Laura Quadarella Sanfelice di Monteforte Life in Mosul under the Islamic State: Efficiency and brutality of the Caliphate (Mursia, December 2019) - Preface by Mosul Eye What is really the Islamic State? What do its men want? Why thousands of youngsters from all over the world left their Countries to join it to build the Caliphate? Thanks to the reports by the citizens who remained in Mosul, we can eventually understand it. The Islamic State has controlled for three years a zone between Syria and Iraq inhabited by millions of people. Excluding the persecuted minorities, we do not have accounts of the kind of life, as it was really, experienced by the Sunni citizens who suffered, even unwillingly, this experience, by living in the Caliphate self-proclaimed by Al Baghdadi. In this essay, some courageous residents of Mosul, at the risk of their own and their families’ lives, tell us the reality of a world precluded to us until now, by explaining what really happened, by describing the incredible brutality, but also the efficiency of its administration. Only this way we can understand the Islamic State, its ideas and the reasons prompting thousands of youngsters to join the struggle by fighting in the Syrian-Iraqi theatre, or by simply attacking in the Country they live in. Thanks to these testimonies, the voice of civilians who suffered so much, we can start understanding a region which since years has transformed itself into a powder keg, ready to explode. By understanding what happened, we can learn how to understand IS, whose ideas are not dead neither after the loss of territorial control, nor with the killing of Al Baghdadi, and we will be able to counter the much wider phenomenon of jihadism. CONTENTS Preface by “Mosul Eye” Introduction - The value of a testimony Chapter 1 - Mosul: a city with a millennial history. Did its destruction start with the arrival of the Islamic State men? 1. Nothing is as it seems 2. A step back: Mosul after Saddam’s fall 3. The arrival of the Islamic State men 4. The escape and the return 5. The first weeks under IS control Chapter 2 - The administration of Mosul under the so-called Caliphate 1. The reality between the propaganda by IS and the one by foreign Media e Governments 2. New rules for shops and commercial activities 3. The different aspects of censorship: forbidden music, cinemas still closed, theaters with many restrictions, internet between bans and controls 4. The University with the Islamic State 5. The reorganization of school 6. The education of children: the indoctrination 7. The powerful propaganda machine in the city’s streets 8. The healthcare system: hospitals, first care, clinics, pharmacies 9. The Judiciary System and the Administration of Justice 10. The Police, the Law enforcement Agencies, the Religious Police, the Army and the Security Services 11. The presence of foreign fighters 12. Identity Cards. Passports and voyages overseas 13. The transport system and the mail service 14. The currency and the “taxes” 15. The structure of the state 16. Daily life: some curiosities Chapter 3 - Violence and Crimes: from the unjustified brutality to the treatment reserved to minorities 1. Crimes and Violence: a generalized brutality 2. The treatment reserved to women and an in-depth analysis on sexual intercourses 3. The Kurds 4. The Yazidi and the Yazidi women 5. The Christians 6. The Shiites 7. The Jews 8. The destruction of mausoleums, of the ruins of Nineveh and of the finds presents in the museums. The erasing of any form of image in the daily life 9. The executions Chapter 4 - The fall of the Caliphate and the liberation of Mosul 1. The siege 2. The destruction and the “liberation”: two sides of the same coin 3. The difficult post-IS 4. Which will be the future of Mosul and of its inhabitants? Notes Essential bibliography Introduction – The value of a testimony Even if a lot has been written and said on the Islamic State (IS)[1] and on the so-called Caliphate, self-proclaimed by the terrorist group led by Al Baghdadi in a vast zone included between Syria and Iraq, extremely scarce are today, in fact, the testimonies from the inside. During almost three years IS has controlled and administered a very wide area, inhabited by millions of people, materializing what has always been the dream of many jihadist groups. Still, except the testimonies by those belonging to persecuted minorities, almost no account by citizens who lived, unwillingly, this experience had reached us, at least until today, until when a courageous man, whom we will call Mohammed, and we will say he is a surgeon, as for reasons connected with his personal security I cannot reveal his real identity, came to the fore and started responding to my questions. Led only by the belief that truth has to be known and by the intellectual honesty which has always characterized him, this courageous Iraqi man, a Sunni Arab of a medium-high class, helped by his other gallant citizens (among them some Christians) has risked his own and his family’s life (he is married with three children) on order to allow us Westerns to know and understand the reality of Mosul’s situation. Slightly more than two years ago, without receiving anything in exchange, he has started responding to my question and sending me photographs taken by him or by his friends, so that, little by little this book started its life. Paragraph after paragraph, chapter after chapter, thanks to him I have filled the tiles needed to understand a world so distant and unknown to us, notwithstanding it is since some time at the center of the attention by Western Governments’ and the civilian societies. What is really the Islamic State? What do his men want? Why thousands of youngsters from the whole world had traveled to join it in the construction of the “Caliphate”? Only by knowing what happened in the territory of the Caliphate self-proclaimed by Al Baghdadi, we can learn to know and understand IS, whose ideas are not dead neither with the loss of the territorial control by IS, nor with the killing of its leader. And, after all, only this way we can fight it, because, as Sun Tzu said, the good general must know his enemy, and I assure you that we do not know nor understand it. Only this way, therefore, we will be able to fight the Islamic State and the wider phenomenon of jihadism, at the base of its actions. Only this way we will have some more elements to understand a Region which since years is transforming itself in a powder keg ready to explode. Only this way, too, we will be able to understand why thousands of youngsters have joined it, and went to combat in the Syrian-Iraqi theater, or in other crisis areas, or to simply carry on attacks in the country where they live, and we will be able to reply to the question “why are they attacking us”. ...but mostly because only this way the voice of civilians who suffered so much will be heard and, probably, by letting truth be known, will be able to have justice, as without it there will not be peace! And only by knowing what really happened, and the feelings of individual Iraqi citizens under the territorial control by Al Baghdadi men, we will be able to understand why IS is born, how it developed itself, and by whom it was supported, but also when and under what form it could come back, as it has not been annihilated. The ideas which were at its base have not been destroyed from the outside, and often, when someone tries to cancel ideas without understanding them, by imposing others, not only there is the risk to see them coming back, but in fact their return is favored, even if unwillingly. In addition, it would not be possible to totally eliminate these ideas, as they are in part rooted among the members of some Sunni groups since one century. In this sense the case of Mosul is really interesting, as it was in Iraq that the Islamic State is born. In Iraq, in fact, the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda has succeeded in merging with others “movements” and “feelings”, until the moment it allowed Al Baghdadi to claim, in April 2013, the right to free itself from the control of Al Zawahiri, by proclaiming the annexation of the then Syrian branch of AQ, Al Nusra, and later, in June 2014, from the Great al-Nuri Mosque of Mosul, even to have not any territorial limitation, self-proclaiming that global Caliphate, which, very slowly and patiently, bin Laden first and Al Zawahiri later, have directed Al Qaeda and the actions of the global jihad. Both bin Laden and Al Zawahiri, though, had always estimated that this process required much more time to be enacted, in order to avoid the risk that a Caliphate, established while the timing was not mature, could be crushed by the West, before it had the strength to defend itself and survive attacks[2]. The arrogance and the haste of Al Baghdadi, whose personal rivalry with Al Zawahiri[3] for the leadership of the jihadist galaxy[4] has caused the birth of a harsh competition between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have led to a rapid territorial expansion (so that many spoke about a Blitzkrieg)[5] and later to a quasi-sudden military defeat. But Al Baghdadi actions have also shown that the Caliphate is something more concrete than it might be imagined. IS has, in fact, been able to attract tens of thousands of youngsters from all over the world, thus fomenting a fire which will really extinguish itself only if the right way to do it will be found, and neither the blind repression nor the imposition of exogenous rules appear to be the right way to avoid any faction and Sunny tribes of the Levant (and not only them) regret some aspects of the Caliphate, created by the men in black of the Islamic State. These men, in the name of those which appear to us in the West only delirious theories and rules of a distorted interpretation of Islam, has in fact ruled during three years vast areas, committing unspeakable crimes, but also providing to a wide part of the population those services, that security and that fight against corruption which they waited for since years, and that, with the fall of the so-called Caliphate, have lost again, in the name of a democracy, whose meaning they have sometimes difficulty to fully understand. This testimony will therefore add to the terrible accounts of the crimes committed by IS, well known thanks to the invaluable testimonies of all those have succeeded, during these years, to evade from persecutions (mostly Syrian Shiites and those belonging to the persecuted minorities), also the description of the several aspects of the daily life of a Sunni town at “the time of the self-proclaimed Caliphate of Al Baghdadi”. The city of Mosul, which was with Raqqa one among the two “Capital Towns of the Caliphate” and in fact its main button-hole flower, even if suffocating under iron rules, has continued to carry on a life which was, under some aspects, apparently normal, in spite of what we, in the West, believed. In addition, her economy did not negatively resent from the IS Administration, during the 2014-2016 period[6], even if, starting from mid-2015, due to the bombings carried out by the international coalition and the huge military efforts sustained by IS to defend the Caliphate, the first problems were encountered[7]. It has been analyzed that in the Capital towns of Raqqa and Mosul, some forms of criticality were experienced, for instance starting from 2016 in the sectors of electric supply to private housings and in fuel supply (always for civilian use), but it was something we can probably consider inevitable in the light of the bombings by the international coalition and of the military efforts required to attempt resisting to the attacks of the coalition itself[8]. Greater problems were instead recorded in other towns, far from Raqqa and Mosul, where the efforts were concentrated more on the military presence and the public infrastructures, and less on the supply of services to private housings or on the small businesses. Among the major economic mistakes, it is worth mentioning the fact that the incomes from oil sale were “nationalized” and re-invested mostly in military expenditures, but we will analyze later in detail the positive economic aspects of the nationalization of all types of service put into practice by IS, which succeeded in having total control on all economic activity and, at the same time, decidedly considerable incomes. All in all, the economic regime established was almost totally self-sufficient, and could, at least in the short period, have continued to guarantee the supply of all essential services at rather good levels, had war not crushed inexorably the Caliphate of IS. If we think that recently I was able to speak to Iraqi Curds, who – in the light of present inefficiencies of the post-IS state administration have gone so far as to regret Saddam Hussein, who had used even gas against them, it is easy to understand how those aspects of Mosul daily life appreciated by some slots of Sunni population could with time cause the re-birth of some nostalgia, among the people, for all the good made by the Islamic State. This could happen if nobody will proceed to promptly re-build the city and manage well what the Romans called “res publica”, which for Mosul inhabitants materializes in their own quality of life, in the supply of essential services and in a positive future perspective for their own sons. Two were the key aspects of IS administration: efficiency and brutality. These are therefore the two key points which should guide the reading of any aspect of this testimony, which will often present, in inverted commas, the exact words, (translated into English), used by Mosul inhabitants with whom I spoke, and especially needed when they appear to be strange in the light of beliefs present in the West. I deem appropriate also to clarify that in this book, even if I amply deal with many among those aspects connected to the numerous crimes committed by IS men and to the often unjustified brutality they showed, there will not be lengthy descriptions of the cruel corporal punishments inflicted (which we call tortures), nor of the different modalities used for capital executions (barbaric killings, we would say), nor of the treatment of prisoners nor how corpses were massed in mass graves just outside the city, not because there was not awareness that all that happened, but because this book wants to be the testimony by civilians who lived in the city. I wrote this book to give them a voice and to tell what Mosul inhabitants witnessed personally in the town, and therefore, as for as the atrocities committed by IS, only those which they unfortunately witnessed or suffered directly have been written. It is, probably, the first testimony of this kind, as I often have read the interviews released by escaped victims or by the captured foreign fighters, who sometimes in a disdainful way, often with repentance and scorn tell what they did or saw. Here, instead, we will have for the first time the courageous testimony of the civilians who lived in the city, who normally do not speak, as they fear both IS revenge, which could consider them as spies, and an accusation for collaborationism by Iraqi authorities. Allow me, therefore, to close this introduction by me with many thanks to these courageous citizens, who risked their life in the name of truth, on order to let others know what really happened. A special thanks also goes to Omar Mohammed, the author of Mosul Eye, whose diary / blog has been a beacon for me in the search for Truth for years, and that I can now have the honor of counting among my friends. His Preface, with the story of how the idea of reporting what was happening every day was born in him, and how he worked so that the true History of Mosul was known to the world, enriches this book in an incredible way. Finally, thanks to my husband Ferdinando, who always supports and advises me, and without whose love I would not have been able to complete this book, which sees the light after years of work and research, sometimes in not simple situations. [1] If in this volume it has been decided to name the group led by Al Baghdadi as the Islamic State (IS), it has been done only to refer to the right naming, the name it gave to itself, not to attribute to it nor to deny a state character to that organization. As known, in fact, in April 2013 the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda (AQ), Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), a group which derived directly from the other which, under the guidance of al Zarqawi had, in 2004, beheaded the American journalist Nicholas Berg, thus disobeying to Al Zawahiri and de facto seceding from Al Qaeda, had tried to annex the Syrian branch of AQ, al Nusra, renaming the group Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS, o Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, ISIL). The group lost then any geographic delimitation, upon the proclamation of the Caliphate at the end of June 2014: from this moment on, by referring to the entire land of Ummah, the group calls itself simply Islamic State. IS is the “proper name of the group”. [2] In this sense, exemplary are, for instance, the words of a profound expert on both groups, Fawaz George, who wrote: “[…] from the beginning, ISIS, and its forerunner, ISI, aimed to capture territory and establish a proto-state in the Sunni areas under their nominal control in Iraq and then in Syria. Although Al Qaeda Central and ISIS share the strategic goal of establishing a caliphate, bin Laden and Zawahiri advised patience and argued against hastily declaring either an Islamic state or a caliphate. The West would strangle such a baby before it grew up and could defend itself, bin Laden and Zawahiri told their supporters.” (Fawaz A. Georges, ISIS: A History, Princeton University Press, 2017, 225). [3] When I asked the inhabitants of Mosul if, after years of propaganda by IS, they had an idea on the consideration that the group of Al Baghdadi had on the two historic founders of Al Qaeda, the reply I received was, while Al Zawahiri was evidently considered a traitor, a profound admiration was always reserved to bin Laden. [4] See Quadarella Sanfelice di Monteforte Laura, Why we are under attack. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the "do-it-yourself" terrorism, Rome, 2017, 37-38: “there are mostly two levels on which the competition between AQ and IS has been carried on, one including the groups vowing fidelity to one or another among the two networks and the other related to the recruitment of youngsters, who come from the whole world to join the “cause” and the “struggle” brought forward in the crisis theaters of several areas of the world, as well as in the West, through the so-called “do-it-yourself” terrorism. Regarding the competition aimed at attracting pre- existing jihadist groups, or their battalions, it should be clarified, since the outset, that whole AQ has always been very rigid in validating any group as its own affiliate, and this implied that the group added to its local agenda those of the central organization, IS has allowed any group to use its own “mark”, creating a sort of franchising of terror. The group, vowing fidelity to IS, is immediately accepted by IS leaders, regardless of its “purity”, can make use of its flag, and must become only nominally a new province of the Caliphate: this is an operation where all parties benefit from a significant media return. A similar consideration applies to the other level of competition be- tween AQ and IS: any youngster can become a “soldier of the Caliphate” and choose whether to go and fight in the Syrian-Iraqi theater, or to become a “do-it-yourself” terrorist, in the name of the Caliphate, even if his behavior in life has not complied, so far, to the rules of the “pure Islam”. Also thanks to this “policy”, IS has attracted dozens of thousands of youngsters, coming from all continents, who are backing IS more or less openly, up to fighting for it in their countries of origin or in the Syrian-Iraqi theater. ” [5] This German term indicates mostly the lightning war waged by Germany at the beginning of World War Two. [6] In this sense see also: Robinson, Eric, Daniel Egel, Patrick B. Johnston, Sean Mann, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and David Stebbins, When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, in https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1970.html [7] In the RAND report, about the city of Mosul, it is reported: “Our analysis of satellite imagery suggests that Mosul’s markets were more active after ISIL takeover than immediately prior and that ISIL oversaw new construction in the main market area of the city. Thermal data on the heat output of industrial areas within Mosul also suggest that local factories remained active, on average. Commercial vehicle traffic on Mosul’s roads persisted. In all, commercial activity within Mosul appears to have persisted at levels roughly comparable to levels seen before ISIL takeover. Despite this early economic stability, Mosul began to show some signs of economic strain before efforts to liberate the city began in 2016. Analysis of nighttime lighting over Mosul reveals that electricity consumption was staggeringly low within the city. The group proved unable to bring fuel resources into the city to match pre-takeover levels of electricity. Islamic State efforts to directly intervene in Mosul’s cement industry appear to have dampened thermal and nighttime lighting activity at one major industrial facility (the Badush Cement Factory) in the long run. Population estimates based on remote sensing data suggest that nearly 200,000 people fled the city between February 2015 and March 2016, despite efforts by the Islamic State to prevent residents of its caliphate from fleeing.” (Robinson, Eric, Daniel Egel, Patrick B. Johnston, Sean Mann, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and David Stebbins, When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria, RAND Corporation, cit., XX). Overall, the economic problems which became evident in the cities under IS control, nonetheless, were due in great part to the war waged against the international coalition “Military pressure on ISIL-held areas has dampened economic activity and prevented ISIL from fully governing according to its stated goals.” (Robinson, Eric, Daniel Egel, Patrick B. Johnston, Sean Mann, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and David Stebbins, When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria, RAND Corporation, cit., XXV). [8] In this sense see again: Robinson, Eric, Daniel Egel, Patrick B. Johnston, Sean Mann, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and David Stebbins, When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, in https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1970.html