Between Theism and Atheism: A journey through Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā

Between Theism and Atheism: a journey through Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Mīmāmṣ ā* Elisa Freschi, IKGA, Vienna November 21, 2013 Contents 1. Terminological Foreword 2. Mīmāṃsā, Anti-Realism and God 2.1 The chapter on deities (devatādhikaraṇa) in the PMS and its commentaries............................. 2.1.1 Jaimini ............................ 2.1.2 Śabara............................. 2.1.3 Kumārila ........................... 2.1.4 Conclusions about the refusal of devatās . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Anti-theologicalargumentsinKumārila . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Viśiṣṭad ̄ vaita Vedānta 9 4. Can They be Reconciled? 9 4.1 Kumārilaandvivakṣā ........................ 4.2 Yāmuna etc. on the denial of deities as an instrumental move . . 4.3 The specificity of Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā: apūrva . . . 4.4 SociologicalBackground ....................... 4.5 Conclusions:siddhapart....................... 4.6 Someyet-to-beestablishedconclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. What Do We Mean by “God”, “Atheism”, and “Empiricism”? 6. Abbreviations 7. References 1 Terminological Foreword The general purpose of this article is to show that the commonly accepted notions of god, atheism, etc. are not as obvious as one might think through the case study of Veṅkaṭanātha’s introduction of a God in an atheistic system. “God” is not a univocal term, as shown also by the fact that it translates different concepts in Sanskrit, from deva/devatā to īśvara and to paramātman or brahman. Furthermore, theism and atheism are not two mutually exclusive alternatives (there might be philosophical positions which neither advocate the belief in a personal God nor support an explicit denial of it). Last, and more intriguingly, the belief in God does not need to be configured as the belief in the existence of an external, subject-independent entity. Within the precincts of this article, I conventionally adopt the terms “deity” to translate devatā; “god” to cover the semantic realm of a superhuman being who still shares a lot with human beings, starting from their ontological foundation and who is mostly the efficient cause of the universe, but not its creator e nihilo; and “God” to denote a non-human being to whom one has a personal and devotional relationship, but who might have no ontological grounding at all. The second “god” is often referred to * I am grateful to Katharina Apostle for reviewing my English. Research for this paper has been conducted within a FWF project, No. M 1437. as īśvara, although one must be aware of the fact that the three levels, and especially the second and the third, are not strictly and explicitly distinguished in the sources, which, rather, often incorporate whatever refers to the previous levels (so that, for instance, a God is also referred to as “creator of the world” or as bearing a conch). Apart from these three levels there are the paramātman and the brahman. The former might be a superior being to be imitated but not necessarily involved in worldly affairs (like the supreme puruṣa in Yoga and Sāṅkhya, see Bronkhorst 1983). The latter term is used for an all-encompassing principle which might resemble an impersonal god comparable to Spinoza’s. The distinction between the Judaic concept of creation and the Indian one of efficient cause must also be taken into account. 1 2 Mīmāṃsā, Anti-Realism and God The Mīmāṃsā is a philosophical school, born as a Vedic exegesis, and hence its main philosophical inquiries have developed out of Vedic exegetical themes. Its root text, the (Pūrva) Mīmāṃsāsūtra, 2 attributed to Jaimini (perhaps 2nd c BC) is probably the most ancient philosophical sūtra. It has been commented on by Śabara (dates uncertain, possibly 3rd–5thc c AD). Śabara’s Bhāṣya was again commented on by Kumārila and Prabhākara (7th c AD?). The fact that within Mīmāṃsā philosophical thinking emerged out of exegetical concerns also means that the Mīmāṃsā is not primarily concerned with ontology. Contemporary Western readers generally tend to think of metaphysics and ontology as the first elements of philosophical thinking and re-read accordingly the pre-Socratic philosophy in Classical Greece. This was not the case for Mīmāmṣ ā, where the main focus was on the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda. Mīmāmṣ akas looked at the Brāhmaṇas (and at all of the Vedas) as primarily prescriptive texts. Non-prescriptive passages of whatever nature were considered as subsidiary to the prescriptive ones. Accordingly, for Mīmāṃsakas the artha 3 of Vedic sentences is something to be done (kārya or sādhya). This means that the Mīmāṃsā theory of meaning 1The discussion on the concept of “god” could go on through many volumes. For a preliminary bibliography see Leftow 1998 which displays the following statement already in the first paragraph: “Views of God’s relation to the universe vary greatly. Pantheists say that God is the universe. Panentheists assert that God includes the universe, or is related to it as soul to body. They ascribe to God the limitations associated with being a person — such as limited power and knowledge — but argue that being a person is nevertheless a state of perfection. Other philosophers, however, assert that God is wholly different from the universe. Some of these think that God created the universe ex nihilo, that is, from no pre-existing material. Some add that God conserves the universe in being moment by moment, and is thus provident for his creatures. Still others think that God ‘found’ some pre-existing material and ‘creates’ by gradually improving this material this view goes back to the myth of the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus, and also entails that God is provident. By contrast, deists deny providence and think that once God made it, the universe ran on its own. Still others argue that God neither is nor has been involved in the world. The common thread lies in the concept of perfection: thinkers relate God to the universe in the way that their thoughts about God’s perfection make most appropriate”. Similarly useful is Owen 2006 (1967), which starts with this passage: “It is very difficult — perhaps impossible— to give a definition of “God” that will cover all usages of the word and of equivalent words in other languages. Even to define God generally as ‘a superhuman or supernatural being that controls the world’ is inadequate. ‘Superhuman’ is contradicted by the worship of divinized Roman emperors, ‘supernatural’ by Benedict Spinoza’s equation of God with Nature, and ‘control’ by the Epicurean denial that the gods influence the lives of men. Therefore, while the above definition satisfies a wide range of usages, it is not universally applicable” (Owen 2006 (1967), p. 107). See also Morris 2002, pp. 27–35 for an overview of the difficulties of discussions among Christians, non-Christians and atheists in order to find a common ground for discussion. I also benefitted from Merricks 2006 and its analysis of the Christian Trinity, another paradoxical kind of “god”. 2As for the meaning of pūrva, see Parpola 1981 and Parpola 1994, and, against it, Bronkhorst 2007. It is uncontroversial that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is the school which focuses on the ritual part of the Veda, i.e. the Brāhmaṇas, and that the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (also called Vedānta) is the one which focuses on the Upaniṣads. 3artha may mean (among other things) both ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’. Given the Mīmāṃsā approach to language as eminently prescriptive, these two senses are always simultaneously present in the Mīmāṃsā use of artha. cannot be direct realist. Thus, an interpreter of Mīmāṃsā should be aware of the need to avoid his/her tendency to use direct realism when reading Mīmāṃsā texts. The Veda also has a specific epistemological place and role, according to Mīmāmṣ ā thought. This also means that the Veda is the only source of transcendental knowledge accepted by Mīmāmṣ akas and that in all other fields of knowledge Mīmāṃsā authors stick to a strict empiricism. In Kumārila’s words: “Here like in any other case, Mīmāṃsākas do not accept anything else beyond what is commonly experienced”.4 It is perhaps noteworthy that this sentence is to be understood not in an ontological context, but rather in an epistemological one (discussing the epistemological value of the Buddha’s word). In other words, Mīmāmṣ ā authors refute the idea of postulating unrequired concepts but this does not mean that they naïvely accept reality as independent of human beings perceiving it. Its existence independently of a knowing subject just lies beyond question, given that the focus is on the Veda and the Veda presupposes the existence of human beings carrying out the sacrifices it prescribes. Out of the same refusal of unrequired postulations, Mīmāmṣ akas adopt atheism. The belief in god(s), they maintain, contradicts direct perception and logical thinking, since no god is ever seen and since this belief is fraught with contradictions (e.g., how could a bodiless god create the world? And how could an embodied god be worshipped simultaneously by different worshippers in different parts of the world?). It is noteworthy that atheism is neither a main nor a distinct topic of investigation for Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas. Unlike in contemporary Western philosophy, the controversy about theism/atheism is almost “hidden” within the Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā Sūtra (in the devatādhikaraṇa, MS 9.1.4, sūtras 6–9, and within other technical discussions). Theism/atheism is not discussed as a preliminary topic within the theoretical introduction of the MS, namely the tarkapāda (MS 1.1). Rather, discussions related to the status of devatās are scattered in the whole PMS just like discussions about any other element of the sacrifice. devatās are in fact regarded as nothing more than an element of the sacrifice (the one to which the offering is dedicated) and their relation to the other elements is discussed within the broader perspective of the sacrifice. 2.1 The chapter on deities (devatādhikaraṇa) in the PMS and its commentaries 2.1.1 Jaimini Understanding Jaimini independently of his main commentator is always a complex task. However, in the case of the sūtras later grouped as devatādhikaraṇa it can be seen with some clarity that they are part of a larger context stating the centrality of the sacrificial action over and above the other elements of the sacrifice, such as ritual offerings and deities: yajñakarma pradhānaṃ tad dhi codanābhūtaṃ tasya dravyeṣu saṃskāras tatprayuktas tadarthatvāt || 9.1.1 || devatā vā prayojayed atithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt || 6 || [...] tasmād yajñaprayojanam || 19 || The sacrificial action is the primary thing, because it has been brought into being by the injunctive word. Hence the preparation of its materials must be regarded as promoted by that [sacrifice], because they occur for its sake (PMS 9.1.1). [Obj.:] The deity should promote [the sacrifice], because s/he is like a guest, for whose sake a meal is prepared (9.1.6). [R:] [...] Therefore, the sacrifice is the promoter (9.1.19). 5 There is no explicit denial of the existence of deities, although they are denied a principal role within the sacrifice, which is the culminating event of Jaimini’s system, the one around which everything else revolves. 4 mīmāṃsakaiḥ punaḥ || idānīm iva sarvatra dṛṣṭān nādhikam iṣyate (ŚV 2.98d-99ab). 5All these translations have very much benefitted from Clooney’s translations and analysis in his wonderful work dedicated to “rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini” (Clooney 1990, pp. 104–5, 147–149). 2.1.2 Śabara The objector who initiates the discussion in the devatādhikaraṇa of the ŚBh 6 starts with the very mention of deities in the dative case in Vedic sacrificial prescriptions, which make the sacrifice look like an act of feeding the deities: bhojanaṃ hīdaṃ devatāyāḥ yāgo nāma. bhojyaṃ dravyaṃ devatāyai pradīyate, [...]. devatāsaṃpradānako hy ayaṃ yāgaḥ śrūyate. saṃpradānaṃ ca nāma karmaṇo ’pīpsitatamād abhipretataram. tasmān na guṇabhūto devatā, devatām prati guṇabhūte dravyakarmaṇī (ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 72). [Obj.:] For, the sacrifice to the deity is this feeding. The food, i.e. the ritual substance, is offered to the deity. [...] In fact, this sacrifice is found in the Sacred Texts as including the deity as the recipient. And the recipient is even more intended than the syntactical object, although this is said to be the “most desired one” (Aṣṭ 1.4.49). Therefore, the deity is not a subordinate element, [rather], the ritual substance and the ritual action are subordinate to the deity. The objector then shifts to a different understanding of sacrifices and adds that sacrifices (yajña) are an instance of worship (pūjā) and that a pūjā is instrumental to the worshipped person (ʼ): api ca, yāgo nāma devatāpūjā. pūjā ca pūjanīyaṃ prati guṇabhūtā loke dṛśyate ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 72). [Obj.:] Moreover, the sacrifice is a worship of the deity. And the worship is commonly seen in worldly experience as being subordinate to the worshipped [person]. The later claim that the result of a sacrifice is given by the deity, pleased by the offering (tasmād dhavirdānena guṇavacanaiś ca devatārādhyate, sā prītā satī phalaṃ prayacchati, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.8, p. 74) is probably related to the pūjā -argument. Beside these two, the opponent speaking in the devatādhikaraṇa seems to have no other theological arguments and to ground his position on the Smṛti texts about devatās, mythically described as eating, having bodies, etc.7 Interestingly, Śabara (and, seemingly, also Jaimini) starts his reply by putting the Vedic sacrificial prescriptions at the centre, insofar as it is only through them that one knows about the result and is then prompted to act (yajñakarma pradhānaṃ syāt. yajater jātam apūrvam. kutaḥ. śabdapūrvatvāt. had dvi phalaṃ dadāti, tatprayojakam. idaṃ phalaṃ dadātīty etajjñānaṃ śabdapūrvakaṃ, na pratyakṣādibhir avagamyate, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). Next, the reply to the first objection is that deities are like ritual substances (dravya), namely ritual elements subordinate to the sacrifice itself (nanu dravyadevatākriyaṃ yajatyarthaḥ. satyam evan. kiṃ tu guṇatve devatāśrutiḥ, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). This subordination is grounded in the Mīmāṃsā thesis that the artha of the Veda (see fn. 3) is something to be done and that all established things mentioned are subordinate to it (dravyadevataṃ hi bhūtaṃ, bhāvayitavyo yajatyarthaḥ, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). As an alternative strategy to the one stressing the centrality of the sacrifice, Śabara introduces with atha a new focus, on the centrality of the human beings involved in the sacrifice, who care for the result, and not for the deities (phalaṃ ca puruṣārthaḥ. puruṣārthā ca naḥ pravṛttiḥ. na cāsau devatāyāḥ. tasmān na devatāprayuktāḥ pravartiṣyāmahe ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). Against the second objection, the one stating that a sacrifice is like an act of worship (pūjā), Śabara says that one should not equate sacrifices with worldly acts of worship. In the latter, the worshipped person stands at the centre, whereas in the former the sacrificial act (yajñakarman) stands at the centre. The reason connects this sacrifice-centric view with the human-centric view discussed above: the sacrifice is at the centre, because it is through that that one obtains the result (yad dhi phalavat tatprayojakam. tasmād yajñakarma prayojakam, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). 6Clooney 1988 offers an insightful outlook into the devatādhikaraṇa from the point of view of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. 7To the uttarapakṣin asking “How is this known?” the objector repeatedly answers with some variations of smṛtyupacārābhyām ‘through recollected texts and through figurative application’. The last objection, i.e. the reference to Smṛti passages pointing at deities, is refuted by Śabara by saying that the Smṛtis are based on mantras and arthavādas (and cannot, thus, contradict the Veda —rather, they must be understood as supplements of the prescriptive portion of the Veda, the Brāhmaṇas) (tan na, smṛter mantrārthavādamūlatvāt). The objector counters that since these Smṛtis do convey informations about the deities they are surely not based on mantras and arthavādas (yadi naivaṃparā na tarhi mantrārthavādamūlaṃ tadvijñan̄ am). Śabara could have answered that if they are not based on mantras and arthavādas they are simply invalid. Instead, he repeats that whoever observes carefully sees that they are based on them (ye ālocanamātreṇa mantrārthavādān paśyanti, teṣāṃ tatsmṛtimūlam, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). More in general, Śabara (and perhaps Jaimini) seems to aim only at the refusal of Vedic deities, i.e. deities conceived as embodied personal beings, delivering the result of Vedic sacrifices. The objector arguing for the principal role of the deities explicitly says that they are embodied while answering to a counter-argument (nanv evaṃ bruvatā, vigrahavatī devatā, bhuṅkte city abhyupagataṃ bhavati. ucyate. bāḍham. vigrahavatī devatā, bhuṅkte ca, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 73). And Śabara repeats that “giving” and “feeding” are impossible in the case of a non-embodied deity (na hy avigrahāyai abhuñjānāyai ca dānaṃ bhojanaṃ vā saṃbhavati, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76) and goes on discussing Vedic quotes8 in which Indra is said to have hands, a powerful neck, reddish brown eyes, etc. (ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, pp. 73–79), with the objector urging that the quotes have to be understood literally (asty asau hasto vayaṃ yaṃ gṛtītavantaḥ, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 77). Śabara’s repeated reply is that there is no evidence (pramāṇābhāvāt, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, twice in p. 77, tasyāpi bhāve na pramāṇam asti, p. 78, grīvāsattve nāsti pramāṇam, p. 78) and that these are only assumptions of unseen things (adṛṣṭakalpanā, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 77). More in detail, he points to the fact that the offered oblations should diminish if they were really eaten by a deity and that there is no evidence for the fact that the deity only eats the taste, like a bee. In fact, this behaviour of bees is seized by sense perception, whereas in the case of deities it is not. api ca, bhuñjānāyai devatāyai prattaṃ haveḥ kṣīyeta. na ca madhukarīvad annarasabhojinyo devatā iti pramāṇam asti. madhukarīsu ̣ pratyakṣam. na ca tadvad devatāyām (ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 79). Moreover, the oblation offered to a deity who [really] eats it should diminish [and this is apparently not the case]. Nor is there any instrument for knowing that the deities eat only the savour of the food, like bees. In the case of [insects] like the bees, this is senseperceptible, but it is not in the case of the deity. 9 The refusal of this sort of deity was —in my opinion— probably not understood as a real threat (see below, chapter 4.2) to theism by authors of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, who would not have supported the real existence of deities having bodies like ours and who actually eat the offered ghee. 10 In fact, it appears that the theology of Yāmuna etc. was not conceived as an alternative mechanical explanation of the way sacrifices work, nor did it accept all mythical narratives about deities (holding weapons, eating, etc., ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.6–9, passim) at face value. 2.1.3 Kumārila In his short commentary on the devatādhikaraṇa, Kumārila basically repeats in a much shorter way some of the arguments used by Śabara, showing that there is no linguistic evidence in favour of the fact that the deities are the principal element in Vedic prescriptions and that the presence of the deities’ 8I have not been able to trace back all quotes. An untraced one (akṣī te indra piṅgale, p. 79) is found also in the Mahābhāṣya (ad Aṣṭ 3.268.16) and was thus probably commonly known as a way of describing Indra. Several others come from the ṚV X (sukhaṃ rathaṃ yuyuje sindhur aśvinaṃ (p. 78), ṚV 10.075.09a; viṣṭvī grāvāṇaḥ sukṛtaḥ sukṛtyayā hotuś cit pūrve haviradyam āsá ta (p. 78), ṚV 10.094.02c). Other textual passages about Indra (tuvigrīva indra, p. 78) could also be Vedic. 9́Śabara also adds that, in fact, oblations may lose some taste but this is only due to the fact that they are left in the open air (yad uktaṃ devatāyai haviḥ prattaṃ nīrasaṃ bhavatīti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. vātopahataṃ nīrasaṃ bhavatīti, ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 79). 10Cf. this passage, where a third person objecting to the objector states that deities do not actually eat and the objector replies that they do: āha. na devatā bhuṅkte. yadi ca bhuñjīta, devatāyai haviḥ prattaṃ kṣīyeta. ucyate. annarasabhojinī devatā madhukarīvad avagamyate. katham. devatāyai haviḥ prattaṃ nīrasaṃ bhavati. tasmād annarasaṃ bhuṅkte devateti gamyate (ŚBh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 73). names in Vedic prescription does not require one to postulate the existence of deities in the world outside the Veda. The linguistic reality of the Veda, in other words, does not necessarily entail a corresponding outer world in order to work.11 2.1.4 Conclusions about the refusal of devatās devatās are beside the point when discussing about atheism or theism in India, so that devatās are found in Buddhist and Jaina texts and only represent a further class of sentient beings. Even Śabara does not altogether deny their existence in other parts of the ŚBh (e.g, ad PMS 6.1.5 where he explains that deities, along with plants and animals are not entitled to sacrifice). However, a different understanding of god(s) can find its way through the objector’s reference (possibly evoked in the sūtras by atithivat ‘like a guest’ and explicitly in the Bhāṣya) to the worship (pūjā), since the same term is used also in theistic and devotional contexts. 2.2 Anti-theological arguments in Kumārila By the time of Śabara’s commentator, Kumārila, the debate on god(s) had also turned into a more philosophical topic, probably especially because of the impact on the debate of the Nyāya deism (see Krasser 1999 on the role of the Naiyāyika Aviddhakarṇa). Thus, the debate evolved from the denial of the role of devatās within sacrifice to the denial of an īśvara who created and preserved the world, created language and taught or even composed the Vedas. Kumārila’s refusal of this kind of god has deeply influenced the Buddhist discussion about the same topic (see Krasser 1999 for its influence on Dharmakīrti) in a way which became more and more philosophically engaged. The target of the criticism is a god/īśvara as part of the ontological construct of a certain school (specifically of Nyāya and of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). 12 Kumārila (and Dharmakīrti) refutes the idea of using an īsv́ ara as a solution of ontological or logical problems on the basis of the idea that S/He creates more difficulties than S/He can solve. For instance, the karmic retribution does not need a divine Supervisor and the assumption of one is only anti-economical: kasyacid dhetumātratvaṃ yady adhiṣth ̣ ātṛteṣyate | karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānāṃ tatsiddheḥ siddhasādhanam || ŚV, SĀP, 75 || If you assume that to govern something means being its general cause, then you prove what is already established. For that (cause) is already established by the past karman of all beings. Śabara’s arguments against the idea of an embodied deity are also expanded by Kumārila, who contends that god, in order to intervene in the world, must have a body. If he did not have one, how could unconscious entities like atoms obey him? kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate | acetanaḥ katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate || 81 || tasmān na paramāṇvāder ārambhaḥ syāt tadicchayā | And if his activity is not held to be like that of the potter, how could an insentient entity [like an atom] obey his will? Therefore, the atoms [and the other insentient elements in the world] do not start [clinging together or separating] because of his will. (ŚV, SĀP, 81–82 ab) However, the idea of a body of god is fraught with difficulties, since also god’s body needs to be created (else it would not be a body like ours), but who created it, since god did not have a body yet at that 11tatra kiṃ vivakṣitaṃ kim avivakṣitam iti vijñeyam. tatra like ’rthakṛtā vivakṣā bhavati. vede tu śabdakṛtā (Ṭupṭīkā ad MS 9.1 adhikaraṇa 5, p. 77). 12See Bronkhorst 1996 on the “arrival” of a god in the Vaiśeṣika system: it seems plausible that god was at least also a way to deal with philosophical problems, such as the ones concerning the creation and dissolution of the world. time? In short, Kumārila rejects the idea of an īśvara which is involved in the creation and maintenance of the world, of language and of the Veda, but which is still very similar to other agents (a “superman” more than an altogether different entity). Personal attacks are reserved for the Buddha, not for Viṣṇu or Śiva and not even for a non-acting Brahman. 3 Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta When Vedānta started occupying the philosophical scene, the situation changed and the role of “god” was primarily occupied by the paramātman or brahman, with lower deities being accepted only at a worldly (vyavahārika) level. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta is, by contrast, a philosophical school which became more and more closely connected to the so-called Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. The latter is a general frame label used to group Vaiṣṇava beliefs mostly diffused and elaborated on in South India and attributing a role also to Viṣṇu’s consort Śrī. On the one hand Śrī Vaiṣṇavism is linked with the devotional songs of the Āḷvārs and on the other with the Pānc̃ arātra Sacred Texts, a kind of “manuals” for temple-worship. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta offers to those beliefs a philosophical, specifically Vedānta, frame. Thus, whereas Śrī Vaiṣṇavism has Viṣṇu as its central focus, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta rather discusses His philosophical counterpart, called brahman or paramātman. In post-Rāmānuja times the two traditions merge more and more, and theological topics (such as the relation Viṣṇu-Śrī, Viṣnu ̣ ’s body...) are dealt with in a philosophical perspective. Thus, theism (here understood only as the opposite of atheism, in the sense of “belief in God”) is a required presupposition of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. However, this does not necessarily imply the belief in a personal God, nor in a saving, caring one. The latter characteristics are altogether absent from Rāmānuja’s contributions to Viśiṣṭad̄ vaita Vedānta stricto sensu (e.g., in his Śrī Bhāsỵ a) as far as my knowledge goes (although they might have been present in his devotional and Vaiṣṇava works). 4 Can They be Reconciled? 4.1 Kumārila and vivakṣā The problem of reconciling something we would have called “god” and the authority of the Veda was already present among Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas. Apart from Kumārila’s ŚV-maṅgala, which, as shown by Pārthasārathi, is a double-entendre praising the Veda and Śiva at the same time, similar devices can be found also in other authors (see the concluding verse by the late Mīmāṃsaka Rāmānujācārya in his Tantrarahasya, Freschi 2012b, p. 5). In a different context and work, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa discussed what it means to speak of the Veda’s vivakṣā ‘intention’ and refused to understand it only metaphorically. In a non-metaphorical sense, vivakṣā implies the desire of someone to communicate. Who could this “someone” be? Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (2007, 2008) explains by means of TV verses that it is the paramātman which is embodied in the Veda: śabdabrahmeti yac cedaṃ śas̄ traṃ vedākhyam ucyate | tad apy adhiṣth ̣ itaṃ sarvam ekena paramātmanā || (TV ad 3.1.13, Subbāśāstrī 1929-1934, p. 703, ll. 6–7, v. 11) This Sacred Text called “Veda” is referred to as the “brahman consisting of language” | And this whole is superintended/inhabited (adhiṣṭhā-) by a single Supreme Self || Here, the key term śabdabrahman and Kumārila’s mention in the same connection (ibidem, v. 15) of a verse by Bhartṛhari about his concept of a śabdabrahman ‘brahman which consists of language’ should alert the reader. In fact, in which sense can the brahman be ‘superintended’ by a paramātman? In my understanding, the śabdabrahman is not a subform of brahman (still in need of a higher governor), but the brahman itself (and Bhartṛhari’s metaphysics correspondingly sees the all-pervasiveness of language in epistemology and ontology). In this sense, Kumārila could look at the śabdabrahman as tantamount to the Veda and connected to/identical with the paramātman. 13 What exactly should this 13According to the latter interpretation, adhiṣṭhita would mean that the Veda is ‘inhabited’ by a paramātman, which was previously declared to be no different from the Veda itself. I do not want to deal extensively with the interpretation of these verses, which is partly off-topic for the present paper. Apart connection (expressed by the verb adhiṣṭhā-) be? The v. 12 speaks of the Ṛgveda and of the other Saṃhitās as “bodies” and as “always endowed with consciousness” (tathargvedādayo dehāḥ proktā ye ’pi pṛthak pṛthak | bhogyatvenātmanām te ’pi catanyānugatāḥ sadā ||). This seems to hint at the idea of the Veda as the paramātman’s body, with “body” pointing at, as usual in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā thought (see Freschi forthcoming(c)), a living body which is inseparable from the self, so that a corpse is no longer a “body”. This also means that such a conscious body is conceptually unseparated from the self “inhabiting” it and that their relation cannot be comprehended as one of ultimate difference. At most, the body might be seen as an inseparable quality of the self. 14 4.2 Yāmuna etc. on the denial of deities as an instrumental move The idea of interpreting Jaimini’s devatādhikaraṇa (although not Śabara’s commentary thereon) as in fact not really aiming at a refusal of deities, but rather at strengthening the faith in the efficacy of sacrifice must have been already common sensical at the time of Yāmuna, the forth in the traditional line of teachers of the tradition later called Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. In fact, Veṅkaṭanātha puts forth this argument with almost the same words as Yāmuna, and Yāmuna himself mentions it en passant while discussing a different point of the alleged Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-Pāñcarātra divergences. This cursory mention makes one think that Yāmuna’s readers were already acquainted with the argument: yathaiva hi bhagavato jaimineḥ karmaphalopanyāsaḥ karmaśraddhāsaṃvarddhanāyeti. Like indeed the revered Jaimini stated that the [rituals’] result comes from the sacrificial action [and not from the deity to whom the sacrifice has been offered] for the sake of augmenting the faith in the sacrificial action. (Āgamaprāmāṇya, Śas̄ trī 1937, p. 67). Should one think that Yāmuna dwelled on this topic longer in his lost works, one should explain why Veṅkaṭanātha, while elaborating on this issue, only mentioned this same passage. Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasaṃgraha repeats a similar point: In order to avoid the lack of faith in ritual action of people who have not heard the Upaniṣads (aśrutavedānta), some excessive statements (ativāda) have been used in the devatādhikaraṇa, in order for one to have faith in the mere ritual actions. The definitive conclusion of those who know the Veda is that all of this is a single treatise (śas̄ tra). 15 Thus, rituals are praised by Jaimini for the sake of people who do not know the Upaniṣads. In fact, Rāmānuja emphasises that rituals lead even people who do not know the Upaniṣads to strive for liberation, thus it is good for them to keep on performing them. Veṅkaṭanātha developed this seminal hint insofar as he chose to distinguish Jaimini from his commentators and attributed all sorts of good intentions to the former, but not to the latter. It might be that this move had also been anticipated by some earlier Viśiṣṭad ̄ vaita or Śrī Vaiṣṇava author, as Veṅkaṭanātha took care to tell his readers in the SM and in the MP, where he tried hard to show that the acceptance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is perfectly legitimate from the point of view of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta-Śrī Vaiṣṇavism (see below, chapter 4.4). 4.3 The specificity of Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāmṣ ā: apūrva Rāmānuja seems quite keen on re-establishing the idea that sacrifices work only insofar as they please from Yoshimizu’s essays, one can read my opinion on the topic here: http://elisafreschi.com/2013/09/06/plurality-of-subjectsin-mimaṃsa-kiyotaka-yoshimizu-2007/ and here: http://elisafreschi.com/2013/09/13/is-theveda-the-body-of-god-yoshimizu-2007-ii-part/. Yoshimizu 2007 is also connected to the issue of Kumārila and Vedānta, on this see Mesquita 1994 and Taber 2007. 14The concept of “body” especially when related to “god” is very problematic. As already described, Śabara and Kumārila showed how a straightforward understanding of god’s body (as having, e.g., a definite extension in space and resembling the body of any other sentient being) leads to contradictions. However, Udayana and other thinkers (also within Buddhism, with the doctrine of the kāyas) tried to imagine a different kind of “body” for the god. On this fascinating topic, see Colas 2009. 15aśrutavedāntānāṃ karmaṇy aśraddhā mā bhūd iti devatādhikaraṇe ’tivādāḥ kṛtāḥ karmamātre yathā śraddhā syād iti sarvam ekaśāstram iti vedavitsiddhāntaḥ, Buitenen 1956, p. 157. Viṣnu ̣ , who then bestows on the sacrificer the expected result. This directly counters the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā stress on the centrality of sacrifice. Rāmānuja even goes so far as to reuse the model criticised by Pūrva Mīmāṃsā authors in the devatādhikaraṇa and to affirm that the sacrifice is for the sake of the devatās but that, since the inner ruler (antaryāmin) of the devatās is Viṣnu ̣ , it ultimately pleases him. Consider his commentary on BS 3.2.39 and 3.2.40: [Obj.:] For this very reason, the teacher Jaimini thinks that, out of congruity and because of the Sacred Texts [stating it], only dharma, in the form of sacrificing, giving, oblating and venerating (upāsana) delivers the fruit. In fact, in worldly experience we commonly see that activities like agriculture and activities like massaging deliver their results by themselves, either immediately (as in the case of massaging and the pleasure it causes) or mediately (as in the case of agriculture, where a plant grows only at a succeeding time). In the same way, also in the Veda, although sacrificing, giving, oblating do not immediately deliver a result, they can nonetheless deliver a result mediately, through an apūrva. [...] [R:] [...] The revered Bādarāyaṇa considers that it is only the supreme person (paramapuruṣa) who delivers the result. [...] Because it is indicated (vyapadiś-) in several Vedic sentences that deities (devatā) such as Agni or Vāyu, which have been propitiated (ārādhya) by the sacrifice —which consists of a propitiation of the deities— are the cause of this or that result. [...] And in the form of Vāyu etc. only the supreme person (paramapuruṣa) remains as the one who delivers the result because of having been propitiated.16 Thus, Veṅkaṭanātha had in front of him a hard task as he tried to reconcile Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta on this issue.17 The fact that he managed to create a new synthesis is evidence of his systematiser’s genius, whereby the term “systematiser” does not entail a lower order of philosophising. On the contrary, Veṅkaṭanātha had to find a higher synthesis of contradictory positions, one which could still look acceptable to his Viśiṣṭādvaita fellows. Veṅkaṭanātha’s general strategy seems to be to accept the Mīmāṃsā approach (which is useful in order to keep Buddhist and other Sacred Texts out of the precinct of validity) while adding to it an exception, namely God. Thus, Veṅkaṭanātha agrees that bodies are created except for God’s body, which is nitya. 18 Similarly, direct perception cannot grasp dharma (so that it is impossible that the Buddha knew dharma) except for God’s perception. In fact, throughout SM ad PMS 1.1.4 Veṅkaṭanātha shares the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā arguments against the possibility of yogipratyakṣa, and only in the concluding verses he, surprisingly, adds that these arguments do not apply to God. “God” (referred to with the adjective aiśa in the verse) is thus clearly different from a devatā but also from the god Kumārila attacks, since He does not belong to the same categories human beings (puruṣa) belong to; He can have an eternal body, although eternal bodies are inconceivable for us, and can perceptually see dharma, although this is also a priori impossible for the other sentient beings. In this way, Veṅkaṭanātha can avoid refuting the Mīmāṃsā stance, while embedding it into a larger frame where a God is indeed possible (this embedding strategy is most likely a distinguishing feature of Veṅkaṭanātha’s approach, see Freschi forthcoming(b)). However, this move is not just a variation of the Vedānta attitude towards Pūrva Mīmāṃsā considered valid, but only concerning worldly affairs. In fact, Veṅkaṭanātha embraces even transempirical claims of the Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā. Noteworthily, in the case of sacrifices, he makes use of the key Mīmāmṣ ā concept 16ata eva upapatteḥ śāstrāc ca yāgadānahomopāsanarūpadharmam eva phalapradaṃ jaiminirācāryo manyate. loke hi kṛṣyādikaṃ mardanādikaṃ ca karma sākṣād vā paramparayā vā svayam eva phalasādhanaṃ dṛṣṭam; evaṃ vede ’pi yāgadānahomādīnāṃ sākṣātphalasādhanatvābhāve ’pi paramparayā apūrvadvāreṇa phalasādhanatvam upapadyate [...] paramapuruṣasyaiva phalapradatvaṃ bhagavān bādarāyaṇo manyate. [...] yaja devapūjāyām iti devatārādhanabhūtayāgādyārādhyabhūtāgnivāyvādidevatānām eva tattatphalahetutayā tasmiṃs tasminn api vākye vyapadeśāt. [...] vāyvādyātmanā ca paramapuruṣa evārādhyatayā phalapradāyitvena cāvatiṣṭhate [...]. 17Just like on many other issues, see Neevel 1977 and its long discussion in Mesquita 1980 about the vehement opposition to Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā by Yāmuna. 18tad etat śarīram dvividham—nityaṃ anityañ ceti | tatra nityaṃ triguṇadravyakālajīvaśubhāśrayādyātmakam īśvaraśarīram; nityānāñ ca svābhāvikagaruḍabhujagādirūpam (Nyāyasiddhāñjana 1st section, on dravya, Vīrarāghavācārya 1976, p. 174, see Mikami n.y. par. 1.9.2). of apūrva, that is, the ‘unprecedented’, which cannot be known through any other means of knowledge: The unprecedented [potency] (apūrva) which is realised by the action, though permanent (sthīra), is not perceivable by people like us. This consists, in fact, in the favour (anugraha) of the Deity [to whom the sacrifice has been offered]. For, the intention of one (the pleased Deity who wishes to favour the sacrificer) cannot be perceived by another person. 19 Hence, apūrva is imperceptible because it consists in the Deity having been pleased, and the intention of one (the Deity who has been pleased) is not perceptible by another (a person like us). In a simpler scheme, this is the (reconstructed) Vedic model: *sacrifice → deities’pleasure → result And the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā model: sacrifice → apūrva → result Last, Veṅkaṭanātha’s model: God’s pleasure = sacrifice → apūrva → result The apūrva is the fact that God is pleased. God’s propitiation is beyond the usual means of knowledge (and hence not empirical) because the intention of one is imperceptible to another; not being empirical, it is not within the boundaries of the Mīmāṃsā empiricism. Thus, Veṅkaṭanātha does not only embed the worldly views of PMS in his system, but also its transempirical views about the Veda and the dharma. This he does by connecting (some of) the highest elements of his system (God and the body of God) with the highest elements of the PMS system (dharma and the Veda). 4.4 Sociological Background At this stage of my research, I have been focusing on Veṅkaṭanātha’s theology in its own value and independently of its possible sociological motivations. 20 Consequently, I have not looked for external evidence through, e.g., inscriptions and other artefacts. Nonetheless, some elements are striking even within Veṅkaṭanātha’s texts only. • Veṅkaṭanātha seems in both SM (Introduction, naming Nārāyaṇārya, and passim for the constant reference to Rāmānuja, see Freschi forthcoming(b)) and MP (MP v. 7cd, MP v. 11, naming Nārāyaṇārya and Dramiḍa21) very keen to show how his forerunners anticipated and endorsed his strategy in regard to the inclusion of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā within Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. That this point was controversial is however shown by the opponents who are sceptical about this inclusion and whose voices have been recorded in the MP (see MP vv. 6–9 and 11). It is also indirectly shown by the fact that Veṅkaṭanātha could not produce univocal statements for the time before Rāmānuja and that even Rāmānuja’s statements often have a rather different scope (see Freschi forthcoming(b)). At the risk of an illegitimate induction, we might derive from the fact that Rāmānuja’s arguments appear to have been at times stretched to cover Veṅkaṭanātha’s agenda that the same happened also with his forerunners, whose works are lost. Consider for instance the following quote from the SM: The ones who, after having themselves superimposed (adhyasta) a fault in the analysis (vyākriyā 22), abandoned even a sūtra, these would almost abandon even a crystal [although the faults are not in the crystal, but have only been superimposed on it], because there is a fault in a China rose [behind it]. 23 19kriyāsādhyam apūrvaṃ sthiram api nāsmadādipratyakṣam. tad dvi devatānugrahātmakam. na hi parābhiprāyaḥ parasya pratyakṣatām iyāt (SM ad PMS 1.1.4, p. 50 1971). 20I am grateful to Paul Dundas for having raised this issue during the discussion of this paper in the fourth IIGRS conference. 21Dramiḍa is mentioned by Rāmānuja in the opening verse of his Śrī Bhāṣya and in his Vedārthasaṅgraha (section 93) among the forerunners on his path (bodhāyanaṭaṅkadramiḍaguhadevakapardibhāruciprabhṛtyavigītaśiṣtạ parigṛhītapurātanavedavedāntavyākh yānasuvyaktārthaśrutinikaranidarśito ’yaṃ panthāḥ, Vedārthasaṅgraha). No work of him has survived. 22 Or perhaps “in the vṛtti”. But both meanings are not attested in Apte, PW, MW. 23adhyasya vyākriyādoṣaṃ ye sūtram api tatyajuḥ | prāyaḥ sphaṭikam pay eye jahyur eva japābhramāt || From the context, the verse should be attributed to Nārāyaṇārya, a predecessor whose work is lost, but credited with a more critical approach to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (see, again, MP v. 11 for Veṅkaṭanātha’s reinterpretation of this approach). Veṅkaṭanātha interprets it as explaining that Jaimini’s sūtras are authoritative, although their commentators are not, but the passage may have referred only to the Vedānta Sūtra (or some other sūtra). • Yāmuna and Rāmānuja use many Pūrva Mīmāṃsā devices, so that the claims by Neevel and Mesquita about the overall hostility between Yāmuna and Mīmāṃsā might need to be at least in part reconsidered: Yāmuna is not hostile to the Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā school (in fact, he uses Pūrva Mīmāṃsā arguments to defend the epistemological validity of the Pāñcarātra in his ĀP), but rather to the person or people, possibly connected with Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā, who tried to deny the validity of the Pāñcarātra (see Mesquita 1980 with a tentative identification of this person as Sucarita Miśra). • De facto, at the time of Veṅkaṭanātha there were perhaps no more atheist Pūrva Mīmāmṣ akas, and perhaps Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in general continued to exist only as a special expertise within Mīmāṃsā (including Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, i.e. Vedānta). To sum up, the relation between Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta was complex and multifaceted. It was not (or not only) the case that Śrī Vaiṣṇavas wanted to be accepted as “orthodox” and were contested by Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas. Resistance was vehement also from the Śrī Vaiṣṇava/Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta side, and Veṅkaṭanātha’s position was very difficult. 24 4.5 Conclusions: siddha part Veṅkaṭanātha could introduce a God in the unitary Vedānta-śas̄ tra because He was very different from the deities refuted in the devatādhikaraṇa, and also from the god criticised by Kumārila and by later Mīmāṃsā authors. First of all, this God does not compete with the Veda; secondly, He does not render the sacrifice devoid of significance. Mīmāṃsā authors did not want sacrifices to be directed at pleasing a deity who would have then delivered a desired result because this runs counter to their empiricism and their sticking to economy (Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā authors agree with Ockham’s entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem), and because it makes sacrifices (and the Veda) just one out of many means to please deities. By contrast, Veṅkaṭanātha does not want to make either the sacrifices or the Veda dependent on something extrinsic. Sacrifices must be performed because of the Vedic injunctions prescribing them but their performance pleases God and this pleasure is equated with the apūrva. 25 At the same time, one should not loose sight of Veṅkaṭanātha’s multiple approach, which is evident in his poetical as well as his philosophical work (see Hardy 1979) and which constantly enables readers/listeners to balance between the epistemological or metaphysical connection of Veda– (śabdabrahman?)–God and one’s personal relationship to God as a person to be worshipped. 4.6 Some yet-to-be established conclusions This part of the conclusions has a merely heuristic and philosophical value, since I have not yet been able to ground it in the words of Veṅkaṭanātha and his forerunners. How should one conceive of a God who is untouched by the Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā attacks? How can S/He “be”26 without being a superfluous entity like the god whose logical necessity is denied by Kumārila? Possibly because Veṅkaṭanātha’s God is no longer an ontologically given entity, distinct from the Veda and from the sacrifices and pleased through them, as with Indra and other Vedic deities. Nor is He an agent acting in the world, like the (allegedly Naiyāyika) one attacked by Kumārila. He does not need a (SM, Introduction, p. 5 1971). 24A comparable case has been discussed in a recent talk by Alexis Sanderson in the context of the relation of Tantric Śaivism and the so-called orthodox “Hinduism”: It is not only the case that Śaiva authors tried to be accepted as “orthodox Hindūs” and “orthodox Hindūs” tried to block them. By contrast, on both sides there were trends towards assimilation and resistance to these trends (see Sanderson 2013). 25The occurrence that God is pleased by sacrifices is not coincidential, given God’s connection with the Veda, whereas the equation with the apūrva implicitly states that the Veda is the only epistemological means to know about God. 26I am using this more neutral term in order to avoid the ontological commitment of the verb ‘to exist’. finite body because the whole world is His body (as stated in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana 1st section, on dravya, p. 178–9, Mikami n.y. par. 1.9.3). 27 This means that He is also the metaphysical foundation of the Veda, not (entirely?) different from it, as described in the case of Kumārila. Such a God would be: God = Veda ≠ an ontological substance A big obstacle in this interpretation is Yāmuna’s care in distinguishing his position (and, thus, what would have become the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta position) from the “Buddhist” and “crypto-Buddhist” (=Advaita Vedānta) position: the self (including the paramātman) is for Yāmuna not tantamount to consciousness (ĀS). Rather, it is endowed with consciousness as its intrinsic characteristic (svabhāva). It is difficult to understand how this position can at the same time be distinguished from the Nyāya position about the Self being intrinsically unconscious, but having consciousness as a characteristic. However, in a similar context, Walter G. Neevel suggested that the technical term svabhāva applied by Yāmuna to consciousness indicates that consciousness is not identical with the self, but that it cannot be separated from it (unlike happiness, sukha), just like in the case of the Nāvya Nyāya svarūpa upādhi and going in the direction of the ontological assessment of viśiṣṭa-advaita, understood as “the non- duality of what has been qualified” (Neevel 1977, pp. 130–141). This would make the disidentification of God with an ontological entity again possible. It might be, moreover, suggested, that the paramātman is understood as a person (Yāmuna and Veṅkaṭanātha stress that it is identical with the “I” appearing in cognitions with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and against Advaita Vedānta28) and, thus, as a dynamic melting of consciousness and action. If this were the case, such a “person” would not need to be an ontologically fixed entity and could steer away from the Scylla of the Nyāya ontology and the Charybdis of Buddhist deconstruction. 5 What Do We Mean by “God”, “Atheism”, and “Empiricism”? The concept of “god” is not as univocal as Western readers who share a similar Judeo-Christian background —but have not dwelled much on it— might think. Furthermore, the link of God first and foremost with ontology is not the only possible way to interpret His/Her role. 29 We have seen that Veṅkaṭanātha introduced God in Mīmāṃsā through its deontics. Kumārila did something similar due to exegetical reasons. The notion of “atheism” stands also in need of a parallel redefinition. The Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā atheism 27eṣāñ ca vyaṣṭijīvaśarīrāṇām īśvaraṃ prati śarīratvaṃ sadvārakam advārakañ ceti sampradāyaḥ. sadvārakam eveti anyaḥ. prathamas tu pakṣaḥ prācuryeṇa bhāṣyakāravyavahāraiḥ sūcyate tattvaratnākare ’pi sa evoktaḥ, “cetanācetanayor aviśiṣtaṃ taṃ prati śarīratvam” ityādivacanāt. dvitīyas tu pakṣo vivaraṇakāraṅgīkṛtaḥ. ṣaḍarthasaṅkṣepe hi acito jīveśvarayor dehatvāt tadvāciśabdajanitadhiyām ubhayatra paryavasānam ubhayor api svayam eva bhānāt dvirbhānañ cāsá ṅkayoktam, “nācito jīvadvārā brahmaśarīratvāt” iti. vivaraṇe ’pi ayam evārthaḥ prapañcitaḥ. ayañ ca vivādo devamanuṣyādivyaṣṭidehaviṣayaḥ; divyamaṅgalavigrahādyacitsu sadvārakatvāyogāt. vivaraṇe ’pi hi tamaḥprabhṛtīnām api śarīratvanirdeśavirodhaparihārāya, “ādisṛṣṭau tu” ityādinā samaṣṭitvānāṃ sākṣāt paraśarīratvam uktam. tejo ’bannasṛṣṭisamanantarabhāvidevamanuṣyādirūpavyākaraṇamātra eva, “anena jīvena” ityādiśrutyanurodhena [p. 179] sadvārakatvam. tatrāpi advārakaṃ sadvārakañ ca śarīratve na kaścid doṣaḥ. ubhayaparyavasānam api viśeṣamūlaprayogabhedapratiniyamāt parihṛtam. ata eva na dvirbhānam api. na ca ekasya yugapad anekaṃ prati śarīratvam anupapannam; tallakṣaṇayogena tadupapatteḥ, anekaṃ prati śeṣatvādivat. na va svato jīvavat śarīrabhūtasya triguṇadravyasya jīvanupraviṣṭasaṅghātaviśeṣadaśāmātreṇa īśvaraṃ prati śarīratvam apasarati. na ca tad anyad dravyam; dravyābhedāt. vyākṛtabhūtatvagādīn prati ca īśvarasya antaryāmitvāt. tata eva ca teṣāṃ taccharīratvaṃ śrūyate. suṣuptimurcchādyavasthāsu ca svābhāvikam īśvaraniyāmyatvam eva dehadehinor dṛśyate. ata idam advārakaniyamanaṃ tatpakṣe na syāt | jīvasattāmātrañ ca na dehaniyamanaupayikam; tadānīṃ jñānecchārahitatayā tasya gaganādisattātulyatvāt. ataḥ sarvāvasthānāṃ sarvadravyāṇāṃ praty eva svataś śarīratvam. jīvaṃ prati tu tatkarmakṛtam iti samīcīno ’yaṃ panthāḥ. 28For Yāmuna, see Neevel 1977, p. 137. For the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā position, see Freschi 2012a, Freschi forthcoming(a). 29An interesting hint at a non-substantiated God is indeed found also in John’s first Letter, with the well- known definition “God is love” (Deus caritas est, ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν, 1 John 4: 16). seems not to address all sorts of “gods” and not all in the same way. Heinrich Zimmer has spoken of transtheism in the case of Jainism, which is more disinterested than hostile towards god(s). Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas are clearly antitheistic but only against a certain interpretation of deities. Last, the Pūrva Mīmāmṣ ā commitment to empiricism, though linked with its atheism, is not linked with direct realism in the realm of semantics and of epistemology (both consider also sādhya ‘to be realised’ items the ontological status of which cannot be dealt with through direct realism). nanv evaṃ śabda eva devatā prāpnoti. naitad asmābhiḥ parihartavyaṃ na hīdam ucyamānam asmatpakṣam bādhate (ŚBh 10.4.23). 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