The Presuppositions of Contemporary Kemalism

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 The Presuppositions of Contemporary Kemalism Toni Alaranta Middle East Technical University, alaranta.toni@gmail.com Abstract Especially during the last decade Kemalist ideology has been vehemently criticized both in Tur- key and abroad. As the proponents of the governing Justice and Development Party have been described as reformists and liberals, the Kemalists have been simultaneously labeled as supporters of authoritarianism, elitism, and status quo. This study is based on the premise that in order to reach beyond such simplistic accounts, it is necessary to analyze the presuppositions of contempo- rary Kemalism, that is, its underlying philosophy of history, and its idea of the human nature. The study demonstrates that any account of contemporary Kemalism which fails to recognize these presuppositions goes astray from the very beginning, ending up repeating the above mentioned prejudices. Keywords Turkey, Kemalism, Philosophy of History, Human Nature, Social Democracy. 49 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 Introduction ending up repeating the above mentioned prejudices. The core mission of Kemalism – the offi- cial modernizing ideology of the Republic of The contemporary Kemalist ideology is Turkey – has been “to reach the level of con- analyzed here by reading the texts produced temporary civilization.” At the core of this by Kemalist intellectuals during the last two modernizing project there has always been decades. The writers included in the study the principle of secularization, understood are Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Erol Manisalı, Yek- as the precondition of modern Turkey. Dur- ta Güngör Özden, Vural Savaş, and Metin ing the last decade especially, the Kemalist Aydoğan. The main analytical concept of this ideology has been vehemently criticized by study is political ideology, understood here as an influential coalition composed of liberal a relatively coherent set of empirical and intellectuals and the conservatives of the normative beliefs and thought, focusing on governing Justice and Development Party the problems of human nature, the process (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The pro- of history, and socio-political arrangements ponents of the AKP have claimed the vocab- (Eatwell 1999, 17). It is crucial that politi- ulary of democratization, reformism as well cal ideology should not be seen as some kind as Europeanization for themselves, labe- of “false consciousness”, but, as for example ling the Kemalists as authoritarian, elitist, van Dijk has asserted, as a belief system that and undemocratic. One can argue that this is socially shared by the members of a collec- AKP’s self-portrait has also won the hearts tivity of social actors. Ideologies consist of of majority of scholars working on Turkish social representations that define the social politics and history. Thus, by following this identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs evaluation, many scholars have either de- about its fundamental conditions and ways clared Kemalism as outdated and irrelevant, of existence and reproduction. Moreover, or concentrated to demonstrate its faults ideologies should be seen as fundamental in and inconsistencies. that they control and organize other socially shared beliefs, and they thus specify what However, Kemalism does not fade away general cultural values are relevant for the by wishing its silent death, and there is no group (van Dijk 2006, 116–117). serious reason why a social science analysis should be grounded on such premises. This Further, even though ideologies are in- article attempts to go beyond this “interpre- deed socially shared, not all members of tative straitjacket” and analyze the presup- groups are equally well aware of these ide- positions of contemporary Kemalist ideol- ologies. That is, “members are able to speak ogy. It is especially important to reject the or act on the basis of the acquired ideology, current fashion of defining the Kemalists but are not always able to formulate its be- as “authoritarian secularists.” In order to liefs explicitly. On the other hand, there are reach beyond such simplistic accounts, it is experts, teachers, leaders, and other ‘ideo- necessary to analyze the presuppositions of logues’ who teach, explain, inculcate and ex- contemporary Kemalism, that is, its under- plicitly reproduce the group ideologies” (van lying philosophy of history, and its idea of Dijk 2006, 119). This assertion, then, serves the human nature. The study demonstrates to justify my decision to analyze contem- that any account of contemporary Kemalism porary Kemalism by reading the texts pro- which fails to recognize these presupposi- duced by the Kemalist intellectuals during tions goes astray from the very beginning, the last two decades. 50  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 The Kemalist Liberal Philosophy individual or a society in the twenty-first of History century (Yeşilova 2010, 38). It is currently widely claimed that Ke- This interpretation is problematic in malism represents a particular version of several ways. Firstly, it suggests that there corporatist-oriented nationalist ideology. is, for the majority of citizens, some kind This is put most forcefully by Parla and Davi- of naturally given “true cultural identity” son, who argue that “Kemalism’s ideological that can be rediscovered. Framing the issue character is best understood not in terms of this way, it ignores that this allegedly “true” liberalism or socialism, but in terms of cor- identity is in no sense objectively “true” but poratism. Kemalism is best seen as an early rather a result of constant and intentional variant of rightist, Third Way… political ide- ideological indoctrination conducted by the ologies that pursue capitalist modernity and conservative politicians and ideologues, es- societal transformation but reject both an pecially since the 1980s. Secondly, it speaks individualist vision of liberalism and a class- about the Kemalist regime as an all-encom- based vision of society and social transfor- passing explanatory category, without any mation of socialism” (Parla and Davison definition concerning its meaning. At least 2004, 7). This interpretation, then, implies it should make clear that the Kemalist po- that as a corporatist and nationalist ideol- litical parties have not ruled the country for ogy, Kemalism has been, and still remains, many decades. Thirdly, it implicitly claims in contradiction with liberal democracy. Fur- that whatever is wrong in Turkey is because ther, the current transformation – which in- of some sort of monolithic Kemalism. In any cludes neoliberalism in economics, globali- case, the main accusation in these kinds of zation, and the ongoing polemics concerning interpretations is that Kemalism is an au- the consolidation of democracy in Turkey – thoritarian ideology that obstructs liberal carries with it accounts according to which freedoms in Turkey. This accusation also Turkey is in the process of liberating itself claims that Kemalism is elitist and more or from the Kemalist “tutelary democracy.” An less forced worldview, seen either irrelevant example of these interpretations is provided or even harmful to the Turkish nation. As by Hakan Yeşilova who argues that, a corporatist and nationalist ideology, this evaluation seems to suggest, Kemalism does Starting from 1980s Turkish history has not provide the basic liberal philosophy to recorded a tremendous transformation in induce the emergence of liberal freedoms. the political culture with a new discourse One is tempting to ask is this the whole sto- of a nationwide awareness and social re- ry? Before trying to answer this question, vival. While this awareness is perceived by it is necessary to scrutinize what have been the supports of Kemalism as a threat to the the characteristics of liberalism in its histor- regime, for those who are part of this new ical development, and then proceed to un- trend it is a rediscovery of their true cultural cover is it really the case that Kemalism is in identity which liberates them from the con- contradiction with it. In other words, does fines of an isolated nation and helps them the evaluation of Kemalism as an elitist and engage with the global society. Turkish peo- authoritarian corporatist-nationalist ideolo- ple did not want to remain isolated from the gy make it unconditionally contradictory to world, and their willingness for liberation liberalism? could no longer tolerate a regime which by no means could respond to the needs of an The main issue we need to tackle is the 51 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 claim concerning Kemalism’s elitism. If intellectually necessary. No truth was ever “elitist” makes Kemalism non-liberal, then definitive, and no view, even the most eccen- liberalism should be its opposite, that is, tric, unworthy of opportunity to challenge non-elitist, democratic, and crucially “ema- received wisdom. This did not lead to relativ- nating from the people.” However, it would ism, however, because of the unquestioned be a mistake to hastily make such a claim. assumption of progress and of the univer- As John Crowley puts it “…the people can sal application of experimental method.” govern itself badly. From Tocqueville to Mill Crowley also explains that after liberalism and Schumpeter, the distrust of popular had come into conflict with religion, God sovereignty runs through liberal thought.” could no longer set the purpose and limits He continues by noting, firstly, that “liber- of government. Thus there emerged the lib- al diffidence reflects…worries or fears about eral “philosophy of history” in which histo- the relation between the characteristic met- ry is the development of human potential, anarrative of progress and the core liberal and since, in the eyes of classical liberals, value of freedom,” describing then how the the highest standard of human excellence fear of uncontrolled and uneducated mass- is essentially unchanged since antiquity, es was present in John Stuart Mill: “As the development can only mean the broaden- squalid realities of industrial society and ing and deepening of human development. mass politics became unavoidable, the clas- Thus, Crowley concludes, liberals necessarily sic problem of the ‘mob’ became central to became pragmatic elitists, not because any- liberal thinking. In Mill, fear and confidence one is by nature better than anyone else, but are still compatible. The problem is defined because some have not yet fully developed as keeping liberal institutions safe until (Crowley 2000, 52–53). education has transformed the mob into virtuous democratic political community. These observations concerning liberals The snobbery and humanism are held to- as pragmatic elitists, on the one hand, and gether, somewhat uneasily, by the belief in liberalism’s secular philosophy of history, on progress” (Crowley 2000, 52–56). Similarly, the other hand, are crucial in any account of Macridis notes that “despite their insistence Kemalist ideology. One can argue that, sim- on representation and elections, the liber- ilar to liberals, Kemalists are also pragmatic als hedged and hemmed at the power of the elitists, not in the sense that conservatives legislature and the right of the majority to have been elitists. In conservative ideolo- decide. They did not have enough confidence gy, people are by nature seen as unequal, as in the people” (Macridis 1992, 37). traditional elite groups are pictured to pos- sess necessary qualities to guide, lead, and At this point, liberalism’s wrongly pre- command others, that is, those incapable to sumed “non-elitist” character must be comprehend the general good of the com- brought together with the “philosophy of munity. With its radical revolutionary effort history” written inside historical liberalism. to change the basis of legitimate political Crowley notes that “from the mid-eigh- authority, by transforming the omnipotent teenth century the questioning of religious sultan’s subjects into equal citizens of the doctrine itself, by applying to it forms of rea- Republic, Kemalist state-elite has not con- soning and standards of proof derived from ceived itself by nature better than anyone natural science, changed the character and else, but as an educated elite obliged to se- consequences of toleration. Instead of being cure the education of the whole population, merely politic, it was increasingly seen as irrespective of gender, ethnicity, language or 52  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 lineage. Vural Savaş tackles this issue by not- revolutions which are executed in underde- ing that various “pseudo intellectuals” have veloped societies. Ideology must generate accused him of being a “Jacobin,” that is, elit- those forces of change that have not come ist, authoritarian, and dogmatic. Savaş asks to existence through the gradual transfor- is Jacobinism that awful, and then quotes mation process. The two most important Taner Timur: goals of the Kemalist revolutionary ideol- ogy were independence and modernization Jacobins were the forefathers of democ- (Kışlalı 2000, 59–63). Kemalist revolution ratization, and by rejecting the distinction as a cultural revolution and the Enlighten- between active and passive citizens, they ment project is defined by Kışlalı in the fol- saw to it that the population at large inter- lowing words: nalized the principle of universal suffrage… In a peasant society where the Enlighten- In the words of Immanuel Kant, this is ment thought had not surpassed the tiny about ‘rescuing the man from the intellectu- elite class, the Jacobins introduced the ideas al immaturity that he has set himself into.’ of freedom and equality to the whole of pop- It is about affirming those unconditional ulation (Quoted in Savaş 2001, 62). rights that man is born with. In short, it is about rescuing man from the darkness of It is here, then, that the liberal presup- the Middle Ages in order to reach the en- positions of Kemalist philosophy of history lightenment (Kışlalı 2000, 62). start to unravel. In this respect, the con- temporary Kemalist stance is pronounced Very similar kind of definition of Kemal- most explicitly by Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, who ism as the execution of the Enlightenment notes that the Kemalist Turkish revolution project in Turkey can be found in all major is, more than anything else, an enlighten- Kemalist intellectuals’ texts. Here we can ment revolution, executed in a backward quote Metin Aydoğan, who asserts that, society in order to change people’s mental structures, to create a new human being, a At the core of the Kemalist ideology more rational individual. Further according there are the principles of rationalism, ob- to Kışlalı, the French Revolution is the best jectivism, and positivism. Its method is to example of those revolutions that have been proceed on the path of science and reason, to forced to occur as a consequence of major rise against old dogmas, to confront life and transformations of social realities. In the social realities in a rational way. Especially in case of the French Revolution, social reali- terms of religion, Kemalism takes the indi- ties and the power balance between various vidual as the sole unit of reference. Further, social groups had already changed, but the an obvious result of these principles is that political system had not changed according- in Kemalism social life is defined according ly. On the other hand, revolution takes a dif- to secular principles (Aydoğan 2004, 400). ferent form in societies that have not expe- This is further emphasized by Aydoğan rienced any major social transformations. In when he notes that “At the core of Mustafa these cases, revolution occurs when men in- Kemal Atatürk’s intellectual toolkit there tentionally, by using an ideology, try to take lies the three hundred years long tradition advantage of particular historical events in of the French Enlightenment” (Aydoğan order to execute those social transforma- 2004, 392). It is claimed, by Taha Parla for tions that have not yet occurred. Because example, that this Kemalists’ recurrent ar- of this, ideology plays a crucial role in those gument cannot be considered justifiable. 53 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 According to Parla, enlightenment thought Before going any further, it should be is characterized most of all by its continuing noted that arguing for the importance of tendency to question itself, to remain con- recognizing the liberal philosophy of history stantly open to challenging propositions, presupposed by Kemalism, does not intend whereas Kemalism is stamped by the un- to claim it being necessarily compatible with willingness to engage in dialogue with other contemporary liberal democratic practice intellectual or political discourses, aiming as it is understood in the West. It is gener- to define all other perspectives as harmful, ally claimed in postcolonial theory that the even a betrayal (Parla 2002, 314). But this is Western historical experience and its con- hardly a fair way of setting this question. An comitant theories of modernization, secu- intellectual movement and a political ideol- larism, democracy and so forth should not ogy cannot be compared this way. As Moya be used in accounting the social realities of Lloyd puts it, “Because society is not a total- non-Western societies (Kapoor 2002, 647– ity, the function of ideology is to attempt to 664). This position often leads to an obser- impose closure upon it, that is, it is to try vation according to which Kemalism and to offer a way of making sense of the social similar Western-inspired transformation world and treat it as if it is bounded and projects are unjustified. This way of think- knowable, when it isn’t” (Lloyd 2003, 234). ing, I firmly believe, has not been taken far This must be seen as a common trait of all enough, however. The emancipatory tone modern political ideologies, including those written inside postcolonial theory should which have been in an attempt to transfer also realize that condemning Kemalists as the Enlightenment’s ideals into practice, elitist and arrogant Westernizers aiming to that is, liberalism, socialism, and Kemalism. establish foreign and harmful social-political For example, even though liberalism came projects on their own society betrays post- to see “no view as unworthy of opportunity colonial theory’s own ethical foundations. In to challenge received wisdom,” the liberal other words, postcolonial theory seems un- theory could not question the presupposi- able to recognize that Kemalists have devel- tions according to which man is rational, oped their own version of Western-inspired scientific truths are universal, and progress modernization which presupposes the uni- is the ultimate telos of history. versality of Western historical experience of modernization and progress, but which Now, it can be claimed that it is this un- cannot be reduced, after initial phase, to questionable idea of universal history of Western experience: Kemalism represents progress acquired through ever deepening the universalization not of “the West” but of human knowledge that works as a perma- that process of intellectual transformation nent component in Kemalist ideology. Like which has generated modernity. Contempo- it is the case with liberalism, so does Kemal- rary Kemalist intellectuals state this quite ism loses its reason for existence if the idea explicitly. Metin Aydoğan notes that “De- of human emancipation through education spite the anti-imperialist stance taken by is abandoned. Thus, neither of these ideolo- the state, those Western methods in science, gies can afford to question the concept of technology, and culture that carry universal history as a story of human development. civilizational value, have been utilized to a Both liberalism and Kemalism are grounded great extent. This is because Kemalism is not on the idea of progress, which can only be about Westernizing, but a civilizing current achieved through the enlargement of the of thought” (Aydoğan 2004, 426–427). The sphere of human rationality. 54  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 same idea is expressed by Vural Savaş who wing Kemalists at that time admitted that notes that “Atatürk was most of all a na- the Kemalist state was authoritarian by na- tionalist and an anti-imperialist. He never ture. However, even they asserted that this trusted the Western states, and never aimed was unavoidable, as there was no other so- to form a political integration with them. cial group to whom the Kemalist revolution- His goal was to catch the modern world, and ary leaders could turn to (Avcıoğlu 2003, then go beyond it” (Savaş 2003, 109). 507; Ecevit 1973, 43–44). In this sense the contemporary Kemalists are reproducing On the other hand, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı the previous mode of argumentation in a argues against Kemalism’s alleged elitism or slightly modified way. Whereas the anti-im- “from top to down” bureaucratic practice, perialist message offered by Doğan Avcıoğlu defining these accusations as “intellectual is reproduced by contemporary Kemalist nonsense.” His argument proceeds from the intellectuals with an astonishing similarity, fact that in Turkey during the 1920s and the more defensive position towards the ac- 1930s, the only social class Mustafa Kemal cusation of bureaucratic elitism has much could turn to in order to form a revolution- to do with the fact that unlike during the ist cadre was the military and civil bureau- 1960s, today the Kemalist ideology is put cracy. Expecting a popular mass movement under severe criticism not only by Kemal- to launch the social and political transfor- ism’s internal opponents, but also interna- mation was nothing else than an essentially tionally. More than ever before, the Kemal- conservative attitude, since that would have ists feel like being pushed against the wall. meant postponing the reform movement for many generations (Kışlalı 2007, 64–65). As Of course, to accept the Kemalists’ own these assertions reveal us, Kemalists have assertion that the Kemalist revolution never even tried to deny the fact that the aimed to establish the Enlightenment pro- Kemalist modernization project has been ject in Turkey is one thing; to assert that it established and executed by the military has accomplished this task, is quite another. and civil bureaucracy. As there was no strong However, making the judgment that Kemal- middle class or national bourgeoisie (unlike ism has never been nothing else than an ide- in France where the revolutionary move- ology to secure the social status and politi- ment emanated from these groups), this role cal leadership of the military-bureaucratic was taken by the bureaucratic state-elite in state-elite stems from the inability (or, in the Turkish Revolution. The Kemalists were many cases, intentional unwillingness), also very much aware that in order to make first, to recognize the liberal philosophy of the new socio-political order permanent, history written inside Kemalism, and sec- they had to create a middle class willing to ondly, from ignoring the influence Kemalist defend the revolutionary principles. This is transformation project has had in produc- exactly what was meant to be achieved with ing popular acceptance for various princi- the Kemalist principle of statism (devletçi- ples that work as a necessary precondition lik). of popular sovereignty: secularism, equality before the law, public universal education, However, on this issue the contempo- and the national political community. rary Kemalist intellectuals are taking a more defensive position if compared to the more It becomes obvious that the Enlighten- explicitly socialist-oriented left-wing Kemal- ment idea of human emancipation through ists of the 1960s and 1970s. The major left- science and rational thinking – the philoso- 55 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 phy of history also written inside liberalism progress (Kışlalı 2007, 75). In this sense the – thoroughly expresses itself in Kemalist Kemalist understanding of secularism, re- ideology. At this stage, nothing is said about ferred to above, must be seen as an internal- the other characters of Kemalist ideology or ly coherent formulation. Kışlalı notes that, resulting Kemalist political practice, how- like most revolutions in history, Kemalism is ever. What is claimed here, is that the sup- not against religion as such, but against the posed “elitism” within Kemalism is nothing effort to conserve the traditional order in else than the idea, also manifest in liberal- the name of religion (Kışlalı 2007, 38). Now, ism, that as long as the whole society has obviously, established religion’s main pur- not been educated and guided to rational re- pose is to conserve the core message of the publican citizens, the state-elite has an ob- revelation, and at least maintain its author- ligation to firmly secure common scientific ity in terms of moral and ethical truth. This education as well as republican institutions. is hardly compatible with the Kemalist idea Thus, the accusation that Kemalism has re- of always searching for a more advanced and stricted various liberal freedoms in Turkey rational modes to organize human society. cannot be based on the preceding assump- After these observations, the concepts tion that the Kemalist ideology lacks the “elitist,” “authoritarian,” and “tutelary de- philosophical foundations of such freedoms. mocracy” attached to Kemalist ideology are justifiable only if they try to describe how The Kemalist Idea of the Human well or badly supporters of Kemalism have Nature been able to enhance the primary values im- plied not by modern-day liberal democracy After demonstrating the liberal philoso- but the “liberal philosophy of history” – for- phy of history implied by contemporary Ke- ever development of human knowledge and malism, we can proceed to uncover its idea rationality. This, however, has rarely been concerning the human nature. As there are the case as the critiques of Kemalism, who no explicit statements, it is necessary to use aforementioned terms in their critique, look at more implicit ones expressed in the do not share the same philosophy of history, discussions of various different issues. One or are unable to recognize it as the crucial can argue that the idea of “forever deepening element of Kemalism. This interpretation, in the human intellectual potential” implied by order to be coherent, needs to be further de- both liberalism and Kemalism is equal to the veloped by accounting the idea of Kemalism Kemalist understanding of revolutionism as an historical synthesis between liberalism (devrimcilik), one of the six core principles of and socialism. The denial of liberalism inher- Kemalism. According to Ahmet Taner Kışlalı ent in Kemalism is not of the same kind as – whose writings must be seen as founda- in fascist or communist ideologies. The de- tional to the whole contemporary Kemal- nial is only partial, and concentrates, firstly, ist discourse – Kemalist devrimcilik stands on liberalism’s excessive individualism, and, for permanent revolution in the sense that much more importantly, on economic lib- transforming the society in order to reach eralism’s economic inequality. According to the most progressed stage demands that Kışlalı, the Kemalist synthesis of liberalism even those institutions and practices con- and socialism can be called democratic so- sidered as the most advanced today, shall in cialism, or social democracy. Out of the six time become petrified. Continuing revolu- main principles of Kemalism, republicanism tionism equals for being always in search of (cumhuriyetçilik), secularism (laiklik), and 56  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 nationalism (ulusçuluk) emanate from lib- try lives under the hostility of Armenian eralism, whereas statism (devletçilik), com- and Greek diaspora…No European country mon peopleness (halkçılık), and revolution- is surrounded by enemy-like neighbor states ism (devrimcilik) emanate from socialism. In (Greece, Armenia, Syria, Southern Cyprus, short, according to Kışlalı, Kemalism does Iraq, Iran)…No European country is a Mus- not have liberal democracy as its goal, but in- lim-majority society. The form of regime in stead social democracy (Kışlalı 2007, 82–86). Turkey, the only secular state in the Muslim world, is a model for other Muslims, sharia Now, of course it is a legitimate question is the danger…(Quoted in Savaş 2003, 51). to ask, in what sense is social democracy different from liberal democratic regime? So, according to contemporary Kemalist Kışlalı’s answer is that liberal democra- intellectuals, Turkey’s secular democracy is cies are based on thoroughly liberal view in constantly threatened by religious funda- which political freedoms have been over em- mentalists aiming to establish a sharia state phasized at the expense of economic equal- in Turkey; it is constantly threatened by an ity. He continues by asserting that those ethnic separatist movement aiming to de- benefits which were secured in the West by stroy the Turkish nation-state; and it is also social democrat parties after centuries of constantly threatened by hostile neighbors political struggle were executed in Turkey in all directions. This evaluation leads to the with the Kemalist regime (Kışlalı 2007, 82– conclusion according to which Turkey must 86). However, by itself, this is not sufficient fight for the survival of its democratic re- to explain why Kemalism is different from gime under totally different circumstances liberal democracy, since especially in Scandi- compared to European democracies. Fur- navian countries liberal democratic regimes ther, contemporary Kemalist ideology is have been thoroughly stamped by social stamped by the idea that during the last democratic ideals. Thus, we have to look fur- 50 years, Turkey has witnessed a “counter- ther on Kemalist argumentation to see why revolution” (karşı-devrim). This concept is Turkey, according to Kemalists, must main- given different contents by different Kemal- tain its unique form of social democracy. The ist intellectuals, but the common factor is initial answer can be found in İlhan Selçuk’s the observation that since the beginning of column, published originally on March 6, the multi-party regime (1945–50), the Ke- 2002 in Cumhuriyet: malist principles have been abandoned one by one. Here we must exclude the highly im- In no European country is the secu- portant issue of surrendering the political lar regime threatened by religion; in these and economic independence of Turkey, and states a religious regime was abandoned concentrate to the idea according to which centuries ago…In no European country are the aforementioned “counter-revolution” is religious reactionaries raiding homes with most of all about gradual weakening of the guns, burning people alive…No European principle of secularism, and this way a be- country have fundamentalist sharia-states trayal of Kemal Atatürk’s foremost vision next to their borders…No European country to “reach the level of contemporary civiliza- has been forced to sacrifice thirty thousand tion” – that is, the modern civilization char- of its citizens for a decades-long ethnic war acterized by science and rational thinking. that is encouraged from outside…In no Eu- ropean country is democracy handicapped; Thus, after these observations, we can it is institutionalized….No European coun- read the above quotation from İlhan Selçuk 57 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 in a new light: the West, after securing secu- the rights of non-Muslims in a particularly lar regime ages ago, may have the luxury “Muslim democracy”? Similar kind of con- to flirt with postmodern relativism, but in ceptual confusion is observable in discus- Turkey, where the secular regime was a con- sions of “multiple modernities” or “Muslim ceptual and intellectual non-existent before modernity.” The Kemalist ideology presup- the establishment of the Republic in 1923, poses that if the concept of “modernity” has the temptation to organize political commu- any relevancy beyond the simple account nity around the all-encompassing and “con- that, unlike traditional ones, modern soci- forming” religious moral order always lurks eties are characterized by those economic around the corner. This is put explicitly by and socio-political transformations brought Yekta Güngör Özden by noting that “the by industrial and political revolutions since Christian faith is not related to the affairs the eighteenth century, the concept of mo- of this world. For this reason, the approach dernity needs to be seen as carrying with it in those countries is different from Mus- its own ethos and self-understanding, and lim nations, especially Turkey. The Islamic this is the Weberian “disenchantment of the faith is preoccupied with the affairs of this world”, that is, secularization. world; it perceives itself legitimate to define the rules of government.” He continues by The Kemalist philosophy of history is noting that “secularism does no harm to grounded on the idea that since the Enlight- anyone…there is no obstruct whatsoever for enment era, human rationality has been going to mosque, for praying, for fasting, for freed from the chains of religious dogma, making a pilgrimage to Mecca, for studying and that the current Islamic conservatives’ the Quran. The principles and criteria of the expressed desire to reformulate the princi- state come before anyone’s personal choices. ple of secularism as it currently stands in In our state, there is a rule of law” (Özden Turkey’s constitution, is nothing else than 2011, 388–390). the final and most threatening effort to set in motion all those forces which try to im- This position, obviously, reflects the pose a religious truth upon the society. In widely recognized idea of “privatization” of Kemalism, this is interpreted not only as religion. This very idea, on the other hand, is an intellectual surrender, but also as a road at core of the whole confrontation between to weak, backward, and poor Turkey that secularists and Islamic conservatives in Tur- is soon easily put under the hegemony of key. The idea of “Muslim democracy,” often Western developed states. The above quo- expressed in Western politicians’ discus- tation from Özden suggests that the often sions of Turkey’s significant potentiality to made accusation, according to which the Ke- work as a model for other Muslim-majority malist regime has repressed pious Muslims societies is, from the Kemalist perspective, and limited the religious freedoms, does not based on a conceptual confusion: If there ex- correspond to reality. At least we can say ists a particularly Muslim version of democ- that the Republican People’s Party (Cum- racy, then this implies that there should also huriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) – commonly de- exist “Christian” or “Buddhist” democracies. fined as the Kemalist party – “has been tol- However, as these formulations clearly re- erant of religious belief and observance, and veal, the idea of a religiously defined democ- the party has made no statement against the racy refutes the whole idea of democracy as a wearing of headscarves in non-official pub- non-confessing neutral order based on fun- lic places” (Ayata and Ayata 2007, 218). One damental equality. In other words, what are can indeed ask, together with Özden, what 58  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 harm is caused to people’s religious beliefs human nature argues that what makes us or their religious observance by the principle distinctly human is our ability, not only to of secularism as it has been applied in Tur- change as our circumstances change, but to key. Thus we can observe that the accusation create new and different social relations and is justified only if we accept the view, often then adapt to them (Wright 1996, 15–27). expressed both by the critics and defenders of Islamic tradition, that Islam should not be The third major modern ideological tra- seen as a purely individual faith, but a more dition, conservatism, is based on altogether general way of organizing the social and po- different premises. In conservatism, man litical sphere. It is obvious that the Kemalist is essentially evil. This idea was founded secularism is indeed vehemently against the upon the religious concept of original sin, latter option. that man had fallen from a state of grace and was an impure being prone to tempta- After these observations it becomes pos- tion and wickedness. Many of those who sible to analyze what is the Kemalist idea of attempted to define the basis of conserva- human nature. This analysis, however, also tism had a strong personal Christian belief necessitates first taking a look at how major which shaped their ideas, whilst those who modern political ideologies understand it. accepted the evolutionary origins of human- Liberalism, which was formed as a political ity started from the position that man had ideology during the eighteenth century, can descended from the beasts, and civilization be seen as the Enlightenment’s first-born was but a veneer overlaid on the law of the child. Its conception of the human nature is jungle. According to this view, there has thus based on the Enlightenment’s general been no noticeable change in human nature optimism concerning the human experi- since the dawn of civilization (Heywood ence. Major liberal thinkers perceived hu- 2003, 60–61). mans as essentially rational beings who act in their own self-interest by seeking pleas- We have already noted that according ure and avoiding pain. Whereas classical to Kemalist intellectuals, Kemalist ideol- liberals argued that the state should inter- ogy represents a major cultural revolution, vene only if someone’s actions limited other even an effort to create “a new human be- people’s freedoms, later liberals have often ing.” We have also noted that the Kemalist espoused that human beings are instinctive- philosophy of history is, similar to liberal- ly emphatic, and therefore the state should ism, characterized by the belief in progress help the poor so that they too could fulfill acquired through the enlargement of the their inborn human potential (Heywood sphere of human rationality. It would be 2003, 22–27). hard, after these observations, to conclude This position is taken further by social- that the Kemalist ideology conceives the ist tradition which is a more communitarian human nature as thoroughly stamped by ir- variant of liberalism’s optimistic view on rational instincts, or that the human nature human nature. According to socialism, hu- has remained unchanged since prehistory. mans are rational, and also crucially shaped The aspired Cultural Revolution implies an by their social circumstances. In this sense optimistic view of human nature, that is, in socialism argues that the only constant fea- Kemalism humans are perceived as rational ture of the human nature is its changeabil- beings capable to adapt into the new circum- ity. Thus, the socialist idea concerning the stances created by the Kemalist revolution. 59 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 Thus, the Kemalist idea of human nature liberal state a common educational system is definitely different from conservatism. It functions as a form of mass state-controlled was hinted above that even though Kemal- socialization (Haugaard 2006, 346–349). ism implies the liberal philosophy of history, Haugaard further argues that the founders this does not in itself make it compatible of modern sociology (Marx, Durkheim and with liberal democracy. On the other hand, Weber) shared the common Enlightenment we also observed Kemalist intellectuals as- misconception that modernity was a move serting that liberal democracy is not the de- from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from tra- sired goal at all; it is social democracy. From ditional communities to societies governed this perspective it is possible to claim that by abstract reason. Haugaard, on the con- the Kemalist idea of human nature is based trary, argues that in the transition to mo- on the idea of humans as rational and capa- dernity Gemeinschaft does not disappear, or ble for change, and that the Kemalist idea is not overcome, but becomes transformed, of “constant revolution” presupposes that “even if it appears counter-intuitive that the change is also constant. Further, the defi- disenchanted, individualistic and de-essen- nition of the territorial nation-state as the tialized modern world could be fertile soil “utopia materialized,” (that is, the Turkish for a nationalist Gemeinschaft” (Haugaard nation-state as the particular spatial foun- 2006, 350). dation of the universal telos of history), implies a communitarian view of human So it seems that even in terms of such nature, one in which individuals are pro- a core liberal value as freedom, the idea of foundly shaped by the social circumstances “unproblematic” liberalism implied by the provided by the national community. To contemporary academic studies on Kemal- conclude, it feels fair to assert that the Ke- ism does not correspond to historical real- malist ideology presupposes an idea of the ity. The “centrality of community” found in human nature according to which humans communitarian ideologies must also be seen are 1) essentially rational beings; 2) capable as an integral part of the liberal ideology. of constant development; and 3) thoroughly As the idea of “positive freedom” developed defined by their social circumstances. within liberal ideology presupposes that the fulfillment of individual liberty can only be The synthesis of the liberal philosophy of secured in relation to some specific commu- history and the optimistic and communitar- nity, the liberal tradition cannot be said to ian view of human nature implied by the Ke- be purely individualistic and atomized. This malist ideology is not an internal contradic- kind of idea of “positive freedom,” that is, an tion. As a matter of fact, one can argue that idea that the individual human being can, in similar kind of synthesis ultimately char- the end, only fulfill his/her inner potential- acterizes liberalism. Mark Haugaard notes ity within a community that encourages this that, at first sight, liberalism is preoccupied inner potentiality to be expressed, lies at the with community as a constraint upon free- heart of the Kemalist ideology. This is also dom, while the nationalist considers com- explicitly stated by Ahmet Taner Kışlalı: munity a condition of self-realization. How- ever, even though the “unencumbered” self Atatürk, who tolerated severe opposi- of liberalism is inherently rational, it has to tion even within his own party, defended be created through socialization. The world the idea of democracy where freedoms were of interchangeable individuals presupposes the foundational value. His concept of free- that they are relatively similar. Hence, in the dom, on the other hand, was not only nega- 60  TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 tive freedom (individual’s freedom to act as the iron rule of Islamist politician’s oligar- one pleases as long as one does not harm chy… In this context liberal economy and other’s legitimate freedoms), but a modern liberal democracy result in the following concept of freedom as individual’s ability to forms: Islamist politics are able to dissolve develop his potentials. It is noteworthy that all its opposing forces, that is, the army, the Atatürk defended this kind of modern idea Republic, the law, the state, and Atatürk. of freedom already during the 1930s (Kışlalı All national institutions are replaced by for- 2000, 66). eign rule in the name of liberalization and privatization; as the national forces become If the Kemalist presuppositions are tak- weak, anti-national and religious forces are en into account, the contemporary fashion becoming more and more powerful. Further, of criticizing Kemalism as an authoritarian, Islamist politics gather around the principle elitist, and illiberal ideology reveals its su- according to which religion is above every- perficial character. On the very basic level, thing else, claiming that we can secure our neither the Kemalist philosophy of history social coherence only with umma structure. nor its concept of the human nature points The nation-state, Atatürk’s nationalism, towards authoritarianism or elitism. Again, Republican philosophy, social state, and as it was the case with the Kemalist philoso- genuine democracy are replaced by efforts phy of history, the accusation that Kemal- to transform Turkey into a community held ism has restricted various liberal freedoms under the sovereignty of a religious order. in Turkey cannot be based on the preceding The one-sided relationships established assumption that the Kemalist ideology lacks with the EU and the USA open the gate for the liberal and optimistic idea of the human a foreign-led action of destroying the Re- nature as a necessary foundation of such public, the nation-state, democracy and the freedoms. Lausanne Treaty. This is because the Islam- ist forces and the foreign forces share the common goal (Manisalı 2006, 14–15). Conclusions Now, the observer convinced already Where does the above analysis bring from the start that the Kemalist ideology is us? I believe the most important thing is authoritarian, illiberal, and keen to suppress that we should not explain Kemalist views religious freedoms interprets this paragraph on various individual issues by postulat- and probably states something like: “a typi- ing to it an essentially conservative, elitist, cal Kemalist espousing his authoritarian or authoritarian foundation. Whenever a ideology.” However, after we have analyzed Kemalist commentator takes a seemingly the liberal, emancipating philosophy of his- illiberal or authoritarian position on some tory, and the optimistic and communitarian individual issue, this should be seen within idea of human nature presupposed by Ke- a specific socio-political context, as an an- malist ideology, these Manisalı’s words can swer to a specific question, more often than be read in a very different light. They become not based on unquestioned presuppositions understood as an argument for defending that guide, but do not determine, opinions. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s original emanci- To highlight this issue, I believe the follow- pating movement at the time when liber- ing quotation from Erol Manisalı is helpful: alism, the Enlightenment’s first pedigree, has found its hegemonic expression in neo- Liberal politics in Turkey transform into liberalism. Together with the fashionable 61 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013 postmodern political philosophy, neoliberal- References ism turns into a purely individualistic creed that has abandoned all the emancipating Ayata, Sencer and Ayşe-Güneş Ayata. goals of the Enlightenment. When this is at- 2007. “The Center-Left Parties in Turkey.” tached to the contemporary phase of global Turkish Studies 8(2): 211–232. capitalism, which is run mostly by Western- Aydoğan, Metin. 2004. Yeni Dünya Düze- originated giant corporations, the anti-im- ni, Kemalizm ve Türkiye. Istanbul: Umay perialist position turning into vehemently Yayınları. anti-Western attitude in contemporary Kemalist intellectuals’ writings becomes Avcıoğlu, Doğan. 2003. Türkiye’nin much more understandable. If the neolib- Düzeni (Dün, Bugün, Yarın). Istanbul: Tekin eral capitalist world-order, together with Yayınevi. postmodern philosophy that cherishes the religious and ethnic particularisms, seems Crowley, John. 2000. “Liberal Values, to threaten the very foundations of Turkey’s Liberal Guilt, and the Distaste for Politics.” modernization, the Kemalists obviously try In The Meaning of Liberalism – East and West, to resist it. This resistance, however, can edited by Zdeněk Suda and Jiří Musil, 47– hardly be explained as a result of their ide- 72. Budapest: CEU Press. ology’s essential authoritarianism, elitism, or illiberalism. 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