Language in the Service of Lawfare: The "Working Definition of Antisemitism" of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance

2019

In June 2017, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution “to combat Antisemitism.” The EP urged member states of the European Union, as well as its institutions and agencies, to adopt “the working definition of Antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and apply it to support efforts by justice and prosecutorial authorities to investigate and prosecute acts of Antisemitism more efficiently and effectively.”

Placards carrying images of swastikas superimposed on the Star of David and the Israeli flag were commonplace in street-level protests about the recent Israeli military actions and the conflict in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. Allusions between Nazi genocidal practices and the activities of the Israeli state were also drawn in some of the speeches at protest meetings and press commentary on the conflict. Although this was not the first occasion that the ‘Nazi card’ had been played against Israel and Jews, the prevalence of the phenomenon appears to indicate its growing normalisation. Playing the ‘Nazi card’ is a discursive act involving the use of Nazi or related terms or symbols (Nazism, Hitler, swastikas, etc.) in reference to Jews, Israel, Zionism or aspects of the Jewish experience. It manifests in words uttered in speech or in writing, or in visual representations such as artwork, drawings, caricatures, cartoons, graffiti, daubings and scratchings, or visual expressions such as a Nazi salute or the clicking of heels. In many instances, the playing of the Nazi card is unquestionably antisemitic. However, the inclusion of particular modes of criticism of Israel in definitions of antisemitism has provoked controversy. The result has been a war of words which has stagnated into an intellectual and discursive cul-de-sac of claim and counter-claim about what does and does not qualify as antisemitism. Because of this, in focusing on discourse, this report attempts to shift the focus of analysis of contemporary antisemitism onto new ground: away from labelling and defining the problem, to an understanding of the consequences of particular discourse. By unravelling and dissecting various manifestations of the phenomenon, the report reveals how the playing of the Nazi card scratches deep wounds by invoking painful collective memory of the Holocaust. It also offers some recommendations as to how the problem might be addressed.

Rosa Luxemburg Foundation Papers , 2019

The “Working Definition of Antisemitism” recognized by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016 is an instrument for collecting required data on and fighting antisemitism that has achieved wide dissemination. In a field of action characterized by a high degree of conceptual insecurity, the definition promises conceptual orientation by providing a basis for practical work. Indeed, with its concrete language devoid of technical jargon and its tangible examples that illustrate the concept of antisemitism using typical, recurring phenomena, the “Working Definition” has become the basis for the work of various groups of users. Moreover, the adoption of hitherto rarely examined aspects of antisemitism related to Israel provided an update for the discussion that was necessary at the time the definition was formulated (in the early 2000s). However, a closer examination also reveals severe deficits. In particular, the “Working Definition” is inconsistent, contradictory and formulated very vaguely. It therefore does not satisfy the requirements of a good definition. Moreover, the core definition of antisemitism is reductionist. It emphasizes some antisemitic phenomena and levels of analysis but largely omits other essential ones. This applies in particular to ideological and discursive aspects, for example antisemitism as a conspiracist worldview. Aspects of organizational sociology related to mobilization in movements and political parties as well as their consequences in discriminatory institutional regulations and practices are also not mentioned. Moreover, some of the examples related to Israel appended to the core definition can only be classified as antisemitic within context using further information, as what is described is ambiguous and occurs in complex, overlapping constellations of conflicts, which often do not readily allow singling out one specific problem such as antisemitism. An example is afforded by the so-called double standards. They are not sufficient criteria for distinguishing an antisemitic focus on Israel from one related to the specific features of Israeli policies and their geopolitical significance. As a consequence, the “Working Definition” is conducive to contradictory and error-prone application in practice and leads to assessments of incidents and facts that are not based on clear criteria but on the preconceptions of those applying it or on prevalent interpretations adopted without reflection. Applying the “Working Definition” creates the fiction of an objective assessment guided by criteria. The definition provides procedural legitimacy for decisions that are in fact taken on the basis of other criteria that remain implicit and are specified neither in the definition nor in the examples. The weaknesses of the “Working Definition” are the gateway to its political instrumentalization, for instance for morally discrediting opposing positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the accusation of antisemitism. This has relevant implications for fundamental rights. The increasing implementation of the “Working Definition” as a quasi-legal basis for administrative action promises regulatory potential. In fact, it is instead an instrument that all but invites arbitrariness. It can be used to abridge fundamental rights particularly freedom of speech with respect to disfavoured positions on Israel. In contrast to what the designation “Working Definition” suggests, no further development of the definition to rectify these weaknesses is occurring. The bottom line is that the attempt to solve problems of general conceptual clarification and universal applicability by means of the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” must be seen to have failed. Mainly due to its technical weaknesses, the deficient practice of its application, its nevertheless partly binding legal status and its potential for political instrumentalization with problematic implications for freedom of speech, the use of the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” cannot be recommended. A potential exception could only lie in narrowly defined pedagogical contexts. As the genesis of the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” and its wide dissemination indicate, there is— not least in view of the persisting threat from current antisemitism—a great need on the part of various institutions for practicable criteria for identifying antisemitic phenomena. The development of clear and context-specific instruments for practical application is therefore urgently recommended.

ResPublica, 2022

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) developed a 'Working Definition of Antisemitism' in 2016. Whilst the definition has received a significant amount of media attention, we are not aware of any comprehensive philosophical analysis. This article analyses this definition. We conclude that the definition and its list of examples ought to be rejected. The urgency to do so stems from the fact that pro-Israel activists can and have mobilised the IHRA document for political goals unrelated to tackling antisemitism, notably to stigmatise and silence critics of the Israeli government. This causes widespread self-censorship, has an adverse impact on freedom of speech, and impedes action against the unjust treatment of Palestinians. We also identify intrinsic problems in the way the definition refers to criticism of Israel similar 'to that leveled against any other country', ambiguous wording about 'the power of Jews as a collective', lack of clarity as to the Jewish people's 'right to self-determination', and its denial of obvious racism. We consider alternative definitions and prefer one like the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition, 'hostility to or prejudice against Jews', with the addition of the words 'as Jews'. We recognise that the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) can play a useful purpose in illustrating the shortcomings of the IHRA definition. However, we do not advocate promoting it as the prime international definition. Indeed, we question the efficacy of using complex new definitions to combat racism against Jews or other groups, and instead advocate combatting it through collective action across societies.

Free Speech on Israel, 2021

Reveals the diplomatic history behind a controversial international definition of antisemitism, adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016. Shows that this definition has been consequentially misrepresented by pro-Israel advocacy groups as well as senior IHRA officials. Media coverage: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/23/ihra-misrepresents-own-definition-of-anti-semitism-says-report Errata: https://jamiesternweiner.wordpress.com/2021/10/04/ihra-the-politics-of-a-definition-errata/

There have been relatively few works focusing on the denial of the Holocaust from a purely legal perspective. Examining different laws banning Holocaust denial from an internationally comparative legal perspective will be an interesting and challenging task. Even though each individual law banning Holocaust denial is nationally distinct, they all bear common ground in terms of being an infringement to freedom of speech. The inclusion and analysis of the relevant legislation in Germany and Austria would have been indispensable had this essay focussed solely on a comparison of laws banning Holocaust denial. However, this paper seeks to tackle the question as to the justification of such legislation, and not the individual merits of each law. It was therefore decided that it would be more challenging to examine issues outside of this more predictable perspective. For this reason, the analysis of state legislation against Holocaust denial will be limited to Spain and France, two countries with particularly interesting case law concerning Holocaust denial (A). By the same token the approach of countries which have not banned Holocaust denial – notably the United States and the United Kingdom will be examined (B). The spotlight will then be turned to a detailed examination of the renowned Irving v Lipstadt trial, because this case exposes the true face of Holocaust deniers and will give a better idea of whether laws are indeed necessary to ban the phenomenon of Holocaust denial (C). Laws banning Holocaust denial obviously entail an infringement of freedom of expression, but after examining legal arguments both for and against such legislation, the question this work will focus on is whether this infringement is legally justifiable (D).

2019

Journal for the Critical Study of Zionism, 2024

This article problematizes the question of antisemitism that is raised, seemingly inevitably, whenever the question of Palestine is presented in Europe and its historic settler colonies, including not least the United States. In the face of the impending U.S. legislative adoption, and presidential endorsement, of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which falsely equates criticism of Israel and Zionism with Jew-hatred and thus effectively criminalizes it, such problematization is urgently necessary for enabling us to argue clearly and unabashedly that the IHRA definition is not only aligned with Zionist political aims-that is, that its aim is to stifle sustained critical analysis of the anti-Palestinian structures and relational practices of the Israeli entity (an easy enough conclusion to draw, even as it may be contested by IHRA proponents)-but that the definition is patently incorrect, based as it is on historical mystification. Perhaps recognizing this fact, in March 2004 the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (now European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA]) rejected a similar definition of antisemitism in its Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002-2003, and in November 2023, the FRA highlighted the Council of the European Union's qualification of the IHRA definition, which it nonetheless endorsed, "that the working definition must not be used to 'stifle, or stigmatise as antisemitic, legitimate criticism of Israel and its policies…in the context of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.'" I believe furthermore that without a correct historical narrativization and in turn re-understanding of antisemitism, the necessary theorization and

Slovak Sociological Review, 2017

This article unpacks the controversy that surrounds criminal law restrictions on Holocaust denial in democracies. By applying insights from postmodernist and post-structuralist theories on amendments of criminal legislation in three Central European democracies, I aim to understand the interplay between politics and truth in introducing legal bans on Holocaust denial. Through a comparative analysis of parliamentary discourse, I demonstrate that the various justifications in favor of such bans all postulate that truth should be separated from politics. In turn, this effort to transform the Holocaust into a taboo outside of politics has consequences on the nature of its remembrance.