Local Intermediaries in post-2011 Syria Transformation and Continuity Local Intermediaries in post-2011 Syria Transformation and Continuity Edited by Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur Contributors: Armenak Tokmajyan Ayman Al-Dassouky Hadeel Al-Saidawi Roger Asfar Sana Fadel Published in June 2019 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung P.O. Box 116107 Riad El Solh Beirut 1107 2210 Lebanon This publication is the product of a capacity building project for Syrian researchers that was designed and implemented by Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur. Each participant conducted independent research and authored a paper under the editors’ supervision. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be printed, reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publisher. Layout and Cover Design: Milad Amin Translation and Editing: Hannah Massih, Livia Bergmeijer, Niamh Fleming- Farrell, Rana Sa’adah and Yaaser Azzayyat CONTENTS Building from the Wreckage Intermediaries in Contemporary Syria........................................................4 Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur Politics of Rural Notables...........................................................................21 Armenak Tokmajyan What We Can Learn from the Rise of Local Traders in Syria........................43 Ayman Al-Dassouky Informal State-Society Relations and Family Networks in Rural Idlib..........67 Hadeel Al-Saidawi The Role of the Christian Clergy in Aleppo as Mediators The Nature of Relationships and their Attributes.......................................93 Roger Asfar The Leaders of Damascus The Intermediary Activists in the 2011 Uprising.........................................119 Sana Fadel Politics of Rural Notables Armenak Tokmajyan Introduction With the onset of the Syrian uprising, the regime reached out to rural notables in many parts of Syria, asking for their help in containing protests in their communities. It dispatched senior officials to protest cites, including during the first weeks of the uprising in Darʿa. It also received delegations that included notables from different parts of Syria. Through this form of outreach, the regime was relying on a pre-conflict intermediary structure which the security forces used to contain conflict in Syria’s countryside. Security forces, by threatening to use high levels of violence, frequently utilized the localized authority of rural notables to resolve intra-societal conflicts through informal reconciliation processes. This mechanism was ineffective in the face of spreading protests. While senior security officials held meetings with Darʿa notables or while security forces in Idlib reached out to their established contacts in society, all in the hope of stopping the protests, the social movement widened. The regime’s tried-and-true methods for dealing with social actors failed in the uprising primarily because the security forces used high levels of violence from early on, which diminished the chances of any constructive intermediation but also, as the uprising displayed more clearly, many notables did not necessarily have authority over or represent those protesting from their communities, as wrongly perceived by at least some in the regime. 21 To help understand the regime’s approach to containing the uprising through intermediary structures, and why it failed, this paper analyzes the relationships the regime developed with rural notables and their role in containing intra- societal conflict prior to the uprising. The processes described here can be found, with significant local variation, in villages, towns, and small cities throughout Syria, but examples in the paper are drawn primarily from the rural areas of the Idlib and Darʿa governorates. Before the uprising, the security forces often relied on an intermediary structure as an informal alternative to the official conflict resolution system to resolve large inter-familial conflicts in Syria’s countryside. When conflicts broke out between civilians and escalated to involve their extended families, they threatened to destabilize the locality, or even spill into nearby towns. The security forces were thus faced with a choice: follow the formal legal procedures of making arrests, charging suspects, and subjecting them to trial and punishment, or encouraging the parties toward a customary reconciliation process between the conflicting families, with mediation led by local notables. A notable in Idlib or Darʿa could be a family elder, a religious shaykh, a tribal leader, or an educated or wealthy man with localized authority; in many cases, a notable would have several of these qualities. The terms of the agreement were negotiated and accepted by the elders of the conflicting families. The element of force was an important defining characteristic in security forces’ relationship with the notables and conflicting families. In such conflicts, the security forces deployed law enforcement units to break up fights, arrest people, and ultimately control the situation. Having the upper hand, judicial and extra- judicial powers, they had the means of using a high level of violence. Instead, however, they often only used the threat of such violence as an effective tactic to steer the conflict towards an informal reconciliation. The security forces, but also the intermediaries, often found that this method could deliver a faster, more effective, and more durable solution. This structure of local conflict management was not effective during the early stages of the uprising primarily due to two factors. First, the logic of violence that the security forces employed to handle the early protests departed from that 22  used previously in inter-family disputes. They actually used significant or high levels of violence that they had previously threatened to use as a way to steer the disputes towards reconciliation. This change in the rationale violated the existing implicit agreement between them and the notables in terms of what was acceptable violence and what was not. Firing at protestors was unacceptable and intolerable form of violence, whether for the notables or the protestors in their communities. This violence fueled the rebellion by fracturing the relationship between security officers and notables in many cases, ultimately diminishing any chance for intermediation. The intermediary structure was ineffective also because the uprising revealed that the relationship between the notables and the youth in their communities had been undergoing a long, slow transformation. The regime’s outreach to notables suggests their enduring faith in notables’ authority over their communities. But events in Darʿa and Idlib suggest that hardly anyone, including community elders, represented or asserted effective control over the protestors, many of whom did not necessarily believe in the intermediary structure as a way to reason with the regime, whose security forces employed unacceptable forms of violence against them. With the increasing counter violence by the protestors, and later with the first signs of armed rebellion, notables’ role was further marginalized. They may have remained notables in name, but they were not intermediaries anymore. I. Alternative Conflict Management Mechanisms before the Uprising The regime primarily relied on its security forces to manage inter-familial conflicts that escalated, got out of police control and threatened to destabilize the locale. Though the circumstances surrounding individual cases and localities varied considerably, a consistent theme across all instances of this mediation was the unequal power relationship between the security forces and other actors involved in the conflict. After containing the situation, they threatened to use high levels of violence against the perpetrators but refrained from doing so. They used the threat of significant violence to steer the conflict from escalation to resolution through informal reconciliation processes. 23 Given the wide powers that the security forces had, in addition to their reputation for being willing to use them, one might wonder why didn’t they just lock up all the offending parties from both families and start a court case. The security forces often found the informal conflict resolution method to be more effective. The fact that they could use official institutions to back up or facilitate the informal reconciliation indicates that there was a relatively methodical approach to alternative reconciliation. Threat of Violence as an Effective Tactic Official involvement in local informal reconciliation processes is neither new nor exclusively the business of intelligence services, but the latter have increasingly assumed a central role in these processes since the Baʿth Party came to power. With the expansion of the state since 1960s, its intervention in local conflicts increased not just in the form of imposing state laws and security measures, but also in its taking part in informal conflict resolution processes. The Peasants’ Union, for instance, was one such example in 1960s; it resolved conflicts between peasants to avoid clan hostilities escalating and involving the whole village in the conflict.1 Another commonly cited example is the intervention of deputies from the National Assembly with ties to the locality where the conflict occurred. Their dual—official and unofficial—identity helped them to facilitate a reconciliation. The security services gradually assumed a more central role in mediating intra- social conflicts with the Baʿth Party’s arrival to power, and especially after the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion (1976-1982).2 They gained judicial but also extra- judicial rights to use violence to manage conflicts in society, including inter- familial conflicts. They often, however, employed a particular form of force to manage these conflicts. After physically containing the conflict, instead of following the formal legal process and opening a court case that would end in an official ruling, they used the threat of high levels of violence to pressure the conflicting families to pursue an informal reconciliation process. That was the case in a major inter-familial fight in 1996 in Saraqib, a city of about 30,000 in Idlib province, where a large family and a smaller one that was known for its courageousness clashed. By the time the local police contained the 24 situation, the fight had taken two lives, one from each side. But this was not a solution and the situation exploded again after two weeks. The subsequent events of this case illustrate the intervention of the security forces and their tactics of using the threat of violence to steer the conflict toward an informal reconciliation. A few weeks later [when it exploded again] about 50 people from family [A] came insultingly knocking the door of family [B]. Though the latter was outnumbered, one of the younger members couldn’t stand the insults. He took a shovel, opened the door and attacked. He cut someone’s arm, broke other’s skull, etc. The police contacted the amn (security forces) who deployed three law enforcement units—about 300 people. They came, hit, arrested, and broke off the fight. By the time they arrived, some members of the fighting families had escaped. The soldiers settled in their houses, with their women, ate and drunk on residents’ expense (akil sharib), until the perpetrators came and surrendered.3 Deploying law enforcement units, arresting people, and occupying houses are clear demonstrations of force—a reminder that the regime is strong and capable of using significant violence. These methods, especially invading peoples’ private spaces, were undoubtedly discomforting for the victims’ families. But they remained within the borders of what is tolerable because they were temporary and remained on the level of threats and not actions. The security forces showed the possibility of using significant, or intolerable, violence in order to compel the belligerent parties to make a reconciliation agreement, and with that the uncomfortable measures were lifted. Demonstration of force can take many different forms depending on the scale of the conflict and locality. In 2010, a village of 6,000 in central Idlib province called Ihsim witnessed a major fight between two big families, which destabilized the entire village. The law enforcement units had to lay siege to the town for a month until it was solved through informal reconciliation.4 In another conflict, taking place in a village near Darʿa city in 1990s, the security forces had to deploy as many as 1,500 security personnel to be able to contain a conflict between two large families.5 In all these cases, however, the threat of violence was used tactically to force the sides to reconcile. 25 Arrests can also be a tactical move towards pressuring families to reconcile rather than see their relatives get long jail sentences. Arresting an accused party could mean an investigation, an entangling court case and possibly a jail sentence, but not necessarily so; in practice, it was typically a measure to pressure the families by keeping the accused temporarily, or giving them much reduced sentences upon reconciliation. In Ihsim, for instance, 55 people were arrested by the security forces. Upon the resolution of the conflict with a reconciliation agreement, which included the sums of compensation that victims would get, all charges were dropped or shortened.6 The events in Saraqib had a different dynamic but a similar finale. The member of family [B] who used a shovel permanently paralyzed someone. The charges were not dropped. But by the time the security forces arrived he had escaped following the principle of: he who kills, escapes in order to avoid a revenge killing. During the reconciliation process, his father said: »If you find him, kill him.« The father took this step to defuse the conflict. By that time, his son had left the country altogether.7 It is also possible, especially in the case of accidental killing, that the perpetrator, right after the incident, would immediately hand himself in to the police to protect himself from revenge. After a few days or weeks, the elders of perpetrator’s family come to see their counterparts from the victim’s family to seal an agreement that gets the perpetrator his freedom back. That often means blood money, which can be agreed during the reconciliation process.8 A now-notable, but then a young man living in Aleppo city, recalled a traffic accident caused by his uncle in the late 1980s that led to someone’s death. Before going to the victim’s funeral »we first went to our village [in northern Aleppo] to ask the representation of our village elders (rhna li-natlub wajahatahum)«. During the funeral, whispers about blood money started circulating. »They were talking about 100,000SYP«, a big sum of money back then. »Suddenly our village elder called out referring to the elder of victim’s tribe: those—referring to our family—are people who attend our funerals and we attend their funerals; they attend our weddings and we attend their weddings, and 26 your understanding is enough (fahmak kifaya).« After a moment of silence, we »wrapped 20,000SYP and passed it to the family«, and the dispute was resolved.9 »Occupying« people’s private space, while women are there, is another form of this tactic. It touches men’s honor in a conservative rural context but seemingly doesn’t violate it; the practice remains within the borders of what’s tolerable because it remains a threat rather than an actual violation of men’s honor. Like the above example in Saraqib, this method was also effective in the case of a conflict that happened in a village in the northern Aleppo countryside. After a few failed attempts to solve a conflict between two families, the security forces intervened. Several security personnel sat in each perpetrator’s house »eating, drinking for free«. They stayed in a »separate room without harassing anyone, but they would be like ›oh you have sheep, aren’t you going to serve us some?‹« The families eventually pressured their relatives to solve the issue.10 This peculiar tactic as a means to pressure the families to reconcile was also evident in the case of a conflict near Darʿa city that required 1,500 personnel to contain it. The soldiers »actually stayed [in the houses] for a month; eating, drinking and sleeping« until the sides agreed to reconcile.11 A long-serving Baʿthist from Idlib explained the logic of how the security forces face these societal confrontations as follows: »The state can crush you, or you can reconcile. Everyone wins.«12 Reconciliation Under the Threat of Violence The alternative to »crushing« is an informal reconciliation process that leads to an agreement between the fighting sides in which town notables, under strong pressure from the security forces, play a crucial mediating role. The perception that dealing with the security forces is potentially troublesome is already enough to effect reconciliation among social actors, who, especially in cases of smaller conflicts, prefer a swift reconciliation in order to avoid security forces’ intervention. The pressure factor is clearer in the cases when security forces deploy law enforcement units or even become part of the mediating team along with notables. They effectively utilize the tradition of reconciliation, notables’ authority and legitimacy to defuse the conflict. 27 Often, conflicting families reconciled among themselves and did not inflame the issue because that could mean state intervention through the security forces. Ultimately, the latter was the most powerful institution in the regime; it had extra- judicial powers, and often also a bad reputation. »People in Darʿa were cautious of him (ʿamalu hsabu)«, a notable from Darʿa city said about a senior security officer in the province. »He was feared. He’d done harm to many people.«13 But avoiding their intervention also simply meant a quicker resolution, no arrests, no violence or threat of violence. Elements of both rationales were part of the motivation behind a reconciliation agreement in one village in northern Aleppo province between two families from the Baggara tribe; the dispute ended with the knowledge, but not the intervention, of the security forces. »One day, I was in my shop in Aleppo [city], when my brother came saying ›Yalla amshi, (come on) we have to go to the village‹«, a notable said, recalling his mediation experience in his native village. After meeting the elder of the first family, and convincing him to reconcile, the mediation team went to the second family. »My father and your father were like brothers. Allah yirhamun (God have mercy on them). I said to the elder of the other family«, the notable reported. With these carefully selected words, the delegation was successful with the second family as well. Over a feast, the families celebrated the achievement.14 Official intervention did not necessarily mean security forces’ intervention. A common pattern is the intervention of MPs with, for instance, personal ties to the locality where the conflict occurred. In these cases, though, the border between a state official and a notable becomes blurry. Such people were accepted by the regime, and must have had the personal potential to influence the conflicting actors. That was the situation with Abu Rumiyeh, a prominent notable from Darʿa’s Hawran plain and a deputy in the parliament since 1990. He was known and tolerated by the security forces as a conflict resolver and respected by many in Darʿa as a fair arbitrator. »You walk and walk and you are still on his land. He owned vast lands«, a native from Hawran said in an attempt to characterize him. »He of course didn’t do any agrarian work himself. He helped people, lent them money, solved problems; you can say dispute resolution was his job (shagheltu 28 kant hal mashakil).«15 Abu Rumiyeh had the profile of an ideal rural intermediary. He had access to the authorities through his position as an MP, and had the blessing of the security forces. At the same time, he was a respected notable with vast wealth, which plays an important role in deciding notability. He used his official power, respect and money to mediate conflicts and »save« the state resources to deal with localized conflicts. The outcome was that the regime had fewer inflated conflicts to deal with and the parties to the conflict achieved a quick resolution without the intervention of the security forces. Abu Rumiyeh benefited too: he has repeatedly been re-elected to the People’s Assembly since 1990, primarily due to authorities’ consent, but also due to the votes he gathered due to his popularity. Security forces’ utilization of local traditions and notables, however, is most clear when they establish a physical presence and directly show that they can use high levels of violence. They take advantage of local reconciliation traditions, and the legitimacy that notables have, to maintain the stability in the area. They do so practically by leaving the conflicting sides with two options, reconciliation or rebellion against the regime. This was the dynamic in the case of Ihsim. The reoccurring conflict between the families was destabilizing the entire town. The families either had to reconcile or face the security forces that had encircled the town and arrested the perpetrators of the violence.16 The Saraqib case had a similar outcome. One difference was that the representatives from the security forces took part in the negotiating team that shuttled between the two families to find a common agreement.17 Giving informal reconciliation a chance had a simple rationale: it was often more effective and sustainable, and the security forces were well aware of that. A More Effective Conflict Resolution Method? Given the judicial and extra-judicial powers of intelligence services, their capacity, and the history of being willing to use it, one would wonder why they wouldn’t just always »crush« the parties to the conflict. Evidence shows that sometimes the security forces saw the alternative approach—that is, utilizing 29 reconciliation traditions and the localized authority of the notables, and solving the conflict under the threat of significant violence rather than the execution of it—as more effective option and in rarer instances even a necessity. There are even designated state institutions that could be used to support such an unofficial alternative reconciliation process. In mid 2000s, a financial dispute between members from an influential tribal group in the eastern, informal part of the city of Aleppo, and members of a national religious minority group living in the city escalated, making violent clashes very possible. Some from the latter group owed unofficial loans to shops owned by the tribal group, who gave them very unfavorable terms. The accumulated debts became the reason for members from the tribal group to harass and threaten members of the minority group. Eventually, the latter sought the help of their official political and religious representatives. One of these representatives, who played the role of intermediary between the state and the minority group and negotiated with the tribal representatives, narrated how the issue was solved through informal reconciliation. We first went to the neighborhood’s security chief, who couldn’t help. We also didn’t get help from his superiors nor from the mayor. We took ourselves and went to Damascus (fa-hamalna halna wa rihna ʿa-l-sham) to meet a very senior security official.18 He came to Aleppo. Without opening an official investigation, he ordered the local security forces to arrest a few people from the large family, and then invited one of its heads to see him, »who came with gifts, and was received well«. The aim was to force the family to negotiate terms agreeable to both sides. The issue was solved through an informal reconciliation agreement, where those who had taken loans had to pay it back but with more reasonable conditions. The intermediary concluded: The senior security officer could jail many people and open a court case. He had the power. But that wouldn’t have solved the problem. Only exacerbated it. Therefore, he tried to find a solution through [informal] negotiations. 30 In other cases, intervention through formal legal bodies is not just ineffective, but could inflate the conflict rather than solve it. In some impoverished areas in Idlib, the state was absent, which gave »local shaykhs, elders and educated people more legitimacy. Some people would refer to shaykhs for problems like land inheritance, divorce, etc.«19 rather than go to court. In such circumstances, the security forces would delegate the solution of a localized conflict to the local notables rather than intervene themselves. 20 In rarer instances, the security agencies may need the involvement of specific influential notables in the region to contain a conflict through informal reconciliation. A verbal fight in a village in northern Aleppo between two men from Kurdish and Christian backgrounds escalated and ended with the former shooting the latter. Despite all the money the family of the Kurdish man spent on bribes, their son got a jail sentence. »The judge went by the book«, a notable from the area affirmed. Due to an incident in the jail, the Kurdish man (and few others in his cell) died. The issue grew bigger and the security forces feared that it could draw in the parties’ extended families, the whole village, and possibly cause the sectarianization of the problem. But the conflict was contained: The amn (security forces) called shaykh [name] and asked him to contain the conflict. He was an influential religious figure in the region. The shaykh summoned representatives from the fighting sides and solved the issue through reconciliation. You know, the state sometimes fears that things can get out of hand. So they want to contain the problem beforehand. 21 Informal reconciliations fall into the unofficial domain. Even though there are some patterns, there are no set-in-stone rules. The security forces’ reliance on these alternative resolution means, however, can be methodical. The indication of that is the presence of official channels, within official state institutions, that could be used to support the unofficial conflict resolution process. One good example is the official channels that connect the head of the local security forces with the town mukhtar, who is »one of the representatives of the central authorities on the level of small administrative units [which are] the villages under 5,000 inhabitants and neighborhoods.«22 31 With a strong local knowledge, the mukhtar becomes a key focal point for the intelligence services. The contemporary mukhtarship is a remnant of an Ottoman heritage, preserved and modified under Baʿth rule. The Neighborhood Councils and Mukhtars Act of 1956 gave wide powers to the mukhtar,23 most of which were transferred to local councils by legislation passed in 1971, under Hafez al-Asad, and this situation has endured through legislation passed in 2011.24 After ceding its powers to the local councils and working under it (at least on paper), the mukhtar’s most important role shrunk to carefully monitoring those residing in his administrative unit and their affairs.25 In other words, part of the mukhtar’s job is to be the eyes and the ears of the society and help the authorities when asked. He, for instance, could be officially relied upon to name the relevant notables and influential people in the locale who might be utilized by the security forces to resolve disputes. The mukhtar’s participation in the reconciliation process was a commonly cited factor by the interviewees. It was referenced as being used during the inter-familial conflict in Saraqib in 1996, for instance. After the law enforcement units stopped the parties from attacking one another, »the head of the intelligence services sent a warrant officer (musaʿid) who, with the help of the mukhtar, found the relevant notables« who could potentially mediate a reconciliation process.26 The same could be said in the incident in Ihsim in 2010 when the then mayor of Idlib province formed a negotiating delegation that included notables, deputies, and the town mukhtar.27 The role of the mukhtar may differ from one place to another. In fact, the intelligence services might include the mukhtar only for ceremonial reasons or not include him at all. Since the reconciliation process is happening in the unofficial domain, even the personal networks of the intelligence official may play a role. What is certain in all the cases, however, is that the security forces have the possibility of relying on the institution of the mukhtarship, which every town or a village has. Summary By utilizing the notables to resolve conflicts through informal reconciliation, the regime enabled an intermediary structure that could be a more effective conflict management tool and of interest to the intermediaries and conflicting parties. 32  In this structure, the regime remains the dominant social force because of its ability to threaten to use high levels of violence, and by doing so influence the behavior of other social actors. Even though the security forces were frequently able influence notables’ behavior, this was not necessarily against notables’ interests. Being part of the structure gave them access to state authorities, which empowered them in their locality. The effectiveness of this structure is also indicative of the preference of conflicting individuals or groups for this informal conflict resolution method over the formal one. II. The Syrian Uprising and the Ineffectiveness of the Old Intermediary Structure With the first protests of the Syrian uprising, the regime received delegations of notables from many parts of Syria, including Darʿa and Idlib, with the hope that they could contain the growing protests. The old intermediary structure that they wanted to use, however, was ineffective. Security forces’ handling of the uprising had violated the implicit understanding that existed between them and the notables by using significant violence rather than threatening to do so. That was a violation of the implicit agreement that existed in the framework of the pre-uprising intermediary structure, between the security forces and the notables in terms of what is an acceptable form of violence and what is not. Besides the factor of violence, the structure failed because the uprising revealed the weakened authority of the notables in their communities. The early protests that started in Darʿa show how the implicit understanding broke down when the local security forces mishandled the situation by using unacceptable violence. The central authorities in Damascus tried to re- establish the former intermediary structure by rebuilding the broken implicit understanding, but security forces’ humiliating behavior with Darʿa’s notables, the mismanagement of children’s files, and attempts to stop protests by firing live ammunition had violated the old understanding. This different logic of violence left little space for intermediation. Another crucial reason that made the intermediary structure fail, as the unfolding events in Darʿa revealed, was the transformation (at least to some extent) that 33 had happened on the level of notables’ relationship with their families and communities. Many notables overestimated their ability to control protests in their communities, where angry crowds did not believe in reasoning with the authorities through intermediation. As counter violence against the regime’s security-military forces grew, the notables effectively lost their role as mediators. Failed Attempt to Rebuild the Old Intermediary Structure The implicit agreement began to unravel in Darʿa with local security’s mishandling of the first steps of the Syrian uprising. For at least a month, the central authorities tried to reach out to their established contacts in society with the hope of utilizing their localized authority to contain the spreading protests. Despite the breach of the old agreement by use of high levels of violence, many notables were not unreceptive. At least some elements in the regime, and some notables, believed that the intermediary structure may be able to contain the protests. On 12 March 2011, anti-regime graffiti appeared on street walls of Darʿa. The Political Intelligence arrested 15 children, mostly underage, for spraying on their school wall.28 Stories of arrest and torture sparked outrage. Notables from Darʿa, among them Abu Rumiyeh, formed a delegation »that matched [head of the Political Intelligence in Darʿa] ʿAtif Najib’s weight« to ask for the release of the kids and make sure that the incident would not be repeated.29 Narratives about ʿAtif Najib’s involvement, the maltreatment of the children, and the notables vary.30 What’s certain, however, is that notables from Darʿa visited security officials and left the security branch humiliated. This led to small-scale angry protests in Darʿa city, which sparked the first major protest on 18 March.31 While protests and violence escalated, the central authorities tried through different means to re-establish the formerly existing implicit understanding with the notables. On the day of the first major protest, a delegation from Damascus, including head of the National Security Bureau Hisham Ikhtiar and head of the Syrian National Intelligence Agency Rustum Ghazala, arrived to meet some of Darʿa’s notables.32 With the escalating situation, the Syrian president himself received delegations of notables from Darʿa, and elsewhere, in the hope that these meetings might get people off the street and contain the mushrooming protests. 34 Many notables were not unresponsive. A delegation from Darʿa went to meet the president on 14 April to submit their demands.33 Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayasina from Darʿa, one of the main figures who intermediated between the protestors and various representatives from the regime, was part of the delegation.34 Prominent cleric Sarya al-Rifaʿi claimed that he and his brother, also a prominent figure, were called by President al-Asad who asked them to go to Darʿa, meet the notables, and come back with their demands.35 Over the course of the first few months, various delegations from different parts of the country met the president. Some notables believed that the situation could be contained through the old conflict resolution mechanism, where they played an important intermediary role, and which preserved their localized authority. »When the first two martyrs fell in Darʿa, Bashar sent money in an envelope«, one notable commented regrettably. »Had he come himself, things could have been solved over a cup of coffee.« This example underlines the notable’s overconfidence in the old mechanism, which was unlikely to contain a rapidly spreading protest movement that was not an intra-social dispute but a conflict between the state and society. This notable’s view echoes with that of Abu Rumiyeh and Shaykh Ahmad al- Sayasina, two prominent figures in Darʿa. »The Hawranis were waiting for the arrival of Mr. President, his apology and condolences to the families of Hawran«, Abu Rumiyeh said during the parliamentary session on 27 March 2011. Had that been the case, nothing would have happened in Hawran »despite the [high] number of casualties«.36 Similarly, Shaykh al-Sayasina, who was directly involved in the events, claimed to have said to the president during the 14 April meeting in Damascus: »The situation would have calmed down … had you come to Hawran, talked to its people, told them that their demands would be answered, and passed your condolences for their martyrs.«37 These efforts did not lead to the containment of the situation because the logic of violence had changed but also because the notables had limited authority over the angry youth who disobeyed them. The regime and, to a certain extent, the notables themselves, wrongly perceived that traditional authority, within the framework of the intermediary structure, could contain protests. 35 Notables Without Being Intermediaries The security forces’ different logic of violence, on one hand, and the disobedience of the youth, on the other, marginalized the role of notables as intermediaries with the ability to contain localized conflicts between the regime and society. From the first day, the security-military apparatus operated with a logic of violence that was not acceptable to either the notables or the protestors; it aimed at killing, rather than resorting to the threat of violence as a tool to contain the situation. This new logic was a breach of the unwritten agreement that existed between the regime and notables, and a blow to their role as intermediaries. It fueled counter violence among the youth who oftentimes disregarded their elders’ advice and commands to deescalate the situation; this raises questions about the effectiveness of traditional authority. After the children’s episode that ended with humiliating Darʿa’s notables, the second example of the changing logic of violence occurred on 18 March, during the first major protest in Syria. When law enforcement units could not control the situation, four helicopters from an anti-terrorism unit landed in Darʿa city and started randomly shooting at people.38 This irresponsible behavior of the security forces from the very beginning created a cycle of violence that took many lives on both sides.39 Each time the security forces and the military, which intervened at a later point, clashed with protestors there were new casualties. The next day, crowds joined the mourning families for the funerals, which turned into protests that in turn led to new casualties on both sides. The bloody events in al-Sanamayn, in the northern part of Darʿa province, show another face of the new unacceptable logic of violence that is not tactical but deliberate, and it goes beyond the borders of what’s tolerable: After the Friday prayer [25 March 2011], protestors gathered in front of the makhfar (police station). They were shouting all sorts of slogans including sectarian ones that targeted ʿAlawites. After a while, someone from the amn, known for being unscrupulous, took an AK-47 and shot at people. That night the security personnel that served in the town escaped.40 36 With the new logic of violence, notables could not be the regime’s intermediaries in society. In other words, through open use of violence against demonstrators, the state bypassed the intermediaries to confront the social actors directly. In doing so, it caused the intermediation structure crumble from below as well. The early events in Darʿa show that hardly anyone, including notables, controlled the protesting crowds, many of whom did not necessarily believe that reasoning with the authorities through the intermediary structure could yield any results. With the increasing levels of counter violence by protestors, and later rebels, the restraining authority of the notables decreased further and so did their role as intermediaries. Soon after the uprising began in Darʿa, it was becoming increasingly clear that no elder community member could assert authority over the protestors, including the notables who were responsive to the mediation calls of the authorities. The account of a protestor in Darʿa city, on the second day of the uprising, 19 March, is an example of that: The young men set off for al-ʿUmari Mosque but there was [a heavy security presence]. They were only one hundred meters away from us. Shaykh Abu Zayd [a notable involved in the protests] tried to calm us down. We didn’t listen to him.41 There was a similar dynamic during a protest in al-Sanamayn, one day before the bloody events and at the same spot, when some protestors engaged in vandalism even though »those who led the violent acts were told not to«.42 To what extent many angry youths accepted their elders’ intermediation is also questionable. One incident that occurred in Izrʿa, an important town in center of Darʿa province, shows that the angry crowd did not even want to listen to one of their town notables, who had been part of delegation from Darʿa that met the president on 14 April, and had a message to convey. After a delegation from Darʿa went to meet [president] Bashar on [14 April] the checkpoints were removed and there was a big demonstration. A wajih (notable), about 80 years old, [who had been part of the delegation] took the 37  stage and started talking: ›We went and met President Asad …‹ the crowd immediately said ›tiz43 in al-Asad‹. The man dropped the mic and left the stage.44 Counter violence effectively weakened notables’ role as intermediaries, and opened the way for enthusiastic youths who thought of direct violence as the only means to counter the authorities. Various accounts from Darʿa and Idlib indicate the diminishing authority of elders with the increasing levels of violence. The bloodshed was simply too much for notables to play a constructive role, as was the case with Sarya al-Rifaʿi, a prominent cleric, who admitted his inability to calm down a young man who had lost relatives and had bad history with the regime.45 In Saraqib, during the early protests, the security forces had a policy of not provoking big families. They used their old channels to the heads of these families to contain protests. When they saw members of a big family protesting, they did not arrest them; they called upon the family heads and told them to »come and discipline their sons«.46 With the escalation of the situation, this tactic »worked with some families and didn’t with others«, and it was eventually dropped with the increasing militarization of the uprising.47 Two accounts in the early days of the uprising, from Jabal al-Zawiya in Idlib province and Izraʿ city in Darʿa, also illustrate how elders tried to hold youth back from counter violence and favored reasoning with the authorities. »My grandpa was from the elders of Izrʿa«, a native from the town said. »He and pretty much all others like him warned the young guys saying, ›calm down the situation, they [the security-military apparatus] are capable of burning down everything‹.«48 But the youth didn’t listen to them, their »blood was boiling«.49 This was also the case in Jabal al-Zawiya where »elders favored a peaceful means of conflict resolution. But after the bloodshed, [their] role receded and young men took over the armed struggle.«50 These examples, though crucial for hinting that a generational gap may had been forming in Syrian society before the uprising revealed it, should not be taken as a dominant trend. In fact, examples of respecting elders’ decisions can also be 38  found both on family and individual levels. In Saraqib, two young adults, about the same age, from two known families, chose different paths when the uprising broke out. One yielded to the command of his family’s elder who prohibited him and his brothers from fighting even though they »wanted to take up arms and fight with the [Syrian regular] army.«51 Whereas the other defied his uncle who was the head of the family, and prohibited him from protesting »deriving from family interests«.52 Such a pattern can be found on familial level, as is the case with two large, prominent families from Saraqib. Members of one such family largely maintained their traditional stance, which could be described as neutral—neither with the regime nor with its opponents—in addition to prioritizing their material interests. Another large family, on the other hand, split along political lines: one part of the family supported the regime, and the other supported the opposition. The roots of the divide, however, go back to the pre-uprising period where one part of the latter family was close to the regime, while the other part of that family, which preferred the opposition, had suffered material losses and saw a financial opportunity in the rebellion.53 Ultimately, it is still hard to determine which pattern has been dominant in the uprising. But what is clearer is that the security forces’ logic of resorting to unacceptable levels of violence, on one hand, and the revolutionary euphoria that made some youth difficult to control, on the other, marginalized notables as intermediaries. The transformation of relations on these two levels left the intermediary structure ineffective. Conclusion Before 2011, the regime, through its security forces, capitalized on the local authority of rural notables and their informal reconciliation methods to resolve local inter-family disputes—frequently encouraging social actors to resolve their differences outside of official state courts. The alternative method prevented destabilization, delivering faster and often more effective results, while perpetuating the security forces’ central role in managing society. The structure, by necessity, left a narrow space for the rural intermediaries to exercise authority 39 over their communities. But this did not threaten the hegemony of the regime, which was guaranteed by the regime’s ability to use or threaten to use coercive force. When demonstrations against the regime began in 2011, the regime turned to notables and intermediation structures in its attempt to contain protests. The forms of violence practiced by the security forces as a response to the uprising— and the counter violence that it triggered—left the old conflict resolution mechanism ineffective, and marginalized the role of intermediaries. From the very beginning, the regime may have misjudged notables’ ability to manage protestors. Uncontrollable crowds and cases of protestors’ disobedience from the first weeks of protest, and their disregard for notables’ intermediation efforts, are indications of the regime’s misconception of traditional authority and its ability to represent and dictate to social groups »below« it. The misconception about traditional authority perhaps also applies to some of the notables as well, who were responsive to the regime’s early attempts to repair the intermediary structure, where they play an important role, and overestimated the structure’s ability to defuse the situation. The armed conflict in Syria has shattered many of the rural communities that had previously been subject to this form of intermediation. Massive swathes of the population of the Darʿa countryside have been displaced outside the country, and rural Idlib was subject to several years of regime violence and civil war before becoming the prime receptor for Islamists displaced from the rest of the country by regime victories. Yet the wrenching effects on local communities have not put an end to the politics of intermediaries. On the contrary, the regime, as it gains more territory from the opposition, has been rebuilding a new intermediary structure where, like the old one, the security forces have assumed a central role in managing society. The identity of these intermediaries and the terms of their implicit bargains with the security forces are currently emerging and constitute topics for future research. What is fairly certain, however, is that the informal processes by which security forces reach into and attempt to control local society will remain relevant to governance and social life in Syria’s foreseeable future. The author would like to express his thanks to a friend from Saraqib for his views on the subject. 40 Notes 1. Raymond Hinnebusch, »Local Politics in Syria: Organization and Mobilization in Four Villages Cases,« Middle East Journal, vol 30, no. 1, 1976, p.14. 2. Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for The Middle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 4th edition, p. 338; Ahmad Abu Saleh (former Syrian Revolutionary Command Council member), interviewed by Ahmad Mansour on Shahed ʿala al-ʿAser program, Aljazeera Arabic (Part 4, 30:10-30:30). https://bit.ly/2Oxvdfv 3. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 8 September 2017; the ›settling in people’s houses‹ method was confirmed by several interviewees. Skype with an activist from Saraqib, 18 August 2018; interview with a former political intelligence officer, Jordan, May 2018; Interview with a notable from Darʿa city, Jordan, 20 June 2018; interview with a former resident of a village in northern Aleppo countryside, Lebanon, December 2018 4. Skype interview with a journalist who covered the issue, August 2018; Aslim, Sa’ir. »Bi-Tadakhul Min al-Wujaha’ … Sulh ʿAʿilatayn Shahiratayn Tashajara ʿAla Mada Sanawat Fi Idlib [With intervention from the notables … reconciliation between two famous families who conflicted over many years in Idlib] », Aks al-Sir, 2 January 2010. https://bit.ly/2Qf0qp9 5. Telephone interview with a notable from Darʿa city, June 2018 6. Skype interview with a journalist who covered the issue, August 2018, ibid. 7. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 8 September 2017 8. Telephone interviews with a notable from Darʿa city, April, June, 2018 9. Interview with the narrator of the story, May 2018 10. Interview with a former resident of a village in the northern Aleppo countryside, Lebanon, December 2018 11. Telephone interview with a notable from Darʿa city, June, 2018 12. Telephone interview with a retired Baʿthist from Idlib, 21 November 2018 13. Telephone interview with a notable from Darʿa city, June 2018 14. Interview with the narrator of the story, May 2018 15. Interview with a resident from al-Sanamayn, Beirut, April 2018 16. Skype interview with a journalist who covered the issue, August 2018, ibid. 17. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 8 September 2017 18. Conversation with a religious leader from Aleppo city, 28 September 2018. 19. Skype interview with a journalist from Jabal al-Zawiya, 20 July 2017 20. Ibid. 21. Interview with a notable from northern Aleppo countryside, June 2018. 22. Nouh, Muhanad. al-Mukhtar«, The Arab Encyclopedia. http://www.arab-ency.com/detail/6549/‫راتخملا‬ 23. See: Act No. 215/1956 of »Neighborhoods Councils and Mukhtars Act« 24. Nouh, M. al-Mukht̄ ar [al-Mukhtar], The Arab Encyclopedia. http://www.arab-ency.com/detail/6549/‫ ;راتخملا‬Khawatimi, Muhammand. Wazaʿef al-Mukhtar Wa Majlis al-Haiyy [Tasks of the Mukhtar and Neighborhood Committees], 19. January 2015, al-Jamahir, http://jamahir.alwehda.gov.sy/node/392251 25. For example, in the (107)2011 Local Administrative Act (Article 93) these roles are clearly stated in 11 points. Except the first one, all 10 duties of the mukhtar involve population monitoring, i.e. monitoring those who have avoided compulsory military service, registering birth and death incidents, monitoring children who have dropped out of their primary education, helping the police and judicial authorities to arrest or locate a wanted person, and accompanying them to the house of the person. 26. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 8 September 2017 27. Skype interview with a journalist who covered the issue, August 2018, ibid. 28. Barout, Muhammad Jamal. 2012. al-ʿAqd al-Akhir Fi Tarikh Suriya: Jadaliyyat al-Jumud Wa-l-Islah [The Last Decade in Syria’s History: Dialectic of Stagnation and Reform]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi lil-Abhath wa-Dirasat al-Siyasat. p.183 41 29. Telephone interview with a notable from Darʿa city, April, 2018. 30. Dukhan, Haian. 2014. »Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising«, Syria Studies, 6(2), pp.7-8; Orient News, On the Road to Damascus program, meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayasina, 28 May 2012, (min. 05:15) https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=vSSpmjBHZLY 31. BBC News, »Middle East unrest: Three killed at protest in Syria«, 18 March 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-12791738; International Crisis Group, »Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-Motion Revolution,« Middle East/North Africa Report N°108, 6/7/2011, p. 11. 32. Human Rights Watch (2011) »We’ve Never Seen Such Horror« Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. p.8; According to Barout Ikhtiar had other meetings too. For instance, on 22 March, he met 30 prominent notables from Darʿa and the meeting was not announced.Barout, Muhammad Jamal. 2012. al-ʿAqd al-Akhir Fi Tarikh Suriya: Jadaliyyat al- Jumud Wa-l-Islah [The Last Decade in Syria’s History: Dialectic of Stagnation and Reform]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi lil-Abhath wa-Dirasat al-Siyasat.pp.189-190, 196. 33. International Crisis Group (2011) Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): the Syrian People’s Slow- Motion Suicide. p.4 34. Orient News, al-Tariq Ila Dimashq [The Road to Damascus] TV program, meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayasina, 28 May 2012, (min. 15:12) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSSpmjBHZLY. 35. See: Orient News, al-Tariq Ila Dimashq [The Road to Damascus] TV program, meeting with Sarya al-Rifaʿi, 2 November 2012, (min. 6:23) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnDjyiHKBGI; the fact that the president called upon al-Rifaʿi was not an isolated case. During the early phases of the uprising, at least two prominent Syria experts that the author knows personally were called by President Asad for consultation. 36. Abu Rumiyeh’s intervention in the Syrian parliament. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVgt-i8fVm8 (2:10-2:27 min) 37. Orient News, al-Tariq Ila Dimashq [The Road to Damascus] TV program, meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Sayasina, 28 May 2012, (min. 15:12) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSSpmjBHZLY. 38. Barout, Muhammad Jamal. 2012. al-ʿAqd al-Akhir Fi Tarikh Suriya: Jadaliyyat al-Jumud Wa-l-Islah [The Last Decade in Syria’s History: Dialectic of Stagnation and Reform]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi lil-Abhath wa-Dirasat al-Siyasat. p.186 39. Even though the protests remained largely non-violence at the beginning of the uprising, the cycle of violence took the lives of many members of the state police, army and security forces. A graph published by the Institute for the Study of War shows the gradual increase in regime casualties. See: Joseph Holliday, The Asad Regime: From Counter Insurgency to Civil War, Middle East Security Report 8 (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2013), p. 28 http:// www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf p.28; International Crisis Group (2011) Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): the Syrian People’s Slow-Motion Suicide. pp.6-8 40. Interview with a resident from al-Sanamayn, Beirut, April 2018 41. Yazbek, Samar. 2012. A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution. Haus Publishing. p.88. 42. Interview with a resident from al-Sanamayn, Beirut, April 2018 43. Tiz in spoken Arabic refers to disregard and derision. 44. Skype Interview with a former resident of Izrʿa, 20 April 2018 45. Orient News, al-Tariq Ila Dimashq [The Road to Damascus] TV program, meeting with Sarya al-Rifaʿi, 2 November 2012, (min. 19:30) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnDjyiHKBGI 46. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 22 June 2017; Skype interview with an activist in Saraqib, 18 August 2018 47. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 22 June 2017 48. Interview with a resident from Izrʿa, 20 June, 2018 49. Ibid. 50. Skype interview with a journalist from Jabal al-Zawiya, 20 July 2018 51. Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 5 September 2018 52. Skype interview with an activist from Saraqib, 17 August 2018 53. Ibid; Skype interview with a resident from Saraqib, 5 September 2018 42