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In the ideal city of the Republic, Plato forbids property ownership for the auxiliaries while he retains private property for the lowest class, including the farmers who will provide the auxiliaries' food. For Plato, agricultural land and practices are the realm of lifelong farmers who are politically dedicated to the upkeep of the ruling class. In his novel Utopia, Sir Thomas More also takes a communalist approach but he extends the ban on private property to the entire community, including those engaged in farming. Furthermore, he includes the practice of agriculture within the regular rotation of living arrangements so that virtually all Utopians have some experience with the land and food production. Thus, although both Plato and More present communalist theories of property, their ideal states show critically different approaches to the role of agriculture and the connection of citizens to the land that supports them.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 2019
In this paper, I argue that in the Republic Plato justifies the political authority of the guardians in light of the principle of partnership-a principle which fits coherently with other Platonic principles which undergird his political theory, including optimum functionality, social justice and power. Therefore, I argue that, by their respective professions, there is a cooperative interaction between the guardians and the producers as partners within the political structure of the ideal polis towards attaining the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the polis. I contrast this with the orthodox interpretation that Plato justifies political authority using the idea of the Good-an interpretation which holds that since the citizens cannot grasp the Good, they assume an insignificant political position, including the allegations that they are cogs, slaves, morally obtuse, and politically inept.
2017
Plato's <em>Republic, </em>as the dialogue is known in English, is a classic, perhaps <em>the </em>classic investigation of the reasons why human beings form political communities —or "cities" in his terms. In the <em>Republic</em> Socrates inquires into the origins of the city in order to discover what justice "writ big" is. But in the process of constructing his "city"—or, actually, "cities"—" in speech," Socrates does not offer us a definition of justice so much as he shows us the reasons why no actual city is ever apt to be perfectly just. From Plato's <em>Republic </em>we thus understand why justice is difficult, if not impossible to achieve for communities, but may be a virtue of private individuals.
History of Political Thought, 2011
This article deals with the issue of the abolition of both property and family for the Guardians in Plato's Republic. My aim is to show that such abolition answers to the problem of the art of ruling raised in Book I: how can the rulers rule not in their own interest, but rather in the interest of the ruled? The abolition of property and family changes the very economic and social framework of the city, leading to an identity of the private interests of the rulers and of the common interests of the polis, by establishing a koinÜnia among the Guardians and a relationship of interdependence between them and the producers. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the lower class from the abolition of property and family creates a situation of fundamental asymmetry in the relationship between the classes and renders ambiguous the manner in which the producers belong to the city, creating in this way a 'differential inclusion into citizenship'.
Forthcoming, 2023
Plato is not the author of the first political writings that have come down to us. Even in classical Greece he was preceded by such authors as Herodotus and Isocrates. Nevertheless, he can be considered the “father” of political philosophy, in that he tries to apply a higher standard—justice—to the experience and the political theory of statesmen and citizens, previously presented by rhetoricians and sophists as morally indifferent. Today it seems evident to us that justice should be the principle used in organizing a political society and that, if a society is too unjust, then it should be reformed through political means: either peacefully through legislation, or even through a violent revolution which turns everything upside down. From Plato we have inherited the idea that justice is something we should aspire to. The central theme of classical philosophy is the development of a doctrine of “the best regime,” which in essence means the most just regime. There is, however, a chasm between ancient and modern political doctrines. The “best regime”, for the ancients, doesn’t seem to be an ideal to be achieved, but rather a sort of “mental experience” which reveals the limits of what can be expected in political life. The goal of this experience is, according to Cicero, to make apparent the principles of political life, and not to give birth to an actual, real city. According to this interpretation, the most beautiful city, Calpollis—which Socrates proposes in the Republic and which raises countless objections from his interlocutors—isn’t a likely scenario, and perhaps not even a possible one. Socrates’ companions, among them Plato’s elder brothers, even ask themselves whether such a city would be desirable. The most famous of Plato’s dialogues should, therefore, be interpreted more like a comedy, rather than a sort of intellectual debate which seeks to find principles for an actual society. Pascal stated that the work wasn’t to be seen as a serious one, but rather a sort of demonstration through a reduction to the absurd. For the ancients, the best regime might not be contrary to nature, but it is extremely unlikely to be achieved. Justice is a virtue of the soul, but the systematic implementation of this standard in the city will always reveal itself to be paradoxical, in light of the ridiculous consequences that would result, such as the abolition of the family and of private property, the purging of the main Hellenic cultural works, the abolition of poetry, and a government by “philosophers”, who can’t even find their way around the public square (meaning that they lack practical experience). Even if their projects were implemented, they would meet so much resistance that it would be necessary to ban all persons older than ten years from the city. The conclusion seems to be that it is not possible to formulate a theory of justice which stipulates the best political institutions and the best laws, without relying to a great extent on the virtue of the citizenry. This perspective strikes us as alien, and it is almost incomprehensible that Plato wouldn’t at least try to put the conjectures of his characters into practice. The traditional view of the Republic in the twentieth century, on the contrary, is that Plato seriously proposes a reign by philosophers, equality between men and women in the military and in public life, shared property, and a communist totalitarian state, or at least a kind of kibbutz avant la lettre, which takes children from the family to ensure social equality. It is said, moreover, that in Plato’s opinion, philosophers should be the counselors of princes, prepared to manipulate the crowds with noble lies. To understand Plato’s political teachings, we are required to read his works as dialogues, in their dramatic context, detecting irony, and without assuming that Plato agrees with what Socrates says to his interlocutors. Whichever way we interpret him, it is undeniable that no political theory since Plato has been able to dispense with the notions of justice and of an “ideal” political regime, one “in accordance with our prayers”—and it was Plato who placed these notions at the heart of political philosophy.
Morus (English translation, originally in Portuguese), 2008
This work intends to present Plato’s Republic as an ancient source of the utopian tradition,not only for its project to found a just city in speech, but also for its project to justify the legitimacy of this literary/philosophical genre mostly through considerations about the possibility of this political form. The thread to guide us is the platonic usage of the concept of dunamis (power) and its cognate adjective (dunaton) through two central axes: i) The argument that what is being drawn with this speech that founds cities – which despite of the anachronism we will call utopian – is a structure of political power based on the human power to prevent mistakes through knowledge. If this is not a really infallible power, this does not undermine revoke the capacity of speech to unveil the consequences that would follow from this hypothesis. ii) It is stated in the text that the just city there built does not exist, did not exist and will not exist, but lies like a model for anyone who would take it as a reference for one’s own actions. This point indicates a carving of the ordinary sense of “possible”, which no longer refers to the practical effectiveness of a whole system, but now denotes a properly metaphysical reference that can be accomplished in different degrees. In the intersection of these two lines of inquiry lies the definition of the genre of philosophy, understood as a speech that longs for immunity from the making of mistakes even if aware of its impossibility. In this scenario, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Republic inaugurates a discursive project defined as philosophy which will function like a pattern for the utopian genre that will be developed later on. Key words: Republic, Plato, dunamis, dunaton
2018
At least since the time of the ancient philosopher Plato, private property rights have posed challenges to those aspiring to craft a just political society. During the nascent years of American civilization, the Pilgrim settlers of the New Plymouth Plantation followed a partly Platonic model of a commonwealth. The survival of their settlement, they initially believed, depended upon pious men sharing food and property in common to protect the good of the whole city instead of simply their own private interests. Yet, this Platonic experiment was plagued by inefficiency and Governor William Bradford opted to restore private property rights. "The experience that was had in this common course and condition… amongst godly and sober men," Bradford explained, "may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato's and other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if they were wiser than God." 1 Bradford was by no means the first to critique Plato's seeming skepticism of private property rights, on display especially in the Republic. In this famous work, the philosopher proposes that a group of elite guardians should share their property in common. 2 Distractions from the common good, such as property, reduce the unity necessary for the guardians to protect the city and must be severely restricted. Yet, Bradford ignores Plato's divergent interpretation of property in the Laws. This later work suggests legislation to protect private property and rejects communism as a viable form of economic organization. The apparent discrepancy between the Republic and the Laws, this essay demonstrates, does not indicate any fundamental change in Plato's political philosophy. Instead, it evinces that the two works address different situations.
Journal of The History of Philosophy, 2010

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