This article was downloaded by: [University of Queensland] On: 8 August 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 906350004] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK International Peacekeeping Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713635493 NGOs and Reconstructing Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bronwyn Evans-Kent; Roland Bleiker Online Publication Date: 21 January 2003 To cite this Article Evans-Kent, Bronwyn and Bleiker, Roland(2003)'NGOs and Reconstructing Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina',International Peacekeeping,10:1,103 — 119 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/714002396 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002396 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 103 Peace beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina B R O N W Y N E VA N S - K E N T and ROLAND BLEIKER We float leaf-words to the ground Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 and gaze in each other. Who got left out of the song?1 NGOs played an important role during the Cold War. But the significance of this contribution has often been limited by a political climate dominated by states and international security organizations. Once the bipolar structures of Cold War politics had collapsed the international community became increasingly aware of the benefits of non-state organizations. In recent years NGOs have become a popular vehicle for the delivery and implementation of services that states are unable or reluctant to provide. This essay scrutinizes the potential and limits of NGO contributions to peacebuilding and long-term stability. We examine the work of several organizations in the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia). NGOs have been active in Bosnia for a decade, and hundreds of organizations have developed and implemented various projects, from victim advocacy to income generation and agricultural drainage. The sheer number and diversity of these activities has created a situation that reveals much about NGO participation in the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Mary Kaldor stresses that the global attention which the Bosnian conflict has received makes it ‘a paradigm case, from which different lessons are drawn’.2 Some lessons can, indeed, be drawn from the Bosnian case, and they are of relevance to the general debate about the advantages and disadvantages of NGOs.3 Those who stress the benefits of the nongovernmental sector focus primarily on the ability of NGOs to act outside the formal structures of national and international politics. NGOs are flexible, it is argued. They can provide technical expertise and specialized knowledge on particular topics.4 They tend to enjoy a  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 104 104 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T high level of credibility in populations, for they often have access to low and medium level leaders in the conflicting communities.5 These grassroots contacts, and the ensuing intimate knowledge of local circumstances, can be used either to foster awareness of disputes or even to attempt to solve them. NGOs are thus seen as effective vehicles to engage parties in formal, low-key, non-threatening dialogue. This flexibility allows them to deliver services where states experience far more constraints. In the context of a humanitarian crisis, for instance, states need to navigate the political and legal problems of interfering with the domestic affairs of another state, which can pose difficulties and tensions even if the latter welcomes humanitarian assistance. Some commentators thus stress that the increasing centrality of NGOs has Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 actually altered the very relationship between the state and the public sphere.6 While their ability to operate at the grassroots level and to provide specialized services is of great practical significance, the contribution of NGOs to the reconstruction of war-torn societies is often idealized. Various commentators see the strength of NGOs in their autonomy from the constraints of international or state-based politics. The official document of the Rio Earth Summit, for instance, stresses that ‘independence is a major attribute of nongovernmental organizations and is the precondition of real participation’7 The reality of post- conflict politics is, however, far more complex. Many NGOs remain limited by ad hoc or narrowly directed funding sources and by the overall policy environment in which they operate. As a result, their ability to promote and implement truly autonomous policies is often compromised. This is, of course, particularly the case of NGOs that take on the role of implementing post-conflict policies of states or their agencies. And such contracting functions have sharply increased since the 1980s, when it became clear that states alone could not provide all the services necessary to deal with humanitarian crises.8 Many states have thus begun to encourage NGOs to take over a range of tasks that governments could no longer meet alone, from humanitarian relief to the provision of welfare.9 According to Stephen Biggs and Arthur Neame this devolution of responsibility has evolved to the point that NGOs are now seen as the most ‘cost effective instruments for the delivery of inputs and achievement of outputs’.10 Limits to autonomy exist even for those NGOs that are openly critical of states and their policies. Consider Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, who speak for those who have no voice. But such a representational practice is not unproblematic, as Gayatri Spivak and other postcolonial critics have shown. The subaltern, they  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 105 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 105 argue, cannot be represented easily. Indeed, the very process of doing so says more about the values and interests of the representer than the situation of the represented.11 It is thus not surprising that many NGO activities are dominated by Western values and agendas. Diana Francis and Norbert Ropers, for instance, detect a clear preference for projects that have Western initiators and project leaders. In many contexts, the urban is privileged over the rural and English-speaking trainers are given preference, often to the detriment of very competent indigenous experts.12 The shadow of the state or of state-sponsored discourses remains omnipresent. Unless this relational dependency is understood and addressed, NGOs will ultimately be little more than an extension of Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 prevalent multilateral and state-based approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. By identifying some of the ensuing problems in the context of Bosnia, we hope to provide a modest contribution towards an alternative vision for NGOs – one that would allow them to take on a more independent role in peacebuilding processes. NGOs and the Challenge to Reconstruct The challenge of reconstructing Bosnia, and the role of NGOs in particular, is intrinsically linked to the process of coming to terms with the traumatic memory of ethnic war and the resulting post-war identities. Significant here is the fact that the Bosnian conflict was not, as it is stereotypically perceived, a natural and inevitable product of historical animosities. Michael Ignatieff correctly stresses, ‘that it would be false to the history of this part of the world to maintain that ethnic antagonisms were simply waiting, like the magma beneath a volcano, for a template to shift, a fissure to split open’.13 Violence emerged from a very deliberate and manipulative strategy to use identity in the pursuit of specific political goals. The conflict was, as David Campbell points out, ‘a question of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals’.14 Until the outbreak of hostilities, Bosnians possessed a variety of parallel identities: man or woman, old or young, mechanic or office worker, mother, uncle or son. Differences in religion and ethnicity did exist, but they were, as Ignatieff stresses, of a minor nature.15 The political manipulation of the Bosnian situation created a conflict zone in which a person’s ethnicity was often literally a matter of life and death. The Dayton agreement, which brought an end to open hostilities in 1995, has resolved only some aspects of the legacy imposed by years of war and ethnic cleansing. At first sight Dayton seems an attempt to  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 106 106 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T retain a multiethnic Bosnia. Arranged by Richard Holbrooke, the key US negotiator to the Balkans, Dayton was a basic agreement reached by the parties to the conflict – Serbs, Croats and Muslims – that consisted of retaining Bosnia as a country, rather than splitting it up into three distinct ethnic states. The elections of 1996 produced a parliament and a presidency that was to rotate between the three ethnic groups. A 60,000 strong NATO peacekeeping mission, drawn from 34 different countries, was stationed in Bosnia to make certain that all parties involved in the conflict were upholding the terms of the Dayton agreement. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement. A closer look at the Dayton agreement does, however, reveal far less Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 commitment to multicultural principles. While it ended outright violence, Dayton also legitimized the ethnic divisions that had been created by the war. The three ethnic communities now control their own territories. The Bosnian Serbs received 49 per cent of the land in the form of the Republika Srpska. The rest went to a Muslim–Croat federation. In addition, the District of Brcko was created to resolve border issues. It is administered at the federal level. The problematic legacy of Dayton has added layers of difficulties to the already gargantuan task of reconstruction. Ethnic tensions and extreme nationalist discourses continue to drive not only politics but also society. Consider, among many examples, the fact that children learn in separate education systems, absorbing only their own history, religion and language. Add to these entrenched sources of tension raising factors such as inequality, widespread domestic violence, an unemployment figure as high as 40–50 per cent in some regions, and the strong presence of organized crime such as the drug trade or the trafficking of women and children.16 It is in this problematic and blurred transitional context that hundreds of international and domestic NGOs have been working on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. Respective activities not only focus on shelter and food relief, which is still a problem in many parts of Bosnia, but also cover issues as diverse as agriculture, health, psycho-social work, children and youth, human rights, the elderly, women, the media, education and training, de-mining and mine awareness, micro-credit and income generation.17 We now proceed to discuss some of the key dilemmas that NGOs face in this reconstruction process. We identify three main challenges. The first revolves around the often problematic relationship between donors and NGOs.  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 107 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 107 The Problematic Donor–NGO Relationship Donors are essential to post-conflict reconstruction. To assess their role is, however, no easy task, for aid reaches its destination through varied and complex routes. The donors themselves can be states, as is often the case, but they can also be individuals, charitable trusts, nongovernmental organizations, corporations or multilateral institutions. The donor community responded quickly and generously to the need to rebuild Bosnia. In late 1995 the Peace Implementation Council in London set the stage for implementing the Dayton Accords. Eight other multilateral pledging conferences followed.18 Most donor activity Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 has focused on reviving the economy but other funding has sought to support an independent mass media, democratization and human rights, as well as the training and modernization of the military, the promotion of police reform or the supervision of elections.19 The international community has spent an estimated US$5.1 billion on the medium-term Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Programme. Pledges from donors in the most recent major donor conference in 1999 reached US$1,052 million. These pledges were received from representatives of 45 countries and 30 international organizations.20 The extraordinary amount of aid pledged to Bosnia, however, cannot hide the problematic aspects of the relationship between donors and NGOs. Indeed, this relationship creates at least some of the problems for which NGOs have been criticized. Several key issues can be identified. One of these is the often conditional nature of aid. Donors may require economic or political conditions to be fulfilled before the delivery of aid can be implemented. The agendas of multilateral organizations and pledging states display a strong preference for projects that promote democratization and reforms aimed at establishing a market economy.21 Assistance from the US, for instance, was conditional on holding democratic elections. Elections, therefore, proceeded at a time (1996) when, at least according to observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the electoral process could not be free and fair.22 This policy preference has continued ever since. Consider how the US Agency for International Development (USAID) gives priority to NGOs focusing on democracy- building.23 As a result, NGOs that focus on different but equally urgent forms of reconstruction or peacebuilding face difficulties in securing adequate funding. The very principle of conditionality tends to favour projects that operate according to the priorities of the donors rather than the needs of communities. Local capacities for peace maintenance  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 108 108 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T are generally underfunded or underexplored. And local organizations continue to struggle in their attempt to fit into the funding structures of international organizations and multilateral institutions.24 Another key issue affecting the NGO–donor relationship is the scarcity of funds and the resulting intense competition for them.25 During the initial phases of reconstruction funding was relatively abundant.26 Half a dozen years later, however, the situation had changed dramatically. Organizations now need to work much harder to secure funding.27 In an environment of scarce funding the art of writing project proposals has taken on an increasingly central role. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is a case in point. It stresses that success for funding is largely dependent on high quality Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 proposal writing.28 But this transparency, desirable as it seems, has not made the distribution of funds more fair or equal. Take the very example of CIDA, which has been very active in Bosnia. Its policies are directed towards providing training, technical assistance and equipment in local capacity projects.29 Given the often highly technical nature of this endeavour, experienced international NGOs stand a much greater chance of being funded than local grassroots organizations. To be successful a local NGO must not only submit a proposal in English, but also be familiar with the structure, expectations and even the jargon of the respective donor organizations. Such information and skills cannot always be acquired locally. This is why an increasingly competitive funding environment tends to discriminate against local NGOs or those that are unfamiliar with the requirements of donors or lack the support of an international organization. One of the most problematic aspects of donor–NGO interactions in Bosnia is located in the often ad hoc nature of their relationship. Donor priorities and expectations frequently change, as a result of either new policy trends or a high turnover of senior staff (who tend to impose their own strategic choices).30 Added to this level of uncertainty is the fact that relief and development activities are designed by a multitude of departments and agencies which all have different – and at times competing – interests. The result is, as Stewart Patrick stresses, an ‘often dissatisfactory amalgamation of interests, mandates and capacities’.31 The problem is that trends in funding change and, as a representative of a local NGO puts it, donors ‘can be interested in mushroom farming one day and reconstruction the next’.32 Likewise, a Bosnian woman involved with several local NGOs stresses that they had to alter their projects regularly to suit the changing priorities of donors. Often effective projects could not be repeated, as they were no  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 109 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 109 longer of central concern to a new donor. It is, indeed, not 33 uncommon that NGOs are prevented from extending successful projects. Mission goals have to be rewritten frequently in order to adjust to changes in donor priorities. A move from one type of project (old trend) to another (new trend) may thus be more successful in gaining funding than the continuation of a project that has worked well and would continue to benefit the population. In stark contrast to the long-term nature of the peacebuilding process the specific missions are often dictated by pragmatic and short- term imperatives.34 In many situations NGOs can only secure funding for as little as three months at a time.35 Since renewal of funding is contingent on meeting the requirements of donors, it is virtually Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 impossible for NGOs to develop a vision that can be implemented in the long run. The pressure to behave according to the expectations of donors is simply too strong. Indeed, funding may disappear altogether if the priorities of the international community – and the resulting media attention – shift to another ‘hotspot’. Support for Bosnia was, as mentioned, very strong in the early stages of reconstruction, but then the focus of international rescue efforts moved to Kosovo, just to be replaced by East Timor and, most recently, Afghanistan. The clash between the long-term needs and the short-term realities of the reconstruction process creates serious difficulties. NGOs tend to deal with this tension by stressing the importance and urgency of the immediate challenge. Representative of such an approach is a member of a local NGO, who argued that there is little point in defining peacebuilding, but rather that ‘We do it’.36 There is, of course, a clear need for immediate, contextual and commonsensical action. But such an engagement should not be to the detriment of long-term planning and coordination. The latter is far too often lacking in Bosnia. Those NGOs that seek to develop and coordinate a vision tend to have difficulties finding the funding necessary to implement their programmes. The international community has a responsibility to provide local NGOs with the freedom and the ability to bring promising projects to a successful conclusion. This would entail moving away from a deeply entrenched practice of seeing development aid as a business that deals ‘in money, not in social processes’.37 A social engagement, in turn, may require a commitment over an extended period of time. While a school can be rebuilt in three months, for example, it takes several years to implement a curriculum that breaks down the stereotypes entrenched by the war. Without a vision for such long-term projects, and the funding to back it up, the peacebuilding process in Bosnia is unlikely to be successful.  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 110 110 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T Tensions between Local and International Organizations The second major issue facing post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia is the divide that has emerged between local and international organizations. Bosnian groups or individuals engaged in peacebuilding activities often resent being dominated by the funding power of international NGOs. The latter, by contrast, tend to perceive local organizations as lacking sufficient skills or competence. Resentment and suspicion towards international NGOs and international governmental organizations is rooted, at least in part, in their reluctance to engage the local population actively.38 The Office of the High Representative (OHR), for instance, is perceived as a massive Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 structure imposed upon Bosnia it drafts most of the legislation and does so with the help of foreign (mostly US) lawyers who often lack sufficient understanding of the societal dynamics in a former Socialist economy.39 As a result, international organizations are perceived as outsider institutions that ignore potentially valuable local forms of peacemaking or problem solving.40 Consider how a representative of a local organization lamented the way in which rape victims were treated. The initial response of many international organizations, he argued, was to treat the rape as an incident in isolation, rather than a tragedy that is part of a larger issue, which includes the potential loss of security, identity, home, family and support.41 The process of distributing aid adds to the already problematic relationship between local and international representatives. External consultants at OHR, for example, were paid out of pledged aid. This reduced the numbers of local staff that could be employed, even though local capacity was actually greater and stronger than portrayed by donors.42 Resentment and problems can emerge even in domains where no harm is intended. Consider the widespread willingness of the international community to support Bosnia in its attempt to reconstruct a war-torn society. The ample funding that emerged in the initial phase created a situation in which many individuals or groups formed themselves into NGOs simply because this was one of the most promising ways of gaining employment. But the rapid influx of funds has created what some call a ‘false economy’.43 In Sarajevo, the presence of the international aid community has engendered an entire industry, sustaining not only direct NGO employees, but also translators, drivers, hotel and restaurant employees, fuel providers and many more. The international community tends to pay salaries or rent at rates that are highly inflated in the local context.44 In the short run  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 111 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 111 such a stark division between the local economy and the presence of the international aid community further fuels an already lingering sense of resentment. In the long run, an economy inflated by the artificial presence of a development industry is simply not sustainable, especially since much of the aid is of a short-term nature and likely to further decrease as world attention shifts to geographical areas with a more dramatic need for assistance. The divide between domestic and international organizations is perhaps at its most problematic when it comes to valuing local approaches and knowledges. John Paul Lederach convincingly argues that peacebuilding must come from within a culture. Although his approach oversimplifies many issues, Lederach is correct in drawing Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 attention to the crucial need for building upon knowledge and experience that has come directly out of specific social conflict contexts.45 He is accurate too in expressing suspicion towards an approach to conflict transformation that revolves around (international) experts training (local) participants. The foundation of this model, which prevails in much of Bosnia,46 is the principle of transferability and universality.47 According to this model there is a predefined agenda for a predefined need. The expert thus controls the agenda, and the task of local participants is to learn and execute an already existing model. Resentment of such outside impositions is widespread in Bosnia. By contrast, those few organizations that seek to draw upon local knowledges and expertise are often seen as doing a highly valuable job. Representatives of several local organizations have expressed the importance of creating better partnerships between domestic and international projects. The latter should shift more responsibility to local organizations, so that achievements can be sustained even once aid funds dry up and the development community leaves permanently.48 The Lack of Regulation and Coordination of NGO Activities In the early stages of reconstruction the international community strongly encouraged the growth of a local NGO community.49 Funding was, as mentioned, relatively ample. As a result, the number of NGOs grew from a handful in the mid-1990s to around 1,500 half a decade later.50 The lack of adequate regulation and coordination, however, seriously undermines the functioning of this new and relatively large NGO ‘industry’. There are two coordinating NGO bodies in Bosnia: The  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 112 112 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the Centre for Information and Support to NGOs.51 The OHR, in cooperation with the OSCE, has created the Civil Society Coordination Group, which consists of several intergovernmental and donor organizations that address human rights and democratization. While these efforts are aimed at coordinating the projects of individual organizations, there is little nation-wide legislation that governs NGOs or charitable funds.52 The OHR has initiated a campaign to develop respective legislation. The ensuing debates and procedures are well underway, but a high degree of tension between the different parties has slowed down the process.53 In the absence of adequate regulation, quality control of NGOs is very difficult. NGOs are defined formally as including anything from Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 sporting organizations to theatre troupes, and many have organized themselves as NGOs simply for the sake of receiving funding.54 The commitment to peacebuilding efforts thus varies greatly. And so does the sustainability of the respective organizations.55 To address this and similar problems, USAID introduced an NGO Sustainability Index in 1998.56 This so-called Democracy Network, or Dem-Net Project, forms a core group of strong, sophisticated local organizations that have already proved themselves. USAID pays their operational costs and provides training and support. The participating organizations are run on four principles: adherence to the rule of law, democracy building, economic development and social safety. The programme began with 28 NGOs that were given institutional support but had to conform to particular standards of administration. The latter included a board, rather than a management structure dominated by one person. The respective NGOs were also encouraged to cooperate with local governments, businesses and communities. These and other attempts at regulating the NGO industry can play an important role in improving the quality of services. In many situations well-funded training is necessary to translate motivation and willingness into concrete projects that yield measurable benefits. Regulation may also help to avoid the duplication of projects or lack of communication between the people associated with them. There are highly revealing examples of NGOs that were successful in coordinating their activities, even in the competitive and under- regulated context of post-war Bosnia. Consider briefly the case of the Centre for Drama in Education in Mostar and an organization called Corridor, in Sarajevo. Both are local and collaborate with local communities on peacebuilding projects. Each was aware of its limitations and thus learned how to operate successfully by engaging in two strategies: (1) exploring a particular niche and developing a  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 113 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 113 reputation in this domain; and (2) embarking on extensive cooperation with larger organizations. This strategy was successful even though the funding policies of donors did not necessarily encourage specialization. But both organizations managed to develop a strong reputation in their field, gained the trust of donors and were thus able to sustain themselves in the long run.57 The Centre for Drama in Education or Centar za Dramski Odgoj (CDO)58 based in Mostar is an NGO that has sought to use drama and theatre tools to work on peacebuilding, conflict resolution and youth trauma. While the organization has contact and cooperates with other organizations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania, CDO’s greatest value is in its development of school curricula in drama, which are Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 aimed at breaking down some of the stereotypes created by the war and its aftermath. Each year the organization runs an international festival of drama, publishes a journal and organizes an international conference. Its representatives recognize that once the needs of food, shelter and security are secured people need to regain a sense of place. Such recognition is now widely accepted: In crisis and post-crisis situations, humanitarian aid naturally focuses upon essential emergency relief. Because these situations have the character of emergencies, matters of the body and material infrastructure tend to predominate. But it is well known that the citizens of Sarajevo during the siege…braved bullets and mortars not only to fetch water and firewood, but to attend plays and concerts. Children and young people wrote poems and stories, and so on. In the most dehumanising conditions human beings still demanded meaning and sustenance of the spirit.59 CDO aims to build ‘metaphorical bridges’. Rather than forging ambitious plans for reconciliation they acknowledge that ‘in a country steeped in blood plans must be modest’.60 As part of their collaborative strategy, CDO has established a partnership with CARE International. They created the Pax Project, which has operated throughout Bosnia. Its objectives are two-fold: The ‘promotion of multi-ethnic peacebuilding work with youth theatre groups’ and the ‘development of a participatory learning approach for classroom peacebuilding work’.61 The themes addressed by theatre groups included drugs, displaced persons and refugees, violence, women’s rights, children’s rights and the struggle for freedom.62 The project operates in 175 schools with 400 primary teachers, reaching some 11,000 students.63 CDO believes it has been successful because it tried to adapt to changing circumstances and collaborated with other organizations  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 114 114 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T while, at the same time, retaining its key mission, for which it has gained a good reputation.64 The second example of a successful organization is Corridor, based in Sarajevo. It too believes its success stems from having developed and retained a strong mission.65 During the war Corridor ran counselling centres, magazines, radio and TV programmes aimed at keeping people informed and connected. Corridor’s post-war activities take place in the general area of psychosocial work, covering issues such as alcoholism, the demobilization of the military, and the return of minorities. For instance, Corridor organized a trip back to Srebrenica for both Serb and Muslim women. It also developed a pilot project for a Children’s Parliament in Dobrinje, on the edge of Republica Srpska. Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 Other engagements include a series of lectures for demobilized soldiers about the effects of alcoholism.66 Corridor too seeks collaborative relationships with other organizations, especially in the Republica Srpska, where it is often difficult to establish ties. Corridor and CDO demonstrate that NGOs can be successful, even in difficult circumstances. Rather than working in isolation and adjusting their programmes to the ever-changing priorities of donors, Corridor and CDO chose to develop specialized expertise. They have gained the trust of donors as a result of a sustained engagement in their respective fields of activity. Both of these NGOs also demonstrate that sustainable peace requires more than a mere physical reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure. At least as important is the task of dealing with the antagonistic identity constructs that continue to cause various tensions. By fostering education, tolerance and cross-ethnic interactions, Corridor and CDO make an important contribution to dismantling the artificially constructed threat images that had given rise to the conflict in the first place. Such an engagement does, of course, take time. Respect for difference cannot emerge overnight in a society that had been devastated by years of war. This is why the contribution of NGOs to post-conflict reconstruction must be seen (and supported) as a medium- to long-term challenge. Conclusion …If we fall it’s someone else’s dark. How, after that, can we be an upright pole, or grow bark like a tree?67  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 115 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 115 NGOs have taken up a unique place in various humanitarian challenges of the last decade. They have become useful instruments to deliver humanitarian services, especially in highly politicized conflict environments, such as Bosnia. But NGOs are not as independent as they are often taken to be. The first major challenge to NGO work in Bosnia is their relationship to donors. While outside aid is crucial, and was readily available in the initial phases of reconstruction, the competition for funding has become more difficult in recent years. Valuable time is spent developing detailed proposals, often for projects that may receive funding only for short-periods of time. Long-term planning and commitment has become very difficult. This is all the more the case Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 since donors – states, state institutions or individuals – often possess interests that either change frequently or are not necessarily of benefit to the community. Local NGOs thus have no alternative but to adjust to new funding trends, even if it means giving up projects that have worked well and would continuously benefit the population. A second challenge for NGOs is located in the divide between international and local organizations. Differences in power, resources and priorities have created a great deal of resentment on both sides. International organizations tend to see local NGOs as lacking the necessary expertise for particular projects. Local organizations, by contrast, believe that their unique knowledge of the conflict and local circumstances is ignored in favour of often inappropriate outside expertise. The resulting tension has produced resentments and structural difficulties that hamper the reconstruction process. The third problem is rooted in the relatively unregulated nature of the new but substantial NGO ‘industry’. Quality control has become an important task, for projects are often duplicated or developed by organizations that possess no adequate training. Relief agencies, for instance, began to do psychosocial work or micro-credit business despite the lack of respective qualifications. Absent as well are bureaucratic, tax and other concessions that NGOs enjoy in most other states. Initiatives are underway to rectify these and other problems through the introduction of respective legislation. But at this stage the largely unregulated nature of NGO activities has created employment patterns that are not sustainable in the long run. It is, of course, not easy to promote the critical capacity and autonomy of NGOs while, at the same time, trying to establish mechanisms that would improve the quality of their work. Such regulatory attempts can easily end up in more state-control over the activities of the NGO sector. The purpose cannot be to impose a uniform standard or to prescribe what kind of  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 116 116 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T vision civil organizations ought to pursue. Indeed, the greatest potential contribution of NGOs perhaps lies in their very ability – incomplete as it is – to defy prevailing norms and structures. Various visions need to co-exist, and NGOs that are successful should be given the means to pursue their project for the duration that is required to bring it to successful completion. While these and other challenges pose serious obstacles to the prospects of achieving lasting peace, they are not insurmountable. One can, at the same time, find instances of projects that have worked successfully. We have drawn brief attention to the work of CDO in Mostar and Corridor in Sarajevo – two organizations that demonstrate how collaboration between different local and international Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 institutions can produce sustainable long-term peacebuilding projects. The responsibility to extend such successful models to the overall peacebuilding process lies with all parties involved. Donors and international organizations need to abandon preconceived universal models and rely more actively on local knowledge and expertise. Domestic organizations, by contrast, must find ways to collaborate more effectively by developing common visions while, at the same time, accommodating the differences and tensions that inevitably remain in a society traumatized by the memory of war. NOTES 1. Hadze Hajdarević, ‘The Voices are Coming’, in Chris Agee (ed.), Scar on the Stone: Contemporary Poetry from Bosnia, Newcastle: Bloodaxe Books, 1998, p.126. 2. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.6. 3. NGOs are affected by a common set of dynamics and constraints, although they differ greatly in size, skills, scope and level of independence. They can be international, international with local staff, local but funded by a separate international organization. NGOs can also exist simply for the express purpose of implementing the policies of government agencies. See Steve Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.18, No.2, 1997, pp.185–286. On the comparative advantage of NGOs and intergovernmental organizations in former Yugoslavia, see: Paul Stubbs, ‘NGO Work with Forced Migrants in Croatia: Lineages of a Global Middle Class?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No.4, winter 1997, pp.50–60; Philip Peirce and Paul Stubbs, ‘Peacebuilding, Hegemony and Integrated Social Development: The UNDP in Travnik’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-torn Societies, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, pp.157–76. 4. Charnovitz (note 3), pp.274–75. 5. Anja Weiss and Aleksej Nazarenko, ‘Strategies and Needs of NGOs Dealing with Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the New Eastern Democracies’, Berghof Occasional Paper No.7, 1997, www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/eng/ind_pub.htm, p.3. For accounts of the benefits of NGOs see David Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, West Hartford, CT: Kumarion Press, 1990; and Laura Macdonald,  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 117 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 117 Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Central America, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 6. Yasemin Topçu, Humanitarian NGO-Networks: Identifying Powerful Political Actors in an International Policy field, Berlin: Social Science Research Center, 1999, p.23. 7. Rio Earth Summit, 1992, Agenda 21, Ch. 27, www.un.org/esa/sustdev/ agenda21chapter27.htm. For various accounts of NGO autonomy, implied or explicitly argued, see Annual Report of the Global Policy Forum, 2000, www.globalpolicy.org/visitctr/annreprt/ar2000-5.htm; M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds.). Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World. West Hartford, CT: Kumerian Press, 1996, p.44; Susan Finch, ‘NGO/Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: The Need for Improved Coordination’, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 2000, www.cfp- pec.gc.ca/OtherAnnualEvents/Susan_Finch.htm. 8. Korten (note 5), p.6. 9. Tadashi Yamamoto and Susan Hubbard, ‘Summary Report on the Osaka Symposium on Philanthropic Development and Cooperation in Asia Pacific’, in T. Yamamoto (ed.), Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community – Nongovernmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1995, p.50. 10. Stephen D. Biggs and Arthur D. Neame, ‘Negotiating Room to Maneuver: Reflections Concerning NGO Autonomy and Accountability within the New Policy Agenda’, in Edwards and Hulme (note 7), p.41. See also Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, the UN and Global Governance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.17–47. 11. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 12. Diana Francis and Norbert Ropers, ‘Peace Work by Civil Actors in Post-Communist Societies’, Berghof Occasional Paper No.7, www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/eng/ind_pub.htm, 1997, pp.7–8. 13. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, London: Random House, 1998, p.38. 14. David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p.86. 15. Michael Ignatieff (note 13), p.38. 16. Interview with an employee of the UN High Commission for Human Rights. Sarajevo, 17 Aug. 2000. 17. ICVA, The ICVA Directory of humanitarian and development agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 2000. International NGOs in Bosnia are from: Canada, the US, Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, Austria, the UK, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Finland, United Arab Emirates, Japan, the Sudan, British Virgin Islands, Norway, Qatar, Ireland, and Croatia. 18. Zlatko Hertić et al., ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in S. Forman and S. Patrick (eds.), Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p.319. 19. Ibid., p.326. 20. World Bank, Chairmen’s Statement – Fifth Donors’ Pledging Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina: May 20–21, 1999, Brussels, www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/ pr052099b.htm; European Union External Relations, International donors ask government to accelerate privatization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/02_00/doc_00_4.htm DOC/00/4, Sarajevo, 3 Feb. 2000. 21. For articles regarding the agendas of donors at the 5th Pledging Conference in Brussels see World Bank 1999 Chairmen’s Statement – Fifth Donors’ Pledging Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina: May 20–21, 1999, Brussels, www.worldbank.rg/html/extdr/ extme/pr052099b.htm; Centre for Peace in the Balkans 2000 Donors community sets  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 118 118 M I T I G AT I N G C O N F L I C T conditions for future financial aid to Bosnia, Sarajevo, May 26, www.balkanpeace.org/ hed/archive/may00/hed154.shtml. 22. Jane M. O. Sharp, ‘Dayton Report Card’, International Security, Vol.22, No.3, 1997, pp.101–37, p.114. The Coordinator for International Monitoring expressed strong reservations, arguing that ‘the general climate in which the elections took place was in some cases below the minimum standards of the OSCE Copenhagen Commitments… Until the problems affecting the integrity of the elections have been addressed and solved, these elections [municipal] should not be held.’ Preliminary Statement of The Coordinator For International Monitoring (CIM) 14 Sept. 1996 – OSCE, www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election_reports/ba/bih1-1.pdf. 23. Interview with an employee of USAID. Sarajevo, 8 Sept. 2000. 24. Information regarding project proposals from interviews with employees of local NGOs, CIDA and USAID. 25. Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, ‘Introduction’, in Forman and Patrick (n.18 above), p.1; Hertić et al. (note 18), p.343. 26. An employee of OHR stressed that in the immediate post-war period the international Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 community would provide funding to virtually any organization that advertised itself as an NGO. Interview with employees of OHR, Sarajevo, 1 Sept. 2000. 27. Interview with employees of USAID, Sarajevo, 8 Sept. 2000. 28. Interview with an employee of CIDA, Sarajevo, 30 August 2000. 29. Ibid. 30. Local organization, Sarajevo, Sept. 2000. 31. Stewart Patrick, ‘The Donor Community and the Challenge of Postconflict Recovery’, in Forman and Patrick (n.18 above), pp.36, 39. 32. Local organization, Sarajevo, Sept. 2000. 33. Local organization, Sarajevo, Aug. 2000. 34. Patrice McMahon argues that the development of a Bosnian civil society has been severely limited due to high levels of NGO dependence on the donor community. Patrice C. McMahon, ‘What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.49, No.1, 2002, pp.18–29. 35. Interviews with staff of international organizations, Sarajevo, Aug.–Sept. 2000. 36. Interview with local peacebuilding organization, Mostar, Sept. 2000. 37. Korten (note 5), p.xii. 38. Interview with an employee of UNHCHR, Sarajevo, 17 Aug. 2000. 39. Ibid. 40. Several local organizations interviewed. 41. Interview with local organization, Sarajevo, Sept. 2000. For a detailed discussion of the issue see Lene Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol.3, No.2, 2001, pp.56–75 42. Hertić et al. (note 18), pp.344–5. 43. Interview with an employee of an international organization. Sarajevo, Sept. 2000. 44. Discussions with local people and local NGOs. 45. John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995, p.27. 46. Local youth, psycho-social and democratization organizations, Sarajevo, Brcko and Srpsko Sarajevo, Aug. 2000. 47. Lederach (note 45), pp.48–53. 48. Interviews with local organizations, Sarajevo, Aug.–Sept. 2000. 49. Interview with employees of OHR, Sarajevo, 1 Sept. 2000. 50. This number includes anything from human rights organizations to sporting associations as they all fall under the same general legislation. 51. Centre for Information and Support to NGOs (CIP), www.geocities.com/cip_sarajevo/ index-eng.html, accessed Nov. 2001. 52. Interview with employees of OHR, Sarajevo, 1 Sept. 2000; See also OHR Press Release, Launching of Campaign to Change NGO Legislation, www.ohr.int/ohr- dept/presso, 1998; and Global IDP Network, International community supports the  101ip08.qxd 19/03/2003 12:48 Page 119 N G O s I N B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I N A 119 capacity of the civil society to address human rights issues, www.db.idpproject.org, 2000. 53. See Global IDP Network, International community supports the capacity of the civil society to address human rights issues, www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/ idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/752c6733308d2d46c12569a7 0050dd55?OpenDocument, 2000. 54. This is the case even though NGOs are fully taxed in Bosnia – a fact that most donor agencies do not take into account. 55. Interview with employees of OHR, Sarajevo, 1 Sept. 2000. 56. Interview with employees of USAID, Sarajevo, 8 Sept. 2000. 57. Interviews with CDO and Corridor and international organizations with whom they had links. 58. Interview with CDO, Mostar, 7 Sept. 2000. 59. Geoff Gillham, Pax Project: A Multi-layered Approach to Peacebuilding and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Hercegovina (An Evaluation Report), CARE International, 2000, p.33. Downloaded By: [University of Queensland] At: 13:16 8 August 2009 60. Interview with employees of CDO, 7 Sept. 2000. 61. Gillham (note 59), p.4. 62. Ibid, p.13. 63. Ibid, pp.15–16. 64. Interview with local organization, Sarajevo, Sept. 2000. 65. Interview with employees of Corridor, 8 Sept. 2000. 66. Ibid. 67. Hajdarevic (note 1), p.127.