Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative "Belarusianness"

CYAN MAGENTA YELLOW BLACK THE OFFICIAL and THE ALTERNATIVE ”BELARUSIANNESS” Nelly Bekus CONTENTS The monograph describes how the ethno-symbolic nation of the Belarusian nationalists, Nelly Bekus ABOUT THE AUTHOR Introduction based on the cultural capital of the Golden Age of the Belarusian past (17th century) PART I. NATION IN THEORY Nelly Bekus is a Belarusian social scientist Chapter 1 Nation-Formation Strategies in competes with the 'nation' institutionalized and reified by the numerous civic rituals Contemporary Nation-Studies and publicist, and a member of the European Chapter 2 State and Nation and social practices under the auspices of the actual post-Soviet Belarusian state. Cultural Parliament. She holds a Ph.D. in Soci- Chapter 3 Nationalism, Capitalism, Liberalism ology and is Assistant Professor at the Univer- Chapter 4 Nationalism and Socialism PART II. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE Comparing the two concepts not only provides understanding of the logic that dominates sity of Warsaw. STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDEA Belarusian society's self-description models, but also enables us to evaluate the chances Chapter 5 The First Belarusian Nationalist Movement Chapter 6 Byelorussian Republic within the Soviet State of alternative Belarusianness to win this unequal struggle over identity. Chapter 7 Post-Soviet Conditions for Independence PART III. BELARUSIAN POST-COMMUNISM Chapter 8 The Election of the First Belarusian President Chapter 9 “Labels” of the Belarusian Regime Chapter 10 “Triple Transformation” and Belarus “Nelly Bekus’ book adds appreciably to the debate about Belarusian identity. Her highly Chapter 11 Prerequisites of Democratization and Authoritarianism original and thoughtful study enhances our current understanding of the con- PART IV. ARGUMENTS AND PARADOXES OF WEAK temporary state led by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka since 1994. Provocative and BELARUSIAN IDENTITY Chapter 12 Belarus as an Example of National and yet dispassionate, the book should appeal to all interested in nation building two Democratic Failure Chapter 13 The Russian Factor in Belarusian Self- decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.” Perception Chapter 14 The Paradox of “National Pride” Chapter 15 Paradoxes of Political and Linguistic David R. Marples, Distinguished University Professor, University of Alberta, Canada Russification Chapter 16 Lack of Religious Basis for National Unity PART V. THE STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY Chapter 17 Two Ideas of “Belarusianness” Chapter 18 Belarusian-Specific Nature of the Public Sphere Chapter 19 Belarusian Tradition Chapter 20 Political Discourses of the Alternative Belarusianness Chapter 21 National Ideology of the Belarusian State PART VI. CULTURAL MANIFESTATION VERSUS STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY SOCIAL REIFICATION Chapter 22 Two Approaches to the Politics of Identity Chapter 23 Belaruski Globus Chapter 24 The Belarusian National Film Misterium Occupation Central European University Press THE OFFICIAL and Chapter 25 The “Free Theater” or the Alternative Belarusianness on Stage Budapest–New York THE ALTERNATIVE Chapter 26 Independent Rock Music Chapter 27 Medieval Reenactors 90000> ”BELARUSIANNESS” Chapter 28 The Official Politics of Identity Conclusion Sales and information: ceupress@ceu.hu Bibliography Cover Illustration by Kirill Goncharov, 9 789639 776685 9 0 0 0 0> Index Website: http://www.ceupress.com www.kirillgoncharov.com. This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 22:59:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page i STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 22:59:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page ii This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 22:59:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page iii STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” NELLY BEKUS Budapest–New York This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 22:59:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page iv © 2010 by Nelly Bekus Published in 2010 by Central European University Press An imprint of the Central European University Share Company Nádor utca 11, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 Fax: +36-1-327-3183 E-mail: ceupress@ceu.hu Website: www.ceupress.com 400 West 59th Street, New York NY 10019, USA Tel: +1-212-547-6932 Fax: +1-646-557-2416 E-mail: mgreenwald@sorosny.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher. ISBN 978-963-9776-68-5 cloth Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bekus, Nelly. Struggle over identity : the official and the alternative Belarusianness / Nelly Bekus. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-9639776685 (hardbound) 1. National characteristics, Belarusian. 2. Nationalism--Belarus. 3. Political culture-- Belarus. 4. Democratization--Belarus. 5. Popular culture--Belarus. 6. Social change-- Belarus. 7. Post-communism—Social aspects--Belarus. 8. Belarus--Social conditions. 9. Belarus--Politics and government. I. Title. DK507.34.B45 2010 2010008736 947.8--dc22 Printed in Hungary by Pátria Nyomda, Budapest This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 22:59:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 PART I. NATION IN THEORY Chapter 1 Nation-Formation Strategies in Contemporary Nation-Studies 13 Chapter 2 State and Nation 27 Chapter 3 Nationalism, Capitalism, Liberalism: The East European Perspective 33 Chapter 4 Nationalism and Socialism: The Soviet Case 41 PART II. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDEA Chapter 5 The First Belarusian Nationalist Movement: Between National and Class Interests 53 Chapter 6 Byelorussian Republic within the Soviet State 69 Chapter 7 Post-Soviet Conditions for Independence 79 PART III. BELARUSIAN POST-COMMUNISM Chapter 8 The Election of the First Belarusian President as a Mirror of Belarusian Preferences 85 Chapter 9 “Labels” of the Belarusian Regime 93 Chapter 10 “Triple Transformation” and Belarus 99 Chapter 11 Prerequisites of Democratization and Authoritarianism in Belarus 121 PART IV. ARGUMENTS AND PARADOXES OF WEAK BELARUSIAN IDENTITY Chapter 12 Belarus as an Example of National and Democratic Failure 133 Chapter 13 The Russian Factor in Belarusian Self-Perception 139 Chapter 14 The Paradox of “National Pride” 145 Chapter 15 Paradoxes of Political and Linguistic Russification 151 Chapter 16 Lack of Religious Basis for National Unity 157 This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:10:36 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page vi PART V. THE STRUGGLE OVER IDENTITY Chapter 17 Two Ideas of “Belarusianness” 163 Chapter 18 Belarusian-Specific Nature of the Public Sphere: “Invisible Wall” 169 Chapter 19 Belarusian History: The Alternative and Official Historical Narrations 179 Chapter 20 Political Discourses of the Alternative Belarusianness 197 Chapter 21 National Ideology of the Belarusian State as a Political Articulation of Official Belarusianness 211 PART VI. CULTURAL MANIFESTATION VERSUS SOCIAL REIFICATION Chapter 22 Two Approaches to the Politics of Identity 223 Chapter 23 Belaruski Globus: An Encyclopedia of What Existed before Communism 227 Chapter 24 The Belarusian National Film Misterium Occupation: Distancing Themselves from Soviets and Russians 229 Chapter 25 The “Free Theater” or the Alternative Belarusianness on Stage 235 Chapter 26 Independent Rock Music: Critical Reflection and Protest 241 Chapter 27 Medieval Reenactors: A Manifestation of Belarus’s European History 253 Chapter 28 The Official Politics of Identity: Social Reification Strategy 261 Conclusion 277 Bibliography 283 Index 303 This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:10:36 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 1 INTRODUCTION In his essay Nasha Zdrada (“Our Betrayal”), the Belarusian writer Pyatro Vasyuchenka writes about the strange phenomenon of “betrayal” in the existence of the Belarusian people: An elderly lady asks me: “Pyatro, why were there so many traitors among your Belarusians during the war?” A young lady says categorically about Vasil Bykau: “He has left […] betrayed us.” Mr. Khazbulatov, after the suppression of the August 1991 putsch states with dismay: “Belarus has betrayed us.” I know what to tell these ladies and gentlemen. […] I can say that […] we have betrayed Bykau, Bykau has not betrayed us.”1 During the past fifteen years in Belarus, a situation has emerged in which one part of society has the impression that the other part has betrayed it, while this other part considers the first part as traitors. Both consider them- selves true Belarusians, both are certain that the other has betrayed Belarus and the Belarusian idea. In a way, both have reason for their positions. Sup- porters of the current Belarusian authorities, indeed, “betray” the propo- nents of opposition ideas of Belarusian development. At the same time, one can see definite truth in the fact that those who fight for “European” Bela- rus “betray” the official notion of the Belarusian nation. Simultaneously, however, each party remains faithful to itself and to the idea of the Bela- rusian nation that has shaped their self-perception: their Belarusian identity. According to the results of opinion polls carried out by the Indepen- dent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies (IISEPS),2 during 1 Pyatro Vasyuchenka, “Nasha zdrada,” Fragmenty, nos. 1–2 (2000): 208. 2 “Okonchatelnye itogi prezidetskikh vyborov,” Arkhiv analitiki Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies (IISEPS), April 2006, www.iiseps.org/4-06-7.html. This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 2 2 Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” the 2006 presidential elections, about 54 percent of the electorate voted for the current president (83 percent according to Central Election Committee data). In other words, due to manipulation during the elections the support of the authorities was overstated, but not entirely falsified. Hence the ques- tion: why resort to manipulation, if the current authorities would have attained the majority of votes without it? What is the meaning of the dif- ference between 58 percent—estimated real support for the president— and 83 percent—officially declared support? A possible answer is that while the difference in the figures does not affect the final election results, it significantly changes the political map of Belarusian society. The figure of 83 percent allows the authorities to speak in favor of the monolithic state of Belarusian society—that it is almost entirely “on this side” of the political divide. Such an impressive percentage may testify to the complete and unconditional adequacy of the Belarusianness ideology formulated by the authorities. At the same time, the figure of 58 percent, though testify- ing to numerical superiority, also manifests a political split in society. It points to a substantial segment of society that falls outside of the sphere of influence of official ideology and seeks alternative ways of political and cultural self-definition. The present work aims to reveal post-communist Belarus as a public and cultural space in which a “struggle over identity” between official and opposition discourses takes place and in which both discourses claim their right to be the only voice of genuine Belarusianness.3 Two concepts of the Belarusian nation are the source of a profound divi- sion in Belarusian society. It is not only split along the lines of political val- ues and socioeconomic development strategies, but this split also influences the system of collective self-determination of “Belarusians as Belarusians.” Each Belarusian idea, both official and alternative, is articulated and mani- fested in the public space according to a definite logic of nation building. Each resorts to historical discourse to create the foundation of Belarusian tradition. This tradition, in turn, establishes a historical alibi for a given stra- tegy of formulating a modern image of Belarusianness, the selection of geo- political guidelines, and the system of socio-cultural values. Thus, behind the screen of the political struggle between the official authorities and the op- position lies a struggle for Belarusian identity, for the right to set up its ci- vilizational parameters and to establish the trajectory of its further develop- 3 “Belarusianness” is understood here as a set of axiological criteria, historical ideas, and geopolitical orientations that sum up the essence of the Belarusian nation in a definite political and cultural conception. This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 3 Introduction 3 ment. “We are fighting not so much for power, as for the future,” said Alaksandar Milinkevich, leader of the united democratic forces of Belarus during the 2006 presidential campaign. First, I am interested in presenting an ideological design of the two con- cepts of Belarusianness in political discourse; second, their substantiation via the tradition raised by the corresponding historical narratives; and finally, the logic of their public and cultural manifestations. These points dictate the specific character of this work, with reference to various levels of Belarusianness: political, historical, and cultural. The work consists of six parts. Part I focuses on the methodological basis of the study with respect to contemporary theories of nations. Consi- dering the numerous works on this topic, it has proved impossible to pre- sent a meticulous analysis of existing definitions of nations in the context of this research. I thus confine the study to a designation of those ap- proaches that appear to be the most methodologically significant in the context of Belarusian studies. An analysis of the phenomenon of coexist- ing dual concepts of Belarusianness can hardly be built on a separate model of nation study. Instead, I aim to apply aspects of both the ethno- cultural and modernist schools, and also the theory of nationalism of small nations by M. Hroch,4 to investigate their explanatory value for the rese- arch. Part I contains discussions of such issues as the ontological status of a nation in different theories of nation, the relationship between nation and state, and the specific characteristics of nationalism within post-social- ist ideological frameworks. The ultimate task of the research is to show the operation of various strategies of articulation and manifestation of a natio- nal idea in the case of official and alternative Belarusianness. Analysis of the conflict of USSR national policy interpretations among the schools of Sovietology in the context of the above theories of nation- alism has revealed an intriguing rule: a positive evaluation of the soviet nation-building experience tends to be natural for followers of the mod- ernist approach in nation study. From this point of view, for all of the decades of Soviet history, the USSR actually played its usual role—creat- ing “national constructions” with educational systems, media, civil rituals, and so on at its disposal. The creation of a Soviet community was thus anal- ogous to other nation-making projects, with the exception that the Soviet state did not attempt to build a unified nation similar to other big nations, 4 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 4 4 Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” but was engrossed in institutionalization of the numerous nations on its territory, a phenomenon that Ian Bremmer calls “matrioshka nationalism.” This constructivist approach to nation building within the Soviet state is significant for a complete understanding of post-Soviet Belarusian devel- opment. At the same time, to understand how different aspects of the national idea have become injected into the concept of Belarusianness, and in what way they are used in contemporary nationalistic discourse and official ide- ology, it is necessary to examine the historical foundation of the national idea in the early twentieth century as well as the specific characteristics of its articulation in view of the features of the historical period. The Belarusian national idea (i.e., the laying of foundations for the symbolic matrix that Belarusians still apply today) was born at the end of the nine- teenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. This historical period saw the expansion of the socialist and social-democratic movements that left ideas of class struggle at the forefront of the European political arena. Thus, the Belarusian national movement was attached to a social move- ment from the very beginning. The progressive ideas of social existence, such as social “equalization” and other elements of socialist ideology, were inscribed into the cultural model of “Belarusianness” as such. Part II of this study is devoted to all of these issues related to the history of devel- opment of the Belarusian nation before and after the October Revolution of 1917. It reveals the beginnings of Belarusian nationalism in the Russian empire and the nation’s existence within the Soviet Union. Today, adherents of the opposition idea of the Belarusian nation insist that the process of nation building, initiated by the first Belarusian nation- alists, was interrupted by the 1917 October Revolution and the Soviet state. They view the Soviet period of Belarusian history as a period of colo- nial submission, and contemporary Belarus as a post-colonial formation. Within the framework of the official ideology, though, the Soviet period is regarded as a period of intensive nation building carried out by the Soviet state and its institutions. These conflicting interpretations of the Soviet past and its significance in the process of Belarusian nation building in the official and alternative discourses of Belarusianness have actually led to the difference of opinions on the interpretation of the Soviet state and its national policy that would later be found in Western Sovietology. The tradition of interpreting the USSR as a colonial empire (the onset of which was manifested by Richard Pipes’s book The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Natio- nalism 1917–1923) was in contrast to theories that saw the Soviet state as This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 5 Introduction 5 “almost all effectively multinational.”5 In these theories, authors view the Soviet state as a quite positive experience in settling national problems behind the veil of the totalitarian political system, and the Soviet Union is perceived here as an “affirmative action empire” (Terry Martin’s notion). Their conclusions are based on a thorough analysis of Soviet moderniza- tion as an analogue, and at the same time as an alternative, to Western modernization (Suny and Martin),6 and analysis of the process of institu- tionalization of national units that once belonged to the USSR (Brubaker).7 The supposition that Soviet national policy led to the forma- tion of a definite format of national identity (but not to its obliteration and annihilation) allows us to evaluate the status and positions of both the offi- cial and alternative models of the Belarusian nation in modern society very differently. Part III is devoted to a description of Belarusian post-communism as a new epoch of national and state development. It formulates a general notion of ongoing sociopolitical and economic processes in the country over the past fifteen years. It includes references to the work of Belarusian authors, data obtained through independent polls, and a wealth of articles by Western and Belarusian researchers on the Belarusian issue. The nature of the Belarusian experience in its triple transition, the prerequisites of democratization and authoritarianism (numerous authors cover the pres- ence of both in Belarusian society), the role of the Soviet legacy, and the responsibility of the political elite are the topics that have enabled me to outline the systemic changes in Belarusian society that resulted in the establishment of an authoritarian regime in the independent Republic of Belarus. In Part III, I also present various approaches to the condition of society that already appear in extant literature on Belarus. Part IV shows the role of Belarusian nationalism in analysis of the Belarusian post-communist scenario. Many authors believe that national- ism as a state of society’s self-consciousness, as a political ideology, and, finally, as the groundwork of a political movement is one of the key fac- tors of Belarusian post-communist development. The absolute majority of authors quoted build their perception of Belarusian reality based on the 5 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 168. 6 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union 1923–1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001); Ronald G Suny, The Revenge of the Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 7 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the Nationalism Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 6 6 Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” thesis of weakness of the Belarusian idea and the absence of national iden- tity among the majority of Belarusians. I dwell on the arguments and para- doxes of such a diagnosis of Belarusian identity in Chapters 12–14 of this Part. Rejecting the cliché thesis of “weak identity and underdeveloped nationalism” this research is based on an alternative thesis of the coexis- tence of two parallel concepts of Belarusianness, which I believe more accurately mirrors the current state of the Belarusian people and allows a different interpretation of the interconnection between the democratiza- tion and nationalization of Belarusian society. Part V is devoted to the description of various forms of representation of official and alternative Belarusianness and their competition for the minds of Belarusians. It also describes the specific features of the Bela- rusian public sphere, or rather two “public spheres,” divided by the invisi- ble ideological wall. Each sphere functions on the basis of its own sources of information, its own social organizations, and two different cultural spheres. It shows the informational background against which appears the struggle over national identity between official and oppositional political discourses. The image of “Belarusianness” on which an appropriate poli- tical ideology is built was obtained from official Belarusian ideology, on the one hand, and oppositional political ideologies, on the other hand. In selecting texts for comparative analysis, the main criterion was the pres- ence of the “national idea” as a political issue. The selected texts deal with defining the Belarusian nation, describing the national idea, designating Belarus’s civilizational orientation, and so on. In the official political dis- course, such material includes public speeches by the Belarusian president, publications in Sovietskaia Belorussia (the daily mouthpiece of Belarusian state ideology) by leading ideologists, and university textbooks on state ideology. Articles by political leaders and political scientists from the opposition camp and manifestos of the main opposition political parties form the main source material for the political concept of alternative Belarusianness. Official and alternative political discourses rest upon their own versions of Belarusian historical tradition. For the purposes of this research, it was important to compare the strategies of the creation of a definite image of the Belarusian nation with the help of a definite interpretation of Bela- rusian history. Furthermore, it was significant to contrast the instrumental possibilities of the official and alternative versions of history, in the first place, and their presence in the educational system. Common “Histories of Belarus:” university textbooks (in the case of official history) and books This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 7 Introduction 7 aimed toward a wide readership and openly educational (in the case of alternative history) were used as the material for comparison to provide a picture of two visions of the Belarusian past by historians working in dif- ferent cultural and political camps. However, the main interest for the pre- sent research is not so much details of historical interpretations of the Belarusian past as generalizations and conclusions, which contain the most valuable reference points of different versions of the Belarusian national idea. One of the main problems in this comparison was the varying avail- ability of educational historical literature covering the “official” and “alter- native” histories: while numerous publications exist on official history, publications on alternative common history for a wide readership are rather limited. The language of political declarations of the national idea alongside its historic grounds has nothing to say concerning the way a certain format of Belarusianness is transformed into a “cultural nation” and becomes a con- stituent part of a self-description, an element of identity. The space of iden- tity is filled with civil rituals and public cultural manifestations during which an idea acquires symbolic “flesh and blood” and becomes part of the mass social consciousness, invading the territory of self-images and self- representation. Part VI of the book is devoted to a description of the way some image of Belarusianness is manifested in the public and cultural life of Belarusian society. The comparative analysis of public cultural repre- sentations was complicated by the fact that, as this research reveals, the two concepts of Belarusianness represent different approaches to nation- definition. A nation as a constructed entity (in the official discourse) and a nation as a cultural unity (the alternative project) imply corresponding dif- ferent strategies of national identity formation. In the first case, one can speak of a social reification strategy, designed to establish a close correla- tion between the state and people via the “nation,” and making use of the institutional system, education, various civil rituals, and social practices to build a national construct for Belarus. In the second case, it is rather a wide area of cultural representations through which memories and myths from the past become part of the mass consciousness, penetrating into the space of self-images and self-representations. As a case study of the cultural manifestation of alternative Belarusian- ness, several examples were chosen. They represent the most significant cultural happenings in the sphere of symbolic representation of the alter- native Belarusian idea for the past decade. The examples include: a feature film, Misterium Occupation, devoted to a reinterpretation of the events of This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 8 8 Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” World War II; a youth movement of historical reenactments, which repre- sents a network of reenactor groups that recollect and “revive” Belarusian medieval history; the Free Theater, where performances deal with the actu- al issues of Belarusian present-day reality; and finally independent rock music as a most influential and effective method of political protest and manifestation of the alternative idea of Belarus. The strategy of public manifestation of official Belarusianness looks dif- ferent from that of the articulation of alternative Belarusianness. Never- theless, there are examples of cultural happenings in the context of repre- senting the official national idea: the annual festival “Slavonic Bazaar,” the national historic “blockbuster” film Anastasia Slutskaia (2003), and the stage play by the Belarusian National Theater Sny ab Belarusi (Dreams about Belarus). However, as this study aims to prove, they do not carry out the main functions. Official Belarusianness is reified in numerous social practices on the micro and macro levels of everyday life in which the state is involved directly and indirectly. The intent of this part of the study is to compare the strategies and tech- niques of public manifestation of official and alternative Belarusianness as a specific tool providing access for them to identity-formative processes in society. Such concepts of Belarusianness influence general political and so- cial processes as the exact basis of a social self-image in Belarusian society. Various sources are used to estimate the adequacy of official Bela- rusianness in the perception of Belarusians, that is, to what degree its basic formulations reflect the self-perceptions prevalent in Belarusian society. These include the indirect evidence of results of referenda and elections conducted by the Belarusian authorities (although independent exit poll data, not the official data were taken into consideration), and also the results of independent opinion polls assessing trust in Belarusian authorities and the official course of political and economic development. Another indirect evidence of support for Belarusian authorities in society is confidence in official information sources. The official media in Belarus are a supplement to the authorities and a propaganda device; they serve not only to articulate the ideological message and to present the vision of Belarusian life reflected in the state ideological “mirror” but also to pro- mote the official concept of Belarusianness in general. Yet, as the 2005 IISEPS opinion poll shows, it is state media in which the Belarusian peo- ple place their confidence. Answers to the question “Which media do you trust most?” are distributed as follows: of those questioned, 58.2 percent trust the Belarusian state media; 35.2 percent—the Russian media; and 12 percent—the Belarusian independent media. (Other answer options were: This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 9 Introduction 9 10.2 percent—European and other Western media; and 8 percent— Internet.)8 These data affirm the fact that approximately half of Bela- rusian voters support the Belarusian regime. The Belarusian national idea and Belarusian nationalism are the sub- jects of analysis in the works of several Belarusian authors, including S. Dubavets, I. Babkou, and V. Bulgakau. Their central preoccupation is the historical aspect of the Belarusian national idea, its design and its forma- tion as the ideology of the Belarusian national movement at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Many foreign researchers quoted in Part IV view Belarusian identity as a factor in the failure of the democratization of Belarusian society. Books and articles by Jan Zaprudnik, David Marples, Grigory Ioffe, and others investigate Bela- rusian identity in the context of ongoing sociopolitical processes in inde- pendent Belarus. In most of the works mentioned above, Belarusian iden- tity stands in opposition to the state, leaving out those aspects of the Belarusian national idea exploited and promoted by the official discourse of Belarusianness. This research provides an alternative interpretation of the Belarusian idea as one that has developed in two different political and cultural contexts and has become the basis of two different national projects. This work contains a description of the instrumental aspect of the in- jection of a different content of Belarusianness into the social conscious- ness, an aspect that has not yet been investigated. The comparison of strategies of public manifestation and cultural representations of official and alternative Belarusianness provides not only an understanding of the logic of dominating self-description models, but also the ability to evalu- ate the chances that alternative Belarusianness will win this unequal struggle over identity. The attempt to embrace in one work several dimensions of Belarusi- anness—its political, historical, and cultural representations—is the main objective of this study, which demonstrates the trajectory of the social and cultural reification of the Belarusian nation. However, it also determines the inevitable sketchiness of the work, since each of the problems of artic- ulation and representation in question is in itself a complete topic for sep- arate research. This work can thus be viewed as the starting point for fur- ther inquiry into the problem of Belarusian society as a battlefield of two ideas of Belarusianness, which can potentially bring forth a more adequate evaluation of events in the country. 8 “Doverie k SMI,” Arkhiv analitiki IISEPS, September 2005, www.iiseps.org/9-05-12.html. This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions bekus.nyomdai:, 7.4.2010 15:17 Page 10 10 Struggle over Identity The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” The name “Belarus” appears in the text in several spellings: during Soviet times, “Byelorussia” was used most often as the name of the Soviet republic, although some authors prefer the spelling “Belorussia” (for example, N. Vakar found it more adequate). After the country became independent, the name “Belarus” was adopted as officially recognized (Беларусь in both Belarusian and Russian). In quotations of different authors the spelling of the name was preserved as used by the authors. This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:14:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions