Prismatic Security: Expanding the Copenhagen School to the Local Level

Prismatic  Security   Expanding  the  Copenhagen  School  to  the  Local  Level   by Andrej Zwitter & Jaap de Wilde* Department of International Relations and International Organization (IRIO) University of Groningen** Key words: Copenhagen School, securitization, human security, psychology of decision making, methodology This article expands the Copenhagen School framework for security analysis to include local level security discourses. To this end, we elaborate the notion of lenses, rather than sectors, to trace distinct discourses about existential threats. These security discourses are overlapping, interrelated and synthesized by both local actors and the analyst. This synthesizing practice results in what we call prismatic security. We adapt a view on existential values that does not only build on existing discourses but also on the discourse about basic needs, thereby establishing thresholds for existential threats at the local level. We further introduce an operational way of assessing security discourses on the local level, based on empirical considerations and two mechanisms of securitization processes: ‘abstraction & prognosis’ and ‘comparison & prognosis’. After more than a decade of rethinking security studies, triggered by the end of the Cold War, some of the dust has settled. In recent years, various authors produced overviews of the new field of Security Studies. Various distinctions and similarities among different strands of security studies in terms of conceptual and methodological considerations are put forward (Walt 1991; Krause & Williams 1996; Terriff et al. 1999; Baldwin 2001; Paris, 2001; Buzan & Hansen 2009). They have in common that they distinguish discourses on levels of analysis (‘global security’, ‘regional security’, ‘state security’, and ‘human security’), and discourses on types of threats (‘military security’, ‘environmental security’, ‘economic security’, etcetera). The varying positions in these academic discourses are well summarized by Buzan & Hansen (2009: 221-224): Strategic Studies, Peace Research, the Copenhagen School and Critical Security Studies. In spite of these developments, security concerns at especially the local level are still * Jaap de Wilde is Professor of International Relations and World Politics and Andrej Zwitter is Assistant Professor for International Political Economy at the University of Groningen. You can contact the authors at: [email protected] or [email protected]. ** We like to thank the members of the VIEW-group (Tanja Aalberts, Erna Rijsdijk, Maarten Rothman, Jorg Kustermans, Geoff Gordon and Wouter Werner) and the members and audience of the ISA Convention 2010 panel “Fresh Ideas on Security and Peace” for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. We also wish to thank the reviewers for their insightful and clarifying comments that greatly helped to improve the article. insufficiently conceptualized and operationalized. Among these few studies interesting new insights are provided by Salter (2008) and Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009); concerning criticism regarding differences in cultural values concerning the local level a revealing article has been written by Wilkinson (2007). The concept of securitization and desecuritization as developed by the Copenhagen School is a constant subject of constructive theoretical discussions and critique (Floyd 2007, 2010; Hayes 2009; McDonald 2008; Mitzen 2006; Stritzel 2007; Taureck 2006; Williams 1998, 2003). However, concrete operationalization for measuring security on the local level is needed as a basis for strategies for third party involvement. Assessment of local situations, including their transnational contexts, and the complex interdependence of existential interests, appears much harder than the broad brush security analyses at the global and world-regional levels of analysis. If the objective is to make the Copenhagen School applicable to all areas of concern for international politics, then it needs operationalization for the local level. It is on this level where humanitarian and development aid needs empirical research in order to better understand the complexities of humanitarian crises. There are some stimulating efforts in the field of human security studies, in particular the attempt to establish a Human Security Index (HSI; Human Security Centre, 2005). However, conceptually human security is a very weak and contestable approach (De Wilde, 2008-b; Paris, 2001), which hinders proper operationalization. Also in Development Studies a wide range of operationalizations exist, but in the end most of them turn out to be quite state-centric (as is the case, e.g., with the Human Development Index [HDI], which also forms a core in the HSI). Moreover, development needs are much wider than security needs. We agree with the Copenhagen School that talking security only makes sense if the term refers to existential values. It is in line with the Copenhagen School that we like to develop a comprehensive approach to analyse and work with local security complexes. Following Buzan’s notion of a security complex, meant to establish critical environments to understand the dynamics of interstate security policies (Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Wæver, 2003), we focus on the interdependence between various security concerns in local settings, establishing local security complexes. In doing so, we need to amend the original notion of sectors in the framework for security analysis that was developed in Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998). Moreover, the expansion of the Copenhagen School from global, regional and national levels to the local level requires some alterations in order to make the original framework applicable to the concerns of local groups and individuals. These alterations, however, stay in line with the original conception of securitization theory and are mostly a further elaboration on securitization processes and an expansion of the framework to the local level. To this end we describe security discourses with the metaphor of a prism. Furthermore, we elaborate on how local actors deconstruct social reality regarding security concerns. We introduce two mechanisms that explain securitization processes (comparison & prognosis and abstraction & prognosis), and elaborate on them on the basis of empirical observations and theories regarding the psychology of decision-making. In conclusion this will lead to a framework on how to assess security discourses on the local level and a way of visualizing these discourses along the metaphor of a prism. Security  Discourse  as  a  Prism   Often the metaphor of sectors for qualifying various security discourses is confusing. Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998) treat a sector as a lens and a value-based logic, rather than a well- defined part of society. “Sectors serve to disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its distinctive patterns of interaction.” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: 8). They are therefore not talking about, e.g., the military, the economy, or the environment as empirically identifiable parts of society, but about the discourses and institutions that come into focus when military, economic or environmental values are highlighted by the analyst. Security analysis subsequently focuses on the perceived threats to these values, as uttered in speech acts (Ole Wæver’s securitization theory). A confusing factor in this approach is that some security discourses have become institutionalized in society. Concerns about military security have led to a military sector in society indeed. Concerns about market stability and competition have resulted in an economic sector, characterized by, e.g., financial regimes, central banks, ministries of Finance, firms, unions etcetera. Not each of the analytical sectors has such institutionalized counterparts in society, nor do all sectors in society cover the analytical ones. The analytical sectors, therefore, are better labelled lenses – as is also suggested at various places in Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998: 168): “We see sectors as a purely analytical device, as different lenses through which to see different views of the same issues”. Hence, through an economic lens, the military – as a sector in society – is seen in economic terms: how does their budget affect government spending and taxation?; is the army an outlet for unemployed young men and women?; is there financial burden-sharing within alliances?; etcetera. Through an environmental lens, the military sector in society may come in view in terms of the environmental costs of warfare (ranging from nuclear winter to widely dispersed anti- personnel mines obstructing normal use of the land) or because of the relief aid they can give in response to natural hazards. The advantage of this approach is that it focuses on security discourses rather than defining fixed values and threats to them. Moreover, “the use of sectors confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: 8). The sector or lens is based on specific sets of values. Once these values are established by the analyst (a troublesome and controversial phase in developing a framework for analysis) they function as independent variables in the analysis of security discourses.1 The disadvantage, however, is that the disaggregation does not tell how to reassemble the sectoral analyses. Chapter 8 of Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998), “How Sectors are Synthesized”, offers two ways to deal with this: One way is to map out scores in a matrix. This is typically an activity for the observing analyst, not for the actors involved. But it remains unclear how the observer must deal with the interdependence of the issues at stake. The prismatic approach we offer here hopes to contribute to a solution of this problem, while acknowledging the value of the second approach. The other way offered to re-establish the whole picture is to trace overarching security discourses: “... in the end, the actors themselves must make up their minds as to how the securitization of different values adds up” (Buzan, et al., 1998: 166). We like to follow on to that approach too, be it by including the analyst herself as one of the actors involved in the security discourse. Positive about looking at cross-sectoral securitizations is that they help to better understand the actors involved. But the method of aggregation is rather implicit: the dominant discourse of the actor at stake does not necessarily reflect his way of matching sectoral concerns; it may merely reflect his specific pre-occupations and biased world views. Here, institutionalization does matter a lot: where you stand depends on where you sit. Our ambition in this article is to elaborate a more explicit way in which sectoral discourses can be related to each other. To that end, we present the image of a prism to combine the best of both matrix-mapping and cross-sectoral discourses.2 Our selection of sectors deviates from the sectors defined by the Copenhagen School, due to the bottom-up logic we apply. We do not see this as problematic because the Copenhagen School is ambivalent about tracing sectors, acknowledging their temporary and epistemological character. There are no theoretical objections within the logic of sectors to expand or limit their number.3 A sector like the environmental sector could hardly be imagined before the 1970s. A sector like the military one is internationally about territorial integrity, whereas at the sub-unit level it is also about coercion, civil war and inner-city warfare. Hence, not only about the territorial integrity of the state but also about the personal security of people; the protection from physical violence. This involves military, police and intelligence, as well as gangs, war-lords, private security firms and domestic violence. Personal security therefore provides a better lens than military security, when risks from organized violence are at stake. Moreover, existential values at the group and individual levels do 1 One of the main concerns in the sector-chapters in Buzan, et al. (1998) is to trace and define clusters of existential values that together form a coherent view on securitization processes. The circular aspect here is that the choice of sectors is itself a reflection of the dominant security discourses in the academic and political fields. 2 In doing so, it is not our intention to qualify local security complexes as types of prismatic societies as developed by Fred Riggs (1961). 3 In De Wilde, 1995, e.g., the military and the political sectors were merged into one military-political sector. Buzan & Wæver (2003) find themselves differences in the relevance of various discourses in different regional security complexes. not always correspond with those at higher levels of analysis. A simple example is road safety. For every individual and her intimates deadly accident is existential, whereas the USA and the EU each take about 42,000 traffic casualties a year without declaring a state of emergency (or a global war on cars). An individual has a different horizon of existential concerns than the group she belongs to. Sometimes a collective interest even requires individual existential threats: sending out troops for a humanitarian intervention puts the lives of the soldiers at risk for a higher purpose. In liberal capitalist economic orders, individual risk is even seen as the root of success: job security is an individual concern, and so is bankruptcy for firms, whereas it feeds the productive dynamics of capitalism. Instead of choosing the collective concerns of states (the international level) as a starting point to sectorize security discourses, one can also start from below and take the local concerns of people as the starting point. In following the Copenhagen School’s logic that only threats to the vital or existential functions of an actor qualify as securitization, we take the discourse on basic human needs as one starting point. That way we can narrow down the human security discourse, which we embrace as a second starting point. In search of an acceptable operationalization of sectors we opted for the sectoral division presented by the UNDP (1994), widely applied in human security research: economic security, health security, food security, environmental security, personal security, social security, and political security. These adjectives qualify seven clusters of values that can be meaningful used as a starting-point for tracing distinct securitization processes. Its arbitrariness is compensated by the fact that we problematise the role of the analyst. Next we need to establish what constitutes the local. We are not looking at individuals as such, although this can be taken as a starting point, but at individuals in relation to their societal context. Individuals normally signify institutions (the priest, the king, the housewife, the child), and their speech acts are valued correspondingly – as agents representing and reiterating a social structure. The local is not defined in terms of (numbers of) individuals, but rather in terms of societal contexts. This involves a combination of identity patterns, administrative practices, geographical location and proximity, interaction capacity and (social-economic, social-political) processes. In essence the local security complex does not differ from the international regional security complexes (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: 201) ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.’ Units at stake, however, are groups and individuals rather than states and transnational corporations, even though these also play a role in local security complexes. The subsequent scale and nature of local security complexes are subject to interpretation. Obviously, humankind as such is a community of fate in face some securitizations. But most global challenges manifest themselves differently over the world in local contexts (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: 84-90). Approaching security issues bottom-up can either begin arbitrarily with a choice of the analyst or with an issue-specific functionalist logic: what is the minimum we need to consider to deal with issue ‘X’? Here, e.g., a hazard can define the local security complex (e.g., concentric circles around the epicentre of an earthquake). An alternative is to begin with a given referent object and to establish its social context.4 It is within this context that we try to operationalize prismatic security for the use of humanitarian studies and local humanitarian action. We look at security analysis and its component lenses in terms of a prism. A prism divides a white light beam into its spectrum of seven colours, as the security analysis divides social life into various security discourses – which in case of the UNDP approach happen to be seven value-clusters indeed.5 That does not mean that the security aspects are separated from each other in practice but that they can be clustered in subsets of security as much as the seven colours of light are subsets of the white light beam. That further means that these clusters cannot be measured and addressed solely by themselves but only in combination with other clusters. In the metaphor of the prism: 1) using less than seven colours of the white light cannot lead to a white light beam; 2) shortcomings in any of the seven colours cannot lead to a white light beam. The first points at an analytical shortcoming, the second at an empirical shortcoming. The prism approach implies that ‘white light’ is the ideal situation. No securitization occurs, because neither analyst nor observed actors perceive any existential threats. We don’t expect to find much white light in practice. The opposite is black. No light at all. Empirically probably impossible, although concentration camps, death cells and torture chambers come very close. The metaphorical approach is to place the prism in the selected case; break the light, and merge the results. 4 A useful approach for defining ‘the local’ in line with our argument is developed by Helen Clouclelis (1992), combining mathematical, socioeconomic, behavioural and experiential space. 5 That there are seven security aspects in the human security approach as there are colours of light is of course coincidental and does not reflect on its validity. It is thinkable that in future other discourses might surface as happened before.  Figure 1: Security as Refracted Light We can look, for example, at a state and break up its security concerns into various subsets, or we can apply the prism to a village to assess the subsets of its security setting. Using a prism, we cannot only deconstruct security into specific discourses; we can also reconstruct the whole in terms of security, and give our reading of the complexity of interrelated social concerns, values and interests. 3.  Deconstruction  of  Social  Reality  Regarding  Security   Due to the perceptive nature of threats not every aspect of security relevant to the individual and the smaller groups she belongs to can easily be measured with quantitative and qualitative data. One has to deal with the cultural settings that define insecurity in order to asses a situation. That leads to a complicated problem: threats perceived by the analyst are not necessarily likewise perceived by a local community. This might be because their cultural setting reflects different values or because the knowledge necessary to perceive something as a threat is missing. In India and Nepal, for example, the lowest cast, the Dalits, face life threatening social exclusion, extreme poverty and atrocities.6 However, the traditional Hindu culture justifies their situation as a result of their karma. Thus, traditional Hindus might not securitize the Dalits’ situation whereas the Dalits perceive a threat to their security; an assumption that is supported by political organization of members of the Dalits (e.g. International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) and Dalit NGO Federation - a body of 175 Dalit NGOs of Nepal). A more theoretical example would be the existence of an undiscovered disease or a population living unwittingly in an area of radiological contamination. Both situations would not result in a security discourse by the local population whereas the analyst based on a different 6 See, e.g., “UN report slams India for caste discrimination” http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/03/02/india- dalits.html. cultural background or knowledgebase would consider them as threatening to the population. Another factor that influences the research is that by researching such situations the analyst changes its environment by pointing to what she perceives as threat. By interacting with the reference group for her inquiry the analyst creates awareness among the researched group of a possible threat. This awareness in turn is being interpreted by the reference group through their cultural lens and either will be accepted, distorted or disregarded. Adding to the problems with the perceptive nature of existential threats is the question of establishing thresholds between basic needs on the one end and luxuries on the other, and between acceptable risk and intolerable deprivation. It seems necessary to add thresholds to the security discourse assessment that can be measured objectively, like numbers of deaths related to perceived threats. One might assume that insecurity can be objectively measured by the amount of deceased persons based on the key assumption that the more people die the higher the likelihood of a situation to be prioritized as an existential threat. A simple example, however, proves this key assumption wrong. In 2005, 41,600 people died in traffic accidents in the EU, while in the same year 56 people died in Western Europe from terrorist attacks.7 While a major political discourse is going on regarding terrorism, road safety is hardly securitized (although a policy issue). Numbers of casualties do not represent what is perceived as threats that justify extraordinary measures. It seems in this case that either we accept the road safety situation as unchangeable, self-inflicted, or not threatening to the political system or justify it simply as a necessary risk to be taken given our dependency on cars as means of mobility.8 Another explanation can be that threats related to ‘abnormalcy’ are securitized more than threats related to ‘normalcy’.9 Still another explanation can be that potential securitizing actors have nothing or little to offer to counter the threat of traffic death (it requires costly readjustment of the entire society), whereas securitizing terrorism opens profitable new windows of opportunity. We do not have the pretension that we can solve these methodological issues. The best scholars can do, is to acknowledge their own impact on what they study by including themselves as variable to their studies and by reflecting on their own bias of what they see as threats. The discourse-based approach asks what securitizing actors put on the agenda. One would think that when objectively basic needs are not met, this will be perceived as a threat and therefore be reflected in the local security discourse. However, it happens that these issues are not mentioned 7 “Road traffic deaths and injuries”, www.erso.eu/knowledge/content/09_postimpact/road_traffic_deaths_and_injuries.htm; Coolsaet & Van de Voorde (2006). 8 See the revealing Appendix in Mueller (1989, 267-270): “War, Death, and the Automobile”. 9 As a consequence, the societal and political impact of terrorist attacks diminishes as their frequency grows. That the Israelis have come to live with the omnipresent threat of suicide bombers is a telling example. Adjustment to street violence in most megalopolises of the world illustrates this too. at all. Take for example domestic violence: the mass of women in patriarchal societies do not tend to express what the analyst will see as a human security problem, and what in international society is defined as violations of human rights: rape, repression and forced labour. Possible explanations: the women do not want to make themselves a target by bringing up violence as a topic of political discussion, or they are kind-of hospitalized in their situation, or they don’t see an alternative. Habituation, fear and uncertainty about alternative paths may outweigh the certainty of survival in miserable circumstances. The status of insecurity assessed according to ‘objective’ indicators (as set, e.g., by the UNDP) runs the risk of representing mainly the values relevant for the analyst. This assessment is not necessarily relevant for the reference group, if they would be asked to comment on that. Another aspect, crucial in understanding the above example, is the need to differentiate between existing miserable circumstances and the threat of ending up in such circumstances. Once there, a security discourse is about escape (resistance, revolution, liberation), which is essentially different from security discourses about prevention. It means that we have to make use of indicators that allow the assessment of taboos, which are reflected in actions rather than in words, and of the unidentified problems that will have an impact on the group nevertheless, like, e.g., health. The spread of deadly disease, even though not perceived as a threat because there is no knowledge about it, is still a threat to security as defined by the analyst – who then becomes a securitizing actor herself. Securitization on the spot only occurs when the potential securitizing actor believes in (emergency) measures that can turn the tides or when she expects to profit from fears and measures raised by securitization, irrespective of their problem solving ability. Especially in situations of apathy, passive compliance or taboos, the lack of securitization can be explained by analyzing the position of the potential securitizing actors in relation to what the analyst has securitized. Reversely, unrelated to threat or actual crisis, institutionalized security concerns (armies, police, paramedics, fire brigades) keep reproducing the securitizations that gave birth to them. What individuals in their social environment identify as risk or threat is learned by direct or indirect experience linked to expectation. This can take the form of comparison & prognosis or abstraction & prognosis. We know about the threat that a rifle can pose because we are informed about its purpose and use. The Incas did not know about the danger of muskets when Pizarro first brought them to South-America. But Atahualpa learned quickly from his informant that it poses a threat, though he himself did not experience it before he was captured. That means that one of his informants directly or indirectly experienced the effect of muskets (comparison & prognosis) and was able to communicate this threat to Atahualpa. He simply did or did not belief (abstraction & prognosis).  The way abstraction & prognosis works, is well explained with the example of the nuclear holocaust. During the Cold War the securitized threat was a nuclear holocaust. We never experienced it, but imagined it (helped by Hollywood, peace research and Cold War game theoretical modelling of scenarios). We were able to take what we learned and communicated about the effects of nuclear warfare, abstracted it and imagined what would happen, if it was waged – the power of imagination. Another issue-area where abstraction & prognosis figure strongly in securitization processes is in environmental security (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998; De Wilde, 2008-a): climate change, its origins, nature and consequences, is about the credibility of models that predict future environmental catastrophes. (Other types of environmental threats, such as natural hazards, industrial disasters, desertification, deforestation, depletion of resources and species, are in the realm of comparison & prognosis.). Essentially the discourse about what are the indicators for different aspects of security concerns is a question of letting the analyst decide, by academic method/discourse, on the broadest possible description of an aspect, and letting the reference group decide, by expression of perception through their words and actions, which indicators have to be used. So the analyst will expect certain aspects to be important beforehand. For example, given a monetary economy, money is expected to be a relevant indicator at all levels. Actors without financial means cannot function within it. Empirical  and  Methodological  Considerations   Several examples have been mentioned of odd cases of securitization – odd from the perspective of the analyst, such as the Dalits example, the Incas case, traffic accidents, terrorism, and nuclear holocaust. In this section we like to present some of these cases in more detail, in order to distinguish several typical securitization practices. This will further elaborate the mechanisms mentioned above: abstraction & prognosis and comparison & prognosis. To the extent necessary for measuring securitization by various means we will introduce key assumptions which will help to establish different levels of security. Security is about how actors relate to each other and to their natural environment in terms of threats and vulnerabilities. Prismatic security is ‘white light’ in its brightest form: a status of a reference group where no threats to its survival or to its key values are observable. The seven beams show no distortions. There is no securitization at all; not by individuals, nor by the analyst – an unlikely situation. Key assumption 1: if indicators of risk, threat or deprivation pass a threshold acutely affecting survival, then a security discourse in the area of these indicators is highly probable. (Put simply: in such circumstances actors are expected to cry out for “Help!”) The first key assumption is based on theories that attest basic needs as the impetus for human behaviour (Maslow, 1943; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). It theorizes that when people are threatened in their basic needs or values, this dominates their behaviour. Any acute threat to survival would fall into this category. A maiore ad minor it means that the probability of the emergence of a security discourse that justifies extraordinary measures regarding a specific aspect is the more likely the more basic needs are affected. Key assumption 1 acts as the ‘objectively’ set threshold applied by the analyst. A method that allows the measurement of basic needs enshrined in human security has been developed by Owen (2002). He advocates measuring human security on the basis of a body count related to different security sectors. Though observing our limits, a body count can serve to support key assumption 1. Acute threats to survival seem to be a universally applicable threshold where a securitization process is to be expected. We attest this threshold universal applicability, which will serve as a point of departure for the operationalization of the Copenhagen School’s framework for analysis. An astonishing phenomenon is that although traffic incidents cause on average 150,000 fatalities a year in 56 states covered by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2007), people tend to accept this as a mere fact and do not securitize this by demanding extraordinary measures. It is dealt with as a concern for ordinary politics and legal regulations. There is a tendency to individualize the casualties: 150,000 wrong decisions by individuals; individual tragedies rather than structural violence within a social system. Terrorist attacks caused in the years 1994 to 2004 worldwide an average of about 5,312 fatalities per year. That is less than 5% of the numbers of persons killed annually in traffic accidents in UNECE countries alone.10 Nevertheless, it is a top priority in security discourses. The graphs on terrorism and traffic incidents (Figures 2-5) illustrate this and add a hypothetical, value-based curve for observed securitization. Thousands 200 150 100 50 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Europe North America UNECE countries Securitization of Traffic 10 This average is based on the GTD 1.1 and 2 and the UNECE statistics.  Figure 2: Road Accidents & Estimated Securitization of Road Traffic, 1994-2004 Source: UNECE, Statistics of Road Traffic Accidents in Europe and North America, 2007 edition, Number of terrorism fatalities http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp6/pdfdocs/Accident_2007.zip. Hundreds 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Global terrorism fatalities S ecuritization of Terrorism Figure 3: Global Terrorist Fatalities & Estimated Securitization of Terrorism Source: Global Terrorism Database Number1.1ofand 2, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/ terrorism fatalities Hundreds 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 North America terrorism fatalities S ecuritization of Terrorism Figure 4: North American Terrorism Fatalities & Estimated Securitization of Terrorism Source: Global TerrorismNumber Database 1.1 and 2, of terrorism http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/ fatalities, 1994-2004 Hundreds 5 4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Europe terrorism fatalities S ecuritization of Terrorism Figure 5: European Terrorism Fatalities & Estimated Securitization of Terrorism Source – Global Terrorism Database 1.1 and 2, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/ In the case of terrorism we can observe a similar phenomenon of opposing securitization processes. The Bush administration justified emergency measures such as torture and war as a means to fight terrorism based on the securitization of the terrorist threat. This strong securitization process was initiated by the events of September 11, 2001. Judging from this high-impact (low-probability) event one could assume that a death-count provides valuable information on how strongly a threat is securitized. However, when looking again at the road traffic fatalities, this seems to be doubtful. The European securitization process regarding terrorism cannot be explained by the same mechanism as the securitization process of the United States. It rather seems that diffusion of security concerns of a dominant peer (the United States) to Europe lead to an increased securitization of terrorism within Europe in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 but before the London and Madrid bombings occurred.11 Similarly, the world effectively experienced the power of the atomic bomb only twice in history (Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945) but still the imagination of a nuclear holocaust worked well during the Cold War, at least ever after the Cuban missile crisis (1961). Irrespective of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the awareness of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) appeared to set a rational limit to their willingness to escalate other ‘existential’ issues between them (Waltz, 1981). Moreover, the tone between the United States and the Soviet Union changed after 1986, when a new disarmament process verbalized fear of the possible environmental impact of nuclear war, helped by the theorized nuclear winter in 198312 and the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.13 In the cases depicted by Figures 2-5 it is illustrated that singular events that had an impact on threat perceptions and generated a securitization process (like Hiroshima, Chernobyl, 9/11), can best be described as ‘abstraction & prognosis’. The incidents are considered to be a demonstration of what could happen in abstract terms anywhere else (terrorists could launch such attacks as experienced also against other targets, which might be more vital for the survival of a state; a nuclear weapon could be used also against other targets) – abstraction. Subsequently, the actor starts to develop a hypothetical prognosis where she multiplies the experienced example (a drastic increase in terrorists employing means that target a huge number of persons; a nuclear holocaust) – prognosis. Multiple low impact events, related to factors such as the increase of pollution, population 11 Diffusion in this regard means the socially mediated spread of ideas among a population or among actors. In this case the institutions facilitating this process are of course the media and also the UN Security Council with Resolution 1373 (2001). 12 The discourse politically particularly unfolded around an article Carl Sagan (1983) in the journal of foreign relations. 13 This incident lead to two international Conventions in the same year: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. and industrial output, are dealt with differently. A steadily increasing curve of low impact events of environmental scarcity and degradation leads to a much lower threat perception based on the prognosis that the curve would simply continue its path. Intervention is therefore always possible and not a security priority. Projections of a neo-Malthusian kind try to alter the discourse by changing the securitization curve from comparison & prognosis to abstraction & prognosis. Studies, such as supported by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 2004), aim to change a politicization process to a securitization process by projecting future (Armageddon-like) events and by shifting the only possible emergency measures to a point near the present. Key assumption 2a: comparison of the reference group with another group, with itself in an earlier (idealized) point of time, or with an abstract standard, influences the perception of possible change in future, and thus affects the incentives for securitization. This is a comparison of circumstances and expected scenarios for change – comparison & prognosis (conducted by the analyst and/or by actors in the reference group). Above the threshold of survival and basic needs, empirical measurements will have to resort to the concept of relative deprivation between a reference group and a comparison group with relevancy to the reference group. The concept of relative deprivation is used to explain the tendency for political violence conducted by an actor depending on how extreme this disparity of capabilities and expectations in the area of her basic needs is perceived (Gurr, 1971: 24-27; Stewart, 2008: 3- 23). This comparison group can either be a group that is in geographic relation to the reference group (‘why can’t we have what they have?’); or it can be a historical comparison group (‘we did better in the past, let’s restore it’). This means that the reference group compares itself with itself at an earlier point in history or with another closely related group experiencing better circumstances.14 The higher the disparity between the situations of comparison, the higher the likelihood of a security discourse, even if there is no or little evidence of the factors described in key assumption 1. This approach allows us to expect a securitization process on the basis of data, like income or crime rates or living standards in general. 14 This follows Weber’s definition of social action that can be geared towards the past, present or future in contrast to reactive action that is geared towards the present (1978: 22-24).  Comparison and Prognosis Comparison Group Self-Perception of Reference Group Securitization Figure 6: Comparison and Prognosis The higher the difference between reference group and comparison group, the higher the tendency for securitization Key assumption 2b: comparison of the reference group with exceptional experiences by others or with imagined hazards influences the perception of the future, and thus the incentives for securitization. Let’s call it the Hollywood-factor: abstraction & prognosis. Key assumption 2b reflects on a similar process of an intersubjective construction of security issues as does 2a. However, the underlying mechanisms are different. The abstraction & prognosis is purely based on a hypothetical vision of the future. The concept of relative deprivation is not applicable in Key assumption 2b as the perceived threat does not follow the projection of a trend into the future. Instead, indicators of relevancy for observing the securitization process can only be found in the securitization process itself, namely discourse (e.g., political statements on terrorism as threat) or actions (e.g., the nuclear arms race). In that case quantitative indicators for Key assumption 1 show no or only small indication of threats to the respective aspect of survival, whereas other indicators that measure actions and discourse point to a rather strong threat perception. Abstraction and Prognosis Incidents Securitization Figure 7: Abstraction and Prognosis Both observations – abstraction & prognosis and comparison & prognosis – are similar in projecting a threat into the future as hypothetically possible and theoretically likely. This leads the actor to a conviction that something abnormal is happening of which she thinks it should be and can be avoided. If the ‘can be’ is missing in the conviction, apathy or surrender is more likely than securitization. Following this logic, in the traffic deaths example securitization will occur: (a) if there are one or more accidents with a much higher amount of casualties as we are used to or in sensational circumstances (abstraction & prognosis); or (b) if the amount of traffic related fatalities shows a clear increase (comparison & prognosis). A factor involved in abstraction and prognosis might be the Peak-End rule (Fredrickson & Kahneman 1993). It explains why a slow increase of casualties due to the accelerating effect of climate change on natural disasters (comparison & prognosis) tends to lead to a less steep securitization process than abstraction and prognosis. Peak experiences, such as 9/11 or Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are felt more strongly than slow changes (e.g. climate change). This seems to be so, even if the final outcome of slow changes might be the same or worse than the result of peak experiences. Abstraction and prognosis can then lead to an overweighting of the probability of events with high impact (in the case of terrorism the high-impact/low-probability event of 9/11 lead to massive securitization). In another study Kahneman, et al. (1993) discovered a cognitive error of judgements: humans tend to neglect situations with a continuous duration of pain. The ‘duration neglect’, as it is called, might explain why car accidents, which happen on a daily basis, are not as strongly securitized as terrorism occurring only incidentally in Europe and the United States. Comparison & prognosis, therefore, has a less strong effect on securitization (see also Taleb, 2008: 76-79). The mechanism of duration neglect leads to no or unsuccessful securitization (Figure 8). The Peak-End rule distinguishes between low securitization as a result of comparison & prognosis and high securitization in casesDuration of abstraction and prognosis. Neglect and Securitization Incidents Securitization Figure 8: Duration Neglect and (No) Securitization The indicators for measuring relative deprivation regarding key assumptions 2a and 2b are essentially established by the analyst, based on assessments of norms in and outside the reference group. A recurring standard research question will be, if securitizations in the field reflect and match the analyst’s expectations.15 That means, e.g., that if there is no evidence of a securitized 15 Compare the Copenhagen School’s insight in the notion of overlay: Overlay dampens local conflict dynamics, which implies that we don’t see the security discourses played out as we, as analysts, would expect them to play out. threat, this has to be contrasted with indicators about threats to basic needs. A disagreement between the outcomes of both assessments can point to a threat perception within the reference group that is not verbalized (because of fear, taboo or social compliance), to misperceptions within the reference group, or to misperceptions of the analyst. In the latter case the analyst may have misjudged the existential thresholds of the indicators. Key assumptions 2a and 2b reflect process dependent variables that vary in their impact based on speed of development from one situation to the other and the extent of change experienced and/or expected. Coming back to the road safety example, road safety is not securitized as terrorism is, simply because it follows a different expectancy curve. In the case of terrorism it appears that not the empirical evidence (frequency, body count etc.) but rather the discourse about terrorism defines the expectancy. The discourse reflects and causes fear. Although, in Western Europe the likelihood of being killed in a traffic accident is much higher than being killed by a terrorist, the expectancy of and fear from an upwards trend for terrorism is much higher than for traffic accidents. Therefore, the need of a policy change appears to be much higher. This definition and the key assumptions allow for a triangulation of methods that identify the threshold of (un)acceptable risks and threats or deprivations assessed by (1) the analyst, and (2) the (other) actors involved. The problem with measuring perceptions is that people do not always verbalize what they perceive as threats, either because it is a taboo or the verbalization as such could increase the threat. The operational path that follows from this starts with researching what the reference group sees as important indicators in regard to the different aspects of security based on their values and by analyzing the respective actions that indicate certain values by observing which indicators are prioritized over others. Assume, e.g., that we look at a group for whom money is important to define their economic security. The indicator money is countable, but the threshold defining minimum existential amounts involves a wide range of societal concerns, and variations in time and space. To ask the group members about how important money for them is, constitutes one but not the only way to determine the threshold. We can also identify it by observing their financial behaviour, including the sacrifices made to make money. Identifying the indicators by looking at where economic, societal, political, etcetera actions are pointing at means to assess the values by the actions they cause. The security discourse is either based on one of the three key assumptions observed, or the analyst looks instead at actions that point to securitized issues. This might be necessary where a discourse is expected but not detectable. That means that every status of security is measurable either by occurrence or absence of factors and processes described in key assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b. In cases where there are words but no deeds, the necessity of securing an aspect seems not to reach the perceived urgency as in the previous case (see for an illustration the analysis of environmental securitizations: environmental policies by governments hardly if ever match the alarming reports that inspire them (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: Ch. 4; De Wilde, 2008-a). Where also acute threats to the survival, as defined by the analyst, are measurable, the urgency is likely to be highest and deeds are to be expected. This leads us to three levels of securitization (or perceived threat levels) – B, C & D – and one level (A) of security defined by the absence of words and deeds. The three key assumptions thereby stand in relation to each other regarding the level of securitization to be assigned. We distinguish between the following levels: • A - Security: a status where no indicators (deaths, discourse or actions) are measurable. • B - Latent Threat: a status where no or little acute threat to basic needs is measurable in terms of key assumption 1, but discourse based on key assumption 2a and/or 2b is measurable, or an equivalent of relative deprivation regarding key assumption 2a is measurable; a missing verbalization of a threat can point at (x) social acceptance, (y) missing knowledge about the threat or (z) a taboo. • C - Manifest Threat: a status where no or only little acute threat to basic needs are measurable in terms of key assumption 1, but action based on key assumption 2a and/or 2b is measurable, or an equivalent of indicators for relative deprivation regarding key assumption 2a is present. • D - Acute Threat: a status where deprivation of basic needs is measurable in terms of Key assumption 1; discourses and/or actions have to be present. The first relevant step is to analyse the values the reference group emphasizes. This is important to know when assessing qualitative and quantitative indicators for the measurement of relative deprivation. The second necessary step is the assessment of the indicators for the security aspects according to the key assumptions, including the associated concepts. The next step is to translate quantitative data as well as qualitative data into a grid that allows an assessment of security by making use of the prism (see Table 1). Each aspect of security can be assessed in regard to its level. Sublevels are possible as well. We can distinguish for the levels B, C and D between few and many indicators for action or discourse, or high or low extent of relative deprivation in regard to key assumption 2a for levels B and C. Key assumption 1 in Level D can be divided between high and low likelihood of lethality. Relative deprivation thereby becomes a testable variable. If the research shows a relative deprivation in a certain case, the analyst would expect a securitization process in this area. However, if he finds that there is no such process in words or actions measureable it points to a discrepancy between the values attributed by the analyst and the values attributed by the reference group. Similarly we expect key assumption 1 to be a testable variable for level D. If there is no securitization process, in other words people just die without taking any actions, one has to assume that there is missing knowledge about the cause and that either the comparison between this group and another group or their current situation in comparison with an earlier situation reveals no relative deprivation and discrepancy. This leads to the following matrix (A1, A2a and A2b stand for the key assumptions): Threshold in Expected relative Level terms of impact Securitization (Emergency) Action deprivation on survival No acute impact No relative depriv- No indications for No indications for action A on survival (A.1) ation between two discourse (A.2a, (A.2a, A.2b) or more compared A.2b) situations No acute impact Low extent of rela- Little indication for No indications for action B1 on survival (A.1) tive deprivation discourse based on (A.2a, A.2b) A.2a and/or A.2b No acute impact Low extent of rela- Much indication for No indications for action B2 on survival (A.1) tive deprivation discourse based on (A.2a, A.2b) A.2a and/or A.2b No acute impact High extent of rela- Much indication for Little indication for action on survival (A.1) tive deprivation discourse based on based on A.2a and/or C1 A.2a and/or A.2b A.2b No acute impact High extent of rela- Much indication for Much indication for ac- on survival (A.1) tive deprivation discourse based on tion based on A.2a C2 A.2a and/or A.2b and/or A.2b Indication for low High extent of rela- Much indication for Much indication for ac- impact on sur- tive deprivation discourse based on tion based on A.2a D1 vival (A.1) A.2a and/or A.2b and/or A.2b Indication for High extent of rela- Much indication for Much indication for ac- high impact on tive deprivation discourse based on tion based on A.2a D2 survival (A.1) A.2a and/or A.2b and/or A.2b Table 1: Prismatic Security Matrix This matrix (table 1) leads us to the visualization of prismatic security. The idea to see security as a prism takes concrete form in the operational structure of prismatic security and its visualization. Each lens will represent one aspect of prismatic security. In order to visualize the overall state of security the measurement of each aspect relevant to human survival has to be assessed. Therefore, the gathered data based on the indicators for each aspect needs to be translated to the security statuses of the prismatic security matrix. The outcome for each aspect is entered into a spreadsheet, which can be easily visualized as a radar graph symbolizing the refracted white light (see Figure 9). Projecting the observed discourse and emergency action on the graph in juxtaposition with the relative deprivation that the researcher expects might shed light on the analyst’s own bias. It would thus reflect on what he securitizes and which indicators she deems important. Figure 9: Prismatic Security of Observed versus Expected Securitization Conclusion   In this article we have shown how the Copenhagen School can be expanded to the local level. We have suggested defining local security complexes along the lines established in regional security complex theory. The theory provides the criteria, and the reading of their scores determines the scale and location of the local security complexes, as well as the actors involved. The kind of lenses required for charging local security discourses differs from the original framework for analysis, due to the peculiarities of including individuals and small groups. We accepted the presently dominant security perspectives of the UNDP, be it with two provisions. First, in order to preserve the threshold that threats must have existential characteristics for the securitizing actors, we added the basic needs discourse as a benchmark. Secondly, the criteria provided by UNDP, or by any other analyst, can be wrong or lead to misleading conclusions in face of the actual (lack of) securitizations in a given local context. Hence, it is crucial to treat the analyst not as a neutral third party, but as one of the local actors: the analyst is involved – the more so, if she is working for a humanitarian organisation that intends to improve the situation. A final observation is simple but vital to the operationalization of securitization theory. It is based on the idea that when threats are perceived acutely affecting our survival, then we tend to accept or at least take existential risks in other value-clusters to overcome the threat. An example is the hungry but poor person who steals bread for his survival, risking arrest. Assuming she had the money, she would buy the food she needs. The values which she perceives are threatened justify extraordinary measures and risks in other issue areas. It is like people jumping from the sixth floor of a burning building. Various situations of self-defence and self-help in cases of emergencies can be mentioned as examples. But also self-sacrifice to change the tides (like suicide-bombers) or to provide others the option of escape (women and children first) show how existential concerns can override each other. Tracing and deconstructing the discourse of the actors involved may reveal how securitization processes make some existential values take priority over others. The distortion between expected and observed behaviour may well have its roots in how some concerns and the local values that underlie them override others. To improve the chances of a successful analysis we have introduced two new explanations of securitizing moves: ‘abstraction and prognosis’ and ‘comparison and prognosis’. From further research we hope that this allows us to profit from psychological and psychiatric research of threat perceptions. 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