Between urban and national: Political mobilization among Mizrahim in Israel’s ‘development towns

Erez Tzfadia

In the face of persisting deprivation, marginalized ethno-classes generally mobilize against their governments and/or against rival groups. Two key arenas of such mobilization are extra-parliamentary protest and local electoral campaigning. The paper examines these arenas in Israel's peripheral `development towns', established during the 1950s, and populated primarily by "Mizrahim"––Jews who migrated to Israel from the Muslim world. The public protest by Mizrahim in the towns has been consistent, though not intense. Generally, it voiced `external' demand to the state for a fairer share of public resources, falling within the `legitimate' boundaries of Zionist political discourse. In local elections, however, the Mizrahim raised a more militant political voice, focusing mainly on their competition against the large number of `Russians' immigrants who arrived during the 1990s. Local election campaigns often transgressed the acceptable boundaries of Zionist discourse, by questioning the core values of immigrant absorption and Jewish unity. In explaining the different agendas and discourses, we argue that the answer is rooted in two related phenomena. First, on a national level, Mizrahi identity at the Israeli periphery has been `trapped' by the settlement agendas of the Zionist project. The local election discourse, however, demonstrates the centrality of place for the Mizrahim in both their communal identity and political power. While the towns were created as peripheral and impoverished places in the attempt to Judaize the land, they have now become a significant, and threatened, ethnic and political resource. The external and internal discourses therefore combine as two key `layers' in the making of the peripheral Mizrahi ethno-class.

3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 32 31 30 29 27 20 15 14 13 12 11 1234567890 2 Cities, Vol. XX, No. XX, p. XXX–XXX, 2003  2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2003.10.006 Printed in Great Britain 0264-2751 $ - see front matter 33 38 39 40 43 42 41 www.elsevier.com/locate/cities 44 Between urban and national: 45 Political mobilization among 46 Mizrahim in Israel’s ‘development 47 48 towns’ 49 Erez Tzfadia 50 Department of Geography, Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel 91905 51 Oren Yiftachel* 52 Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. Box 53 653, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel 54 In the face of persisting deprivation, marginalized ethno-classes generally mobilize against their 5 55 governments and/or against rival groups. Two key arenas of such mobilization are extra-parlia- 6 56 mentary protest and local electoral campaigning. The paper examines these arenas in Israel’s 57 peripheral ‘development towns’, established during the 1950s, and populated primarily by 58 “Mizrahim”—Jews who migrated to Israel from the Muslim world. The public protest by 59 Mizrahim in the towns has been consistent, though not intense. Generally, it voiced ‘external’ 60 demand to the state for a fairer share of public resources, falling within the ‘legitimate’ bound- 61 aries of Zionist political discourse. In local elections, however, the Mizrahim raised a more 62 militant political voice, focusing mainly on their competition against the large number of ‘Rus- 63 sians’ immigrants who arrived during the 1990s. Local election campaigns often transgressed 64 the acceptable boundaries of Zionist discourse, by questioning the core values of immigrant 65 absorption and Jewish unity. In explaining the different agendas and discourses, we argue that 66 the answer is rooted in two related phenomena. First, on a national level, Mizrahi identity at 67 the Israeli periphery has been ‘trapped’ by the settlement agendas of the Zionist project. The 68 local election discourse, however, demonstrates the centrality of place for the Mizrahim in both 69 their communal identity and political power. While the towns were created as peripheral and 70 impoverished places in the attempt to Judaize the land, they have now become a significant, 71 and threatened, ethnic and political resource. The external and internal discourses therefore 72 combine as two key ‘layers’ in the making of the peripheral Mizrahi ethno-class. 73  2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 74 Keywords: Elections, Immigration, Regions, Development, Zionism 75 76 77 Introduction Soviet Union, coupled with repeated economic crises 85 associated with Israel’s globalizing, neo-liberal, econ- 86 78 A large number of the Mizrahi Jews, who arrived in omic policies, has further destabilized the towns. 87 79 Israel from the Muslim world, mainly during the 80 1950s, were settled in peripheral ‘development Given their current population, which exceeds 88 81 towns’. Their political mobilization has emerged 800,000, and the recent influx of immigrants, these 89 82 against a background of geographic marginality, per- immigrant towns have become a significant compo- 90 83 sisting deprivation and demographic instability. A nent of Israeli politics and identity formation. 91 84 recent period of mass immigration from the former Our paper aims to study political mobilization of 92 Mizrahim in the towns, and focuses on two central 93 1 arenas: extra-parliamentary protest and local election 94 28 ∗ Corresponding author; e-mail: yiftach@bgumail.bgu.ac.il campaigns. These provide useful vantage points from 95 1 32 1 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P DTD v4.3.1 / JCIT589 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 96 which to examine the changing patterns of mobiliz- political circumstances. At each time/space configur- 150 97 ation and identity. Notably, different ‘voices’ are ation, an ethnic group will make use of what it con- 151 98 raised in the two arenas: public protest is aimed ‘out- siders to be the “correct” identity to advance its inter- 152 99 side’ at the national state and other loci of power, ests through public mobilization. This is particularly 153 100 while local election campaigns are aimed ‘inside’, at salient when an immigrant group resides in a com- 154 101 the local voter. The difference between these ‘voices’ munity whose ethnicity is regarded as having a low 155 102 will link our paper to the question of geographic scale social status, and especially a group whose identity, 156 103 and its socio-political significance. we contend, is ‘trapped’ at the margins of a settler 157 104 Our research indicates that the public protest by society. The connection between patterns of mobiliz- 158 105 Mizrahim in the towns has voiced demands for a ation for protest in development towns and the 159 106 fairer share of Israel’s public resources, falling within ‘entrapment’ of their Mizrahim is central to the claims 160 107 the ‘legitimate’ boundaries of Zionist political dis- of this paper. A ‘trapped’ identity emerges in the gray 161 108 course. In local election campaigns, however, the area, between the centers of authority and wealth and 162 109 Mizrahim raised a more intense political voice, focus- the excluded margins. Trapped communities have few 163 110 ing on competition against the large number of ‘Rus- alternative paths for identity development or political 164 111 sians’ immigrants who arrived during the 1990s. mobilization, except the oppressive structure estab- 165 112 Local election campaigns often transgressed the lished by the state. The main open option is inclusion 166 113 boundaries of accepted Zionist discourse, by ques- at the national center, but this comes at a heavy price 167 114 tioning the core value of immigrant absorption. What of structural inferiority (see Swirski, 1989; Shohat, 168 115 explains the different agendas and discourses? We 2001).2 However, no group would accept a ‘trapped’ 169 116 argue that the nature of political mobilization is position as final, and searches for ways to undermine 170 117 rooted in the intertwined influences of place (and the oppressive setting. Such an attempt is likely to 171 118 hence, scale), identity and class. The dynamic role of first emerge on a local scale, where interests are 172 119 place is a central point in our analysis. It emerges immediate and concrete. It is on the local scale that 173 120 5 as a major source of communal identity and political the group may begin to exploit small ‘cracks’ in the 174 6 121 power, constantly reshaped through social processes national hegemony. The suggestive connection we are 175 122 (See; Agnew, 1987; Massey, 1994; Paasi, 1999). And making between issues of mobilization, identity and 176 123 further, place and identity are composed of several geographic scale, is one of the intended contributions 177 124 ‘layers’, most notably corresponding to ‘national’ and of this paper. 178 125 ‘local’ scales. The former pertains to the formation of To substantiate these claims, the paper reports on 179 126 the Israeli-Zionist nation, and the critical role of the two research projects. The first focused on acts of 180 127 development towns in the making of Israeli-Jewish public protest in the towns, while the second studied 181 128 space, while the latter focuses more on the actual local election campaigns. The first analysis explores 182 129 town, and may be indifferent to national imperatives. the position of peripheral Mizrahim in the national 183 130 While the towns were created as peripheral and place, identity and politics, while the latter examines 184 131 impoverished places in the attempt to Judaize the their mobilization in the local urban turf, and parti- 185 132 land, they have now become a significant—and thre- cularly vis-a`-vis the large influx of Russian-speaking 186 133 atened—ethnic and political resource. The Mizrahi immigrants in recent years. Prior to the detailed 187 134 voice is thus pitched differently in the two arenas: it account of development town mobilization, let us out- 188 135 demands resources from the state and economic line some of our theoretical approaches. 189 136 forces, while attempting to maintain control over the 137 local ‘turf’. Hence, our examination also reveals some 138 ‘cracks’ in the Zionist nation-building project: Theoretical aspects 190 139 Mizrahi Jews in the periphery are developing alterna- Ethnic mobilization and protest: Motivations and 191 140 tive outlooks and voices (especially, but not only, goals 192 141 ultra-orthodox Sepharadic identity), which aims to A substantive literature exists on ethnic mobilization 193 142 transform the nature of Zionism from within, while and protest (for reviews, see Bulmer and Solomon, 194 143 using the development towns as a major source of 2001; Gurr, 1993). In this paper, we draw on three 195 144 power. This has yet to present an open challenge to major approaches3 most appropriate to the study of 196 145 the Ashkenazi-dominated Israeli state, but the level peripheral Mizrahim: (a) relative deprivation, (b) 197 146 of consent awarded to state dictates is gradually 1 147 declining.1 2 148 Our basic assumption holds that ethnic goals and Another option is to by-pass the existing political system, as 1461 attempted in Israel by ultra-orthodox groups such as Jewish- 1462 149 identities are constantly reshaped by material and Mizrahi Shas and the Islamic movements (see: Peled, 1998). This 1463 1 will be discussed later in the paper. 1464 3 In this paper we do not discuss Tilly’s theory of resource mobiliz- 1465 1 1456 Ashkenazi Jews (Ashkenazim in plural) comprise the dominant or ation (Tilly, 1978), which assumes that activists in this form of 1466 1457 ‘core’ Jewish collective in Israel. Most Ashkenazim immigrated organizing are not marginalized socially or politically, nor subject 1467 1458 to Israel from Europe and America during the pre-state period or to social-economic-political discrimination, since this does not, in 1468 1459 immediately after 1948, founding and constituting Jewish culture our opinion, reflect the situation of Mizrahi residents of develop- 1469 1460 and nationalism in Israel. ment towns in Israel. 1470 1 2 2 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 198 resource competition, and (c) the politics of identity, Studies of violent protest in American cities during 253 199 and relate them to the scale question. the 20th century shows that an influx of immigrants 254 200 Relative deprivation is defined by Gurr (1970) as places additional pressure on veteran immigrant com- 255 201 a gap between value expectations and value capabili- munities, and contributes significantly to the intensity 256 202 ties. Value expectations are the conditions and goods of ethnic unrest (Olzak and Shanahan, 1996). As we 257 203 to which ethnic groups believe they are entitled, while shall see below, the observation that minority groups 258 204 value capabilities are the conditions and goods that tend to adopt violent protest against the influx of new 259 205 groups acquire. Changes in the social, political, or immigrants will not be supported in the Israeli case. 260 206 demographic structure can widen the gap between However, even in the Israeli case, it is evident that 261 207 expectations and capabilities, leading to dissatis- the presence of more than one ethnic group in a con- 262 208 faction, a sense of relative deprivation, competition testable locality usually encourages ethnic mobiliz- 263 209 for resources, and political mobilization. A sense of ation and the sharpening of conflicting identities. 264 210 deprivation based on disparities and discriminatory The politics of identity extends the theory of depri- 265 211 policies, accompanied by structural transformation vation and competition to mobilization aimed at non- 266 212 processes, often fosters tensions between the group material gains. The politics of identity, above all, 267 213 and state authorities. This plays itself out as a compe- seeks to achieve recognition (Taylor, 1995). This 268 214 tition over economic, cultural, spatial, and political refers not only to accepting one’s own identity, but 269 215 resources (Esses et al., 2001). Economically, this cre- also to having others acknowledge the collective as 270 216 ates competition for housing (Barkan, 1986; Johnston, different (Fincher and Jacobs, 1998). At the same 271 217 1982; Knox, 1982) and jobs (Olzak, 1992; Bonacich, time, the politics of identity seek to gain power on the 272 218 1972). Competition for spatial, cultural, and political basis of collective identity. This transforms collective 273 219 resources includes control over territory, relation to identities into a resource for organizing and mobiliz- 274 220 place, and the right to cultural expression. Beyond ing political support, particularly in cases of collective 275 221 these, the conflict over political resources is associa- deprivation (Herzog, 1995). The politics of identity 276 222 5 ted with an ability to organize both within the system, intensifies at times of structural change, such as the 277 6 223 typically through voting, and outside it, in mobilizing entry of a substantial group with a different ethnicity, 278 224 extra-parliamentary protest (Nagel, 1986; Taylor, culture, language, or occupation. The multiplicity of 279 225 1993). identities in one location fosters the politics of ident- 280 226 Protest by deprived minorities can range from ity, as groups and individuals become aware of the 281 227 words to violence. The groups adopting a strategy of mobilizing potential of ethnic difference (Fincher and 282 228 militant or violent protest are usually ‘homeland’ eth- Jacobs, 1998; Jackson and Penrose, 1993). To 283 229 nic minorities or indigenous peoples. In contrast, enhance its power, each community mobilizes its 284 230 ‘immigrant’ groups usually adopt less militant stra- members through the construction of difference, as a 285 231 tegies, their identity is more malleable, and hence the convenient platform for reinforcing ethnic and racial 286 232 threat they pose to the established order is less acute solidarity. This does not take place in isolation, but 287 233 (see: Yiftachel, 2001).4 Gurr and Harff (1994) note by groups in constant relation (often contestation) 288 234 that immigrant mobilization often emanates from an with other groups and interests (Comaroff and Com- 289 235 ‘ethno-class’ identity, highlighting the link between aroff, 2000; Wilmsen, 1996). 290 236 ethnic origins, current material conditions and polit- The politics of identity is also based on a sense of 291 237 ical mobilization (Gurr and Harff, 1994). Yet, the belonging to a place, since beyond the ethnic culture 292 238 definition of immigrant and homeland identities is this is the resource most available to those organizing 293 239 never clear-cut. Over time, immigrant groups develop ethnic protest. During this process, local identities are 294 240 ‘homeland sentiments’ for the place in which they created or renewed, reflected in phrases like “my 295 241 settle. This becomes apparent when the integration of neighborhood”, “my community”, “my city”, “my 296 242 the immigrants in the new society or their dominance school”, or “my milieu”. These identities attach them- 297 243 over ‘their’ localities is threatened. In such cases, selves to the familiar and the spatial, in opposition to 298 244 ‘veteran’ immigrants might implement a strategy of processes of globalization, which symbolize uncer- 299 245 violent protest vis-a-vis the sources of threat. Adopt- tainty and fragmentation (Castells, 1997). 300 246 ing the competition model of ethnic collective action Ethnic political mobilization can also be achieved 301 247 (Olzak and Shanahan, 1996), Bergesen and Herman via institutionalized mechanisms, like political parties 302 248 (1998) argue that the 1992 Los Angeles riots rep- or other social movements. In fragmented party sys- 303 249 resented a defensive reaction to recent Latino and tems, ethnicity and place are major bases for rallying 304 250 Asian penetration into African-American neighbor- political support. This is especially true when the eth- 305 251 hoods. Hence, most of the casualties in these riots nic candidate, or party, promises benefits to group 306 252 were Latino and Asian immigrants (Sanchez, 1997). members via jobs in the public sector or an “open 307 1 door” to public officials. Accordingly, the “group 308 4 homogeneity voting model” assumes that voters who 309 1471 The distinction between ‘immigrant’ and ‘homeland’ groups is 1472 sharpened for analytical purposes; needless to say, this distinction belong to certain ethnic groups tend to vote for a party 310 1473 is often blurred in ‘real life’, and is itself constructed through a or candidate of the same ethnicity, especially if that 311 1474 multitude of political mobilizations. group is relatively small and distinct from the rest of 312 1 2 3 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 313 the population spatially, culturally, and socially. The cept of scale in order to understand better the nature 372 314 more an ethnic group maintains its distinct identity of relative deprivation, resource competition and col- 373 315 and religious or cultural institutions, the more likely lective mobilization among urban immigrant groups. 374 316 its members will vote the same way. On the other But before we address these issues empirically, let us 375 317 hand, if and when an ethnic group become assimilated turn to a brief presentation of Israel’s political-histori- 376 318 into the general community, it is less likely to exhibit cal settings. 377 319 uniform voting patterns, even when ethnicity remains 320 a ‘symbolic’ general basis for group identity and Settler society and the making of ethno-classes 378 321 mobilization (Landa et al., 1995). Israel’s development towns are key components in the 379 322 Yet, these three major approaches remain unsatis- making of a Jewish settler society in Israel/Palestine, 380 323 factory when examined at different geographic scales. and this geographic-historical setting is central to the 381 324 Their explanatory power was implied earlier in understanding of the Mizrahim as a marginalized 382 325 relation to militant protest of immigrant groups. The ethno-class. Settler societies have generally been 383 326 relative deprivation approach contends that immi- established by Europeans, who settled other conti- 384 327 grants usually exercise less militant strategies, con- nents and dominated indigenous peoples by seizing 385 328 trary to the resource competition approach, which and ethnicizing space, economy and politics (Stasiulis 386 329 seeks to explain riots in multi-ethnic cities. However, and Yuval-Davis, 1995). In order to advance the pro- 387 330 we contend that there is no substantial contradiction ject of nation- and state-building, the new settling 388 331 between these approaches, once we enter the factor regime had to ‘import’ immigrants who entered 389 332 of geographic scale within which ethnic protest takes society at a status lower than the dominant group— 390 333 place, as a potential explanation of the intensity of the ‘founders’—but higher than the indigenous ‘nati- 391 334 mobilization. ves’. To advance the project of territorial ethniciz- 392 ation, the immigrants usually serve three main func- 393 335 Geographic scale tions: cheap labor to replace native groups; settlement 394 336 5 Scale refers to the hierarchy of bounded spaces of on the ‘frontier’ (periphery); and control over the 395 6 337 differing size, such as urban, regional, national and natives and their land (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 396 338 global (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). It does not, how- 1995). These dynamics generally result in the mainte- 397 339 ever, suggest that one scale is fixed and separated nance of hegemony held by the dominant European 398 340 from other scales. Scales should be viewed as related group (usually identified with ‘the state’), by distanc- 399 341 to networks of interaction (Cox, 1998), or as Agnew ing the immigrants from the centers of capital and 400 342 (1997) suggests, be defined as “the focal setting at political power (McGarry, 1998). Meanwhile, the 401 343 which spatial boundaries are defined for a specific immigrants are contributing to the important national 402 344 social claim” (Agnew, 1997, p.100). This links the project of settlement, which provides them with a 403 345 geographic scale to political projects often concep- sense of belonging and certain material gains from 404 346 tualized as the ‘politics of scale’. The politics of scale the settling state. Culturally and politically, however, 405 347 involves relations between space, power and ideol- they are marginalized, while the natives find them- 406 348 ogy, in which a particular scale is advanced as a social selves entirely excluded (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 407 349 organizer and capital regulator, vis-a-vis other scales 1995). 408 350 (a relevant example of the 1990s is the de-privileging The ambiguity of immigrant marginalization and 409 351 process of national regulation and the shifting of regu- inclusion transforms them into an ethno-class (or a 410 352 latory power to local and global scales; Brenner, cluster of ethno-classes), situated between the ‘foun- 411 353 2000). ders’ and the ‘indigenous’. In due course, other immi- 412 354 Yet, the question of how social claims, often grant groups join the project, and create new axes of 413 355 expressed by ethnic mobilization and protest from ethno-class tensions and struggles. Through this spa- 414 356 ‘below’, intersect with the politics of scale has hardly tial-economic process, the immigrant becomes ‘trap- 415 357 been studied by geographers. In order to examine this ped’, as it were, between the founding group and the 416 358 question, in the context of immigrant-settler towns,, excluded ‘natives’. Their identity thus develops at 417 359 we suggest an additional component to the nexus several simultaneous ‘layers’5– a quest for full inte- 418 360 between scale and social claim: identity. Therefore, gration with the ‘founders’ at the national arena, 419 361 similar to Staeheli’s (1999) scholarly endeavor to alongside an emphasis on ‘difference’ at a local level. 420 362 integrate the scale question with citizenship, we sug- Let us turn now to the case itself. 421 363 gest here that the dynamics of spatial scale and ident- 364 ity offers fruitful paths for geographic and urban 365 research. If, indeed, geographic scale is a platform Mobilization in the development towns 422 366 and container of social activity, we propose that every The creation of a Mizrahi ethno-class 423 367 scale is also a platform of a certain ‘layer’ of identity, 368 and each layer is constructed through certain forms Following Israel’s independence in 1948, a great 424 369 of mobilization. In this paper we plan to focus on two many Jewish immigrants from a range of cultures 425 370 such scales: national and local. In other words, we 1 371 seek to integrate the politics of identity with the con- 5 See: Yuval-Davis, 2000. 1475 1 2 4 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 426 began to arrive in the country. The large numbers and urban centers. The towns were populated through the 455 427 cultural diversity forced policymakers to adopt a pol- provision of public housing to (mainly Mizrahi) 456 428 icy of ‘rapid and optimal absorption’ (Eisenstadt, homeless and dependent immigrants who had little 457 429 1969). This policy sought to implement the concepts other residential choices (Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 458 430 of “Judaization-dispersal” and “ingathering of the 1999; Lewin-Epstein et al., 1997). Most of the few 459 431 exiles”. The policy of dispersing the Jewish popu- Ashkenazim sent to the towns found their way to the 460 432 lation throughout the country—a key principle under- center of the country, leaving the Mizrahim behind in 461 433 lying the ethnicization of space—was operationalized the development towns. 462 434 in a national program known as the “Sharon Plan” Thus, paradoxically, the concept of ‘population dis- 463 435 (Sharon, 1951). This important policy document was persal’ undermined the concept of the ingathering of 464 436 named after Aryeh Sharon,6 head of the Planning the exiles, since the segregated development towns 465 437 Authority in the Prime Minister’s Office in 1948– were virtually entirely populated by Mizrahi immi- 466 438 1952. Sharon sought to provide an urban plan for the grants. Over the years, these immigrants were subject 467 439 state of Israel, in anticipation of a population of 2.5 not only to social, political, and cultural marginaliz- 468 440 million (Kark, 1995). This plan created a pyramid ation, but were also at an acute economic disadvan- 469 441 with five primary types of settlement in a hierarchical tage (Etkin, 2002). The economic profile of all the 470 442 relationship. One major category missing from the towns relied on heavy and traditional industries, 471 443 urban landscape prior to the founding of Israel was cheap labor, and constant job instability (Razin, 1996; 472 444 Jewish middle-sized towns and urban centers having Gradus and Einy, 1984; Gradus and Krakover, 1977). 473 445 a population of 6000–60,000 (Sharon, 1951; Troen, The existence of towns distinctively inferior from 474 446 1994). These communities came to be called “devel- mainstream Israeli society and commonly patronizing 475 447 opment towns”. behavior toward the Mizrahim, spawned widespread 476 448 The development towns became the main tool for sentiments of alienation and social marginality 477 449 implementing the policy of (Jewish) population dis- (Shohat, 2001). 478 450 5 persal and creating a Jewish majority in the Galilee The conspicuous gap between Ashkenazim and 479 6 451 and Negev. Between 1948 and 1963, 27 development Mizrahim generated various scholarly accounts. One 480 452 towns were established as medium-sized peripheral perspective, drawn from neo-Marxist thought, views 481 453 urban centers, in realization of the concept of disper- the settlement of Mizrahim in development towns as 482 454 sal (See: Fig. 1). Most were far removed from Israeli a pool of cheap labor for the rapidly growing Israeli 483 1516 1515 1514 economy (Shafir and Peled, 1998; Bernstein and 484 Swirski, 1982). A complementary analysis regards the 485 establishment of development towns as a means used 486 by the dominant Ashkenazi group to advance the ter- 487 ritorial goals of Zionist nationalism. In other words, 488 by transforming the Mizrahim into a settlement force, 489 the territorial interests of the dominant group were 490 served, creating a Jewish majority in previously Arab 491 regions. During the process, these regions were also 492 transformed from glorified frontiers to stigmatized 493 peripheries (Hasson, 1998). At the same time, the dis- 494 tancing of Mizrahim from the economic and political 495 centers enabled the dominant Ashkenazi group to 496 maintain its dominance over Mizrahim and Palestini- 497 ans (Swirski, 1989). 498 This account links the development towns to the 499 settler society model. The dominant (‘founders’) 500 group is composed primarily of Ashkenazim who 501 settled in the territory prior to the founding of the 502 state, and the middle-class Mizrahi immigrants who 503 mobilized upwards; the native group is Palestinian- 504 Arab; and the immigrant group is composed primarily 505 of Mizrahim who arrived from the Muslim world and 506 more recently from the ex-Soviet Union. A related 507 approach defines Israel as a “settling ethnocracy”, in 508 which a European ethnic group controls the state 509 1517 apparatus (in the name of ‘the nation’), unevenly 510 1518 incorporating later immigrants through various 511 1519 Figure 1 Development Towns in Israel, 1948–1963. nation-building projects. The ‘founders’ reinforce 512 1 their dominance through their control of the state’s 513 1476 6 No relation to Israel’s current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. evolving geography, economy and politics. Rights 514 1 2 5 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 1523 1522 21521 1524 1525 1526 Figure 2 Protest intensity of the Mizrahi Ethno-class in Development Towns, 1960–1995. 515 and capabilities are determined mainly according to found, were almost entirely influenced by two related 549 516 ethnic affiliation (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000). How factors: macro-economic conditions and public poli- 550 517 does this affect the patterns of protest of Mizrahim cies. We can note waves of protest surfacing during 551 518 from development towns? every period of economic hardship and restructuring 552 in Israel, which usually hits peripheral groups hardest. 553 This occurred during the mid1960s, the late 1970s, 554 519 Protest of the Mizrahi ethno-class in the mid1980s, the late 1980s, and the mid 1990s, 555 520 5 development towns when many demonstrations, rallies and media activi- 556 6 521 Our analysis of public protest includes all events ties in the towns objected, at times fiercely, to the 557 522 expressing dissatisfaction in the public sphere, rise in unemployment, the decline in services and the 558 523 especially against the state. Data were collected for emigration from the towns during these periods. And 559 524 the years 1960–1998 from the reports of two national conversely, during periods of government investment 560 525 newspapers (Ha’aretz and Ma’ariv) and two local in the towns, and growth in local employment, such 561 526 papers (Kol HaTzafon and Sheva). Data about each as the early 1980s (when a ‘neighborhood renewal’ 562 527 act of protest were translated into a numerical index project was established in development towns), or the 563 528 based on the number of participants, duration and early 1990s (the massive building for ‘Russian’ 564 529 intensity.7 Due to limitation of space, the presentation immigrants) the towns remained relatively calm. 565 530 of results will be quite brief. In the period under dis- What did peripheral Mizrahim mobilize against? 566 531 cussion, 345 acts of protest took place in development Despite the large number of events in and about the 567 532 towns (see Fig. 2). Public protest in the towns has towns, we discovered, as noted, that the range of 568 533 been relatively persistent and consistent, if not issues has been quite narrow. The findings show that 569 534 intense, apart from one exceptionally active year protest in development towns focused primarily on 570 535 (1989); it has remained without the volatility that economic themes, especially employment and wages: 571 536 would constitute a direct challenge to the settler ethn- 62% of the acts of protest dealt with economic issues, 572 537 ocratic regime. This stands in contrast to far more 22% with political issues, 11% with planning issues, 573 538 intensive and often fluctuating levels of protest in and 5% fell into the “other” category. The narrow 574 539 nearly all other organized sectors of Israeli society, focus of protest is especially conspicuous in compari- 575 540 notably the Arab citizens and Jewish settlers son to other groups in Israeli society, who have cam- 576 541 (Herman, 1996; Lehman-Wilzig, 1990). The relative paigned on a range of matters pertaining to the 577 542 detachment of the towns from the major political national agenda, including Israel’s relations with Ger- 578 543 struggles of Israeli society was conspicuous in the many, Arab-Israeli wars, the occupation and settle- 579 544 early 1970s, when the Black Panthers movement ment of Palestinian territories, nature protection, 580 545 mobilized many Mizrahim, especially in Jerusalem’s religious-secular, Mizrahi-Ashkenazi and Arab-Jew- 581 546 poor neighborhoods, but managed to rally only scant ish relations within Israel, as well as matters per- 582 547 support in the towns.8 taining to resource distribution and service provision 583 548 What about the fluctuations in protest? These, we (Lehman-Wilzig, 1990). This relatively limited focus 584 1 and the consistent shunning of topics considered 585 1477 7 For details about quantifying the protest actions, see Gurr, 1993; ‘ideological’, illustrates the ‘entrapment’ of peripheral 586 1478 Lehman-Wilzig, 1990. Mizrahim within the Israeli settling ethnocracy. This 587 8 1479 The Black Panthers was a group of young Mizrahim who mobil- 1480 ized popular protest against the Israeli elites during the early 1970s. setting silenced their voice on issues at the basis of 588 1481 The protest emerged from Jerusalem’s poor neighborhoods, and the oppressive system, and gave them only limited 589 1482 spread to other parts of Israel (Bernstein, 1984). options with which to challenge their marginal pos- 590 1 2 6 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 591 ition, leading to the emergence of a fairly docile the emergence of a relatively uniform, marginalized 651 592 ‘ethno-class’ identity. (and mainly Mizrahi) ‘ethno-class’ in the towns and 652 593 It is particularly striking to note the virtual absence across the state. In other words, the identity of periph- 653 594 of public objection among peripheral Mizrahim eral Mizrahim, as reflected in their protest activities, is 654 595 against continuing Jewish settlement in the occupied most identifiable in terms of their national peripheral 655 596 territories (Golan Heights, West Bank and Gaza). This socio-economic and geographic position, and not 656 597 has clearly deprived the towns of material and human through a distinct cultural or ideological stand. This, 657 598 resources. Instead of objecting to on-going settlement as we shall see, changes in the local arena, where we 658 599 activity, the Development Towns Forum (an umbrella focus on local electioneering. Here the new immi- 659 600 forum of mayors often voicing the towns’ collective grants from the former Soviet Union (“the Russians”) 660 601 concerns) accepted towns from the occupied terri- provide a major focus. 661 602 tories (Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim and Katzrin) into its 603 ranks, thereby indicating indirect support of the con- ‘Russians’ in the development towns: Background 662 604 tinuation of Jewish settlement. Why do leaders of Some 911,000 immigrants from the former Soviet 663 605 towns support further Jewish settlement activity? Union (‘Russians’) arrived in Israel from late 1989 664 606 This, we suggest, reflects the dependent and insecure until the end of 2001 (Ministry of Immigrant Absorp- 665 607 position of peripheral Mizrahim within the Israeli tion, 2002). Like most previous waves of immigrants, 666 608 ethnocracy, ‘cornering’ them to take a territorial- the majority of Russians did not arrive in Israel for 667 609 nationalistic and a pro-settlement (i.e. anti- ideological reasons, but to improve their security and 668 610 Palestinian) position. This impedes their ability to quality of life (Al-Haj and Leshem, 2000). The econ- 669 611 voice opposition to and challenge policies that clearly omic and social beliefs of the immigrants were the 670 612 affect them adversely. product of Soviet socialization, but also of exposure 671 613 This collective identity is marked by a strong desire to Western culture after the disintegration of the 672 614 to assimilate and integrate into the ‘core Israeli cul- USSR (Lissak and Leshem, 2001). The will of the 673 615 5 ture’, a pervasive feeling of deprivation vis-a-vis the Israeli elites to absorb such a large mass of immi- 674 6 616 national center, and a drive for improving the towns’ grants is related to their Zionist desire to maintain 675 617 low socioeconomic position. The combination of Jewish majority over the Palestinians, to their aspir- 676 618 economic deprivation and social alienation from the ation to preserve a secular majority over a growing 677 619 Israeli center has recently given rise to a range of ultra-Orthodox population, and their wish to reinforce 678 620 political movements, which promote local patriotism, the country’s European culture. In these senses, the 679 621 and especially Mizrahi Jewishness (Ben-Ari and Bilu, arrival of the Russian immigrants served primarily the 680 622 1987). Most notable has been the successful ultra- interests of the secular Jewish Ashkenazim. 681 623 orthodox movement of Shas. Unlike previous waves of immigrants, the Russians 682 624 Returning to the topics of protest, why did arrived in Israel when capitalist and individualist 683 625 Mizrahim in the towns avoid raising ideological and values were ascendant. This created some space for 684 626 controversial issues? Moreover, why did no signifi- norms that are different than, though not contradictory 685 627 cant political opposition emerge from the deprived to, the core Zionist ideology, and eroded the collec- 686 628 towns? We point to Mizrahi ‘entrapment’ within Jew- tive will to instill a uniform national culture 687 629 ish settler society as the key explanation. The Jewish (Kimmerling, 2001). Instead, higher importance was 688 630 settling ethnocracy institutionalized the superiority of placed on providing the immigrants with housing and 689 631 the Ashkenazim in most spheres of society, creating employment. This was reflected in a new policy lab- 690 632 a dependency of the Mizrahi ethno-class on the Ash- eled “direct absorption”, whereby an immigrant is 691 633 kenazi center. Thus, we should view the issues of awarded a package of benefits and financial aid for a 692 634 public protest not through the narrow lens of protest limited period to cover all social and housing needs. 693 635 and its motivations, but within the broader context of This is vastly different to the absorption policy pre- 694 636 a society that is fractured and stratified in both class vailing during the 1950s and 1960s, when the state 695 637 and ethnic terms. This society was built by a power- directed immigrants to public housing and pre- 696 638 ful, Zionist-Ashkenazi hegemony, which has worked arranged employment (Hasson, 1992). But the 697 639 to overlap Zionism, “Israeliness” and Ashkenazi government remained a key actor, shaping the 698 640 identity. This power structure undermined every location of immigrant absorption through the con- 699 641 attempt to challenge its legitimacy and left no alterna- struction of large-scale projects of affordable housing 700 642 tive other than protest against the discrimination and and employment at the state peripheries, especially in 701 643 deprivation in the distribution of material resources. the development towns (Tzfadia, 2000). These poli- 702 644 In overview, the nature of public protest reflects a cies contributed to the settlement in the towns of some 703 645 profound transformation of identity on a national-state 130,000 Russians, many of an economically and soci- 704 646 level: from peripheral ethnicity(ies) to a deprived ally disadvantaged background (Central Bureau of 705 647 ethno-class. This transformation has occurred under Statistics, 1998). The rapid growth brought about not 706 648 the force of the settling Jewish (de-Arabizing) ethnoc- only an increase in the towns’ population, but also 707 649 racy, which has wiped out the Mizrahim’s culture significant changes in their ethnic composition. Spati- 708 650 while settling them in frontier regions, thus spawning ally, most of the Russians settled in new neighbor- 709 1 2 7 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 710 hoods, which became spaces distinct from the older next section deals with control of place as reflected 769 711 urban sections, and sometimes constitute “a town in local voting and electioneering. 770 712 within a town”. Demographically, the towns lost their 713 distinct Mizrahi character, and at present accommo- Local elections 771 714 date 25–40% Russians (Tzfadia, 2000). We begin by comparing statewide local election 772 715 The pattern of isolationism and integration adopted results in 1989, 1993, and 1998.9 Later, this section 773 716 by the immigrants contributed greatly to creating a focuses on the Mizrahi-Russian tension during the 774 717 distinct social category—“the Russians”. Although elections in two development towns in the southern 775 718 most of these immigrants came from a variety of sub- periphery of Israel, Ofakim and Kiryat Gat (see Fig. 776 719 cultures, some from Asia and others from Europe, the 1).10 These towns are representative of the geo- 777 720 great majority speaks Russian and tends to see itself graphic, social and ethnic settings of most Israeli 778 721 as belonging to this category. Above all, this is how development towns, but as we shall see, offer two 779 722 they are perceived and categorized by mainstream different trajectories of local ethnic mobilization. In 780 723 Israeli society. Thus, clear ethnic and cultural bound- most local elections, Israel’s many political parties 781 724 aries were drawn around the new immigrants, who combined into several main blocs: Labor;11 Likud;12 782 725 emerge as a distinct group within an increasingly Russian immigrant parties; local parties; small 783 726 multi-cultural Israel (Kimmerling, 2001). These national parties; and religious parties. The religious 784 727 boundaries were accepted and reinforced by the bloc is divided into Shas, a Mizrahi ultra-orthodox 785 728 founding of two immigrant political parties with a party founded in the 1980s following a split within 786 729 clear Russian character, “Yisrael b’Aliyah” (Israel in the ultra-Orthodox circles between Mizrahim and 787 730 Immigration/Ascendance) and “Yisrael Beitenu” Ashkenazim, and other religious parties. 788 731 (Israel our Home). The two parties (and especially the The municipal council elections held on November 789 732 former) performed well in national elections, attesting 10, 1998 brought to a climax a number of dynamics 790 733 to the success of the Russians in acquiring political that had begun in Israel in the 1980s, including the 791 5 734 6 power as a distinct group. The success of the parties diminished power for the large parties and increased 792 735 also demonstrates their ability to convert their num- support for sectoral, ethnic, local or independent par- 793 736 bers and organizational skills into political power in ties (Goldberg, 2001). In development towns, how- 794 737 order to maximize their access to resources and bud- ever, these processes were particularly salient, as the 795 738 gets, which were also used to buttress the ethnic walls boundaries between the sectors were clearer, and per- 796 739 (Kimmerling, 2001). sonal familiarity with the candidate carried greater 797 740 The encounter in the development towns between weight, if only because these are small towns. 798 741 the two social groups, the Russians and the Mizrahim, It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the key dynamics in 799 742 quickly led to competition over economic resources, the development towns were as follows. There was a 800 743 which were already in short supply. This competitive significant drop in the election of Likud members to 801 744 drive was intensified by a sense of relative deprivation the councils, from 30% in the 1989 elections to 22.6% 802 745 among the Mizrahim, in light of the benefits bestowed in the 1993 elections, and to 13.6% in the 1998 elec- 803 746 upon the Russians, such as housing assistance (in new tions. In parallel, there was a significant drop in sup- 804 747 neighborhoods), tax breaks and help in finding jobs, port for the Labor Party, especially in the 1993 elec- 805 748 and a feeling that Israeli society is more indulgent tions. Then, Labor won an average of 27.9% of the 806 749 toward Russian culture than it ever was toward municipal council seats, winning only 13.8% of the 807 750 Mizrahim immigrants in the 1950s. The Mizrahim seats in 1998. In contrast with the diminishing power 808 751 also note that the housing benefits for the Russians of the many ‘mother parties’ (Likud and Labor), there 809 752 are in excess of what they, the veterans, receive at was a slight increase in the power of the local parties, 810 753 present. In the early stages of absorption, welfare ser- 1 754 vices became a major arena of contest. The “direct 9 Data for this comparison were collected from a special series of 1483 755 absorption” policy decentralized the absorption func- publications issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics (1990, 1484 756 tions, which had previously been handled by the cen- 1994, 1999). 1485 10 757 tral government, leaving most of the absorption work Data for this analysis were taken from local newspapers pub- 1486 lished before and after the elections. Several in-depth interviews 1487 758 to the local authorities, including the provision of wel- were also conducted with key figures in the elections in Ofakim 1488 759 fare services. The gap between demand and supply and Kiryat Gat. 1489 760 led to competition over the available services from 11 The Labor Party is currently one of the two largest parties in 1490 761 the earliest stages of absorption. Later, the Mizrahim Israel. Until the mid-1970s, Labor was consistently the party in 1491 power and dominated all the state institutions. In the 1970s, Labor 1492 762 and Russians began to compete over employment, lost the national election to the Likud Party, and ever since there 1493 763 notoriously scarce in the development towns has been rivalry between the two for dominance. 1494 764 (Lipshitz, 1992). The struggle over these resources 12 Likud is currently the party in power in Israel, but until 1977, it 1495 765 was conducted alongside other efforts of cooperation. was the main opposition party to the Labor-led government . 1496 Mizrahi candidates had appeared on Likud lists, and therefore the 1497 766 It illuminated, to both groups, the importance of con- Likud rise to power was attributed to increased support from 1498 767 trol over place as a means to acquiring not only econ- Mizrahim, as well as the Mizrahi protest of Labor’s attitude toward 1499 768 omic, but also political and cultural resources. The them in the 1950s and 1960s. 1500 1 2 8 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 1531 1530 21529 1532 1533 1534 Figure 3 Distribution of Political Blocs in the Municipal Councils of Development Towns after Recent Elections. 811 in comparison with the previous elections in 1993. In hand, there was an internal-local hegemony, which 847 812 the 1989 elections, the local parties won 28.1% of the characterized development towns prior to the munici- 848 813 council seats, 22.3% in 1993, and 26.2% in 1998.13 pal council elections, when Mizrahim enjoyed over- 849 814 More importantly, the local parties became the domi- representation in local decision-making circles, while 850 815 nant bloc on most councils, indicating the increased the Russians had almost no voice (in the 1993 local 851 816 importance of place over national or statewide polit- elections, the Russians won 0.7% of the seats in the 852 5 817 ical concerns. Nevertheless, the local bloc is also municipal councils, even though the Russians com- 853 6 818 rather fragmented, and hence often ineffective. prised more than a quarter of the towns’ population). 854 819 Together with increased support for the local parties On the other hand, from a broader perspective of eth- 855 820 was a sharp increase in the power of the Russian nic relations in Israel, the development towns 856 821 immigrant bloc, which captured 13.9% of all munici- remained on the margin of direct Ashkenazi domi- 857 822 pal council seats in development towns. This achieve- nation. Some use this setting and interpret state efforts 858 823 ment turned the immigrants into the third largest, after to settle large numbers of Russians in the towns, as 859 824 the local and religious blocs. The immigrant bloc is an attempt to undermine their Mizrahi identity (see: 860 825 composed primarily of ‘Yisrael b’Aliyah’, the Shalom Chetrit, 1999). Therefore, the conflict 861 826 national immigrant party, but also ‘Yisrael Beitenu’ between veterans and immigrants in elections were 862 827 and other local ‘Russian’ parties. The great homogen- also a reflection of the struggle of Mizrahim to protect 863 828 eity of the immigrant bloc enhanced its power, in con- their spatial bases of political and cultural power in 864 829 trast with the splintered power of the local parties, Israel. This was most noticeable in the campaign of 865 830 and the partial fragmentation of the religious parties the Mizrahi-local movements, to which we shall 866 831 (Shas, Agudat Israel,14 and other religious factions). return. 867 832 The roots of this keen ethnic electoral struggle, 833 beyond the feelings of relative deprivation and com- Veteran immigrants and new immigrants: Kiryat 868 834 petition over resources, relate to the existence of two Gat and Ofakim 869 835 distinct identities in a small, isolated place. The multi- The main tension between Mizrahim and Russians is 870 836 plicity of identities in a small place tends to sharpen generated by the desire of the Mizrahim to preserve 871 837 the politics of identity, and thereby reconstruct and their over-representation on the municipal councils, 872 838 even essentialize difference (Jackson and Penrose, and by the opposition of the Russians to that privi- 873 839 1993). The struggle between Mizrahim and Russians lege. As found in previous empirical work, the power 874 840 to define which identity will be dominant in the small of the development town, in the opinion of its Mizrahi 875 841 place is intertwined with the struggle over political residents, derives from its ability to provide a rela- 876 842 power and local resources, and is hence shaped by tively autonomous political space (Yiftachel and 877 843 broader fields of hegemonic influence, which deter- Tzfadia, 1999). Within this setting, both the Mizrahim 878 844 mines resource distribution and identity construction. and the Russians seek to increase their control over 879 845 In the development towns we discerned the exist- local resources. Unlike the Russians, however, the 880 846 ence of two major hegemonic influences. On the one Mizrahim perceive much of their cultural identity to 881 1 be linked to the development towns (Ben-Ari and 882 13 Bilu, 1987; Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 1999). In this 883 1501 ‘Local’ parties denote electoral groupings organized locally, with sense, local government is perceived as having the 884 1502 no direct association to a known state-wide political party. Needless 1503 to say, branches of state-wide parties in the development towns are ability to protect that identity, reflecting the impor- 885 1504 also led by local people. tance attached to control over place; as Castells notes, 886 1505 14 An Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox party. protection of cultural identity is related to and 887 1 2 9 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 888 organized around a particular territory (Castells, small town and there is frequent contact between the 947 889 1983). two groups…The fact that the new immigrants are 948 890 The intensity of the conflict differed from town to foreign, different, is not what caused the frustration 949 891 town, in keeping with two main factors—the relative and tension between the veterans and the new immi- 950 892 size of the Russian immigrant community and their grants (Interview with Hava Sultana, Ofakim, 951 893 level of local organization. To illustrate the differ- October 2, 1998). 952 894 ences in intensity, two development towns in the 953 895 south of Israel were selected: Ofakim, which had a In the local election of 1993 Sultana won one out 954 896 low-intensity conflict, and Kiryat Gat, with a high- of 11 seats on the town council. In both Ofakim and 955 897 intensity confrontation. Prior to the arrival of the Rus- Kiryat atGat, tation all in then, the immigrants local government had had (Figs. no 4represen- and 5 956 957 958 898 sians, the two towns had much in common. Both were ), until this situation changed in the 1998 elections, 959 899 established during the 1950s on the southern periph- as it became clear that immigrants were the single 960 900 ery of Israel, in order to Judaize the Negev desert, largest bloc in both towns. 961 901 function as urban centers for agricultural settlements, The similarity in relative proportion of the immi- 962 902 and supply housing for Jewish immigrants. Mizrahi grant population in each of these towns does not cor- 963 903 Jews mostly populated the two towns with their econ- relate with the power they gained in local elections. 964 904 omies being based on labor-intensive industrial devel- In Ofakim, two immigrant parties ran for the council: 965 905 opment. Typical of peripheral towns, the narrow Yisrael b’Aliyah, the national immigrant party, and 966 906 economic base could not guarantee a decent standard Veterans and Immigrants: The Hope of Ofakim, the 967 907 of living. In 1997 the average income of wage earners joint immigrant-veteran party, headed by Hava Sul- 968 908 in Ofakim was 77% of the Israeli average, while in tana. The Yisrael b’Aliyah party won 13.3% of all the 969 909 Kiryat Gat it reached 80%. Other parameters also seats on the council (2 out of 15 members), while 970 910 reflected socioeconomic weakness: a high rate of the joint party did not pass the qualifying threshold 971 911 unemployment, high rates of out migration and low required to have a seat in the council. In Kiryat Gat, 972 912 5 educational achievement. However, in the long run, 6 four immigrant parties competed for the municipal 973 913 some differences emerged between the two towns, council. Yisrael b’Aliyah, the national party, won 974 914 reflected in different growth rates, which saw Kiryat 10.5% of the council seats (2 out of 19). Among the 975 915 Gat reaching a population of 25,400 in 1983, while three local immigrant parties, Atid Ha’Ir [Future of 976 916 Ofakim reached a size of only 12,600 The difference the City] won 15.8% of the vote, or 3 council seats; 977 917 was exacerbated when, in 1993, a large Intel plant the Bukharian party won 10.5% of the vote, or 2 978 918 was established in Kiryat Gat, whereas two years later council seats, and Kiryat Gat of the Immigrants did 979 919 Ofakim lost one of the major employers—the large not pass the qualifying threshold. All told, the immi- 980 920 textile factory of Uman. grant parties won 7 of 19 council seats. More 981 921 The influx of Russian immigrants to Kiryat Gat and important, the Atid Ha’Ir immigrant party, headed by 982 922 Ofakim caused a dramatic change to the towns’ ethnic Alexander Wechsler who also ran for mayor, garnered 983 923 compositions. In December 2001, they constituted 31% of all the valid votes, just behind Albert Erez, 984 924 27% of the population in Ofakim, and 29% in Kiryat head of a local party called Mifneh [Turning Point] 985 925 Gat (Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 2002). Other in Kiryat Gat, which won 34% of all the valid votes 986 926 indicators show that the groups of immigrants resid- for mayor. According to Israel’s electoral laws, a can- 987 927 ing in both towns are similar: about 23% arrived from didate cannot win the elections unless gaining at least 988 928 the Asian republics of the Soviet Union; 25% of the 40% of the vote. This often requires a second round 989 929 adult immigrants have an academic degree certificate of voting for the two top candidates. This meant that 990 930 and 25% of the immigrants are aged 65 or more Erez and Wechsler had to run again in the second 991 931 (Central Bureau of Statistic, 1998). The most round; however, an unprecedented compromise 992 932 important data on Russian immigrants in the two agreement was signed by Erez and Wechsler on Nov- 993 933 towns is that until the recent elections, they were con- ember 16, 1998, preventing a second round, which 994 934 spicuously under-represented on both local councils. would have caused heightened tension and, possibly, 995 935 A major source of tension between the Mizrahim violence. The compromise agreement saw Erez con- 996 936 and Russians in the towns is the sense of relative tinuing as mayor and Wechsler becoming his deputy, 997 937 deprivation felt by many Mizrahim. Ms. Hava Sultana with new and wider responsibilities.15 998 938 (herself a Mizrahi) from Ofakim, who headed “Vet- The elections in Ofakim and Kiryat Gat differed. 999 939 erans and Immigrants: The Hope of Ofakim”, a joint In Ofakim, almost no tension was evident between 1000 940 party of newcomers and former residents running for the Mizrahim and Russians, as the latter vote was 1001 941 the city council, expressed this clearly: split. Those immigrants who settled in Ofakim prior 1002 to 1993, and the elderly immigrants living in pro- 1003 942 The tension between new immigrants and veteran tected housing in a new immigrant neighborhood, 1004 943 residents is a product of the discrimination. The tended to support the rightist Likud-NRP (National 1005 944 immigrants received more than Ofakim residents 945 could attain…it caused unrest…expressed as hostility 1 946 toward them. This feeling grows because this is a 15 Our Kiryat Gat, local newspaper, Issue 953, November 20, 1998. 1506 1 2 10 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 1539 1538 21537 1540 1541 1542 Figure 4 Composition of the Municipal Council in Ofakim after the Local Elections of 1993 and 1998. 1547 1546 1545 5 6 1548 1549 1550 Figure 5 Composition of the Municipal Council in Kiryat Gat after the Local Elections of 1993 and 1998. 1006 Religious Party) coalition. This bloc was headed by 1029 1007 Yair Hazan, who had been mayor in 1989–1993 and In Kiryat Gat, on the other hand, although the 1030 1008 who was responsible for the absorption of many immigrants split their vote for the council into three 1031 1009 immigrants. Perhaps it was his function during his separate parties, they united in support of Alexander 1032 1010 first term of office that won him votes of the elderly Wechsler for mayor. Due to his political experience— 1033 1011 immigrants in these elections (Hazan was re-elected he had immigrated to Israel in the 1970s and was 1034 1012 mayor in 1998). Other immigrants supported ‘Yisrael active for many years in the Likud Party—Wechsler 1035 1013 b’Aliyah’ which was poorly organized and lacked was able to unite the ranks of immigrants. Despite his 1036 1014 leadership. The implications of this split among the declarations that his party represents veterans as well 1037 1015 immigrants can be gleaned from the words of Yair as immigrants, the Mizrahim called it ‘the Russian 1038 1016 Hazan, current mayor of Ofakim, about a month party’. To rally immigrant support, Wechsler stressed 1039 1017 before his election: the division between the veterans and the immigrants, 1040 with emphasis on the distress of the newcomers. In 1041 1018 Because they [the Russians] don’t have leadership other words, Wechsler took advantage of political eth- 1042 1019 and the immigrant vote is split…they pose no threat nicity to gain power. In one of his speeches, Wechsler 1043 1020 to control [of veterans in the Ofakim city govern- said, “I do not deny the fact that there is a schism 1044 1021 ment—E.T. and O.Y.], and therefore there is no eth- and polarization in the town…The polarization wase 1045 1022 nic tension in town…The immigrant parties are not here even before the elections. The new immigrants 1046 1023 trying to undermine the dominance of the Mizrahim live in ghettos here, in an atmosphere of ‘us’ versus 1047 1024 …[The goal of the Russians is—E.T.] to enlarge their ‘them’.”16 1048 1025 share of the local pie…They have no leadership 1026 because they are weak…a high percentage of elderly 1 1027 and single parents… (Interview with Yair Hazan, 16 Quoted in the local Kiryat Gat newspaper— Our Kiryat Gat, 1507 1028 Ofakim mayor, October 2, 1998). Issue 953, November 20, 1998, p. 29. 1508 1 2 11 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 1049 The awareness of the Mizrahim in Kiryat Gat that defend their control in the towns, i.e. a religious- 1107 1050 their control over ‘their place’ was in jeopardy created national strategy. Accordingly, the Mizrahim under- 1108 1051 considerable tension, which also turned into violence. mined the connection between the Russian immi- 1109 1052 The tension reached a peak after the first round of grants and the Israeli-Jewish nation, by claiming that 1110 1053 voting, in which it became clear that a second round most of the immigrants were not ‘real’ Jews. Since 1111 1054 would required between Erez and Wechsler. There belonging to the Israeli-Jewish nation is defined by 1112 1055 were incidents of violence, as dummy bombs were Jewish religious law, and since many of the immi- 1113 1056 placed near Wechsler’s home, threats were made, and grants were not recognized as religious Jews, the 1114 1057 knives brandished. All this took place in the context Mizrahim could exploit an advantage in the field of 1115 1058 of continuing stereotyping with Russians being lab- national belonging, and gain with it a high moral 1116 1059 eled as mafia gangsters, prostitutes, and lacking any ground at the local level. By adopting this strategy, 1117 1060 connection with Judaism. These stereotypes were Shas (the Mizrahi ultra-orthodox party), presented a 1118 1061 reflected in the following excerpt from the local news- powerful (if racist) counter-narrative to the growing 1119 1062 paper Ma Nishma after the agreement was signed claims of Russians in the towns. This has occurred in 1120 1063 between Erez and Wechsler: several towns, including an incident which received 1121 wide media attention in November 1999, during a 1122 1064 “On Tuesday morning, after the agreement was demonstration against opening non-kosher Russian 1123 1065 signed between Erez and Wechsler, suddenly all the grocery shops in the development town of Bet- 1124 1066 local massage parlors and branches of the Russian Shemesh;17 Rabbi Shmuel Bennizri from Shas pre- 1125 1067 Mafia were ‘closed’. Wechsler was acknowledged by ached to a local Mizrahi audience:18 1126 1068 his opponents to be Jewish, and all’s well that ends 1069 well” (Ma Nishma, Issue 953, 1998, November 20, The Russians brought to Bet-Shemesh the diseases 1127 1070 1998, p. 26). from Russia. Heaven forbid, the following biblical 1128 text is turning into a reality: when ye entered, ye 1129 1071 defiled my land, and made mine heritage an abomin- 1130 1072 5 The elections in Kiryat Gat thus revealed the under- 6 ation [Jeremiah, 2,7]. They [the Russians] inundated 1131 1073 lying tension between the Mizrahim and Russians. As the land with tens of thousands of non-Jews, and they 1132 1074 noted, this conflict peaked when the Mizrahim felt inundate the land with shops of abomination. Just 1133 1075 that their control over the town was at risk. Several after the town has developed, the devils raised their 1134 1076 statements by Mizrahi residents in Kiryat Gat heads and inundate Bet-Shemesh with their abomin- 1135 1077 appeared in the local press after the agreement, illus- ations. 1136 1078 trating tension: 1137 1079 N.A.: “…The compromise is a wise move. An atmos- Hence, Shas and the Mizrahim have used the 1138 1080 phere of hate was avoided…If Wechsler had been national Zionist discourse, which includes people 1139 1081 elected, there would have been a Mizrahi uprising…” according to their connections to (ethnic) Jewishness, 1140 1082 T.B.: “…During the final week of the campaign, there but modified that discourse to the local-religious cir- 1141 1083 was an atmosphere of war…” cumstances, where the Mizrahim enjoy an advantage. 1142 1084 A.V.: “A split and rupture between the Mizrahim and This allowed them to use an aggressive, essentialized 1143 1085 Russians…reflected in extremist invective and physi- rhetoric to maintain their control in the towns. But, 1144 1086 cal and verbal violence…” notably, this strategy is another sign of Mizrahi 1145 1087 M.B.: “Had there been a runoff, the ethnic tension entrapment: they could not challenge the pro-immi- 1146 1088 would have erupted…” gration (ethnic) Zionist ideology, so they emphasized 1147 1089 the issue of religious boundaries. This gave them a 1148 1090 Ofakim and Kiryat Gat represent the spectrum of high moral ground, within the very national project 1149 1091 ethnic tensions between the Mizrahim and Russians, that continues to marginalize them. We can observe 1150 1092 which was evident to varying degrees in most devel- this as a strategy adopted by a trapped ethno-class, 1151 1093 opment towns. Even in Ofakim, where inter-group which illustrates the multi-layered nature of its collec- 1152 1094 tension was never violent during local elections, the tive identity. 1153 1095 potential for violence existed had the Russian immi- 1096 grants posed a threat to Mizrahi dominance. It was 1097 the different organizational ability of the immigrants In conclusion 1154 1098 that appears to have determined the intensity of con- This paper has explored the making of a Mizrahi 1155 1099 flict. In general, the more organized were the Russi- ethno-class in Israel’s development towns through the 1156 1100 ans, the more intense became local electioneering. prism of ethnic mobilization, particularly in public 1157 1101 The elections in the development towns reveal a 1 1102 Mizrahi protest against the Russians, but this appears 17 1103 to have remained at a local level. The same action The development town of Bet-Shemesh was established in the 1509 1950s, 30 Kilometers south-west of Jerusalem. At the end of 2001, 1510 1104 appears impossible in the national arena, given the 22% of its 50,883 residents were new immigrants (Ministry of 1511 1105 persisting hegemony of Zionism. This impossibility Immigrant Absorption, 2002). 1512 1106 led the Mizrahim to adopt a new strategy in order to 18 Quoted in Ma’ariv, November 22, 1999. 1513 1 2 12 21 JCIT: The Int. Journal of Urban Policy and Planning 20-11-03 12:22:35 Rev 16.04x JCIT$$589P 3 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 1 Between urban and national: Erez Tzfadia and Oren Yiftachel 2 1158 protest and local electioneering. In these arenas we ade vis-a`-vis the new influx of ‘Russian immigrants’. 1218 1159 found two prevailing voices— public protest and local Here we notice a more militant stance, which works 1219 1160 politics. First, public protest, which has been consist- to differentiate Jewish identities and assert Mizrahi 1220 1161 ent over the years, has ‘broadcast outwards’ a plea control over ‘their’ (threatened) towns. The promin- 1221 1162 for social and economic equality, emanating from the ence of Shas in both Kiryat Gat and Ofakim, as in 1222 1163 towns’ persistent deprivation as compared to the rest most development towns, highlights the search for 1223 1164 of Israel’s Jewish society. As we have shown, the new resources, especially Jewish religious affiliation, 1224 1165 consistently disgruntled nature of the voice emerging as a tool in ethnic competition. Given the role of reli- 1225 1166 from the towns can be partially explained by the rela- gion as a cornerstone of Israeli-Jewish identity, the 1226 1167 tive deprivation. But the relatively docile nature of the Shas movements has developed a strategy which 1227 1168 protest should be further explained by their ‘trapped’ attempts to by-pass the ethnocratic entrapment of the 1228 1169 settings within a Jewish settler society. These settings Israeli settler society, with its emphasis on settlement, 1229 1170 have prevented the peripheral Mizrahim from chal- militarism and secularism. By emphasizing religion, 1230 1171 lenging the very system which created their structural traditional values and ethnic (Mizrahi) memory and 1231 1172 marginalization, as long as these challenges were solidarity, Shas was also able to present a powerful 1232 1173 made at the national scale. counter-narrative to the Russians in the towns, and 1233 1174 Second, on a local-urban scale, as demonstrated in effectively link local Mizrahi politics with a national 1234 1175 the local electoral campaigns, the towns’ Mizrahim agenda of ‘integration through difference’ (see: 1235 1176 spoke in a different voice, aiming ‘inwards’ and Peled, 2001). 1236 1177 stressing the need to control ‘our’ space, while The local conflicts documented above illustrate the 1237 1178 (indirectly) questioning some of the major tenets of power of place and identity in mobilizing ethnic com- 1238 1179 Zionist ideology, such as the unconditional encour- munities, often in contradiction to broader national 1239 1180 agement of Jewish immigration to Israel, or the agendas. While this trend is still relatively minor, it 1240 1181 unquestioned homogeneity and solidarity among all should not be regarded as trivial, because, as noted at 1241 1182 5 Jews. Here we can note the relevance of theories of the outset, it is rooted in resistance to the hegemony 1242 6 1183 resource competition and politics of identity to of Ashkenazi forces, whose economic and cultural 1243 1184 explain ethnic mobilization in the towns. On that dominance has not waned. Peripheral Mizrahim in 1244 1185 scale, mobilization at times became more militant and general, the new identification with the Sepharadi- 1245 1186 less in line with the accepted norms of Ashkenazi- religious Shas movement and the increasing use of 1246 1187 Zionist hegemony. We suggest here that this intensi- the religious card against the Russian in particular, 1247 1188 fication is related to the local-urban scale, which is are illustrations that ‘cracks’ have opened in the 1248 1189 both closer to peoples lives and immediate needs, but dominance of the secular Ashkenazi ethnocracy, at 1249 1190 also to the question of collective identity as articu- least among its Jewish peripheries. At present, it 1250 1191 lated by the control over ‘our’ space. appears as if these ‘cracks’ are opening up mainly at 1251 1192 Drawing on our findings, we may describe periph- the local scale. However, if the economic and cultural 1252 1193 eral Mizrahi identity, like most collective identities, marginalization of peripheral Mizrahim continues, as 1253 1194 as composed of various ‘layers’ (Yuval-Davis, 2000), likely under Israel’s intensifying neo-liberal regime, 1254 1195 which can be conceptualized as geographic scales. the cracks have the potential to spread ‘upward’ 1255 1196 Our study therefore offers a new link to be further towards the national scale. 1256 1197 explored by geographic and social research, between 1198 spatial scale and collective identities. It may be fruit- 1199 ful to examine, theoretically and comparatively, how Uncited references 1257 1200 the articulation of political projects in terms of spatial Yiftachel, 1992 1258 1201 scales affects the construction of identities and the 1202 strategies used to voice a claim and mobilize the col- 1203 lective. 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