Making Space for God: Karma, Freedom, and Devotion in the Brahmasūtra Commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Baladeva

Andrew J. Nicholson
andrew.nicholson@stonybrook.edu
[DRAFT VERSION of article published as “Making Space for God: Karma, Freedom, and Devotion in the Brahmasūtra Commentaries of Śańkara, Rāmānuja, and Baladeva.” In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Vedānta, pp. 227-253 (ed. Ayon Maharaj). London: Bloomsbury, 2020.]

Making Space for God:
Karma, Freedom, and Devotion in the Brahmasūtra Commentaries of Śańkara, Rāmānuja, and Baladeva

Of the Vedānta school’s three foundational source-texts (prasthāna-traya), the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and the Brahmasūtras, it is the third and most recent of these texts that is also the most ambiguous in meaning. This is not surprising, since the Brahmasūtras stand out from the other two sources by their aphoristic format. Like the Yogasūtras, Nyāyasūtras, and other ancient sūtra-texts, the Brahmasūtras themselves are so extraordinarily terse as to be almost meaningless without some type of commentaryin some cases a sutra can be just one or two words. ${ }^{1}$ The Upaniṣads and Bhagavad Gītā, by contrast, are generally written in verse or prose (in some early Upaniṣads) that is syntactically complete. As varied as their possible interpretations may be, they can be read and nowadays usually are read as stand-alone texts, without reference to the Sanskrit commentarial tradition. In this chapter I will pay special attention to the Brahmasūtras (abbreviated $B S$ ), along with three commentaries on that text, by the Advaita (NonDualist) Vedāntin Śaṅkara (8th c. CE), the Viśiṣṭādvaita (Qualified Non-Dualist) Vedānta philosopher Rāmānuja (11th c. CE), and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (18th c. CE) of the Acintyabhedābheda (Paradoxical Difference and Non-Difference) school. In particular, I will examine the differing ways that these commentators understand BS 2.1.32-37, an important section that explores divine freedom, karmic justice, and human suffering. ${ }^{2}$

Among the diverse perspectives of Vedāntic commentators on the $B S$, there is general agreement that the aphoristic text teaches the existence of a personal God. The commentators designate this god by terms such as “lord” (issvara), “highest lord” (parameśvara), “creator” (sraștr), and “master” (prabhu). Commentarial accounts vary on a variety of issues concerning this god. Unlike the Bhagavad Gītā, the Brahmasūtras

themselves never describe the personal god as engaging in a loving, reciprocal relationship with his creatures, or suggest that the means to the highest state of Brahman can be attained through devotion (bhakti). The path described in the third and fourth adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtras is a textually-oriented “meditation” (upāsana), which as described by the sūtras and their early commentators does not have the strongly affective dimension of later bhakti worship. ${ }^{3}$ Following Yajñavalkya’s famous injunction in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5, commentators have often described Vedāntic meditation as having three parts: hearing (śravana), reflection (manana), and meditative absorption (nididhyāsana). ${ }^{4}$

The project of the pre-modern and early modern Vedāntic commentators was one of harmonization of the three central source-texts of Vedānta, playing down what at times seem to be central differences between the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and Brahma Sūtras. For Rāmānuja and later Vaiṣṇava philosophers, Purāṇas such as the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and Bhāgavata Purāṇa were also enormously important in shaping the ideas expressed in commentaries. However, modern historians of philosophy do not share this interpretive project of harmonization and have instead emphasized points of apparent disagreement between these many texts. For instance, Hajime Nakamura noted in his in-depth analysis of the original Brahma Sūtras that there appears to be an enormous gulf between the disengaged, limited personal god presented in Brahma Sūtras 2.1.32-37 and the god of rapturous grace presented by Vedāntic sects in the second millennium CE:
. . . the attempt to use the law of Karma to solve the problem of individual sufferings in a Brahman-created world is a special point of the philosophy of Brahma-sūtra. At the same time the Highest God was not an absolutely free

personal god, because he is dependent upon external factors for world creation. Since he merely allocates the karmic effect appropriate to the individual self, his function was that of an automaton. He is a stern god and not a god of grace; he is a god who makes possible individual action, bondage, and liberation and is the basis of all things, but merely acts as a mechanism and does not positively encourage either good or bad acts on the part of individual selves. This god merely abides (sthiti) without doing anything in particular (1.3.7), for the spiritual liberation of individual self is dependent upon the religious discipline and practice of the individual. The burning bhakti worship of later Hindu sects is not seen in the Brahma-sūtra. ${ }^{4}$

While the commentators on this text all agree that Brahmasūtras 2.1.32-37 teach some sort of personal being who has creative agency in the world, there is disagreement among them on the question of who precisely this personal being is and what his relation is to individuals in the world. The three commentators I focus on here represent three different schools of Vedānta: the Non-Dualism (Advaita) of Śaṅkara, Qualified NonDualism (Viśiṣ̣̣ādvaita) of Rāmānuja, and Paradoxical Difference and Non-Difference (Acintya-bhedābheda) of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. ${ }^{5}$ Each thinker makes reference to a personal god and to bhakti, but in distinctively different ways. Śankara argues that as knowledge alone is the means to liberation from the cycle of rebirth, devotion to a personal god can at best function as a preparation for the path of knowledge. Rāmānuja and Baladeva, by contrast, embrace the path of bhakti and understand it to be superior to knowledge as a means to liberation. They continually and emphatically critique the Advaita Vedānta system, and especially its understanding of this personal god as existing

only at the level of conventional reality (vyāvahārika-sat), not ultimate reality (pāramārthika-sat). However, Baladeva goes beyond Rāmānuja in emphatically centering his interpretation of the Brahma Sūtras on the relationship between an absolute, loving personal god and his ecstatic devotee.

Play (Līlā) and Motivated Action

Given the well-known differences between the doctrines of $B S$ commentators from the Advaita, Viśiṣ̣̣ādvaita, and Acintya-bhedābheda traditions of Vedānta, it is remarkable how often diverse thinkers agree about the basic meaning of a given sūtra. One such example is the general agreement among commentators on the Brahmasütras’ sequence of arguments at 2.1.32 to 2.1.35, where the text responds to and rejects the objections of an anti-theistic interlocutor. ${ }^{6}$ The anti-theist pūrvapakṣin first suggests that God (īsvara) cannot be the cause of the world, insofar as He lacks any reason to create. Second, the pūrvapakṣin says that if God did indeed create the world, then he must be cruel, on account of the sufferings that beings in the world experience. The Vedānta commentators had an answer to both of these objections to God’s existence. However, these answers come at a cost. In particular, the commentators’ response to the charge of cruelty leads the sūtras and some of their commentators to paint a picture of a god who appears to be different from the sort of being presented in influential and beloved works such as the Mahābhārata and the Purānas.

Commentators on $B S$ 2.1.32 present it as the anti-theistic argument of an opponent to the Vedānta school: "[He is] not [the creator] because of not having a motive. ${ }^{7}$ Anti-

theists, such as Sāṃkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas of pre-modern India, point out that in everyday life that a creator always creates out of need. The potter creates a pot, for instance, because she needs a receptacle for holding water; or perhaps she creates these beautiful ceramic objects in order to make money to feed and clothe her family. She has a motive (prayojana). God is not like a normal person, as He is by definition eternally and completely fulfilled (paripūrṇa). It would seem, therefore, that He could have no motive to create. Why doesn’t God simply exist in a quiescent, blissful state? Without a need, why do anything at all? The Vedānta Sūtra’s famous answer to this problem is that God’s creation is play (līla): “But [creation is] just play, as [we see] in the world.” As Rāmānuja explains,

The motive of brahman, whose every desire is fulfilled and who is absolutely complete, to create the world full of all sorts of sentient and insentient beings who undergo change due to his volition, is simply play. We see in the world a great king who is strong and heroic and who rules the earth with its seven continents-he engages in activities such as a ball game. His motive is nothing other than play. In just that way Brahman, whose volition alone accounts for the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world, has nothing but play as his motive. This point is not grounds for an objection. ${ }^{9}$

Here the sūtra and its subsequent commentators anthropomorphize brahman. Rāmānuja goes beyond anthropomorphism to regimorphism: he likens brahman’s play to the game of a world-conquering king whose wants and needs have already been completely fulfilled. The most common epithet among Vedānta philosophers to characterize brahman as a personal being is “lšvara.” This word is derived from the Sanskrit verbal

root vìś, meaning “to own” or "to have mastery."10 By implication, îśvara is a lord, a sovereign, or more generally someone with extraordinary power. ${ }^{11}$

The importance of comparing brahman to a human lord in the philosophical context of BS 2.1.33 is evident since, by the demands of traditional Indian logic, each syllogism must include an example. In this case, to establish that there is such a thing as a form of creative activity that is not motivated by a want or lack, we require in the third step of the five-step syllogism a worldly example (drṣ̣̣ānta) of a self-fulfilled being engaged in creative action. ${ }^{12}$ One such argument could be:

1. There exists creative activity among beings whose wants have been completely fulfilled.
2. Because some activity arises out of play.
3. As in the case of a great king playing a game with balls.
4. This is such a case.
5. Therefore it is so.

The importance of the drṣ̣̣ānta in the syllogism raises real problems for theologians in India who seek to reason about a unique being, or a being who is free from attributes. ${ }^{13}$ Without such an example, making an inference is not possible. However, because Rāmānuja believes he has established that some creative activity arises as an expression of fullness or joy, not out of a need or a lack, he suggests that his rejoinder to the anti-theist of sutra 2.1.32 is “not objectionable” (niravadya).

Baladeva, representing the Acintya-bhedābheda school of Vedānta approximately 700 years after Rāmānuja, was in full agreement with him about the persuasiveness of the Brahmasūtras’ teaching of a personal creator God. However, Baladeva rejects the

example (dṛ̣̣tānta) provided by Rāmānuja here, as well as the example provided by Śankara in his commentary. In his commentary Baladeva writes:

The Advaitins explain the words “as we see in ordinary life” by the well-known example of respiration that goes on even in deep sleep, and which is altogether involuntary and motiveless. This analogy, however, is open to the objection that the lord is subject to deep sleep and loses consciousness, as man does. The example given by the Viśistāadvaitins is that of a king who amuses himself without any motive, at the game of balls. This analogy, however, is open to the objection that playing at a game of balls is not altogether motiveless, for the king gets some pleasure by the play. ${ }^{14}$

According to Baladeva, what is wrong with deriving pleasure from play? One possibility is that such a king needs pleasure to ward off boredom. ${ }^{15}$ Paradoxically, human beings whose goals have been achieved often experience a certain kind of suffering. God does not require a diversion to pass the time or to find relief from his stressful job the way that certain rulers sometimes do, for instance, by repeatedly striking a ball with a club. The Advaitins’ example, on the other hand, is problematic because it suggests that God’s creation could be not only motiveless but also entirely unconscious. ${ }^{16}$ Respiration does not require any conscious attention to happen, and in fact, attention to respiration is the exception, not the rule. This would point not to an intelligent creator, but to an impersonal process, such as the transformation of seed into sprout or milk into curd (two examples often mentioned by the atheistic Sāṃkhya school). We require an example of an activity that is autotelic-that is, free of a goal outside of the activity itself, yet

intelligent in a way that respiration caused by the autonomic nervous system is not. In Baladeva’s judgment, neither of these examples suffices.

As an alternative, Baladeva suggests another example from everyday life that is both autotelic and intelligent:

Though all-full and desiring nothing, yet the motive which prompts the Lord towards the creation of this wonderful world is mere play (līlā) only, and has no object beneficial to him in view. As in ordinary life, men full of cheerfulness, when awakening from sound sleep, begin to dance about without any object, but from mere exuberance of spirit, such is the case with the lord. This līlā or the play of the lord is natural to him, because he is full of self-bliss. ${ }^{17}$

Remarkably, in Indian art and literature, the highest deity is often depicted as a dancer, and his or her creation as a dance. Besides the cultural or artistic reasons for this portrayal, we see here that there are also strong philosophical reasons to think of divine creation as play (līlā), and further, to think of play in terms of dance. Although it is not a normal expression to say that a person is “playing dance” (in comparison to “playing football” or “playing music”), spontaneous dance may be one of a few purely autotelic activities that intelligent agents consciously engage in. Baladeva points out that the king’s play is not genuinely autotelic, as he gets something out of this activity-namely, pleasure or diversion from the tedium of being an all-powerful king. This criticism of the Viśistādvaitin’s example is an ancient mirror of debates among contemporary analytic philosophers on the concept of play. Is play in fact autotelic? In a recent article, Stephen Schmid rejects the idea that autotelicity is a necessary condition for the activity known as “playing a game”:

…it is exceptionally difficult to think of any game or sport activity which involves the intentions of the agent to be separable from “some further purpose” … it seems that participation in games and sports for anything other than random reasons would disqualify that activity as play. In fact, it seems that even the alleged play of a dog would not be purely autotelic since such canine activities play a role in training and establishing social behaviors and, thus, serve "some further purpose."18

Very few play activities, if any, appear to meet the criterion of autotelicity, of having no end outside of themselves. Obviously, this criterion means that professional football players cannot be said to truly “play” their sport because it is their source of income. But even amateur high school athletes have reasons for playing, such as earning bragging rights or amassing social capital, that go beyond the confines of the game itself. While human beings often do engage in play activities for the love of the game itself, that love is almost always on closer analysis a mixture of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Among the few conscious creative activities that might be considered autotelic are those done spontaneously, whimsically, and privately, such as doing a jig upon waking, or singing in the shower. ${ }^{19}$ For Baladeva, these activities are expressions of fullness (characterized as “exuberance,” “joy,” or “excess of energy”), not indicative of a deficiency in the agent and a desire to achieve some further purpose. ${ }^{20}$ This is yet another reminder of how unlike God human beings are. It is also a reminder of just how hard it is to satisfy the condition of providing a worldly example (drṣṭānta) for a syllogism whose purpose is to establish the nature of İ̌vara, the sole instrumental cause of the universe.

There is yet another important metaphor commonly employed to make sense of God’s play in Hindu traditions. Like the English term “play,” “līlā” in Sanskrit and vernacular languages can refer to a theatrical performance, and the famous Rām-Līlā (“Rama Play”) and Rās-Līlā (“Circle Play [of Kṛ̣ṇa]”) performances re-enact the important episodes of each god’s life on earth, with children and young adults often playing the characters. Especially in the texts of the Śaiva Nondual philosophical tradition, it is this type of “play” that is often invoked. As Isabelle Ratié explains, … māy $\bar{a}$ is rather defined by the Śaiva nondualists as a crucial aspect of the ultimate reality-that is, the freedom of consciousness, since it is nothing but the ability of consciousness to play: cosmic creation, while being perfectly real insofar as it is a manifestation of the only reality (namely the dynamism of consciousness), is ultimately a game in which consciousness acts as if it were split into a variety of objects and subjects, just as children, while playing, remain aware that they are not really what they pretend to be. ${ }^{21}$

In spite of the apparent commonalities of the Śaiva Nondual and Nondual (Advaita) Vedānta philosophies, none of the Advaita commentators I am aware of use the examples of a child’s make-believe or the theatrical play of an actor to explain the term “līlā” as it is employed in Brahmasūtra 2.1.33. Instead, Śankara mentions a king’s play and the automatic process of inhalation and exhalation. ${ }^{22}$ In his commentary on BSB 2.1.32-37, the non-dualist Śankara operates at the level of conventional truth, following the original realist orientation of the Brahmasūtras themselves. ${ }^{23}$ In these sections he refrains from pulling back the veil to reveal that İśvara and all of the individuals who undergo transmigration are, from the highest standpoint, all just Brahman, a pure and

eternally unchanging unitary consciousness. He follows the same basic script as Rāmānuja, Baladeva, and other realist commentators who seek to show the possibility of an absolute personal god creating the world free from any motive beyond the creative act itself, despite the suffering that individual beings experience as they proceed through a sequence of rebirths in various bodies, high and low. In other sections of his commentary on the Brahmasūtras, however, Śankara reveals that īsvara’s cause-effect relation to the world is ultimately a fiction. ${ }^{24}$

Beginninglessness and the Problem of Suffering

Following the anti-theist’s argument at BS 2.1.32 about God’s apparent lack of motivation to create, and BS 2.1.33’s response that God’s activity is just play (līla $\bar{a}$ ), the anti-theist takes up a new line of attack. Sāṃkhya and Buddhist philosophers, among others, argued that the world cannot have been created by a compassionate god for the sake of others since all of transmigratory existence is characterized by suffering (duhkha). ${ }^{25}$ Given the widespread acceptance of this fact in ancient India by most philosophers, including Vedāntins, how could we ever accept this world to have been created by a loving god? Suffering (duhkha) should not exist in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and compassionate being. Yet suffering does exist. As Rāmānuja presents the opponent’s argument,

We may admit that due to his paradoxical powers, the highest person can create the world with its various sentient and insentient beings though he is different from all of them, and in spite of his being unitary and partless prior to creation.

However, if he were the creator he would be guilty of partiality since beings have high, middle, and low births; they consist of gods, humans, animals, and immobile beings. Furthermore, because beings experience the most horrible suffering, he would be guilty of cruelty. ${ }^{26}$

Suffering (duhkha) is a central problem, arguably the central problem, of the ancient philosophical schools in India. The fact of suffering is the first noble truth of Buddhism. Similarly, in the first verse of its foundational text, the Sāṃkhya school asserts that the cessation of suffering is the goal of its philosophical analysis: "due to the affliction of threefold suffering (duhkha-traya), the inquiry into its removal [begins]."27 These schools were concerned not just with an accurate depiction of the true nature of things, but beyond this with prescribing a way of life that would allow its followers to escape the painful cycle of re-birth (punarjanma) and re-death (punarmrtyu).

The opponent at BS 2.1.34 seems to have abandoned the previous objection and conceded that it is possible to conceive of a perfectly fulfilled god as having created the world. But how can we accept that god created this world? When we look around we see that some beings are millionaires, others paupers. Why wouldn’t god reward all beings equally, instead of arbitrarily picking winners and losers? Foundational texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā, portray a god who is full of love for his creation. In that case, why should any being ever experience suffering, let alone the most horrible (atighora) varieties of suffering associated with illness, war, and famine that were a daily reality for many people in first millennium India? Like the problem of evil presented by philosophers in Enlightenment Europe, the problem of suffering presents a challenge to theistic traditions

that describe the creator god as benevolent and fair, not cruel (nirghrna) and partial (visama). ${ }^{28}$

The response to this challenging argument is presented concisely beginning at $B S$ 2.1.34: "[There is] no partiality or cruelty [in Brahman], due to dependence [on karma]; for [scripture] shows it to be so. ${ }^{, 29}$ As Śankara explains in his commentary, It does not logically follow that the Lord (issvara) is guilty of partiality and cruelty. Why? It is because of his dependence (sāpekṣatva). If Īśvara alone, without any dependence, produced this unequal world, then he would be guilty of partiality and cruelty. However, as creator he is not independent (nirāpekṣa). He is dependent (sāpekṣa) as he produces the created world. On what is he dependent? We say that he is dependent on merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma). Hence the world is unequal because of the merit and demerit of the beings who are created. It is not $\overline{\mathrm{I}}$ śvara’s fault. ${ }^{30}$

Perhaps Śaṅkara’s words are surprising, but he is following the Brahma Sūtra on ascribing “accountability” or “dependence” (sāpekṣatva) to god. This is troubling because it seems to go against one of the central characteristics of the highest god, that his will is absolute. The juxtaposition of $B S 2.1 .33$ with 2.1.34 seems almost designed to create cognitive dissonance. On the one hand God’s creation is play. Play is normally characterized as being free and spontaneous-and the point of the sūtra is to argue that God is not constrained by any motive outside of the game of creation itself. ${ }^{31}$ Yet in the subsequent sūtra we are told that this creation is dependent on the prior actions of individuals. It is this that had led the Hajime Nakamura to characterize the god of the Brahma Sūtras as an "automaton … and not a god of grace.,"32

B.K. Matilal, perhaps the 20th century’s most influential interpreter of classical Indian philosophy, portrays Śankara’s commentary on BS 2.1.34 as a theodicy that attempts to solve the problem of evil by giving up the idea of an all-powerful being. Though benevolent and omniscient, this god is causally dependent (sāpekṣa), and hence not omnipotent:

The sāpekṣatva ‘dependence’ thesis which BS 2.1.34 underlines and which Śankara amplifies as God’s dependence upon the Karma of the creatures, seriously delimits, i.e. restricts God’s omnipotence, which will not be shared by any of the Biblical religions, Judaism, Christianity, or Islam … We may note here that although Fate is called Daiva (‘of gods’) sometimes in the popular literature of India, it is also recognized there that God cannot often control it or stop its operation. Thus, God is said to be more powerful than all of us but still he is not omnipotent. ${ }^{33}$

For Matilal, this view of a non-omnipotent god is not just a quirk of Śankara. It is, rather, a thread running throughout Indian religions, from the elite to the popular. This alleged lack of omnipotence of Hindu gods is also central to Matilal’s reading of the Mahābhārata. He makes the argument that Kṛṣna’s questionable behavior in the great war of the Mahābhārata is vindicated by the fact that, as he was not omnipotent, he could not by his own power stop the tragic events described in that work. ${ }^{34}$ Yet throughout the Mahābhārata and Purānas, the god called Kṛṣna or Viṣṇu is frequently called “all-doer” (sarvakartr) or “possessing all powers” (sarvaśakti). Matilal’s reading, then, suggests that such passages should not be taken literally. Although god is an extraordinarily powerful being, he is nonetheless dependent on other forces beyond his control.

A related strategy available to Advaitins to deal with the cognitive dissonance of the free, playful god at $B S 2.1 .33$ and the constrained, dependent god at $B S 2.1 .34$ is to note that Śaṅkara ultimately considers the ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '́' at position 11: \bar{I} s ̲́ v a r a of the Brahmasūtras and the Krṣṇa of the Mahābhārata to be unreal. Although he refrains from making the point here, his system depends on a two-tiered hierarchy of truths, ultimate (pāramārthika) and conventional (vyāvahārika). Advaitins may therefore be willing, or even logically compelled, to discard notions of ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '́' at position 11: \bar{I} s ̲́ v a r a 's freedom, caught up as He is in a web of conventional relationships between beings. On this reading, it is important to realize that the freedom of Brahman itself is distinct from the freedom of a personal god (issvara). In an earlier part of his commentary, during his refutation of a “difference and nondifference” (bhedābheda) interpretation of Vedānta at BS 2.1.14, Śaṅkara points out that ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '́' at position 11: \bar{I} s ̲́ v a r a is enmeshed in a web of causal relations:
[Opponent:] Brahman is manifold (ānekātmaka). As a tree has multiple branches, so brahman has multiple powers. Hence oneness (ekatva) and multiplicity (nānātva) are both true. The tree is one, but multiple with regard to its branches. The sea is one, but multiple with regard to its waves and its foam. The clay is one, but multiple with regard to pots and plates made of clay…
[Śañkara’s response:] This is incorrect because the Upaniṣad’s statement “as clay they are true” merely asserts that the cause is true, while the statement “having its origin in speech” (vācārambhaṇa) asserts that all of the effects are false…Īśvara’s being lord (issvaratva), his omniscience, and his omnipotence are such only with regard to the limiting conditions whose nature is ignorance (avidy $\bar{a}$ ). In ultimate truth (paramārthatah) the self’s true nature free of all limiting conditions is

revealed by knowledge, and the conventions of being lord, of having a lord, of omniscience, etc., do not apply to the self. ${ }^{35}$

To understand this passage it helps to recall the literal meaning of the term “lord” (issvara) itself, which derives from a verbal root meaning “to own” or "to have mastery of. ${ }^{36}$ Ownership and mastery are relational concepts, yet the Advaita Vedāntin claims that at the highest level of analysis, there are no relations, just pure undifferentiated consciousness. There is ultimately nothing for the lord (issvara) to own or master. Without his subjects and his land, the lord ceases to be a lord. Therefore the highest brahman must out of necessity be free from “lordliness” (īsvaratva). Only “brahman without qualities” (nirguṇa Brahman) is truly independent, not “brahman with qualities” (saguṇa Brahman).

The distinction between a higher and lower brahman in Advaita Vedānta is rejected by Vedāntic realists such as Rāmānuja, who attacks Advaita Vedānta forcefully and repeatedly in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras. Therefore, one might expect Rāmānuja to go further than Śankara by directly addressing the apparent discrepancy between the personal God’s playful freedom (svātantrya) and His karmic dependence (sāpekṣatva), and affirming that independence is fundamental to God’s true nature while His dependence is not. Rāmānuja does not do so. Instead, he elaborates on the nature of īsvara’s dependence by citing authoritative texts that explore His relation to other causal forces. Rāmānuja cites the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Viṣṇu Purāna, one a revealed text (śruti), the other a traditional text (smrti):

Revealed and traditional texts teach that the union of bodies-divine, human, animal, etc.-with individual selves depends on the [previous] actions of those

selves. For instance, “one who performs good acts becomes good; one who performs wicked acts becomes wicked. By a virtuous act, one becomes virtuous. By a wicked act, one becomes wicked (Bṛ. Up. 4.4.5).” In the same way the blessed one Parāśara also declares that the cause of the diversity of gods, men, animals, etc. is the previous actions of the individual selves undergoing the process of creation: “He is just the instrumental (nimitta) cause in the creation of new beings, for the primary (pradhāna) cause truly consists of the powers of those who are to be created. O greatest of ascetics, besides the instrumental [cause] nothing more is required. By its own power the being is led into existence (Viṣ. Pu. 1.4.51-52).” “Its own power” means that by its own [previous] action it is led into existence. ${ }^{37}$

This passage from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Rāmānuja’s second citation, addresses the philosophical problem at hand and makes a distinction about the precise nature of God’s causal relation to the world. In contrast to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the Viṣnu Purāna, composed in approximately the 4th c. CE, is an emphatically monotheistic text, portraying Viṣṇu as the absolute God who manifests as other gods, such as Brahmā, the god of creation. It may therefore be surprising that in this text too God’s causal agency is qualified in the verse Rāmānuja cites: Viṣṇu is not the “primary” (pradhāna) cause. ${ }^{38}$ However, this formulation is hardly unusual. According to Indian theists, God does not create out of nothing. In contrast to the Christian concept of creatio ex nihilo, theologians in India generally maintained that for an intelligent deity to create, there must also be some sort of primordial stuff for that deity to shape and form. ${ }^{39}$ In the famous metaphor

of the creation of a pot, the potter is in some sense dependent on the clay. No matter the potter’s skill, without the clay there can be no pot.

It is in this sense that Rāmānuja invokes the passage from the Viṣnu Purāna to elucidate Brahmasūtra 2.1.34, and by implication to defend God from the accusations of arbitrariness and cruelty. The stuff out of which God manifests beings’ new embodiments is their prior actions, known in the Viṣnu Purāna as latent “powers” (śaktis) of individual selves. Implicit in Brahmasūtra 2.1.34 and Viṣnu Purāna 1.4.51 is a dualistic position that accepts the reality of multiple causal factors that bring into being causal results. But there are other passages in sacred texts that suggest that a single creator can be both instrumental and material cause of the world. In another section of the revealed text Rāmānuja cited above, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the creator is famously described as being like a spider:

As a spider sends forth its thread, and as tiny sparks spring forth from a fire, so indeed do all the vital functions, all the worlds, and all beings spring from this self. Its hidden name is “the real behind the real,” for the real consists of the vital functions, and the self is the real behind the vital functions. ${ }^{40}$

The disagreements within authoritative texts on whether causes are ultimately one or many are mirrored by disagreements within Vedānta schools on this question. The Dvaita (Dualist) Vedāntin Madhva argues that causes are multiple. Baladeva disputes this position, and argues forcefully that instrumental and material causes are ultimately one, not many. Following Jīva Gosvāmin, Baladeva cites the spider analogy to suggest that this universe and all beings within it are real, and have their ultimate source in a loving, highest God creating from out of Himself. In this Baladeva is closer to Rāmānuja than

either to Śankara (who argues that from the ultimate standpoint, neither īśvara nor individuated beings are real) or to Madhva (whose doctrine of pañcabheda asserts that the difference between the instrumental cause and the material cause is real and beginningless). ${ }^{41}$ Rāmānuja does not to attempt to resolve this apparent discrepancy between multiple and unitary causality in this section of his commentary on the Brahmasūtra. Baladeva, however, going further than any previous commentator on this section, endeavors to show that the Highest God is a free and loving God, not the demiurge or automaton that the logic of the $B S 2.1 .34$ appears to demand.

Divine Love and Freedom in Baladeva’s Govinda-bhāṣya

Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja addresses the apparent discrepancy between the free, spontaneous God of Brahmasūtra 2.1.33 and the God whose activities are subordinate to or dependent (sāpekṣa) on karma, as 2.1.34 seems to suggest. The first commentary on the Brahmasūtras to acknowledge this explicitly as a problem and suggest a solution appears to have been Baladeva’s Govinda-bhāṣya (18th c. CE). ${ }^{42}$ The title of this work itself lays out the basic project of Baladeva’s commentary: to harmonize the teachings of the Brahmasūtras with a theology centered around the ecstatic devotion to Kṛ̣̣na (or Govinda), the playful, loving cowherd depicted as Highest God in the Bhāgavata Purāna. His theology is informed by many different sources, but especially Jīva Gosvāmin’s formulation of the “Paradoxical Difference and Non-Difference” (Acintyabhedābheda) school of Vedānta. ${ }^{43}$

Baladeva follows the commentators who came before him, and the language of the Brahmasūtras, in explaining the term “dependence” (sāpekṣatva): “In brahman the creator there is no flaw of partiality or cruelty. It is because of the creator’s dependence, i.e., dependence on karma.” Baladeva follows this with a quote from the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad that complicates the question of His dependence: "He makes the one whom he wants to lead up from these worlds to perform a good action, and the one whom he wants to lead down from these worlds to perform a bad action. ${ }^{344}$ This juxtaposition is striking. In spite of his “dependence,” Baladeva suggests, it is not God’s agency that is determined by another. Rather, God is the agent and the individual human is the one whose actions are ultimately determined by another. But on what basis does God decide whom “he wants to lead up” or “wants to lead down”? That is on the basis of the individual’s prior acts. Baladeva attempts to balance the idea of accountability to karma with God’s role as instrumental cause when he interprets the Kauṣitaki as saying, “this indicates that divine or demonic states of the individual selves are caused by the lord, but he takes into account (parāmrṣati) the good or bad karma of those selves.” ${ }^{45}$

Brahmasūtra 2.1.35 follows the previous sūtra’s statement of God’s “dependence” with an objection that because there was no distinction of the karma of beings prior to creation, God could have chosen to make the situations of all beings the same, and create a blissful world where none suffer. The sūtra also offers a Vedāntic response to this objection: “this is not the case, due to beginninglessness.” As we saw from the Viṣnu Purāna’s discussion of God’s creation, the idea of creatio ex nihilo was not a position seriously entertained by Vedānta philosophers or the authors of the Upaniṣads, epics, and Purānas. Like Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers,

many Indian philosophers adopted the position that the universe had no beginning. ${ }^{46}$ It follows from this, according to Brahmasūtra 2.1.35, that there could have been no time before which individual beings were already acting and creating karmic fruits. This temporal factor, combined with God’s dependence on prior karma, absolves God of partiality (vaiṣamya) and cruelty (nairghrnya). In support of this position, Baladeva cites a smrti verse that says that “Viṣnu causes people to do good or bad actions in accordance with their previous karma. There is no logical contradiction, since karma is beginningless.” ${ }^{47}$

Following this defense of beginninglessness, Baladeva’s commentary explicitly confronts the question of whether his “dependence” (sāpekṣatva) on karma logically implies that God is unfree. It is here that Baladeva finally broaches a topic that Śankara and Rāmānuja did not. Baladeva is a realist who takes the personal God to be the highest reality. He rejects any suggestion that the Brahmasūtras describe god as being unfree:

The lord’s dependence on karma does not mean that he lacks freedom (svātantrya). In verses such as “Substance, karma, and time…” traditional texts show that the existence of karma, and so forth, depends on him. And if you suggest this is a case of the maxim “Dawn at the Toll-house,” we reply that he causes action just following the natures of the beginningless individual selves. He does not make anyone act contrary to their nature. Hence we say that the lord is not unfair. ${ }^{48}$
“Dependence” on karma is not an absolute dependence that makes God a mere auxiliary cause to the absolute cause, known as karma. The verse Baladeva references here is from the Bhāgavata Purāna, the focal text of his Acintyabhedābheda tradition.

According to Bhāgavata Purāna 2.5.14, "In reality there is nothing other than and distinct from Vāsudeva, o Brahmin-not substance, karma, time, essence, or the individual self."49 Due to the dominion of Vāsudeva (also known as Kṛṣna) over all of these aspects of reality, it makes no sense to portray Him as a subordinate cause. He is, in fact, the foundation of karma itself. The subcommentary on Baladeva’s commentary called the Sūkṣma-ṭīkā says that God willingly and freely acts in accord with karma when He creates, which makes sense considering that He himself is the ultimate source of karma. ${ }^{50}$ On this interpretation, the “dependence” (sāpekṣatva) of God on karma is of a very weak sort. God is in fact free to act without regard for the being’s previous karma, but He chooses not to.

In the second half of the quote above, Baladeva references the popular maxim (nyāya) known as “Dawn at the Toll-house.” This is a parable about merchants who, in order to evade a toll, attempt to sneak by the toll-house under cover of darkness. However, at dawn they realize that their circuitous route has led them back where they started, and they are still forced to pay the toll. This point from an imagined interlocutor is that in spite of Baladeva’s best efforts, by admitting that karma is in fact an aspect of God himself, and that God’s dependence on karma is a matter of choice, He is still subject to the charges of partiality and cruelty. Baladeva counters this with reference to the beginningless essential nature (svabhāva) of each individual self-it is this that God follows, and not arbitrary or cruel whims.

Whether or not we are convinced by Baladeva’s argument that absolves God of unfairness, Baladeva adopts a view shared by many other devotionally-oriented thinkers in India: due to His absolute freedom and omnipotence, God can act preferentially in

cutting off bad karmic consequences for his devotees. Specifically, Baladeva claims elsewhere in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras that God can suspend the activity of prārabdha-karma, the type of actions that have already begun to produce karmic results. ${ }^{51}$ God does this as an act of grace toward His devotees, cutting off the link between cause and effect that governs the normal processes of karma. This understanding of God’s power over prārabdha-karma, not present in the earliest commentaries on the Brahmasūtras, was a feature of early modern thought in the Acintyabhedābheda and Śuddhādvaita Vedānta traditions, both devotionally-oriented schools of Vedāntic realism. ${ }^{52}$

After this commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.1.35, Baladeva makes a remarkable departure from precedent, attempting to balance God’s justice with God’s special relationship with his devotees as described in the Bhagavad Gītā and Bhāgavata Purāṇa. The words of Brahmasūtra 2.1.36 could, out of context, mean almost anything: "It is acceptable, and it is seen in sacred texts. ${ }^{53}$ For the commentators prior to Baladeva, the “it” functioning as subject of the sūtra is the “beginninglessness” of karma mentioned in sūtra 2.1.35. The $16^{\text {th }}$-century Bhedābheda Vedāntin Vijñānabhikṣu, for instance, follows tradition when he glosses “it is acceptable” as "the beginninglessness of karma, and so forth, ‘is acceptable’ by means of argumentation… and furthermore it ‘is seen’ in revealed and traditional texts. ${ }^{54}$ This interpretation is seemingly natural as it follows directly from the previous sūtra, a theodicy based on the beginninglessness of karma. “Due to beginninglessness” God is not culpable, since karma, and the individual selves, had no beginning in time prior to which God could have assigned them to states full of happiness and free of suffering.

However, Baladeva’s understanding of Brahmasūtra 2.1.36 is that it is the “partiality” (vaiṣamya) of God that the text considers acceptable:

The lord, who is tender toward his devotees, does indeed have “partiality,” or favoritism (paksapāta), toward them. However, such partiality is acceptable. He protects them since it is his natural power to bestow grace on beings depending on their devotion. This does not contradict declarations of his flawlessness. In fact, this partiality has been praised as a virtue; the śruti text declares, “this is the jewel among the heap of qualities.” Without such partiality toward his devotees, all his other qualities would not have been attractive, and would not have motivated beings. ${ }^{55}$

This is a remarkable reversal, since BS 2.1.34 explicitly rejects God’s partiality, as Baladeva acknowledged. Yet according to him, there is one kind of partiality that is a virtue, not a vice: the favoritism of God toward those who love Him. Furthermore, God is not only dependent on the previous karmas of individual beings. He is also, according to Baladeva, dependent (sāpekṣa) upon the devotion of worshippers. Bestowing grace upon them is His "natural power."56 Therefore, for Baladeva, “partiality” is not arbitrary, but rather natural to God, no less than His justice in following the demands of karma is a natural attribute.

The literal meaning of the final sūtra in this section of the Brahmasūtras is “because it is acceptable that all attributes are present.” For Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and other commentators, this is an uncontroversial statement of the creative power of Brahman, the absolute reality. The majority of commentators read this to mean "because it is acceptable that all attributes [required for the creation of the world] are present [in brahman]."57

Baladeva, however, following from his discussion of God’s partiality prior to this sūtra, takes the opportunity to suggest that it is not just all qualities proper for the creation of the world that exist in Brahman. He asserts that Brahman has all qualities, even those that would contradict one another if found in a normal being. Among these contradictions is God’s both following the dictates of karma and responding preferentially to His devotees: Since it has been proven that the lord of all, whose nature is paradoxical, possesses all contradictory and non-contradictory attributes, the wise consider even his favoritism toward his devotees to be a virtue. For example, he is by his very nature knowledge, yet he possesses knowledge; he is dark-hued, yet he is without form or color; he is just, yet he shows favor to his devotees. Besides his contradictory characteristics, the supreme one also has non-contradictory characteristics: he is patient, kind, and so forth … Hence it is established that although Hari is not unfair, he is kind-hearted toward his devotees. ${ }^{58}$

This, Baladeva’s final word at the end of this important section of the
Brahmasūtras, reiterates the central theological doctrine of his Acintyabhedābheda school. God’s nature is, when examined through the lens of human reason, “paradoxical” (acintya). Alessandro Graheli observes that Acintya-bhedābheda thinkers "do not negate conceivability altogether, rather they deny the possibility of conceivability by means of humanly instruments of knowledge, i.e. perception and inference . . . In short, acintyabhedābheda is the mind-boggling coexistence of two contradictory qualities in the person of God. This doctrine stands as an axiomatic key of interpretation of most tenets in Gauḍīya religion. ${ }^{559}$

Limiting Divine Power or Human Reason?

Skepticism about non-scriptural means for knowing ultimate reality abounds across the different sub-schools of Vedānta, not just Acintyabhedābheda. A repeated argument of Śańkara’s Advaita Vedānta school, for instance, is that perceptual knowledge is inferior to scriptural knowledge, and that our sense organs constantly trick us into seeing multiplicity instead of oneness. Just as a person with double vision needs medicine to fix her eye disease, the statements of non-dualism contained in the Upaniṣads are the cure of our misapprehension of the true non-dual nature of the existent (sat). Rāmānuja insists, contrary to other theists such as the Naiyāyikas, that God’s existence cannot be proven by human reason, but only by revelation. ${ }^{60}$ The “Paradoxical Difference and Non-Difference” school is the apotheosis of this tendency in Vedānta toward skepticism about the human capacity to know God. While Rāmānuja and many other theistic commentators on $B S 2.1 .32-37$ are silent on the apparent incommensurability of God’s justice and God’s grace, Baladeva revels in this paradox. He calls special attention to it by departing from the received interpretations of Brahmasūtra 2.1.36 and 2.1.37. Instead of beginninglessness, it is God’s partiality that “is acceptable,” and is actually an occasion to rejoice, not to lament. God does not just possess all qualities logically necessary for creation. Rather, He possesses all qualities whatsoever, defying the dictates of reason (anumāna) and perception (pratyakṣa). Baladeva’s attitudes may call to mind those of certain western thinkers such as Kierkegaard, who stress the suprarational, affective and even absurd aspects of the relationship between the human and the divine. ${ }^{61}$

Taking a long view of the intellectual arc of Brahmasūtra commentaries stretching from the 8th to the 17th centuries, it appears that no commentator addresses the discrepancy between the freedom (svātantrya) of God in His creative play and His dependence (sāpekṣatva) on karma. Perhaps Śankara, who understood God’s freedom to be conventionally real but ultimately false, saw no great need to address this problem. But beginning with the realist Vedāntin Bhāskara, up through influential commentaries by Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, and Vijñānabhikṣu, it is remarkable that none chose to address this problem prior to Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa in the early modern period. Baladeva’s commentary represents a break from earlier traditions in numerous ways. One of these is his willingness to put bhakti decisively and emphatically at the center of the Brahmasūtras, even in places where earlier Vaiṣṇavas such as Rāmānuja did not. Baladeva does not just take up and defend the reality of God’s absolute freedom in light of His apparent dependence on karma. He also reads against the literal meaning of the text, creating a space for a devotional and perhaps even antinomian path to god. While conditionally accepting the rejection of God’s partiality at BSB 2.1.34, he goes on to argue for a certain kind of partiality of God toward His devotees as praiseworthy, not blameworthy. Could this reversal of commentarial tradition be evidence of a distinctively “modern” attitude that earlier Vedāntins did not share? ${ }^{62}$

19th and 20th century readers of this section of the Brahmasūtras tended to adopt one of two general strategies to resolve the aporia of a god who is both dependent (sāpekṣa) on karma and absolutely free. The first is to state outright that the isśvara presented in the Brahmasūtras is limited. ${ }^{63}$ Nakamura characterizes this as the position of the author(s) of the Brahmasūtras themselves: ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '̌' at position 11: \bar{i} s ̲̌ v a r a is a subordinate cause, unfree and

fully under the sway of prior karmic causes. Bimal Matilal similarly ascribes the position to Śankara that God is not omnipotent, even making the broader claim that the Indian traditions of theism in general, unlike the Abrahamic traditions, are willing to limit God’s power in significant ways. If true, this would suggest that Kṛ̣ṇa in the Mahābhārata is no more accountable for the general suffering of beings than Zeus or Odin might be in the Greek and Norse pantheons. All three gods are extraordinarily powerful, yet limited in important ways. If $i$ švara is limited, it is worth asking why he was introduced into the Brahmasūtra at all. As atheist Sāṃkhya philosophers point out, with karma as a primary cause, it is unnecessary to posit the existence of God. It is quite possible to construct a systematic reading of the Upaniṣads that presents the impersonal principle called brahman as the unitary source of creation, without the philosophical complications of introducing a demiurge or majestic personal god into its cosmogony as a subordinate cause. Yet all extant commentaries on the Brahmasūtras make reference to a personal God. ${ }^{64}$

An approach among some modern religious thinkers, including A.C.
Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada and Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, has been to follow the same path as Baladeva in emphatically affirming the omnipotence of the God of Vedānta. ${ }^{65}$ Baladeva rejects the idea that God could be limited in any meaningful way, and points to the Bhāgavata Purāna’s depiction of Kṛ̣ṇa to argue that as karma is an aspect of the highest personal God, it makes no sense to describe Him as dependent on it. Baladeva futher argues that not only is God not subordinate to karma, but He is also the only causal agent. All other agents, including individual human beings, should properly be understood as instruments through which God exercises His will. Baladeva’s

theological determinism is conjoined with a form of skeptical theism shared with other thinkers in the Vedānta tradition of Acintya-bhedābheda. He employs this to make sense of what Nakamura considered impossible for the God of the Brahmasūtras: offering preferential treatment toward those who have entered into a loving relationship with Him. To this end, Baladeva reiterates his Vedāntic sub-school’s understanding of the inadequacy of human faculties of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) in the face of God’s superhuman, paradoxical reality. God’s creation may appear to us as unjust, and indeed God may at times suspend the normal workings of karma for individuals whom he prefers. Baladeva’s understanding, however, is fully in keeping with depictions of the loving God described in the epics and Purānas. If those depictions offend human reason, the defect is not in God, but in the human capacity to understand the truth expressed in these texts.

Skeptical theism has been adopted as a philosophical position by many figures in western and Asian religious traditions to counter the argument from evil against God’s existence. One thinker who showed such tendencies was Sri Ramakrishna, the 19th century Bengali saint and mystic. In the words of Sri Ramakrishna,

Can we ever understand God’s ways? I too think of God sometimes as good and sometimes as bad. She has kept us deluded by her Mahāmāya $\bar{a}$. Sometimes She wakes us up and sometimes She keeps us unconscious. . . . One is aware of pleasure and pain, birth and death, disease and grief, as long as one is identified with the body. . . . After the death of the body, perhaps God carries one to a better place. It is like the birth of a child after the pain of delivery. Attaining knowledge of the Ātman, one looks on pleasure and pain, birth and death, as a dream. How little we understand! Can a one-seer pot hold ten seers of milk? ${ }^{67}$

While Sri Ramakrishna’s characterization of the absolute being as a female and the emphasis on her delusory power ( $m \bar{a} y \bar{a}$ ) is not found in Baladeva’s

Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta, in his characterization of human understanding as like "a

one-seer pot" Ramakrishna shares Baladeva’s skepticism about humans’ cognitive abilities to understand God. These two thinkers also share a strong theological determinism that leads them to deny that human agency is real.

The skeptical theist response to the problem of suffering presented by Baladeva and Sri Ramakrishna is an internally consistent way of dealing with the problem of suffering as presented by traditional atheists in India. It is such a strong position, however, that it may lead to other conclusions that many would consider problematic or even dangerous. Most versions of skeptical theism implicitly or explicitly draw from an a consequentialist ethical position, suggesting that states of affairs in the world may seem less than optimal, but if normal humans had a God’s eye view to see all the causal ramifications of present sufferings, we would see a higher ethical logic at work-in this we are each in a situation analogous to that of a small child who cannot understand why his father takes him to the doctor’s office to inflict the suffering of a vaccine on him, not understanding the father’s purposes in inflicting a small amount of suffering in order to avoid much greater suffering in the future. ${ }^{68}$

Following this line of reasoning to its full implications, however, arguably leads to a form of extreme moral skepticism that few people, religious or otherwise, would be comfortable with. For any apparent evil or suffering in the world, including war, torture, or genocide, the skeptical theist says there is a greater plan beyond our grasp. This can lead to a potential ethical quietism or paralysis in the face of the limitations of human reason. In the words of Stephen Maitzen,

There is. . . a type of belief we can expect theists to possess and nontheists to lack that also undermines the moral obligation to intervene in cases of horrific evil: the belief the someone exists who can make this suffering turn out for the sufferer’s best even if I do not intervene. Given the badness of severe suffering, why do we

not feel obligated to prevent children from ever undergoing painful rabies vaccinations? Because we are confident that sometimes severe suffering will turn out for the sufferer’s best. Suppose we believe, as many theists do, that someone exists who can always make suffering turn out for the sufferer’s best. . . We ought, I submit, to feel less obligated to prevent and relieve suffering than we would if we did not believe in such a potential guarantor of a good outcome . . one might counter that God makes us witness current or imminent suffering because God wants us to reduce or prevent it, but skeptical theism denies us any confidence in drawing that conclusion. ${ }^{69}$

In the Indian context, the combination of skepticism about human knowledge and consequentialist ethics can lead to a rejection of humans’ ability to differentiate dharma from adharma. One such example of radical moral skepticism appears in a teaching Krṣṇa delivers to Arjuna in the Mahābhārata, the parable of the hunter Balāka. Balāka kills a blind and helpless animal while it is drinking water, a fairly clear violation of his dharma as a hunter. Balāka nonetheless earns heaven for reasons he could not have himself foreseen: “As soon as that blind creature had been killed, a shower of flowers fell from the sky. . . that creature had endured austerity and earned a boon to annihilate all living things, so Svayambhu had made it blind.” Kṛ̣ṇa concludes, "in this matter dharma is very difficult to understand."70

The implication of this teaching is not just that one should attend to the consequences of one’s actions. It is, rather, that a finite human intelligence can never be wholly aware of the full merit contained in an apparently blameworthy act, or the full demerit contained in an apparently praiseworthy act. Only a god or omniscient sage who possesses full knowledge of all past and future karmic causes and conditions can be certain of the goodness or badness of a given act. This is an extremely troubling state of affairs for those of us who lack such omniscience. Even if we take the moral of this story to be that we should follow divine injunctions rather than our own limited powers of

reason, God’s commands are notoriously complicated: for instance, Jews have historically insisted that God demands his followers circumcise themselves and abstain from eating shellfish, while Christians understand such commands to have been superseded. ${ }^{71}$ The situation becomes even more complicated in the case of Hinduism, where there is not just one God issuing commands and one holy book, but many divine beings and holy texts, often issuing directly contradictory directions. ${ }^{72}$ For the majority of worshippers who, unlike Arjuna, do not have a divine friend to guide them in teasing out the messy and tangled consequences of their actions, they will have to rely on their own faculties of ethical reasoning to determine which divine command is relevant to their specific situation.

Such conundrums resulting from moral skepticism, however, take us well beyond the Brahmasūtras. ${ }^{73}$ There is little hint in the text itself or in its earliest commentaries of a skeptical theist or bhakti-oriented position on the nature of God, as Hajime Nakamura has noted. Bimal Matilal’s understanding of the Brahmasūtras and Śankara’s commentary as presenting a powerful though non-omnipotent ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '̄' at position 11: \bar{i} s ̲̄ v a r a is therefore a reasonable interpretation. Yet there is strong evidence throughout the Purānas and epics of another conception of God, an omnipotent personal God whom the Bhāgavata Purāna describes as encompassing "substance, karma, time, essence, and the individual self."77 Furthermore, the philosophies of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Sri Ramakrishna are emphatic evidence to disprove the argument that "in India . . . the attribute of omnipotence was never seriously emphasized."78 They are also a general reminder that in the vast ocean of Indian intellectual traditions, it can be dangerous to suggest that any given philosophical view cannot be found. ${ }^{79}$ Use of the term ParseError: KaTeX parse error: Expected 'EOF', got '̄' at position 11: \bar{i} s ̲̄ v a r a to denote a non-

omnipotent God does seem to be a characteristic of some texts, including the Brahmasūtras and Yogasūtras. ${ }^{80}$ Faced with the choice between Śańkara diminishing God’s power or Baladeva diminishing the human ability to reason about God and world, most contemporary philosophers would follow Matilal in rejecting a position such as Baladeva’s that casts doubt on the power of human reason to understand God and dharma. However, committed devotees will side with Baladeva in emphasizing God’s love in spite of the apparent contradiction between God’s partiality and impersonal karmic justice.

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Vidyābhavana.
${ }^{1}$ Examples of the sūtras’ extreme brevity include BS 2.3.2, “But it is” (asti tu) and BS 2.3.11, “Water” (āpah). In spite of the obvious challenges, scholars of Vedānta have attempted to reconstruct the basic doctrines of the Brahmasūtras based on a systematic comparison of similarities and differences between early commentaries on the text. Notable examples include Ghate (1926), Nakamura (1983), and Uskokov (2018). The consensus among these scholars is that the text presented a type of realist Bhedābheda (Difference and Identity) doctrine. However, later commentaries by Bhedābhedavādins such as Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Vijñānabhikṣu contain innovations that went far beyond the type of early Bhedābheda presented in the Brahmasūtras.
${ }^{2}$ Other valuable examinations of the philosophical and theological issues raised in $B S$ 2.1.32-37 and the commentaries by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja include Herman (1976: 26486), Clooney (1989), Matilal (1992), Bilimoria (2013: 288-94), and Maharaj (2018: 24180). To the best of my knowledge there are no English-language works exploring how Baladeva’s interpretation deals with the aporias from Śaṅkara’s and Rāmānuja’s commentaries on these sūtras. This is one of my main projects in this chapter.
${ }^{3}$ Bhagavad Gītā 14.26-27, among other verses, describes the path of bhakti which leads to the highest state of brahman: “One who serves me with bhakti-yoga, unwavering, transcends the gunas and is prepared to become brahman. For I am the foundation of brahman, immortal and unchanging, of eternal dharma, and of absolute bliss.” The Brahmasūtras, by contrast, present a path described as vidy $\bar{a}$ (“knowledge”) and glossed with terms such as upāsana, dhyāna, and bhāvanā by early commentators. Uskokov (2018: 188-209) describes upāsana as a type of meditative exercise based on the Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and Taittirīya Upaniṣads. Rāmānuja and later bhaktioriented commentators do understand upāsana explictly in terms of bhakti, but such interpretations of the practice-oriented sections such as BS 4.1.1-12 are beyond the scope of this chapter. On the meaning of upāsana in early Vedānta, see also Nakamura (2004: 734-55).
${ }^{4}$ Yajñavalkya addresses the female sage Maitreyī at BS 2.4.5: “You see, Maitreyī-it is one’s self which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one’s self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one’s self, one gains knowledge of this whole world.” ātmā vā are drastavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi. ātmano vā are darśanena śravanena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam (trans. in Olivelle 1998: 69).

${ }^{4}$ Nakamura (1983: 496).
${ }^{5}$ I follow Graheli (2007) in using the translation “Paradoxical Difference and NonDifference” rather than the more literal “Inconceivable Difference and Non-Difference” in the name of this school of Vedānta. For more on this topic, see Ravi Gupta’s chapter in this volume.
${ }^{6}$ While the interlocutor is not identified in the text, it presents arguments against god’s existence that were familiar from the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya schools. Both of these schools predated Vedānta.
${ }^{7}$ na prayojanavattvāt (BS 2.1.32, in Karmarkar 1962: 639).
${ }^{8}$ lokavat tu līlākaivalyam (BS 2.1.33, in Karmarkar 1962: 640). Arthur Herman has argued that in fact the Brahmasūtras’ entire line of argument based on “play” misses a central point: “God is not responsible for the purposes in līlā, for supposedly there are none, but He is surely responsible for the act that brings līlā into existence . . . The Vedāntists have mistaken the description of līlā for a justification of līlā” (Herman 1976: 268-9).
${ }^{9}$ avāptasamastakāmasya paripūrṇasya
svasaṃkalpavikāryavividhacidacinmiśrajagatsarge līlaiva kevalā prayojanam. lokavat. yathā loke saptadvīpāṃ medinīm adhitiṣṭhatah saṃpūrṇaśauryavīryaparākamasyāpi mahārājasya kevalalīlaikaprayojanāh kandukādyārambhā drśyate tathaiva parasyāpi brahmaṇah svasaṃkalpamātrāvaklptajagajjanmasthitidhvaṃsāder līlaiva prayojanam iti niravadyam (comm. on BS 2.1.33, in Karmarkar 1962: 640).
${ }^{10}$ Monier-Williams 1995: 171.
${ }^{11}$ In the medieval period in India, the epithet īśvara (Lord) or maheśvara (Great Lord) was often applied not only to the god Śiva, but also to yogis who acquired supernormal powers through their one-pointed meditation on him. However, in many philosophical works, such as early commentaries on the Yogasūtras, there is no implication that Śiva is the god meant by the term “Īśvara.” (See Nicholson 2010: 12-20.)
${ }^{12}$ The model provided by the Nyāya school for the 5 -step syllogism establishes that there is fire on a hill: 1 . There is fire on the hill; 2 . Because there is smoke; 3 . As in a kitchen; 4. This is such a case; 5. Therefore it is so (see Matilal 1998: 4-7.)
${ }^{13}$ The latter point is especially an issue in critiques of the Advaita Vedānta system, as Advaita claims that the ultimate truth about brahman is that it is without qualities (nirguṇa). Other schools of Vedānta point out that nirguṇa brahman could neither be the object of perception (pratyaksa), nor could it be established by logical reasoning (anumāna).
${ }^{14}$ This is S.C. Vasu’s rendering, with minor edits, of Baladeva’s terse dismissal of previous Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita commentaries on this sūtra (Vasu 1912: 267). ucchravāsapraśvāsadṛ̣̣̣̣ānte 'pi suṣuptyādau tadāpatteh. rājadṛ̣̣̣āntas tu tattat krī̄̄āsambhūtasya sukhasya phalatvān nopāttah (Dasa 1965: 110).
${ }^{15}$ I thank students in a philosophy seminar at Stony Brook University for this suggestion, which is not explicitly stated in any Sanskrit commentary I am aware of.
${ }^{16}$ Śaṅkara’s example of respiration during deep sleep as a type of līlā is in his commentary on BS 2.1.33: " $\ldots$ or just as inhalation, exhalation, and so forth occur without any aim outside of themselves, just following their own nature. . ." … yath $\bar{a}$ cocchvāsapraśvāsādayo 'nabhisaṃdhāya bāhyaṃ kiṃcitprayojanaṃ svabhāvād eva sambhavanti… (Yogīndrānanda 1995: 610).

${ }^{17}$ Translation by S.C. Vasu (Vasu 1912: 266). paripūrṇasyāpi vicitrasṛ̣̣tau pravṛttir līlaiva kevalā na tu svaphalānusandhipūrvikā. atra dṛ̣̣tānto loketi. ṣaṣthyantātvatih. lokasya sukhonmattasya sukhodrekāt phalanirapekṣā nṛtyādilīlā dṛsyate tatheśvarasya. tasmāt svarūpānandasvābhāvikyeva līlā (Dasa 1965: 110). The specific detail mentioned by Vasu of the dancer having just woken from a deep sleep comes from the subcommentary on Baladeva’s work called Sükṣma-Țīkā. On the question of the authorship of this sub-commentary, and whether it is Baladeva’s own autocommentary, see Dasgupta (1922: 269-70).
${ }^{18}$ Schmid (2011: 154-8).
${ }^{19}$ On some interpretations even these activities, to the extent that it is physically pleasurable to dance or sing, might not be considered autotelic. This points to ambiguities in the definition of the word “autotelic” used by Bernard Suits and other philosophers (See Schmid 2011: 155-8). Suits develops a theory of “lusory attitude” which he claims allows the definition of game-playing to apply to professionals no less than to amateurs (see Suits 2014: 154-60), but does claim that some types of human activity are autotelic. ${ }^{20}$ Baladeva also cites a potentially unflattering verse from the Nārāyaṇa Saṃhitā that suggests that Viṣṇu’s creative activity is “like the dancing of a drunkard” (yathā mattasya nartanam). Baladeva insists that this simply means that god’s creation is autotelic, not that it is unconscious or disordered (Dasa 1965: 110).
${ }^{21}$ Ratié (2017: 451).
${ }^{22}$ See note 16 .
${ }^{23}$ On the realism of the Brahmasūtras, see Nicholson (2010: 26-8) and Nakamura (1989: 500).
${ }^{24}$ Lance Nelson remarks that for Śaṅkara, “from the point of view of liberation original word? [īsvara] is dependent on the world, just as the space limited by pots and jars is, for its existence as such, dependent on those vessels … This kind of thinking … [seems] to remove Deity from the sphere of final truth in a way that a true theist could not tolerate. Advaitic theism emerges as, so to say, a kind of transtheism” (Nelson 2007: 314).
${ }^{25}$ According to Aniruddha’s commentary on Sāṃkhya Sūtra 5.2, “we know from experience that all activity is either self-interested or for the sake of another. But Íśvara has no self-interested motives. Suppose his activity were for the sake of others. Then it would impossible that the created world, which consists of suffering (duhkha), could be ascribed to him, since he is compassionate” (my translation from Garbe 1888: 180).
${ }^{26}$ yady api paramapuruṣasya sakaletaracidacidvastuvilakṣanasya acintyaśaktiyogāt, prāksṛ̣̣ter ekasya niravayavasyāpi vicitracidacinmiśrajagatsṛ̣̣tih saṃbhāvyeta, tathāpi devatiryaṅmanuśyasthāvarātmanā, utkṛ̣̣tamadhyamāpakrṣ̣tasṛ̣̣tyā paksapātah prasajyeta. atighoraduhkhayogakaraṇāt nairghṛ̣yaṃ cāvarjanīyam iti (comm. on BS 2.1.34, in Karmarkar 1962: 640).
${ }^{27}$ See Sāṃkhya Kārikā 1 in Larson (1998: 255). “Threefold” refers to the Sāṃkhya division of suffering into three kinds: 1 . originating from oneself (ādhyātmika), 2. originating from other beings in the human and animal worlds (ādhibhautika), and 3. originating from the gods and other superhuman forces (ādhidaivika).
${ }^{28}$ Though David Hume ([1779] 1998: 63) attributed to Epicurus an argument against the existence of God from the existence of evil in the world, this was probably not Epicurus’s actual view. There were arguments against God’s existence on the basis of evil in the premodern west, but they were not as pervasive as the arguments on the basis of suffering

advanced by atheists in classical India. On Epicurus and classical European atheism, see Whitmarsh (2016: 109-10, 173-85). Contemporary philosophers distinguish the logical problem of evil from the evidential problem of evil, a distinction not made in these ancient debates (see Maharaj 2018: 241-2).
${ }^{29}$ vaiṣamyanairghrnye na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati (BS 2.1.34, in Karmarkar 1962: 640).
${ }^{30}$ vaiṣamyanairghrnye neśvarasya prasajyete. kasmāt. sāpekṣatvāt. yadi hi nirapekṣah kevala īśvaro viṣamāṃ sṛ̣̣tiṃ nirmimīte syātām etau doṣau vaiṣamyaṃ nairghrnyaṃ ca. na tu nirapekṣasya nirmātṛtvam asti. sāpekṣo hīśvaro viṣamāṃ sṛ̣̣tiṃ nirmimīte. kim apekṣata iti cet. dharmādharmāvapekṣata iti vadāmah. atah sṛ̣yamānaprāṇidharmādharmāpekṣā viṣamā sṛ̣̣̣tir iti nāyam īśvarasyāparādhaḥ (Śaṅkara’s comm. on BS 2.1.34, in Yogīndrānanda 1995: 612-3).
${ }^{31}$ One way to address this problem is to suggest that as a player in a game, God willingly takes on arbitrary rules that limit His actions within that game. This calls to mind Bernard Suits’ definition of playing a game: “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014: 43). But in that case, why would a compassionate God choose a game that involves enormous suffering? Wouldn’t another game with less horrible rules be preferable?
${ }^{32}$ Nakamura (1983:496).
${ }^{33}$ Matilal 1992: 368-9, 373.
${ }^{34}$ Matilal (2002: 100).
${ }^{35}$ nanv anekātmakaṃ brahma yathā vṛkṣo 'nekaśākha evam anekaśaktipravṛttiyuktaṃ brahma. ata ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cobhayam api satyam eva. yathā vṛkṣa ity anekatvaṃ śākhā iti nānātvam. yathāca samudrātmanaikatvaṃ phenataranigādyātmanā nānātvam. yathāca mṛdātmanaikatvaṃ ghaṭaśarāvādyātmanā nānātvam … naivaṃ syāt. mṛttikety eva satyam iti prakṛtimātrasya dṝ̣̣̣ānte satyatvāvadhāraṇāt. vācārambhaṇaśabdena ca vikārajātasyānṛtatvābhidhānāt… avidyātmakopādhiparicchedāpekṣam eveśvarasyeśvaratvaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ sarvaśaktitvaṃ ca na paramārthato vidyayāpāstasarvopādhisvarūpa ātmanīśitrīśitavyasarvajñatvādivyavahāra upapadyate. (Śaṅkara’s comm. on BS 2.1.14, in Yogīndrānanda 1995: 572-3).
${ }^{36}$ Monier-Williams 1995: 171.
${ }^{37}$ devādīnāṃ kṣetrajñānāṃ devādiśarīrayogaṃ tattatkarmasāpekṣaṃ darśayanti hi śrutismṛtayaḥ sādhukārī sādhurbhavati pāpakārī pāpo bhavati puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā tathā bhagavatā parāśarenāpi devādivaicitryahetuḥ sṛ̣̣yamānānāṃ kṣetrajñānāṃ pracīnakarmaśaktir evety uktam nimittamātram evāsau sṛ̣̣yānāṃ sargakarmaṇi. pradhānakāraṇībhūtā yato vai sṛ̣yaśaktayaḥ. nimittamātraṃ muktvaikaṃ nānyat kiṃcid apekṣyate. nīyate tapatāṃ śreṣtha svaśaktyā vastu vastutām. iti svaśaktyā svakarmaṇaiva devādivastutā prātir iti. (Rāmānuja’s comm. on BS 2.1.34, in Karmarkar 1962: 641).
${ }^{38}$ The term pradhāna is commonly used in Sāṃkhya to refer to prakrti in its “primary” or “primordial” state-it is the material (upādāna) cause out of which the world is formed. In the Purānas these Sāṃkhya concepts are often adapted to fit into a larger theistic cosmology.
${ }^{39}$ While the position that God requires a material cause was almost unanimous, there may been exceptions. For instance, the Kashmir Śaiva philosopher Utpaladeva wrote,

“The Lord. . . must manifest externally the totality of objects . . . without a material cause” (Ratié 2010: 460).
${ }^{40}$ sa yathorṇavābhis tantunoccared yathāgneh kṣudrā visphulingā vyuccaranty evam evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prānāh sarve lokāh sarve devāh sarvāni bhūtāni vyuccaranti. tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti. prānā vai satyaṃ teṣām eṣa satyam (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.1.20, trans. in Olivelle 1998: 63-5). The spider metaphor also occurs at Munḍaka Upaniṣad 1.7 and in numerous Purānas (e.g., Bhāgavata Purāna 2.9.28). For the significance of the spider metaphor in Baladeva’s thought, see Okita (2014: 200-4). David Hume knew, and mocked, this theological metaphor from India (Hume [1779] 1998: 48).
${ }^{41}$ See Okita (2014: 131-2).
${ }^{42}$ Francis X. Clooney attributes to Vācaspati Miśra, author of the Bhāmatī subcommentary (9th c. CE) on Śañkara’s Brahmasūtraḅhāṣya, an argument that “when a great king chooses to reward or punish subjects based on their behavior, this restraint on his exercise of power does not diminish him” (Clooney 1989: 536). However, careful attention to the passage in question suggests that Vācaspati addresses a slightly different problem. He is concerned not with god’s freedom, but specifically with whether God can be accused of being unjust simply for punishing some people according to their prior behavior. Vācaspati also seems to suggest that God is not unjust in giving preference to those who are devoted to Him. Like other commentators, Vācaspati uses the analogy of a king: “A worldly lord is propitiated by acts of devotion originating from extraordinary faith, consisting of praise in the form of gifts, service, prostrations, salutations, and praise. Pleased, he gives rewards to the one who properly honors him. On the other hand, when opposed, he gives that which is undesirable to the person opposing him with offenses. This is well-accepted.” laukikaś ceśvaro
dānaparicaraṇapraṇāmāñjalikaraṇastutimayībhir atiśraddhāgarbhābhir bhaktibhir ārādhitah prasannaḥ svānurūpam ārādhakāya phalaṃ prayacchati virodhataś cāpakriyābhir virodhakāyāhitām ity api suprasiddham (Vācaspati’s comm. on 3.2.41, in Yogīndrānanda 1995: 970).
${ }^{43}$ For more on Baladeva’s influences, see Okita (2014: 59-60) and Buchta (2016: 32-3). Okita argues that despite Baladeva’s debts to Madhva, he is ultimately closer to the philosophy of Jīva Gosvāmin.
${ }^{44}$ eṣa eva sādhukarma kārayati taṃ yamebhyo lokebhya unninīṣate. eṣa evāsādhu karma kārayati yam adho ninīyate (Kauṣītaki Up. 3.8; Olivelle 1998: 354). This is cited in Baladeva’s commentary on BSB 2.1.3, although Baladeva attributes this quote to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Dasa 1965: 111). Surendranath Dasgupta, summarizing Baladeva’s position on human agency, states that the “jīvas too have no independence in themselves; they are created by God, by His mere will, and having created the world and the jīvas. He entered into them and remained as their inner controller … The spontaneous desire and will that is found in man is also an expression of God’s will operating through man; thus man is as much subject to necessity as the world, and there is no freedom in man” (Dasgupta 1922: 444). Baladeva’s understanding of God as the only true cause has affinities with Nicolas Malebranche’s “occasionalism.”
${ }^{45}$ kṣetrajñānāṃ devādibhāvaprāptim īśvaranimittāṃ darśayantī madhye karma parāmrśatīty arthah (Dasa 1965: 111). David Buchta has helped me make sense of this ungrammatical passage in Baladeva’s commentary.

${ }^{46}$ On the theme of beginninglessness in Indian and Greek philosophy, see Nicholson (2017: 609-13).
${ }^{47}$ puṇyapāpādikaṃ viṣṇuh kārayet pūrvakarmanā. anāditvāt karmaṇaś ca na virodhaḥ kathaṃ cana (Dasa 1965: 111). Baladeva’s quote here is of questionable provenance. He likely took the quote from Madhva, who in his commentary on BS 2.1.16 cites this verse and identifies it as from the Bhavisya Purāna. However, this quote does not appear in any known edition or manuscript of that text, and may have been manufactured by Madhva himself (see Mesquita 2007: 58). I am grateful to Johannes Bronkhorst (private communication) for pointing this out.
${ }^{48}$ na ca karmasāpekṣatveneśvarasyāsvātantryam. dravyaṃ karma ca kālaś cetyādinā karmādisattāyās tadadhīnatvasmaranāat. ca ghaṭtakudyāṃ prabhātam iti vācyam anādijīvasvabhāvānusāreṇa hi karma kārayati svabhāvam anyathā kartuṃ samartho 'pi kasyāpi na karotīty aviṣamo bhanyate (Dasa 1965: 111).
${ }^{49}$ dravyaṃ karma ca kālaś ca svabhāvo jīva eva ca. vāsudevāt paro brahman na cānyo 'rtho 'sti tattvatah (Goswami 2006: 104). This is my translation of Bhāgavata Purāna verse 2.5.14.
${ }^{50}$ See Vasu (1912: 269-70) for a translation of the Sūkṣma-Ṭīk $\bar{a}$ on this section. The argument presented in this subcommentary for God’s freedom in spite of his “dependence” on karma is remarkably similar to the position Clooney (1989: 536) imputes to Vācaspati Miśra.
${ }^{51}$ On the different types of karma (prārabdha, samcita, and anāgata) see Nicholson (2010: 114).
${ }^{52}$ These arguments are in Baladeva’s commentary on Brahmasūtra 4.1.13-19. On the Gauḍīya and Puṣtimārga arguments for God’s ability to cut off prārabdha-karma, see Buchta (2016). As Buchta notes, these arguments were not present in the two earliest commentaries on the Brahmasūtra by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara (Buchta 2016: 30). The earlier position that prārabdha-karma cannot be avoided is often based on an interpretation of Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.14.2: “There is a delay here for me here only until I am freed; but then I will arrive” (Olivelle 1998: 257).
${ }^{53}$ upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate (Yogīndrānanda 1995: 615).
${ }^{54}$ karmādīnām anāditvaṃ yuktyā 'py upapadyate … tathā upalabhyate ca śrutiśmṛtibhyaḥ … (Vijñānabhikṣu’s comm. on BS 2.1.36 in Tripāṭhī 1979: 162).
${ }^{55}$ bhaktavatsalasyāsya prabhos tatpakṣapāto vaiṣamyam eva tad upapadyate sidhyati. tadrakṣanādeh svarūpaśaktivrttibhūtabhaktisāpekṣatvāt. na ca nirdoṣatāvādivākyavyākopaḥ. tadrūpasya vaiṣamyasya gunatvena stūyamānatvāt. “guṇavṛndamanḍanam idam” ity api śrutir āha. yadvinā sarve gunāh janebhyo 'rocamānāh pravartakā na syuh (Dasa 1965: 112).
${ }^{56}$ On the concept of “natural power” (svarūpaśakti) in Baladeva’s thought, see Okita (2014: 89-90).
${ }^{57}$ Rāmānuja, for instance, offers only one sentence in his commentary on this sūtra: pradhānaparamāṇvādīnāṃ kāraṇatve yaddharmavaikalyam ukta vaksyamānaṃ ca tasya sarvasya dharmajātasya kāraṇatvopapādino brahmany upapatteś ca brahmaiva jagatkāraṇam iti sthitam (Karmakar 1962: 643).
${ }^{58}$ avicintyasvarūpe sarveśvare sarveṣāṃ viruddhānām aviruddhānāṃ ca dharmānām upapatteḥ siddheś ca bhaktapakṣapāto 'pi guṇaḥ sujñair āstheya eva. yathā jñānātmako jñānavān syāmaś caivam aviṣamo bhaktapreyānityādayo mitho viruddhāh

kṣāntyārjavādayo 'viruddhāś ca parasminn eva santi … tathā cāviṣamo 'pi harir bhaktasuhrd iti siddham (Dasa 1965: 112-3).
${ }^{59}$ Graheli (2007: 184). Also see Ravi Gupta’s chapter on the Acintyabhedābheda thinker Jīva Gosvāmin in this volume.
${ }^{60}$ In his commentary on 2.1.34, Rāmānuja also employs the term acintya (“paradoxical” or “inconceivable”) to describe God’s powers: “We may admit that due to his inconceivable powers, the Highest Person can create the world with its various sentient and insentient beings…” (my translation from Karmarkar 1962: 640). Here the more literal translation, “inconceivable,” may be preferable, as Rāmānuja uses this term in a slightly different sense than Baladeva does.
${ }^{61}$ It is worth noting that the affective states of the worshipper often emphasized by Kierkegaard (fear, trembling, and so forth) are quite different from those that characterize most Gauḍīya Vaiṣnava worship. For one discussion that contrasts the idea in Kierkegaard of God’s unknowability with the Gauḍīya Vaiṣnava idea of access to God through bhakti, see Sardella (2016: 96-8).
${ }^{62}$ Jonardon Ganeri, for instance, has argued that a newly critical and modern attitude toward textual authority began with the Navya-Naiyāyika Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in the late 15th and early 16th century (Ganeri 2011: 150ff.). If this is correct, we need to reexamine the works of Vedāntins in the $16^{\text {th }}$ and $17^{\text {th }}$ centuries to confirm that there was a new type of commentarial independence prior to Baladeva.
${ }^{63}$ This is arguably the strategy Clooney employs when he reads Vācaspati Miśra as affirming that God could act against the dictates of karma, though He chooses not to do so; though He is theoretically free, in practice God’s actions are limited (Clooney 1989: 536). Compare this to Baladeva’s position that God does at times act against the rules of karma, erasing the prārabdha-karma of his devotees.
${ }^{64}$ On the Sāṃkhya argument portraying īsvara as causally superfluous, see Nicholson (2016: 602ff.). One possibility as to why the Brahmasūtras introduce īsvara in spite of this alleged superfluity is the frequent references of a god or gods throughout authoritative texts such as the Upaniṣads and Mahābhārata, which preceded the Brahmasūtras. Positing īsvara could have therefore been culturally important, though he is only a “nominal” (pāribhāṣika) sovereign of the world. Scriptural references to god’s omnipotence can then be read as arthavādas, non-literal statements often used to encourage worship or ritual action.
${ }^{65}$ When Sri Ramakrishna was asked, “Can God violate law?” he replied, “What do you mean? She is the Lord. She can do everything. She who has made the law can also change it” (translated in Maharaj 2018: 263).
${ }^{67}$ This is translated from the Kathāmrta, a Bengali collection of Sri Ramakrishna’s sayings and actions, in Maharaj (2018: 252-3).
${ }^{68}$ On the connection between consequentialism and skeptical theism, see McBrayer (2019). I borrow the vaccination metaphor from Maitzen (2013: 450).
${ }^{69}$ Maitzen (2013: 451).
${ }^{70}$ Bowles (2008: 169). This story comes before the story of Kauśika, another story with a consequentialist message: a foolish sage takes a vow of truth-telling. When murderous bandits asks him which way their potential victims went, he tells the truth. For this act Kauśika eventually ends up in a “miserable hell.”
${ }^{71}$ See Maitzen (2014: 452).

${ }^{72}$ Often such contradictory injunctions appear in the same text. For instance, Mbh 14.94.23 holds up the extreme nonviolence of the gleaner (uñcavṛttin, one who only eats grains that have fallen on the ground after harvested by others) as ideal, far superior to the violence of Yudhiṣthira’s animal sacrifice. Passages such as these led Mohandas Gandhi to argue that the true message of the text is one of absolute non-violence, in spite of other sections (e.g., Mbh 12.98.13-30) that extol the ideal of the warrior (śūra) who kills in battle as engaged in the holiest form of sacrifice.
${ }^{73}$ Arguably the single central concern of the Mīmāṃsā school was the systematic interpretation of Vedic injunctions. On the ways in which Mīmāṃsā ritual theory acts as a foundation for the path to liberation presented in the Brahmasūtras, see Uskokov (2018: 1-144).
${ }^{77}$ Referring to Bhāgavata Purāṇa verse 2.5.14., as cited by Baladeva: dravyaṃ karma ca kālaś ca svabhāvo jīva eva ca. vāsudevāt paro brahman na cānyo 'rtho 'sti tattvatah (Goswami 2006: 104).
${ }^{78}$ Matilal (2002: 100).
${ }^{79}$ Even the concept of creatio ex nihilo, sometimes described as unique to Christianity, can arguably be found in the Kashmir Śaiva tradition (see note 39).
${ }^{80}$ On the “weak” theism of Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, see Nicholson (2017: 604-9).