1 ORDE WINGATE, ‘GUERRILLA’ WARFARE AND LONG-RANGE PENETRATION, 1940-44 By Simon Anglim Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate’s own official writings on this subject reveals that long range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situation regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins’ doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001. Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903-1944) is well-known and controversial in both Britain and Israel. This began during the Palestine Arab uprising of 1936-39, when, then a captain in the British Army, he was authorised by two General Officers Commanding (GOC) Palestine, General Sir Archibald Wavell and General Sir Robert Haining, to train Jewish men, in British-organised police units, in his personal brand of counter-insurgency. These included  2 Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, and they , and, later, Ariel Sharon2 identified Wingate as a 1 major influence upon Israeli military thought. However, he roused strong feelings, then and since, as he used Jewish units in pre-emptive and reprisal attacks on Arab villages believed to be hiding insurgents, and what now might be described as ‘torture’ to extract intelligence from suspected insurgents.3 In 1940, Wingate was summoned by Wavell, now Commander in Chief, Middle East, to take over an operation organised by G(R), a branch of Wavell's headquarters responsible for paramilitary activity in enemy-occupied territory. The objective was a major revolt in Gojjam, in Italian-occupied Ethiopia, in the name of the exiled Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie. This Wingate attempted, with mixed results, utilising ‘Gideon Force’, a small regular formation, cooperating occasionally with Ethiopian tribal irregulars.4 However, in Britain, Wingate is best remembered for his command of brigade-sized Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPGs), light infantry formations, ostensibly using ‘guerrilla’ methods, and supplied and supported by air, in two large operations inside Japanese-occupied Burma: Operation Longcloth of February-May 1943 and Operation Thursday of March-August 1944. Thursday involved a specialist unit of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), No.1 Air Commando, providing transport - the operation opened with two LRP brigades being inserted by air - supply and close air support.5 Wingate's LRPGs are better remembered as the Chindits, a propaganda name derived from Wingate's mispronunciation of Chinthey, the stone dragon-figures which guard Buddhist temples.6 Wingate was unequivocal that the Chindit operations advanced a new form of warfare, pioneered in Ethiopia, that he called long range penetration (sic - LRP). This claim has been mentioned extensively in the literature, but not explored deeply. Wingate was killed in an air crash early during Thursday, and much of the literature dwells upon a posthumous controversy concerning whether his Chindit operations were cost-effective in terms of lives lost versus objectives attained, on outcome rather than origin. This began in the 1950s, with two works, Volume III of the British Government's Official History of the War against Japan, authored largely by the former Director of Staff Duties, India, Major General S Woodburn Kirby7, and Defeat into Victory, the memoirs of the British theatre commander in Burma, Field Marshal  3 Lord Slim. Both clashed bitterly with Wingate when he was alive 9, and both questioned not 8 only his professional abilities, but his mental stability also. Wingate was certainly ‘different’: he regarded the Old Testament as literal history, political tract and tactical manual, became a fanatical Zionist and laced his speeches with portentous, Biblical rhetoric; in an army fixated on appearance, he was often scruffy and fully bearded, and on operations, wore an old-fashioned solar helmet10; he ate six raw onions a day, and ordered all his officers to eat at least one11; he often greeted visitors in the nude, brushing himself with a wire brush 12, and carried an alarm clock to time his meetings.13 Moreover, he was bloody-minded, feuding constantly, and unafraid to ‘name and shame’ those he saw as thwarting him in official correspondence. 14 More seriously, he attempted suicide in 1941, after the Ethiopian operation, due to a combination of depression, exhaustion and dementia arising from cerebral malaria.15 These are taken as signs of madness by Wingate's detractors, most prominently Ronald Lewin16 and Duncan Anderson17, both treating Slim’s testimony in particular with unquestioning reverence. In reaction, several of Wingate's friends and subordinates, including Sir Robert Thompson18, Major General Derek Tulloch19 and Brigadiers Michael Calvert20 and Peter Mead21 produced work in rebuttal, followed in the 1990s by the prolific and vociferous David Rooney.22 Consequently, the literature centres largely upon Wingate as ‘maverick’ rather than as military thinker: indeed, the five biographies - three by journalists, two by non-academic historians23 - focus upon Wingate's idiosyncrasies rather than his ideas or place in military history. There is little agreement among the few investigating LRP itself. Kirby described the Chindits as guerrilla forces24; likewise, Michael Elliot-Bateman places Wingate firmly in the context of ‘people's war’25 while Robert Asprey26 and David Shirreff27 also assess Wingate as a guerrilla commander. Yet, John Terraine28 and John W Gordon29 place the Chindits among the plethora of special forces formed by the British in the Second World War, while Luigi Rossetto argues specifically against the ‘guerrilla’ claim, claiming that Wingate was attempting a practical application of Basil Liddell Hart's ‘theory of the indirect approach’ using specialist troops.30 This has some support from the official historian of British airborne forces, Lieutenant  4 Colonel Terence Otway, who treated Thursday as an airborne operation.31 This paper investigates the nature and development of LRP, based largely upon a reading of Wingate's own papers. These were unavailable before 1995, being guarded jealously until her death by Wingate's widow. A different pattern from hitherto emerges. Rather than guerrilla, airborne or Special Forces, LRP combined all three, hinging upon lightly-armed regular forces, cooperating with local irregulars and supported liberally by airpower, operating against vital targets in the enemy rear, forcing him to disperse his strength and be destroyed in detail, either by Allied heavy forces or LRP forces themselves. With some creative imagination, this could be seen as bridging the ideas of Wingate's distant (and detested) relative, TE Lawrence, 32 and the ‘Aspin-Rumsfeld Doctrine’ applied in Afghanistan in 2001 and Kurdistan in 2003,33 both involving guerillas, attached regular forces and airpower support as a substitute for main-force action. However, although Lawrence's input is detectable in places, Wingate's principal starting point appears to have been the doctrine for directing armed resistance in Axis-occupied territory devised in 1939 by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Gubbins, then with the MI(R) covert operations branch of the British War Office, and applied by G(R) - an offshoot of MI(R) - in planning for Ethiopia. This was encapsulated in two pamphlets by Gubbins, The Art of Guerrilla Warfare and The Partisan Leader's Handbook. In the first work, Gubbins defined the objective of guerrilla warfare as ‘to harass the enemy in every way possible...to such an extent that he is eventually incapable of embarking on a war, or of continuing one...’ 34 via attacking supplies and communications, forcing him to disperse to protect them and thereby become more vulnerable to offensives by regular forces.35 This required levels of planning and coordination irregulars might not possess, and so British officers should be attached to provide command, staff work and technical skills. An Allied Mission should be located at the headquarters of the movement, liaising with regular forces in theatre and overseeing deliveries of arms, ammunition and other supplies. This should be headed by a ‘Chief', a senior British officer familiar with the country and people, and would form a ‘guerrilla GHQ’, identifying and supporting leaders, quartermastering the movement, and devising a  5 plan of campaign tied to Allied strategic objectives.36 G(R)'s ‘Chief' for Ethiopia was Colonel Daniel Sandford, who had lived there for two decades, and a friend not only of Haile Selassie, but of many Ethiopian nobles. 37 GHQ Middle East gathered arms and personnel for several G(R) Missions for insertion into western and southern Ethiopia, each having several Report and Advisory Centres - later retitled Operational Centres - each comprising a British officer and several non- commissioned officers, and intended to move forward of the main Mission to communicate with guerrilla leaders and dispense weapons.38 A new development was the attachment of two battalions of regular infantry, one of them of Ethiopian refugees, the other being the Frontier Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force, intended to escort supply convoys and guard G(R) bases in enemy territory.39 Wingate, according to his ‘Appreciation of the Ethiopian Campaign’, saw these arrangements as inadequate: [I]t should be settled beforehand, as precisely as possible, what tasks the Mission is to carry out, and the head of the Mission should, from the first, be placed in touch with the Commander of the force which is later to operate behind the enemy's lines....There was no effectual collaboration between the SUDAN and Col. SANDFORD, nor did there appear to exist any feasible plan of campaign that was likely to produce tangible results in the time available.40 That there would be ‘penetration forces’, separate from the Mission and from local irregulars, was not implicit in Gubbins' writings or G(R)'s planning. Wingate wanted logistics controlled by the Operational Centres rather than the Missions41, while teams of trained guerrilla warfare specialists, supported by purpose-trained regular troops, prosecuted an offensive against Italian communications and garrisons. As to why: ‘We had...to convince the Ethiopian, suspicious as he was of all white men, of our bona fides. This meant he must see us fighting not by his side but in front of him. His contact with our  young officers must convince him that...we 6were not only brave soldiers but devoted to the cause of his liberties.’42 British personnel should, therefore, do more than dole out guns and money: [C]ease trying to stimulate the revolt from without, using agents, but...enter amongst the patriots small columns of the highest fighting quality, with first class equipment, to perform exploits and to teach self sacrifice and devotion by example instead of by precept. By doing so we should not only fan the revolt to proportions that really threatened the enemy's main bases, but should also assume its direction and control - a most important factor in any future settlement.43 Wingate upgraded the Operational Centres from advice, coordination and administration centres to fighting units intended to spearhead the revolt. At his ‘Guerrilla School’ in Khartoum, Wingate formed and trained ten Operational Centres, each consisting of a British officer, five sergeants and 200 Ethiopians, divided into ten guerrilla squads, 44 their role being to create a situation of which other forces could take advantage: ‘By doing exploits [sic] these young officers were to obtain an ascendancy over the patriots in their areas and were to keep in constant touch by wireless with the directing staff. The latter would thus be able to direct the available force into the most profitable channel.'45 As to what this channel would be: Guerrillas aim at bringing the enemy to a stand-still in the heart of this own occupied territory. It is impossible for any enemy always to present an unbreakable front at all points. Where his troops are living, training, resting, recreating and recovering from the effects of conflict with our regular forces, the enemy is compelled to lay himself open to attack. In normal conditions he counts upon his foe being unable to attack him in his rear areas; he counts upon the local population being either friendly or cowed. Guerrilla warfare, in the first place, is therefore possible only when a large proportion of the civilian population surrounding the enemy's back areas is friendly to the  guerrillas. Where this is so, 7however, unrivalled opportunities exist for ambush and surprise of every description. The essence of guerrilla warfare is...surprise combined with security. Both are obtained by the employment of numerous bodies of troops so small that: (a) the enemy cannot find them to strike at; (b) if one or two are destroyed, it makes no difference to the success of the general campaign.46 The aim was not to wear the Italian garrison of Gojjam down via guerrilla action, but to defeat it in a rapid mobile campaign: My primary objective was to drive the enemy out of Gojjam. After that I intended to move on and cut the North and South communications between the capital and [the north]. I knew the enemy would attack as long as possible along his Roman roads [roads built by the Italians since the 1936 invasion], and that, if I wanted to fight him, I must do so on these roads. I knew that he would resent the attack of Haile Selassie as an assault on his prestige and that if he were not hard pressed he would resume the offensive....With these facts in mind I made the following plan. I would divide my force into two parts, in the proportion of one to three. The weaker force should contain the Northern Italian Force until reinforced...The stronger force, under my own immediate command I would direct upon the Nile bridge at SAFARTAK [at the far western edge of Gojjam, on the main road from Addis Ababa into Gojjam] thus cutting the enemy's retreat, and then proceed by a process of night attack plus fifth column penetration to reduce the various garrisons.47 Wingate's attitude was that of an orthodox British commander of the time: this was his ‘Master-Plan’, with Safartak as the ‘decisive point’ upon which all effort must be concentrated, allowing a breakthrough to Shoa Province, southwest of Gojjam, and, circumstances allowing, Addis Ababa. The northern thrust was entrusted to Major Anthony Simonds, Wingate's old friend and colleague from Palestine, commanding Beghemder Force, named for the province in which it operated. Wingate's own Gideon Force executed the southern thrust. Gideon’s chosen men, and his tricking of the Midianites into attacking each other in the dark, were favourite metaphors of Wingate’s and were, apparently, sources for his tactics. By day, he ordered Operational Centres to harass communications around the fortified towns which lined the ‘Roman 8Roads’, mining the roads and ambushing smaller convoys, while the Frontier Battalion harassed the towns themselves with long- ranged mortar and machinegun fire. By night, he attacked ‘secretly, often and from as many directions as possible, to attempt to create in the minds of the garrisons of these localities the same erroneous impression of our strength...'48 Parties of 40-50 approached Italian camps under cover of darkness; one element laid machineguns and mortars on Italian campfires while the other closed to within ten yards, to throw grenades and then charge home with the bayonet, Wingate having lifelong faith in the terror effect of cold steel. The position would be held against counterattacks, the raiders withdrawing before dawn.49 The Italians lit fires night after night, even though these drew Wingate's raiders, did not set piquets and so were surprised easily, and when attacked, responded by barraging the surrounding countryside, in all directions and apparently aiming at nothing in particular, with every gun, machinegun and mortar available, so, in the words of the GOC East Africa, General Sir William Platt, ‘waging a war of nerves upon [themselves]’50 Wingate's strategy evolved, due to two factors. Firstly, the rapid Italian collapse in the face of Operation Compass, Wavell's offensive in North Africa of December 1940-March 1941, combined with Churchill's pressing Wavell to resolve the situation in North Africa quickly, to release British troops for deployment to Greece. Wavell consequently escalated action against Italian East Africa, from containment to invasion, aimed at liberating Ethiopia and re- taking British Somaliland51 The guerrilla campaign was escalated, Wingate was promoted colonel, and made ‘Commander of British and Ethiopian Forces in the Field', a post approximating to Gubbins' ‘Chief', involving planning and administering the guerrilla offensive, but with which Wingate combined operational and tactical command.52 The second factor was the attitude of the Ethiopian ‘resistance.’ The Ethiopians in the Operational Centres and the Mortar Platoon proved keen, disciplined and efficient throughout the operation. Local tribesmen were a 9different matter. As irregulars, their performance often depended upon leadership which, to Ethiopians, was linked to rank53: the retainers of senior nobles were full-time warriors and generally disciplined, aggressive and sometimes recklessly brave54; those of others lower down the social scale - the type most prevalent in Gojjam - were often little more than bandits, and could be a menace.55 Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, who served with G(R) and then as Wingate's staff captain, recalled that the first consignment of rifles sent into Gojjam was doled out to all comers ‘and that was the last thing anyone ever saw of them.’56 G(R)'s Major Arthur Bentinck, operating in Beghemder, reported despairingly of G(R)-supplied rifles being used to bribe potential vassals, or sold on to bandits or even the Italians, and ammunition, also provided by G(R), being squandered in endless celebratory fusilades.57 Wingate himself commented on the unwillingness of tribes to venture outside their own territory, let alone carry out organised offensives or pursuits.58 Consequently, Wingate issued a standing order, on 9 February 1941, that weapons ‘will on no account be issued to any patriot [the official propaganda term for Ethiopian irregulars] who is not going to become part of the Operational Centre and operate directly and permanently under its command...Issue of Springfield rifles to local feudal patriots is prohibited.... If possible issues to feudal retainers should be avoided altogether.’59 Wariness about local support seems to have shifted Wingate away from the concept of a guerrilla campaign to that of a small number of units operating under regular command and control. Indeed, Gideon Force now had a permanent line of communication (LOC) back to Sudan, with Royal Engineer units constructing a motorable track, allowing stores to be lorried to the western edge of Gojjam, from where they were carried forward by camel convoy60, and a South African Air Force flight of three Ju-52s began regular shuttle flights from Sudan to Wingate's main base at Burye on 17 March 1941.61 The operation, therefore, was now effectively an offensive by an 10unusually organised and under-strength regular brigade supported, occasionally, by bombing. Where irregulars were involved, it was in support: The modus operandi of the small regular forces is to ambush and cut communications and deliver night attacks, etc. on isolated positions. At the same time, by their presence they stimulate neighbouring patriot activity. After a few days in a given locality a large but temporary patriot force collects and cooperates with the regular nucleus. The enemy, perpetually harassed, eventually decides on flight, when an opportunity occurs for causing his complete disintegration through air action.62 As to how this shaped Wingate's ideas, the two principal sources are his ‘Appreciation of the Ethiopian Campaign’, submitted to GHQ Cairo on 18 June 1941, and ‘The Ethiopian Campaign, August 1940 to June 1941’, produced after his return to London in November 1941. The ‘Appreciation’ illustrates Wingate's tendency to write strategic manifestos rather than straightforward reports, its core being Wingate's advocacy of Long-Range Penetration, distilled from ‘lessons learned’ from Gojjam. He began by disparaging his relative: ‘It became increasingly clear that the type of operation usually associated with the name of Lawrence, is wasteful and ineffectual. In fact, psychologically, it is wrong, and deprives us of much of the best support available'63 The ‘Wrong Method’ was prevalent in Ethiopia: On entering the area, the commander gets in touch with the local patriot leader, and after an exhortation, suggests that the leader can do something to help out some operation. The patriot at once replies that he desires nothing better but has no arms...The commander asks how much he wants [and]...promises a fraction which he hands over and waits for results. These are nil....or, possibly, bogus reports of activities this type of commander believes to be true. The patriot argues thus: "This person evidently needs my...help; so much that he is willing to part with arms he must know I have only the most rudimentary idea of how to use. Ergo, he has no one to fight for him, and so is prepared to give me this  substantial bribe. Therefore, he is in 11a weak position, and may well be beaten. If that happens I shall be in the soup. That is an argument for not fighting, but no argument for not taking what he offers....I think on the whole, that the best and kindest way will be to accept the help with gratitude; to hold it in trust in case some day I can use it safely against the common enemy, and, meanwhile, to get to learn how to use it by settling once and for all that dispute over the water with the Smiths.64 The ‘Right’ method entailed a commander entering enemy territory with ‘a small but highly efficient column with modern equipment and armament, but none to give away’65 and asking for nothing more than supplies and information: The patriot goes away thinking - "This is curious. The force is very small, but no doubt much larger ones are at hand, or he wouldn't be so confident....I'd better watch this." The...commander carries out a successful night attack. Next day comes the patriot saying - "Why didn't you tell me you intended to attack? I could have been of great help to you." "Oh well you have no arms, and you're not a soldier. And after all why should you get killed? That is our job....you have no arms or ammunition, and I have none to spare." "It is true that I have very little ammunition, but what I have I want to use in support of my flag." "Very well, come along with me....[I] can probably find some useful work for your followers. But I shall judge you by results, and if you make a mess of it, I shan't be able to use you again." Result - the patriot rushes to the fray with keenness and devotion. He regards the commander as his leader. It is a privilege to help him.66 This ‘corps d'elite’ would be superior to ‘peddlers of war material and cash’ because resistance depended upon appealing ‘to the better nature, not the worse...We can hope that the rare occasional brave man will be stirred to come to us and risk his life to help our cause....All the rest - the rush of the tribesmen, the peasants with billhooks, is hugaboo’.67 Local support was essential because of the 12pattern of operations Wingate saw developing since 1939 - deepening the battle by rapidly penetrating the enemy's rear areas.68 Wingate introduced Long Range Penetration - his first use of the term - with a rough definition (which would mutate several times): The German, so far, has not had to attempt long range penetration (as distinct from sabotage) because he had always had the advantage of numbers and weight of armament, and so is usually conducting an offensive. But an army whose main forces are compelled...to adopt a defensive role cannot in the nature of things conduct short range penetration (i.e. penetration that links up at once with a general forward rush, which has, in fact, a tactical, as opposed to a strategical employment. Such penetration is carried out by mass descents of parachute troops, by small armoured thrusts with accompanying air contingents, and other means of close penetration.) Long range penetration can, however, be more effectual man for man, and weapon for weapon, than close penetration....[W]e are not discussing sabotage here, but something far more effectual: actual war and rebellion on the enemy's L. of C. [lines of communication]and in his back areas.69 This should be assigned to specialist units, ‘given the best armament available for [the] purpose [and] under…the commander in chief of the whole theatre of operations’70 and targeted carefully: The force should be given an objective such that the gaining of it will vitally effect [sic] the campaign in question. It is a common error to think that something has been achieved when forces have been assembled in desolate areas far from points vital to the enemy. Something is achieved only when the enemy's communications have been effectively broken and his armed forces in the rear areas destroyed. This is done only by hard fighting.71 To succeed in this ‘hard fighting’, the force should have dedicated air support, with air staff at its headquarters.72 Planning should be guided by what Wingate called ‘doctrine’. As Wingate might not have appreciated having pointed out, this echoed Lawrence's ‘doctrine, the idea that produces friendliness’73, the political ‘message’ that military action should send to allies and potential allies in enemy- 13occupied territory, that British forces were ‘on their side’74: ‘The force must operate with a definite propaganda...or creed of war...based on truth, and not lies. Lies are for the enemy. The truth is for our friends.'75 The ‘Ethiopian Campaign’ is shorter, emphasising narrative and ‘lessons learned’. The Gojjam operation now centred upon the patriot uprising: ‘In Ethiopia the local population not only made possible the advance of the British armies, but a separate patriot campaign played a decisive part in the defeat of the enemy's plan and the conquest of Italian East Africa.’76 This represents Wingate's first mention of ‘defeating the enemy's plan’, a concept not dissimilar to Lawrence's ‘arranging the enemy's mind’77, entailing using manoeuvre and diversion to force him to dissipate his forces, preventing him concentrating for battle. Wingate concluded the ‘Ethiopian Campaign' by arguing that British strategy should centre upon penetration operations: It is a mistake to imagine that operations of the kind described are possible only in a country like Abyssinia. They are possible wherever there is a patriot population....The scale of the success, and the magnitude of the odds, even making every allowance for the nationality of the enemy, justifies the belief that campaigns in other countries where there are patriots, even when occupied by Germans, will prove practicable....Let us select a force in the manner described, let us train it, let us arm and equip it suitably, let our military command regard it with favour, let aircraft be allotted for its support; and you will have a force many times as strong and efficient as the force with which I gained these successes. I may say in passing that the type of fighting I refer to has nothing to do with the operations of Commandos. I am talking of forces which live and fight in the heart of the enemy's territory.78 Suitable theatres included Spain, Morocco and Algeria and, as Japan had entered the war in December 1941, ‘In the Far East there must already be several areas where such a force could operate with great detriment to the enemy.’79 Moreover, penetration operations should spearhead the liberation of Europe:  14 All modern war in inhabited areas is war of penetration. The military problems correspond to those of revolt....If we are to control the first stages of liberation in Europe in order to avoid general anarchy, we had better start assembling forces of the type I have described. Their ultimate aim will be to form that coordinating and controlling element which alone will allow us to bring hostilities quickly and finally to a close.80 It is apparent from Wingate's ‘Notes on Penetration Warfare, Burma Command, 25/3/42’ that he aimed, initially, at practicing this in Burma. He began by arguing that limiting penetration attacks to just behind the front line - as hitherto in Burma - wasted an asset: ‘Commanders are admittedly ignorant of the technique of employing such troops, and it is evident that they will become mere raiding parties, implemented for the occasion with what regular troops are required and can be spared. Such is not war of penetration, and no considerable results can be expected from such employment...’81 He then presented a new description of LRP, now consisting of combining specially trained regular columns and local irregulars to attack targets behind enemy lines important enough to have a ‘strategic’ effect, he defining ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ in terms of LRP. ‘Strategic’ penetration was enabled by technological advance: Modern war is war of penetration in all its phases. This may be of two types - tactical or strategical. Penetration is tactical where armed forces carrying it out are directly supported by the operations of the main armies. It is strategical where no such support is possible, e.g. where the penetration group is living and operating 100 miles or more in front of its own armies. Of the two types, long range penetration pays by far the larger dividend on the forces employed. These forces...are able, wherever a friendly population exists, to live and move under the enemy's ribs, and thus to deliver fatal blows to his Military organisation by attacking vital objectives, which he is unable to defend. In the past, such warfare has been impossible owing to the fact that the control over such columns, indispensable both for their safety and their effectual use, was not possible until the age of easily portable wireless sets. Further, the supply of certain indispensable materials...was impossible until the appearance of communication aircraft.82  15 The regular element was essential because of the nature of totalitarian states. Irregulars were effective only against occupiers wary of losses, restrained in their use of force and constrained by a morality forbidding reprisals. If facing an opponent prepared to murder prisoners or destroy property in reprisal, insurgents’ ties to the populace constrained their level of aggression. The Japanese were such opponents, and Wingate's answer was to insert regular troops to protect and direct guerrilla forces: All concerned, Military and civilian, should disabuse their minds of the fallacy that there are going to be any guerrilla operations in Burma except those that can be carried out under the aegis, and in the neighbourhood of regular columns. Guerrillas are born and not made. Essentially a guerrilla soldier is a man who prefers death on his own terms to life on the enemy's. Such were the Rifi in Morocco, and the majority of them were killed; such were the Caucasian Moslem insurgents against the Soviet troops in the '20s; they were mainly exterminated; such were the Ethiopian guerrillas, who continued to fight for 5 years after the Italian occupation; they were steadily being exterminated when we intervened....Mere dislike of the enemy does not produce guerrillas. Burning hatred based on religion or other ideal [sic] will do so. It is clear, however, that in Burma we need not expect to find guerrilla operations, actively carried on by groups favourable to ourselves or hostile to the enemy, without considerable encouragement on our part. Such encouragement will be provided by the creation of long range penetration groups, who...will both take advantage of and sustain the resistance of local patriots.83 Events changed Wingate's view further. On 29 May 1942, a 300-strong penetration force of G(R), Burma Frontier Force (BFF) and Royal Marines, under G(R)'s Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave, operating on the west bank of the Irrawaddy, was surprised and destroyed by a larger Japanese force at the village of Padaung. This involved Japanese use of what Wingate described as ‘short-range penetration’ - infiltration of the village by hostile Burmese and disguised Japanese soldiers.84 The Padaung disaster opened the British western flank in Burma, and in the following three days, the Japanese penetrated the front of Burma Corps in several places, making the Corps 16Commander - Slim - unwilling to spare troops or facilities for Wingate.85 Consequently, in early April 1942, Wingate wrote an ‘Appreciation of chances of forming Long Range Penetration Groups in Burma’, presenting a series of proposals updated and adapted from his previous ‘Notes’. Among factors listed as affecting his new appreciation, he noted the destruction of the Musgrave force, his opinions on its failure marking his becoming more specific about the aim of LRP operations - to disrupt enemy decision-making through threatening their command and logistical infrastructure. He began by again castigating British commanders’ apparent failure to appreciate the value of depth operations: There was in fact no penetration on our side of any kind, either short range or long range...Lt Col Musgrave's operation was merely a delaying action. Small forces cannot prevent large forces from carrying out their plan. They can, if properly used...compel the larger force to alter its plan by creating an important diversion, i.e. by positive and not negative action. Forces which have the role of penetration should never, therefore be told to prevent the enemy from carrying out some operation, but should be given the task of surprising and destroying some important enemy installation or force, which will have the effect of changing the enemy's plan.86 Failure to create a G(R) cell at Burcorps HQ resulted in existing assets being squandered. Such a cell should be formed immediately, to plan penetration operations, recruit and train personnel, liaise with Special Operations Executive (SOE) and devise propaganda.87 Most significantly, Wingate mentioned for the first time resupply by air, demanding ‘Communication aircraft, sufficient to deliver 20 tons a week over a carry of not less than 300 miles', and ‘R.A.F. Officers of Bomber and Fighter experience allotted to columns and Group H.Q.’ equipped with wireless sets with a range ‘not less than 300 miles’ to coordinate ground with air forces.88  Two factors resulted in Wingate's ideas 17evolving yet further: firstly, the collapse of the Allied front in Burma and the subsequent retreat; secondly, the attitude of the local population. General Sir Harold Alexander, GOC Burma during the retreat, estimated that the population of Burma was ten per cent pro-British, ten per cent pro-Japanese, and eighty per cent indifferent, or likely to fall behind whoever was winning, and in 1942, that was not the British.89, forestalling hope of a large resistance for Wingate's columns to support. However, several Allied commanders had detected a flaw in the Japanese psyche. As early as 1937, General Joseph W Stilwell and other American observers of the war in China had noted the repetitiveness and predictability of Japanese tactics and the lack of initiative of even senior Japanese commanders90; Australian forces in New Guinea reported that, if presented with an unexpected situation, there would be a noticeable pause as the Japanese worked it out, during which they could be hit very effectively with a counterattack91, while Slim recalled the Japanese commander whose over-rigid obedience to orders allowed British forces in Rangoon to escape, despite being surrounded momentarily.92 In an article on Longcloth, written for the Army Bureau of Current Affairs in late 1943, Wingate presented his views on this issue: [T]he Japanese mind is slow but methodical. He is a reasoned, if humourless, student of war in all its phases. He has carefully thought out the answer to all ordinary problems. He has principles which he applies, not over-imaginatively, and he hates a leap in the dark to such an extent that he will do anything rather than take it....The answer is evidently never to let him know the intentions or strength of his enemy but always to present him with a situation which he does not thoroughly understand....Our own methods, as opposed to those of the Japanese, were always to present him with a new situation which he could not analyse...93 This would convert the salient characteristics of the British soldier, ‘firstly, intelligence in action, i.e., originality in individual fighting, and, lastly, on the morale side, great self- reliance and power to give of his best when 18the audience is smallest'94, into tactical advantages. LRP now aimed specifically at ‘arranging the enemy's mind’: ‘This is strategical as opposed to tactical penetration. It influences not only the enemy's forward troops but his whole military machine, and his main plan.’95 To do this, columns should penetrate 2-300 miles behind Japanese lines, establish bases and launch attacks on lines of communication96: Immediately after penetration has been effected, the attack or attacks should be delivered on suitable objectives to start the ball rolling....The effect of these attacks will be the allotment of enemy troops to the pursuit and destruction of Columns. Immediately therefore, after the attack on a major objective, the force will split into single Columns each with a suitable role in the L of C Area. Columns will...lead the enemy punitive Columns on a wild goose chase. The diversion they will create in this manner should compel the withdrawal from forward operational areas of very considerable enemy forces...97 These attacks would not be guerrilla raids, but assaults by regular troops on targets of importance to the Japanese. However, guerrilla methods - dispersal, concealment, and superior field craft - would be used to infiltrate defended areas, avoiding combat until necessary: ‘Colns [sic] achieve their results by skilful concentration at the right time and in the right place, when they will deliver the maximum blow against the enemy. The essence of LRP is concentration, the method of dispersal is only a means to achieve ultimate concentration.’98 Killing Japanese and destroying supplies was less important than diverting forces from their main effort: ‘The withdrawal of enemy forces from forward areas to protect their long and vulnerable lines of communication from incessant spasmodic attacks by Columns, should compel the enemy to alter materially his plan of operations, and should thus assist the achievement of our own objective.’99 Air support was central to LRP, along with another invention of the inter-war years, the portable wireless:  [LRP] is made possible by two 19factors comparatively new to war...These factors are firstly, the power of wireless to direct and control small or large bodies of men in the heart of enemy territory, and, secondly, the power of aircraft to maintain such troops with essential supplies; to make physical contact with them where this is necessary; and finally, and most important, to employ them to make its own blow against the widely scattered and invisible enemy effectual.100 LRP could also be a vital auxiliary to Allied air offensives: ‘[F]orces of this nature are better placed than any other ground forces to assist the air arm to direct its strategic offensive, supply it with detailed air intelligence, and exploit on the spot the opportunities created by its attacks.'101 There could, indeed, be an integrated air-land offensive against Japanese rear areas: Provided the force has gained the upper hand over the enemy... exploitation [of air attacks] will be carried out by the Guerrilla organisation, which will grow as the Force succeeds in imposing its will on the enemy...i.e. R.A.F. co-operation must be aimed to help the Force win the battle against the enemy L of C organisation.102 Wingate also argued that ‘It is most desirable that co-operating aircraft should be kept on the job, and not be changed with every action’103 - for part of the Allied air effort to be dedicated to supporting LRP operations. It seemed this might be achieved with Operation Thursday. Thursday involved a divisional command - Third Indian Division, or Special Force - overseeing six brigades, supported by the Air Commando - 112 light aircraft, 150 gliders, and a squadron each of C- 47 Dakota transports, B-25 Mitchell medium bombers and P-51 Mustang fighters.104 The Mustangs doubled as light bombers and ground strafers and they and the Mitchells trained intensively in close air support of LRP columns prior to the operation. Moreover, four Dakota squadrons of the RAF, and two of the USAAF were attached at various times.105  Consequently, infiltrating the Japanese 20front, then marching through jungle and across mountain to Japanese areas of critical vulnerability, as on Longcloth, was no longer necessary. From 1944, Wingate's operations centred on defended airports or ‘Strongholds’. A Stronghold was established by two LRP columns, marching in or landed by glider, securing an area of flat, cleared ground: engineers were then flown in to prepare an airstrip, upon which the rest of the brigade arrived, reinforced by artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and at least one line infantry battalion for garrison duties. Once completed, each Stronghold consisted of a fortified area, incorporating earthworks and minefields, large enough to hold a battalion or two columns, two troops of artillery, and a rest area for 200 personnel. An adjacent airstrip was cleared, with taxiways into the Stronghold itself; while the strip should be Dakota-capable, it was used primarily by light aircraft to deliver small amounts of supplies and evacuate wounded, Wingate suggesting that ten such aircraft should be dedicated to each Stronghold. The bulk of supplies were still delivered by air-drop in or around the Stronghold.106 Wingate ordered that Strongholds should be as inaccessible as possible to Japanese forces, in the centre of approximately thirty square miles of broken country passable only to pack animals.107 This is because he had another purpose for them more ambitious than simple raiding bases. The objective now would not just be to divert Japanese forces away from the front, but to lure them into situations where they could be destroyed in detail, making a major contribution to the main battle: The Stronghold is designed to fulfill [sic] a definite function in the employment of L.R.P.G's; a function which has hitherto been neglected. In all our recent contacts with the Japanese it has been apparent that any dug-in defended position sited in remote areas where it is almost impossible to assemble a concentration of artillery and extremely difficult to make accurate reconnaissance without heavy losses is capable of a most obstinate and prolonged defence against greatly superior force....From this I  draw the inference, firstly, that it is 21foolish to direct attacks against defended enemy positions if by any means he can be met in the open, and, secondly, we should induce him to attack us in our defended positions. It is obvious that columns of L.R.P. have an unrivalled chance of meeting him in the open and that, therefore, they should even more rarely need to attack him in his positions....We wish, therefore, firstly to encounter the enemy in the open and preferably in ambushes laid by us, and secondly to induce him to attack us only in our defended Strongholds.108 Each Stronghold should have at least two ‘floater columns’, patrolling the surrounding countryside out to a few thousand yards.109 These would drive off Japanese reconnaissance patrols, hopefully provoking the Japanese to commit a force of regimental strength or above. The terrain in which the Stronghold was located meant that only ordnance which could be man or mule-packed could be brought in, and any attempt to build roads would provide a prime target for attack by floater columns.110 Upon learning that a large Japanese force was approaching, the Stronghold commander should reinforce his floater columns: ‘In this way, the enemy is met under ideal conditions; making an approach whose route can be forseen [sic] through country with which we are more familiar than he, and compelled to move slowly to cover his road construction. Under these conditions, two Columns should find little difficulty in cutting up a regiment.’111 Should the Japanese reach the Stronghold, they would have to attack its fortifications while under attack from behind by floater columns and from the air by the Air Commando's Mustangs and Mitchells.112 They would, therefore, have no option but to commit a force of divisional size or above, with air assets in support.113 The Brigade commander might then recall columns from elsewhere to reinforce the Stronghold or the floater columns, but this should not be at the expense of threatening Japanese lines of communication, drawing in yet more Japanese forces.114 There is a noticeable resemblance here to the system of ‘boxes' first used by the British Army in North Africa in 1941. Each ‘box’ was a fortified position, held by a brigade with all its supplies, its tactical role being as a block of anti-tank and artillery firepower. If attacked, the ‘box’ was to halt the enemy 22with massed artillery, while a ‘striking force’, a reserve of tanks and artillery, attacked his flanks and rear.115 The British Army was using company-sized ‘boxes’, with platoon-sized ‘striking forces’, for defence in jungle warfare from 1942,116 and Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones, commander of IV Corps, would use brigade-sized ‘boxes’, supplied by air, in the great battle of Imphal-Kohima in 1944.117 Wingate's aim, apparently, was to use air transport to carry the ‘box’ concept into the enemy rear, converting a defensive method into an offensive one. In his ‘Appreciation of the Prospect of Exploiting Operation “Thursday”’' (February 1944), he argued to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, that 14th Army, the main British formation in Burma, should consider building its entire offensive doctrine around this model: It does not seem to be realised that if Operation ‘THURSDAY', which is being carried out by unsupported L.R.P. Brigades, succeeds in driving the Japanese out of Northern BURMA, the superiority of L.R.P. to normal formations in a normal operation (including normal airborne formations), will have been abundantly proved, and there will no longer be any grounds for claiming that normal Divisions have any function in South East Asia. They should instead be broken up into L.R.P. Brigades (Airborne), Assault Brigades, and Airport Garrison Brigades, organized into larger formations corresponding to divisions and corps but with rather different scope and functions....118 This would, Wingate claimed, provide a viable alternative to Operation Culverin, the planned amphibious invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Should Culverin be abandoned, 14th Army should launch an air-land offensive aimed at Hanoi and Bangkok, LRP Brigades leapfrogging from Stronghold to Stronghold:  23 In the van will be the deeply penetrating columns, a mass of enemy between them and territory occupied by us. The operations of these columns will progressively force the enemy to withdraw. In territory from which he has withdrawn, normal communications may be built up, and strong garrisons living in fortifications introduced. At certain distances behind the forward wave of penetration will come defended airports. In the van with the L.R.P. Brigades will be Strongholds with their Garrisons.... The capture of BANGKOK and HANOI may well result in the giving of an amphibious role to the India Command (Nov. 45) and the L.R.P. thrust would then continue to carry a chain of defended airports across CHINA to the coast where it would meet up with seaborne forces.119 The objective would now be to defeat the Japanese by airborne invasion, forcing them to retreat, through threat to their communications, or destroying them through making them contest control of territory on unfavourable terms. Of course, this model was never applied in practice, but it illustrates how far Wingate had come from small-scale operations supporting guerrillas. An analogy has been made already between Wingate's concept of operations and that applied by American and Allied forces since September 2001. Therefore, while accepting that projecting current military doctrine onto past operations, and vice versa, can be dangerously facile120, it still seems appropriate to close this paper with a brief discussion of the ‘messages’ Wingate might send to today's commanders. Wingate's model of war centred on disrupting enemy planning through forcing him to disperse his armed assets; this entailed a specialist behind-the-lines organisation, attached regular units and local irregulars, with airpower providing the main means of movement and supply, and the main offensive ‘punch'. He therefore would have approved of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations Special Activities Division, and its growing, if tempestuous, cooperation with US Army Special Forces.121 He might be less impressed with how it went about business. In 24Afghanistan in the 1980s, the USA confined itself largely to being a peddler of weaponry and (mainly Saudi) cash, via Pakistani intelligence.122 Those ‘doing exploits’ among the Afghans were the Arab volunteers of Osama bin Laden, the ‘doctrine’ was Salafism, and the outcome was not a dispute over the water with the Smiths but with the USA, the al-Sauds, and others over the future of the Islamic world.123 Likewise, he might have felt vindicated by the CIA's attempt, in autumn 2001, to ‘buy’ another army in Afghanistan, and the Northern Alliance's conspicuous lack of aggression, allayed only by Allied Special Operations Forces (SOF) deploying among them and summoning airstrikes.124 He might be equally satisfied with Operation Iraqi Freedom, eighteen months later, wherein SOF were deployed to areas held by the Kurdish Peshmerga in greater numbers, at an earlier stage, with a common ‘doctrine’ - toppling Saddam Hussein - and with the airpower of a US Navy carrier group and AC-130 gunships in support. Aggressive operations, cooperating with Peshmerga irregulars, were therefore possible, most notably Operation Viking Hammer, an offensive against Iranian-backed terrorists in the hills along the Iraq-Iran border in March 2003, and the subsequent liberation of Mosul, the largest city in Kurdistan.125 As to the situation faced by Allied forces post-2003, Wingate might have commented upon how the cultural mores of the modern West allowed insurgents and terrorists a freedom of action others would not tolerate – including himself. NOTES Papers from the following collections were used: - The National Archives (Public Records Office), Kew - The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London  - The Wingate Papers, held at the 25Imperial War Museum, London, particularly the Abyssinia and Burma Collections - I am also extremely grateful to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker for giving me several hours of his time to discuss Orde Wingate, MI(R), G(R) and SOE, and for commenting upon my research. My thanks also to Professor Martin Alexander for his unstinting support. 1. Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel's Army (London: Valentine, Mitchell 1980), pp.8- 11; Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought (London: Cassell 1977), pp.247-248; Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1976), pp.44-48; Robert Slater, Warrior Statesman: The Life of Moshe Dayan (London: Robson 1992), p.47 2. Bond, Op.Cit, p.248 3. Simon Anglim, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No.49, Orde Wingate, the Iron Wall and Counterterrorism in Palestine, 1936-39 (Shrivenham: SCSI 2006) 4. Simon Anglim, ‘MI(R), G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-1942', Intelligence and National Security, Volume 20 Number 4, December 2005, pp.641-645 5. Vice Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Commander South-East Asia 1943-1945 (London: HMSO 1951), Section A, Para.5, Section B, Para.36 6. Richard Rhodes James, Chindit (London: John Murray 1980), pp.90-91; Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate (London: Collins 1959), p.378, 380, 436, 442-443 7. Major General S Woodburn Kirby et al, History of the Second World War, The War Against Japan, Volume III: The Decisive Battles (London: HMSO 1961) [hereafter OHJ3] 8. Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell 1956)  9. Ibid, pp.218-220; ‘LRP Groups - 26Comment on note of DSD by Colonel OC Wingate', IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I 10. Currently displayed in the Imperial War Museum, London 11. Wingate to Central Command, Agra, of 15 August 1942, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I; Dayan, Op. Cit, p.47; Philip Stibbe, Return via Rangoon (London: Leo Cooper 1995), p.19 12. Author's interview with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, of G(R) and Special Operations Executive, and Wingate's Staff Captain in East Africa, 25 August 2004; Wilfred Burchett, Wingate's Phantom Army (London: Frederick Muller 1946), p.43; Michael Calvert, Fighting Mad: One Man's Guerrilla War (London: Jarrolds 1964), p.113; Stibbe, Op.Cit, pp.20-21 13. Sykes, Op.Cit, p.249; Wilfred Thesiger, The Life of My Choice (London: Collins 1987), p.320 14. See Colonel OC Wingate, ‘Appreciation of the Ethiopian Campaign', several copies in the IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, p.16, where Wingate refers to General Sir Alan Cunningham as a ‘military ape.' 15. Anonymous, ‘Narrative of Events: May to November, 1941', IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II 16. Ronald Lewin, Slim, The Standardbearer (London: Leo Cooper 1976), especially pp.142-144 17. Duncan Anderson, ‘Slim’, in John Keegan (Editor), Churchill's Generals (London: Abacus 1999), pp.315-316 18. Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills (London: Leo Cooper 1989), pp.71-76 19. Derek Tulloch, Wingate in Peace and War (London: Macdonald 1972) 20. Michael Calvert, Prisoners of Hope (London: Jonathan Cape 1952), especially pp.283-303  21. Peter Mead, Orde Wingate and the 27Historians (Braunton: Merlin 1987) 22. See especially David Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the Balance (London: Arms & Armour 1994) 23. John Bierman and Colin Smith, Fire in the Night: Wingate of Burma, Ethiopia and Zion (London: Macmillan 1999); Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War (London: Arthur Barker 1955); Rooney, Op.Cit; Trevor Royle, Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1995); Sykes, Op.Cit 24. OHJ3, pp.222-223 25. Michael Elliot-Bateman, ‘The nature of People's War’, in The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Volume I – Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1970) pp.141-143 26. Robert B Asprey, War in the Shadows (London: Little, Brown 1994), pp.423-427, 429-433 27. David Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers: Wingate, Sandford, the Patriots and the part they played in the Liberation of Ethiopia (London; Ratcliffe 1995), especially pp.8-14 28. Interviewed on ‘Orde Wingate: Military Genius?’ BBC TV 1976 29. John W Gordon, ‘Wingate’, in Keegan (Ed), Churchill's Generals, pp.282-284, 294- 296 30. Luigi Rossetto, Major General Orde Charles Wingate and the Development of Long Range Penetration (Manhattan, Kansas: MA/AH 1982), pp.v-vii, 24-27, 455-457 31. Lieutenant Colonel TBH Otway, The Second World War 1939-1945, Army: Airborne Forces (London: IWM 1990), pp.356-377 32. TE Lawrence, ‘The Evolution of a Revolt’, Army Quarterly Volume I Number I, 1920, pp.55-69; Revolt in the Desert (Ware: Wordsworth Editions 1997), especially pp.95- 97; The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Jonathan Cape 1935), especially pp.197-202; entry on ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ in 1929 28Encyclopaedia Britannica, reprinted in Gerard Chaliand (Editor), The Art of War in World History (Berkeley: University of California Press 1994), pp.880-890 33. Michael Codner, ‘An Initial Assessment of the Combat Phase’, in Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Paper 59, War in Iraq: Combat and Consequences (London: RUSI 2003), pp.10-13; George Friedman, America's Secret War (London: Little, Brown 2004), pp.82-90; Williamson Murray and Robert H Scales, The Iraq War (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2003), pp.58, 69-71 34. Lieutenant Colonel C McV Gubbins, The Art of Guerrilla Warfare (London: MI(R) 1939), copy in PRO HS8/256, pp.1-3 35. Ibid, pp.7, 9, 16-17 36. Wavell's Dispatch on East Africa Operations, in PRO CAB120/471, p.1 37. Major EA Chapman-Andrews, ‘Abyssinia’, in PRO FO371/2643, p.3; PRO CAB 106/356, Major General Sir Philip Mitchell, Chief Political Officer, Dispatch on the Administration of Occupied Enemy African Territories up to September 1941, p.8; Anglim, Op.Cit, p.641; Douglas Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze: An Account of Ungentlemanly Warfare (London: Springwood 1983), p.57; Major General ISO Playfair, The Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I: The Early Successes against Italy [hereafter OHM1] (London: HMSO 1954), p.403 38. GHQ Middle East Operational Instruction No.1-10, in PRO HS8/261, Para.4 39. Dodds-Parker, Op.Cit, p.57 40. Wingate, ‘Appreciation’, Appendix D, p.1 41. Ibid, p.6 42. Ibid, p.6 43. Ibid, Appendix 6, p.6  44. Colonel OC Wingate, ‘The Ethiopian 29Campaign, August 1940 to June 1941', several copies held in the IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, p.7 45. Major OC Wingate, ‘Sand-model lectures illustrating strategy and tactics of Ethiopian Campaign, Lecture No.1 – First Principles, G(R), 11 January 1941’ IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box I, p.4 46. Wingate, ‘Appreciation’, pp.9-10 47. Ibid, p.10 48. PRO WO201/308, ‘Abyssinia: guerrilla warfare in the Gojjam by WAB Harris MC’, p.28 49. Ibid, pp.28-29; PRO WO201/297, ‘Abyssinia and Eritrea, operational dispatch by Lt. Gen Sir W Platt’, pp.10-11 50. PRO WO291/297, p.11 51. OHM1, pp.394-395; General Sir AP Wavell's Dispatch on east Africa Operations, in PRO CAB120/471, p.4; Wingate, ‘Ethiopian Campaign’, pp.8-9 52. Ibid, p.9; undated letter from Wingate to Platt, Wingate to Sandford of 9 March 1941 and Sandford to Wingate of 18 March 1941, all in IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II; Minutes of a Conference held at HQ Trps in the Sudan, 12 February 1941, IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II, Paras.2-3; Entry of 20 March 1941 in Abraham Akavia's [Wingate's personal assistant in Ethiopia] Diary, PRO WO217/37 53. PRO WO201/308, pp.44-47; Akavia's diary entry of 8 February 1941, PRO WP217/37 54. PRO CAB106/952, pp.62-63 55. Ibid, pp.93-94; see Akavia's diary entry of 20 May 1941 56. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Interview with the author of 25 August 2004  57. PRO WO178/36, ‘War Diary, 101 30Mission, Northern Section’, compiled by Major AWD Bentinck, entries of 15, 19 and 23-27 September and 25 November 1942 58. Wingate to Lieutenant Colonel Terence Airey of 4 April 1941, IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II 59. Standing Orders of 9 February 1941, IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II 60. Colonel OC Wingate, ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Ethiopian Campaign, February-March 1941’, Box II, Paras.1, 3 61. Wingate, ‘Appreciation’, p.3 62. Ibid, p.3 63. Ibid, p.4 64. Ibid, p.4 65. Ibid, p.4 66. Ibid, p.5 67. Ibid, pp.5-6 68. Ibid, p.6 69. Ibid, p.7 70. Ibid, pp.7, 10 71. Ibid, pp.6-7, 13-14; Wingate, ‘Ethiopian Campaign’, pp.4-5 72. Wingate, ‘Appreciation’, p.6 73. Lawrence, ‘Evolution’, p.69; ‘Guerrilla', p.890 74. Wingate, ‘Ethiopian Campaign', p.1; ‘Notes Relating to Possible Employment’, IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, Box II 75. Wingate, ‘Ethiopian Campaign’, p.13 76. Ibid, p.14 77. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp.200-202  78. Wingate, ‘Ethiopian Campaign’, 31pp.14-15 79. Ibid, p.14 80. Ibid, pp.14-15 81. Colonel OC Wingate, ‘Notes on Penetration Warfare - Burma Command’, IWM Wingate Burma Papers Box I, p.1 82. Ibid, pp.2-4 83. Ibid, pp.3-4 84. Colonel OC Wingate, ‘Appreciation of chances of forming long range penetration groups in Burma by Colonel OC Wingate at Maymyo on 2/4/42’, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I, pp.1-2; for a more positive account, see Slim, Op.Cit, pp.44-46 85. ‘Record of an attempt to organise long range penetration in Burma during April 1942, By Colonel OC Wingate’, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I, p.2 86. Wingate, ‘Notes’, pp.3, 6 87. Ibid, pp.5-6 88. Ibid, pp.2-4 89. The comment by Alexander is from Chapter VIII, Paragraph 2 of the manuscript of an anonymous LRP Training Pamphlet referred to hereafter as ‘LRP Pamphlet’. 90. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945 (London: Macmillan 1970), pp.213-214 91. PRO WO106/4837, Military Training Publication (Australia) No.23 - Jungle Warfare, Draft Copy, p.29 92. Slim, Op.Cit, pp.14-15 93. Brigadier OC Wingate DSO, ‘Intruder Mission’, War, No.48, 10 July 1943, pp.7-8 94. Ibid, p.5 95. Wingate, ‘Training Notes No.1', p.5  96. ‘77 Infantry Brigade: ROLE’, 22 32September 1942, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I, p.1 97. Ibid, p.1 98. Ibid, p.1 99. ‘77 Infantry Brigade: ROLE’, p.1 100. Brigadier OC Wingate, Report on Operations of 77th Infantry Brigade in Burma, February to June 1943 (New Delhi: Government of India Press 1943) p.3; Copy No.27 is held in IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box I 101. Ibid, p.1 102. Wingate, ‘77 Brigade’, p.2 103. Ibid, p.2 104. Minutes of Conference Held at HQ Fourteenth Army and Air HQ Bengal - 3 December '43, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II, Para.8; Letter AX.866 from Air Minister to AHQ India of 22 September 1944, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box IV 105. HQ 14th Army to HQ 3rd Indian Div of 3 March 1944, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II; Otway, Op.Cit, p.361 106. Brigadier OC Wingate, ‘Special Force Commander's Training Memorandum No.8, "The Stronghold"’, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II, pp.1-2 107. Ibid, p.2 108. Ibid, p.1 109. Ibid, p.3 110. Ibid, p.4 111. Ibid, p.4 112. Ibid, p.5; No.1 Air Commando Close Support Forecasts - period 14/25th March, 1944 - Note by Commander Special Force, IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II  113. ‘Stronghold’, p.5 33 114. Ibid, p.16 115. Notes from Theatres of War No.10 - Cyrenaica and Western Desert January/June 1942, (London: HMSO 1942) pp.9, 13-14; ‘Lessons from Operations 14 Sept 41- 21 Aug 1942, Fixed Defences and the Defensive Battle - Deductions from the Present War’ in PRO WO201/538; David French, Raising Churchill's Army (Oxford: OUP 2000), pp.219-220 116. Military Training Pamphlet No.52 - Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare against a Modern Enemy, in PRO WO231/126, pp.24-26 117. Slim, Op.Cit, pp.220, 290, 292, 294 “’ 118. Major General OC Wingate, ‘Appreciation of the prospect of exploiting Operation “’Thursday“’ by Commander Special Force at Imphal on 10 February 44 for Supreme Commander South East Asia', IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II, pp.3-4 119. Ibid, p.4 120. e.g. Robert Lyman, Slim, Master of War: Burma and the Birth of Modern Warfare (London: Robinson 2004) 121. Friedman, Op.Cit, pp.139-140; Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Pocket Books 2003) pp.50, 139-140 122. Richard A Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (London: Free Press 2003), pp.47-54; Friedman, Op.Cit, pp.11-17 123. Clarke, Op.Cit, pp.52, 53, 59, 70, 154; Friedman, Op.Cit, pp.25-32 124. Clarke, Op.Cit, pp.274-277; Friedman, Op.Cit, pp.151-155, 160-165, 171, 178-182; Woodward, Op.Cit, pp.251-254, 260, 267, 275, 282 125. Murray and Scales, Op.Cit, pp.185-195 END