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Schooling in Murder:‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft Battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬and‭ ‬Hauptmann Roman Shukhevych in Belarus‭ ‬1942 Per Anders Rudling Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität,‭ ‬Greifswald‭ (‬Germany‭)‬. Introduction The OUN(b‭) ‬and UPA’s campaign to cleanse Western Ukraine‭ ‬of its non-Ukrainian minorities‭ ‬in‭ ‬1943‭ ‬and‭ ‬1944‭ ‬was carried out‭ ‬in a brutal,‭ ‬systematic fashion.‭ ‬The UPA’s cleansing of the Volhynian and Galician Poles was the culmination of a campaign of violence,‭ ‬the understanding of which requires a study of the background of its leadership,‭ ‬and the establishment of the context within which it operated.‭ ‬While several‭ ‬researchers‭ ‬emphasize the training of a substantial part of the UPA leadership by Nazi Germany,‭ ‬this is a relative recent field of study.‭ ‬Many questions remain to be answered. ‭ ‬See,‭ ‬for instance Timothy Snyder,‭ “‬To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All:‭ ‬The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland,‭ ‬1943-1947,‭” ‬Cold War Studies,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬2,‭ (‬1999‭)‬:‭ ‬86-120‭; ‬John-Paul Himka,‭ “‬Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War:‭ ‬Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors,‭” ‬in‭ ‬The Fate of the European Jews,‭ ‬1939-1945:‭ ‬Continuity or Contingency,‭ ‬ed.‭ ‬Jonathan Frankel‭ (‬New York and Oxford:‭ ‬Oxford University Press,‭ ‬1997‭)‬,‭ ‬Studies in Contemporary Jewry‭ ‬13‭ (‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬170-189‭; ‬Ivan Katchanovski,‭ “‬Terrorists or National Heroes‭?‬:‭ ‬Politics of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine,‭” ‬paper presented at the‭ ‬World Conference of the‭ ‬Association for the Study of Nationalities,‭ ‬New York,‭ ‬NY,‭ ‬April‭ ‬15,‭ ‬2010.‭ ‬Forthcoming,‭ ‬Nationalities Papers.‭ ‬What seems clear is that the brutalization of the war in the east came to influence the violent nature of the campaign,‭ ‬and the way it was carried out.‭ ‬Therefore,‭ ‬in order to understand the‭ ‬nature of the UPA’s anti-Polish campaign,‭ ‬particularly during its most violent phase in‭ ‬1943-44,‭ ‬it is important to study the background of its leadership,‭ ‬particularly its activities and affiliations in‭ ‬1941-42.‭ ‬Roman Shukhevych,‭ ‬its commander,‭ ‬had distinguished himself in German service.‭ ‬Serving in German uniform since‭ ‬1938,‭ ‬Shukhevych combined his political activism‭ ‬as a‭ ‬Ukrainian nationalist‭ ‬with a distinguished military record.‭ ‬In‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬he was a commander of the‭ ‬Nachtigall battalion,‭ ‬a‭ ‬Wehrmacht formation consisting of Ukrainian nationalists.‭ ‬Soldiers under his command carried out mass shootings of Jews in the vicinity of Vinnytsia.‭ ‬The role of Shukhevych and‭ ‬the‭ ‬Nachtigall in the pogroms of the June‭ ‬30,‭ ‬1941‭ ‬L’viv pogrom has been the topic of heated discussions. ‭ ‬On the controversies surrounding‭ ‬Nachtigall and the L’viv pogrom,‭ ‬see Philip-Christian Wachs,‭ ‬Der Fall Theodor Oberländer‭ (‬1905-1998‭)‬:‭ ‬ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte‭ (‬Frankfurt a.M.:‭ ‬Campus,‭ ‬2000‭)‬,‭ ‬55-71‭ ‬and Per Anders Rudling,‭ “‬The Shukhevych Cult in Ukraine:‭ ‬Myth Making with Complications,‭” ‬paper presented at the conference World War II and the‭ (‬Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine,‭ ‬Kyiv,‭ ‬Ukraine,‭ ‬September‭ ‬25,‭ ‬2009.‭ ‬Available online,‭ ‬http://ww2-historicalmemory.org.ua/abstract_e.html‭ (‬Accessed October‭ ‬11,‭ ‬2009‭)‬ A less known,‭ ‬and often overlooked‭ ‬aspect of Shukhevych’s service for Nazi Germany was his whereabouts in‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬something often omitted in the nationalist historiography. ‭ ‬A typical biography in the nationalist press could like this:‭ “‬On assignment from the OUN,‭ [‬Shukhevych‭] ‬travelled to Gdansk,‭ ‬and in June‭ ‬1941‭ ‬he became the deputy commander of the so-called Ukrainian Legion.‭ ‬It gathered the best Ukrainian youth in emigration in Poland and Germany.‭ ‬After training them they marched east together with the German army.‭ ‬The legion reached Vinnytsia,‭ ‬but Hitler did not like him,‭ ‬and punished him by liquidating the battalion.‭ ‬In‭ ‬1943‭ ‬Roman Shukhevych was elected head of the Bureau of the Leadership of the OUN,‭ ‬and in the fall he occupied the position as Supreme Commander of the UPA.‭” ‬Sign.‭ ‘‬Ukrains’ka Dumka,‭’ “‬Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka,‭” ‬Ukrains’ki visti,‭ ‬no.‭ ‬22,‭ ‬May‭ ‬29,‭ ‬1975:‭ ‬7.‭ ‬ During this year,‭ ‬Shukhevych served as‭ ‬Hauptmann‭ (‬captain‭)‬ of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften,‭ ‬and stood under the command of‭ ‬Höhere Polizei-‭ ‬und SS-Führer‭ ‬Heinrich Himmler.‭ ‬This paper is an attempt to document this white spot in the Shukhevych’s biography. Background:‭ ‬Jews,‭ ‬partisans,‭ ‬and‭ ‬“bandits‭” Given the huge size of the Soviet territories under German occupation,‭ ‬the German military personnel were spreading thinly.‭ ‬Aware of this shortage,‭ ‬Wilhelm Keitel,‭ ‬the head of the‭ ‬Oberkommano der Wehrmacht,‭ ‬argued‭ “‬Since we cannot watch everybody,‭ ‬we need to rule by fear.‭” ‬Hitler himself,‭ ‬when learning about Stalin’s call for a partisan movement in the summer of‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬exclaimed‭ “‬That’s only good,‭ ‬it gives us a possibility to the exterminate everybody who challenges our rule.‭” Ales‭’ ‬Adamovich,‭ ”‬Zapisnye knizhki raznykh let,‭” ‬Nëman:‭ ‬Ezhemesiachnyi literaturno-khudozhestvennyi i obshchestvenno-politicheskii zhurnal,‭ ‬no.‭ ‬7,‭ (‬July‭ ‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬14.‭ ‬ Hitler himself compared the fighting of partisans with that of the struggle against‭ “‬red Indians.‭” Philip W.‭ ‬Blood,‭ ‬Hitler’s Bandit Hunters:‭ ‬The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe‭ (‬Washington,‭ ‬DC:‭ ‬Potomac Books,‭ ‬Inc.,‭ ‬2006‭)‬,‭ ‬79.‭ ‬ On September‭ ‬16,‭ ‬1941‭ ‬Keitel issued an order that every German soldier,‭ ‬killed in a partisan attack in the occupied Soviet Union would be avenged by the killing of‭ “‬50‭ – ‬100‭ ‬Communists.‭” I.‭ ‬N.‭ ‬Kuznetsov and V.‭ ‬G.‭ ‬Mazets,‭ ‬eds.‭ ‬Istoriia Belarusi v dokumentakh i materialakh‭ (‬Minsk:‭ ‬Amalfeia,‭ ‬2000‭)‬,‭ ‬542,‭ ‬citing TsGAOR SSSR,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬7445,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬2,‭ ‬d.‭ ‬140,‭ ‬l.‭ ‬502-504‭; “‬Erlaß des Chefs des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht Keitel über Vergeltunsmaßnahmen bei Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzungsmacht,‭ ‬vom‭ ‬16.‭ ‬September‭ ‬1941,‭” ‬in Johannes Schlootz ed.,‭ ‬Deutsche Propaganda in Weißrußland‭ ‬1941-1944:‭ ‬Eine Konfrontation von Propaganda und Wirklichkeit‭ (‬Berlin:‭ ‬Freie Universität Berlin,‭ ‬1996‭)‬,‭ ‬13.‭ ‬At a September,‭ ‬1941‭ ‬meeting for army officers,‭ ‬von dem Bach-Zelewski and SS-Brigadeführer Artur Nebe,‭ ‬the leader of‭ ‬Einsatzgruppe B linked the partisans to the Jews:‭ “‬Where the partisan is,‭ ‬there also is the Jew,‭ ‬and where the Jew is,‭ ‬is the partisan.‭” Helmut Krausnick,‭ ‬Hitlers Einsatzgruppen:‭ ‬Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges‭ ‬1938-1942‭ ‬(Frankfurt a.‭ ‬M.:‭ ‬Fischer,‭ ‬1993‭)‬,‭ ‬218.‭ ‬ In December,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬one month before the Wannsee conference,‭ ‬Himmler’s appointment book carried the cryptic note‭ “‬Jewish question/to be exterminated as partisans.‭” Blood,‭ ‬Hitler’s Bandit Hunters,‭ ‬54.‭ ‬ As escaping Jews reinforced the partisans,‭ ‬the Nazis linked the expediency of exterminating Jews to their counterinsurgency activities.‭ ‬The view that‭ “‬The Jews are without exception identical with the concept of partisan‭” ‬was‭ ‬a key assumption of the architects of the German counter-insurgency campaigns. ‭ ‬Hannes Heer,‭ ”‬Killing Fields:‭ ‬The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia,‭ ‬1941-1942,‭” ‬Holocaust and Genocide Studies‭ ‬11‭ (‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬88,‭ ‬citing Kommandatur des Sicherungs-Gebietes Weißruthenien-Abt.‭ ‬Ic.‭ ‬Lagebericht,‭ ‬20.‭ ‬2.‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬BA-MA,‭ ‬RH‭ ‬26-707-15,‭ ‬p.‭ ‬4.‭ Local Collaboration during World War II The shortage of German military personnel necessitated an increased reliance on local collaborators.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften,‭ ‬auxiliary police forces,‭ ‬were designated as an instrument,‭ ‬operating under the‭ ‬Gendarmerie,‭ ‬intended to carry out the‭ “‬dirty work‭” (‬Schmutzarbeit‭) ‬of the occupying forces, ‭ ‬Martin C.‭ ‬Dean,‭ “‬The German Gendarmerie,‭ ‬the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the‭ ‘‬Second Wave‭’ ‬of Jewish killings in Occupied Ukraine:‭ ‬German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region,‭ ‬1941-1944,‭” ‬German History,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬14,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬2‭ (‬1996‭)‬:‭ ‬178.‭ ‬ including the execution of Jews and Communists. ‭ ‬Richard‭ ‬Breitman,‭ ‬“Himmler’s Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories,‭” ‬Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual,‭ ‬vol.‭ ‬7‭ (‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬27.‭ ‬ Central assignments were‭ “‬anti-partisan warfare,‭ ‬searching the ghettoes and sealing them off during‭ ‬Aktionen,‭ ‬to executions at the murder sites.‭” Yehoshua Büchler,‭ “‬Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS:‭ ‬Himmler’s Personal Murder Brigades in‭ ‬1941,‭” ‬Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬1,‭ (‬1986‭)‬:‭ ‬94,‭ ‬citing the Stahlecker report,‭ ‬and Prague Military Archives,‭ ‬V.‭ ‬H.‭ ‬A.:‭ ‬Pol.‭ ‬Reg.‭ ‬Mitte‭ ‬13/74‭ ‬and‭ ‬5/36.‭ ‬Martin Dean,‭ ‬Collaboration in the Holocaust:‭ ‬Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine,‭ ‬1941-44‭ (‬New York:‭ ‬St Martin’s Press,‭ ‬2000‭)‬,‭ ‬77.‭ ‬See also Dean‭ (‬1996‭)‬,‭ ‬181,‭ ‬192.‭ While the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften had constituted a fairly small force,‭ ‬they were drastically enlarged after the summer of‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬From July‭ ‬1942‭ ‬to the end of that year,‭ ‬the overall strength of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft-Einzeldienst increased from about‭ ‬30,000‭ ‬to over‭ ‬200,000‭ ‬men. ‭ ‬Dean,‭ ‬Collaboration in the Holocaust‭ (‬2000‭)‬,‭ ‬122.‭ While half of the men worked in fire brigades,‭ ‬the dramatic growth of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften mirrored the growth of the pro-Soviet partisan formations.‭ ‬By October,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬there were‭ ‬55,562‭ ‬local police in‭ ‬Ostland,‭ (‬i.e.‭ ‬the Baltics and Western Belarus‭)‬ but only‭ ‬4,428‭ ‬Germans,‭ ‬i.e.‭ ‬a ration of‭ ‬1:13. ‭ ‬By comparison,‭ ‬the balance was‭ ‬1:1‭ ‬in The General Gouvernment and Norway,‭ ‬1:4‭ ‬in the Reichsprotektorat‭ ‬Böhmen-Mähren and the Netherlands,‭ ‬Serbia‭ ‬1:6,‭ ‬France‭ ‬1:15,‭ ‬and Russia‭ ‬1:20,‭ ‬Petras Stankeras,‭ ‬Litovskie politseiskie batal’ony‭ ‬1941-1945‭ ‬gg.‭ (‬Moscow:‭ ‬Veche,‭ ‬2009‭)‬,‭ ‬37.‭ ‬ With the exception of the Soviet POWs,‭ ‬the‭ ‬Schutzmänner were recruited on a voluntary basis. ‭ ‬"The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration‭ (‬applicant‭) ‬v.‭ ‬Vladimir Katriuk‭ (‬respondent‭) (‬T-2408-96‭) ‬Federal Court of Canada Trial Division,‭ ‬Nadon,‭ ‬J.‭ ‬January‭ ‬29,‭ ‬1999,‭” ‬Federal Trial Reports,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬156‭ (‬Fredricton,‭ ‬NB:‭ ‬Maritime Law Book Ltd,‭ ‬1999‭)‬,‭ ‬178-179.‭ The activities of the very institution of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft‭ ‬are one of the lesser-known‭ ‬episodes of the Holocaust. ‭ “‬The little-known role of the Gendarmerie and the Schutzmannschaft demonstrates the‭ ‘‬open‭’ ‬or ill-concealed nature of the genocide in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.‭ ‬The Jews were killed by shooting in pits close to their neighbours.‭ ‬As German forces,‭ ‬especially Security Police‭ ‬,‭ ‬were so thin on the ground,‭ ‬most of the available local manpower had to be utilized to carry out such as vast programme.‭” ‬Martin C.‭ ‬Dean,‭ “‬The German Gendarmerie,‭”‬191.‭ ‬ While there are considerable documentary evidence and witness accounts to establish the participation of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften in Nazi war crimes, ‭ ‬Report by‭ ‬Gebietskommissar Carl,‭ ‬October‭ ‬30,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬in Ernst Klee et al,‭ (‬eds.‭) ‬”Schöne Zeiten‭”‬:‭ ‬Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter und Gaffer‭ (‬Frankfurt a.‭ ‬M.:‭ ‬Fischer,‭ ‬1988‭)‬,‭ ‬164-167.‭ ‬ their direct participation in anti-Jewish actions is poorly documented in the surviving German records.‭ ‬The German occupation authorities left‭ ‬relatively little information about the local auxiliaries.‭ ‬Our knowledge of the anti-partisan activities is still limited.‭ ‬Only in exceptional cases are the names of individual soldiers,‭ ‬other than their commanders mentioned.‭ ‬After the war,‭ ‬the West German authorities paid limited attention to war-time killing of civilian Slavs.‭ ‬Unlike the murder of Jews,‭ ‬killing of‭ ‬local Slavs was generally not‭ ‬regarded as having been carried out on racist grounds.‭ ‬Anti-partisan activities were considered as conventional war crimes,‭ ‬and something to which the Federal German prosecutors in Ludwigsburg generally paid little interest. ‭ ‬Christopher R.‭ ‬Browning,‭ ‬Ordinary Men:‭ ‬Reserve Police Battalion‭ ‬101‭ ‬and the final Solution in Poland‭ (‬New York:‭ ‬Perennial,‭ ‬1998‭)‬,‭ ‬150.‭ The fact that many of the crimes on the local level were committed not by Germans,‭ ‬but‭ ‬by local collaborators was something that further diminished the interest in Germany for these crimes. ‭ ‬Ruth Bettina Birn,‭ “’‬Zaunkönig‭’ ‬an‭ ’‬Uhrmacher.‭’ ‬Grosse Partisanaktionen‭ ‬1942/43‭ ‬am Beispiel des‭ ’‬Unternehmens Winterzauber,‭’” ‬Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift No.‭ ‬60‭ (‬2001‭)‬:‭ ‬99-101.‭ ‬Until the late‭ ‬1960s,‭ ‬a large part of the‭ ‬evidence was kept in inaccessible Soviet archives. ‭ ‬Mats Deland,‭ ‬Purgatorium:‭ ‬Sverige och andra världskrigets förbrytare‭ (‬Stockholm:‭ ‬Bokförlaget Atlas,‭ ‬2010‭)‬,‭ ‬60.‭ ‬ Soviet war crimes trial records‭ ‬of former‭ ‬Schutzmänner‭ ‬were long inaccessible,‭ ‬and‭ ‬much of the‭ ‬Belarusian and Russian archives remain off-limits to scholars.‭ ‬Historians are only beginning to use the materials from Soviet war crimes trials. ‭ ‬Alexander Victor Prusin,‭ “’‬Fascist Criminals to the Gallows‭!’‬:‭ ‬The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials,‭ ‬December‭ ‬1945-February‭ ‬1946,‭” ‬Holocaust and Genocide Studies,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬17,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬1‭ (‬Spring‭ ‬2003‭)‬,‭ ‬1-30‭; ‬Karel C.‭ ‬Berkhoff,‭ “‬Dina Pronicheva’s Story of Surviving the Babi Yar Massacre:‭ ‬German,‭ ‬Jewish,‭ ‬Soviet,‭ ‬Russian,‭ ‬and Ukrainian Records,‭” ‬in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower‭ (‬eds.‭) ‬The Shoah in Ukraine:‭ ‬History,‭ ‬Testimony,‭ ‬Memorialization,‭ (‬Bloomington:‭ ‬Indiana University Press in Association with the United States Holocaust Museum,‭ ‬2008‭)‬,‭ ‬291-317.‭ ‬Other than Dean’s pioneering work on the Schuma in Belarus,‭ ‬there is also Stankeras‭’ ‬2009‭ ‬book on Lithuanian‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften.‭ ‬See also Per Anders Rudling,‭ “‬The Khatyn‭’ ‬Massacre:‭ ‬A Historical Controversy Revisited,‭” ‬Journal of Genocide Research‭ (‬Forthcoming‭)‬. ‭ ‬In addition,‭ ‬many documents were destroyed during,‭ ‬or immediately after the war. ‭ ‬Stankeras,‭ ‬Litovskie politseiskie batal’ony,‭ ‬5.‭ ‬ At the end of the war,‭ ‬many members of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften retreated with the German army.‭ ‬A survey of about‭ ‬200‭ ‬Schutzmänner indicated that over‭ ‬30‭ ‬per cent of them remained in the west after the war. ‭ ‬Martin C.‭ ‬Dean,‭ ”‬Der Historiker als Detektiv:‭ ‬Fluchtweger der einheimischen Schutzmannschaften und anderer deutschen Polizeieinheiten aus der besetzten Sowjetunion,‭ ‬1943-1944.‭” ‬http://www.fantom-online.de/seiten/scienc2.htm‭ (‬accessed November‭ ‬7,‭ ‬2007‭) ‬ Few,‭ ‬if any,‭ ‬were held accountable for their actions.‭ ‬Western countries have yet to try a single‭ ‬Schutzmann for war crimes. ‭ ‬Richard‭ ‬Breitman,‭ ‬“Himmler’s Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories,‭” ‬Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual,‭ ‬vol.‭ ‬7‭ (‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬33. Schutzmannschaft Battalion‭ ‬201 On June‭ ‬30,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬in L’viv,‭ ‬the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,‭ (‬OUN(b‭)‬) issued a declaration of Ukrainian statehood,‭ ‬modeled on‭ ‬the Slovak and Croatian precedents.‭ ‬The OUN(b‭) ‬had hoped for German recognition of their pro-Nazi state,‭ ‬which they intended as a totalitarian ally of Nazi Germany.‭ ‬To the disappointment of the OUN(b‭)‬,‭ ‬the Nazi leadership refused to recognize their state,‭ ‬seriously complicating the OUN(b‭)’‬s‭ ‬relations with‭ ‬its major‭ ‬sponsor.‭ ‬The German refusal to accept the Ukrainian declaration of‭ ‬statehood led to a conflict with the leadership of the‭ ‬Nachtigall battalion,‭ ‬a collaborationist formation,‭ ‬consisting almost exclusively of members of the OUN(b‭)‬.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Nachtigall battalion was dissolved.‭ ‬On August‭ ‬13,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬it was ordered to return from Vinnytsia to Neuhammer,‭ ‬where it was disarmed at gunpoint.‭ ‬Its members were then transported to Frankfurt an der Oder.‭ ‬On October‭ ‬21,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬the soldiers were reorganized as the‭ ‬201st Ukrainian‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft Battalion,‭ ‬which consisted of four companies.‭ ‬The formal commander of the battalion was‭ ‬Sturmbannführer‭ (‬major‭) ‬Ieven Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬under the supervision of the German‭ ‬Hauptmann Wilhelm Mocha. ‭ ‬Andrii‭ ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia v zbroinykh sylakh Niemechchyny,,‭ ‬1939-1945‭ (‬L’viv:‭ ‬LNU im.‭ ‬I.‭ ‬Franka,‭ ‬2003‭)‬,‭ ‬143‭; ‬Sergei Chuev,‭ ‬Ukrainskii Legion‭ (‬Moscow:‭ ‬Iauza,‭ ‬2006‭)‬,‭ ‬180.‭ ‬ Roman Shukhevych’s title was that of‭ ‬Hauptmann‭ ‬(captain‭) ‬of the first company and deputy commander of the legion. ‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(Ivano-Frankiv’sk:‭ “‬Lileia-HB,‭” ‬2002‭)‬,‭ ‬62.‭ ‬Even though enrollment was voluntary,‭ ‬of the some‭ ‬300‭ ‬remaining members of the‭ ‬Nachtigall division,‭ ‬only about‭ ‬15‭ ‬declined to sign up for service in the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften. Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬the former commander of the‭ ‬Roland battalion,‭ ‬served as an officer in‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬and became an officer in the Waffen-SS Division‭ ‬Galizien in‭ ‬1943.‭ ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬60,‭ ‬143,‭ ‬360.‭ ‬The commanders of the other three companies were‭ ‬Hauptmann Bryhyder,‭ ‬who later continued as an officer in SS Galizien,‭ ‬Vasylyi Sydor and Volodymyr Pavliuk.‭ ‬DA SB Ukraїny:‭ ‬F.‭ ‬5,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬67418,‭ ‬T.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬208-241,‭ ‬in Volodymyr Serhiichuk‭ (‬ed.‭) ‬Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh radians’kykh orhaniv derzhavnoї bezpeky‭ (‬1940-1950‭)‬ Tom I.‭ (‬Kyїv:‭ ‬PP Serhiichuk M.I.,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬529. ‭ ‬Parmen Posokhov,‭ ”‬Shukhevych.‭ ‬Beloe piatno v biografii,‭” ‬FRAZA,‭ ‬August‭ ‬15,‭ ‬2007‭ ‬http://fraza.org.ua/zametki/15.08.07/40788.html?c=post&i‭=‬113503‭ (‬accessed November‭ ‬18,‭ ‬2007‭) ‬ The members themselves named the battalion after Ievhen Konovalets,‭ ‬a co-founder and the first leader the OUN,‭ ‬an organization to which almost all of its members belonged. ‭ ‬Chuev,‭ ‬Ukrainskii Legion,‭ ‬180‭; ‬Volodymyr V‭’’‬iatrovych,‭ “‬Roman Shukhevych:‭ ‬soldat,‭” ‬Ukraїns’ka Pravda,‭ ‬May‭ ‬2,‭ ‬2008.‭ ‬http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2008/4/25/75222.htm‭ (‬accessed May‭ ‬6,‭ ‬2008‭)‬,‭ ‬Ren,‭ ‬115‭; ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬143.‭ ‬To the battalion were added‭ ‬60‭ ‬Soviet POWs from Poltava and‭ ‬Dnipropetrovs’k oblasti,‭ ‬selected by Shukhevych. ‭ ‬Bolyanovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia‭ ‬144‭; ‬Stepan Kotelets‭’‬-Lisovyi,‭ ”‬Mii spomnyn z legionu:‭ ‬U Krakovi i Komanchi,‭” ‬in Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ (‬ed.‭)‬,‭ ‬U lavakh druzhynnykiv:‭ ‬spohady uchasnykiv‭ ‬(Denver:‭ ‬Vydavnytstva Druzhyn ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv,‭ ‬1982‭)‬,‭ ‬ 91.‭ ‬Several future UPA commanders served in‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft Battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬besides Roman Shukhevych himself,‭ ‬there was‭ ‬also Oleksander Luts‭’‬kyi,‭ ‬the organizer and first Commander of the UPA-West,‭ ‬based primarily in Galicia,‭ ‬and‭ ‬his successor‭ ‬Vasyl Sydor,‭ ‬who commanded UPA-West in‭ ‬1944-49. ‭ ‬Katchanovski,‭ “‬Terrorists or National Heores‭?‬”,‭ ‬13-14,‭ ‬see also Petro Sodol,‭ ‬Ukrainska povstanska armiia,‭ ‬1943-49.‭ ‬Dovidnyk.‭ (‬New York:‭ ‬Proloh,‭ ‬1994‭)‬.‭ After training in Germany,‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬was assigned to Belarus on February‭ ‬16,‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬The soldiers signed a one-year contract with‭ ‬the‭ ‬Germans. ‭ ‬Mykola Posivnych,‭ “‬Roman Shukhevych‭ (‬30.VI.1907-5.III.1950‭)” ‬in Petro J.‭ ‬Potichnyj and Mykola Posivnych‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Litopys Ukraїns’koї Povstans’koї Armiї,‭ ‬Tom‭ ‬45,‭ ‬Heneral Roman Shukhevych‭ – ”‬Taras Chuprynka‭” ‬Holovnyi Komandyr UPA‭ (‬Toronto and L’viv:‭ ‬Vydavnytstvo‭ “‬Litopys UPA,‭” ‬2007‭)‬ 29,‭ ‬citing Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv‭ (‬Detroit:‭ ‬DUN,‭ ‬1994‭)‬,‭ ‬45-53,‭ ‬75-80.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Schutzmänner themselves were disappointed with this assignment,‭ ‬having hoped to be stationed in Ukraine.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi wrote in his memoirs that‭ With bitterness in my heart and with serious thoughts I returned to Frankfurt‭ [‬an der Oder‭]‬,‭ ‬and there I received the order,‭ ‬that‭ ‬on‭ ‬March‭ ‬19,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬we would be sent to a so-called‭ ‬Einsatz,‭ ‬i.e.‭ ‬military assignments.‭ ‬The location of our assignment was not given,‭ ‬since only the commander had the information.‭ ‬Even though I was the commander,‭ ‬I did not receive the order.‭ ‬Only Mocha had seen it.‭ ‬This was the way the Germans treated the commander of the legion‭…‬.How disillusioned we were when we found out that we were not going to Ukraine,‭ ‬but Belarus‭… Pohibushchyi,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(1982/2002‭)‬,‭ ‬64.‭ The men of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬wore German police uniforms without national symbols.‭ ‬On March‭ ‬16,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬the battalion was ordered eastwards and arrived in Belarus,‭ ‬it they replaced a Latvian‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion.‭ ‬Under the command of General J.‭ ‬Jakob it was spread out over‭ ‬12‭ ‬different points in the triangle Mahiliou-Vitsebsk-Lepel‭’‬,‭ ‬guarding a territory of‭ ‬2,400‭ ‬square kilometers, ‭ ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬144‭;‬ Chuev,‭ ‬Ukrainskii Legion,‭ ‬183.‭ ‬at the time of the implementation of the Holocaust of the Belarusian Jews. ‭ ‬R.‭ ‬A.‭ ‬Chernoglazova‭ (‬ed.‭) ‬Tragediia evreev Belorussii v gody nemetskoi okkupatsii‭ (‬1941-1944‭)‬:‭ ‬Sbornik materialov i dokumentov‭ (‬Minsk:‭ ‬Ia.‭ ‬B.‭ ‬Dremach and E.‭ ‬S.‭ ‬Hal’perin,‭ ‬1995‭)‬,‭ ‬169-181.‭ ‬ There is no consensus in the sources about the activities of the battalion.‭ ‬Andrii Bolianovs’kyi’s magisterial work on Ukrainian military formations in the service of Nazi Germany dedicates but a few pages to the division’s whereabouts in‭ ‬1942. ‭ ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬143-151.‭ ‬ Frank Golczewski describes the activities of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft Battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬as‭ “‬fighting partisans and killing Jews,‭” ‬but does not provide a source for this claim. ‭ ‬Frank Golczewski‭ ‬“Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine,‭” ‬in Christoph Dieckmann,‭ ‬Babette Quinkert,‭ ‬Tatjana Tönsmeyer‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Kooperation und Verbrechen.‭ ‬Formen der‭ ‬“Kollaboration‭“‬ im östlichen Europa‭ ‬1939-1945‭ (‬Göttingen:‭ ‬Wallenstein,‭ ‬2003‭)‬,‭ ‬176.‭ ‬However,‭ ‬Golczewski does not provide a footnote or source for this claim. ‭ ‬Several veterans of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬made it to the west after the war.‭ ‬Whereas‭ ‬30-40‭ ‬veterans of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬were alive in‭ ‬1980,‭ ‬only‭ ‬4‭ ‬remained by‭ ‬2004. ‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬DUN v rozbudovi UPA‭ (‬Detroit and Ternopil‭’‬:‭ ‬Dzhura,‭ ‬2005‭)‬,‭ ‬109-112‭; ‬Kal’ba in‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv.‭ ‬Tom druhyi.‭ (‬Munich and London:‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren and the Association of Ukrainian Former Combatants in Great Britain,‭ ‬1985,‭ ‬264.‭ ‬ The veterans were acutely aware‭ ‬of efforts to track down collaborators and perpetrators. ‭ ‬In his post-war correspondence with Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba refers to the activities of the Wiesenthal Centre as‭ “‬a Jewish assault that knows no limits.‭” ‬Volume two of Pobihushyi’s memoirs contains a section on his correspondence with other former‭ ‬Schutzmänner.‭ “‬In his attack Wiesenthal lies to create a narrative which Nachtigal and Roland leave a trail of blood all the way to Kyiv and‭ “‬Babyn Iar.‭” ‬The Jewish assaults know no limits,‭” ‬Myroslav Kal’ba and his wife Iryna wrote Pobihushchyi-Ren on February‭ ‬23,‭ ‬1983.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv,‭ ‬268.‭ ‬ Most published veteran memoirs avoid any specific mention of the battalion’s geographic whereabouts.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi’s‭ ‬1982‭ ‬memoirs do not provide any details about where the division was stationed in Belarus.‭ ‬Many memoirs refer back to the accounts from‭ ‬Schutzmann Teodor Krochak’s diary,‭ ‬an edited version of which appeared in the‭ ‬1953‭ ‬collection,‭ ‬which Pobihushchyi helped to craft. ‭ ‬Teodor Krochak,‭ “‬Vytiahy z shchodennyka‭ ‬1941-1943‭ ‬rr.‭ ‬Pro pobut u Legioni DUN,‭” ‬in‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba‭ (‬ed.‭)‬,‭ ‬U lavkah druzhynnykiv‭;‬ Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Nationalistiv v‭ ‬1941-1942‭ ‬rokakh‭ (‬n.p:‭ ‬Vyd-ia Druzhyny ukraїnsks’kykh nationalistiv,‭ ‬1953‭)‬,‭ ‬59,‭ ‬63,‭ ‬65,‭ ‬69,‭ ‬72.‭ ‬There are some uncertainties regarding the authorship of this volume.‭ ‬In addition to an unsigned foreword,‭ ‬this collection of memoirs lists four authors,‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬Teodor Krochak,‭ ‬Karlo Malyi and Ievhen Ren.‭ ‬Later in life Ievhen Pobihushyi used the name Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren.‭ ‬In his‭ ‬1982‭ ‬memoirs,‭ ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren writes that the‭ ‬1953‭ ‬volume had three authors,‭ ‬namely himself,‭ ‬Krochak and Malyi.‭ ‬He also informs his readers that unsigned forward was written by Stepan Lenkavs’kyi.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬53.‭ ‬Likely,‭ ‬the Ievhen Pobihushyi and Ievhen Ren of the‭ ‬1953‭ ‬volume was the same person.‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬a non-commissioned officer in‭ ‬Nachtigal and the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201, ‭ ‬Anatolii Kentii and Volodymyr Lozyts’kyi,‭ ‬”From UVO fighter to sumpreme commander of the UPA,‭”‬ in P.‭ ‬Sokan and‭ ‬P.‭ ‬Potichnyj,‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Zhyttia i borot’ba Henerala‭ “‬Tarasa Chuprynky‭” (‬1907-1950‭)‬:‭ ‬dokumenty i materialy Litopys UPA,‭ ‬nova seriia,‭ ‬10,‭(‬Kyiv and Toronto:‭ ‬Litopys UPA,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬95‭; ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬59.‭ ‬who has edited six books on‭ ‬the formation,‭ ‬which the nationalists prefer to refer to as DUN,‭ ‬Druzhuny Ukrains’kykh Nationalistiv‭ ‬generally‭ ‬either avoids listing the battalion’s specific geographic whereabouts in‭ ‬1942‭ ‬or uses abbreviations,‭ ‬referring to the cities‭ “‬K.‭” “‬M.‭” “‬L‭”‬,‭ ‬the villages‭ “‬Zh.‭” “‬V‭”‬,‭ “‬P‭” “‬small city B‭” ‬or‭ “‬the locality H.‭” Krochak,‭ ‬“Vytiahy z shchodennyka,‭”‬ 59,‭ ‬63,‭ ‬65,‭ ‬69,‭ ‬72‭; ‬Kal’ba,‭ ‬U lavakh Druzhynykiv,‭ ‬102,‭ ‬104,‭ ‬105,‭ ‬106.‭ ‬In‭ ‬2008,‭ ‬Kal’ba added that‭ “‬All other companies were placed far from Borovkiv,‭ ‬such as Zhar,‭ ‬Komenia,‭ ‬Voronezha and others.‭” ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬“Nakhtigal‭’”‬ v zapytanniakh i vidpovidiakh Myroslava Kal’by‭ (‬L’viv:‭ ‬Halytsk’ka vydavnycha spilka,‭ ‬2008‭)‬,‭ ‬45.‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ (‬Munich and London:‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi and the Association of Ukrainian Former Combatants in Great Britain,‭ ‬1982‭)‬,‭ ‬87,‭ ‬97,‭ ‬103.‭ ‬The first volume of Pobihushchyi-Ren’s memoirs appeared in a second edition in‭ ‬2002.‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬My prysiahaly Ukraїni:‭ ‬DUN‭ ‬1941-1942‭ (‬L’viv:‭ ‬Memuarna biblioteka NTSh,‭ ‬1999‭)‬,‭ ‬63,‭ ‬69,‭ ‬70,‭ ‬79‭; ‬A‭ ‬1982‭ ‬collection of veteran memories,‭ ‬edited by Kal’ba follows the same trend,‭ ‬containing little information on its activities in Belarus,‭ ‬focusing more on the battalions whereabouts in‭ ‬1941‭ ‬and its dissolution.‭ ‬Most of the contributions are non-committal as to its specific whereabouts,‭ ‬or use abbreviations.‭ ‬However,‭ ‬a certain‭ “‬Vasyl‭” (‬no last name provided‭) ‬mentions being stationed in Zhary,‭ ‬Letel‭’‬ [sic‭?]‬ and‭ “‬the city Voronezh on the Biarezina river‭” ‬around Easter,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬and Krochak locates his‭ “‬first baptism of fire‭” ‬to the‭ “‬southeast of Zhariv,‭ ‬by Homol,‭ ‬where none of us had been before.‭” ‬A chapter by Stepan Kotelets‭’‬-Lisovyi mentions a few localities in Belarus‭ – ‬the villages Cherven‭’‬,‭ ‬Komen‭’‬,‭ “‬the village Porych,‭ ‬not far from Komen‭’‬,‭”‬Borovka,‭ ‬Zhary,‭ ‬and‭ “‬the village Voronezh on the Biarezina river,‭” ‬but does not give the dates for its specific whereabouts.‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬U lavkah druzhynnykiv:‭ ‬spohady uchasnykiv.‭ ‬Materialy zibrav i vporiadkuvav Myroslav Kal’ba.‭ (‬Denver:‭ ‬Vyd-ia Druzhyny ukraїns’kykh natsionalistiv,‭ ‬1982‭)‬,‭ ‬91-95,‭ ‬102,‭ ‬104,‭ ‬105,‭ ‬106,‭ ‬117,‭ ‬119,‭ ‬144.‭ ‬ Unsurprisingly,‭ ‬the veterans‭’ ‬own accounts of their whereabouts in Belarus make no mention of atrocities,‭ ‬but present the battalion’s tasks as being of a military nature.‭ ‬Ievhen Pobihushchyi describes the military assignment as defending the major bridges across the rivers Biarezina and Dzvina‭ ‬and‭ ‬to prevent Bolshevik partisans from destroying them.‭ ‬That was the main assignment,‭ ‬and for that purpose,‭ ‬the legion was distributed over an area nearly‭ ‬50‭ ‬kilometers long,‭ ‬and approximately‭ ‬50‭ ‬kilometer wide,‭ ‬and the soldiers were quartered in the villages in groups of‭ ‬40,‭ ‬since their task was to protect the local administration.‭ ‬In addition,‭ ‬to the assignments of the legion belonged a constant combing of the forests from Bolshevik partisans.‭ ‬Such combing operations‭ (‬besides,‭ ‬being very dangerous‭)‬ required‭ ‬no less‭ ‬than two formations‭ ‬(80‭ ‬men‭)‬,‭ ‬which,‭ ‬in turn,‭ ‬weakened our positions in the villages,‭ ‬the so-called‭ ‬Schützpunkte.‭ ‬Still‭ – ‬regardless of various difficulties,‭ ‬the entire time‭ –‬ that is from March‭ ‬22‭ ‬to December‭ ‬31,‭ ‬1942‭ –‬ the Legion painstakingly and in an exemplary fashion‭ ‬had to‭ ‬carry out its military service in such a way that the Bolshevik partisans would not be able to destroy another large bridge. ‭ ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(1982/2002‭)‬,‭ ‬65.‭ ‬ There were indeed pressing military matters,‭ ‬which also required attention.‭ ‬The so-called Vitsebsk or Surazh Gate was a forty-kilometer-long breach in the German front line between Velizh and Usviaty in the RSFSR between the German Army groups‭ “‬North‭” ‬and‭ “‬Center.‭” ‬It opened up as a result of a shock attack by the third and fourth Soviet Armies in the winter of‭ ‬1941-1942,‭ ‬and remained open from February to September‭ ‬28,‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬Through this opening in the front,‭ ‬Soviet ammunition,‭ ‬weapons,‭ ‬sabotage groups and medical supplies were transported behind the enemy lines. ‭ ‬David Meltser and Vladimir Levin,‭ ‬The Black Book with Red Pages‭ (‬Tragedy and heroism of Belorussian Jews‭)‬ (Cockneysville,‭ ‬MD:‭ ‬VIA Press,‭ ‬2005‭)‬,‭ ‬249.‭ ‬There were various partisan formations in the region.‭ ‬Partisan Detachment‭ ‬406‭ ‬carried out military operations on the Minsk-Vilnius,‭ ‬Maladzechna-Polatsk,‭ ‬and Minsk-Lepel‭’ ‬railroad lines.‭ ‬Over the course of the war,‭ ‬they attacked‭ ‬148‭ ‬highway bridges and blew up three railroad bridges.‭ ‬One of their more spectacular attacks was carried out on October‭ ‬14,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬when they destroyed‭ “‬9‭ ‬automobiles and‭ ‬70‭ ‬Nazis on‭ [‬the‭] ‬Pukhavichy-Omel'na road.‭” Meltser and Levin,‭ ‬The Black Book,‭ ‬106.‭ ‬It is quite possible that‭ ‬members of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬may have been a target.‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion veterans reported several attacks on August‭ ‬25‭ ‬and October‭ ‬2,‭ ‬in‭ “‬U.‭” ‬and‭ “‬Zh.‭” Krochak,‭“‬Vytiahy z shchodennyka,‭”‬ 76,‭ ‬82.‭ ‬ The accounts contain no information on reprisal actions by the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften,‭ ‬even though this was a standard practice. Yet,‭ ‬even the memoirs of the‭ ‬Schutzmänner themselves indicate that the battalion had alternative assignments beyond the safeguarding of the infrastructure.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi wrote‭ ‬that his soldiers‭ “‬found out‭” ‬that in the vicinity there was a camp for Soviet POWs.‭ ‬According to Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬Shukhevych attempted to have‭ ‬45‭ ‬Ukrainians POWs there released to join the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft,‭ ‬but was prevented from doing so as a punishment for refusing to participate in an operation of forced grain requisitions from the local Belarusian population. ‭ ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(2002‭)‬,‭ ‬65 Interrogated by the MKGD by the very end of the war,‭ ‬Nachtigal and‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬veteran Oleksandr Luts’kyi Petro Sodol,‭ ‬Ukraїns’ka Povstancha Armiia‭ ‬1942-1942:‭ ‬Dovidnyk.‭ (‬New York:‭ ‬Proloh,‭ ‬1994‭)‬,‭ ‬99.‭ ‬ gave the following account of the activities of the battalion: In mid-April,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬we were brought from Minsk to the city of Lepel‭’‬,‭ ‬where we were divided‭ ‬into four groups.‭ ‬Each group was assigned particularly important military objects to be safeguarded,‭ ‬but the primary task was to fight the Soviet partisan movement in the Lepel‭’‬,‭ ‬Ushycha,‭ ‬and Beshankovichy‭ ‬raiony.‭ ‬Personally,‭ ‬I belonged to a group of the legion of approximately‭ ‬90‭ ‬people,‭ ‬brought to the south of the city of Lepel‭’‬,‭ ‬in the village‭ ‬Veleushchyna,‭ ‬where I took part in the safeguarding of roads,‭ ‬the protection of the representatives of the German command,‭ ‬which moved along the roads from place to place.‭ ‬Several times I was sent out on assignments to liquidate Soviet partisans.‭ ‬The information we received was passed on to the staff of the legion,‭ ‬located in the city of Lepel‭’‬. ‭ ‬Bolianovs’kyi,‭ ‬Ukrains’ki viiskovyi formuvannia,‭ ‬144,‭ ‬citing TsDAHO Ukraїny,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬57,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬4,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬340,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬29-30‭; ‬DA SB Ukraїny:‭ ‬F.‭ ‬5,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬67418,‭ ‬T.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬208-241,‭ ‬in‭ ‬Volodymyr‭ ‬Serhiichuk,‭ ‬Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh radians’kykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bekpeki‭ (‬1940-1950‭) ‬Tom I.‭ (‬Kyiv:‭ ‬PP Serhiichuk M.‭ ‬I.,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬529.‭ Luts’kyi stated that‭ “‬in October of‭ ‬1941‭ ‬the entire legion was put under the disposal of the SS,‭ ‬and the Germans used us to fight Soviet partisans.‭ ‬At that point our battalion was already named‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201.‭” “Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo BODNARA Antona Andreevicha‭ ‬29‭ ‬iuinia‭ ‬1945‭ ‬goda,‭” ‬DA SB Ukraїny,‭ ‬F.‭ ‬5,‭ ‬Spr.‭ ‬67418,‭ ‬t.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬138-146,‭ ‬in‭ ‬P.‭ ‬Sokhan‭’ ‬and P.‭ ‬Potichnyj‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Litopys UPA,‭ ‬Nova seriia,‭ ‬tom‭ ‬9,‭ ‬Borot’ba proty povstans’koho rukhu‭ ‬i natsionaluistychnoho pidpillia:‭ ‬protokoly dopytiv zaareshtovanykh radians’kymy orhanamy derzhavnoї bezpeky kerivnykiv OUN i UPA‭ ‬1944-1945‭ (‬Kyїv and Toronto:‭ ‬Litopys UPA,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬320,‭ ‬328,‭ ‬63.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Soviet interrogators were more interested in the veterans‭’ ‬role in‭ ‬Nachtigal in‭ ‬1941‭ ‬and in the UPA from‭ ‬1943‭ ‬than in their whereabouts in‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬The reports therefore provide little information of the activities of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201.‭ ‬Schutzmann Volodymyr Pavlyk told his Soviet interrogators that‭ ‬“[i‭]‬n‭ ‬1941‭ ‬and‭ ‬1942‭ ‬he served in the German armed formations as a commander of a platoon and company.‭ ‬In that period I,‭ ‬as a platoon and company commander did not participate in the battles against partisans and the Red Army,‭ ‬but helped form them and sent them into battle against the Red partisans.‭” “Protokol dopolnitel’nogo doprosa Pevlyk Vladimira Ivanovicha‭ ‬8‭ ‬avgusta‭ ‬1945‭ ‬goda,‭” ‬DA SB Ukraїny,‭ ‬L’viv,‭ ‬Spr.‭ ‬P-36445,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬97-98‭ ‬zv.,‭ ‬in Sokhan‭’ ‬and‭ ‬Potichnyj‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Litopys UPA,‭ ‬Nova seriia,‭ ‬tom‭ ‬9,‭ ‬564-565,‭ ‬73.‭ ‬The interrogation reports from that of other veterans,‭ ‬such as‭ ‬Schutzmann Omelian Pol’ovyi,‭ ‬make no mention of the activities of battalion‭ ‬201. ‭ ‬Sokhan‭’ ‬and Potichnyj‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Litopys UPA‭ ‬Nova seriia,‭ ‬tom‭ ‬9,‭ ‬78.‭ ‬ Some correspondence between the‭ ‬201‭ ‬battalion and their German superiors has survived.‭ ‬The last report from‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬was sent on November‭ ‬3,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬at which point the unit was stationed‭ ‬20‭ ‬kilometers north of Lepel‭’‬. ‭ “‬Meldungen an den Führer über Bandenbekämpfung,‭ ‬Nr.‭ ‬37‭ (‬E-spiel‭)‬,‭” ‬Nov.‭ ‬3,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬and‭ ‬“Nr.‭ ‬36,‭ “‬Ergebnisse im Gebiet Russland Mitte,‭ ‬Gefecht des Schutzmannschafts-Battallions‭ ‬201‭ ‬20‭ ‬km Nördlich Lepel,‭ ‬Nov.‭ ‬3,‭ ‬1942,‭” ‬Serial‭ ‬124,‭ ‬Roll‭ ‬124,‭ ‬Reichsführer-SS u.‭ ‬Chef der Deutschen Polizei Feld-kommandostelle.‭ ‬T-175,‭ ‬Item EAP‭ ‬161-b-12/250,‭ ‬1st frame,‭ ‬2598495,‭ ‬Guide to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria,‭ ‬VA.‭ ‬No.‭ ‬33,‭ ‬Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police‭ (‬Part II‭)‬,‭ (‬Washington,‭ ‬DC:‭ ‬The National Archives,‭ ‬National Archives‭ ‬and Record Service General Service Administration‭ ‬1961‭)‬,‭ ‬4.‭ ‬http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/t175-2.pdf‭ (‬Accessed January‭ ‬17,‭ ‬2010‭)‬ On December‭ ‬1,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬the contracts of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬expired.‭ ‬Its volunteers had originally agreed to serve until December‭ ‬31,‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬Yet,‭ ‬in late‭ ‬1942‭ ‬the German authorities increased the recruitment of forced labor in the occupied territories extending the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften’s‭ ‬term of service for an indefinite period. ‭ ‬Dean‭ ‬“The German Gendarmerie,‭”‬ (1996‭)‬,‭ ‬179.‭ ‬ They therefore declined to renew their contracts.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Schutzmänner also had grievances with the leadership style of the Germans.‭ ‬Pobihushchyi himself complained that‭ [t‭[‬he last straw,‭ ‬which led to the dissolution of the entire legion‭ [‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭] ‬was the terrible occurrence,‭ ‬unforgivable crimes that the German command allowed to be carried out against the riflemen of the legion.‭ ‬At the funeral of one fallen volunteer there wasn’t even a Ukrainian banner on his‭ ‬bier,‭ ‬only a German one.‭ ‬One of‭ [‬our Ukrainian‭ ‬Schutzmänner‭]‬ pushed the swastika bands in under the wreath.‭ ‬When a German policeman saw this,‭ [‬the Ukrainian‭ ‬Schutzmann‭] ‬was terribly abused.‭ ‬No appeals or pledges from the Ukrainian side helped.‭ ‬It was deemed an insult to the German state.‭ ‬The rifleman was jailed and…shot.‭ ‬From that moment‭ ‬on the attitude of‭ ‬the soldiers of the‭ [‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭] ‬to the Germans changed. ‭ ‬Ievhen Pohibushchyi,‭ “‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv na Bilorusi,‭” ‬in‭ ‬Kal’ba‭ (‬ed.‭) ‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv u‭ ‬1941-1942,‭ ‬38.‭ This,‭ ‬according to Pobihushchyi,‭ ‬contributed to the battalion’s refusal to renew the contract‭ We decided to abstain from‭ [‬further‭] ‬service,‭ ‬since military honor required it.‭ ‬We did not receive answers to our inquiries about why our leaders were arrested,‭ ‬our dear ones were‭ ‬arbitrarily‭ ‬sent to work deep into Germany,‭ ‬why wounded Ukrainian soldiers were not allowed to be treated in the same hospitals as the Germans,‭ ‬but taken to hospitals for‭ ‬“aliens.‭” ‬The Legion did not want to fight for such a‭ “‬New Europe,‭” ‬with different categories of citizens and soldiers.‭ ‬At the front we all faced death‭ ‬equally.‭ ‬Yet‭ ‬the wounded had different rights and received different treatment.‭ Pohibushchyi,‭ “‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv na Bilorusi,‭” ‬in‭ ‬Kal’ba‭ (‬ed.‭) ‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv,‭ ‬38.‭ Around Christmas,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski informed Pobihushchyi that the battalion would be dissolved.‭ ‬On January‭ ‬6,‭ ‬1943,‭ ‬the battalion was sent to L’viv where most members arrived January‭ ‬8.‭ ‬The officers left Belarus on January‭ ‬5,‭ ‬the last soldiers January‭ ‬14,‭ ‬1943. ‭ ‬Pobihushchyi‭ ‬in Kal’ba‭ (‬ed.‭)‬,‭ ‬U lavkah druzhynnykiv‭ ‬(1953‭)‬,‭ ‬40‭; ‬Pobihushchyi-Ren‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(2002‭)‬,‭ ‬85.‭ ‬The‭ ‬201st battalion was disbanded and taken to L’viv,‭ ‬where its officers were arrested and placed in the jail on Lontsky Street.‭ ‬Some,‭ ‬including Roman Shukhevych,‭ ‬managed to escape and went underground. ‭ ‬Posivnych,‭ ‬“Roman Shukhevych‭ (‬30.VI.1907-5.III.1950‭)”‬ in Potichnyj and Posivnych‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬Litopys Ukraїns’koї Povstans’koї Armiї,‭ ‬Tom‭ ‬45,‭ ‬Heneral Roman Shukhevych‭ – ”‬Taras Chuprynka‭” ‬Holovnyi Komandyr UPA‭ (‬Toronto and L’viv:‭ ‬Vydavnytstvo‭ “‬Litopys UPA,‭” ‬2007‭)‬ 29,‭ ‬citing Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv‭ (‬Detroit:‭ ‬DUN,‭ ‬1994‭)‬,‭ ‬45-53,‭ ‬75-80‭; ‬Chuev,‭ ‬Ukrainskii legion,‭ ‬184. ‭ ‬The officers were formally arrested for declining to continue their service,‭ ‬but appear to have been treated quite leniently by the Germans.‭ “‬The forms under which we were arrested were quite delicate‭ – ‬we only had to surrender our weapons,‭ ‬and with an escorting officer from the German officer we traveled to L’viv,‭” ‬wrote Pobihushchyi. ‭ ‬Ievhen‭ [‬Pobihushchyi‭]‬-Ren,‭ “‬Spohady pro generala Romana Shukhevycha,‭” ‬in Kal’ba‭ (‬ed.‭)‬ Druzhyny Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv u‭ ‬1941-1942,‭ ‬123.‭ The German authorities reported to Berlin that while the‭ “‬better treatment of the Ukrainians by the local administration is not without effect,‭” Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im Generalgouvernment an das Reichssicherheitshauptamt‭ – ‬Amt VII‭ – ‬Berlin.‭ ‬February‭ ‬2,‭ ‬1943,‭ ”‬Meldungen aus dem Generalgouvernement für die Zeit von‭ ‬1.‭ ‬Bis‭ ‬31.‭ ‬Januar‭ ‬1943.‭ ‬P.‭ ‬0310,‭ ‬p.‭ ‬8,‭ ‬reproduced in Heinz Boberach‭ (‬ed.‭)‬,‭ ‬Regimekritik,‭ ‬Widerstand und Verfolgung in Deutschland und den besetzten Gebieten‭ [‬microform‭]‬:‭ ‬Meldungen und Berichte aus dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt,‭ ‬dem SD-Hauptampts der SS und dem Reichssicherheitsamt‭ ‬1933-1944,‭ ‬Teil II:‭ ‬Besetzte und angeglierdete Gebiete‭ (‬1939-1945‭)‬ Mikrofische‭ ‬006.‭ ‬the disbanding of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬caused‭ “‬indignation‭” ‬and‭ “‬extensive disquiet‭” ‬among Galician Ukrainians,‭ ‬also the intelligentsia. ‭ “‬Mit grossem Unwillen wurde die Auflösung des ukrainischen Bat.‭ ‬20‭ ‬[sic‭!] ‬der Schutzmannschaften in der Ostukraine‭ [‬sic‭!] ‬aufgenommen.‭ ‬Die Festnahme des Offizierskorps,‭ ‬das früher die bekannten Roland-Nachtigallunternehmen geführt hat,‭ ‬stiess auf allgemeines Unverständnis und führte insbesondere unter den Kreisen der Intelligenz in Lemberg zu einer weitgehenden Beunruhigung,‭ ‬die sich erst nach Freilassung der Offiziere allmählich legte.‭” ‬Ibid,‭ ‬p.‭ ‬8-9,‭ ‬P.‭ ‬0310,‭ ‬0311.‭ ‬ The German command suggested‭ ‬that the men of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬should gather in Lublin to form a new unit.‭ ‬This time its members declined‭ ‬to renew their contracts,‭ ‬even if several continued to volunteer their services to Nazi Germany until‭ ‬1945.‭ ‬Evhen Pobihushchyi joined the ranks of the‭ ‬Waffen SS‭ ‬Galizien,‭ ‬progressing to the rank of major. ‭ ‬DA SB Ukraїny:‭ ‬F.‭ ‬5,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬67418,‭ ‬T.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬208-241,‭ ‬in Serhiichuk,‭ ‬Roman Shukhevych,‭ ‬Tom I.,‭ ‬529-530.‭ Counterinsurgency or mass murder‭? While the source material of the whereabouts of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬is incomplete,‭ ‬some of the correspondence between the battalion and its German commanders has been preserved.‭ ‬According to Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬the‭ ‬DUN,‭ ‬that is‭ ‬Nachtigall and‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬“lost‭”‬ 450‭ ‬soldiers and officers,‭ ‬i.e.‭ ‬two thirds of it members over the entire period‭ ‬1941-1945. ‭ ‬Kal’ba,‭ ‬DUN v rozbudovi UPA,‭ ‬68.‭ ‬Many of these losses were due to desertions,‭ ‬most of which took place after‭ ‬1943.‭ ‬However,‭ ‬during its ten-month tenure in Belarus,‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬lost only‭ ‬49‭ ‬men,‭ ‬while‭ ‬40‭ ‬were wounded.‭ ‬This should be contrasted with to the over‭ ‬2,000‭ “‬partisans‭”‬ it killed. ‭ ‬I.‭ ‬K.‭ ‬Patryliak,‭ ‬Viis’kova diial’nist‭’ ‬OUN(b‭) ‬u‭ ‬1940-1942‭ ‬rokakh‭ (‬Kyiv:‭ ‬Kyїvs’kyi natsional’nyi universytet imeni Tarasa Shevchenko,‭ ‬Instytut istroiї Ukraїny NAN Ukraїny,‭ ‬2004‭)‬,‭ ‬386.‭ ‬Even if all the losses of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬were due to war deaths,‭ ‬this means a discrepancy in the casualty ratio between‭ ‬its members and enemy‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬of over‭ ‬1:40.‭ ‬Such disproportional losses between German and collaborating forces and‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬is largely‭ ‬in line with what we know about the activities of other‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalions.‭ ‬The imbalance is‭ ‬also reflected in von dem Bach-Zelewski’s personal records,‭ ‬which he kept as‭ ‬Bevollmächtiger für Bandenbekämpfung.‭ ‬On October‭ ‬30,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬von dem Bach-Zelewski noted‭ ‬26‭ ‬casualties from‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬4‭ ‬Germans and‭ ‬22‭ “‬fallen members of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften.‭” ‬Enemy losses were listed as‭ ‬89‭ ‬dead and‭ ‬20‭ ‬wounded. ‭ ‬Meldung Nr.‭ ‬36,‭ “‬Ergebnisse im Gebiet Russland Mitte.‭ ‬Gefecht des Schutzmannschafts-Batallions‭ ‬201,‭ ‬20‭ ‬km nördlich Lepel,‭ ‬Feld-kommandostelle Nov‭ ‬3,‭ ‬1942‭” ‬Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police‭ ‬[Reichsführer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei‭]” ‬United States National Archives and Records Administration‭ (‬Henceforth NARA‭)‬,‭ ‬EAP T-175,‭ ‬item161-b-12/250,‭ ‬reel‭ ‬124,‭ ‬frame‭ ‬2599081‭;‬ Blood,‭ ‬90-91,‭ ‬citing‭ ‬Tagesbuch von dem Bach‭ (‬TVDB‭)‬,‭ ‬Bundesarchiv,‭ ‬Berlin‭ (‬Lichterfelde‭) ‬A R20/45b,‭ ‬55-95.‭ A routine report on the activities of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬von dem Bach-Zelewski’s report appears in a folder of fifteen‭ “‬Meldungen an den Führer über Bandenbekämpfung‭” ‬to‭ ‬Reichsführer-SS Himmler,‭ ‬who passed them on to Adolf Hitler personally.‭ ‬It contains a series of information bulletins from German-led police forces in occupied Belarus and Ukraine. ‭ ‬This folder,‭ ‬containing materials captured by the US Army,‭ ‬bears annotations showing that Hitler had seen it.‭ ‬US National Archives,‭ ‬MF-3293,‭ ‬T-175,‭ ‬roll‭ ‬124,‭ ‬Reichsführer-SS Chef der Deutschen Polizei,‭ ‬Feld-Kommandostelle,‭ ‬NARA EAP T-175,‭ ‬item‭ ‬161-b-12/250,‭ ‬frames‭ ‬2598495‭ ‬to‭ ‬2599093.‭ ‬www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/t175-2.pdf‭ (‬Accessed January‭ ‬17,‭ ‬2010‭)‬ The reports illustrate the nature of the‭ “‬counterinsurgency‭” ‬activities in which‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬was involved.‭ Meldung number‭ ‬51‭ ‬is a summary of anti-partisan warfare in Russia-South,‭ ‬Ukraine,‭ ‬and the Bezirk Białystok,‭ ‬which is a summary of the police activities in that region from September to November,‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬Passed to Hitler on December‭ ‬29,‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬it shows the realities of the‭ ‬Bandenbekämpfung.‭ ‬The number of Jews outweighs all other groups executed,‭ ‬and the number of‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬executed after an‭ ‬Aktion far outweighs the number of people killed in action. Bandits Killed in combat‭ ‬ 1,337 Executed prisoners‭ ‬737 Executed later‭ ‬7,827 Bandit helpers Arrested‭ ‬ 16,553 Executed‭ ‬14,257 Jews Executed‭ ‬363,211 Deserters‭ ‬140 German casualties Dead‭ ‬174 Wounded‭ ‬132 Missing‭ ‬ 13 Schutzmannschaft Dead‭ ‬285 Wounded‭ ‬127 Missing‭ ‬ 133 ‭ ‬Meldung‭ ‬51a,‭ “‬Russland-Süd,‭ ‬Ukraine,‭ ‬Bialystok vom‭ ‬1.9.‭ ‬bis‭ ‬1.12.‭ ‬1942,‭” ‬December‭ ‬29,‭ ‬1942.‭ ‬NARA,‭ ‬RG‭ ‬242,‭ ‬T175,‭ ‬reel‭ ‬81,‭ ‬frame‭ ‬2601524.‭ ‬Also cited in Blood,‭ ‬90. Meldungen‭ ‬36,‭ ‬40,‭ ‬41,‭ ‬42,‭ ‬44,‭ ‬45,‭ ‬46,‭ ‬47,‭ ‬48,‭ ‬49,‭ ‬55,‭ ‬56,‭ ‬57,‭ ‬covering‭ ‬Russland-Mitte‭ ‬and‭ ‬Gebiet Weissruthenien for the fall of‭ ‬1942,‭ ‬report‭ ‬28,‭ ‬360‭ ‬enemy casualties and‭ ‬381‭ “‬own losses‭;”‬ a ratio of‭ ‬1:74. ‭ ‬NARA MF-3293,‭ ‬T-175,‭ ‬roll‭ ‬124,‭ ‬frames‭ ‬2599081,‭ ‬2599082,‭ ‬2599007,‭ ‬2598963,‭ ‬2896965,‭ ‬2598940,‭ ‬2598915,‭ ‬2598937,‭ ‬2598916,‭ ‬2598925,‭ ‬2598926,‭ ‬2598836,‭ ‬2598837,‭ ‬2598814-2598815,‭ ‬2598775-‭ ‬2598778,‭ ‬25987783-25987784,‭ ‬2598709,‭ ‬2598710,‭ ‬2598703-2598704,‭ ‬2598692-2598693,‭ ‬2598653,‭ ‬2598655.‭ ‬ Meldung‭ ‬51a,‭ ‬which appears in the same folder,‭ ‬summarizing the entire region‭ ‬Russland-Süd,‭ ‬Ukraine,‭ ‬and Białystok,‭ ‬shows a ratio of killed‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft and Germans to killed‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬and‭ “‬bandit helpers‭” (‬excluding the category of‭ “‬Executed Jews‭”) ‬of over‭ ‬1:52.‭ ‬If we include the‭ ‬363,211‭ ‬executed Jews in the column of‭ ‬Bandenverdächtige,‭ ‬or‭ ”‬suspected bandits,‭” ‬the ratio is‭ ‬1:843. ‭ ‬Reichsführer-SS Chef der Deutschen Polizei,‭ ‬Meldungen‭ ‬35,‭ ‬36,‭ ‬37,‭ ‬38,‭ ‬40,‭ ‬41,‭ ‬42,‭ ‬45,‭ ‬46,‭ ‬47,‭ ‬48,‭ ‬49,‭ ‬51,‭ ‬55,‭ ‬and‭ ‬56,‭ ‬issued November‭ ‬3,‭ ‬1942‭ ‬to January‭ ‬17,‭ ‬1943.‭ ‬NARA MF-3293,‭ ‬T-175,‭ ‬roll‭ ‬124 It may also useful to compare the ratio of dead‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften‭ ‬to‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬with the more infamous anti-partisan‭ ‬Aktionen,‭ ‬such as Operation‭ ‬Cottbus in‭ ‬1943,‭ ‬during which‭ ‬6,087‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬were registered as‭ “‬killed in action‭” ‬while only‭ ‬88‭ ‬German officers and soldiers and‭ ‬40‭ ‬non-Germans‭ ‬Schutzmänner were killed and‭ ‬152‭ ‬wounded,‭ ‬a casualty ratio of‭ ‬1:47.‭ ‬In operation‭ ‬Cottbus,‭ ‬90‭ ‬per cent of the people killed were unarmed. ‭ ‬Manfred Messerschmidt,‭ ‬expert report,‭ ‬cited in‭ “‬The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration‭ (‬applicant‭) ‬v.‭ ‬Vladimir Katriuk‭ (‬respondent‭) (‬T-2408-96‭) ‬Federal Court of Canada Trial Division,‭ ‬Nadon,‭ ‬J.‭ ‬January‭ ‬29,‭ ‬1999,‭” ‬Federal Trial Reports,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬156‭ (‬Fredricton,‭ ‬NB:‭ ‬Maritime Law Book Ltd,‭ ‬1999‭)‬,‭ ‬183.‭ ‬Christian Gerlach calculates that between‭ ‬10‭ ‬and‭ ‬15‭ ‬per cent of the victims of the partisan hunts in Belarus actually were partisans. ‭ ‬Gerlach,‭ ‬Kalkulierte Morde,‭ ‬907.‭ ‬ Regular warfare or counterinsurgency campaigns do not generate such staggering imbalances.‭ ‬Rather,‭ ‬they show the genocidal‭ ‬consequences of the war of annihilation,‭ ‬in line with Keitel,‭ ‬Himmler,‭ ‬and Hitler’s‭ ‬directives.‭ ‬German historian Manfred Messerschmidt‭ ‬makes the following assessment‭ ‬of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften‭ In evaluating the operations of the Schuma battalions one has to consider that‭ … ‬they were involved in a ruthless scenario of terror.‭ ‬This included the compulsory use of specific language.‭ ‬They had to speak of‭ ‘‬gangs‭’ [‘‬Banden‭’]‬.‭ ‬Annihilation operations were called‭ ‘‬pacification‭’ ‬or‭ ‘‬re-establishment of security and order‭’‬.‭” “Minister vs.‭ ‬Katriuk,‭” ‬184,‭ ‬citing Manfred Messerschmidt expert report on‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalions‭ ‬115‭ ‬and‭ ‬118.‭ Former‭ ‬Schutzmänner in UPA In the spring of‭ ‬1943,‭ ‬the men of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft‭ ‬battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬who had crossed over from Belarus to Volhynia came to constitute the heart of the OUN(b‭) ‬security service,‭ ‬the‭ ‬Sluzhba Bezpeki,‭ ‬or SB. ‭ ‬Marples‭ (‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬195‭; As the result of a campaign of mass desertion from the German collaborating forces following Stalingrad,‭ ‬several thousand deserting Ukrainian policemen flocked‭ ‬to the ranks of the UPA,‭ ‬forming its backbone. ‭ ‬Other‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalions saw mass desertions around the same time.‭ ‬On‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalions‭ ‬115‭ ‬and‭ ‬118,‭ ‬see‭ ‬Duda and Staryk,‭ ‬132,‭ ‬152.‭ ‬On‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬103,‭ ‬see Ivan Kachanovs’kyi,‭ “‬Ukraintsy ne veriat v mify ob OUN i UPA,‭” ‬Fraza.ua,‭ ‬October‭ ‬14,‭ ‬2009,‭ ‬http://www.fraza.ua/print/14.10.09/76064.html‭ (‬Accessed January‭ ‬22,‭ ‬2010‭) ‬See also Katchanovski,‭ “‬Terrorists or National Heroes‭?”‬ From March‭ ‬15‭ ‬to April‭ ‬15,‭ ‬1943,‭ ‬close to‭ ‬4,000‭ ‬Ukrainian former‭ ‬Schutzmänner joined the UPA. ‭ ‬Serhiichuk‭ (‬ed.‭) ‬Roman Shukhevych,‭ ‬Tom I.‭ ‬,11.‭ ‬Timothy Snyder gives a somewhat higher number,‭ ‬around‭ ‬5,000‭ ‬Ukrainians from the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften deserted to join the UPA in March,‭ ‬1943.‭ ‬Timothy Snyder,‭ “‬To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All:‭ ‬The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland,‭ ‬1943-1947,‭” ‬Cold War Studies,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬2,‭ (‬1999‭)‬:‭ ‬97.‭ Former‭ ‬Schutzmänner and other forms of auxiliary‭ ‬policemen,‭ ‬who had‭ ‬joined the UPA on OUN(b‭) ‬orders constituted about half of the‭ ‬UPA and OUN(b‭)‬ leaders in the fall of‭ ‬1943:‭ ‬23‭ ‬per cent had a background‭ ‬in‭ ‬regional and local‭ ‬auxiliary police formations,‭ ‬18‭ ‬per cent‭ ‬had been trained in German intelligence and military schools at the beginning of the war,‭ ‬11‭ ‬per cent in‭ ‬the‭ ‬Nachtigall and‭ ‬Rolland Battalions,‭ ‬8‭ ‬per cent in the regional or local administration in Nazi-occupied Ukraine,‭ ‬and one per cent had a background‭ ‬in‭ ‬the‭ ‬Waffen-SS Division‭ ‬Galizien. ‭ ‬Katchanovski,‭ “‬Terrorists or National Heroes‭?”‬ The skills acquired in‭ ‬1941-1942‭ ‬became useful in the UPA’s ethnic cleansing of the Poles of Volhynia. ‭ ‬Timothy‭ ‬Snyder,‭ ‬The Reconstruction of Nations‭; ‬Poland,‭ ‬Ukraine,‭ ‬Lithuania,‭ ‬Belarus,‭ ‬1569-1999‭ (‬Princeton,‭ ‬NJ:‭ ‬Yale University Press,‭ ‬2003‭)‬,‭ ‬162‭; ‬Franziska Bruder,‭ ‬”Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben‭!”‬:‭ ‬Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten‭ (‬OUN‭) ‬1929-1948‭ (‬Berlin:‭ ‬Metropol,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬184.‭ ‬ John-Paul Himka writes that Of course,‭ ‬infiltrating the Ukrainian police formations meant taking part in anti-Jewish actions.‭ ‬Apparently,‭ ‬this did not constitute an obstacle of conscience for the radical nationalists.‭ ‬In fact,‭ ‬taking part in some actions was probably useful,‭ ‬since weapons could be confiscated during ghetto clearings and added to the stockpile. ‭ ‬John-Paul Himka,‭ “‬Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War:‭ ‬Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors,‭” ‬in‭ ‬The Fate of the European Jews,‭ ‬1939-1945:‭ ‬Continuity or Contingency,‭ ‬ed.‭ ‬Jonathan Frankel‭ (‬New York and Oxford:‭ ‬Oxford University Press,‭ ‬1997‭)‬,‭ ‬Studies in Contemporary Jewry‭ ‬13‭ (‬1997‭)‬:‭ ‬179. Singled out by his German superiors for his particular heroism in battle, ‭ ‬Wolf-Dietrich Heike,‭ ‬Sie wollten die Freiheit:‭ ‬Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division‭ ‬1943-1945‭ (‬Dorheim:‭ ‬Podzun-Verlag,‭ ‬n.d‭)‬,‭ ‬42.‭ ‬ Pobihushchyi summarizes his own experiences of the‭ ‬Einsätze in Belarus in the following way: The struggle against the partisans was extraordinarily good education for our officers and‭ ‬soldiers.‭ ‬It taught us a lot.‭ ‬Too bad,‭ ‬that my notes were lost at the time I was interned.‭ ‬Our education,‭ ‬battle experience was very useful to all of our soldiers,‭ ‬non-commissioned officers‭ ‬and officers,‭ ‬who continued their military paths in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or the I UD UNA‭ [‬The first Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army‭] Pobihushchyi-Ren,‭ ‬Mozaїka moїkh spomyniv‭ ‬(1982/2002‭)‬,‭ ‬72.‭ ‬The Ukrainian National Army was the name the members of the‭ ‬14.‭ ‬Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS‭ (‬Galizische Nr.‭ ‬1‭)‬ chose for their organization on March‭ ‬17,‭ ‬1945.‭ ‬In their own writings,‭ ‬they avoid using the term SS.‭ By‭ ‬1943,‭ ‬as the German violence escalated,‭ ‬the OUN(b‭) ‬appeared increasingly concerned with the image of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften.‭ ‬By now,‭ ‬Soviet Belarusian partisans habitually referred to the‭ ‬Schutzmannaschaft batallion‭ ‬118‭ ‬in ethnic terms‭ ‬as‭ “‬Ukrainians‭” ‬and‭ “‬Ukrainian police.‭” National’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus‭ (‬NARB‭)‬,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬1450,‭ ‬vop.‭ ‬4,‭ ‬d.‭ ‬168,‭ ‬ll.‭ ‬70,‭ ‬72,‭ ‬153. ‭ ‬The OUN(b‭)‬ now began to disassociate itself from the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften.‭ “‬A Ukrainian police can exist only in a Ukrainian state,‭” ‬OUN(b‭) ‬propaganda stated. ‭ ‬TsDAVOU,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬3833,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬2,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬246-247,‭ ‬as cited in Vitalii Nakhmanovych,‭ “‬Do pytannia pro sklad uchasnykiv karal’nykh aktsii v okupovanomu Kyievi‭ (‬1941-1943‭) ‬in V.‭ ‬R.‭ ‬Nakmanovych et al,‭ (‬eds.‭) ‬Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukraїny:‭ ‬Materialy‭ ‬2-ї Vseukraїnsäkoї naukovoї konferentsiї m.‭ ‬Kyїv,‭ ‬30-31‭ ‬zhovtnia‭ ‬2006‭ ‬r.‭ (‬Kyiv:‭ ‬Zovnishtorhvydav,‭ ‬2007‭)‬,‭ ‬254.‭ ‬ Conclusion Researching the whereabouts of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬in occupied Belarus in‭ ‬1942‭ ‬is in many ways a difficult piece of detective work.‭ ‬Not only are the sources scarce,‭ ‬a number of actors‭ –‬ Soviet authorities,‭ ‬Ukrainian‭ ‬nationalists and the veterans themselves‭ ‬– have all tried to distort the historical record. ‭ ‬Former Nachtigall and Schuma‭ ‬201‭ ‬veteran Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬one of the few surviving veterans of Nachtigall and‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬who was present in L’viv on June‭ ‬30th,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬deny that that well-documented pogrom took place,‭ ‬and claims not to have seen anyone killed.‭ ‬Myroslav Kal’ba,‭ ‬“Nakhtigal‭” ‬v zapytanniakh i vidpovidiakh Myroslava Kal’by‭ ‬(L’viv:‭ ‬Halyts’ka vydavnycha spilka,‭ ‬2008‭)‬,‭ ‬23-25.‭ ‬Survivors of the L’viv pogrom remember these events very differently,‭ ‬and emphasize the role of Ukrainian militiamen in the pogroms.‭ ‬On eye witness testimonies and photographs from the L’viv pogrom See Ivan Khymka‭ [‬John-Paul Himka‭] “‬Dostovirnist‭’ ‬svidchennia:‭ ‬reliatsiia Ruzi Vagner pro l’vivs’kyi pohrom vlitku‭ ‬1941‭ ‬r,‭” ‬Holokost i suchasnist‭’‬:‭ ‬studii v Ukraini i sviti No.‭ ‬2,‭ ‬vol.‭ ‬4‭ (‬2008‭)‬:‭ ‬43-79.‭ ‬That memories are selective and self-serving is well-known.‭ ‬On how participants in well-documented events suppress their memories to make them conform to a particular political agenda,‭ ‬see John-Paul Himka and Eva Himka,‭ “‬Absense and Presence of Genocide and Memory:‭ ‬The Holocaust and the Holodomor in Interviews with Elderly Ukrainian Nationalists in Lviv,‭” ‬Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar of Contemporary Ukrainian Studies,‭ ‬Chair of Ukrainian Studies,‭ ‬University of Ottawa,‭ ‬October‭ ‬29,‭ ‬2009.‭ ‬Under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko‭ (‬2005-2010‭) ‬it was government policy to glorify Shukhevych,‭ ‬who‭ ‬the president posthumously turned into a national hero in‭ ‬2007.‭ ‬The government-orchestrated Shukhevych cult was accompanied by a campaign by official historians to produce a hagiographic representation of Shukchevych’s life.‭ ‬His activities in the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften‭ ‬have been ignored and glossed over,‭ ‬and the presence‭ ‬of a handful of Jews in the UPA presented as evidence that the OUN could not have been‭ ‬involved in‭ ‬anti-Semitic‭ ‬activities. ‭ ‬For an example of this see,‭ ‬for instance,‭ ‬Volodymyr V‭’’‬iatrovych,‭ ‬Stavlennia OUN do evreiv:‭ ‬Formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy‭ (‬L’viv:‭ ‬Vydavnytstvo‭ “‬Ms‭”‬,‭ ‬2006‭)‬,‭ ‬77-79,‭ ‬but see also Taras Kurylo and John-Paul Himka‭ [‬Ivan Pavlo Khymka‭] “‬Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv‭? ‬Rosdumy nad knyzhkoiu Volodymyra V‭’’‬iatrovycha.‭ ‬Ukraina Moderna vo.‭ ‬12‭ (‬2008‭)‬:‭ ‬252-265.‭ ‬We know the names of four Jews who served in UPA.‭ ‬This is presented as evidence that the OUN and UPA could not have been anti-Semitic.‭ ‬The UPA’s murder of thousands of Jews is overlooked,‭ ‬ignored,‭ ‬or denied by nationalists historians and OUN apologists.‭ ‬Per Anders Rudling and John-Paul Himka,‭ “‬The Ukrainian Insurgent Army‭ (‬UPA‭) ‬and the Holocaust,‭” ‬paper presented at the‭ ‬41st National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies‭ (‬AAASS‭)‬,‭ ‬Boston,‭ ‬MA,‭ ‬November‭ ‬13,‭ ‬2009.‭ ‬OUN involvement in pogroms,‭ ‬the fascist nature of the‭ ‬OUN and its collaboration with Nazi Germany was downplayed or denied.‭ ‬Nachtigall’s involvement in the murder of Jews in the summer of‭ ‬1941‭ ‬has been the subject of an emotional debate.‭ ‬The Polish Sejm has described UPA’s ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles in‭ ‬1943‭ ‬in terms of‭ “‬genocide.‭” Bronisław Komorowski,‭ ‬Marszałek Sejmu,‭ “‬Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia‭ ‬15‭ ‬lipca‭ ‬2009‭ ‬r.‭ ‬w sprawie tragicznego losu Polaków na Kresach Wschodnich‭” ‬Website of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland,‭ ‬http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie6.nsf/nazwa/2183‭_‬u/$file/2183‭_‬u.pdf‭ (‬accessed October‭ ‬18,‭ ‬2009‭)‬ By comparison,‭ ‬Shukhevych’s role as a‭ ‬Hauptmann of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft Battalion in‭ ‬1942‭ ‬has generated marginal attention.‭ ‬Yet,‭ ‬a few conclusions can be made from this episode. Shukhevych appears to have had a violent temper,‭ ‬and to have abused his soldiers physically. ‭ ‬In his diary,‭ ‬OUN(b‭)‬,‭ ‬Nachtigal,‭ ‬and‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬member Viktor Khar’kiv‭ (‬Khmara‭)‬,‭ ‬describes how he was physically abused by Shukhevych.‭ ‬After visiting the barber without telling his superiors Khar’kiv‭ (‬Khmara‭)‬,‭ ‬other members of his battalion go looking for him.‭ “‬Returning from the barber shop,‭ ‬I run into captain Shukhevych,‭ ‬who has been told about the fact.‭ ‬On the spot he attacked me,‭ ‬asked me how I could have managed to get out,‭ ‬despite the explicit prohibition of leaving the sealed-off limits around the casern.‭ ‬I began explaining that I had only been to the barber.‭ ‬Captain Shukhevych did not listen to that and punched me in the face.‭” ‬TsDAVO Ukrainy,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬3833,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬57,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬18.‭ ‬Thanks to Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe for this reference. ‭ ‬Under his command,‭ ‬soldiers of the‭ ‬Nachtigall battalion carried out mass murder of Jewish civilians‭ ‬in the Vinnytsia area in‭ ‬1941. ‭ ‬Viktor Khar’kiv‭ (‬Kharma‭) ‬wrote in his diary:‭ “‬At the time of our march eastwards we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Judeo-Bolshevik terror,‭ ‬and the sight of it so strengthened our hatred to the Jews,‭ ‬that in two villages we shot all the Jews we encountered.‭ ‬I recall one example.‭ ‬At the time of our march through one village we saw many vagrant people.‭ ‬Asked where they were going,‭ ‬they answered that the Jews were threatening them and that they are afraid of spending the nights in their houses.‭ ‬As a result of that,‭ ‬we shot all the Jews we encountered there.‭” ‬TsDAVO Ukrainy,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬3833,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬57,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬17.‭ ‬Also in‭ ‬Ivan Kazymyrovych Patryliak,‭ ‬Viis’kova diial’nist‭’ ‬OUN(b‭) ‬u‭ ‬1940-1942‭ ‬rokakh‭ (‬Kyiv:‭ ‬NAN Ukraїny,‭ ‬2004‭)‬,‭ ‬361-362.‭ ‬Under Shukhevych’s leadership the UPA carried out a campaign of mass murder in Volhynia and Galicia in‭ ‬1943-1944,‭ ‬in which‭ ‬60,000-100,000‭ ‬Poles and thousands,‭ ‬perhaps tens of thousands of Jews lost their lives. ‭ ‬Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe,‭ ‬“Den polnisch-ukrainische Historikerdiskurs‭ ‬über den polnisch-ukrainischen Konflikt‭ ‬1943-1947,‭” ‬Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,‭ ‬No.‭ ‬57‭ (‬2009‭)‬:‭ ‬54-85‭;‬ John-Paul Himka‭ ‬“The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,‭” ‬Paper presented at the‭ ‬2009‭ ‬National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies,‭ ‬Boston,‭ ‬MA,‭ ‬November‭ ‬13,‭ ‬2009.‭ ‬It is reasonable to assume that also‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬201,‭ ‬like other‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft‭ ‬battalions and‭ ‬Nachtigall,‭ ‬its previous incarnation was involved in a ruthless scenario of terror,‭ ‬aimed not only against‭ “‬bandits‭” (‬partisans and Jews‭)‬,‭ ‬but also passive bystanders. ‭ ‬Other‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalions from the General Government,‭ ‬such as‭ ‬203‭ ‬and‭ ‬204‭ ‬consisted of Trawniki men,‭ ‬many of which came to staff the death camps of Sobibor and Bełżec.‭ ‬Frank Golczewski,‭ “‬Shades of Grey:‭ ‬Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia,‭” ‬in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬The Shoah in Ukraine:‭ ‬history,‭ ‬testimony,‭ ‬memorialization‭ (‬Bloomington and Indianapolis:‭ ‬Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,‭ ‬2008‭)‬,‭ ‬114-155.‭ ‬On the activities of‭ ‬Schutzmannschaft battalion‭ ‬115/118,‭ ‬see Per Anders Rudling,‭ “‬The Khatyn‭’ ‬Massacre:‭ ‬A Historical Controversy Revisisted,‭” ‬Journal of Genocide Research‭ (‬Forthcoming‭)‬ The leadership of the OUN(b‭) – ‬Shukhevych,‭ ‬Bandera,‭ ‬Lenkavs’kyi,‭ ‬and Stets’ko shared the Nazi stereotypes of the‭ ‬żydokomuna,‭ ‬of Jews as the tools of Moscow and/or Bolshevism,‭ ‬and the latter two openly approved of the German extermination of the Jews. ‭ ‬Gabriel Finder and Aleksander Prusin,‭ “‬Collaboration in Eastern Galicia:‭ ‬The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust,‭”‬ East European Jewish Affairs,‭ ‬Vol.‭ ‬34‭ ‬No.‭ ‬2‭ (‬2004‭)‬:‭ ‬102‭; ‬Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk,‭”‬The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude towards Germans and Jews:‭ ‬Iaroslav Stets’ko’s‭ ‬1941‭ ‬Zhyttiepys‭’‬,‭”‬ Harvard Ukrainian Studies vol.‭ ‬XXIII,‭ ‬no.‭ ‬3-4‭ (‬1999‭)‬:‭ ‬171.‭ ‬ Like the Nazis,‭ ‬the OUN(b‭) ‬leadership equated the fight against communism with the struggle against Jews and Muscovites. ‭ ‬The OUN(b‭) ‬blueprint for its wartime activities,‭ “‬Borot’ba i diial’nist‭’ ‬OUN pid chas viiny‭” ‬from May,‭ ‬1941,‭ ‬authored by Shukhevych,‭ ‬Stets’ko,‭ ‬Lenkavs’kyi and Bandera,‭ ‬outlined the creation of an OUN‭ “‬People’s militia,‭” ‬the establishment of‭ “‬internment camps,‭ ‬set up for Jews,‭ ‬asocial elements and captives.‭” [“‬Tabir internovanykh,‭ ‬pryznachenyi dlia zhydiv,‭ ‬asotsial’nykh elementiv ta polonenykh‭”] ‬It demanded‭ “‬Ukraine for the Ukrainians‭!‬...Death to the Muscovite-Jewish commune‭! ‬Beat the commune,‭ ‬save Ukraine‭!”[“‬Ukraina dlia Ukraintsiv‭!‬...Smert‭’ ‬moskovs’ko-zhydivs’kyi komuni‭! ‬Byi komunu,‭ ‬spasai Ukrainu‭!”]‬,‭ ‬demanding a‭ “‬dog’s death‭” ‬for the Muscovite-Jewish outsiders‭ [“‬moskovs’ko-zhydivs’kykh zaid‭”]‬.‭ ‬TsDAVO Ukrainy,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬3833,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬2,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬57-76.‭ ‬Kopiia.‭ ‬Mashynopys and TsDAVO Ukrainy,‭ ‬f.‭ ‬3855,‭ ‬op.‭ ‬1,‭ ‬spr.‭ ‬2,‭ ‬ark.‭ ‬1-2.‭ ‬Kopiia.‭ ‬Mashynopys.‭ ‬Both published in Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi et al‭ (‬eds.‭)‬,‭ ‬OUN v‭ ‬1941‭ ‬roki.‭ ‬Dokumenty,‭ ‬Chastyna‭ ‬1.‭ (‬Kyiv:‭ ‬Natsional’na akademiia nauk Ukrainy,‭ ‬Instytut istorii Ukrainy,‭ ‬2006‭)‬,‭ ‬143,‭ ‬159,‭ ‬165. ‭ ‬ To the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften,‭ ‬the struggle against communism was linked to the killing of Jews.‭ ‬In Belarus,‭ ‬the exterminating‭ ‬of‭ ‬Jews and partisans‭ ‬were overlapping tasks.‭ ‬Anti-partisan operations were often carried out as extermination campaigns,‭ ‬or outright massacres.‭ ‬Jewish civilian victims of these massacres were often murdered under the pretense that they were also partisans.‭ ‬The‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften and their German commanders tallied up massacred Jews as‭ “‬partisans.‭” ‬The ratio of‭ ‬1:40‭ ‬killed‭ “‬bandits‭” ‬to‭ ‬Schutzmänner‭ ‬in Battalion‭ ‬201‭ ‬indicates mass murder and executions,‭ ‬rather than conventional counter-insurgency campaigns.‭ ‬In line with Keitel’s instructions of mass retribution,‭ ‬the numbers also resemble those of other‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften in occupied Belarus.‭ ‬They were part of a greater scheme,‭ ‬that of‭ ‬Generalplan Ost,‭ ‬which foresaw the deportation and extermination of entire ethnic groups and communities. ‭ ‬On‭ ‬Generalplan Ost,‭ ‬see Czesław Madajczyk‭ (‬ed.‭)‬,‭ ‬Generalny Plan Wschodni:‭ ‬Zbiór dokumentów‭ (‬Warszawa:‭ ‬Glówna  Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce,‭ ‬1990‭)‬ and Czesław Madajczyk,‭ “‬General Plan East:‭ ‬Hitler’s Master Plan for Expansion,‭” ‬Polish Western Affairs,‭ ‬vol.‭ ‬III,‭ ‬no.2‭ (‬1962‭)‬,‭ ‬accessed online,‭ ‬http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/GPO/gpoarticle.HTM‭ (‬August‭ ‬28,‭ ‬2009‭)‬.‭ ‬Given the training of much of the UPA and SB OUN leadership by Nazi Germany,‭ ‬it is no coincidence that the patterns and tactics of the OUN and UPA’s ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles resemble the anti-partisan tactics of the‭ ‬Schutzmannschaften.‭ ‬Within their ranks,‭ ‬a significant part of the UPA leadership had‭ ‬been accustomed to the use of disproportionate violence,‭ ‬attacks on civilians,‭ ‬and the use of collective retribution.‭ ‬The ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles,‭ ‬Jews,‭ ‬Armenians,‭ ‬and Czechs carries the hallmarks of the SS and‭ ‬Schutzmannschaftens‭’ ‬tactics of‭ “‬anti-partisan‭” ‬warfare.‭