Mexican Cartel Adaptation and Innovation

Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) – commonly called drug cartels – are challenging states and their institutions in increasingly brutal and profound ways. This is seen dramatically in Mexico's drug wars and the expanding reach of Mexican organized criminal enterprises throughout Latin America and other parts of the world. This essay updates a 1998 paper ‘Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences’ and examines current cartel and gang interactions. The paper links discussion of cartel phases to gang generations; updates and applies the discussion of third phase cartel potentials to Mexico; and assesses four alternative futures for Mexico, as well as their cross-border implications for the United States.

Trends in Organized Crime, 2013

Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 4, No 2 Summer, pp. 55-74, 1998

The first-phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980's in response to the increasing demand for cocaine in the United States. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellin model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970's. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence, uncompromising nature, and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state. The Medellin model was hierarchical and revolved around its kingpin, Pablo Escobar. The second phase of the cartel form also originally developed in Colombia in the city of Cali. Unlike its Medellin counterpart, the Cali group, which emerged in the early 1980's, was a shadowy organization devoid of an actual kingpin. Its organization was more distributed and network-like, rather than traditionally hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were stealth-masked and dispersed, thereby providing many operational capabilities not possessed by the first-phase cartel form. Third-phase cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose an even more significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A third-phase cartel would result from unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions. Although this "criminal state successor" has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many States worldwide. Such an entity would challenge our current institutions and, at least during a transitional period, could be expected to exploit corruption, co-option, terrorism, crime, and violence toward its ends.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a ‘criminal insurgency’ against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space—ranging from ‘failed communities’ to ‘failed regions’—will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as ‘lawless zones,’ ‘ungoverned spaces,’ ‘other governed spaces,’ or ‘zones of impunity’) where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or ‘criminal enclaves’ in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into ‘accidental guerrillas’ and ‘social bandits’ will be explored through the lens of ‘third generation gang’ theory and ‘power-counter power’ relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a 'criminal insurgency' against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space -- ranging from 'failed communities' to 'failed regions' -- will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as 'lawless zones,' 'ungoverned spaces,' 'other governed spaces,' or 'zones of impunity') where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or 'criminal enclaves' in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into 'accidental guerrillas' and 'social bandits' will be explored through the lens of 'third generation gang' theory and 'power-counter power' relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

2011

International Journal on Criminology, 2024

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal car- tels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third gen- eration) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence opera- tions involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies.

Mexidata, 2010

This essay looks at emerging perspectives of counterinsurgency (COIN) including responses to small wars and 'criminal' insurgencies.

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2019

The explosion of the drug trade has sent analysts scurrying for reliable sources. Given the prominence of Mexico in, particularly, the distribution chain, the assessment of Nathan P. Jones bears a relook. For he provides an in-depth qualitative look at the relationship between the business strategies of Mexican drug networks (territorial and transactional), the level of risk associated with each model, state reactions to these models, and the level of resilience these organizations have. His intent is to determine: (1) What makes these illicit networks resilient, and (2) why states attack some illicit networks more aggressively than others? The author uses a comprehensive historical case study of the AFO (Arellano Felix Organization), better known as the Tijuana Cartel, to answer these questions and provide the field of study with a state-reaction framework, as well as a continuumbased typology of Mexican drug network resilience. He then tests his AFO-based state-reaction framework by exploring its validity in relation to three other Mexicobased drug networks. His findings are derived from extensive archival court document research, reports from governments and media outlets, and an academic year of fieldwork in Tijuana and Mexico City, complemented by 32 in-depth interviews (totaling 80 hours). The interview participants include journalists, scholars, both US and Mexican law enforcement officials, government officials, businessmen, organized-crime victims, and inadvertently, traffickers. Jones begins with a brief introduction to profit-seeking illicit networks (PSIN), a description of drug networks through a globalization lens, and a section covering his fieldwork and data collection. Chapter 1 provides the conceptual framework of the state-reaction argument, which suggests that state reaction to drug networks can be explained by the type of drug network business model used by the network and the level of risk involved in carrying out that business model. State reaction to drug networks, in turn, can determine network resilience. The chapter provides a useful-list of 26 business strategy characteristics of transactional and territorial networks and a flow-chart showing the lifecycle of drug networks. Chapter 2 applies the state-reaction framework and explains the process through the AFO case study, focusing upon critical junctures and the dynamic structure of the network over time. Chapter 3 provides examples of the numerous national and local state-reactions to the AFO and the El Teo network, concluding that the strength of state institutions and their democratic transition is related to the strength of state-reaction, which affects the resilience of drug networks. Chapter 4 uses smaller case studies of three other Mexican drug networks (Los Zetas, Los Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartel), and provides detailed