, the former might provide a convenient justification for the latter. Probably none of the mainstream contemporary critics of multiculturalism would like to see a return to some old-style “mono-culturalism,” where the basic cultural rights of minority groups would not be respected. Moreover, it is widely accepted among those who stress the need for a higher degree of cultural integration that native national minorities – such as Israel’s Arab community – have a right to preserve their distinct culture to a greater degree than what is accepted in the case of immigrants. 2. The Arab Minority The cultural difference between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority is obviously much wider than the still-significant differences between the various subgroups within the former; of course, one should bear in mind that there is a considerable degree of cultural diversity within the Arab minority itself. We will see where non-Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return stand in this respect. Jews and Arabs in this country have always regarded themselves, virtually unanimously, as two distinct national groups, rather than as two ethnic communities (or even national subgroups4) shar- ing the same overall national identity. The Arab community is, thus, a national minority par excellence. The cultural differences between the two communities include a difference in language and a clear religious divide. Arabic is recognized by the State as the second official language (though this principle is not consistently implemented in practice), and the great major- ity of Arab children receive their education in state schools where Arabic is the language of instruction. Both communities regard themselves as con- nected with large populations outside the state’s citizen body: the Israeli Jews with the Jewish people of the Diaspora, and the Israeli Arabs with the Palestinian people, and, in a larger sense, with the Arab world as a whole; both communities perceive this connection as an important part of their identity. All these things follow naturally from the very emergence of a Jewish- majority state in this part of the Arab-Muslim Middle East. The prolonged national conflict inevitably makes the cultural differences more significant politically. But even if the two states envisaged by the United Nations Partition Plan in 1947, a Jewish state and an Arab state, had been established peace- fully then and continued to live in peace ever since, it seems very improbable that the basic map of cultures, languages, religions, and identities would be different. shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 204 2 0 4 ⏐ alexander yakobson Thus, one cannot be surprised by the persistence of strong cultural differ- ences between these two large groups of Israeli citizens. The question, rather, should be whether a sufficiently cohesive civic community can exist under such conditions (exacerbated as they are by the ongoing national conflict). This topic goes beyond the scope of this chapter. The picture is complicated and contradictory. Alongside undeniable tensions, apparently unbridgeable ideological differences, worrying gaps between the two populations, griev- ances strongly voiced by the minority and quite a lot of angry rhetoric on both sides (the heights of which are usually reached during outbreaks of actual fighting between Israel and its Arab neighbors, when leaders and representa- tives of the Arab community openly express their solidarity with the other side), it is equally undeniable that the actual level of violence between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel is and has been, over time, very low. It is quite remarkably low, considering the acuteness of the Israeli-Arab and Israeli- Palestinian national conflict, whose violent expressions take place literally “next door,” and in comparison to relevant international (not to mention regional) experience.5 Furthermore, Israel faces no problem of ethno-national separatism – nobody wants to secede from it. The vast majority of Arab citi- zens are appalled by suggestions that have come from right-wing hard-liners like Avigdor Liberman that Arab towns and villages alongside the “Green Line” should come under the jurisdiction of a future Palestinian state as part of “land swaps” – in other words, not that these Arab citizens should go, in the future, to the Palestinian state, but that the Palestinian state should come to them. This they reject categorically. Moreover, polls conducted among Israel’s Arab citizens consistently suggest that their attitude to the state is more positive than the impression one gets from the rhetoric of the Arab community’s representatives and leaders – first and foremost, members of the Knesset from Arab parties. Among other things, the percentage of Arab citizens who gave a positive answer to the highly loaded question “Are you proud to be an Israeli?’’ fluctuated between 40% and over 50% during the last decade. This figure is, to be sure, much lower than among the country’s Jewish citizens (close to 90%), but many will find it surprisingly high in the circumstances. It is often argued that Israel’s official designation as a Jewish state makes it impossible in principle for any non-Jewish citizen – and certainly for an Arab citizen in the midst of the Arab–Israeli conflict – to feel genuine identification with, and civic pride in, the state. These figures do not confirm such a view. Similarly, there is a consis- tent absolute majority among Arab respondents that accepts Israel’s designation as a genuine democracy – contrary to what is usually claimed by Arab elites – and opposes all forms of protest that are contrary to the laws of the state. Most of the Arab citizens polled also consistently agree that Israel “is a good place to live in.”6 At the same time, it can hardly be claimed that members of the Knesset from Arab parties, who send a very different message on their attitude to the state, do not represent their voters. Not only does a large majority of Arab shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 205 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 0 5 citizens vote for those parties, but the same polls show that most of them express confidence in their representatives and refuse to define their positions as too radical. (This, incidentally, shows that they do not feel constrained, in any way, to please the establishment and the Jewish majority in their answers.) It appears that the basic attitude of the Arab minority to the state is deeply ambivalent – which, under the present circumstances, should be considered good news. Most of them share the Palestinian national narrative, and they are highly critical of the Jewish state and of its various flaws; at the same time, they are not at all unaware of its considerable advantages. Those who speak in the name of this community give expression to the negative side of this ambivalence well enough, but the other side also exists, and is not at all negli- gible. It probably goes a long way to account for the remarkably low level of inter-community violence. At any rate, cultural and ethnic pluralism in this field is one of the fundamental characteristics of the State of Israel, as is natural in the case of a large national minority. Prof. Sammy Smooha, one of the leading sociologists in Israel, who studies the Arab community and is, in general, highly critical of the state’s policies toward it, describes the situation regarding the cultural right of the Arab minority in Israel as follows: The Arabs . . . are recognized as a minority, and they are granted all the collective rights which are vital to the maintenance of separate exis- tence: the free use of their language, a separate educational system in their language, media in their language (radio, television, press), cultural institutions in their language (art, literature, theatre), and sepa- rate religious institutions and separate religious courts guaranteeing endogamy. These institutional arrangements are financed in part or in full by the State. Furthermore, there is recognition of their right to be different, they are allowed to live in separate communities, and no pres- sure is brought to bear on them to assimilate.7 None of this is meant to present an idealized picture of the status of the Arab minority in a country that, on top of all the other issues of majority- minority relations, is affected adversely by the long-protracted Arab-Israeli and Palestinian–Israeli conflict.8 But the basic problem is, clearly, an insuffi- cient level of civic inclusion and integration, rather than any difficulty, on the part of the minority, to preserve its distinct identity.9 3. Jewish-Israeli Society and Cultural Pluralism As for the multicultural aspect of the Jewish people in Israel, it seems obvious that a notion of peoplehood and (trans)national identity that regards Jews from Poland, Yemen, Germany, Morocco, and Ethiopia as belonging to the same “people” – even before their immigration to Israel and the resultant shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 206 2 0 6 ⏐ alexander yakobson processes of integration – is fundamentally and radically multicultural. The national community, thus perceived, consists of subgroups with huge cultural differences between them; this applies already to the subdivisions within the two broad categories of European Jews (from Eastern, Western, and Central Europe) and Middle Eastern Jews, and a fortiori to differences across this line. A nation created by, and continuously open to, large-scale immigration from numerous countries belonging to those broad categories is by definition a multicultural and multiethnic one. The differences of ethnic descent within Israel’s Jewish population are immediately obvious to anyone who has ever taken a walk in one of Israel’s towns and cities. The term “multiethnic” may sound surprising, considering that the Jewish- Israeli identity is widely considered an example par excellence of “ethnic nationalism.” And indeed, it is ethnic, or ethnocultural, in two important senses. First, it comprises only a part of the country’s population, and is thus not congruent with citizenship. When a country’s citizen body consists of two distinct national groups, as both of them perceive themselves, both of them are inevitably “ethnic” in this sense. Moreover, it is an important part of the traditional Jewish culture that Jews perceive themselves as an ethnocultural group sharing a common descent – as descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But even assuming that this is literally true (which, of course, there is no way of proving or disproving), it is obvious that since the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have been dispersed throughout the world for two millennia (and for many of them, the Diaspora in fact started much earlier), the modern Jewish people is inevitably both influenced by the different local cultures and includes a substantial element of local-origin ethnic descent. In fact, Zionism is the only modern ideological framework that makes it possible to regard all of the diverse Jewish communities as belonging to the same people, as sharing the same (trans)national identity. For those who, in modern times, have regarded the Jews as merely a religious community, as opposed to “a people,” Jews in Poland and in Yemen certainly cannot be regarded as sharing the same peoplehood. Those who have favored assimila- tion – not necessarily a complete one – have always regarded themselves, and sought to be regarded, as sharing the same peoplehood with their non-Jewish compatriots. Communist movements and regimes originally favored assimi- lation as the best way to solve “the Jewish problem.” Later, in the Soviet Union (and following the Soviet example, elsewhere), a view was adopted according to which the Jews could, indeed, constitute a national or ethnic minority within each country with a considerable Jewish population. But at the same time, the idea of a “worldwide Jewish nation” (in fact, of a Jewish people comprising all of the different Jewish communities) was strongly rejected, and Jews in each country were proclaimed to be closer, culturally, to their non- Jewish compatriots than to Jews in other countries. The Bund, once a powerful competitor of Zionism, was an Eastern European Jewish secular and socialist movement that adopted a model of “Diaspora nationalism” and aimed at attaining cultural national autonomy shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 207 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 0 7 in those areas where the great majority of the world’s Jews lived in the first decades of the twentieth century. For the Bund movement, the “Jewish people” on whose behalf it was waging its struggle consisted of the large Yiddish-speaking Jewish population in Eastern Europe, whose popular language it regarded as the national language of the Jewish people. As opposed to this, Zionism sought a national home, and eventually an inde- pendent state, for the “Jewish people” living in all of the different countries of the world, East and West.10 Critics of Zionism have often objected to the idea of a worldwide Jewish peoplehood, arguing that the cultural differences between the various Jewish communities were too great for such a notion to be realistic; in other words, they have found the Zionist notion of peoplehood too multicultural for them to stomach. It is true that today, it is much more usual than in the past to accept a multiplicity or a mixture of identities, including ethnic, cultural, and even national ones; in this sense, strong transnational ties are not necessarily regarded as precluding national ties with members of other communities in the same country. Still, it is the Zionist approach that regards, as no other does, what is common to Jews from all over the world, despite any cultural differences between them, as the decisive component of their identity. Of course, the Zionist movement did not invent anything new in this respect – Jewish religion and tradition have always regarded Jews everywhere as belonging to “the people of Israel.” But this traditional notion of common peoplehood was a feeling, a cultural trait, and an ideal, not a social reality. Jews from different countries, by definition, did not live together, much less did they run a state together. Before this ideal was implemented and put to the test in an actual modern nation, there was no way of knowing whether the beliefs and feelings in question would prove stronger than the huge cultural gaps between the different groups involved. During the first decade of Israel’s independence, in the 1950s, and still in the early 1960s, the official policy was of a “melting pot” rather than mul- ticulturalism. This was very much in the spirit of the times in any country that experienced large-scale immigration. Most of the huge influx of immi- grants (roughly twice the original Jewish population of the country) originated in the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East – Sephardic Jews, or, according to a designation which later became more usual, Mizrahi (Eastern) Jews. They were, on the average (and despite many variations within this broad category) more traditional and religiously observant than the society that received them. Alongside them came numerous Holocaust survivors from Europe. Among the latter, too, there were many religiously observant people, and many of them were relatively less influenced by the Zionist ideology (including its then-dominant Labor version). Of course, even before the Holocaust and the establishment of the state, many of Europe’s Jews fleeing anti-Semitism and persecution had found themselves in Palestine for reasons that were not – or not primarily – ideological. Typically, they were strongly influenced by the cultures of their different shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 208 2 0 8 ⏐ alexander yakobson countries of origin, while their Jewish cultural identity (either religious or secular) was often weak; most of them spoke no Hebrew when they arrived. The degree of cultural diversity in this society (which already then included a significant “Mizrahi” element) was very high even before the mass immi- gration during the first period of Israel’s independence; but it was increased hugely by this influx. The Israeli establishment that presided over the immigration and integra- tion (“absorption”) of these people was overwhelmingly Ashkenazi (European), reflecting the large Ashkenazi majority that existed before the mass immigration of these years (which ultimately made the Jews of Middle Eastern origin a majority). The avowed aim of the integration policy of those years was to create a shared modern Jewish-Israeli identity and cul- ture, transcending “communal” differences (that is, ones based on the different countries of origin), with the Hebrew language at its center. In practice, the model of a common Israeli identity fostered by the state was heavily influenced by the mainstream culture of the original Ashkenazi majority and of the Labor leadership’s notions of how a modern Jewish soci- ety should look. Among other things, this society, while preserving some elements of Jewish tradition, was conceived, ideally, as primarily secular.11 This policy is today often criticized for cultural insensitivity and an Ashkenazi (European) attitude of superiority, in light of currently prevailing norms of cultural pluralism. At the time, in the 1950s and (mostly early) 1960s, the strongest opposition came from religious parties that accused the Labor-dominated establishment of high-handed secularization, and especially of erasing the traditional culture of Jews from Middle Eastern countries. However, the “melting” effect of this policy was limited, already during its heyday, by several important factors. The multiparty parliamentary regime limited the power of the government (though at that time its power was very considerable, and certainly much stronger than today) to shape the cultural character of society and modernize it in a way that clashed with communal and religious traditions. Not even Ben-Gurion at the height of his power and prestige had anything approaching the power of Atatürk in Turkey. The Israeli electoral system – pure countrywide proportional repre- sentation, with a low electoral threshold – made sure that all Israeli governments since the establishment of the state have been coalition cabi- nets. Mapai (Labor Party) was at the center of these coalitions, but always had to accommodate junior coalition parties. In most cases, the coalition cabinets included religious parties. These, naturally, gained considerable clout and influenced many of the arrangements that shaped the country’s character – including the establishment, alongside the “general” and pre- dominantly secular state education system, of a system of religious schools financed, wholly or partly, by the state. One of the basic tools through which many a modern state has imposed a large measure of cultural uniformity and its version of modernization has thus stood at the disposal of the Israeli state only to a limited degree. Ideologically and rhetorically, it was always shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 209 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 0 9 acknowledged that the Jewish people consisted of the various “tribes of Israel.” Thus, some (limited) legitimacy to diversity within this broad cate- gory was always conceded, while political and electoral constraints made sure that the establishment had to concede more than it would have wished to. Finally, the very scope of immigration during that period – with immi- grants receiving citizenship and the vote, in a pluralistic and fragmented political system, upon arrival – imposed its own constraints. In the end, the success of the “melting pot” policy of Israel’s early years in shaping the cultural character of Israeli society was limited, as it was bound to be in these circumstances. It certainly succeeded in turning Hebrew into an overwhelmingly dominant national language – a very significant achievement in its own right; but this approach has been far less successful in limiting the influence of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Judaism among the country’s Jewish population in general, and among the Mizrahi Jews in particular. It is important to bear in mind that, in Israel, a greater influence of religion and religious tradition also means a society with a greater degree of “communal” cultural distinctness. This is due to certain differences in religious ritual and observance between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews, as well as to the fact that the distinct cultural characteristics of the latter are strongly imprinted by Jewish religious tradition – even when, as often happens, the people in ques- tion are not strictly observant, and despite the fact that the most strict ultra-Orthodox are predominantly Ashkenazi. The size of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community and its influence and political clout are certainly beyond anything that Israel’s founders could have imagined or found desirable. This both contributes to the richness of the country’s cultural mosaic and serves as a reminder that real-life multicultur- alism, as distinct from the often idealized and sanitized discourse on it, is fraught with challenges and paradoxes. The right to be culturally different – very different – is often most strongly insisted on by those who not merely find it easy to deny others’ rights (as understood in a modern liberal democ- racy), but sincerely regard denying them as a condition for preserving the integrity of their own cultural identity. Sometimes, the internal contradictions of cultural diversity can be assuaged by more diversity. The influx of the overwhelmingly secular Russian-speaking immigrants of the 1990s greatly enhanced the secular element within Israeli society. So did Israel’s increasing integration in the global capitalist economy. The founders would surely have been dismayed at the sight of the large numbers of pupils attending state-financed Haredi schools in today’s Israel; the volume of private economic activity that takes place on Saturday would probably not have pleased them either. The real-life Israeli society, whose foundations they laid in the 1950s, turned out to be a complicated and often paradoxical mixture of super-modernity, ultra-Orthodoxy, and everything in between. shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 210 2 1 0 ⏐ alexander yakobson 4. The “Melting Pot” Abandoned The early “melting pot” policies were, over time, progressively abandoned in favor of a much greater, and growing, degree of acceptance of cultural diver- sity. The 1960s, in this respect, were already very different from the 1950s. In 1977, Labor lost power to a coalition of right-wing, religious, and ultra- Orthodox parties; the strong support that the right-wing Likud enjoyed then, and has enjoyed since, can be attributed to a considerable degree (though certainly not exclusively) to massive support by Jews from Arab countries, who have often been critical of the way they, or their parents, were received and treated by the Labor establishment. Under the right-wing coalitions that have dominated Israeli politics for most of the time since 1977, the Haredi community strengthened its political influence and also grew in numbers to a very considerable degree, due to its (much) higher birth rate. Though ultra- Orthodoxy is originally an Ashkenazi phenomenon – a strongly conservative reaction to radical modernization and secularization in Europe – it “spilled over” to the Mizrahi population. This phenomenon is represented by Shas – a party of Orthodox and traditional Mizrahi voters with an ultra-Orthodox or near-ultra-Orthodox leadership. It has become a very significant force in Israeli society and politics, and has been able to win state recognition and support for its own system of schools. It is certainly regarded by many Mizrahi Jews as having empowered them, while its opponents accuse it of hampering their modernization and social mobility. By the time the massive wave of Russian-speaking immigrants from the former Soviet Union came to Israel in the 1990s and made their own, very significant, contribution to the country’s cultural diversity, multiculturalism had become a significant point of reference in both descriptive and normative Israeli discourse;12 the melting pot policies of earlier days belonged to a distant (in Israeli terms) and much-criticized past. The evaluation of these policies in the early stages of Israel’s statehood, and of the general attitude of the Israeli establishment and society toward the immigrants of the 1950s, in particular towards the Mizrahi Jews, is an intensely controversial topic, with wide-ranging political and cultural implications; this controversy is far beyond the scope of this chapter. The melting pot policies are often said to have failed. They have certainly failed to realize the more far-reaching hopes of the establishment and original majority population of shaping an Israeli society in their own image and likeness. (Different assessments of that period’s history will attach different weight to those hopes.) At the same time, the very abandonment of these melting pot policies may testify to a widespread feeling that they are no longer needed, since a strong enough common ground between the different communities has already emerged.13 It is, however, worth pointing out that there is a certain paradox involved in this debate, as regards the most radical critics of Israel’s record of tack- ling the mass immigration of the 1950s – chiefly, though not exclusively, of its treatment of immigrants from Arab countries. These are often apt to shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 211 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 1 1 “deconstruct” and sometimes explicitly reject the Zionist ideology on which the state itself, and its immigration and integration policies, were based.14 (Of course, it should be stressed that there is plenty of criticism in this field that does not share this ideological outlook.) But, in fact, if one rejects (or simply regards as irrelevant) the Zionist point of view, and views the immi- gration of the 1950s as, indeed, simply immigration (rather than “repatriation” and an “ingathering of the exiles”) there is clearly much less to criticize. The story of integrating the immigrants into Israeli society then appears more clearly as a multicultural adventure – all in all, an extraordi- narily successful one, despite huge challenges and difficulties, by any reasonable comparative standard. If the people who came to Israel during those years are to be regarded as immigrants in the ordinary sense (that is, people from widely divergent national cultures and identities, speaking numerous different languages, coming to a foreign country and trying to build a common nation there), rather than, as the Zionist ideology would have it, sons and daughters of the same “Jewish people” who shared some- thing in common that was always stronger than whatever separated them – then the story of their immigration and integration becomes doubly remark- able. Certainly, no other country in modern times, including the classical immigration nations, has undergone and achieved anything comparable in the field of immigration (assuming that this is a case of “normal” immigra- tion). No other country received, within the space of a decade, immigrants from such a variety of origins on such a massive scale – far exceeding the original population; conferred on all of the immigrants citizenship and vot- ing rights upon arrival; and succeeded – despite all the tensions, difficulties, grievances, and gaps – in merging them into a community with an over- whelming sense of common nationhood and speaking, overwhelmingly, the same language. And it achieved all this with a negligible level of violence between the various groups of immigrants, and while preserving a function- ing multi-party parliamentary democracy. No country has received a comparable wave of immigrants while facing the enormous economic diffi- culties of Israel’s early years. No other community of European origin (as Israel’s Jewish population was, overwhelmingly, when the state was estab- lished) has accepted, in such a short space of time, a comparable number of immigrants from the Middle East – to the extent of becoming a minority in the country. From the Zionist perspective, which regards the immigrants in question as sharing the same peoplehood even while still in their countries of origin, all these things should in principle be regarded as quite natural. From this perspective, it is unremarkable that second-generation immigrants from Arab and Muslim countries in Israel have served in such positions as minister of defense, finance, foreign affairs, justice, education, and interior, as well as chief of staff of the IDF or attorney general, or in the highest civil service posi- tions in the ministry of finance. On the other hand, one may wonder why this population is yet to produce a prime minister, and it is a cause for concern shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 212 2 1 2 ⏐ alexander yakobson that it is still clearly under-represented in some of the country’s elites, notably in academia, the media, and the judiciary. So is the fact that there are still, on the average, significant income gaps between people of European and Middle Eastern origin. In terms of the Zionist ideology and its emphasis on the unity of the Jewish people, it is barely legitimate to refer to the fact that the European-origin population of the country became a minority – in fact, turned itself into a minority – within a short space of time by accepting and actively encouraging mass immigration from non-European countries; and it sounds strange to claim the lack of violent friction between the various Jewish communities (despite all the tensions and controversies) as any kind of an achievement. Hence, the Zionist perspective seems to provide the best basis for discus- sion if one wishes to criticize the many shortcomings and failures of this process. Compared with the Zionist ideal of Jewish solidarity – as opposed to what can normally be expected from a country allowing foreigners to immi- grate – there is obviously a lot to criticize. Of course, even a Zionist perspective, if it is to be reasonable and realistic, avoiding excessive dogma- tism, cannot ignore the huge objective difficulties involved in this process; but it is this perspective that provides a basis for arguing that better ways should have been found of dealing with them. If, however, one wishes to analyze what has happened in ordinary, non- ideological terms of immigration and integration of immigrants, taking into account the actual cultural differences between the different groups and applying the criteria usually used in such cases – first of all, as regards language – the picture looks quite different. Seen from this angle, the mass immigration that has shaped Israeli society appears most clearly as a radical multicultural enterprise. 5. “The Russians Are Coming” Jewish immigration to Israel was thus always going to make the country much more culturally diverse – not only because of the highly diverse character of the modern Jewish Diaspora, but also for an additional reason. It is part of this diversity that some – but not all – Diaspora Jewish communities have long been characterized by high rates of intermarriage. Hence, mass immigration of Jews to Israel from these countries has always meant that many non-Jews would be among the immigrants. This has indeed occurred since the estab- lishment of the state in 1948 and even in preceding decades, when many mixed families immigrated to Mandatory Palestine. This phenomenon stirred little public attention or controversy, since the people in question were, as a rule, successfully integrated into the Hebrew-speaking Jewish society in the country. Some of them converted to Judaism – the traditional way for a non- Jew to become Jewish. In many cases, this conversion had little, if any, religious significance as far as the converts and their subsequent lifestyle were shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 213 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 1 3 concerned. Others did not convert, but nevertheless became part of the Jewish-Israeli society, both socially and culturally. In the 1990s, a huge wave of immigration from the former USSR brought to the country large numbers of non-Jewish immigrants. Out of approxi- mately one million people that came to the country, some 300,000 were “non-Jewish.”15 The sheer scale of the phenomenon focused public attention on it.16 The term “non-Jewish,” in this context, needs unpacking. The Israeli Law of Return grants every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel; the Citizenship Law grants every such “returnee” automatic citizenship upon arrival. The term “Jew” was not defined when the Law of Return was adopted in 1950, and various controversies arose as to its meaning in this context. In 1970, under the pressure of religious parties, the law was amended by introducing a restrictive definition, based on the halakhah – Jewish religious law. “A Jew,” for the purpose of the law, is a child of a Jewish mother or a person who has converted to Judaism; the religious parties have tried since then, unsuccess- fully, to have the law amended further by specifying that the conversion should be according to the (Orthodox) religious law. But the (partial) Orthodox success on this issue was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. The restrictive Orthodox impulse clashed not only with more liberal attitudes that favored allowing non-Jewish relatives of Jews to come along (and sought to broaden the category of people allowed in to all those who had suffered, or could have suffered, from Nazi racial persecution). It also clashed with the Zionist imperative of encouraging as many Jews as possible – including those who want to bring their non-Jewish relatives along – to come to Israel. Thus, while the official definition of Jewishness, for the purpose of the Law of Return, was largely “subcontracted” by the state to the religious establishment, the actual reality on the ground was affected in a very different direction by another amendment to the law, passed simultaneously. A wide circle of people related to Jews by family ties were given the same rights as Jewish immigrants: spouses of Jews, children (of a Jewish father), grandchil- dren of Jews (one grandparent out of four is enough for this purpose), as well as their spouses. Some of the 300,000 “non-Jewish” immigrants in question – especially children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers – had a significant Jewish element in their identity prior to their immigration. Defining such people as “non-Jewish” is problematic, and it could be expected that their integration in Israel would proceed more or less in the same way as that of ordinary Jewish newcomers (except for some obstacles created by the Orthodox religious establishment, as we will see below). But in many other cases, the immigrants in question lacked any significant Jewish identity or awareness when they came to Israel. Their status is in some way paradoxical: The country to which they have immigrated conferred on them its citizenship upon arrival – some- thing that a “normal” immigrant in a “normal” country can only dream of. At the same time, it regards them officially as not belonging to its majority shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 214 2 1 4 ⏐ alexander yakobson people. It can thus be argued that it imposes on them, willy-nilly, the status of a national minority (although, as we will see, this is not what is actually happening). Formally, the only way to join the Jewish people – as opposed to acquiring Israeli citizenship, which is not conditional on Jewish peoplehood (for either the native-born or immigrants) – is to convert to Judaism. However, the great majority of the people in question, while certainly willing and eager to become part of the Hebrew-speaking Israeli society, do not wish to undergo a religious conversion. The Orthodox religious establishment in the country has adopted a strict model of conversion, requiring converts to become fully observant Orthodox Jews. This is acceptable only to a small minority among the immigrants. A more liberal and less exclusively Orthodox model of conversion would probably have been acceptable to significantly greater numbers – but certainly not to all of the people in question. Nor is it accept- able, as a matter of principle, that conversion should be the only way to join the Jewish people in Israel. A modern national identity, in a modern nation- state, should, in principle, be open to people wishing to adopt it on the basis of social and cultural integration and common citizenship. Are we then witnessing the emergence of a second large national minority in Israel? Something along these lines has indeed been suggested.17 The Jewish identity in Israel, it has been argued, is too narrowly “ethno-religious” to be able to accommodate and integrate large numbers of immigrants who are Jewish neither by ethnic descent nor by religion (even though most of them, it should be noted, do not have a non-Jewish religious affiliation either – because of the Soviet tradition of secularism and atheism).18 Only an inclu- sive “civic nationalism” would, according to this logic, be capable of successfully integrating these people without creating an additional “incon- gruence” between national identity and state citizenship. But this kind of civic nationalism is impossible in Israel in any case, regardless of the issue of the immigrants in question, because the civic community includes a large (Arab) national minority and, hence, a (Jewish) “national majority” both perceiving themselves as full-fledged distinct national groups.19 On the other hand, no immigration policy based on “normal” criteria of national interest in the civic sense would have allowed, in the first place, this group (both the Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union) to immigrate to Israel en masse and receive citizenship upon arrival, without any restriction or selec- tion based on the country’s needs in the ordinary non-ideological sense. Historically, the same was true for Holocaust survivors, for Jews from Middle Eastern countries, and for Jews from Ethiopia. All of these were received and naturalized upon arrival regardless of their health, wealth, education, skills, age, and numbers. The integration of the Russian-speaking immigrants who came in the 1990s is widely regarded today as, all in all, a success story – despite the obvi- ously inevitable difficulties and frictions that accompany any immigration on such a scale. The “non-Jewish” part of this community is to a large degree part of this story – although they have undoubtedly faced both ethnic preju- shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 215 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 1 5 dice (a phenomenon by no means unknown to Jewish immigrants, but known even better, no doubt, to non-Jewish ones) and obstacles resulting from the influence of the religious establishment (see below). The great majority of the Russian-speaking immigrants of non-Jewish origin clearly wish to integrate, both socially and culturally, in the Jewish-Israeli society, and are doing so successfully.20 They have become an integral part of the society in which they live and work. They speak Hebrew; their children go to Hebrew-speaking public schools and on to military service; Saturday is their day of rest and the calendar by which they live and work is punctuated by Jewish holidays; they have adopted various aspects of the Israeli majority culture – including the ones influenced, also among secular people, by Jewish tradition (including the non-Orthodox celebration of Jewish holidays). Israel’s Independence Day is their national holiday. The overwhelming majority of them are, without ques- tion, patriotic; in not a few cases “nationalistic” would perhaps be the most suitable definition. At the same time, the Russian-speaking community (people of both Jewish and non-Jewish origin) preserves a substantial measure of cultural distinctiveness – first and foremost, as regards the Russian language. Under the norms prevailing in Israel today – that are very different from the “melting pot” policies of the early years – this is not considered incompatible with successful integration (though sometimes excessive “ghet- toization” might be decried). A Russian-speaking state-financed TV channel and radio station, Russian newspapers and numerous cultural institutions (often supported by the state), signs in Russian in many public places, and strong “Russian” influence in the political system (though parties confined to Russian-speaking immigrants have had no long-term success) have become a familiar feature of the country’s public life.21 The formally non-Jewish status of the Russian immigrants in question has one major practical consequence: in the area of personal status. Matters of marriage and divorce have been, controversially and problematically, handed over by Israeli state law to the different religious communities; in the case of the Jewish community, to the Orthodox rabbinate. “Non-Jewish” citizens thus cannot legally marry their Jewish compatriots in Israel. However, all Israeli citizens, regardless of religion, can be legally married in neighboring Cyprus (where a whole fast-track system for this purpose, catering to Israelis, has been created). Upon their return to Israel, state authorities are obliged to register such people as married, under liberal Supreme Court rulings inter- preting the law that provides for legal recognition of marriages contracted abroad. This widely used loophole is, of course, an unsatisfactory alternative to introducing civil marriage, which has till now been prevented by the reli- gious parties’ clout in Israeli politics. The status quo in this field is in clear breach of international standards of civil rights, and should be changed. It does not, however, actually prevent anybody from being married, and is not a serious impediment to the full integration of the people in question into the Hebrew-speaking Israeli society. It is obvious that the community in question cannot be realistically shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 216 2 1 6 ⏐ alexander yakobson described as a national minority. All in all, while it does not belong to the Hebrew-speaking Jewish majority in Israel formally, it does belong to it (increasingly so over time, and certainly its second generation) culturally and socially;22 and it should be remembered that these people have already received, upon arrival, the most important thing that a nation-state can confer on a successfully integrating immigrant – the nation’s citizenship. Hence, it is no longer true in practice, as opposed to theory, that the only way to join the Jewish people is through religious conversion. The process by which the immi- grants in question join the Jewish-Israeli society – and thus, the Jewish people – has been dubbed “sociological conversion,”23 by analogy with, and as distinct from, religious conversion. This traditional way of becoming Jewish, it should be noted, is still available and is fully accepted by the secular part of the Jewish-Israeli society. Religious conversion involves adopting what is indisputably the traditional culture of the Jewish people, still adhered to by a large part of the Jewish society in Israel; moreover, different aspects of Jewish religious tradition still influence, in various degrees, the culture of many secular Israeli Jews. But the traditional religious culture of the Jews is no longer – and has not been, for a long time – the sole version of Jewish culture; a large part of the Israeli society practices a modern, mainly secular, version, based to a large extent on the Hebrew language. Those who adopt it, becoming part of this society and of the citizen body of the state, should be regarded as having joined the Jewish people in Israel. Conclusion The Law of Return, often criticized as “ethno-religious,” has in fact made the Jewish identity in Israel less religious and less ethnic (in the narrow sense of being based on ethnic descent), and more cultural and civic (not in the sense of comprising all of the country’s citizens, but in so far as it can be adopted through a mechanism of cultural and social integration provided by the state). It has also – continuously, since the establishment of the state, as regards Jewish immigration itself – made Israel much more multicultural. The non- Jewish immigrants who came to Israel and were naturalized upon arrival do not represent a fringe phenomenon; the numbers are such that we are speaking about a significant section of the country’s population. Nor is the phenom- enon accidental. Despite much of what is said about Israel, and also much of what can be heard – sometimes very loudly and stridently – within Israel itself, and despite the undeniable tensions between the notion of a Jewish state and the idea of multiculturalism (including vis-à-vis immigration), the multicul- tural aspects of any real-life Jewish state were always bound to be very significant. But there is no doubt that the greatest challenge to Israeli democracy and Israeli multiculturalism is posed by the task of successful civic integration of the Arab minority – not a community of immigrants, but a large native shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 217 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 1 7 national minority that wishes to be integrated while preserving its distinct culture and national identity, without adopting the identity of the majority people. The aim in this case should be to foster a notion of common “Israeliness” as citizenship (rather than a common national identity) – but citizenship in a “thick” sense that goes much beyond formal legal association with the state. The ongoing Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian national conflict makes this task much more difficult, but no less crucially important. It can be argued that the task cannot be completely fulfilled until the national conflict between the two peoples is resolved in the way accepted by the inter- national community and, at least officially, by both sides: the two-state solution. But all possible efforts should be made to fulfill this task as much as possible, even in the absence of such a solution. Notes 1 Baruch Kimmerling, for example, argues that a Jewish state, as such, is essentially incompatible with multiculturalism, chiefly due to the status of the Arab minority vis-à-vis the Jewish majority, but also because of the ties between Jewish religion and state. See Baruch Kimmerling, “The New Israelis: Multiple Cultures without Multiculturalism,” Alpayim 16 (1998): 263–308 [Hebrew]. Similarly, Majid Al- Haj argues that, despite some multicultural elements, Israel’s basic character as a Jewish state precludes any genuine multiculturalism. See Majid Al-Haj, “Multiculturalism in Deeply Divided Societies: The Israeli Case,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 26 (2002): 169–183, especially the summary on p. 182. 2 See, for example, James S. Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land? The “Canaanite” Critique of Israel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). 3 The literature on multiculturalism and its dilemmas is vast. For a few examples, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 237–257; Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe,” American Journal of Comparative Law 58, no. 1 (2009): 1–45; Amnon Rubinstein, “The Decline, but not Demise, of Multiculturalism,” Israel Law Review 40, no. 3 (2007): 763–810; Michelle Williams, ed., The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 4 As, for example, the different “nationalities” in Spain are defined by the Spanish constitution as subdivisions of a single “Spanish nation.” But it should be noted that this definition is disputed, and both the Catalan and Basque autonomous parliaments have passed resolutions asserting that both peoples are full-fledged “nations.” See on this, with a comparison to the Israeli situation, Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2009), 167–171. 5 “[V]iolence between Arabs and Jews [in Israel] is negligible in light of the deep divisions between them and in comparison with the rampant violence in other deeply divided societies, even just across the 1949 Green Line” – Sammy Smooha, shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 218 2 1 8 ⏐ alexander yakobson Arab–Jewish Relations in Israel: Alienation and Rapprochement (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 7. 6 The main source of this data is the annual Israeli Democracy Index, published by the Israel Democracy Institute in Jerusalem (Tamar Hermann et al.) – a wide- ranging survey of public opinion on various issues regarding democracy and attitudes to the state and its institutions. For the 2013 report see: http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/idi-press/publications/english-books/the-israeli- democracy-index-2013. See also Sammy Smooha, Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel (above n. 5); Sammy Smooha, Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab–Jewish Relations in Israel 2012 (University of Haifa and The Israel Democracy Institute, 2012) [Hebrew]. For an abridged version in English, see: http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/idi-press/publications/english-books/still-playing-by- the-rules-the-index-of-arab-jewish-relations-in-israel-2012–english/. Similarly, see the surveys on patriotism and national resilience submitted to the annual Herzliya Conference. This article summarizes some features common to these polls, though there are also significant differences between them. Sammy Smooha’s findings indicate a considerable worsening in the indicators of the Arab minority’s attitude to the State during the 2000s (after an improvement in the 1990s), but they are still within the parameters mentioned here. See in detail on this, and generally on the attitude of the Arab minority to the state, Alexander Yakobson, “Zionism and Multiculturalism,” Law & Business: IDC Law Review 14 (2012): 704–713 [Hebrew]. 7 Smooha goes on to note that, on the other hand, “the Arabs in Israel are not recog- nized as a Palestinian national minority, their national leadership is not recognized, nor is their right to autonomy and their ties with the Palestinian people.” See Sammy Smooha, “The Regime of the State of Israel: Civil Democracy, Non-democracy or Ethnic Democracy?” Soziologia yisre’elit 2, no. 2 (2000): 593–594 [Hebrew]. It should be noted that the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, signed in 1995, requires neither autonomy nor official recognition of a national autonomy as such (provided that the minority’s substantive rights are respected). The various European states that have signed the convention vary in their policies in this respect. In the case of Israel, precisely because its national character is explicitly defined by law, an explicit legislative recognition of the Arab community’s status as a national minority status is clearly desirable. On the civic status of Israel’s Arab citizens and the Arab community as a national minority, with reference to international and European norms, and specifically to the European Framework Convention, see Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the Family of Nations (above n. 4), 104–123. See also Oded Haklai, Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 8 For some strongly critical assessments, see for example: As’ad Ghanem, Nadim Rouhana, and Oren Yiftachel, “Questioning ‘Ethnic Democracy’: A Response to Sammy Smooha,” Israel Studies 3 (1998): 253–267; Oren Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” Constellations 6 (1999): 364–390; Amal Jamal, Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of Ingenuity (London: Routledge, 2011). For a different perspective, see Dan Schueftan, Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora Bitan, Dvir, 2011) [Hebrew]. 9 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, in their book Being Israeli: The Dynamics of shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 219 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 1 9 Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), distinguish between liberal citizenship, which the Arab minority possesses to a considerable, though imperfect, degree (including the ability to defend its rights and combat discrimination through the country’s judicial system) and republican citizenship, which, according to them, it lacks. They defined the latter as sharing in the domi- nant concept of the common good, which, they argue, is identified with the good of the Jewish majority. It might be argued that the readiness of many Arab citi- zens to aver pride in being Israeli indicates that the “republican” aspect of their citizenship, in this sense, though certainly insufficient, is not altogether lacking – despite the highly unfavorable circumstances of a national minority in the midst of a national conflict between what it regards as its wider national community and the majority people of the state. See also Sammy Smooha, “Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel: A Deeply Divided Society,” in Anita Shapira, ed., Israeli Identity in Transition (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 31–68. 10 On the Bund and Zionism, see, for example, Zvi Y. Gitelman, ed., The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics: Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003). See there, in Gitelman’s introduction, “A Century of Jewish Politics in Eastern Europe: The Legacy of the Bund and the Zionist Movement,” on the significance of the adoption of Hebrew (as opposed to Yiddish) as a national tongue by the Zionist movement for Israeli nation- building and the integration of Jews from Middle-Eastern countries. 11 See, for example, Oz Almog, The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 12 See, for example, Menachem Mautner, Avi Sagi, and Ronen Shamir, eds., Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1988). See also the various papers included in Anita Shapira, Israeli Identity in Transition (above n. 9), and specifically Daniel Gutwein, “From Melting Pot to Multiculturalism: or, the Privatization of Israeli Identity,” 215–231, with a crit- ical view of the phenomenon. Amnon Rubinstein (“The Decline, but not Demise, of Multiculturalism” [above n. 3], 796) describes Israel as “a multicultural, multi- lingual, multireligious and multinational society” – not only de facto, but also as regards the attitude of the legislature and the courts toward the cultural rights of minority groups; see there, 799–800, on the changing attitude of Israeli society toward cultural pluralism. 13 “As in the United States, which has moved from the ‘melting pot’ theory to ‘cultural pluralism’ (or ‘multiculturalism’), once Hebrew culture emerged unchal- lenged, people began to rethink the policy of assimilation. Israelis have begun to make gestures in the direction of multiculturalism.” Gitelman, “A Century of Jewish Politics” (above n. 10), 9. See Yosef Gorney, “The ‘Melting Pot’ in Zionist Thought,” Israel Studies 6, no. 3 (2001): 54–70; Ephraim Ya’ar, “Continuity and Change in Israeli Society: The Test of the Melting Pot,” Israel Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 91–128. 14 See, for example, Yehouda Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Rachel Shabi, Not the Enemy: Israel’s Jews from Arab Lands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 15 See Asher Cohen, Non-Jewish Jews in Israel (Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute and Keter, 2006), 15, 26–27 [Hebrew]. 16 A more detailed presentation of the arguments in this chapter is included in shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 220 2 2 0 ⏐ alexander yakobson Alexander Yakobson, “Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR, Israeli Identity and Jewish Peoplehood,” Israel Law Review 43, no. 1 (2010): 218–239. 17 See, for example, Yifat Weiss, “The Golem and Its Creator, or How the Law of Return Turned Israel into a Multi-Ethnic State,” Teoria U-Vikkoret 19 (2001): 45–69 [Hebrew]. A similar notion is implied in Ian Lustick, “Israel as a Non-Arab State: The Political Implications of Mass Immigration of Non-Jews,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 3 (1999): 417–433. 18 On the Christian subgroup of the Russian-speaking community, see Cohen, Non- Jewish Jews in Israel (above n. 15), 28–29, 71, and Yakobson, “Joining the Jewish People” (above n. 16), 223 n.12, 237–238, with a more optimistic assessment of their chances of full integration. 19 The traditional dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism is still influen- tial, but it has been repeatedly challenged by questioning both the assumption that civic nationalism is inherently more liberal and inclusive and the very notion of a national identity that is purely civic, or culturally neutral. See, for example, Tim Reeskens and Marc Hooghe, “Beyond the Civic–Ethnic Dichotomy: Investigating the Structure of Citizenship Concepts Across 33 Countries,” Nations and Nationalism 16, no. 4 (2010): 579–597. It is clear in any case that a common national identity comprising the state’s whole citizen body cannot exist when both a majority and a minority aver two distinct national identities. See on this Alexander Yakobson, “State, National Identity, Ethnicity: Normative and Constitutional Aspects,” chapter 7 in Azar Gat with Alexander Yakobson, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism, 328–379 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 20 See on this in detail, with references to scholarship and sociological surveys, in Yakobson, “Joining the Jewish People” (above n. 16), 223–229. Among other things, polls show that large majorities of Russian-speaking immigrants (both Jewish and “non-Jewish” – some polls give a breakdown according to this crite- rion) are “satisfied with their life in Israel,” “feel at home” in the country, and are “proud to be Israeli.” One poll shows that two-thirds of “non-Jewish” immi- grants who have spent ten years in the country aver a connection to “Jewish culture” and not just to Israel (see p. 226). This is remarkable since the term “Jewish culture” is certainly felt by many to have a distinct religious or at least a traditional flavor. Hebrew would probably be defined by many as an element of Israeli culture rather than Jewish culture. See also Theodore H. Friedgut, “Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union: Their Influence and Identity,” in Anita Shapira, Israeli Identity in Transition (above n. 9), 185–214, drawing a broadly similar picture of the Russian-speaking community’s successful integra- tion, combined with preserving its distinct cultural character. 21 According to Shafir and Peled, the integration of the Russian-speaking immi- grants, accompanied by an acceptance of a considerable degree of cultural distinctiveness on their part, points (among other factors) “in the direction of greater pluralism, even multiculturalism” in Israel. See Shafir and Peled, Being Israeli (above n. 9), 309, 320. 22 A comprehensive study of Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel (both Jewish and “non-Jewish”) by Majid Al-Haj, a professor of sociology at the University of Haifa, puts great emphasis on the ethnocultural distinctiveness of the “Russians” and, more generally, on the ethnic tensions and frictions within the Jewish-Israeli shapira - 3 - r3__ 06/10/2014 11:07 Page 221 Multiculturalism, Law of Return, and Immigration ⏐ 2 2 1 society. However, he concludes that in “the younger generation [of immigrants] . . . the Israeli component [of their identity] seems to be gaining the upper hand,” while also in the older generation, “support for the existence of Russian-ethnic institutions is not the outcome of the immigrants’ despair with and alienation from Israeli society,” but rather fits well into, and strengthens, the currently prevailing pattern of what he defines as “ethnocratic [that is, Jewish-dominated] multiculturalism” in the country. As for the future of this group, he holds that “Russian Israelis can be expected to form an ‘ethnic community’ that is an inte- gral part of Israeli society, rather than an ‘ethnic minority’ which is usually the result of denial and rejection by the host society.” See Majid Al-Haj, Immigration and Ethnic Formation in a Deeply Divided Society: The Case of the 1990s Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 105, 108, 216. 23 The expression was coined by Asher Cohen in Non-Jewish Jews in Israel (above n. 15).