This article was downloaded by: [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] On: 22 July 2013, At: 09:12 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Strategic Analysis Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20 China's ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications a Gurpreet S. Khurana a IDSA, Published online: 27 Feb 2008. To cite this article: Gurpreet S. Khurana (2008) China's ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications, Strategic Analysis, 32:1, 1-39, DOI: 10.1080/09700160801886314 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160801886314 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions  Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2008 China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications Gurpreet S. Khurana Abstract China’s efforts to build ‘nodes’ of influence in the Indian Ocean Region Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing’s military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis. An assessment is nonetheless crucial because notwithstanding China’s legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean, its naval presence in these waters would bear strongly upon the security calculi of India in particular and those of other major powers. From the study of available information, this paper attempts to de- rive China’s objectives in the Indian Ocean, its approach and the attendant security ramifications for India. Introduction China’s interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) can be traced back to the early 1960s, when it began to actively express its solidarity with some of the Afro-Asian states with financial aid and military supplies.1 This ideological cause was, in principle, a ‘wrapping’ for an engagement strategy with a region seen to be of geo-strategic and political importance. However, due to its internal turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution, China could not take any further initiatives to build up its relations with IOR states.2 In more recent years, Beijing has begun to view the IOR with renewed interest primarily due to its economic stakes in the region. Some 30 per cent of China’s sea trade worth more than US$300 billion presently moves across Indian Ocean.3 Chinese analysts see the security of its shipping, particularly ISSN 0970-0161 print / ISSN 1754-0054 online DOI: 10.1080/09700160801886314
C 2008 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses  2 Strategic Analysis of its energy imports, as important. Some 77 per cent of its oil imports are sourced from West Asia and Africa and these are transported through the Indian Ocean.4 Besides, some IOR countries are rich in minerals, such as copper, aluminium and uranium, and other raw materials. China is also aware of the fact that in the coming decades, it will have to vie for markets in the region. It is, therefore, no surprise that Chinese strategists have begun to view the Persian Gulf as the westward extent of their (grand-) ‘strategic frontiers’.5 Reports since the early 1990s also indicate China’s military-strategic Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 intent in the Indian Ocean. Mainly engendered by China’s assistance to Myanmar in terms of arms sales and to build military infrastructure all along its coast, these reports were corroborated by other events. For exam- ple, a July 1992 report of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) General Logistics Department (GLD) called for stepped-up naval visits to the In- dian Ocean.6 Another was a top-secret memorandum issued in early 1993 by Zhao Nanqi, GLD Director of PLA Navy, which provided detailed strate- gic plans to consolidate control over the Indian Ocean (and South China Sea) under a new PLA doctrine of ‘high-sea defense’.7 The August 1993 incident, when a Chinese freighter, Yin He, was in- tercepted by the US Navy in the international waters of the Persian Gulf under a false claim that it was transporting chemical weapons to Iran, ap- pears to have had some influence in shaping its naval intentions.8 Chinese leaders were ‘extremely furious, but had no recourse’ to prevent such an occurrence in waters so distant.9 This incident is said to have been the catalyst in Beijing’s decision to build long-range naval capabilities to safe- guard its expanding vital interests. The lesson of the Falklands War (1982) was also well etched in their minds—it was only due to Royal Navy’s long-legged assets that Britain could retake the far-flung islands within 45 days of commencing military operations.10 However, it was unrealistic for Beijing to emulate Britain’s Royal Navy, and so, stealthy assets capable of stand-alone extended range missions were considered more suited in the Chinese context. The building of new-generation nuclear submarines (SSN) like Type 093 has, thereafter, been accorded high priority.11 In any case, underwater warfare assets undeniably form the mainstay of China’s sea denial and deterrent strategy against US naval forces in the western Pacific, as evident from inter alia the high induction rate of advanced sub- marines since the mid-1990s (Song, Yuan and Kilo-class diesel boats, besides the Type 093 SSN)12 and the intense efforts towards development of Type  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 3 094/096 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN). It is also pertinent to take note of the large number of submarine support vessels in Chinese inventory (11, as opposed to only one in case of India).13 You Ji, a Chinese origin expert on the PLA Navy, says, ‘China’s cur- rent strategy (in the Indian Ocean) is . . . to make its presence felt through building a credible naval strength. Submarines, at present, give China a short-run relief’.14 This statement is reinforced by an earlier analysis, which deduces that China will have at least the ‘capability’ (even if not the ‘intent’) of deploying its naval forces in the Indian Ocean earlier than 2020–2025, Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 beginning with its undersea assets.15 However, this analysis has only ac- counted for the Chinese submarine forces’ numerical availability, ‘reach’ and command-and-control, and not for their ‘sustainability’. Sustaining the forces for sufficiently long periods will be the foremost operational imperative for the Chinese navy to maintain a permanent presence in the area. To en- able this, Beijing’s efforts have been directed at assisting some IOR littorals located strategically along arterial sea-lines to build ports and shipping infrastructure. As per these writings, China intends to use the ports as replenishment facilities (and perhaps even as bases later) for its forces op- erating in the Indian Ocean. Since 2005, this has been referred to by some analysts as China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy (Figure 1).16 China’s use of naval power to preserve its vital interests in the Indian Ocean is already being perceived by other powers as causing a security imbalance in the region. It is thus being factored in a major way in the strategic calculi of India, the United States and others. The Indo-US Defence Joint Working Group, meeting at New Delhi in April 2007, for example, is reported to have discussed ‘(China’s) growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean (and its) rapidly increasing military and maritime links with countries . . . such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. . . ’.17 However, China and the IOR countries involved maintain that the transport infrastructure being built is purely for commercial use. There is no decisive evidence at this point to assert otherwise because these facilities are in nascent stage’s of development. Besides, it could be ar- gued that the statements by Chinese officials advocating naval presence in the Indian Ocean cited above could be motivated by vested interests in order to garner a greater allocation of funds for naval growth. There is a normative acceptance worldwide of warship port calls being a part of naval diplomacy, which aims to further the state’s foreign policy. It is,  4 Strategic Analysis Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 therefore, unclear whether China’s strengthening ties with regional littorals are merely politico-diplomatic and economic endeavours, or are driven by military-strategic imperatives. Answers are particularly elusive because the Chinese state apparatus has always been marked by ‘opaqueness’. It is, therefore, essential to analyse the so-called ‘String of Pearls’, while broadening the definition of ‘pearls’ (beyond potential military facilities) to encompass all other infrastructure that serve China’s military-strategic ends. The aim is to reveal whether Beijing has military-strategic motiva- tions in the Indian Ocean, and if it does have such intent, what approach is it likely to adopt in terms of using these ‘pearls’? Addressing the timeframe of circa 2020–2025, this paper also aims to deduce the security ramifications for India and recommend a response. By that time, India and other major pow- ers like the United States would surely have instituted a military-strategic response to China’s actions. However, this paper deliberately omits these imponderables for a more focused study.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 5 China and IOR: Politico-Strategic Relations At the outset, it is necessary to examine the broad contours of China’s political interactions with IOR littorals since the 1960s. Besides serving as a backdrop, it will provide an insight into Beijing’s grand-strategic approach to build ‘nodes’ of influence in the region. Relations with India India–China relationship is still marked by an adversarial character, Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 with the key contention being the border dispute. Tibet continues to be an- other thorny issue. The strategic utility to China of a strong Pakistan hostile to India leads to the third irritant, viz., Chinese support to Pakistan aimed against India. Such antagonistic relations have historical underpinnings, rather than being a product of recent circumstances. China’s antipathy to- wards the erstwhile colonial powers for its ‘century of humiliation’ (bainian guochi)18 is also directed against India, which China believes has inherited British imperialism. From the Chinese viewpoint, India considers itself to be a ‘natural successor of the great British empire’ and wants to include within its sphere of influence the Indian Ocean, the erstwhile ‘British lake’.19 The assertion of many senior Chinese leaders (including Chinese Defence Min- ister Chi Haotian in 1994) that the ‘Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean’20 could be seen in this context. Beijing also perceives the McMahon Line as a legacy of British colonialism and, therefore, rejects it as Sino-Indian land boundary. Among various elements of India–China discord, the territorial dispute has the greatest potential of escalating into use of military force or the threat of its use. One expert has aptly opined, ‘China wishes to put . . . (this issue) on the backburner for the time being, while it consolidates its economic and military power, and resolves other disputes in the western Pacific. It would then turn to settle the boundary issue at a time of its own choosing, either through coercive diplomacy or even by seeking a military solution’.21 It is, therefore, not surprising that the ‘China factor’ was among the principal drivers of India’s decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent.22 Relations with Other IOR States In contrast to its relationship with India, China has developed close multifaceted bonds with other IOR littorals, some facets of which may be closely linked to its military-strategic calculus, either directly or indirectly.  6 Strategic Analysis Bilateral high-level military visits between China and the IOR littorals have become frequent (see Appendix A). There have been visits between China and India as well, but considering the political weight that New Delhi wields in regional security affairs, these have been few. Since 1985, the PLA Navy’s visits to the Indian Ocean have also in- creased in one form or another (see Appendix B). While the warship port calls are essentially meant to strengthen politico-diplomatic ties, other forms of naval presence may have their own primary objectives; all these visits are invaluable for the Chinese navy to familiarise itself with the area Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 of its future operations. In November 2003, China and Pakistan conducted a joint naval exercise off Shanghai. It was China’s first ever joint exercise with any country.23 The PLA Navy’s first ever joint exercise outside Chinese waters also involved the Pakistan Navy—off Karachi in November 2005.24 While these were soon followed by naval exercises with India, equating the two cases may be mis- leading. The exercises with India were pitched ‘at a very basic level’, and primarily aimed at ‘confidence-building’.25 In contrast, Sino-Pakistan exer- cises involved ‘advanced maneuvers’, cross-deck helicopter landings and even an exchange of officers to witness each other’s operational practices.26 Since as early as the 1960s, Chinese-made arms have been finding their way to Africa and Pakistan. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have been recipients since the early 1970s. A list of major military platforms held in inventory of the Indian Ocean littorals is placed at Appendix C. Besides being a means to generate revenue, defence exports are considered by Beijing as invalu- able for building political ties and bringing about dependence. Besides, many of the financial dividends go to nourish the Chinese defence indus- try, with some amount going to the PLA as well if the arms are sourced from its inventory.27 China has been quick to seize the opportunity whenever it arose, such as when Western arms supplies to major importers in West Asia dried up at the end of the 1970s. By the 1980s, nearly 90 per cent of China’s total arms exports were booked for this region. During the decade follow- ing Indian military ‘withdrawal’ from Sri Lanka in 1990, Beijing supplied Colombo as many as 10 naval ships. In December 2002, Beijing entered into a milestone agreement to meet Dhaka’s defence requirements—the first signed by Bangladesh with any country.28 The Chinese have rarely been mindful of any ideological or ethical considerations while supplying arms. During the 1983–1986 period of Iran–Iraq war, 92 per cent of all Chinese  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 7 exports bound for West Asia went to the two warring nations.29 It later sold US$1 billion worth of weapons to both Ethiopia and its adversary Eritrea during their border conflict from 1998 to 2000.30 Myanmar has been heav- ily dependent on China for its military supplies since 1988, since it was castigated by other exporting nations due to its human rights record.31 Media reports and analyses following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 indicated that China was conspicuous by its absence in the quadrilateral (India, United States, Japan and Australia) naval disaster- relief operations. It was less noticed, however, that China provided re- Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 lief supplies to the affected littorals worth US$60.46 million. Furthermore, Beijing made sure that its aid was the largest of all donors and even publicly announced later that it had set a ‘record’.32 China has also stepped up its strategic engagement with Southeast Asia, particularly with Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2005, it signed a memoran- dum of understanding on defence cooperation with both.33 The reason is evident—-these countries are littoral to the strategic Malacca Straits.34 Due to severe capacity constraints, these straits-littorals have been urging the countries that use the waterway to contribute towards its security and nav- igational safety. This has led to three meetings since September 2005 (under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation) to solicit their fi- nancial contribution towards funding of relevant projects. Besides Japan, which has been providing financial assistance for a long time, China has been the only ‘user-state’ so far to have pledged funds for these projects.35 As examined later, this move was largely driven by Beijing’s strategic ob- jectives and has strengthened its influence in this important part of South- east Asia, at the expense of the other major powers such as the United States. China is also reported to be making intense efforts for conducting its first multilateral naval exercise with the ASEAN states in mid-2008 (India has not yet conducted such a structured multinational exercise with these countries).36 China’s strengthening political ties with African countries have be- come particularly evident after the November 2006 China–Africa summit in Beijing. The military/strategic component of the relationships is not concealed either.37 In January 2006, the state-run China Radio International installed an FM radio transmitter in Kenya and has plans to do the same in Tanzania.38 China currently maintains bilateral diplomatic military rela- tions with at least 25 African countries (in contrast to four Indian officers  8 Strategic Analysis covering nine countries). In Beijing, 18 African countries maintain perma- nent defence attach´e offices (as compared to only seven in New Delhi). From Appendix A, particularly noticeable is the higher frequency of mil- itary high-level visits involving countries of eastern Africa littoral to the IOR, as compared to West African states. Between 2001 and 2006, China conducted 110 bilateral security-related meetings and consultations with Africa, with the number of talks increasing from 33 in 2003–2004 to 46 in 2005–2006. Beijing has deployed the largest number of its personnel in three of the six ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa: Liberia (1055), Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 Sudan (469), and Congo (230). A notable fact is that the other three missions (Morocco, Cote d’Ivoire and Ethiopia/Eritrea) are also not devoid of Chinese presence. African countries like Sudan also have PLA personnel, other than under UN umbrella, tasked to provide technological support and training to the armed forces and for low-intensity operations.39 In February 2007, China’s President Hu Jintao visited the Seychelles on return leg of his six-nation African tour. Unlike his quest for building economic relations (raw materials, energy and markets) and for political mobilisation (such as gaining legitimacy for its sovereignty claims over Taiwan) in other countries, China’s interest in the Seychelles was intriguing. The country has a land area of only 451 sq km, a population of barely 80,000, and carries little ‘weight’ in international or regional affairs. The Chinese president’s visit can thus be attributed only to Beijing’s strategic incentives in the centrally located island state of Indian Ocean. He reportedly allocated US$6.4 in million to the Seychelles for an undisclosed ‘mutually agreed future projects’.40 It is pertinent to recall that in February 2005, India gifted its newest fast attack craft (INS Tarmugli), commissioned barely 3 years ago, to the Seychelles coast guard, as a means to pre-empt China, which was about to make a similar gift to the country.41 Chinese ‘Presence’ in Indian Ocean Offshore Energy Investments China’s state-owned companies have made (or planned) substantial investments for offshore oil and gas exploration in many IOR coun- tries like Kenya, Sudan (Block 13, Red Sea), Iran (South Pars and North Pars), Bangladesh (Barakpuria), Myanmar (off Rakhine coast and in Gulf of Martaban) and Sri Lanka (Puttalam-to-Hambantota coastal belt, Gulf of Mannar and Palk Strait). While this is driven by China’s growing  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 9 energy needs and its ‘mercantilist’ approach to hydrocarbon resources, the security demands for these investments will reinforce Beijing’s ratio- nale for naval presence in Indian Ocean and even the legitimacy of such presence. Energy ‘Shunt’ Routes There has been a realisation in Beijing that China’s strategic objectives in the western Pacific are imperilled by its vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 The clearest articulation of this link was commented on by PLA General Qian Guoliang in his article published in 2000. Referring to the ‘crucial Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP) decision of 1999 on accelerating preparation for war’, he wrote, ‘the threat perception is centered on the danger of “one point” and “one lane”’. Here, the ‘point’ means ‘Taiwan’s slide towards de jure independence’, and the ‘lane’ refers to ‘the long voyage of China’s oil tankers coming home from the Middle East and elsewhere (through the Indian Ocean)’.42 In November 2003, President Hu Jintao declared that ‘some big powers have tried to control and meddle in the Strait of Malacca shipping lanes’ and called for adoption of a ‘new strategy’ and ‘active mea- sures to ensure (China’s) energy security’. This was widely reported by the Chinese press as Beijing’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’.43 Although Beijing does factor non-conventional threats to shipping like piracy and terrorism, it perceives a greater threat from ‘control’ of sea-lines and maritime choke points by inimical naval powers. China has, therefore, invested substantial efforts in the past decade to bypass ‘insecure’ waters for its strategic energy imports. The salient features of these are given below. r Pakistan: China and Pakistan are exploring the possibility of building an oil pipeline from Gwadar to Kashi (China’s Xinjiang province).44 Although its capacity is not yet known, the pipeline will help Chinese oil tankers to bypass the Indian Ocean com- pletely and lead to considerable cost savings by reducing sea transportation distance by more than 4,000 nautical miles. How- ever, the economical viability of the proposal is doubtful since the pipeline will need to traverse high-altitude areas of more than 15,000 feet. While laying pipelines over rugged terrain per se will involve technical complexities, oil transfer will necessitate mea- sures to prevent the oil freezing in winter. Though there is insuf- ficient information available yet for an analysis, the added cost  10 Strategic Analysis involved may exceed that of the additional distance (4,000 nauti- cal miles) for sea transportation. r Myanmar/Bangladesh: In April 2006, Myanmar approved the pro- posal to build a 1200-km oil pipeline from Sittwe/Kyaukphu to Kunming/Rili in China’s Yunan province. The estimated cost is put at US$2 billion, which will be primarily funded by China. The construction is likely to begin at the end of 2007.45 It will reduce the sea-route distance by 1,820 nautical miles and account for 10 per cent of China’s oil flow through the Malacca Strait. In mid- Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 2007, China also finalised a gas deal with Myanmar. This has led to another plan for China to spend US$1.04 billion to build a gas pipeline, which may be laid together with the oil pipeline.46 In mid-2007, Bangladesh also proposed an oil pipeline for carrying Chinese crude from Chittagong to Yunnan through Myanmar47 but this may not be necessary if the former materialises. r Thailand/Malaysia: China had earlier proposed to Thailand a canal across Kra Isthmus but the plan was stalled.48 In 2003, Thai- land proposed an oil pipeline across Kra (from north of Phuket to Songkhla). China remained enthusiastic, but this plan did not fructify either since foreign investors, including those from China, were put off by escalating violence in Thailand’s south- ern provinces. China then mobilised its diplomatic efforts in early 2005 to build a pipeline across the Malay Peninsula (northern Malaysia) from Yan (Andaman Sea) to Bachok (South China Sea). The plan was to make the Chinese tankers offload crude oil at Yan, and from Bachok another set of tankers would take refined products to China. Including oil storage and refineries, it is a US$7 billion plan, which will probably be primarily funded by Iran, but some investments may also come from other states like China, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In May 2007, the project’s ap- proval by the Malaysian Cabinet was followed by the signing of agreements among the construction companies in the presence of the Malaysian prime minister and the Indonesian president.49 The construction is slated to begin in 2008 and complete in 2016. However, some apprehensions have been raised in relation to the cost-effectiveness of the project, particularly due to the slowing of oil demand in eastern Asia (except China).50 Moreover, some ana- lysts have suggested that the plan does not make economic sense,  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 11 as the cost of offloading and then picking up the oil at the other end of pipeline will be greater than the journey through the Malacca Straits. This was another reason why the Thai Kra-proposed pipeline never materialised. It remains to be seen whether China will offset these disadvantages through government funding of the projects. If it does, the pipeline will enable passage of 20 per cent of China’s oil currently transiting the Malacca Straits. Potential Military Facilities Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 It is evident that the aforesaid energy ‘land bridges’ are inadequate to mitigate China’s strategic vulnerability, more so because most of the proposed pipelines are aimed at bypassing the Malacca Straits and not the Indian Ocean. China must, therefore, have a ‘Plan B’ (alternate plan), in terms of its ‘physical’ presence. The question is whether the maritime transport infrastructure being built with overwhelming Chinese assistance in strategic locations of the IOR forms a part of this plan. The following examines these locations. It is important to bear in mind that since China’s plan is in the formative stage, these only serve to exemplify its efforts in that direction and may not be exhaustive. Pakistan A deep-water port is being developed at Gwadar (Baluchistan province) with 12 multi-purpose berths and associated facilities. With China provid- ing most of the US$1.16 billion for the entire project, the state-owned China Harbor Engineering Company is involved in the construction, which be- gan in March 2002. While phase I was completed in 3 years,51 phase II was unveiled in April 2007. The whole project may be completed by 2010. It is also planned to build a road-and-rail link from Gwadar to Kashi (China’s Xinjiang province). The first stage of road link from Gwadar to Pakistan’s north–south Indus highway is under construction. Islamabad expects substantial economic advantages from Gwadar’s key geographical location. As a transshipment port for natural resources of the land-locked Central Asia, it can bring large revenues into Pakistan and catalyse economic activity in its underdeveloped hinterland. China ostensibly has two main interests in the project. Firstly, it will increase western China’s economic connectivity by providing a shorter  12 Strategic Analysis access route to the sea (Kashi lies 4,000 km from China’s east coast but only 2,000 km from Gwadar). This will be particularly advantageous for China’s westbound trade and facilitate development of its western regions. Secondly, the proposed Gwadar–Xinjiang pipeline, as mentioned in the previous subsection, is an essential component of its energy security. However, there are major impediments. Transportation through the proposed road—rail link will encounter difficulties in winters due to blockage by snow. Employment of snow-clearing equipment will raise transportation costs. (The problems associated with oil transfer through Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 pipelines have been mentioned earlier.) Besides, these routes will traverse insurgency-affected areas of Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s vision of an economic hub is also unlikely to fructify in the foreseeable future due to turmoil in the area surrounding Gwadar–Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Baluchistan itself. These realities thus indicate that military-strategic motivations overwhelm other considerations. Reportedly, China was initially reluctant to finance Gwadar project be- cause Pakistan had offered the United States access to its airbases during Operation Enduring Freedom and allowed it to establish listening posts in Pakistan’s Northern Areas bordering Xinjiang and Tibet. China finally ac- quiesced when Pakistan agreed to ‘sovereign guarantees’ for Beijing’s use of port facilities.52 While this does not explicitly denote a basing right for the Chinese navy, it is certainly a pointer to Beijing’s military-strategic intent. Its naval units operating from Gwadar, located virtually at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, will enable monitoring of all shipping activity and military movements of US-led coalition forces in the area. China’s use of Gwadar is unlikely to be seen favourably by the United States and could lead to strong US pressure on Pakistan against it. However, considering the in- creasing ‘tilt’ of Islamabad towards Beijing, it may not relent. Musharraf’s statement is pertinent in this regard. He is reported to have stated, ‘China has been our most consistent ally over the past 30 years . . . Washington’s interest (in Pakistan) is likely to diminish’.53 Some unconfirmed reports indicate that Gwadar already has a sig- nal intelligence (SIGINT) facility, and Chinese engineers are assisting Pakistan to construct a naval base in the vicinity that is to be completed by 2010.54 Notwithstanding the authenticity of these reports, Gwadar’s military-strategic necessity for Pakistan is undeniable. As an alternate port to Karachi and located the farthest from Indian naval bases and airfields, Gwadar would make it difficult for the Indian Navy to impose a blockade  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 13 (as it did in the 1971 Indo-Pak war). It can, therefore, be assumed that Pakistan will build naval facilities at Gwadar (repair yards, weapon and equipment stores, SIGINT stations, etc.) with or without Chinese help. There is a high probability of these facilities being made available for the use of Chinese naval forces, particularly if Sino-Pak bonds strengthen further in the coming years. Myanmar Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 A host of scholarly articles, books and news reports since 1992 have stated that China has a permanent military presence (or access agreements) in Myanmar’s various naval bases and airstrips at Kyaukpyu, Hianggyi, Great Coco, Mergui and Zadetkyi Island, all of which were constructed with Chinese financial and technical assistance. Some writings have also asserted that China has been operating radar stations and SIGINT posts at various locations along the Myanmar coast, including in Coco Island acquired on lease from Myanmar in 1994.55 Such literature derived strength from the regional security environment in those days and Beijing’s ‘aggressive’ atti- tude towards littorals of the South China Sea. During China’s strained rela- tions with India in the late-1990s, news reports reinforced this impression. A 1998 report, for example, indicated that India had ‘eyewitness’ evidence of Chinese naval officials working on at least nine naval bases in Myanmar.56 However, an incisive analysis57 corroborated by recent events58 indi- cates that these writings may not have been accurate; at least these do not reflect current realities. Except for ‘goodwill’ port calls, none of the Chi- nese naval vessels is known to have been deployed in Myanmar. Also, Chinese military personnel are unlikely to be stationed in Myanmar on a permanent basis. The 1998 reports on ‘sightings’ of Chinese personnel in Myanmar may have been true, but these men may have been present as instructors and technicians, rather than ‘manning’ the facilities. Nevertheless, it is well known that over the years China has been con- sistently assisting Myanmar to build new military facilities and upgrade existing ones. An example is the naval jetty project in Great Coco Island launched on November 4, 2002, which was completed a year later.59 It is very likely, therefore, for Chinese naval/military forces to obtain periodic access to these facilities. Besides, as noted earlier, the presence of China’s ‘commer- cial’ shipping at Sittwe/Kyaukphu will be established soon when its oil/gas pipelines to Yunan province are completed. These facilities also bear the  14 Strategic Analysis potential of being used by Chinese naval vessels. (India’s offer to develop the Myanmarese ports of Dawei60 and Sittwe61 could be seen as a response.) The Yunan–Yangon Irrawady road–rail–river corridor is already op- erational. Its cargo-carrying capacity is being enhanced through building more road and rail links and dredging the Irrawaddy river from Bhamo to Yangon and Thilwa ports (Andaman Sea). The work is being done, mostly by Chinese engineers and workers, using Chinese dredgers.62 While the intention is stated to be to improve trade connectivity for China’s Yunan province, its potential as a logistics supply route to Chinese naval forces in Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 the Indian Ocean cannot be ignored. Bangladesh According to a Booz–Allen–Hamilton report, ‘Energy Futures in Asia’ prepared for the US Defense Secretary in early 2005, China had been building a container port facility at Chittagong port in Bangladesh and ‘seeking much more extensive naval and commercial access’.63 India asked Bangladesh in mid-2005 for access to Chittagong for transporting goods to its north-east, without much success so far.64 A mid-2006 report indi- cated that Bangladesh has been negotiating with China and South Korea to develop its Chittagong military and civilian facilities, respectively.65 (This adds to an earlier report of 2005 that Bangladesh intends to build a second naval base at Chittagong, to supplement the existing BNS Isa Khan naval base.)66 However, China may not prefer it as a replenishment site due to the long and arduous passage through the riverine channel, with an atten- dant strategic vulnerability. The naval base in Chittagong would, however, provide a useful alternative to Myanmar’s facilities to China. Sri Lanka As per an agreement signed in March 2007, China is to provide financial aid and technical support to develop Hambantota port located at the south- ern tip of Sri Lanka, only six nautical miles from the arterial shipping route of the Indian Ocean. The complete project involves building a harbour, two cargo terminals (one for containers and another for oil and gas), a repair yard and an oil tank farm/bunkering system to supply fuel to ships. The cost for first phase is about US$420 million, and of this US$375 million is being provided by the Chinese government (the proportions of  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 15 ‘grant’ and ‘loan’ are yet unclear). With the work having begun in June 2007 by state-owned China Harbour Engineering Company and Sino Hydro Corporation, the entire project is to be completed in 15 years.67 India is already refurbishing the World War II-vintage oil-tank farm at Trincomalee with 99 tanks. As per reports, only 35 of these can be put to use in the near future since ‘there isn’t enough business in Sri Lanka to make expansion worthwhile’.68 It is, therefore, unlikely that similar facilities in Hambantota would make economic sense. Besides, it is important to note that unlike Gwadar and ports in Myanmar, where China is building oil Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 pipelines, Hambantota is of little value to China for its energy security, except if it maintains a ‘physical’ naval presence in the area. Maldives News reports from 1999 stated that the Maldives had leased Marao Island (40 km south of Male) to China for maritime traffic management, which was being used by China to monitor Indian and US warships in the area.69 More writings on Marao appeared during the 2001, visit of Chinese premier Zhu Rongji to Male, stating China’s efforts to acquire the coral island on lease to build a submarine base, with Pakistan playing the role of a facilitator. These reports even projected its fructification by 2010, with the Chinese using it for 25 years, while paying back the Maldives in foreign cur- rency and creating jobs for the locals. The deal reportedly ran into trouble in 2002.70 Reports of China–Maldives cooperation, however, resurfaced in March 2004 with a PLA Navy team’s secret visit to the Maldives. Its stated aim was to assist Male in dealing with the threat of sea-level rise, but re- ports indicate that the Chinese team carried out an extensive hydrographic survey (mapping of underwater terrain) 180 km around Male and also en- quired about setting up permanent survey infrastructure.71 India’s offer to carry out hydrographic surveys for the Maldives in 200672 was probably a response to this. There is no Chinese military presence in the Maldives, and not much is known about an island called Marao (unless if it is better known by a local name). But the large number of reports, corroborated by China’s ef- forts to acquire underwater topography mapping technology for submarine operations,73 indicates its attempts to obtain a military-strategic ‘foot-hold’ in the island state that have so far not succeeded. Given the strong polit- ical ties between India and the Maldives, it is unlikely that China would  16 Strategic Analysis succeed in achieving its ends. Nonetheless, these events certainly provide a good indicator of China’s intent. China’s Likely Military-Strategic Objectives and Approach From the foregoing, China’s likely grand-strategic motivations for its naval presence in the Indian Ocean may be surmised as follows: Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 r to deter a state to interdict its shipping/strategic imports,74 r to protect energy investments, primarily against non-state threats, r to displace influence of major economic competitors75 in the IOR, r to achieve geo-strategic ‘leverage’ against adversaries,76 r to achieve military objectives against adversaries77 during war and, r to reinforce nuclear deterrence/strike capability against India. To achieve these objectives, Chinese warships may increase the fre- quency of ‘goodwill’ visits to IOR ports during peacetime. The availability of repair and replenishment facilities in these ports will be ensured for such port calls. The intended purpose of these visits may not only be naval diplomacy and to gain familiarity with the area, but also to showcase the Chinese defence industry. Its arms exports will accrue dividends beyond merely political and economic; it could facilitate Chinese naval operations. With local navies also operating Chinese-made platforms, it would ease China’s logistics in terms of technical support and spare parts to an ex- tent. Besides, China may even obtain access to equipment-specific tactical doctrines developed for use against the Indian forces. Chinese-flagged merchant vessels (cargo ships, tankers and liquified natural gas carriers) may also be employed increasingly to ply these wa- ters, most of which are likely to be state-owned. When assigned military- strategic missions, these could be valuable for carrying spare parts and technical personnel for Chinese naval units. These could supplement in- telligence gathering and be used innovatively for other tasks, like towing ‘noise-makers’ to conceal transit of submarines through choke points or mapping the seabed using side-scan sonars.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 17 Intelligence collection may be supplemented by facilities in the IOR littoral. A covert understanding to permit a few key Chinese military in- telligence personnel (posing as civilians) in the SIGINT and radar posts of the littorals is highly possible. Specifically in case of Myanmar, Chinese military technicians and instructors attending to technical breakdowns and overseeing the upgrading of Chinese-built equipment could be tasked to obtain regular intelligence inputs. As more Chinese SSNs are inducted within a decade, these may be de- ployed in deeper waters of the Indian Ocean, particularly for intelligence Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 gathering and familiarisation. However, to preserve stealth, the boats are unlikely to use (the presently uncovered) IOR docking facilities in which they will be vulnerable to aerial/satellite detection. Given their virtually un- limited endurance, China will prefer to operate these boats from its closest homeport; most probably the new underground submarine base at Hainan, which became operational in 2006. IOR ports will, however, be necessary for SSNs in case of machinery/equipment breakdowns and other emergencies. A similar approach may be adopted for deployment of SSBNs.78 The diesel submarines may be deployed (earlier than SSBNs) in shallower waters, as in the Andaman Sea. While the IOR facilities would be necessary here (due to their limited endurance), these boats may not dock in the IOR ports as well. Instead, China could position submarine-support vessels (mother-ships) at these ports, which would replenish these submarines at sea. The key question is whether the IOR facilities could be made avail- able to Chinese submarines during war. In case of India–China hostilities, ‘neutrality’ of all IOR states cannot be taken for granted. The possibility of Pakistan seizing the opportunity to advance its strategic goals cannot be discounted, which will significantly complicate India’s security calcu- lus. Even if India’s politico-diplomatic manoeuvres make it confident of their neutrality, China’s naval operations may not be seriously impeded. Although international law (Law of Neutrality) states that ‘belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries’,79 it also stipulates that neutral nations are not obliged to close their ports and roadsteads to belligerents (provided this is done on a non-discriminatory basis).80 This provision can be exploited by China to maintain its submarine-support vessels in IOR ports. Alter- natively, it could even use merchant tankers converted for a submarine support role. Even if these vessels are expelled, the law provides for a 24-hour grace period from outbreak of hostilities that must be provided  18 Strategic Analysis to belligerent vessels to leave the neutral port.81 This period could be used to ‘top-up’ the large-capacity support-ships with fuel and rations for sus- taining submarines at sea for a sufficiently long duration. Besides, with the law providing for the right of war vessels to undertake repairs in neutral ports,82 the SSN/SSBNs would not be affected at all. Security Implications for India As evident from the previous section, Beijing’s military-strategic moves Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 in the Indian Ocean will affect Indian security more seriously than that of the other major powers. Broadly, China’s naval presence in these waters will lead to overlapping spheres of influence with India. As indicated by the October 2006 stand-off between a Chinese Song-class submarine and the USS Kitty Hawk, international waters bear immense potential for mil- itary stand-off between major naval powers competing to maintain their respective strategic spaces. The Laws of Sea codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)83 are ambiguous on the conduct of military activities in foreign maritime zones.84 This ambiguity has manifested often in the west- ern Pacific, leading to incidents such as the mid-air collision of the US EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese J-8 fighter in 2001. There have also been occasions when China has conducted military activities and surveys in the waters of its maritime neighbours without prior notification. In November 2004, a Chinese Han-class SSN intruded well into Japan’s territorial waters.85 If Chinese vessels conduct intelligence-gathering activities or exercises in- volving live firing of weapons in Indian maritime zones, it is bound to have grave security ramifications for India. In the case of hostilities in the western Pacific, if India lends a military support to China’s adversaries (or if Beijing doubts New Delhi’s ‘neutrality’), the PLA Navy submarines may be deployed off Indian ports to deter a possible interdiction of China’s strategic imports—what the Chinese call ‘punishment strategy’.86 Even if its position is clearly ‘neutral’ and its vessels are not specifically targeted, any interdiction of Chinese strategic supplies will also adversely affect India. Indian shipping transiting through choke points like the straits of Hormuz and Malacca would be under grave risk of inadvertent attacks due to the difficulty in identifying neutral shipping in the dense shipping traffic in these waters. This is among the key lessons learnt from the 1980– 1988 ‘Tanker War’ in the Persian Gulf.87 In case of a Sino-Indian conflict,  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 19 China will certainly interdict Indian strategic supplies. It would be easier for China to interdict India-specific sea-lines close to Indian ports than it would be for India to attack Chinese shipping using the international shipping routes of the Indian Ocean. The reason is the same as the aforesaid ‘warship Captain’s dilemma’: sifting neutral shipping from the enemy vessel. Con- sidering its strategic location, Gwadar will be particularly helpful for Chi- nese submarines to interdict India-bound tankers. Besides, India’s vital in- stallations like oil and gas rigs, ports and nuclear plants will also be at grave risk of submarine-launched land-attack missiles and long-range torpedoes. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 Once China is able to deploy its Type-094 SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, it will severely complicate India’s security calculus by presenting an all- round and indeterminate nuclear threat. While its 8,000-km-range JL-2 SLBM may not be able to target the continental United States from the Indian Ocean (unless the planned 14,000-km-range JL-2B SLBM fructifies), a US analyst states that ‘whether or not China would actually launch JL-2 SLBMs from the Indian Ocean, its SSBNs might operate there, and else- where, simply to complicate US ballistic-missile defence and tie up more anti-submarine assets . . . (and also) China may choose to demonstrate its nuclear deterrent to India’.88 It will be even more serious if Beijing decides to opt for a first strike (notwithstanding its current ‘no-first use’ policy), because then conventional land attack cruise missile (LACM) strikes by Chi- nese SSNs could neutralise India’s nuclear command-and-control nodes to disable its second-strike capability. China’s energy exploration in waters off Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, virtually adjoining the Indian territorial seas, also constitutes a latent threat. The Chinese presence off northern Sri Lanka is of particular concern to New Delhi considering the currently complex security scenario in these waters, caused by the presence of Sea Tigers, the naval wing of Sri Lanka’s Tamil separatists. To protect its energy investments off Myanmar coast, China is reported to have asked Pyinmana for greater ‘control’ over its ports spread along the entire Myanmar coast facing the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.89 This translates into a potential threat to India’s approaches to its Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The increased Chinese tanker traffic to ports in Myanmar will also increase the risk of oil spills off these Islands, which are ecologically sensitive. Many regional countries are seeking to augment their naval sea de- nial capabilities either through acquiring new submarines (Bangladesh and  20 Strategic Analysis Malaysia) or by upgrading the existing capabilities (Pakistan, Indonesia and even India). The keen interest of Thailand in submarines is also well known. The possibility of a sale/gift of Chinese diesel submarines to Bangladesh or that of a nuclear boat to Pakistan cannot, therefore, be discounted. This will severely complicate India’s security calculus. India’s response to the security challenges posed by China’s emerging naval presence in the Indian Ocean would need to be two-pronged and a judicious mix of ‘engagement’ and ‘strategic dissuasion’. Towards the former, New Delhi would need to appreciate Beijing’s legitimate concerns and explore means to address them Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 where possible. India has made such attempts in the past. In February 2005, for example, the Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyer proposed extending the Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline to China.90 Notwithstanding the fact that the virtually insurmountable hurdles to fructify it were well known, the proposal was received in China with immense interest.91 India’s efforts, however, need to be sustained. There may be many other avenues to mitigate China’s fears, such as through increasing mutual economic inter-dependence. Towards resolving China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’, both can contribute to augment the straits-littorals’ policing capacity. Furthermore, since India’s energy supplies have begun to be sourced from East Asia (Sakhalin), ‘swapping’ with China could be considered. While these will also serve as effective confidence-building measures, other steps will be necessary to bridge the wide trust deficit. These could comprise ‘observ- ing’ each other’s military exercises and reciprocal high-level military visits and warship port calls. An endeavour could even be made to incrementally build a security relationship. While this has already been initiated through joint naval exercises at the basic level, these could be raised to forge greater inter-operability between the forces. Joint operations for UN peace sup- port operations, combating low-intensity threats and benign missions like disaster relief may be other possible areas for security cooperation. Concurrently, however, New Delhi will also need to check the emerg- ing threats through developing geo-political leverages and deterrence at the strategic and operational levels. For this, India could use its favourable geographical location and naval power to advantage. The geo-political measures will need to focus on strengthening ties with IOR littorals in all dimensions—political, economic, military, even cultural, and so on. A greater emphasis will need to be laid on developing ties with countries in the northern Indian Ocean and the island states. Arms sales and vari- ous forms of assistance to littoral states for policing their maritime zones,  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 21 disaster relief, hydrography, diving and training will attenuate China’s rising influence in the region. Besides, this will also build their capacity in terms of ensuring their own security, making the regional environment more stable, with attendant longer-term dividends for India. A politico-diplomatic engagement of western Pacific littorals may also be an imperative for New Delhi as a means to deter China at the strategic level. While India has been building up its historic ties with Vietnam, it ought to reach out to other countries like Cambodia and the Philippines. It will also be necessary to forge cooperative security bonds with the ma- Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 jor powers with whom a strategic convergence and reciprocity is realised, which will dissuade any potentially inimical major power, and not neces- sarily China. Most importantly, India will need to mitigate its own vulnerabilities. It would need to fill the presently gaping voids in its military/maritime capabilities, such as in terms of maritime domain awareness (including its underwater component), anti-submarine warfare and nuclear submarines (including SSBNs). It will also have to ‘harden’ vital areas and vital points off its mainland and islands and build redundancy for the more critical ones. Considering the substantial ‘lead-time’ necessary to build these ca- pabilities, it is also imperative to invest financial and intellectual capital in research and development of emerging and futuristic defence technolo- gies, particularly in terms of space-based assets and underwater detec- tion/communications. Considering that the ‘lead-time’ factor also holds good for the Chinese, India’s close monitoring of ship-building and defence-related activities in China will provide the Indian security establishment with adequate warn- ing to (re)orient its strategy, force structure and capabilities. The access routes to the Indian Ocean and developments in China’s ‘pearls’ in these waters will also need to be kept under constant observation. Conclusion The policymakers in Beijing increasingly feel that as a major power, China would need to wield greater influence overseas to safeguard its spa- tially expanding geo-political and strategic interests. Considering that the IOR is inextricably linked to its military-strategic objectives in the west- ern Pacific, the region has become one of China’s major focal areas of interest. It has been making intense efforts to secure its strategic imports  22 Strategic Analysis passing through the Indian Ocean by building overland pipelines, but even if these do fructify, they will reduce China’s strategic vulnerability only marginally. China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean is, therefore, seen as being crucial for advancing its interests. Submarines are likely to be China’s instruments of choice in the medium-term timeframe since the in- trinsic attributes of underwater warfare make them ideal for use against advantaged adversaries. Once sufficient deployable submarines are avail- able, the only necessity will be the means to sustain these. China is likely to cater for this through its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 In the medium-term timeframe, China is unlikely to develop (or even try to develop) naval ‘bases’ in the region. However, China’s ‘informal’ agreement with the political leadership of IOR littorals for naval access to their ‘dual-use’ facilities cannot be ruled out. Referring to Gwadar port, Ashley Tellis says that ‘at the moment, these are (only) fears . . . but there is no logical reason why the Chinese would not contemplate the military benefits of such a facility in the long term’.92 This is applicable to all other structures in the IOR that Beijing has contributed to build. This is partic- ularly so in the case of Myanmar, where the military regime has endured since the late 1980s, primarily due to sustained Chinese support. China may, in fact, consider this as its legitimate right to use these facilities. It may be conceded that no single ‘pearl’ provides concrete evidence on its own as yet. However, taken together, they are strongly suggestive of China’s military- strategic intentions, which are also driven by Beijing’s persistent mistrust of New Delhi and US predominance in the seas. Furthermore, the ‘pearls’ vary in terms of their potential for China’s military use. Most IOR littorals may not be willing to oblige China since it involves antagonising India. But even if China succeeds in persuading one of these to relent to its military necessity, it will succeed in maintaining a reckonable naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with serious security implications for India. Contingent upon regional geo-strategic scenarios in the longer term, it is not inconceivable for some littorals to even permit China to build dedicated naval infrastructure, like depots for ammunition stores and equipment spares, for use of these facilities as forward operating bases. As and when these fructify, the Gwadar–Kashi and Irrawaddy corridors could become permanent logistic routes for Chinese naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean. It may be exigent for India to take appropriate measures to preserve its vital interests, while there is time.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 23 Appendix A: China and IOR States: High-Level Military Visits in 2005–2006* Northern IOR Littorals (Listed East to West) 1. Indonesia: a. Chinese Assistant Chief of General Staff to Indonesia (May 2006) b. Indonesian Army Chief to China (July 2006) 2. Thailand: Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 a. Thai Assistant Defence Minister to China (July 2005) b. Thai Armed Forces Supreme Commander to China (May 2006) c. Thai Air Force Commander to China (July 2006) d. Chinese Assistant Chief of General Staff to Thailand (August 2006) e. Chinese Chief of General Staff to Thailand (October 2006) f. Chinese Assistant Chief of General Staff to Thailand (November– December 2006) 3. Myanmar: a. Chinese Chief of General Staff to Myanmar (October 2006) 4. Bangladesh: a. Chinese Chief of General Staff to Bangladesh (May–June 2005) b. Bangladeshi Naval Chief to China (July 2005) c. Bangladeshi Army Chief to China (May 2006) 5. Sri Lanka: a. Sri Lankan President (also Defence Minister) to China (August– September 2005) 6. India: a. Chinese Chief of General Staff to India (May–June 2005) b. Indian Defence Minister to China (May–June 2006) c. Chinese PLA Air Force Commander to India (October 2006)  24 Strategic Analysis d. Political Commissar, Chengdu Military Region to India (November–December 2006) 7. Pakistan: a. Pakistani Defence Minister to China (January 2005) b. Pakistani Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to China (September 2005) c. Pakistani Naval Chief to China (May 2006) Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 d. Chinese Assistant Chief of General Staff to Pakistan (August 2006) e. Chinese PLA Air Force Commander to Pakistan (October 2006) 8. Iran: a. Chinese Nanjing Military Region Commander to Iran (August 2005) 9. Yemen: a. Chinese Deputy Chief of General Staff to Yemen (November– December 2006) South-Eastern IOR Littoral 1. Australia: a. Australian Defence Minister to China (June 2005) b. Australian Naval Chief to China (August–September 2005) c. Chinese Deputy Chief of General Staff to Australia (September 2005) d. Australian Deputy Defence Chief to China (October 2005) e. Chinese Assistant Chief of General Staff to Australia (November 2005) f. Australian Chief of Special Operations to China (July 2006) g. Chinese CMC Vice-Chairman to Australia (September 2006) h. Australian Army Chief to China (October 2006)  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 25 Western IOR Littorals (Listed North to South) 1. Egypt: a. Chinese Political Commissar, Beijing Military Region to Egypt (June 2005) b. Chinese Deputy Chief, PLA General Logistics Department to Egypt (September 2005) c. Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) to Egypt (Septem- Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 ber 2006) 2. Sudan: a. Chinese CMC Vice-Chairman to Sudan (October 2005) b. Sudan’s Defence Minister to China (March–April 2006) 3. Kenya: a. Deputy Chief, PLA General Logistics Department to Kenya (September 2005) b. Kenyan Minister of State for Defence to China (August– September 2006) c. Kenyan Armed Forces Chief to China (October–November 2006) 4. Tanzania: a. Deputy Chief, PLA General Logistics Department to Tanzania (September 2005) b. Tanzanian Defence Chief to China (September 2005) 5. Mozambique: a. Mozambique’s Defence Minister to China (June 2005) 6. South Africa: a. South African Defence Chief to China (September 2006) b. Chinese Head of Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) to South Africa (September 2006)  26 Strategic Analysis Appendix B: Chinese Naval Visits/Deployments in IOR 1. November 1985 to January 1986: First visit of any Chinese naval unit to the Indian Ocean. A destroyer and a replenishment ship call at Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong. 2. November 1993: PLA Navy training ship Zheng He calls at Karachi, Bombay, Chittagong and Bangkok. 3. January and February 1995: First Kilo-class (Type 877) submarine purchased from Russia is transported from the Baltic Sea to China Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 around the Cape of Good Hope. 4. October and November 1995: Second Kilo-class (Type 877) submarine purchased from Russia is transported from the Baltic Sea to China around the Cape of Good Hope. 5. November 1997: A destroyer and a frigate call at Lumut naval base (Malaysia, at northern entrance to the Malacca Straits). 6. December 1997 to January 1998: Third Kilo-class (Type 636) submarine purchased from Russia is transported from the Baltic Sea to China around the Cape of Good Hope. 7. January 1999: Fourth Kilo-class (Type 636) submarine purchased from Russia is transported to China on a heavy-lift transport ship around the Cape of Good Hope. 8. February 2000: First Chinese Sovermenny (Type 956E) destroyer pur- chased from Russia and a replenishment tanker sail from the Gulf of Finland to China through the Suez Canal. 9. July 2000: A destroyer (with Admiral embarked) and a replenish- ment ship call at African ports. 10. February 2001: Second Chinese Sovermenny (Type 956E) destroyer purchased from Russia and a replenishment tanker sail from the Gulf of Finland to China through the Suez Canal. 11. May 2001: A destroyer (with Admiral embarked) and a replenish- ment ship call at Karachi in connection with 50th anniversary cele- brations of Pakistan–China relations. The ships also call at Bombay. 12. Early 2002: Soviet aircraft-carrier Varyag purchased by China is towed from Russia to China through the Indian Ocean. 13. 2002: A destroyer and a replenishment ship call at Egyptian ports.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 27 14. April 2004: Third Chinese Sovermenny (Type 956 EM) destroyer pur- chased from Russia and a replenishment tanker sail from the Gulf of Finland to China through the Suez Canal. 15. Late 2004: Fifth Kilo-class (Type 636M) submarine purchased from Russia is transported to China on a heavy-lift transport ship around the Cape of Good Hope. 16. November and December 2005: A destroyer (with Admiral embarked) and a replenishment ship participate in joint naval exercises, sepa- rately with Pakistan, India and Thailand. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 17. December 2005: Two Kilo-class (Project 636M) submarines purchased from Russia are transported to China around the Cape of Good Hope. 18. February 2006: Third Chinese Sovermenny (Type 956 EM) destroyer purchased from Russia and a replenishment tanker sail to China through the Suez Canal. 19. August 2006: Fourth Chinese Sovremenny-class (Type 956 EM) de- stroyer purchased from Russia and a replenishment tanker sail to China through the Suez Canal. Note: The PLA Navy has also been using the Indian Ocean for transit passage, such as in the following cases: a. West-bound Warship port calls to foreign ports: For example, in 2001, Chinese warships made port calls in about 23 countries in Asia, America, Africa, Europe and Oceania. Between May and September 2002, a Chinese destroyer and a replenishment tanker conducted an around-the-world cruise, calling into ports in a dozen countries, including the United States, Russia, Portugal and Brazil. b. The 24 Chinese annual Antarctic expeditions conducted so far since the first one in 1984–1985. These were mostly conducted by government research vessels with PLA Navy personnel embarked. These per- sonnel are known to have carried out oceanographic surveys and sea-bottom research. c. Transit involving government-owned China Ocean Shipping Company: Closely linked to the PLA Navy, these ships are even called ‘zhanjian’ (warships) in Chinese language and are known to be used by China for military-strategic purposes.  28 Strategic Analysis Appendix C: Major Chinese-Origin Arms in Inventory of IOR Littorals* (with numbers held and induction year) South Asia 1. Bangladesh: a. Type 62 light tanks, 40, 1970s b. F-7M ‘Airguard’ (MIG-21 derivative) fighter aircraft, 20 (24), 1977 c. Type 59 and Type 69 main battle tanks (MBT), 80, 1975–1990 Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 d. Shanghai II-class Fast Attack Craft–Gun (FAC-G), 08, 1982 e. Chinese P-4 Fast Attack Craft–Torpedo (FAC-T), 04, 1983 f. Hegu-class Fast Attack Craft–Missile (FAC-M), 05, 1983 (01 in 1992) g. Hainan-class patrol craft, 01, 1995 h. Huangfen-class FAC-M, 04, 1988 i. Huchuan-class FAC-T, 04, 1988 j. Jianghu-class Frigate, 01 (order for one more cancelled), 1989 k. A-5C III ‘Fatan’ fighter-bomber aircraft, 12 (16), 1992 l. Haizhui-class FAC-G, 01, 1995 m. T-43 Minesweeper, 04, 1996 n. F-7 BG fighter aircraft (upgraded MIG-21), 16, April 2006 2. Pakistan: a. Type 59 MBT, 1200, 1965–1966 (few remain in service) b. A-5 III ‘Fatan’ fighter-bomber aircraft, 45 (60), 1983 c. Huangfen-class FAC-M, 01, 1984 d. Type 69 MBT, 250 (license manufacture), 1985–1990 e. Fuqing-class Replenishment ship (AORH), 01, 1987 f. F-7P fighter aircraft, 17 (20), 1988 g. F-7MP fighter aircraft, 94 (100), 1988 h. Type 85 MBT, 300, 1992–1996 i. C-801/802 Anti-ship missiles, 38, 1996  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 29 j. Y-12 transport aircraft, 04, 1996–1997 k. Jalalat-class FAC-M, 04, 1997–2005 l. F-7MG fighter aircraft, 57 (57), 2002 m. F-22P Frigates (with Z-9 ASW helicopters), 04, 2003 agreement, to be inducted n. JF-17 ‘Thunder’ (FC-1) fighter-strike aircraft 150, 2007 (Joint ven- ture) Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 3. Sri Lanka: a. Shanghai II-class FAC-G, 05, 01 in 1971, 01 in 1980 and 03 in 2000 b. Y-12 maritime patrol/transport aircraft, 7 (9), 1987 c. F-7B fighter aircraft, 3 (4), 1991 d. Chengdu FT-5 trainer aircraft, 2 (2), 1991 e. Yunan-class Landing Craft Utility (LCU) (for amphibious sealift), 02, 1991 and 1995 f. Shanghai II-class (Modified) FAC-G, 01, 1992 g. Yuhai-class Landing Ship–Medium (LSM), 01, 1995 h. Haiqing-class FAC-G, 01, 1996 i. Lushun-class (Modified Haizhui-class) FAC-G, 02, 1998 South East Asia 1. Myanmar: a. Jiangnan-class Frigate, 02, 1993 b. Type 69 MBT, 100, 1993–1995 c. Type 63 light amphibious tanks, 105 d. F-7M ‘Airguard’ fighter aircraft, 18 (24), 1991 e. Hainan-class patrol craft, 10, 1991–1993 f. Y-8D transport aircraft, 5 (6), 1992 g. A-5C ‘Fatan’ attack aircraft, 22 (24), 1993 h. Houxin-class FAC-M, 06, 1995–1997  30 Strategic Analysis i. Type 80 MBT, 20+, after 2000 2. Thailand: a. Type 69 MBT, 50, 1987–1988 b. Jianghu-class (Modified) Frigate, 04, 1991–1992 c. Jiangwei-class (Modified) Frigate, 02, 1995 (Joint Chinese-Thai design, western systems) d. Hudong-class Replenishment ship (AORH) Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 e. Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV), 02, 2005–2006 (Additional 02 may be supplied) West Asia (Middle East) 1. Iran: a. Type-59 MBT, 220, 1970–1980 b. Type-69 MBT, 200, 1985–1990 c. Houdong-class FAC-M, 10, 1994–1996 d. China Cat-class FAC-M (with catamaran hull), 10, 2001 onwards e. Many naval weapons (anti-ship missiles, mines, etc.) are of Chinese origin 2. Yemen: a. Huangfen-class FAC-M, 04, 1988 Africa 1. Egypt: a. F-6 fighter aircraft, 45 (70), 1979 b. F-7B fighter aircraft, 60 (100), 1982 c. Romeo-class (Type 033) submarines, 04, 1982–1984 d. Hainan-class patrol craft, 08, 1983–1984 e. Hegu-class FAC-M, 04, 1984 f. Shanghai II-class FAC-G, 04, 1984 g. Jianghu I-class Frigate, 02, 1984–1985  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 31 2. Sudan: a. Type 62 light tanks, 100, 1970–1980 b. Type 59 MBT, 10, 1960–1980 c. F-6 fighter aircraft, 08 (12) d. Y-8 transport aircraft, 01 (01) e. F-7B fighter aircraft, 15, 1995–1996 3. Eritrea: Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 a. Y-12 (HAI), Utility aircraft, 04 (04), 1993 4. Kenya: a. Y-12 II (HAI), Utility aircraft, 11 (12), 1997 5. Tanzania: a. Type 62 light tanks, 25, 1970–1980 b. Type 59 MBT, 30, 1960–1980 c. Huchuan-class FAC-T, 02, 1975 (02 additional boats received 1975 decommissioned) d. Shanghai II-class FAC-G, 02, 1992 (06 additional boats received 1971–1972 decommissioned) e. Yuchin-class LCU, 02, 1995 Notes 1 This is notwithstanding the fact that at that time, China was itself dependent on the Soviet Union for military hardware. 2 Gurnam Singh, ‘China and the Indian Ocean Region’, China Report (Journal of East Asian Studies), 20(3), May–June 1984, p. 15. 3 ‘Analysis of China’s Foreign Trade in First Quarter 2007’, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, May 21, 2007, at http://www.tdctrade.com/report/ indprof/indprof 070507.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007). 4 Half of China’s crude oil needs are met through imports, and this proportion is rising. ‘China’s Oil Import Scheme Is Far from Crude’, Foreign Policy, October 4, 2006, at http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/1852 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 5 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, California University Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2002, pp. 66–69.  32 Strategic Analysis 6 Philip L. Ritcheson, ‘Nuclearization in South Asia’, Strategic Review, 21(4), Fall 1993, p. 39. 7 Yossef Bodansky, ‘The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US’, Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 1995, p. 6. 8 Patrick E. Tyler, ‘No Chemical Arms Aboard China Ship’, The New York Times, September 6, 1993, p. 4. 9 Although China possessed Han-class nuclear submarines, these were ‘backward’. Lin Changsheng, ‘The Combat Power of China’s Nuclear Submarines’ (translated from Chinese), World Aerospace Digest (Journal of China’s Aerospace Technology Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 Group), No. 103, September, p. 31. Cited in Andrew Erickson, ‘China’s Future Nu- clear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings’, Naval War College Review, Winter 2007, p. 57. 10 Yan Lie, ‘A Feeling for the Ocean Depths: A Visit with Naval Nuclear Submarine Commander Yan Baojian’ (translated from Chinese), Navigation (Chinese journal), 1, 1998, p. 1, cited in Andrew Erickson, 9, p. 60. 11 Lin Changsheng, no. 9. While two Type 093 SSNs have been inducted since 2005, the third one is likely to be commissioned soon. 12 As per Jane’s Fighting Ships, China commissioned more than 30 new submarines between 1995 and 2005. 13 Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2005–2006. 14 See, Conference Report, IDSA-PRIO International Conference on ‘The Geopol- itics of Energy Security: The Rise of Asia’, New Delhi, December 15–16, 2006, at http://www.prio.no/files/manual-import/CONFERENCE% 20REPORT%20GEOPOL.pdf (Accessed October 22, 2007). 15 This is based on a classified study undertaken by the author. 16 The phrase ‘String of Pearls’ was first used in a 2005 report by Booz–Allen– Hamilton, ‘Energy Futures in Asia’ prepared for US Defense Secretary. ‘String of Pearls Military Plan to Protect China’s Oil: US Report’, Space War, January 18, 2005, at http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050118111727.edxbwxn8.html (Ac- cessed October 22, 2007). 17 ‘China’s Growing Military Clout Worries India, US’, The Times of In- dia, April 10, 2007, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Chinas growing military clout worries India US/articleshow/1888817.cms (Accessed October 22, 2007). 18 Period between mid-19th and mid-20th centuries, when foreign powers subjugated China and caused immense sufferings to its people. Peter Hayo Gries, China’s New Nationalism, California University Press, California/London, 2004, pp. 43–53. 19 Michael Pillsbury, ‘China’s Strategic Outlook’, in K. Santhanam and S. Kondapalli (eds.), Asian Security and China 2000–2010, IDSA and Shipra Publications, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 99, 105.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 33 20 David Shambaugh, ‘The News about Chinese-Indian Relations Is Good’, International Herald Tribune, October 20, 1995, at http://www.iht.com/ articles/1995/10/20/edsham.t.php (Accessed October 22, 2007). 21 Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Countering China’s Strategic Encirclement of India’, Indian Defence Review, 15(3), July–September 2000, p. 17. 22 Among the other drivers was the threat from Pakistan (due to its nuclear nexus with China) and the non-proliferation regime’s pressure on India to close its nuclear option. R.M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security, Studies in Asian Security, California University Press, East–West Center, Stanford, 2006, p. 76. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 23 ‘PN Ships Reach China for Joint Exercise’, Dawn, October 19, 2003, at http://www.dawn.com/2003/10/19/nat2.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007). 24 ‘Naval Exercise an Important Development’, website of the PRC Embassy in Pakistan, November 25, 2005, at http://pk.china-embassy.org/eng/zbgx/ t223408.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007). 25 ‘Chinese Warships at Kochi for Naval Exercise’, India Defence, November 28, 2005, at http://www.india-defence.com/print/955 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 26 An important aim of these exercises was to familiarise Pakistan Navy person- nel with Chinese equipment considering its impending purchase of four Chi- nese F-22P frigates between 2008 and 2013. The cross-deck landings were also necessary to check the compatibility of its deck landing system with Chinese Z-9C helicopters, six of which are also being bought with the frigates. ‘Pakistan– China Exercise Begins’, Dawn, November 25, 2005, at http://www.dawn.com/ 2005/11/25/top8.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007) 27 Keith Crane et al., ‘Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints’, 2005, Project Air Force, RAND Corporation Report, p. 131. 28 Urvashi Aneja, ‘China–Bangladesh Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partner- ship?’, IPCS, New Delhi, Special Report 33, November 2006, p. 4. 29 Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Middle Eastern Perceptions of the China Threat’, in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds.), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, Routledge, Oxon, New York, 2002, pp. 313–316. 30 ‘China Steals the March over India in Arms Sales’, Defence Digest, September– October 2006, p. 32. 31 Nyi Nyi Lwen, ‘Economic and Military Cooperation between China and Burma’, September 2006, at http://www.narinjara.com/Reports/BReport.ASP (Accessed October 22, 2007). 32 ‘China’s Aid to Tsunami Victims Sets Record: Official’, Gov.cn (Chinese govern- ment’s official web portal), January 18, 2006, at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006- 01/18/content 162616.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007).  34 Strategic Analysis 33 With Malaysia, this was an upgradation of the earlier MoU signed in 1999. ‘China, Indonesia Sign Documents to boost Defense, Economic, Cultural Cooper- ation’, People’s Daily Online, June 29, 2005, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 200507/29/eng20050729 198900.html (Accessed October 22, 2007); Ian Storey, ‘Malaysia’s Hedging Strategy with China’, China Brief, 7(14), July 11, 2007, p. 11, at http://www.jamestown.org/china brief/article.php?articleid=2373541 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 34 Singapore is also a littoral, but to a relatively smaller southern stretch of the waterway (Singapore Strait). 35 The Malacca Straits is the shortest sea-route between the Indian and Pacific Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 oceans, and thus critical for global trade. However, insecurity to shipping ply- ing the waterway has increased lately due to maritime crimes like piracy. Japanese Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) monthly report (September 2006), p. 5, at http://www.sof.or.jp/ocean/report e/pdf/200609.pdf (Accessed October 22, 2007). 36 Robert Karniol, ‘China Seeks Joint Exercise with ASEAN Countries’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 25, 2007, p. 14. 37 Susan Puska, ‘Military Backs China’s Africa Adventure’, Asia Times Online, June 8, 2007, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IF08Ad02.html (Accessed Octo- ber 22, 2007). 38 ‘CRI Launches First Overseas FM Radio Station’, Gov.cn, February 28, 2006, at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-02/28/content 212957.htm (Accessed October 22, 2007). 39 Susan Puska, ‘Military Backs China’s Africa Adventure’, Asia Times Online, June 8, 2007, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IF08Ad02.html (Accessed Octo- ber 22, 2007). 40 ‘Hu Jintao’s Visit Is Historic Event: Seychelles’ President’, People’s Daily Online, February 11, 2007, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200702/11/ eng20070211 349213.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 41 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Beijing Is Testing Strategic Waters in India’s Backyard’, Indian Express, January 30, 2007, at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/22072.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). The authenticity of this report has been confirmed from credible naval sources in India. 42 General Qian Guoliang (Shenyang MR Commander), ‘Quanmian luoshi ‘silinbu jianshe gangyao’, gaobiaozhun zhuahao silingbu jiguan jianshe’ (comprehensively implement guideline of headquarters construction, and do a good job at headquar- ters construction), Journal of the PLA National Defence University, 6, 2000, p. 4, quoted by Dr. You Ji (University of New South Wales), paper presented at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) seminar on ‘China & IOR’, New Delhi, October 13–14, 2006.  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 35 43 ‘Energy Security Runs Up Against “Malacca Dilemma”, Will China, Japan & Korea cooperate?’ (translated from Chinese), China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004, at http://japan.people.com.cn/2004/6/15/2004615101302.htm (Accessed Octo- ber 22, 2007). 44 Irfan Ghauri, ‘Pakistan, China Considering Oil Pipeline from Gwadar’, Daily Times (Islamabad), May 24, 2006, at http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2006\05\24\story 24-5-2006 pg1 1 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 45 Ian Storey, ‘New Energy Projects Help China Reduce Its “Malacca Dilemma”’, Opinion Asia, May 14, 2007, at http://www.opinionasia.org/ NewEnergyProject- shelpChinareduceitsMalaccaDilemma (Accessed October 22, 2007). Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 46 ‘Myanmar Confirms Plan to Export Natural Gas to Yunnan, China’, June 12, 2007, at http://www.indianmuslims.info/news/2007/jun/12/myanmar confirms plan export natural gas yunnan china.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 47 ‘China Pips India to Bag Oil Project of Bangladesh’, The Times of India, May 26, 2007, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Business/India Business/ China pips India to bag oil project of Bangladesh/articleshow/2075110.cms (Accessed October 22, 2007). 48 It did not succeed due to political opposition in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The diversion of a large portion of shipping to the Kra canal would have caused tremendous economic loss to these states. 49 ‘Malaysian Government Backs Pipeline Project’, International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/07/business/pipe.php (Accessed November 16, 2007), ‘Indonesia, Saudi Arabia Join Malaysian Oil Pipeline Deal’, Asian Economic News, May 28, 2007, at http://findarticles.com/ p/articles/mi m0WDP/is 2007 May 28/ai n19172760 (Accessed November 16, 2007) and Prasun Sengupta, ‘Looking East’, Force, 4(9), May 2007, p. 24. 50 ‘Experts Cautious on Malaysian Oil Pipeline’, Turkish Press, June 13, 2007, at http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=180878 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 51 Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, ‘Gwadar’, at http://www.pakboi. gov.pk/News Event/Gawadar.html (Accessed August 25, 2007). 52 Tarique Niazi, ‘Gwadar: China’s Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean’, The Jamestown Foundation (China Brief), February 28, 2005, at http://www.jamestown. org/news details.php?news id=93 (Accessed October 22, 2007). 53 Zahid Hussain and Jay Solomon, ‘Pakistan’s Ties to Beijing Face New Challenges: Abduction of China Workers Forces Musharraf to Balance Militant War, Ally Interests’, Wall Street Journal, A.20, October 12, 2004, cited in Ammad Hassan, ‘Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: Prospects of Economic Revival’, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (California), June 2005, p. 45. 54 B. Raman, ‘Gwadar, Hambantota & Sitwe: China’s Strategic Triangle’, SAAG Paper 2158, March 6, 2007, at http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers22%5Cpaper2158.html; Brahma Chellaney, ‘Dragon’s Foothold in Gwadar’, Asian Age, April 7, 2007, at  36 Strategic Analysis http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8A2EA4A30!249.entry (both accessed October 22, 2007). 55 See as examples, Bertil Lintner, ‘Myanmar’s Chinese Connection’, Interna- tional Defence Review, November 1994, p. 23; Clare Hollinworth, ‘Japan’s De- fence Worries Grow’, AP Defence Reporter, 20(10/11), April–May 1994, p. 9; Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, ‘Coco Is- lands’, at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/ china/facilities/coco.htm; Brahma Chellaney, ‘Dragon Designs’, Hindustan Times (Editorial), June 22, 2006, at http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2006/6/22 1.html (both accessed August 25, 2007). Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 56 Wilson John, ‘Chinese Officials Working on Nine Myanmar Bases’, The Pi- oneer, New Delhi, May 10, 1998, at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/ archives/199805/msg00154.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 57 Andrew Selth, ‘Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth’, Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper, No. 10, 2007, pp. 1–27. 58 These include visits of naval officials to these facilities at the behest of the Myanmar government. In 2006, INS Sukanya visited Great Coco Island. 59 ‘Myanmar bolsters Coco Island Naval Facilities’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2003, p. 12. 60 ‘India to Study Possibility of Building Deep-Sea Port in Myanmar’, Peo- ple’s Daily Online, March 22, 2005, at http://english.people.com.cn/200503/ 22/eng20050322 177762.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 61 ‘India to Develop Myanmar Port to Benefit Northeast’, Hindustan Times, February 3, 2007, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181 1918666,0002.htm. See also, Sandeep Dikshit, ‘India’s New Offer to Myanmar’, The Hindu, August 8, 2007, at http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/08/stories/2007080862441600.htm (both ac- cessed October 22, 2007). 62 John Garver, ‘Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Cen- tral, South-West and South Asia’, The China Quarterly, 2006, pp. 11–14; Arun Shourie, ‘China’s Economic Growth Is Not Just “Economic Growth”’, Indian Ex- press, November 8, 2006, at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/16218. .html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 63 Bill Gertz, ‘China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes’, Washington Times, January 21, 2005, at http://www.asiafinest.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=28181 (Ac- cessed October 22, 2007). 64 ‘India Seeks Permission to Use Chittagong Port’, People’s Daily On- line, September 12, 2005, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200509/12/ eng20050912 208076.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 65 ‘China to Build Chittagong Naval Base in Bangladesh’, News Insight, June 12, 2006, at http://www.newsinsight.net/nati2.asp?recno=3682&ctg= (Accessed October 22, 2007).  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 37 66 ‘Bangladesh to Build Second Naval Base in Chittagong’, People’s Daily On- line, August 9, 2005, at http://english.people.com.cn/200508/09/eng20050809 201204.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 67 ‘Sri Lankan Govt, Chinese Companies Sign Port Building Agreement’, People’s Daily Online, March 13, 2007, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/13/ eng20070313 356862.html; ‘Sri Lanka Port Construction Starts’, Portworld, June 7, 2007, at http://www.portworld.com/news/2007/06/68071?gsid= 0a9a9f57a8649047ab271e5c50858b8b&asi=1 (both accessed October 22, 2007). 68 Hindustan: 2007 2005, cited in Sudha Ramachandran, ‘China Moves into In- dia’s Back Yard’, Asia Times Online, March 13, 2007, at http://www.atimes.com/ Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 atimes/South Asia/IC13Df01.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 69 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India, Maldives Move Toward a “Privileged Partnership”’, Defence News, April 24, 2006, at http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=1717348& C=asiapac (Accessed October 22, 2007). 70 A.B. Mahapatra, ‘China: Base Strategy’, News Insight, July 27, 2001, at http://www.indiareacts.com/archivefeatures/nat2.asp?recno=16&ctg; Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Maldives: Tiny Islands, Big Intrigue’, Asia Times Online, April 7, 2006, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South Asia/HD07Df01.html (Accessed October 22, 2007). 71 ‘China Seeks Maldives Base Again’, News Insight, April 24, 2004, at http://www. newsinsight. net/nati2.asp?recno=2719&ctg=Defence (Accessed October 22, 2007). 72 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India, Maldives Move Toward a “Privileged Partnership”’, Defence News, April 24, 2006, at http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=1717348& C=asiapac (Accessed October 22, 2007). 73 In May 2007, Chinese scientists developed a bathymetric side-scan sonar with a very high resolution well above the standards laid down by International Hydrographic Organisation. ‘Installation of High-Resolution Submarine Sonar by Chinese Navy is Unprecedented and Alarming!’, (Translated from Chinese), May 9, 2005, at http://future.chinaiiss.org/content/2007-05-09/2821.shtml - 24k (Accessed August 18, 2007). 74 The threat is likely to emanate from US forces but could also involve Australia, India or/and Japan. 75 These are likely to be the United States and India in the foreseeable future. 76 Besides India, this could be directed against Japan and Taiwan, for whom, the Indian Ocean sea-lines are critical for economic sustenance. 77 Ibid. 78 Considering their higher vulnerability to US naval forces in the relatively shallower waters of the China Seas, China may deploy these boats in the deeper waters of the Pacific Ocean, However, when more of these boats armed with longer-range  38 Strategic Analysis ballistic missiles are inducted, China may prefer an ‘SSBN-dispersion’ and thus deploy some in the Indian Ocean as well. 79 Hague Convention XIII (1907), Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Art. 5. 80 Ibid, Art. 9. 81 Ibid, Art. 12 and 13. 82 Ibid, Art. 17. 83 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea) entered into force in Novem- ber 1994. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013 84 For genesis of this ambiguity and details, see Rear Admiral (Retd.) O.P. Sharma, ‘Ocean Governance: Potential Areas of Conflict’, in Securing the Oceans: An In- dian Ocean Perspective, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, Seminar Proceedings, June 2004–2005, p. 53. 85 For details, see, East Asian Strategic Review (2005), National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan), pp. 105 and 120. 86 Based on the author’s conversation with PLA officials. 87 The ‘Tanker War’ began with Iran and Iraq targeting each other’s oil tankers, but due to inaccuracy of shipping intelligence and targeting on both sides, it eventually turned into indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping. See, Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, Tanker War, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 1, 4, 87. 88 Considering their higher vulnerability to US naval forces in the relatively shallower waters of the China Seas, China may deploy these boats in the deeper waters of the Pacific Ocean. However, when more of these boats armed with longer-range ballistic missiles are inducted, China may prefer an ‘SSBN-dispersion’ and thus deploy some in the Indian Ocean as well. Christopher McConnaughy, ‘China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent’, in Andrew Erickson et al. (eds.), China’s Future Nu- clear Submarine Force, US Naval War College and Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, p. 98. 89 Prasun Sengupta, ‘Looking East’, Force, 4(9), May 2007, p. 24. 90 ‘Aiyar Moots Asian Gas Grid’, The Hindu Business Line, February 15, 2005, at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/02/15/stories/2005021502690300. htm (Accessed October 22, 2007). 91 Based on the author’s interaction with Chinese scholars from SAWCCAD (Cen- tre for South Asia-West China Cooperation & Development Studies) at Sichuan University, Chengdu (China) during the seminar on ‘Sino-Indian Energy Cooper- ation’, July 10–11, 2005. 92 Cited in Henry Chu, ‘China’s Footprint in Pakistan’, Indian Express, New Delhi, April 3, 2007, p. 10. * Source: ‘China’s National Defense in 2006’, White Paper published by Informa- tion Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 29,  China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications 39 2006, Appendix B, at http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2007- 01/15/content 706686.htm * Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005–2006, Jane’s World’s Air Forces (August 2006) and Jane’s Armour & Artillery 2005–2006. Chinese designators are used in the listing. In case of aircraft, figure in brackets denotes total numbers supplied, and the induction year mentioned is for the first delivery. Gurpreet S. Khurana is Research Fellow at IDSA. Downloaded by [Cdr Gurpreet S. Khurana] at 09:12 22 July 2013