12
THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA
IN THE CHARACTER
ASSASSINATION OF
WORLD LEADERS IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Greg Simons
Propaganda has traditionally been considered a passive form of communication where the “con-
sumer” has little or no opportunity to provide feedback to the communicator. It has also, by
virtue of its nature, aimed for a more transactional relationship between the messenger and the
target public. However, the development of modern information communication technology
has been instrumental in changing the dynamics of propaganda, particularly as they relate to key
events and people within international affairs.
Traditional mass media (radio, television and print) have long held significant “gatekeeping”
power and ability to persuade and influence audiences; they still do. Today, however, there are
new voices on the media landscape. Social media – and social media groups, in particular – allow
like-minded individuals, regardless of where they are geographically located, to meet virtually
and engage in many-to-many discussion of what they consider to be important issues. Such
dynamics create relational partnerships between this collective of individuals.
Political marketing, based on notions of relational marketing and mutually beneficial exchange
between communicator and target audience, is considered an active form of communication
which is intended to shape people and events in the political environment ( Johansen, 2012;
Newman, 1999; Ormrod, Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2013). Notably, not all researchers see
political marketing as positive. Instead, they view it as a subversion of democracy that discon-
nects the public from the political process (Savigny, 2008).
Political marketing is normally associated with a particular country’s political environment,
but it is becoming apparent that it can also operate at the international level (Simons, 2018). It is
the intention of this chapter to explore and analyse possible linkages between political market-
ing, propaganda and character assassination within the specific context of projections of world
leaders caught in crises that are connected to iconic events in international affairs. The first step
is to examine if such linkages are possible from a theoretical/conceptual perspective. Next, it is
necessary to detail and analyse those linkages, testing them with empirical data. Finally comes
the question of whether there are any common means of attacking a world leader’s intangibles
within the context of international events.
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This chapter concerns the convergence of propaganda, character assassination and political
marketing within a negative political campaign that is intended to adversely affect the target’s
intangible assets (image, brand and reputation) such as to eventually affect his or her tangible
abilities (the ability to sway an audience and narrow possible operational choices of the target
of CA). Such campaigns are often waged within the framework of a political crisis, which is
represented by an iconic event. This chapter uses the examples of Vladimir Putin and the shoot-
ing down of MH-17 over Ukraine and the media reporting on Donald Trump around the
November 2016 US presidential election. Outwardly, the two cases display some differences:
they relate to different countries and political systems, one involves a head of state and the other
a prospective head of state, the incidents took place on different continents. At the tangible level,
one case involves the loss of non-combatants’ lives in an armed conflict, the other an alleged
attack on the fundamental values of a national political system. In both cases, however, at the
intangible level, well-known political and public figures were subjected to an emotion-based
character assassination campaign.
Political Marketing and Political Actors
The focus of this particular section is on political marketing, but not from the traditional per-
spective of the discipline. Traditionally, the objective of political marketing is to make a political
product more attractive in the political market. In this instance, by contrast, the goal is to severely
compromise the political image and reputation of a political actor to the extent that it begins to
affect the target’s operational capacity and choices. It is the goal of this chapter to delve into the
field of anti-marketing and the attempt to “brand-jack” a political image and brand. First, how-
ever, it is necessary to recap the current state of political marketing and its objectives, particularly
as these relate to the political persona.
Political marketing currently assumes an active form of communication that engages com-
municators and the target audience in a mutually beneficial relationship. These aspects and ele-
ments are stressed in different definitions of the term and practice of political marketing:
Political marketing is a perspective from which to understand phenomena in the polit-
ical sphere, and an approach that seeks to facilitate political exchanges of value through
interactions in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental markets to manage rela-
tionships with stakeholders.
(Ormrod, Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2013, p. 18)
[Political marketing involves] the processes of exchanges and establishing, maintaining,
and enhancing relationships among objects in the political market (politicians, political
parties, voters, interest groups, institutions), whose goal is to identify and satisfy their
needs and develop political leadership.
(Cwalina, Falkowski and Newman, 2011, p. 17)
These definitions highlight that ideally, political marketing involves active relational engage-
ment and mutually beneficial outcomes. Public opinion is one means of determining whether
attempts to market a political actor are working: “Success in politics is measured by the ability
of a leader to move public opinion in the direction he or she wants to move” (Newman, 1999,
p. 46). In this chapter, the success of a negative marketing campaign is measured by its ability to
reduce the popularity and approval ratings of its target in opinion polls.1
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The popularity of a political actor is linked to the public perception of his or her intangible
qualities. Emotions therefore play an important role in the public’s perception and evaluation of
key political figures: “Politics comes down to our gut reactions about politicians and their ideas.
The emotions that we feel when we watch leaders are an integral part of how we judge politi-
cians” (Newman, 1999, p. 89). Newman refers to politics as a “national game,” observing that
“marketing is now the name of the game, and political consultants are the coaches and managers
who determine the outcome, with the media serving as umpires” (1999, p. 18).
Within this emotional setting emerges the notion of a brand: “Branding is about how a
political organisation or individual is perceived overall. It is broader than the product; whereas
a product has a functional purpose, a brand offers something additional, which is more psycho-
logical and less tangible” (Lees-Marshment, 2009, p. 110). An individual’s strategic positioning
within the broader political market and personal brand are central in determining his or her suc-
cess or failure. Johansen (2012, p. 40) contends that the outcome “relies principally on competi-
tion as the ultimate driver of action at all levels of the ‘market’ ”: the resonance of an individual’s
brand and perceptions of his or her effectiveness are influenced not only by the qualities the
individual projects, but also by the perceived qualities of his or her competitors.
Cwalina, Falkowski and Newman (2011, pp. 158–159) “consider emotions as a separate ele-
ment not only influencing voters’ behaviours, but also shaping the way of perceiving a candi-
date’s agenda and receiving political information broadcast by the media.” Thus, the aspects of
emotion, communication and perception interact and influence one another in a contextual
relationship:
In covering the prevailing power struggle, there is typically increased emphasis on the
actors’ appearance, autobiography and leadership qualities, as well as their policies. This
personality-based coverage has both been a response to and encouraged the use of a
coterie of media specialists.
(Stanyer and Wring, 2004, p. 2)
This quotation demonstrates the importance of a projected communication-based percep-
tion in shaping the value quality of an actor’s intangible qualities (and implied tangible quali-
ties and abilities). Castells notes that politics is largely based upon socialised communication
and its capacity to influence people’s minds. In this sense, the distribution of political power
is determined by the media: “In our society, politics is primarily media politics. The work-
ings of the political system are staged for the media so as to obtain the support, or at least
lesser hostility, of citizens, who become the consumers in the political market” (Castells, 2007,
p. 240). In similar fashion, elements of the political system may also be staged for and by the
media to create the greatest amount of hostility and resistance toward a political actor and/
or their policies.
This intentional destruction of a person’s reputation brings us into the field of character
assassination. Character assassination is defined as “the deliberate destruction of an individual’s
reputation . . . ‘Character assassins’ target the private lives, behaviour, values, and identity of
their victims. Biographical details are altered or fabricated. Intimate features are made public.
Achievements are questioned. Good intentions are doubted” (Icks and Shiraev, 2014, p. 4). The
goal is to attack the moral standing of the target in the eyes of the public and to provoke a nega-
tive emotional response to the object of character assassination. Some theorists have noted an
overlap between propaganda and modern political marketing (Scammell, 2014, p. 15). This does
not, however, mean that the two are exactly the same. One significant difference is that political
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marketing contains the “promise” of reciprocity in the communicational relationship, whereas
propaganda does not (Scammell, 2014, p. 33).
An approach that takes into account political marketing and character assassination is the
notion of obstructive marketing. This concept is often misunderstood, as when it is assumed to
involve negative marketing. However, obstructive marketing is much more complex than this
rather simplistic view. It can be defined as:
Any process, ethical and legal or not, which prevents or restricts the distribution of a
product or service, temporarily or permanently, against the wishes of society, sharehold-
ers, management, staff or procedures of the product manufacturer, service provider or
customer.
(Hyslop, 2014, p. 11)
From this definition, it is clear that obstructive marketing plays an oppositional role in the
image and/or brand of a product or service. This can be applied to adversely affect a public
figure’s image and brand. Within the context of a politician’s reputation and brand, obstructive
marketing aims to erode a politician’s competitive edge in order to reduce his or her operational
capacity and choices. This can be done in at least two ways: product depreciation – “doing a product
down in some way” (Hyslop, p. 52) – and product contamination – “where the product becomes
damaged in some way” (Ibid). These methods attack a politician’s most vulnerable front: his or
her intangible value and perception. In the current informational environment, the “Internet is
a rich source of information and a conduit for obstructive marketing” (Hyslop, p. 223).
Attempts to “brand-jack” a politician provide an opportunity for the perpetrator to condi-
tion an audience to develop a negative political relationship if that person loses control of their
projected public image. The next logical step is to create a “spark” that ignites the indignation
of a primed audience, such as by putting the now-negative persona into a concrete public event
laced with negative political symbolism, with the goal of transforming intangible feelings and
emotions into tangible expressions and actions.
Propaganda and the Significance of Iconic Events
The definition of the word “propaganda” is every bit as controversial as its use. This term has
connotations of manipulation, brainwashing, and excessive use by Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union. At a superficial level, it seems to represent a practice and goal that is utterly alien and
counter to a free and democratic society (Taylor, 2003).
There are numerous definitional points of departure for understanding the word “propa-
ganda.” Conserva (2003, p. iii) describes it as “organised persuasion [which] involves the dis-
semination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies, deceptions, distortions,
exaggerations and censorship.” Taylor (2003, p. 6) considers propaganda “the deliberate attempt
to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way . . . the conscious, methodical and
planned decisions to employ techniques of persuasion designed to achieve specific goals that are
intended to benefit those organising the process.”
Propaganda involves not only tangible acts, but also intangible expectation, as Pratkanis and
Aronson (2001, p. 11) relate:
The word propaganda has since evolved to mean mass “suggestion” or “influence”
through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. Propaganda
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involves the dextrous use of images, slogans, and symbols that play on our prejudices
and emotions; it is the communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of
having the recipient of the appeal to come to “voluntarily” accept this position as if it
were his or her own.
Like political marketing, propaganda is an act of communication and relies on eliciting an
emotional response from its target audience, but is inherently deceptive in some shape and
form. Nor is there any intention to build and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship. That
being said, propaganda comes in many shapes and forms, and not all of it is harmful in nature
(Shabo, 2008; Taylor, 2003). Shabo claims that through careful study it is possible to recognise
examples of propaganda by its persuasive function, sizeable target audience, representation of a
specific group’s agenda, and use of faulty reasoning and/or emotional appeals (Shabo, 2008, p. 5).
Its intention is to affect the thoughts and/or behaviour of the target audience in a manner that
benefits the communicator.
Thus, the issue is one of influence: the messenger seeks to affect his target audience in some
pre-determined manner. To stand a chance of success, this requires a specific and methodical
approach. According to Pratkanis and Aronson (2001, p. 51), the four stratagems of influence are:
1. Create a climate that is conducive to the communicator’s message, enabling him or her to
take control of the situation via pre-persuasion. This establishes “common knowledge” and
what “everybody knows.”
2. Establish source credibility. To do this,“the communicator needs to appear likeable or author-
itative or trustworthy or possessed of any other attribute that would facilitate persuasion.”
3. Construct and delivering a message that focuses the audience’s attention on what the com-
municator wants.
4. Seek to control the emotions of the target audience: “Arouse an emotion and then offer
the target a way of responding to that emotion that just happens to be the desired course
of action.”
This approach suggests that it is necessary to consider carefully not only the message, but
also the wider political and social environment, if the goals and objectives of the messenger
are to stand any chance of success. Patrick (2012, p. 10) argues that “more than a mere set of
techniques, propaganda is situational in nature. It is an organised bid for the right to interpret
meaning in a given set of circumstances.” The right message needs to hit the right audience at
the right time and in the right circumstances. It is meant to increase the perception of a simple
subjective reality, but the process of deployment is complex.
Propaganda can be used to effectively create a simplistic bipolar world for an audience. It can
create divisions through the projection of real or imagined differences between the audience
and the target of the propaganda. According to Patrick (2012, p. 142), this approach plays on
an existing human tendency to dehumanise or personalise based upon certain wants or needs
in everyday life: “Personalisation occurs quite naturally via everyday language, symbolic or
spoken.” In propaganda, this personalisation is carried out by a communicator with a political
agenda, and it is done in a rather simplistic manner:
Negative personalisation or dehumanisation of people or things attributes undesirable
and decidedly non-virtuous attributes worthy of censure; provoking disgust, outrage,
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Greg Simons
enmity; robbing people of essential humanity; makes them seem evil, crazy, uncultured
or stupid.
(Patrick, 2012, p. 143)
This negative projection of a personal image and brand is intended to form a negative politi-
cal relationship between the audience and the target of character assassination. Language, with its
ability to shape an emotional perception of a projected reality, is a critical aspect of the process:
“The language in which ideas are expressed is critical to defining a cause or strategy, and sets
forth the story, plot, and narrative that underlies a strategy as well as its themes and messages”
(Farwell, 2012, p. 57). However, other tools are also salient.
One of these is symbols and symbolism. Embedded in every symbol are a number of associ-
ated values and norms. To quote Farwell (2012, p. 79), “Symbols matter, especially for identity
politics, and in today’s world, identity motivates political activity. . . . Symbols can provide points
of reference that ground a campaign.” That being said, it should be noted that people interpret
symbols differently; it is far from a uniform process.
Key historical events, their propagation and perception are potent and powerful symbols to
publics. Historical events form a central part of a society’s collective memory through a shared
narrative and experience. Exceptional historical moments and iconic events play a role in shap-
ing values, norms and morals by communicating ideas. These ideas serve to “instruct” members
of a society on acceptable or unacceptable thoughts and actions, a categorisation that is influ-
enced by media coverage of those iconic events. This creates a myth-like aura surrounding the
moment, which can be exploited for different purposes.
Iconic events take shape in different ways. From the moment they occur, certain events
seem to occupy a disproportionate space in the culture. The media fixates on these
events, which, in turn, alerts the public to the event’s unique significance. The press
thus engages in a tautology: the event is historically exceptional and it gets endless
coverage, thus reinforcing its historical exceptionality.
(Leavy, 2007, p. 3)
An event that can, in the presence of political marketing and propaganda, be transformed
into an iconic event is intended to activate an emotional logic in the target audience. Specifi-
cally, it is meant to induce outrage in said audience in order to create an information environment
where pathos dominates. Sobieraj and Berry (2011, p. 20) use the term “outrage” in reference to
a particular form of political discourse involving efforts to provoke visceral responses (e.g., anger,
righteousness, fear, moral indignation) from the audience through the use of over-generalisations,
sensationalism, misleading or patiently inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks, and partial
truths about opponents, who may be individuals, organisations, or entire communities of interest
or circumstance. Outrage sidesteps the messy nuances of complex political issues in favour of mel-
odrama, misrepresentative exaggeration, mockery, and improbable forecasts of impending doom.
Inducing a negative emotional response from a target audience means that it is easier for a
communicator to manipulate that audience should they accept the premises of the communica-
tor’s argument and the projected truth. Audiences are conditioned and primed when their deci-
sions are not based on a reasoned weighing of informational pros and cons, but instead derived
from faulty perceptions and logic. These factors affect the reception and perception of political
brands, which is linked to the identification and differentiation of a brand: whether publics are
able to recall the political actor’s name and if the brand sets this actor apart from other political
actors (Nielsen, 2016, p. 71).
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How does this play out in the arena of international affairs when key political figures are
targeted with character assassination? To answer this question, this chapter looks at two cases:
Vladimir Putin and the shooting down of MH-17 over Ukraine and media coverage of Donald
Trump during the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election. In
this instance, political brand is instrumentalised as negative political marketing, with the goal of
damaging the reputation and status of a political actor.
Using Character Assassination and Iconic Events
in International Affairs
Method
In July 2016, we performed a Google search to generate a sample of media material for the case
study presented in the next section. The search involved the following keywords: Vladimir Putin
+ MH17 shot down + 17 July 2014. These searches were conducted in the English language only.
The search generated about 35,600 results.
Given the sheer volume of results generated, it was necessary to establish criteria for sort-
ing the results. The articles needed to relate specifically to the exact incident and to contain
elements of some of the following: character assassination, propaganda, political marketing and
obstructive marketing. Blogs and social media posts were excluded, while media material from
professional media outlets was included. (Professional media are considered to be those outlets
where journalists conduct professional work, whether or not the informational product is sold
or available for free.)
Having established these criteria, the first fifteen pages of Google results were manually
checked and analysed by the author for the aforementioned characteristics. In September 2017,
another Google search was conducted for the second case, which used the following search
criteria: Donald Trump + Vladimir Putin + 2016 Presidential Election. The latter search generated
about 8,440,000 results. Again, articles on the first fifteen pages of search results were then man-
ually inspected and analysed. Results were excluded if they were published after January 2017
and if they did not contain a character assassination reference that had a negative association
with Vladimir Putin.
This process narrowed down the number of articles to 100 for the Putin case and sixty-one
articles for the Trump case. Each article was analysed in terms of the nature and style of its rhetoric.
Articles needed to demonstrate intent to perpetrate information bias against the actor. Content
analysis sought to critically interrogate the nature of the negative informational characteristics and
traits that were used to project a negative emotional picture to the media consumer, and ask what (if
any) relationship basis could be formed between the messenger and the content consumer. In both
cases, certain descriptions of the two political actors recurred. On the basis of these, different cat-
egories of labels and traits associated with Putin or Trump were elaborated and then used to deter-
mine what kind of alternative political image was being projected by this obstructive marketing.
The strength of this method is that it provides an overview of the public political discourse
surrounding a given event, such as the two cases being analysed. Various attempts to shape the
debate using negative political discourse in the public information space are identified and
tracked. Professional media outlets (those which pursue media content as a business), by virtue
of carrying such public information, are well positioned to potentially influence public percep-
tions of – and reactions to – the news.
A potential weakness of the approach is that it struggles to identify the underlying motives
(desired outcomes) and actors involved in the production and distribution of this information.
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In addition, it is unable to accurately measure the effect of the information disseminated on the
publics that consume it. (The author does not take a moral or ethical stance on these debate-
shaping approaches, as this is not germane to the subject of the chapter, which is focused on the
practical aspects of the processes being described.)
Vladimir Putin and MH 17
On 17 July 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was beginning a scheduled flight from Amster-
dam to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia when it was struck and shot down with what was likely to be
a Surface-to-Air missile while over Ukraine. Some 298 passengers and crew were killed in the
incident (Koren, 2016). Russia was assigned direct or indirect blame for what had happened; in
a number of reports, Putin was held personally accountable. The lifespan of the attempt to use
this particular iconic event as a means to hobble the image and reputation of Putin was, how-
ever, short-lived. It was most intense in the immediate aftermath of the crash and flared again in
2016, when it was announced that some of the victims’ families were going to sue Russia and
President Putin.
Some mainstream news reporting uses assertion propaganda to back up its attempts at char-
acter assassination, exploiting questionable medical diagnoses and false logic. The main aim of
these tactics is to try to demonstrate that Putin is dangerous and cannot be reasoned with like a
“normal,” rational person. Take, for example, a headline in the British newspaper The Independ-
ent: “President Putin is a Dangerous Psychopath – Reason is Not Going to Work With Him”
(Smith, 2015). The author offers no medical credentials that might suggest she has the expert
knowledge to make such a diagnosis; the content of the article is full of catchphrases and buz-
zwords: “Russian aggression,” responsibility for the act of shooting down MH-17, appeasement.
Putin himself is vilified as a dangerous, power-hungry and unpredictable leader.
In these media reports, character assassination takes the form described by Icks and Shiraev
(2014): it is a deliberate act to contaminate (Hyslop, 2014) Putin’s political reputation. Take
another headline: “Malaysia Air MH-17: Vladimir Putin Gets Away With Murder” (Streiff,
2014). The article provides no hard evidence of the claim advanced in the headline; in fact, it
offers nothing more than hearsay and conjecture. Nevertheless, the case is presented as being
open-and-shut. It can thus be concluded that the headline is attempting to induce readers to
feel outrage at a crime that has purportedly gone unpunished. A third headline – “The Malaysia
Airlines Disaster Is Vladimir Putin’s Lockerbie Bombing” (Karatnycky, 2014) – goes further,
actually accusing Putin of terrorism. Once again, the author uses assertion propaganda to influ-
ence readers.
Other narrative categories associated with stories about MH-17 are the role of deception and
misdirection in covering Putin’s guilt. “The goal of Putin’s propaganda is the same: to suggest
a one percent probability that someone other than Kremlin terrorists brought down the plane”
(Gregory, 2014). Articles often assign blame on the basis of nothing more than rumour or par-
tial/circumstantial information. In a particularly explicit personalisation of guilt, one headline
declares, “Shocking MH17 Report Says Vladimir Putin’s Missile Crashes Plane!” (Ong, 2016)
These are far from isolated cases. The Guardian produced a lengthy “human-interest” story titled
“Flight MH17, Two Years On: ‘As Far as I’m Concerned, Putin Killed My Son’” (Harding,
2016), which combines an emotional story with a non-expert (in law or forensics) opinion.
Of the myriad avenues of character assassination and slurs, by far the most popular was Putin’s
presumed responsibility for the deaths that occurred with the shooting-down of MH-17 (twenty-
six mentions), followed by deception/lies, with eleven mentions. Third place was taken by char-
acterisations of Putin as reckless/unpredictable, which received six mentions. (For a complete list
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Reckless/Unpredictable (6)
Psychopath/Dangerous (2)
Aggressive/Sadis c (4)
Power-Hungry/Dictator (4)
Outcast/Pariah (4)
Lies/Decep on (11)
Guilty/Responsible (26)
Figure 12.1 CA Categories Used on Putin
Please note that a maximum of one of each category was recorded for each article, even if this category appeared
more than once in the article. The total number of articles examined and analysed was 100.
Source: Created by author
of the different categories, please see Figure 12.2 at the end of this section.) These accusations,
which were presented as truth, were often based upon circumstantial evidence or rumour/hear-
say. This is in line with Patrick’s (2012) observation in the field of propaganda studies that dehu-
manisation of a target occurs on a personal level that is based upon certain basic needs and wants.
These character assassination categories are designed to deprive the targeted individual of their
essential humanity, creating a political reputation that is intended to provoke disgust or outrage.
MH-17 provides a reference point for political activity, namely character assassination of
Putin. Western media activity is not exceptional in this regard: a number of articles have high-
lighted an apparent bias in media reporting on Russia and on Putin (Carden, 2016; Hart, 2014).
In this particular case, articles engaging in content-based propaganda and character assassination
came from a diverse array of countries.
The character assassination of Putin surrounding the shooting-down of MH-17 appears to
have been aimed at mobilising the political support of an international public. It is important
to understand the context of these attacks: another actor (a competitor) stands to gain if Putin’s
popularity and support decline.
Donald Trump: “Putin’s Preferred Candidate” in the 2016
Presidential Election Campaign
In order to contextualise the symbolism and nature of the character assassination attacks on
Donald Trump during the November 2016 presidential elections in the United States, it is first
necessary to understand the significance of this election to the American political system and its
connection to national identity. These are very emotional attachments, associations and percep-
tions. As such, they can form the basis for an environment of inflamed passion that can prime
and mobilise an audience. Asked about the iconic symbolism of the presidential elections and
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what they had the power to affect, political marketing professor Bruce I. Newman of De Paul
University responded, “Everything! As you know, political leadership is the ultimate symbol,
and symbols drive the behaviour of the nation. Ultimately, the identity of the country will be
defined internally through laws and externally through relationships with other countries.”2
Following Leavy (2007, p. 3), the presidential election can also be understood as an iconic
event due to its perceived ability to occupy significant emotional psychological resonance in the
national culture and identity of the United States. Therefore, any perceived attempt to ‘meddle’
in it is can be perceived as an attack on the viability and legitimacy of that ‘scared’ identity. Any
person or event with the potential to damage or disrupt this identity is likely to induce outrage
among the public, as noted by Sobieraj and Berry (2011, p. 20). To synthesise these insights,
symbols matter greatly in identity politics: they identify, motivate and drive political activity. The
case of Trump and the 2016 presidential election clearly illustrates this point.
An exploration of the media coverage surrounding Trump and the 2016 election reveals
a number of different suggestions and associations regarding the alleged relationship between
then-candidate Donald Trump and Russia (or Russian president Vladimir Putin). These char-
acter assassinations seemed to play different roles depending on whether they were perpetrated
before or after Election Day. Those that came before the election apparently aimed at rendering
Trump unelectable by stigmatising him and causing reputational damage. Those that came after-
ward were seemingly directed at making his presidency untenable for exactly the same reasons.
One of the lines of character assassination is the suggestion that Trump is Putin’s puppet; a sec-
ond strand was the dangerous collusion between Trump and Putin/Russia. Other observed means
of propaganda and character assassination were: the Trump-Putin relationship; that Trump is Putin’s
(and Russia’s) preferred candidate; Trump’s alleged collusion with Russia and Putin; various connections
and communications between Trump and Putin; and the narrative that Putin and Russia were celebrating
Trump’s election success. The rest of this section will be devoted to identifying and analysing the
different highlighted values and norms in each of these categories and the significance of using
them in terms of possible desired outcome.
The first slogan/catchphrase used to damage and taint Trump’s political brand and reputa-
tion was the accusation that he was Putin’s puppet. The phrase was coined by Hilary Clinton
during the very heated final presidential debate of the election cycle (Engle, 2016; Gibson, 2016;
Krieg and Berlinger, 2016). One article to make extensive use of this slur appeared in Slate.
The article deploys suggestive phrasing and innuendo in an attempt to establish some kind of
subversive connection between Putin and Trump. The “Putin’s puppet” assertion refers to the
narrative that Putin is seeking to destroy the West: “If the Russian president could design a
candidate to undermine American interests – and advance his own – he’d look a lot like Donald
Trump.” The article concludes with the judgment that “Donald Trump’s ego compounds his
naiveté. He’s vulnerable to flattery; his confidence in himself exceeds his intellectual capacities.
All of this makes him particularly susceptible to exploitation, an easy mark” (Foer, 2016). This
assertion is used as “proof ” of the assumed hierarchy of the alleged Trump-Putin relationship.
Not coincidentally, the publication of the article was timed to coincide with an iconic and
highly symbolic moment in US nationhood, the Fourth of July, thus giving the article particular
political resonance. Clinton’s characterisation of Trump and then the Slate article managed to
spark debate as to whether Trump was Putin’s puppet – and, if so, to what degree. Some arti-
cles did question whether Trump was really Putin’s puppet (Rubin, 2017; Trudolyubov, 2016),
while others asked what it meant to refer to Trump as Putin’s puppet (Scarola, 2016) and still
others discussed the phrase in terms of its operationalisation (as a means to confound actual and
potential supporters) (San Diego Union-Tribune, 2017). Another set of articles and opinion
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pieces tended to speculate on the breadth and depth of his assumed “guilt” (Benen, 2016a; Han-
son, 2016; Huang, 2017).
An article in Inverse, the main argument of which was that Trump was Putin’s puppet, also
develops a line of argumentation on the potentially dangerous nature of collusion between
Putin and Trump. “On multiple occasions, Trump has taken the opportunity to express his
admiration for Putin and disdain for the current position of the United States” (Scarola, 2016).
Thus, if the audience believes that Putin is a negative influence, then Trump is guilty by asso-
ciation. The supposed strength of the “relationship” between Trump and Putin is asserted in a
New York Times article headlined “Donald Trump’s Campaign Stands By Embrace of Putin,”
which elaborates a purported dissonance between the “reality” of the allegedly warm relation-
ship between Trump and Putin, on the one hand, and the “growing discomfort” of that relation-
ship for US society, on the other (Martin and Chozick, 2016).
In an opinion piece, George Will used various propagandistic assertions to assassinate the
characters of Trump and Putin. He stated that, “Putin is again following Hitler’s playbook”
and echoed the Slate assessment of Trump as Putin’s puppet in describing Trump’s purported
“validation” of Putin’s anti-Western machinations (Will, 2016). Indeed, numerous suggestions
and associations involved comparisons with Neville Chamberlain and the Munich Conference.
The use of this analogy implies that its users have a limited understanding of historical events or
alternatively believe the consumers are lacking in this knowledge.
Trump’s remark that Russia should hack Clinton’s email triggered heated debate, sparking a
number of articles that spoke of Trump aiding and abetting one of the United States’ longstand-
ing geopolitical adversaries (Crowley, 2016). One example is an article headlined “The Dangers
of the Putin-Trump Relationship” (Frum, 2016), which used a hypothetical scenario of what
might happen should Trump be elected to foster fear in readers, with the goal of damaging the
resonance of Trump’s political brand with voters.
The next theme to be identified and analysed is the Trump-Putin relationship, which assumes
that a close personal bond exists between them. One of the narrative strands within this theme
is the so-called “bromance” between Putin and Trump (Schatz, 2016; Thiessen, 2016). Other
articles go so far as to describe the alleged relationship between Trump and Putin as a “lovefest”
(Hendrickson, 2016). Donald Trump’s actual or implied praise of Russia is a particular focus,
with outlets such as the BBC comparing Trump’s assumed stance on Russia with that of Obama
(BBC News, 2016). The logic of fear is used to try to influence voters’ perceptions, encouraging
them to avoid the “dire” possibilities by not voting for Trump.
In addition to using the label “Putin’s puppet,” the Slate article also paints a very dark picture
of various connections and communications between the Trump team and Russia, including
Putin and various “sinister” Russians (Foer, 2016). Its aim was to instil a sense of fear and sus-
picion in the minds of readers. The characterisation of how Putin and Russia allegedly reacted
to Trump’s win is particularly revealing: in the wake of Trump’s victory, which ran counter to
the mainstream narrative and predictions, the focus of character assassination had shifted from
destroying his appeal to voters to making his leadership untenable.
Significant ink was expended on Putin’s telephone call to Trump to congratulate him on
his win (Bierman and Memoli, 2016; Fortune Staff, 2016; Jackson, 2016; Shinkman, 2016; Tan
and Simonetti, 2016). Although this is a standard diplomatic move, it was framed as something
far more sinister, in line with previous allegations that Trump was Russia’s puppet or that
Russia had influenced the US election. Slogans such as “Putin’s preferred candidate” (Benen,
2016b; Oliphant, 2016; Rescheto, 2016; Shuster, 2016) and “Russia celebrating Trump’s win”
(Bray, 2016; Efstathiou, 2016; McDonald, 2016; Rainsford, 2016) tended to reinforce the threat
173
Greg Simons
Pu n-Trump rela onship (47)
Dangerous coopera on (53)
Pu n's puppet (17)
Pu n's preferred candidate (12)
Bromance (8)
Contact/connec ons with
Pu n/Russia (26)
Pu n/Russia celebra ng (17)
Figure 12.2 CA Categories Used on Trump
Please note that a maximum of one of each category was recorded for each article, even if this category appeared
more than once in the article. The total number of articles examined and analysed was 61.
Source: Created by author
narrative. Many stories stressed Russia and Putin’s celebration of Trump’s victory, using this to
imply hidden connections and a hidden agenda between the two leaders.
These attempts to assassinate Trump’s character exemplify Bruce Newman’s (1999, p. 89)
assertion that likability comes down to gut reactions and judgements concerning a politician,
their ideas, and what they supposedly stand for. This does not necessarily involve reasoned logic,
but rather the emotional associations and connections that are formed by various brand associa-
tions. Therefore, in the words of Lee-Marshment (2009, p. 110), the result is more psychological
and less tangible. In this instance, an attempt was made to engage in obstructive marketing of
Donald Trump and to strategically position his brand in such a way that voters would be less
likely to vote for him, seeing him as too close to the “enemy,” “unpatriotic,” and lacking in any
number of other respects.
Figure 12.2 lays out the preferred media narratives used in character assassination attempts
on Trump. The personal relationship between Trump and Putin – along with the possible
dangerous consequences thereof – features heavily, as do all allegations of communication and
connection between the “Trump team” and the “Putin team.” It can therefore be said that
character assassination of Trump relied on establishing his close proximity to Putin – who was
characterised as a “super-villain” – and on the basis of this proximity deducing that Trump was
opposed to US values and interests.
Further Research
This study is not, of course, conclusive. More case studies involving character assassination of
leading political actors need to be analysed in order to determine whether the tentative links
between propaganda, character assassination, obstructive marketing, and political marketing
hold. Please see Chart One for a visual representation of how the different pieces of the puzzle
fit together.
174
Propaganda in the CA of World Leaders
A greater N sample will be needed to test the reliability of this and similar studies. It is
also necessary to develop a clearer understanding of not only how these communication pro-
grammes are established and maintained, but also their motivations and objectives.
Newman (1999, p. 46) understands success in politics as a leader’s ability to move public
opinion in the direction that he or she wishes it to move. “Success” within the context of this
chapter still involves moving public opinion in a certain direction, but it is defined as the ability
to move another actor’s political brand and reputation in such a way as to damage or disrupt
Crea ng poli cal rela onships and
marke ng poli cs
Offering a Polical
Polical Mobilisaon
Soluon and Acon
Merge propaganda and obstruc ve
marke ng around an iconic event
Priming an
Audience for
Polical Acon
Obstruc ve marke ng – hijack
vic m’s poli cal brand and
reputa on
Shaping the
Creang the
Informaon Space
Impression of
in the Polical Market
a Polical
Problem
Ini ate Propaganda
Campaign
Emoonally Influence
‘reality’
and Percepon
Select target for character
assassina on
Figure 12.3 Overview of the Logic and Connections between Character Assassination, Propaganda,
Obstructive Marketing, and Political Marketing
Source: Created by author
175
Greg Simons
the political resonance and appeal of that candidate, thereby rendering him or her an ineffective
political force. More research needs to be conducted into this particular aspect of the character
assassination of world leaders, especially concerning the measure of effect considerations, which
is at times conflated with measure of activity (the false logic activity automatically implies effect).
Conclusion
How do propaganda, political marketing, character assassination and obstructive marketing
come together within the context of iconic events in international affairs? At a glance, they seem
somewhat connected, but there also seem to be plenty of disconnects. Some of the concepts are
passive (propaganda), while others are interactive (political marketing). This chapter aimed to
understand how to hobble a political actor by attacking his or her political reputation.
The first point to consider is the role of propaganda. As Taylor explains, propaganda is a
“deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way” (2003, p. 6). The
accomplishment of this involves “the dextrous use of images, slogans, and symbols that play on
our prejudices and emotions” (Pratkanis and Aronson, 2001, p. 11). Propaganda is recognised
by its persuasive function, sizeable target audience, representation of a specific group’s agenda,
and use of faulty and emotional appeals (Shabo, 2008, p. 5). It serves to prime audiences, thus
enabling character assassination and obstructive marketing.
The iconic event plays different roles. Firstly, it enables the creation of associated values and
norms that connect a given figure to a particular event. If successful, this creates mental shortcuts
linking person and place at an emotional level. Secondly, as noted by many scholars, including
Newman (1999) and Castells (2011), the workings of the political system are staged for the
media, which enable support or hostility toward a political actor. The media permit character
assassins to go about their “deliberate destruction of an individual’s reputation” (Icks and Shiraev,
2014, p. 4). They make possible a character assassination and obstructive marketing attack on an
actor’s political brand. This is significant, since it is an actor’s political brand that determines how
they are perceived and rated overall. As noted by Cwalina, Falkowski and Newman (2011), the
value of that brand refers not only to the attributes of the actor, but also to the perceived quali-
ties of their competitors. Obstructive marketing seeks to exert influence through either product
depreciation or product contamination (Hyslop, 2014). This sets the scene for political market-
ing and the establishment of a political relationship between communicator and audience.
Political marketing “seals the deal” by facilitating political exchanges (Ormrod, Henneberg
and O’Shaughnessy, 2013), as well as by establishing, maintaining and enhancing relationships in
the political market that satisfy a political need and demonstrate political leadership (Cwalina,
Falkowski and Newman, 2011). The political need is created through the use of propaganda,
character assassination and obstructive marketing. It manufactures and projects a reality in a
context where the attacking side may be able to position itself as demonstrating apt political
leadership in comparison to the object of vilification.
In the case of Putin, there is evidence of communicators using pre-persuasion to establish
“common knowledge” on his personal and professional characteristics. The iconic events served
to focus audience attention, amplifying the message and allowing communicators to evoke an
emotional response from their target publics (those they seek to influence). Events in Ukraine
and the United States were highly symbolic and intended to motivate political activity. They
also served as a means to project a simple, subjective political reality. In attempting to induce
outrage among the audiences being communicated to, the messenger can create an atmosphere
akin to a melodrama that combines misrepresentation, exaggeration and predictions of some
form of doom. In so doing, the communicator can skirt the messy nuances of complex political
176
Propaganda in the CA of World Leaders
situations. Both cases discussed involved a deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and
behave in a specific way.
Putin was further characterised as being dishonest, but also aggressive. Attacks on Putin
seemed to serve as product contamination (ensuring that his political brand and reputation were
damaged in order to reduce his operational choices and abilities), but applied to the poten-
tial and practice of Russian foreign policy in international affairs. Product contamination also
formed the basis of the attack on Trump’s brand and reputation, with the distinction that the
first case saw a direct attack on Putin’s character and brand, while the second instrumentalised
Putin’s supposedly negative brand to contaminate Trump’s brand.
The mutual political relationship between voter and communicator implied by this study
suggests that the two can join forces and mobilise to ensure that this positive resonance does not
happen (blocking the formation of a relationship). Nominally, this would be done to protect
national security, to ensure justice is served, and for the good of the Ukrainian/American people
and the victims of MH17/Russian machinations. Putin is represented as a danger to the world;
by extension, owing to his alleged associations with Putin, Trump is a danger to the political and
social status quo in the US and beyond. The implication is that these political figures must be
stopped in order to uphold the values of democracy, sovereignty, human life and the rule of law.
Notes
1. Some theorists, however, view such power as a potential subversion of the democratic process, and warn
of possible negative consequences. Scammell (2014, p. 4), for instance, cautions that there is a disconnect
between theoretical ideals and actual practice.
2. Email interview between author and Bruce Newman – question posed and answer received on 16
October 2017.
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