IS EXTREME RIGHT-WING POPULISM CONTAGIOUS?
By
Jens Rydgren
Department of Sociology
Stockholm University
S–106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 31 76
Fax: +46 8 612 55 80
E-mail: jens.rydgren@sociology.su.se
Abstract
This article presents a new model for explaining the emergence of the
party family of extreme right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.
As the old master frame of the extreme right was rendered impotent by
the outcome of the World War II, it took the innovation of a new,
potent master frame before the extreme right was able to break
electoral marginalization anew. Such a master frame—combining
ethno-nationalist xenophobia, based on the doctrine of ethno-
pluralism, with anti-political establishment populism—evolved in the
1970s, and was made known as a successful frame in connection with
the electoral break-through of the French Front National in 1984. This
event started a process of cross-national diffusion, where embryonic
extreme right-wing groups and networks elsewhere adopted the new
frame. Hence, the emergence of similar parties, clustering in time—
i.e., that a new party family was born—had less to do with structural
factors influencing different political systems in similar ways, as with
cross-national diffusion of frames. The innovation and diffusion of the
new master frame was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
emergence of the ERP parties. In order to complete the model, a short
list of different political opportunity structures is added.
Introduction
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of a long period of marginalization
for the extreme Right in Western Europe. The outcome of the war—and not the least, the
brutish act of genocide of which the general public became fully aware only after the war—
2
delegitimized the extreme Right and rendered its old ideological master frame impotent.
Neither biologically based racism, anti-Semitism, nor overt antidemocratic critique of the
prevailing societal order would attract more than marginal popular support. The main
elements of the old master frame had become highly stigmatized—and so had, indeed,
anything that could be associated with Nazism or fascism. To this we may add the strong
economic developments of Western Europe up to the early 1970s, which kept the level of
societal strain on a low level. Finally, the level of political trust was still high—or, to put it
inversely, the level of political discontent had not yet decreased below a critical point.
As a consequence, with some few isolated and transitory exceptions (e.g., MSI in
Italy in 1972, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [NPD] in Germany during the late
1960s) there was not much ado about the contemporary extreme Right in Western Europe
during this period. After the oil crises in the 1970s, the Western European economies have
become more unstable, and have been plagued with deep economic downturns and a high
level of structural unemployment. Moreover, since the late 1960s, the level of political trust
has decreased rapidly in most Western countries. However, it took the development of a new,
innovative master frame until the extreme Right succeeded to escape marginalization, which
did not happened until the mid 1980s. Since then, extreme Right-wing parties of a new
family—which in this paper will be called extreme Right-wing populist (ERP) parties—have
emerged in most West European countries.1 Today, ERP parties are represented in the
Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Italian, Norwegian, and Swiss parliaments, and are also
substantially represented at a local and regional level in France and Germany.
These introductory paragraphs indicate three possible ways of explaining the success
as well as failure of political parties and social movements: development of potent master
frames and how they may be rendered impotent by socio-political changes; presence/absence
of societal strain—sometimes caused by economic hardships and relative deprivation—which
3
may result in waves of social protest; and expanding or contracting political opportunity
structures, such as the level of trust in established political institutions. As should be evident
from these paragraphs, there are strong reasons to believe that the first alternative,
development of potent master frames, might be particularly important in understanding why
the ERP parties emerged when they did, especially if combined with political opportunities. It
is hence somewhat puzzling that the literature on the family of contemporary extreme Right-
wing parties has focused much on societal strain and/or political opportunity structures, but
has ignored the question of how a new innovative master frame was constructed and—even
more important—could be spread and adopted through cross-national diffusion processes.2
More specifically, with few exceptions earlier research on the ERP parties has
focused on singular national cases (see e.g., Hainsworth 1992, 2000; Betz & Immerfall 1998;
Merkl & Weinberg 1993). ERP parties have commonly been treated as discrete entities
arising independently of one another, which have prompted a search for unique causes of the
emergence of the national ERP party in question. These causes are typically sought within
each country. This research design is highly problematic: because of ignoring research done
on similar parties in other countries, it often leads to ad hoc-theorizing. Moreover, when
doing research on social and political change, there are no reasons to assume that explanans
and explanandum are to be found within the same delineated geographical territory (of the
nation state)—in fact, this is less likely to be the case today, in our open globalized world,
than ever. However, there are also some rather sophisticated comparative studies on ERP
parties in Western Europe, showing ambitions to present a more universal theory of the
emergence of these parties generally. Most of this comparative literature has been macro-
structural oriented—it has focused on the postindustrialization of Western European societies
(e.g., Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995)—and is biased towards finding one universal cause of the
new party family of ERP parties (e.g., Betz 1994). This focus is understandable, given the
4
puzzle to explain the clustering in time of emerging ERP parties within different political
systems, and given the rightful ambition to avoid ad hoc-theorizing. However, both these
aims can be dealt with in another—and far better—way, which will be charted in this paper.
The fact that the ERP parties look alike in different political systems, that is, that they
constitute a party family, has less to do with macro-structures forming the demand-sides of
these political systems in similar ways—as the prevalent demand-centered approach would
have it—than with the fact that ideas and practices diffuse from successful ERP parties to
embryonic ones in other countries. Second, instead of trying to find one universal cause of
the emergence of all ERP parties, I will in this paper assume that the emergence of the ERP
parties may have different causes within different countries. However, this is not to give in
for a relativist everything-goes methodology: instead of searching for grand, universal
theories we should look for causal mechanisms of some generality (Hedström & Swedberg
1998).3 The prevailing answer to why ERP parties emerged—as a party family—during the
1980s and 1990s is that the postindustrialization of Western European countries have both
undermined the salience of the economic (class) cleavage, and created new “loser” groups
susceptible to a political message combining cultural protectionism, xenophobic welfare
chauvinism, a populist critique of “the establishment,” and a reactionary call for returning to
the “good old values of yesterday” (e.g., Betz 1994, Minkenberg 2001). Hence, in most
respects, this is a strain- or grievance-based explanation. As indicated above, although such
an explanation need not to be wrong per se—and indeed may help us understand variances in
electoral success of the extreme Right over time—it tells us nothing about the variance in
electoral success of the ERP parties between different countries. Countries in which ERP
parties have done poorly have been postindustrial societies, and have experienced economic
downturns and high levels of unemployment during the last twenty years, as well (Rydgren
2002). Furthermore, by itself this approach is also deterministic and tells us little about what
5
is actually going on between explanans and explanandum (cf. Tarrow 1998, and McAdam
1999 for a critique of grievance based explanations of social movement activity). Yet, as we
will see below, this kind of macro-structural explanation could, if successfully interwoven
with other elements, contribute to our understanding of why the ERP parties emerged in the
1980s and 1990s rather than in, say, the 1950s or 1960s. However, I will propose that two
other families of explanatory mechanisms are much more useful in understanding the
emergence of the party family of ERP parties, and not the least why these parties have been
electorally successful in some countries, and failed in others:
First, we need to take cross-national diffusion processes seriously. With the
innovation of a new potent master frame—combining ethno-nationalism based on “cultural
racism” (the so-called ‘ethno-pluralist’ doctrine) and a populist (but not antidemocratic) anti-
political establishment rhetoric—the extreme Right was able to free itself from enough
stigma to be able to attract voter groups that never would have considered voting for an “old”
Right-wing extremist party promoting biological racism and/or antidemocratic stances. The
development of this new master frame was a long process, in many ways going back to the
neo-fascist international meeting in Rome in 1950—“Carta di Roma”—although it did not
reach its refined form until the late 1970s and early 1980s under the influence of the French
Nouvelle Droite. The decisive moment, however, was the electoral break-through of the
French Front National in 1984, which made the new master frame known as a successful
frame for existing but marginalized extreme Right-wing groups and networks all over
Western Europe—and hence started a process of cross-national diffusion. By focusing on
cross-national diffusion processes two biases, common in the literature on the ERP parties,
will be avoided: it will bring agency and time back into the analysis.
As will be demonstrated below, adopting ERP parties never mimic innovations
automatically, but creatively adapt and interpret things they have learned from others,
6
because they think they can gain something from doing so (cf. McAdam 1995). Political
actors—ERP party leaderships included—can for good reasons be assumed to be rational in
the bounded sense of the term. The main goal of a political party is to maximize its influence
on policy outcomes (within a particular political system) in accordance with the core ideas
and values embedded in their party ideology—and the duty of its party leaders is to use
strategies that (given information shortage and uncertainties, cognitive limitations and biases,
etc.) are judged to arrive at that goal as effectively as possible. One such strategy is “rational
imitation”—that is, learning by looking at others’ behavior in situations in which the relation
between strategies and goals are difficult to assess (Hedström 1998; see also Hedström et al.
2000)—which constitute the motivational basis of diffusion processes, as they are conceived
of here. Yet, as will been stressed in this paper, it is often non-rational to imitate the behavior
of others without first translating it to fit the contextual situation in which the adopter is
embedded.
Moreover, as Tilly (1984), among others, has pointed out, when things happen affect
how they happen: in trying to explain the emergence of, say, the Danish People’s Party—or
the transformation of the Austrian FPÖ into an ERP party in 1986—one has to account for
the simple but mostly overlooked fact that the Front National already existed as a successful
exemplar influencing the action of others.
Although diffusion and successful adaptation of the master frame combining the
ethno-pluralist doctrine with anti-political establishment populism will be considered a
necessary condition for explaining why ERP parties emerged as ERP parties, it is not a
sufficient explanation by itself. In order to reach a full explanation of why the ERP parties
emerged when they did in respective political system, and not the least, why ERP parties
have failed completely in some countries, we must consider a second group of mechanisms
falling within the composite notion of expanding and contracting political opportunities. If
7
an ERP party is to emerge, some—but not all—of the various political opportunities
presented below would have to be present.
These two families of mechanisms—diffusion and adaptation processes, and
expanding and contracting political opportunities—will be extensively discussed below. The
aim of the article is to outline a new model for understanding two basic things: (1) the
emergence of the new party family of ERP parties, and (2) why such parties have been
successful in some countries, but failed in others. This model is as suitable for explaining so-
called ‘positive cases’ as it is for explaining ‘negative’ ones—and it has the advantage of
being general enough to escape ad hoc explanations of singular cases, while at the same time
flexible enough to be applicable to empirical cases all over Western Europe. Because of lack
of room, this article will not provide empirical applications, only a few, scattered empirical
examples. However, I urge people to apply the model to as many cases as possible (and see
Rydgren 2003a for a discussion of the Danish case along these lines).
The article will be structured in a straightforward way: first, political opportunities
will be discussed. Secondly, the development of the new, innovative master frame will be
discussed, and the processes of cross-national diffusion and adaptation will be discussed in
the final part of this paper.
Political Opportunities
Following Tarrow (1998: 19–20), political opportunities will in this paper be seen as
“consistent—but not necessary formal, permanent, or national”—resources that are external
to the party or movement in question. Although the term Political Opportunity Structure
(POS) has been prevalent in much of the literature on social movements, it should be
emphasized that not all mechanisms deemed to fall within this concept is of such a stability
and duration to qualify as structures—some of them are rather situational (see Tarrow 1998).
8
In my opinion, both stable political opportunities (POS) and more fluctuating, situational
ones might be useful in explaining the emergence of ERP parties: we may expect that highly
stable and enduring POS is particularly useful in explaining (long-term) geographic variation,
while not very good at explaining variation over time within specific political systems—
whereas the opposite is likely to be true for situational political opportunities.
As mentioned above, although political opportunities do not explain the success or
failure of ERP parties completely by themselves, I do believe that they contribute a great deal
to such an explanation. More specifically, I will argue that the following political
opportunities—which are partly overlapping—are of particular importance in explaining the
emergence of the ERP parties, and not the least why they have been successful in some
political systems while failed in others:
(1) Most general—and most important—the emergence of niches on the electoral
arena (Rydgren 2003c). This is a composite notion, and overlaps in significant parts with
mechanisms that will be discussed below, under the headings of ‘dealignment/realignment’
and ‘politicization of new issues.’ Nevertheless, we may assume that no new parties will
emerge and sustain their electoral support over time if:
• there are no sufficiently large niches, defined as gaps between the voters’ location in the
political space and the perceived position of the parties (i.e., the party images and/or
position on crucial issues) in the same space, and
• the proportion of voters with high degree of party identification is close to 100 percent.
Because of a time lag between voter and party movement within the political space,
niches occasionally emerge, in which new political parties can position themselves. When the
voter distribution is shifting in some direction, the parties will have to adapt their positions in
9
the same direction, unless they want to risk loosing voters. The parties are not as flexible as
the voters—to shift position is a process that takes time for a political party—which implies
that there normally exists a considerable time lag between voter and party movement within
the political space. However, niches are unlikely to evolve under stable conditions—with
relatively stable voter preferences—when the established parties have had time to find their
strategically optimal positions. Only at rapid changes in the voter distribution—and at
situations when the political profile of one or several of the largest established parties have
changed dramatically—significant gaps between the political demand side and its supply side
are created. If a political party can position itself in this gap, or niche, it may have a good
chance of attracting votes, at least if the number of party-identified voters has decreased
below a certain level. Only when the level of party identification is low, voters chose how to
vote on basis of ideological or issue preferences (Rydgren 2003c).
The probability of the emergence of niches is particularly great if the salience of a
new or earlier weak cleavage dimension—or a specific issue connected to such a cleavage
dimension, which the established parties have been unable or unwilling to deal with—
suddenly increases at the expense of the old, established cleavage dimension. In such
situations, the established parties often had no incentive to position themselves strategically
within the “new” cleavage dimension, but are likely to be positioned near one of the end-
poles (if the “new” cleavage dimension has increased in salience as a reaction against a
consensual way of thinking) or near the center (if the parties used to be indifferent to issues
belonging to the cleavage dimension). As a result, a rather large niche may emerge, which a
new political party may be able to mine.
Many Western European countries have seen a more volatile electoral arena during
the last decades, and often also radical changes in the distribution of voter attitudes and
preferences in the political space (see Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2003c). This has partly been
10
the result of profound macro changes—most important: the transformation from industrial to
postindustrial society, and, related, economic, political, and cultural globalization—which
have caused increased stress, frustration, and disillusionment among those whose situation
has become impaired (absolutely or relatively) as a result of the changes. These changes have
had four important effects: First, they have altered the interests of certain voter groups;
second, they have resulted in a situation in which some voter groups have perceived a threat
to their identity; third, they have fed an increased discontent with (established) politicians and
political parties, because of the perceived inability of these actors to solve the anomalies of
the postindustrial society (such as high unemployment rates); and, finally, they have resulted
in a situation in which certain voter groups experience that their “old” frames of
understanding reality have become increasingly ineffective. The first three points indicate
that some voter groups became increasingly susceptible for being attracted by a political
program combining anti-political establishment populism, a quest to return to the status quo
ante—including the priority to preserve the national identity—and welfare chauvinist racism
and xenophobia (see Rydgren 2003c). This is a combined result of changing interests and
emotional dispositions. In a situation of decreased salience of the economic cleavage
dimension, fewer will make use of class frames in understanding their impaired status
position. A frame stressing clashes of economic interests between immigrants and natives—
that is, claiming that “they are taking our jobs,” for instance—may be adopted as an
alternative interpretation of the same situation. The fourth point above indicates that more
people have become increasingly susceptible to adopting new frames at all (and, inversely, to
abandon their old ones). It moreover seams reasonable to assume that people who have lost
trust in established parties and politicians are less likely to use traditional socio-economic
frames, and hence more likely to adopt ethnic ones. Hence, the transformation processes of
postindustrialization and globalization have brought about “unsettled times,” in which,
11
according to Swidler (1986), “the likelihood that cognitive and affective routines will be
abandoned in the search for new interpretations of reality” (McAdam 1999: xxxiii) is
increased.
Since established parties have occasionally been unable or unwilling to meet these
changing opinions—or, indeed, sometimes been unable to canalise or articulate the increased
frustration by their political frames—significant niches have emerged in several Western
European political systems. Socio-cultural authoritarianism, and, more specific, ethno-
nationalism and xenophobia, have been the two most important niches presenting ERP parties
with expanding political opportunities, together with a “negative” factor: The political
transformation process has also resulted in a growing discontent with political institutions
and politicians, as well as in a decrease in party identification among voters (Putnam et al.
2000). This situation has facilitated the emergence of the ERP parties by freeing resources
and opening up niches in the electoral arena—that is, by making voters prepared to leave
their “old” party for a new, untried one—which has made it possible for some ERP parties to
mobilize on ethno-nationalism and xenophobia. In addition, it has made it possible for the
ERP parties to foment popular discontent and mobilize political protest.
(2) Hence, dealignment and realignment processes may present favorable political
opportunities (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995). Decreased trust in (established) political parties, and
increased salience of alternative (or even conflicting) cleavage dimensions constitute political
opportunities for emerging ERP parties.
Several cleavage dimensions always exist simultaneously (see Lipset & Rokkan 1967;
Rokkan 1970), most of them ultimately based on social identity or interests. Although these
cleavage dimensions exist side by side, either manifest or latent, their salience increases or
declines during certain periods (Hout et al. 1996: 55–56). Contemporary Western European
democracies are characterized by two major cleavage dimensions: the economic cleavage
12
dimension, which puts workers against the capital, and which concerns the degree of state
involvement in the economy, and the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, which is about
issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion, and so on (see Bell 1996: 332–333).
Although issues belonging to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension have existed at an
attitudinal level throughout the twentieth century, the economic cleavage dimension has
structured most political behavior in the postwar era (see Budge & Robertson 1987).
However, there are certain indications that the salience of the socio-cultural cleavage
dimension has increased at the expense of the economic cleavage dimension during the past
few decades, not least because of the politicization of issues like immigration,
multiculturalism, feminism, and environment (for discussion and empirical indications, see
e.g., Betz 1994; Clark & Lipset 2001; Ignazi 1996; Inglehart 1997; Kitschelt 1995; Perrineau
1997, Rydgren 2003c). This trend creates expanding political opportunities for the ERP
parties.
More specifically, as indicated above, we may expect that the relative strength or
salience of old cleavages influence the possibilities to mobilize on issues and frames
connecting to new cleavages (Kriesi et al. 1995). As old cleavages lose in salience, frames
connected to these cleavages become less effective for people’s interpretation of the world.
As Kriesi et al. (1995: 4) have stressed, therefore, old cleavages may provide ”a shield
against the framing attempts of rising collective actors.” For instance, although xenophobic
attitudes might be at least as common in countries strongly dominated by the socio-economic
dimension, voters sharing these attitudes are less likely to base their decision how to vote on
these particular attitudes, because there are other issues (and attitudes) deemed to be more
important.4 A defining characteristic of the ERP parties during the 1990s has been their
ability to mobilize working-class voters (see e.g., Rydgren 2003c; Mayer 1999). This has not
been the effect of increased xenophobia and authoritarianism among workers; but rather the
13
increased salience of immigration matters and socio-cultural issues generally vis-à-vis socio-
economic issues. As Lipset (1981) has argues, although manual workers traditionally have
been at odds with the Left parties’ positions on socio-cultural issues—by being considerably
more authoritarian, on average—this has not have any practical effect on their voting patterns
as long as they identify with the socialist parties’ economic positions (i.e., see them as
defenders of their class interests). In such a situation, they will vote for the left despite their
conflicting opinions on socio-cultural issues. However, in those political systems where the
economic cleavage dimension has lost in salience—and the socio-cultural cleavage
dimension has gained in salience—this has started to change.
As a consequent, it is important to be sensitive to the fact that cleavage structures may
be of different degrees of complexity. While countries such as Sweden has a relatively simple
cleavage structure, dominated by the economic dimension, countries such as France has a
much more complicated one. In France, other cleavage dimensions (e.g., religious, ethnic,
regional) have for a long time cut through economic class bonds and loyalties, which has
made the impact of social class on political behavior lower (Lipset in Mair et al. 1999: 313).
It can be argued that stronger bonds of class loyalties may evolve in countries that have been
strongly dominated only by the economic cleavage dimension, such as Sweden, which delays
the re-alignment process.
Yet, as indicated above, not only realignment processes but also dealignment
processes matter. More specifically, I will argue that increasing political alienation among
certain groups of individuals; decreasing trust in political institutions, and a corresponding
increase in discontent with political parties and politicians; a decreasing level of party
identification among voters; and a decline in class voting, all presented the ERP parties with
expanding political opportunities. These situations have risen in several Western European
countries, for a variety of reasons, and I will briefly mention the four most important ones.
14
First, the political parties and other political institutions have found it difficult to adapt to the
profound economic and social changes that have left many voters feeling that both the
politics and the politicians are decoupled from the “reality” that “ordinary people” live (Mény
& Surel 2000: 24). Second, the increasing complexity of the political process, combined with
the declining political autonomy of the nation-state, has made the political decision-making
processes more opaque (see Poggi 1990; Sassen 1996). Third, the real or perceived
convergence between the mainstream parties in the political space, in some countries, has
caused a widespread feeling that no real differences exist between the political Right and
Left. And fourth, various political scandals and “affairs,” and cases of corruption in
particular, have had a disenchanting effect on many voters in some political systems.
(3) Following Budge and Farlie (1983), we may assume that parties try to benefit
from issue-voting not so much from opposing each other’s issue positions as from trying to
shift public (and media) attention from one issue to another. Hence, as also indicated above,
agenda setting and politicization of new issues may provide expanding political
opportunities.5 Politicization of new issues—most important the immigration question—is of
great importance, not the least because it may grant ERP parties increased media coverage.
As Koopmans (1996), among others, have stressed, the amount of media coverage for social
phenomena is influences by issue-intention cycles. It is hence always of strategic interest for
political parties and social movements to link their pet issues to as many other issues of high
and enduring political salience as possible (such as the EU or ‘globalization’). By doing so,
they may extend the mobilization cycle (see Rydgren 2003b).
Concerning this paragraph, it is also important to consider “liberal” changes in policy,
or increased mobilization of groups defending or propagating for the multicultural society,
which may fuel the discontent of latent xenophobes and racists—who perceive a threat to
their interests and/or identity—as well as leading to growing salience of the immigration
15
issue through increased mass media coverage. In any case, the result might be expanding
political opportunities for ERP parties.
(4) As Kitschelt (1995) has argued, the degree of convergence in the political space
also provides expanding political opportunities for new political parties. First, a convergence
may result in a feeling that the established parties “are all the same.” This, in turn, may fuel
popular distrust and discontent in politicians and political parties, and create an audience
receptive to parties ready to mobilize protest votes. Second, of course, a convergence may
also have direct effects, in that it facilitates the emergence of niches within the political
space.
(5) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political systems (see e.g.
McAdam 1996) plays a role, as well. Whether a political system has a proportional or a
majority voting system, for instance, and how high the thresholds are, all make a difference
(cf. Katz 1980; Weaver & Rockman 1993). The idea that the majority voting system places
constraints on the emergence of new parties is an idea that goes back to Duverger (1954).
According to what has become known as Duverger’s Law, the simple majority–ballot system
favors a relative stable two-party system, while proportional voting systems favor a
multiparty system (Duverger 1954: 217). According to Duverger, there are two reasons for
this. First, there is a mechanical effect in that the third and fourth parties in an election held
within a majority voting system will receive a much smaller share of legislative seats
compared to the votes they received. Second, there is a psychological effect in that many
voters will feel that a vote for a small party is a wasted vote, which makes them vote for one
of the two major parties instead. In such a situation, the emergence of new political parties is
less likely. Similarly, whether a political system has an entrance threshold of two or four
percent, for instance, makes a difference for the emergence of new parties. The same
psychological effect identified by Duverger is likely to be operative here, as well.
16
(6) The presence or absence of elite allies (see e.g. McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998),
which can give increased legitimacy (Rydgren 2003b) and/or increased visibility. Situations
in which the established parties chose to collaborate with emerging ERP parties—or
associated actors—lend legitimacy to these parties. By being controversial, such events are
also likely to arouse the interest of the mass media, and hence give ERP parties increased
coverage. As a result, we should also consider established political actors’ willingness and/or
capacity to present a solid front to ERP parties and similar groups and networks (see Tarrow
1998: 20).
(7) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (see e.g. McAdam 1996; Tilly
1978: chapter 4). When considering repression, we should bear in mind that it “can be a
double-edged sword, sometimes deterring and intimating and sometimes producing a political
backlash that enhances the movement’s support” (DeNardo 1985: 154). In line with the so-
called “inverted U-curve” hypothesis (e.g. DeNardo 1985; Muller & Weede 1990), we may
assume that repression only becomes effective beyond a certain level. Up to that level,
however, repression may lead to enhanced mobilization because of reinforcing the
movement’s collective identity: rather “than being evaded as a cost, from these movements’
perspective, repression embodies the very message that they seek to convey to their adherents
and to the larger public, namely, that of a repressive political system that is in need of
revolutionary change” (Koopmans 1997: 151). To connect this to the framework of this
paper, we may expect that repression up to a certain level facilitate the successful use of the
anti-political establishment strategy, because of making it easier for ERP parties to present
itself as a true outsider. However, beyond that level, repression will be negative for the ERP
parties, because of leading to delegitimization and radicalization and, hence, marginalization.
Ultimately, ERP parties may be banned in some countries, and therefore prohibited from
running in public elections.
17
(8) Finally, the availability of a potent master frame (McAdam 1994), or more
generally, prevalent strategies external to the party (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995). The political
opportunities listed above have in common that they lead to the emergence of successful ERP
parties only if embryonic groups or networks identifying with an ERP party program have the
capacity to take advantage of them. If they fail to do so, no successful ERP party will emerge.
In order to exploit existing niches and other favorable political opportunities new parties must
present political programs—and, even more important, use a political rhetoric—that fit the
available niches. A potent master frame helps forming such a political profile. Potent master
frames and useful strategies for mobilization are seldom invented within embryonic parties
and movements, although it does happen at rare occasions. More commonly, emerging
parties and social movements try to make use of master frames and strategies already “out
there,” which they try to modify in ways to fit the specific political and cultural context in
which the adopter is embedded. This being the case, it is of crucial importance to discuss
(rare) innovations of master frames and action repertoires, how these are spread to embryonic
ERP parties by cross-national diffusion processes, and how these manage to “translate” them
to fit the particular cultural and political context in which they are embedded.
The Innovation of the New Master Frame
Following Snow and Benford (1992: 137), I see frames as “interpretative schemata that
simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past
environment.” Collective action frames, employed by social movements and political parties,
function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for perceived social
problems by identifying individuals, social groups, or structures that are believed to have
caused the problem in question (diagnostic framing); and they also suggest a general line of
18
action (prognostic framing). Master frames can be seen as encompassing, generic frames that
have the potency of constraining more specific (derivative) frames used by specific social
movements or political parties. Master frames are of importance because they have the ability
to synchronize—and in fact give rise to—families of movements or political parties. As Snow
and Benford (1992: 143) show, the emergence of a cycle of mobilization is typically
associated with the construction of an innovative master frame. In the case of the ERP
parties, I will argue that such an innovative master frame was constructed in France during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, and was made known as a successful frame in connection
with the electoral break-through of the Front National in 1984. As the old master frame of the
extreme Right—containing elements of biological racism, anti-Semitism, and an
antidemocratic (radical) critique of the political system—was rendered impotent by the
outcome of the Second World War, it took the extreme Right a long time to establish a new,
potent master frame that simultaneously met the conditions of: (1) being flexible enough to
fit (in modified form) in different political and cultural contexts, (2) being sufficiently
resonant with the lived experiences, attitudes, and preconceptions of many people, and (3)
being sufficiently freed from stigma (for the two first paragraphs, see Snow & Benford
1992). The master frame combining ethno-nationalist, cultural racism and anti-political
establishment populism met these requirements.
Inspired by Gramsci’s notion of ‘cultural hegemony’ intellectual groups of the New
Right formed in France during the late 1960s and 1970s in order to counter the intellectual
and cultural dominance of the left. The most important ideological innovation of the French
Nouvelle Droite was to replace the old, biologically based notion of racism with the notion of
‘ethno-pluralism,’ which constitutes the foundation of the so-called new racism (Barker
1981) or cultural racism (Wieviorka 1998: 32). Departing from the left’s notion of
différence—on which the doctrine of multiculturalism (that is, the idea that migrants should
19
have the right to preserve habits and traditions of their home countries) is largely based—the
notion of ethno-pluralism states that in order to preserve the unique national characters of
different peoples they have to be kept separated. Mixing of different ethnicities only lead to
cultural extinction (see Minkenberg 1997; Taguieff 1988). Yet, contrary to the traditional
conception of racism, the doctrine of ethno-pluralism, as such, is not hierarchical: different
ethnicities are not necessary superior or inferior, only different and incompatible. However,
when applied by ERP parties, the non-hierarchical elements of the doctrine are often
disregarded: the culture of the own country (or of Europe) is held to be superior to other ones
(in particular the Muslim culture). By adopting the doctrine of ethno-pluralism the ERP
parties were able to mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being
stigmatized as being racist.
The French Front National adopted this notion, which is essential ethno-nationalist,
from the Nouvelle Droite—with which the party had many contacts, even overlapping
members, some of the highly placed—and made it the core of the party’s political program
and rhetorical profile (see Rydgren 2003c). As Schumpeter (1968: 65) has put it, to innovate
is to carry out new combinations—which was what the Front National did. The party leader,
Jean-Marie Le Pen, picked the other main element of the new master frame from the
Poujadist movement—in which he was engaged during the mid 1950s; the populist anti-
political establishment strategy.
A party using this strategy tries to construct an image of itself as in opposition to the
“political class,” while trying actively not to appear antidemocratic. A party that is viewed as
antidemocratic will be stigmatized and marginalized as long as the overwhelming majority of
the electorate is in favor of democracy per se (Schedler 1996; cf. Mudde 1996a: 272). In
order to create distance between themselves and the established political parties (i.e., both the
government and the anti-incumbent opposition), populist parties aim at recoding the political
20
space, with its diversity of parties, into one single, homogeneous political class. One way of
achieving this goal is to argue that the differences between government and established
opposition parties are irrelevant surface phenomena. According to ERP parties, in reality the
established parties do not compete but collude.
In using the anti-political-establishment strategy, the aim is to present the own party
as the only real opposition to the “political class,” while at the same time being cautious not
to overstep the line to opposition to democracy per se. This is the second part of the anti-
political-establishment strategy: to position the party between the “normal opposition” (i.e.,
the presently nonincumbent party or parties) and openly antidemocratic groups. Since an
overwhelming majority of the Western European voters are in favor of democracy and view
antidemocratic parties and movements as illegitimate, the ability of parties that are perceived
as antidemocratic to win votes is slight.
Although the ideological difference between traditional forms of right-wing
extremism and the ERP parties in many ways is slight (see Rydgren 2003c), the differences
that do exist are of huge importance. The qualitatively new about the master frame used by
the ERP parties is: (1) the shift from “biological racism” to “cultural racism,” which
permitted ERP parties to mobilize xenophobic and racist public opinions without being
stigmatized as being racists, and (2) the incorporation of the populist anti-establishment
strategy, which permitted ERP parties to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic
systems without being stigmatized as being antidemocrats.
This new master frame was made known as a successful one in 1984, when the Front
National got its electoral breakthrough. This is not the place to account for the reasons why
the Front National succeeded to escape electoral marginalization in the mid 1980s (but see
Rydgren 2003c)—suffice is to say that a combination of the political opportunities listed
above was present in France at the moment, and that the new master frame enabled the party
21
to take advantage of the opportunities. Moreover, it should be stressed that a number of
contextual factors (as well as entrepreneurial qualities of the leadership) made it possible to
adopt the elements constituting the new master frame, and to use it successfully: First, the
scattered, diverse currents of right-wing extremism in France (past and present) facilitated the
ideological transformation—with only one strong current, such as fascism, this would have
been more difficult. Second, had not the Front National expelled some of the groups of die-
hard activists of the “old school” from the party, the new master frame would not have been
credible (see Camus 1997, Kitschelt 1997, Rydgren 2003c).
Hence, as we have seen, sometimes innovations do occur. Mostly, however,
embryonic ERP parties do not have to reinvent the wheel anew, but can draw on repertoires
of ideas and practices already there: rather than playing the role of innovators, most ERP
parties play the role of adopters in a cross-national diffusion process (cf. McAdam & Rucht
1993).6 By adopting constitutive ideas and practices from others, these parties can be seen as
spin-off parties (cf. McAdam 1995; Tarrow 1995), in contrast to the Front National, which
initiated the diffusion process. Although spin-off parties may add to the collective “tool kit”
available for other ERP parties to draw from, as well, only initiators establish new, innovative
master frames with the ability to give rise to new party families. Yet, since latecomers are
more likely to adopt ideas and practices from the most successful exemplars—irrespective of
this happen to be an initiator or a spin-off party—we are as likely to see a situation in which
party A influences party B and party C, and party B influences party D and party E (as a
situation in which party A influences parties B, C, D, and E directly). This indicates that
some of the parties under certain conditions are more likely to adopt party B’s modified
version of actor A’s ideas and practices, rather than the original ones. Concerning the ERP
parties, we would therefore expect that the Austrian FPÖ has been at least as influential as the
Front National since the mid 1990s.
22
Cross-National Diffusion and Adaptation Processes
Katz (1968: 78) defined diffusion as “the acceptance of some specific item, over time, by
adopting units—individuals, groups, communities—that are linked both to external channels
of communication and to each other by means of both a structure of social relations and a
system of values, or culture.” Defined in such a way, diffusion is a general, encompassing
term for processes embracing contagion, mimicry, social learning, organized dissemination,
and so on (Strang & Soule 1998: 266). However, in this paper this definition will be
narrowed down: cross-national diffusion is only believed to occur when the adopter—and
often the emitter, as well—take an active role in the process. Hence, to provide an answer to
the title of this paper, extreme Right-wing populism is not contagious (in the sense that
epidemics are)—it only diffuses if actors want it to diffuse.
Diffusion not only involves emitters and adopters, but also items that are being
diffused, as well as a channel of diffusion, consisting of persons or media linking the emitter
to the adopter (see McAdam & Rucht 1993). Although there are at least three different items
that can be diffused from one ERP party to another—or, indeed, to other political actors, the
focus in this paper is on the diffusion of master frames.7
Concerning diffusion channels, diffusion can be either direct and relational or indirect
through non-relational channels, such as the mass media (e.g., Katz 1968). In real life
processes, relational and non-relational channels typically commingle (McAdam & Rucht
1993). Diffusion between ERP parties goes through both types of channels. Direct diffusion,
in turn, can be either formal, as when ERP parties meet or communicate on a leadership level,
or informal, as when activists from different ERP parties develop friendship links to one
another, or when activists and members read other ERP parties’ publications (cf. Kriesi et al.
1995: 185). This latter kind of informal diffusion is today facilitated by the fact that some
23
ERP parties post links to one another’s Internet sites. Generally, one may assume that the new
information technology—Internet and e-mails in particular—have facilitated both direct and
indirect diffusion.8 The likelihood that direct diffusion will occur is furthermore enhanced by
the following factors: First, and arguably most important, actors are more likely to adopt
ideas and practices from emitters that have proved themselves successful. When actors think
they can increase their effectiveness in obtaining their political goals by adopting elements
from others, diffusion is more likely to occur. Second, opportunity for diffusion may increase
in proportion to the geographical proximity, which makes the presence of direct ties between
emitter and adopter more likely. Third, movements that are a priori similar in respect of
political goals, ideological outlooks, values, historical “idols,” and so on, are more likely to
establish direct contacts with one another (Kriesi et al. 1995: 190; Strang & Soule 1998;
Soule 1997).
Concerning indirect diffusion through information provided by mass media reports, it
will be argued that mass media play an important role not only by facilitating indirect cross-
national diffusion, but also by turning electoral successes of foreign ERP parties into
expanding political opportunities for domestic ERP parties: If something extraordinary
happens in place x—such as Le Pen’s success in the first round of the 2002 presidential
election—media in place y is likely to (1) give the event great coverage, and (2) do their best
to relate the event to domestic affairs (which is believed to make it more interesting for the
readers/viewers). In this way, mass media not only communicate the event, but also create
opportunities for embryonic ERP parties in place y, not the least by giving them increased
visibility. For instance, this was exactly what happened in Sweden during the spring and
summer of 2002, when mass media brought the so-far marginal Sweden Democrats into the
limelight.
24
However, when studying the effect of diffusion processes on the emergence of ERP
parties, it is not enough to look at the diffusion of ideas and practices per se. Two additional
aspects must be taken into account: (1) how adopters manage to modify and adapt diffused
items in a way that make them appealing to voters within the specific political culture
characterizing their political system, and (2) how adopters manage to make diffused items
tune with their internal party or movement history, that is, how they make activists—already
identifying with certain aspects of the party or movement—accept the diffused ideas and
practices. Hence, it should be emphasized that diffused ideas and practices are always being
actively modified or even “translated”—to a higher or lesser extent—by adopters in order to
fit the unique political and cultural context in which they are embedded (cf. Czarniawska &
Joerges 1996; Snow & Benford 1999). Following Snow and Benford (1999), we may assume
that a situation of reciprocation—that is, when both the emitter and the adopter take an active
role—facilitates the successful adaptation of diffused ideas and practices, because all actors
involved have an interest in smoothing the process in which the diffused item must be
modified to fit a new cultural and political context. This is not an uncommon situation in the
cross-national diffusion of ERP party practices and frames. However, as long as the adopter
takes an active role in the process, adaptation is possible, even when the emitter remains
passive.
Yet, not all frames can be modified to fit the particular national political and cultural
context in which adopters are embedded, which means that they sometimes are left out. One
example of such a frame is the ardent anti-abortion rhetoric of the Front National, which is a
strategically dead issue in highly secular protestant contexts such as Sweden and Denmark.
Hence, probably of strategic reasons, neither the Danish People’s Party nor the Sweden
Democrats have adopted it. Yet, this phenomenon mainly relate to more detailed, derivative
frames, whereas potent master frames are potent partly because they have the capacity of
25
fitting into a vide range of different cultural and political contexts. At the same time,
however, focusing on the adaptation process may help us understand instances of ERP party
failure. Since diffused ideas and practices only work if they are sufficiently cultural resonant
with the political system in which the adopter try to make use of them—or at least as cultural
resonant that “translation” or creative modification is possible—ERP party failure may be
explained by exceptionalities in a political systems’ political culture. Furthermore, actors
sometimes make strategic mistakes. They may fail to “translate” the diffused ideas and
practices in a proper way: either because the leadership is trapped in a trade-off situation
between strategic needs of renewal and activist groups’ identification with the status quo, or
because they lack the required level of (organizational) sophistication. “Trade-off situations,”
that is, the potential or real conflict between attracting voters and pleasing the opinions of
(more extreme) party activists (cf. Rose & Mackie 1988), in particular are likely to spoil a
successful adaptation of master frames. As a consequence, whether an ERP party originates
from a populist movement (as e.g., the Danish People’s Party) or from a more traditional
right-wing extremist tradition (such as the Front National and the Sweden Democrats) is of
great importance. Ceteris paribus, I would assume that the former type of ERP parties face
less aggravating trade-off situations. Furthermore, of the parties belonging to the latter group,
ERP parties with a party or movement history dominated by only one, strong current of right-
wing extremist ideology (such as fascism), are likely to become more constrained by trade-
off situations than parties whose party or movement history has been more scattered and
diverse.
Yet, we should finally keep in mind that diffused master frames—even when adapted
in an optimal way—lead to result only if there are favorable opportunity structures.
26
Conclusions
I have in this article presented a new model for explaining the emergence of the party family
of extreme right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. As the old master frame of the
extreme right was rendered impotent by the outcome of the World War II, it took the
innovation of a new, potent master frame before the extreme right was able to break electoral
marginalization anew. Such a master frame—combining ethno-nationalist xenophobia, based
on the doctrine of ethno-pluralism, with anti-political establishment populism—evolved in
the 1970s, and was made known as a successful frame in connection with the electoral break-
through of the French Front National in 1984. With this new master frame, ERP parties could
(1) mobilize on xenophobic and anti-immigration attitudes without being stigmatized as racist
and (2) mobilize on political discontent without being stigmatized as antidemocrats. The
success of the Front National in 1984 started a process of cross-national diffusion, where the
master frame was adopted by embryonic extreme right wing groups and networks elsewhere
in Western Europe. Yet, in order to be successful, these parties must adapt the diffused frame
to fit the specific socio-political context in which they are embedded—as well as persuade
activists within the organization that new frames should be implemented. Hence, the
emergence of similar parties, clustering in time—that is, that a new party family was born—
has less to do with structural demand-factors influencing different political systems in similar
ways, as with the cross-national diffusion of frames, ideas, and practices.
Yet, although the innovation and diffusion of the new master frame was a necessary
condition for the emergence of the ERP parties, it was not a sufficient one; nor does it explain
cross-national variation in electoral success for ERP parties. In order to complete the model,
we must also consider political opportunities. It should be kept an open, empirical question
how many of these factors that have to be added to explain singular cases, but it is suggested
in this paper that (1) dealignment and realignment processes, in which the socio-economic
27
cleavage dimension lose in salience, as the socio-cultural dimension gain in salience, and (2)
politicization of the immigration issue, are of particular importance.
28
Notes
1
In this paper, I will not dwell of definitions. As Mudde (1996), among others, has shown, there is an
abundance of concepts and definitions of this party family. I will use a minimalist, generic definition: ERP
parties share the fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia (manifested in the so-called ethno-
pluralistic doctrine) and anti-political establishment populism. This is not to say that these parties have narrow
political programs; they have not. The ethno-pluralist doctrine is mostly embedded in a general authoritarianism,
stressing themes like law and order and family values.
2
It is interesting to note, for instance, that although Eatwell (2003) in a recent contribution identified no less
than five so-called supply-side explanations of the emergence of ERP parties, he failed to mention the
importance of cross-national diffusion processes.
3
A mechanism can be seen as a systematic set of statements providing a plausible account of how an input and
a given outcome is linked to one another (Hedström & Swedberg 1998; Schelling 1998), or in McAdam et al.’s
(2001: 24) words, as a “delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in
identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (see also Tilly 2001). Such a mechanism should be
of a certain generality. It is precisely this generality (although of a middle-range) that gives them their
explanatory power. As Hedström & Swedberg (1998: 10) emphasize, simply making up an ad hoc story tailored
to a specific case does not constitute an acceptable explanation. Serious, noncommonsensical explanations
require mechanisms of some generality.”
4
This is also a result of the fact that other issues are likely to dominate the media.
5
Following Campbell et al. (1960: 29–32), I regard politicization as a “political translation,” in which social
phenomena and situations are linked to political objects and understood in political terms.
6
The successes of the Front National provided information that influenced other, unorganized or marginalized,
extreme Right-groups and networks’ beliefs about the likely consequences of founding a party organization (cf.
Hedström et al. 2000: 151), as well as promoting a certain program rather than another. Without a reference
point, it may be difficult for an ERP party to estimate how many voters that would actually vote for the political
program offered by the party, or more generally, to estimate the strength of the political opportunity structures
(see Oberschall 1993: 223–224). The success of an ERP party elsewhere is likely to be encouraging for potential
activists by reducing these kind of uncertainties: there are good subjective reasons for believing that ERP party
A in place x would have the same chances for electoral success as ERP party B in place y—if they propagate for
the same (or highly similar) political programs, and if they use the same (or highly similar) strategies. As a
29
result, a successful initiator, such as the Front National, may initiate not only a cross-national diffusing process
of a specific master frame—which will make extreme Right-wing groups and networks elsewhere change their
political profile in accordance with this frame, and hence make it easier for them to capitalize on existing niches
and other political opportunities—but also indirectly promoting these groups’ opportunities for successful
resource mobilization.
7
In addition, also forms of organization may diffuse, both from one ERP party to another and between ERP
parties and other kinds of political parties—as when the Front National adopted the organizational structure of
the French Communist Party in order to create a strong, disciplined party organization (see Birenbaum 1992).
Also, forms of action—such as strategic and tactical devices—may be diffused (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam
1995). Examples of such action forms may be the strategy to create a party organization and run in public
elections instead of choosing other kinds of movement forms—which was not evident before the scattered
extreme Right in France decided to launch the party Front National as a front organization in 1972 (a move that
in turn was influenced by the electoral success of the Italian MSI earlier the same year; cf. Camus 1997; Marcus
1995). In this way, the successes of the MSI—and, more important, the Front National—provided information
that influenced other, unorganized or marginalized, extreme Right-groups and networks’ beliefs about the likely
consequences of founding a party organization (cf. Hedström et al. 2000: 151).
8
However, in assessing the impact of direct diffusion between ERP parties we meet a methodological problem:
many ERP parties officially deny having anything to do with other ERP parties (in fact, they deny being an ERP
party at all). These denials are the result of the need to create and uphold a sufficiently respectable façade in
order not to get stigmatised. Yet by reading the internal party press and publications posted on their Internet
sites—which frequently report cross-national meetings—such contacts can often be assessed indirectly.
30
References
Barker, M. 1981. The New Racism. London: Junction.
Betz, H-G. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London: MacMillan..
Betz, H-G. and Immerfall, S. 1998. eds. The New Politics of the Righ: Neo-Populist Parties
and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s.
Birenbaum, G. 1992. Le Front National en politique. Paris: Éditions Balland.
Budge, I. and Farlie, D. 1983. “Party competition—selective emphasis or direct
confrontation? An alternative view with data,” in Daalder, H, and Mair, P. eds. West
European Party Systems. Continuity & Change. London: Sage.
Budge, I. and Robertson, D. 1987. “Do parties differ, and how? Comparative discriminant
and factor analyses,” in Budge, I., Robertson, D., and Hearl, D. eds. Ideology,
Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in
19 Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. 1960. The American Voter.
New York: John Wiley.
Camus, J-Y. 1997. Le Front National. Histoire et analyses. Paris: Éditions Olivier Laurens.
Clark, T. N. and Lipset, S. M. 2001. eds. The Breakdown of Class Politics. A Debate on Post-
Industrial Stratification. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Czarniawska, B. and Sevón, G. 1996. “Travels of ideas,” in Czarniawska, B. and Sevón, G.
eds. Translating Organizational Change. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
DeNardo, J. 1985. Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Duverger, M. 1954. Political Parties. London: Methuen.
31
Eatwell, R. 2003. “Theorizing the rise of the European extreme right: Towards a three
dimensional model,” in Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. eds. Right-Wing Extremism in
the Twenty-first Century. London: Frank Cass.
Hainsworth, P. 1992. ed. The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. London: Pinter.
Hainsworth, P. 2000. ed. The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the
Mainstream. London: Pinter.
Hedström, P. 1998. “Rational imitation,” in Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. eds. Social
Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hedström, P., Sandell, R. and Stern, C. 2000. ”Mesolevel networks and the diffusion of
social movements: the case of the Swedish Social Democratic party,” American
Journal of Sociology 106: 145-172.
Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. 1998. “Social mechanisms: An introductory essay,” in
Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. eds. Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to
Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hout, M., Brooks, C., and Manza, J. 1996. “The persistence of classes in post-industrial
societies,” in Lee, D. J. and Turner, B. S. eds. Conflicts about Class. Debating
Inequality in Late Industrialism. London: Longman.
Ignazi, P. 1996. “The crisis of parties and the rise of new political parties,” Party Politics 2
(4): 549–566.
Inglehart, R. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Katz, E. 1968. ”Diffusion (interpersonal influence),” in Shils, D. L. ed. International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan.
32
Katz, R. S. 1980. A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Kitschelt, H. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Koopmans, R. 1996. “Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in Western
Europe: Grievances or opportunities?,” European Journal of Political Research 30:
185–216.
Koopmans, R. 1997. “Dynamics or repression and mobilization: The German extreme right
in the 1990s,” Mobilization: An International Journal 2 (2): 149–165.
Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. G. 1995. New Social Movements
in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Lipset, S. M. 1981. Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. 1967. ”Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter
alignments: an introduction,” in Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. eds. Party Systems and
Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press.
Mair, P., Lipset, S. M., Hout, M., and Goldthorpe, J. H. 1999. “Critical commentary: Four
perspectives on the end of class politics?,” in Evans, G. ed. The End of Class
Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. New York. Oxford University Press.
Marcus, J. 1995. The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie
Le Pen. London: Macmillan.
Mayer, N. 1999. Ces Français qui votent FN. Paris: Flammarion.
33
McAdam, D. 1994. “Culture and social movements,” in Laraña, E., H. Johnston, and J. R.
Gusfield, eds. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
McAdam, D. 1995. “’Initiator’ and ‘spin-off’ movements: diffusion processes in protest
cycles,” in Traugott, M. ed. Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham:
Duke University Press.
McAdam, D. 1996. “Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions,” in McAdam,
D., McCharthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. eds. Comparative Perspectives on Social
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McAdam, D. 1999. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970.
2nd Ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
McAdam, D. & Rucht, D. 1993. ”The cross-national diffusion of movement ideas,“ The
Annals 528: 56-74.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. 2000. Par le people, pour le people: Le populisme et les démocraties.
Paris: Fayard.
Merkl, P. H. and Weinberg, L. 1993. eds. Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right.
San Francisco: Westview.
Merkl, P. H. and Weinberg, L. 1997. eds. The Revival of Right-wing Extremism in the
Nineties. London: Frank Cass.
Minkenberg, M. 1997. “The New Right in France and Germany. Nouvelle Droite, Neue
Rechte, and the new right radical parties,” in Merkl, P. H. and Weinberg, L. 1997. eds.
The Revival of Right-wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass.
34
Minkenberg, M. 2001. “La nouvelle droite radicale, ses électeurs et ses milieux partisans:
vote protestaire, phénomène xenophobe ou modernization losers?,” in Perrineau, P. ed.
Les croisés de la société fermée. L’Europe des extrême droites. Paris: Éditions de
l’Aube.
Mudde, C. 1996. “The war of words: defining the extreme right party family,” West
European Politics 19 (2): 225–248.
Muller, E. N. and Weede, E. 1990. “Cross-national variation in political violence: A rational
action approach,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (4): 624–651.
Oberschall, A. 1993. Social Movements. Ideologies, Interests, and Identities. London:
Transaction Publishers.
Perrineau, P. 1997. Le Symtôme Le Pen. Radiographie des électeurs du Front National. Paris:
Fayard.
Poggi, G. 1990. The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospect. Cambridge: Polity.
Putnam, R. D., Pharr, S. J., and Dalton, R. J. 2000. “Introduction: What’s troubling the
trilateral democracies?,” in Pharr, S. J. and Putnam, R. D. eds. Disaffected
Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rokkan, S. 1970. Citizens, Elections, Parties. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Rose, R. and Mackie, T. T. 1988. “Do parties persist or fail? The big trade-off facing
organizations,” in Lawson, K. and Merkl, P. H. eds. When Parties Fail: Emerging
Alternative Organizations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rydgren, J. 2002. “Radical right populism in Sweden. Still a failure, but for how long?,”
Scandinavian Political Studies 26 (1): 26–57.
35
Rydgren, J. 2003a. ”Explaining the emergence of extreme right-wing populist parties: the
case of Denmark,” unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, Stockholm
University.
Rydgren, J. 2003b. ”Mesolevel reasons for racism and xenophobia: Some converging and
diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden,” European
Journal of Social Theory 6 (1): 45–68.
Rydgren, J. 2003c. The Populist Challenge. Political Protest and Ethno-nationalist
Mobilization in France. New York: Berghahn Books.
Sassen, S. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Schelling, T. 1998. “Social mechanisms and social dynamics,” in Hedström,, P. and
Swedberg, R. eds. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schedler, A. 1996. “Anti-political-establishment parties,” Party Politics 2 (3): 291–312.
Schumpeter, J. 1968. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press.
Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. 1992. “Master frames and cycles of protest,” in Morris, A.
D. and Mueller, C. M. eds. Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. 1999. “Alternative types of cross-national diffusion in the
social movement arena,” in della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. eds. Social
Movements in a Globalizing World. London: Macmillan.
Soule, S. A. 1997. “The student divestment movement in the United States and tactical
diffusion: The Shantytown Protest,” Social Forces 75 (3): 855-883.
36
Strang, D. and Soule, S. A. 1998. “Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From
hybrid corn to poison pills,” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 265-290.
Swidler, A. 1986. “Culture in action: Symbols and strategies,” American Sociological Review
51: 273–286.
Taguieff, P-A. 1988. La Force du préjugé. Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles. Paris: La
Découverte.
Tarrow, S. 1995. “Cycles of collective action: Between moments of madness and the
repertoire of contention,” in Traugott, M. ed. Repertoires and Cycles of Collective
Action. Durham: Duke University Press.
Tarrow, S. 1998. Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, C. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Tilly, C. 1984. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russel Sage
Foundation.
Tilly, C. 2001. “Mechanisms in political processes,” Annual Review of Political Science 4:
21-41.
Weaver, R. K. and Rockman, B. A. 1993. eds. Do Institutions Matter? Government
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Wieviorka, M. 1998. Le racisme, une introduction. Paris: La Découverte.
37
