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Between 1979 and 1983, several hundred Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed, and many more wounded, by ever bigger explosive devices hidden in baskets, on bicycles or mules, in cars or trucks. Time and time again, the same pattern repeated itself. Following an explosion, calls to the media were placed claiming responsibility in the name of a mysterious group, the FLLF. Palestinian and Lebanese officials insisted that the FLLF was merely a fiction intended to hide the hand of Israel and its Christian rightist allies. Israeli officials usually remained silent or, on occasion, explicitly denied these accusations, insisting that the bombings were part of an internecine war amongst rival Arab factions. A political discourse is a way of speaking that attempts to give meaning to events and experiences from a particular perspective. In the American and Israeli cases, this process of meaning construction is most clearly seen at work during the last decade of the Cold War. Over a relatively short period of time, Palestinians came to embody the threat of “terrorism,” while Israel and the United States came to be seen as the main targets and victims of “terrorism.” The very possibility that Palestinians could be victims of “terrorism” was simply erased, as was the possibility that the United States or Israel may at times engage in “terrorism.” To the contrary, their uses of force were increasingly understood and framed as coming solely in response to and in defense against “terrorism.” Using the FLLF bombing campaign as a case study, this article will attempt to present a partial history of the construction of “terrorism” in the early 1980s and highlight the central role played by a variety of actors, and notably political leaders and “terrorism experts,” in that profoundly ideological process. Specifically, it will reveal and interrogate how these actors systematically erased the very existence of the FLLF "terrorist" campaign, thus erasing the reality of Palestinians as victims (and not just perpetrators) of "terrorism," as well as the possibility that Israelis may have been perpetrators (and not just victims) of "terrorism" in Lebanon. Such silences, it will be argued, have been central to the (deeply ideological) construction of "terrorism."
Mondoweiss
Note: The article that follows is part of a much broader book project on the construction of " terrorism " over the last 40 years. This article was posted online on May 7, 2018. The claims made herein about the public discussion that followed publication of Ronen Bergman's book Rise and Kill First and, specifically, about media coverage (or lack thereof) of car-bombing attacks by the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners, therefore apply only to the time period leading up to early May, 2018. It is of course very possible, indeed it is hoped, that this car-bombing campaign (and the role senior Israeli officials played in it) will, in the following weeks and months, start to receive the kind of media coverage they should have received a long time ago.
This essay documents how, in the early decades of the Cold War, American presidents barely ever used the concept of “terrorism” and, when using it, referred to a very broad type of acts and actors. The term was essentially absent from the discourse, and undefined. An analysis of United Nations debates, Congressional hearings and mainstream media discussions then illustrates how, throughout the 1970s, “terrorism” remained a fully contested, un-defined concept that countless actors, at the international level and in the United States, understood as encompassing political violence by all kinds of actors and, crucially, by States just as much as groups or individuals. In a context where major geopolitical events such as the decolonization movement and various Cold War conflicts loomed large, determining which forms of political violence were and were not legitimate was, unsurprisingly, a highly contentious process. If “terrorism” was a form of violence aimed at civilian populations in order to achieve political purposes, then, many argued, it was a method used by “national liberation movements” in order to achieve self-determination, but also by the military forces of countless States around the world. Said differently, as late as the mid-1970s there existed many different narratives about the nature of “terrorism” around the world. The term was used to refer to non-state actors, notably pro-Palestinian groups such as Black September, but also to describe countries like Portugal (still holding to its colonies in Africa), South Africa (and its Apartheid regime), Israel (for its practices as an occupying power) or the United States (because of its bombing campaigns in Vietnam). Against this historical backdrop, the analysis turns, finally, to the Reagan years, highlighting the central role played by Israel in shaping the American discourse on “terrorism,” notably through the organizations of the 1979 and 1984 conferences described by Kumar. It illustrates how a very specific, narrow and ideologically driven understanding of “terrorism” came to dominate the American discourse, while other possible narratives about legitimate and illegitimate political violence were discarded, simply disappearing from the public debate. This study then argues that actual Israeli and American rhetorical and political practices in the early 1980s did in fact contradict many of the central tenets of the new discourse. In the real world, both States repeatedly used the term “terrorism” to condemn any and all uses of force by their enemies and not, as the discourse claims, solely to condemn attacks against civilian targets. Meanwhile, specific Israeli practices in Lebanon, and American policies in Central America or Afghanistan, clearly demonstrated a readiness on both countries’ part to give support to actors whose methods did undoubtedly fit their own definition of “terrorism.” In fact, Congressional debates show that, throughout the 1980s, Democrats and Republicans repeatedly failed to agree on a clear definition of “terrorism” whenever they attempted to do so in contexts other than the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. When debating US policies in Nicaragua, in El Salvador or in South Africa, Democrats and Republicans were in complete disagreement as to who the “terrorists” were. Just as importantly, in these contexts they developed arguments about the (il)legitimacy of the use of force by state and non-state actors fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, the positions they defended when talking about “terrorism” in the context of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite its repeated claims to linguistic as well as moral clarity, the discourse on “terrorism” is thus full of contradictions, and inconsistencies. It is, at heart, the result of a deeply political and ideological process of meaning production, one in which specific political actors, from American neoconservative political operatives to Israeli officials to, as will be suggested in conclusion, the mainstream media, played a central role. Since it burst onto the American political scene some 3 decades ago, this discourse’s central aim has been to de-humanize, de-politicize and de-legitimize the “enemy of the day,” while legitimizing any and all uses of political violence against it. It is, in its contemporary expression, a dangerous, a-historical and anti-intellectual discourse, which should be deconstructed and, ultimately, discarded.
POLITICS AND RELIGION JOURNAL
This article examines the extent to which the Palestinian issue is exploited to promote cross-border terrorist movements. The analytical descriptive approach is employed to explore the evolution of the terrorist organizations, and trace the ideology, means, and content of their media discourse. The article reveals that the extremist groups utilized the value, sanctity, and nobility of the Palestinian issue to influence Arab and Islamic societies in an attempt to give legitimacy and credibility to their presence, media discourse, and terrorist acts; disseminate their extremist ideologies; rally support and recruit new elements, and emotionally influence the public perception. The article also concluded that these terrorist organizations refrained from targeting the Israeli occupation and opposed the Palestinian national narrative about the national and political nature of the Palestinian struggle.
Faced with the ongoing reality of stabbings, vehicle attacks, and shootings, many in Israel are demanding that much more be done to deal with the situation. In this context, they repeatedly invoke the old, familiar toolbox that was effective during the second intifada, when Israel faced organized terrorism. However, the current outbreak does not resemble the second intifada. In recent years, Israel has failed to outfit a new toolbox suited to the spirit of the times focused on economic, infrastructural, social, educational, and public relations efforts, to be used also in the new media. The reality of the last few years has suppressed the development of a legitimate local Palestinian leadership that is attentive to the population’s problems, and represents an outlet for dialogue with Israel and a means to rein in violence. Lacking an appropriate solution to a strategic problem, there is a return to the old tool box; some in Israel are pushing to recycle operational plans formulated as a response to a radically different situation. This could well prove to be a bad mistake. The pressure on the political echelon and the security establishment to act is liable to impair the political echelon’s rational considerations, undermine the restrained and responsible reaction taken to date, and lead to it adopt a rationale of action that is unsuited to the current type of terrorism.
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2009
This article follows the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism. This representation was produced in the Israeli media and academia, and broadcast by the state's political elite in international arenas. In the West, this image was accepted in many circles and affected the chances of the Palestinians having a fair hearing in the peace negotiations which began after the 1967 war. The article follows the construction of the equation of Palestinian nationalism with terrorism, assesses its impact on the peace process, and suggests the deconstruction of this narrative as the best way forward in future negotiations.
Excerpted from my “Compartmentalization, contexts of speech and the Israeli origins of the American discourse on “terrorism,” ” Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 69-119.
This paper tried to examine the effects of Palestinian-Israeli conflict that rampage the region for decades. History has availed us with the picture of the Middle East as a region infested with the "longest lasting struggles" of Political Terrorism between the Zionist on one hand and the Palestinians on the other over Land, Security, and Dignity. Since the beginning of the crisis, it has been warred upon wars without final and finite victor or a vanquished. Each regards itself as a victim and drew from that self-image a solipsistic self-righteousness that is used to justify ruthless means. On May 14, 1948, the Zionist, led by David Ben Gurion, proclaimed the state of Israel, and ever since, Israel has been bulldozing Arab villages, killing people with helicopter gun-ships, armored cars, and rockets. Occupation, sending into exile and discrimination of the occupied by the occupier became the norm. These maltreatments on the Palestinians spilled into what the Israelis term as extremism. Many militant groups from Palestine and other areas of the Middle East have therefore sprung up in recent years as well as past decades, engaging in acts such as suicide bombings, sniper shootings, and car or bus bombing-the West and Israel, and their propaganda media described as terrorism. The groups justify their actions as freedom fighting. This gory relationship spiraled into consequences, which tragic effect impinged on the Israelis, Palestinians as well as the Arab politics. It affected regional stability, inter-religious dealings, and the moral standing of Islam and global Jewry. The study relied on secondary data: published and unpublished works of scholars sourced from resource institutions. Data collected was qualitatively analyzed using content analysis. To capture the essence of the study, a correlation was conclusively drawn between the crisis, its immutability to solutions and political terrorism.
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2024
Contribution to "Where is Palestine in Critical Terrorism Studies? A Roundtable Conversation," eds. Alice Finden, Rabbi M. Khan, and Amna Kaleem, with Layla Aitlhadj, Sophie Haspeslagh, Akram Salhab, Somdeep Sen, & Lisa Stampnitzky

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