UNPOL and Police Reform in Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and Setbacks

UNPOL and Police Reform in Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and Setbacks NICOLAS LEMAY-HÉBERT [7,213] Key words: Timor-Leste; United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, international policing, UNPOL, police reform, PNTL, peacekeeping, UNTAET. Published in: International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, no. 3 (June 2009). ________________________________________________ Following the 2006 gang violence in Timor-Leste amid dissension between the two main security institutions in the country, the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F–FDTL) and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1704, establishing a UN multidimensional, integrated mission, including UN police with an executive policing mandate, to ensure the restoration and maintenance of public security. With the mission winding down in 2009, this article offers an early assessment of its accomplishments and setbacks in the realm of security and public order, emphasizing the UNPOL leg of the mission. If the mission succeeded in restoring a modicum of security in Timor-Leste, it fell short of effectively assisting the PNTL reform process, implying that another security crisis erupting in the country cannot be ruled out. _______________________________________________ Following the political crisis of 2006, the UN was reinforced in Timor-Leste, mainly to rebuild the capacity of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), a much needed task after the complete collapse of the institution. The UN Police (UNPOL), acting under the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), received an executive mandate in order to give enough time for the PNTL to be restructured effectively, and for training and mentoring to take place. UNPOL’s mandate was basically to: (1) restore peace and order; (2) support the electoral process; and (3) to assist in the rebuilding, reconstruction and reform (RRR) of the local police force.1 However, as discussed below, UNMIT was not the first UN mission in Timor-Leste mandated to deal with security reform, and it is important to understand the UN’s involvement since 1999. 1  In light of those past experiences what have been the lasting accomplishments of UNPOL since 2006, and is the PNTL ready, as an institution, to resume its duties in an impartial and depoliticized fashion to provide security? These issues are crucial, especially in the context of a progressive withdrawal of the UN mission, starting to hand-over once again the policing duties to the PNTL on a district-by-district basis.2 This article contends that although UNPOL succeeded in restoring a modicum of security in Timor-Leste, it fell short of effectively assisting the RRR process – the implication being that a new security crisis cannot be ruled out. Moreover, some of the problems stem directly from the format of the mission: it appears that executive policing, coupled with an unclear and ill-conceived mandate, brought about some of the problems in RRR. From UNTAET to UNMIT: A Legacy of Weak Security Institutions UNMIT was building on the legacy of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which administered Timor-Leste from October 1999 until May 2002.3 UNTAET had generally been categorized as a success in the UN, at least before the 2006 security crisis erupted. After nearly three years of international administration, a large number of refugees had returned, the building of Timorese institutions was on its way, and the parliamentary election of 2001 had brought a democratically-elected government to power. Jean-Christian Cady, deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN in Timor-Leste in 2000– 01 famously stated in 2002 that ‘in the rather chaotic history of UN peacekeeping operations, where results have not always matched the efforts of the international community, Timor-Leste stands as an undeniable success’.4 The British Ambassador to the Security Council even hinted that UNTAET could become a paradigm of nation building, an opinion supported by The Netherlands representative in the Security Council.5 An array of scholars, however, has presented a more balanced review of UNTAET’s legacy, underlining various shortcomings.6 Interestingly, most of the critical accounts came from scholars who had previously worked for UNTAET, and 2 therefore had first-hand knowledge. For instance, Anthony Goldstone, senior political affairs officer, warned that Timor-Leste’s security institutions were far from being as solid as some suggested: ‘The Timorese Lorosae Defence Forces (F-FDTL) and the East Timorese National Police (PNTL), which the UNTAET had created, were suffering crises of legitimacy that had made them political targets’.7 This statement echoed the view of Edward Rees, a political affairs officer who pointed out that UNTAET committed a series of early mistakes vis-à-vis the demobilization of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil) guerrillas and the establishment of the F–FDTL and PNTL. The crux of the matter was the constitution of the F–FDTL under a biased process, where more than 1,300 former Falintil guerrillas were sacked and the whole power apparatus was left to the followers of Xanana Gusmão (formerly Falintil Commander who later became President and subsequently Prime Minister). Gusmão failed to consult the political wing of Falintil – Fretilin – which later dissociated itself from Gusmão’s policies.Rees reached the conclusion that ‘despite years of UN administration and billions of dollars spent on rebuilding the country and associated peace operation, there is a possibility of a disintegrating state divided along political lines drawn by divisions in the resistance/veterans community and supported by their control of various state agencies’.8 These warnings went unheeded, and the UN gradually downsized its presence after the declaration of independence in 2002. The UM Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) took over policing duties in May 2002 with a mandate to gradually handover responsibilities to the government, which was done in 2004. In this regard the UN adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach, as embodied by the muted diplomacy of the then SRSG, Sukehiro Hasegawa. After 2005, a new UN office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was created, with a handful of police and civilian advisers to support institutional development. However, the structural problems that bedevilled the development of security institutions under UNTAET were not addressed, by the UN or by the Timor-Leste leadership. This would prove to be a critical factor in explaining the 2006 crisis, as the Commission of Inquiry later concluded.9 The evolution of the political situation in Timor-Leste after 2004 presented the perfect opportunity for political manipulation of the security institutions by leaders, as 3 pundits had accurately warned several years before. Ideological and political disputes in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly between Fretilin central committee members and the guerrilla commander, Xanana Gusmão, carried over into the post- conflict government.10 The growing chasm dividing Timor-Leste’s leadership between the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri of Fretilin, and President Gusmão, laid the foundations for a new political crisis. The lack of a clear mandate given to the F– FDTL and the crisis of legitimacy it suffered since its inception were all factors in this crisis, as was the progressive militarization of the PNTL under the then-Minister for the Interior, Rogerio Lobato. Lobato was close to Alkatiri and decided to turn the police force into an institution to compete with the Gusmão-controlled F–FDTL. In February 2006, approximately 715 military personnel (from a total strength of 1,435) petitioned Gusmão to address their complaints of discrimination against ‘Westerners’ (loromonu) by ‘Easterners’ (lorosae) in the military. Shortly after being dismissed by Taur Matan Ruak, titular commander of the F–FDTL, the petitioners staged protests in Dili. On 28 April the protests turned violent. Citing ineffective police response, the government called in the F–FDTL. Large numbers of citizens began to flee their homes to reach camps for internally displaced persons in outlying districts, and several members of the F–FDTL, including the commander of the Military Police, left their posts in protest at the military intervention. Violence escalated on 23–24 May with a series of deadly clashes involving the F-FDTL, dissident military forces, civilians and some police, followed on 25 May by further lethal conflict between the PNTL and PNTL elements supporting the F–FDTL. The police institution in Dili quickly collapsed, with police officers running away from the capital or hiding their uniforms and police insignia. Mob and gang violence took over the capital, resulting in additional deaths, widespread destruction of property, and the continued displacement of thousands of Dili residents. An Effective Restoration of Public Order After 2006 The security situation in May 2006 was dire. The violence had killed 37 people, and wounded many more. It left the security institutions, the prime actors in the crisis, at 4 loggerheads. Key members of the political elite were also diametrically opposed to each other, and the prospect of new elections in 2007 risked triggering a renewal of the crisis. More than 150,000 people were displaced by the violence, creating a potentially volatile situation in the refugee camps. The security vacuum created by the collapse of the PNTL allowed martial arts groups, important non-state actors in the region,11 to take over security responsibilities in sectors of Dili and other towns. A de facto curfew was in place in Dili, with virtually no one daring to go out in the streets after sunset. In this context, the return of an international force under the UN’s aegis, comprising 1,600 international, was a welcome addition in the security landscape. Resuming the executive authority exercised from 1999 to 2004, UNPOL patrolled the streets and some order quickly returned, especially in Dili. From 70–80 incidents per week during the first half of 2007 (statistics in 2006 are unavailable), the level of violence dropped to an average of 54 per week during the second half of 2007, and 36 in 2008.12 People were less afraid to go out in the streets at night, and major martial arts groups decided to join the peace process.13 UNPOL also successfully assured a secure environment for the 2007 parliamentary election and, apart from isolated clashes in rural districts, voters were able to cast their votes without major disturbances. By all accounts, the special Portuguese police, the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), was a key player in the restoration of security and order in Dili.14 Police from different nationalities have explained that the GNR’s success resulted from experience in facing massive demonstrations relating to football matches back home,15 hence the GNR Formed Police Units (FPU), had the proper know-how to break up demonstrations in Timor-Leste.16 The heavy reliance on FPU in Timor- Leste reinforced a general trend. FPUs were first deployed in 1999 in Kosovo, and became a central feature in UN operations thereafter – in Liberia, Ivory Coast, DRC and Haiti.17 However, the FPU’s contribution to the restoration of security in Dili masked the relative ineptitude of other UNPOL contingents.18 UNPOL’s lack of local knowledge clearly hindered its effectiveness. As an interviewee recalled: a simple fight between two members of different martial arts groups in 2006–2007 could soon involve a large group of fighters and turn into a 5  bloodbath if nothing was done to stop it right away. The problem was that most UNPOLs, when receiving dispatching calls, didn’t know the exact location of the incident and had to look for it, hence losing precious time. And frequently, facing what had already become a massive street fight, they had to call reinforcement and return to the base.19 Not only did most of UNPOL units lacked knowledge of the city, but perhaps more importantly, the culture of self-protection in the force impeded effectiveness.20 As a PNTL leader explained, the rioters knew that UNPOLs would not retaliate when attacked, which according to him explains why many UNPOL vehicles were stoned and targeted by local rioters in 2006–07.21 In addition, the lack of knowledge of applicable laws was also an impediment, given the fact that the Timorese laws are a mix of Indonesian and Portuguese laws, complemented by certain UNTAET regulations. Two other aspects have to be taken into account concerning the restoration of security and public order. First, statistics, especially those related to crime and the justice system, have to be treated with great caution. Many cases, especially those involving minor crimes, tend not to be reported to the police and are subject to settlement within the traditional system of justice.22 Arguably, this might be especially true in the aftermath of the collapse of public order in 2006, which saw the Timorese police and military taking an active part in the violence. This factor has been fully recognized by the UNPOL leadership.23 Nevertheless, by 2009 the security situation had dramatically improved. Second, reactivation of the PNTL task force was a very important, underestimated, factor the restoration of security. The 100-strong Dili- based task force was established unilaterally in December 2007, according to PNTL leaders as a response to UNPOL’s general failure to effectively restore peace and security.24 In effect, the reactivation of the task force posed an unprecedented challenge to UNPOL’s executive authority. Indeed, the UN was forced to be a spectator in the process when the PNTL decided to regain a degree of executive policing. The task force, which quickly became well-known for its cavalier methods of arresting and interrogating gang members,25 certainly played a role in curbing gang- related crime in the capital, though at the cost of serious human rights violations.26 6 These abuses receded as the security situation improved and as UNPOL began training and mentoring task force police officers. Two UNPOL advisers followed them on their daily assignments, as part of the Dili task force training programme.27 Despite these reservations, it can be argued that UNPOL had an overall positive impact on the restoration of peace and security. Nurturing Reform While Exercising Executive Authority Paradoxically, the same structural condition that allowed the mission to have an impact on the security situation in the country – executive authority – impeded the overarching goal of the rebuilding, reconstruction and reform of the Timorese national police. First, by devoting most of its resources to executive policing, UNPOL’s third mandate, the RRR process suffered from a lack of critically-needed resources. This problem was related to the evolution of the political situation that required UNPOL to maintain an active security role. After having to cope with the immediate post-2006 crisis and the conduct of presidential and then parliamentary elections in 2007, an attempted assassination of the, recently elected, President José Ramos-Horta in February 2008 compelled the UN to return to basic policing in order to reassure the population. Police officers who were assigned to the RRR process again had to divide their time between their functions in the department and their patrolling duties on a rotating basis. What should have been the prime objective was relegated by the turn of events. From the standpoint of the RRR process, it can also be said that executive policing was to a certain extent counterproductive. It tended to reduce the sense of ownership by the local police of the policing process, especially in Dili where the executive policing was more evident. PNTL units did not feel the necessity to patrol, or when they did were patrolling carelessly, knowing that UNPOL had the final responsibility for security duties. In one of the main refugee camps near Dili PNTLs decided to let UNPOL patrol alone, even though the RRR process involved joint patrols.28 The ‘disenfranchisement’ in the process was especially felt at the highest 7 levels of the PNTL, triggering numerous disagreements between the PNTL and UNPOL, in what a policing expert dubbed a ‘crisis of leadership’ between the two institutions.29 In fact, contrary to common knowledge, it was not the Timorese leaders who asked the UN to exercise executive authority following the 2006 crisis. Rather, the UN requested this prerogative when the UN mandate was negotiated with the Timorese, a condition that bred resentment at the process dragging on.30 Reactivation of the task force by the PNTL, and later the creation of the Joint Command between PNTL and F–FDTL to pursue the perpetrators of the 11 February attack on the Ramos-Horta was a show of force by the local leaders, demonstrating their indispensability and their willingness to resume executive authority for policing. The Impact of a Poorly-conceived Mandate Another aspect to be considered is the ill-conceived mandate that limited the responsibility of UNPOL over the reform process. Combined with the executive authority vested in the mission, this helps to explain the limits of the UN mission: UNPOL was endowed with executive responsibility for policing without the means to conduct a reform process. In this context, PNTLs, including elements who actively engaged in the 2006 crisis, just stood by and waited for a resumption of their power over policing, while the UN was consistently blamed for everything that went wrong during its tenure. Far from fulfilling the Brahimi recommendations in this regard,31 the UN mission had a fuzzy mandate. Obviously, the Timorese leadership’s sensitivity over the newly-gained sovereignty, and a reluctance to grant unfettered executive privilege to the UN, having been under international administration for three years, played a major role in explaining this. During the negotiations between the UN and Timorese officials in 2006, the drafters of the agreement had to reconcile the Timorese stance over sovereignty with the necessity, expressed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), for executive policing to fully implement a reform agenda and attract commitments from member states. 8  The result was a poorly-conceived mandate replete with paradoxes, and which, on a general basis, left the UN mission stranded. For example, the UN was in charge of registration of officers, a mostly technical issue, as well as a ‘provisional certification’ following the completion of mentoring, while the actual certification is controlled by the government.32 Moreover, paragraphs 11.10 and 11.11 of the Agreement state that the appointment, retention and promotion of PNTL personnel is a prerogative of the Minister of Interior (who later became the Secretary of State for Security, in order to break with the 2006 legacy), as well as all decisions regarding the discipline and dismissal of PNTL personnel. Needless to say, these features are the keystones of reform, and the UN could not be a primary actor in the process without controlling these aspects. As a UN official noted: ‘having been able to fire the police officers involved in the 2006 events would have drastically changed the situation. Now, with the appeal process and the lack of political will to really investigate the major crimes committed in 2006, it is becoming harder and harder to reform the police structure’.33 In another demonstration of the limits of the UN’s clout, some senior Timorese police officers are still in service, occupying major functions in the PNTL hierarchy even though UNMIT refused to work with them on grounds of their negligence and unprofessionalism. In spite of frequent complaints by UNPOL the government failed to respond.34 Perhaps more extraordinary, incompatible positions during the drafting of the Agreement meant that some responsibilities were granted to both the international and local authorities. The Agreement states that the Secretary of State for Security shall continue to establish policy and to exercise such powers and authority with respect to the management and administration of the PNTL [but also].... The [UN] Police Commissioner shall be considered as the interim PNTL General Commander and shall accordingly be vested with all powers and authority ... with respect to: c) management and administration.35 Hence, the person(s) effectively in charge of the PNTL depends on the interplay between local and international actors, and the ability of the UN to induce the Timorese authorities to cooperate and undertake reform. The entire arrangement 9 relied on political negotiations between the two authorities, which was far from being ‘an optimal situation’.36 Moreover, as the whole system relied on political negotiations between Timorese officials and their international counterparts, UN HQ did surprisingly little to reinforce the mission’s politically relevant positions. Consequently, the police mission remained weak vis-à-vis the local counterparts. For example, UN HQ has been unable to fill the position of senior coordinator for the RRR Department, which impeded the reform process. Also, after Roldolfo Tor left as police commissioner in 2007, a former commissioner, Juan-Carlos Arevalo-Linares had to assume temporary charge for administration and development for several months. Linares found that this void put him at distinct political disadvantage in trying to accelerate the reform process.37 Finally, the position of deputy special representative for security sector reform, in charge of linking UNMIT, the UNPOL component and the local authorities, was left vacant until Takahisa Kawakami took over in November 2008. The UN modified its policies following the report of a special assessment team from the DPKO in March 2008, led by Andrew Hughes, police adviser to the UN Secretary-General. Unhappy with the pace of the reform process, the team noted the lack of cooperation by the local authorities.38 Subsequently the UN prioritized an early hand-over to the PNTL, in order to make them accountable for their actions, promote a sense of ownership, and in doing so to preserve the image of the UN. Four conditions were set: (1) the security situation had to be under control in each district; (2) the rate of certification of the PNTLs had to be at least 80 per cent; (3) satisfactory logistics for the PNTL had to be provided by the government; and (4) there should be stable institutions supporting the work of the PNTL at the national level.39 Under the auspices of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) team sent by UNPOL to follow-up on the assessment, provisional certification was rushed through without substantial mentoring. The logistics criterion will be the hardest to meet, especially given the lack of Timorese managerial skills. However, it is a criterion that is subject to interpretation, and it did not seem to have deterred the UN from executing a quick hand-over process. Indeed, in Mercado Lama, Bidau and Bairo 10 Pite police stations remained empty, in a striking resemblance to UNTAET’s hand- over of 2002, widely disparaged by local authorities at that time. A Fragmentary and Partial Reform Process The RRR process was divided into several steps beginning with the registration process, whereby 3,115 PNTLs in service before 2006 were registered, leaving only 74 officers not registered after the deadline of 1 December 2007.40 The second step was the investigation of some 900 PNTLs for alleged misbehaviour during the 2006 events. Only 15 were suspected of serious crimes.41 Those cleared of all allegations were allowed to take a five day refresher course at the Police Academy, followed by a mentoring process before applying for final certification. Both vetting and mentoring processes have drawn heavy criticism from local politicians and PNTL leaders. The executive authority vested in UNPOL did not work out well with regard to mentoring PNTL elements. Because some PNTLs were assigned to a specific unit during the mentoring programme (traffic duties, for example), some mentors filled out the evaluation form concerning other competencies (community policing or arrest and searching, for example) with ‘no access’. When a PNTL failed to attain an average of 75 per cent in the mentoring process, he/she had to begin the whole process again. Although this was corrected in 2007 and the mentoring process was cut from six months to two, damage had already been to perceptions of the process. Further, UNPOLs were largely absent from sub-districts, either because of personnel shortages or because of the perceived hardship of staying with those communities. The overall result was indisputably a flawed mentoring process. The vetting process produced modest results, in part because the UN was deprived of political leverage necessary to ensure completion and because of procedural challenges. Only a few investigations have led to indictments, and even in these cases, the alleged perpetrators were not arrested. Investigators faced the 11 problem of identifying the suspects in the absence of a reliable database. Investigators faced problems in collecting evidence and securing testimonies. They had to rely on information provided by the suspects, and many gave false names.42 UNPOL seemed to rely on local structures to gather intelligence, a lesson learned from the UNTAET mission. But the cultural gap impacted on their capacity to gather reliable information, especially when the showdown between security institutions might not have yet been over. Additionally, there was also concern about the competency of UNPOLs to conduct major-crime investigations. Of more than 1540 international police officers, only three had experience in investigation major crimes.43 The constant turnover of UNPOL personnel, appointed for one year, did not help either, forcing UNPOLs to constantly train newcomers. However, even when the investigations reached a conclusion, it was nearly impossible to get the suspects formally convicted, highlighting the structural problems concerning the vetting process. Files are sent to a special committee with four local stakeholders and one UNPOL representative. Most files are sent back for ‘further investigation’. Fear of local repercussions and the possible escalation of violence when trying to arrest well-known suspects plays a part, as well as political interference, especially in the context of a government that values the reconciliation process.44 The PNTL Facing increasing impatience from local authorities and the PNTL which wanted to resume policing, the UN decided to hurry the transfer process.45 However, serious doubts have remained about PNTL’s capacity to assure peace and order neutrally, given that political involvement and confusion of roles between military and police are still present. The PNTL is a fragile institution with only an acting police commander (Afonso de Jesus) and subject to political involvement (by the Secretary of State for Security and the office of the Prime Minister (Gusmão). The PNTL leadership has been deferential to the political authorities, despite UNMIT efforts to encourage it to gain independence from the political sphere in the window of opportunity after 2006.46 All the effort deployed by the UN leadership to induce the 12 Timorese officials to reduce their political involvement over the PNTL has been largely ineffective. This is worrisome, considering the fact that it was one of the major causes of the 2006 crisis. Moreover, the confusion of roles between the military and police institutions was not addressed after the 2006 crisis. The Joint Command between F–FDTL and PNTL, put in place by the Council of Ministers after the attempted assassination of the Ramos-Horta, reinforced the cooperation between the two institutions but also sent a confused message about the respective roles of the institutions. In effect, the old problems remain: the police suffer from low status and an excess of political interference, while the army still trades its heroism in resisting the Indonesian occupation but has not yet found a new role and has been plagued by regional (East–West) rivalry.47 While the Joint Command was an understandable response to the events of 11 February, it has also highlighted the ‘well-known shortcomings of the security institutions in terms of professional standards and respect for the rule of law’.48 The decision of the Council of Ministers not only contravened Resolution 1704 mandating UNPOL executive policing,49 it was also counterproductive in terms of the advancement of the PNTL reform process. Another concern is the lack of emphasis placed on structural conditions to democratise the PNTL. After two years of UN tutelage, the PNTL of 2008 bore a strange resemblance to its predecessor of 2006. If UNTAET and UNMISET were unable to develop an appropriate Ministry of Interior or establish the internal systems and procedures for the accountable and transparent management and administration of the police service,50 it appears that UNMIT has had no more success. The managerial skills of public servants in charge of the administration of the PNTL remain inadequate and police stations lack basic equipment, especially outside Dili. Nor is there a system to track equipment that does reach the police station. Furthermore, the training issue was inadequately addressed by the UN mission. It seems improbable that the a five day ‘refresher’ course at the police 13 academy would address shortcomings and improve the professionalization of the PNTLs, who have gone through one of the shortest training course to qualify as police officers (it takes only three months at the police academy to become a police officer). Moreover, PNTLs complained that south Asian UNPOL contingents, with dubious human rights records in their own countries, were teaching human-rights related classes at the academy.51 In addition, a lack of funding for PNTLs ‘agents’ (the lowest echelon in the PNTL hierarchy), as well as a general problem related to the promotion system, are lingering problems.52 As one PNTL leader put it, ‘if you give $123 per month for a PNTL agent and provide him an access to a gun (or a rifle in certain cases), are you sure he will remain professional and will not abuse his authority?’53 The government responded partially to this issue, not by raising the salary of police officers but by ordering searches to stop police from unlawfully taking weapons home after work.54 Conclusion Towards the end of 2008 tension remained high in the Timor-Leste police force. Amid political wrangling over who would be appointed the next PNTL commander, group of police officers warned anonymously that ‘if a person from the East is appointed as commander, we will petition and organize people from districts to go against the government’.55 According to Alkatiri, the Fretilin leader, ‘this is the repetition of 2006, even in 2006 they started with this kind of thing, the pamphlets and letters accusing, dividing the people into loro mono and loro sae’.56 According to Francisco Gutteres, Secretary of State for Security, the crisis originated with police officers who were concerned about the government’s programme for adjusting police ranks.57A further demonstration of fragility in the police force occurred in 2008 when threats of a strike and a heated confrontation at police headquarters over non- payment of earnings. The equivalent of about US$28,000 was alleged to have been stolen by some police members.58 One view is that the PNTL was simply not ready to resume its policing duties. The national HQ was weak and divided and the whole institution risked disintegrating through internal rivalries.59 Hence, there is a risk that ‘the state-building process being sustained by internationals, the state will collapse when they begin to leave, as was happening before 2006’.60 A leaked UN report of December 2008 reportedly 14 argued that Timor-Leste remained on the brink of anarchy and could easily slide back into the violence that fractured the country in 2006.61 In that context, the future challenge for the international community will be to break with the ‘history of slipshod UN planning and management, squandered opportunities, and unimaginative UN leadership in Timor-Leste and at the UN headquarters in New York’,62 and devise a new plan to support the development and professionalization of the PNTL. As pointed out by the UN acting police commissioner, there is a need to restart the process from by drafting an assessment plan targeting the specific needs of the PNTL.63 This had not been done, partly because the UN had to respond to security crises without having the chance to conduct adequate prior planning, The UN mission was not accomplished, and much work remained to be done to build a fully competent national police institution. The UN expects to keep around 600 UNPOLs after 2009 as advisers, as well as FPU security backups.64 How they will relate with the other bilateral programs, such as the Timor-Leste Police Development Programme, an Australian initiative, remains to be clarified. However, there is an urgent need to keep up a coherent and cohesive international presence in the country and some creative thinking to continue the police reform process. Acknowledgments An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA), New York, February 2009. My thanks to Aurélie Martin, Caroline Boulos and Richard Wattenmaker for comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank UNPOL and PNTL officials who kindly participated in this study, especially Mr Juan-Carlos Arevalo-Linares, without whom the conduct of this research would not have been possible. NOTES 1 The general mandate given to UNMIT is stipulated in Resolution 1704, UN doc., S/RES/1704 (2006). The specific mandate given to UNPOL was defined by a supplementary agreement between the UN and the Government of Timor-Leste. 15 2 Report of the Secretary General on the UNMIT for the Period of 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009, UN doc. S/2009/72, 4 Feb. 2009, para. 21. UNPOL is present in the thirteen districts of Timor-Leste, but the PNTL is responsible for 64 of the 65 sub districts and 442 of the 498 sucos or village clusters. 3 Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice, UN doc., S/RES/1272 (1999). 4 Cited in Anthony Goldstone, ‘UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State’, Global Governance, Vol.10, No.1, Jan.–Mar. 2004, p.83. 5 ‘Head of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor Briefs Security Council’, 3 Feb. 2000, UN doc., SC/6799, pp.6–10. 6 See, e.g., Joel Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor’, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.33, No.4, 2001, pp. 1101–78; Jarat Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’, Survival, Vol.42, No.3, 2000, pp.27–39; Paulo Gorjão, ‘The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No.2, 2002, pp.313–33; Tanja Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration and Local Political Legitimacy in East Timor’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No.3, 2002, pp.569–89; Ludovic Hood, ‘Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999–2004’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.1, 2006, pp.60–77; Astri Surkhe, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, 2001, pp.1–20. 7 Goldstone (see n.4 above), pp.83–4. A University of London King’s College study group on UNTAET concluded that ‘UNPOL has produced an institution [PNTL] that is unsustainable and weak’. Conflict Security and Development Group, ‘A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, East Timor Study’, 10 Mar. 2003, para.101. 16 8 Edward Rees, ‘UN's failure to integrate Falintil veterans may cause East Timor to fail’, Australia e-journal of social and political debate, 2 Sept 2003 (at: www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=666). 9 United Nations, ‘Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste’, UN doc., Geneva, 2 Oct. 2006 (at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf). 10 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis’, Asia Report No. 120, Dili, 10 Oct. 2006. 11 70 per cent of Timor's 230,000 young men and women are considered active or involved in martial arts gangs. Shiela Oviedo, ‘Kung-Fu Peace Building’, oneworld.net, 12 Sept. 2008 (at: http://us.oneworld.net/article/357546-civilians-timor- get-a-lesson-%E2%80%98real%E2%80%99-kung-fu-master). See also James Scambary, A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor Leste, Sept. 2006, report commissioned by AusAID; Matthew B. Arnold ‘“Who is my friend, who is my enemy?”’ Youth and state-building in Timor-Leste’, International Peacekeeping, this issue. 12 Interview with Juan-Carlos Arevalo-Linares, acting UN Police commissioner, Dili, Timor-Leste, 30 June 2008. 13 Timor-Leste Daily Media News, ‘Martial Arts Groups Say “Yes to Peace”’, 28 Aug. 2008 (at: http://tl-dailymedia.blogspot.com/2008/08/martial-arts-groups-say-yes-to- peace.html). 14 Allegations of human rights abuses by the Portuguese police are common in the media, but the GNR has also been praised by the political establishment. President Jose Ramos-Horta described the GNR as ‘é modelo de referência para a polícia timorense’ [a model of reference for the Timorese police] in an interview with the News Agency Lusa, 10 Jan. 15 Interviews with UNPOLs in Dili, June–July 2008. 16 According to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Unit Training (COESPU) Vicenza, Italy, ‘stability police are robust and armed police units that are capable of 17 performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the capacity for the appropriate use of less-than lethal as well as lethal force.’ FPU is the acronym used for stability police units deployed in support of UN peacekeeping operations. NATO uses the term ‘Multinational Specialized Units’ (MSU) and the EU ‘Integrated Police Units’ (IPU). COESPU, The Future Roles for Stability Police Units Workshop, report of conference, Washington, DC, 4–5 April 2005. 17 Joshua Smith, Victoria Holt and William Durch, ‘From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity’, Issue Brief: Future of Peace Operations Program, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007, p.3; Michael Dziedzic and Christine Clark, ‘Bridging the Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations’, United States Institute of Peace Briefing, June 2006 (at: www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0616_coespu.html). 18 For a discussion on the general limits of UN police missions, see Harry Broer and Michael Emery, ‘Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’, in Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic and Eliot Goldberg (eds.), Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002, (at: www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_1998/Policing%20the%20New%20World%20Disord er%20-%20May%2098/chapter10.html). 19 Interview with a former UN official, Dili, 20 July 2008. This statement has been supported by other interviews with PNTL inspectors. 20 The ‘Dealing With Disorder Standard Operating Procedure’ clearly states that: “the UNPOL units should be advised to approach the scene cautiously and try to ascertain what is happening from a distance; ensure there are sufficient staff available to safely and effectively deal with the incident; if serious civil disorder is found to be occurring the UNPOL units are to withdraw to a safe spot and await further support’. UNMIT, Report UNMIT Internal Review Panel, internal report, 1 April 2008. 18 21 Interview with Adérito Neto, PNTL District Commander, Baucau District, 7 July 2008. 22 For a discussion on the traditional system of justice, see Rod Nixon, ‘Non-State Actors as Agent of Order: Suco Justice and Dispute Resolution Systems in East Timor’, in William Binchy (ed.), Justice and Human Rights in Timor-Leste, Dublin: Trinity College (forthcoming). 23 According to Arevalo-Linares, ‘as many cases are resolved through the traditional justice system, it is very difficult for UNPOLs to assess the security situation throughout the country.’ Interview (see n.12 above). 24 Interview with Henrique da Costa, Deputy PNTL commissioner for administration, Dili, 21 July 2008; interview with Joao Babo, Adviser to the PNTL commissioner, Dili, 22 July 2008. 25 As one policing expert in Dili recalled, the task force acted in a completely different fashion to UNPOL, known for shying away from direct confrontation with gang members (the only exception might be the GNR in that respect). As he explained, the task force tends to give three options to delinquents: either you stop right now and we arrest you, or you chose to continue fighting and we will beat you, or you run away and we will beat you even stronger. Interview (see n.19 above). 26 The US Department of State reports that there was ‘numerous complaints of excessive force and degrading treatment by the Dili Task Force’, while UNMIT notes that ‘monitoring of the Task Force revealed an increase in alleged cases of excessive use of force and ill-treatment during arrest, unlawful searches of houses and abusive behavior.’ US Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Reports: Timor Leste, Washington, DC, 25 Feb. 2009; UNMIT, Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor Leste: The Security Sector and Access to Justice 1 September 2007 – 30 June 2008, Dili, 2008 On the general issues posed by police abuse in Timor Leste, see Human Rights Watch, Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor, New York: HRW, April 2006. 19 27 Interview with Rhoderik Armamento, UNPOL District Commander, Dili District, Dili, 26 June 2008; interview with Carlos Pereira, UNPOL Deputy District Commander, Dili District, Dili, 22 July 2008. 28 Interview with UNPOL leader, [Dili, 20 July 2008. 29 Interview with Andrzej Szydlik, UNPOL Police Systems Adviser, Dili, 21 July 2008. 30 Interview with Anthony Goldstone, Political adviser to the Department of Political Affairs, UNMIT, Dili, 26 July 2008. 31 ‘Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that the Council refrain from mandating such a mission’, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc., A/55/305, S/2000/809 (2000), para.56. 32 ‘Arrangement on the Restoration and Maintenance of Public Security in Timor- Leste’ (see n.9 above), annex, paras. 3,15,18. 33 Interview with UN official, Dili, 4 July 2008. 34 Jesse Wright, ‘East Timor’s Unready Police’, Asia Sentinel (Hong Kong), 17 June 2008 (at: www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?Itemid=31&id=1265&option=com_content&task=vi ew). 35 ‘Arrangement on the Restoration and Maintenance of Public Security in Timor- Leste’ (see n.9 above), paras 4.1, 5.1. 36 Interview with Arevalo-Linares (see n.12 above). 37 Ibid. 38 Interview with UN Officials, Dili, July 2008. 39 Interview with Marlo Meneses, Chief of Strategic Planning, UNMIT/UNPOL, Dili, 29 June 2008. 20 40 Interviews with Maria Tibulca and Mollah Tabibur Rahman, Registration and Screening Unit, RRRD, Dili, 28, 29 June 2008. 41 Interview with Mikel Ciobotariu, Chief, Integrity and Inquiry Unit – RRRD, Dili, 24 June 2008. 42 Interview with Paulo Henriques, Chief of National Intelligence Department (NID), UNPOL, Dili, 12 July 2008. 43 Interview with David Elliott, Team Leader, Major Crime Investigations Unit, NID- UNPOL, Dili, 24 July 2008. 44 Interview with Caesar Ranaweera, Team Leader, UNPOL Internal Evaluation Unit, Dili, 5 July 2008. 45 This is consistent with the Secretary-General report on security sector reform, in which he states that ‘where a genuine will to build effective and accountable security does not exist or where there is no basic agreement between national actors on the objectives and the approach for national security arrangements, the potential contribution of the United Nations – and other partners – is limited at best.’ Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, UN doc., S/2008/39, 23 Jan. 2008. 46 Interview with Lino Saldanha, Inspector, PNTL, Dili, 23 July 2008. 47 ICG, ‘Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform’, Asia Report No. 143, Dili, 17 Jan. 2008, i. See also Bu Wilson, Smoke and Mirrors: Institutionalising Fragility in the Policia Nacional Timor Leste, paper at a conference on, ‘Democratic Governance in Timor-Leste: Reconciling the National and the Local’, Charles Darwin University, Darwin, Australia, 7–8 Feb. 2008, p.13. 48 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008, UN doc. S/2008/501 (2008), para.6. 49 Bu Wilson, ‘Joint Command for PNTL and F-FDTL Undermines Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste’, East Timor Law Journal, 20 Feb. 2008, (at: 21 www.eastimorlawjournal.org/ARTICLES/2008/Joint-Command-PNTL-F-FDTL- Undermines-Rule-of-Law-Wilson.html). 50 Edward Rees, Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: “Improvisation and Confusion” from the Field, New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Mar. 2006, pp.18–19. 51 Interviews with PNTL and UN officials, Dili, June–July 2008. 52 As of July 2008, there was 23 inspectors (earning US$250 per month, plus certain advantages and bonuses for special responsibilities); about 100 sub-inspectors (earning US$170–190 per month), only four senior agents (earning US$150 per month), and more than 2,000 agents (earning US$123 per month). A new promotion system has been in the process of being adopted, and some PNTLs fear that it will ignite new internal confrontations. Interview with Enrique da Costa (see n.24 above). 53 Interview with Lino Saldanha (see n.46 above). 54 Australian Associated Press (AAP), ‘Timor Police to Stop Taking Guns Home’, 6 Oct. 2008. 55 AAP, ‘Timor Police Tensions Worry Authorities’, 1 Oct. 2008. 56 ‘Escalating Tensions Among East Timor Police’, Radio Australia, 1 Oct. 2008. 57 Ibid. 58 AAP, ‘Timor Police Tensions Worry Authorities’, (see n.55 above); ‘Timor Leste Joint Command Police Corruption Report 2008’, East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, 24 July 2008, (at: http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2008/07/timor-leste- joint-command-police.html). 59 Interview with Mateus Mendes, Ermera District Commander, Gleno, 29 July 2008. 60 Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor’s New Clothes?’ International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.2, 2008, p.194. 61 Reuters, ‘East Timor Still on Brink of Anarchy: Report,’ 23 Dec. 2008. 22 62 Ludovic Hood, ‘Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999-2004’,Civil Wars, Vol.8, No.2, 2006, p.144. 63 Interview with Arevalo-Linares (see n.12 above). 64 Interview with a senior UN official (Standing Police Capacity), Dili, 14 July 2008; ‘Portugal Ready to Keep GNR Police Forces in Timor’, The Portugal News Online, Lagoa, Portugal, 8 Aug 2008 (at: www.the-news.net/cgi-bin/google.pl?id=971-18). 23