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InternatIonal CommIssIon of mIlItary HIstory BulgarIan CommIssIon of mIlItary HIstory aCta 2012 teCHnology and warfare 38th ICmH Congress ProCeedIngs sofIa, BulgarIa, 25 august – 1 sePtemBer 2012 urCH alma mater sofIa unIversIty Press 2013 ACTA 2012 Technology and Warfare 38th ICMH Congress Proceedings ACTA 2012 Technologye et Art Militaire Actes du 38eme Congres de la CIHM Editors: Prof. Dr. Dimitar Minchev, President, Bulgarian Commission of Military History Prof. Dr. Jordan Baev, Scientiic Program Manager Prof. Dr. Kostadin Grozev, Academic Director, University Research Complex in the Humanities at Soia University St. Kliment Ohridski © Bulgarian Commission of Military History / Commission d’Histoire Militaire Bulgare © University Research Complex in the Humanities Alma mater © Cover Design: Borislav Kjosev ISBN: 978-954-07-3533-7 davide Borsani (Italy) Beyond military technology: the Cultural dimension of Counterinsurgency doctrines In the last two decades, the expression “asymmetric warfare” has been generally adopted with an innovative dimension by the popular imagery to point out the disparity between military means (and tactics) used by conventional and unconventional forces in a low-intensity conlict. Hence, public opinion often links the “new” wars to two warfare phases – the insurgency and the counterinsurgency – not so truly “new”1. It is no coincidence that principles to win these wars were identiied since the end of the XIXth century2, and they did not speciically concern military technology and its innovations. The aim of this paper is to highlight briely the continuity lines among the most important counterinsurgency military doctrines3, which pave the road for today’s doctrines. The focus will be on the cultural dimension, which is here supposed to be one of the main keys to achieve victory. §1. small wars Important ancestors of the current counterinsurgency operations are the British “small wars” between the XIXth and the XXth centuries. The expression “small wars” was initially used in 1896 by Colonel Charles Callwell4, who fought in the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Boer Wars, to title his manual: Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice5. What are the “small wars”? According to Callwell, they are «campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops […] where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open ield […] operations very varying in their scope and 1 2 3 4 5 A common vision is embodied in Sheila Jackson Lee’s words (a US Democratic congresswoman), who declared in 2002 that «the new wars of the 21st century will be fought differently from World War II. In fact, there will be probably more wars of terrorism». US CoNGRESSIoNAl RECoRD, House of Representatives, v. 148, Pt. 13 (Washington: from 20 September to 1 October 2002) H6551 <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-09-24/pdf/CREC-2002-09-24-pt1-PgH6549.pdf> See Gianluca Pastori, “L’Occidente in guerra con gli «altri»: lezioni storiche” in Massimo de Leonardis and Gianluca Pastori (eds.), Le nuove side per la forza militare e la diplomazia. Il ruolo della NATo (Bologna 2007) 35–48 British and in particular American doctrines. JoHN P. SUllIvAN JR., The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars – Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms? (Quantico AY 05-0) http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v6/sullivan%20w%20bib.pdf Charles E. Callwell, Small wars: their principles and practice (Lincoln 1996). Originally published in 1896. The third edition was published in 1906 by His Majesty’s Stationery Ofice, London. 375 in their conditions […] operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces». How could the Westphalian actor win these wars «conceived in uncertainty, conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority»7 to settle «conquered or annexed territory»8? Of course, the overall strategy required to preserve the tactical initiative by maintaining «a dominant bearing», and of course «the troops must get at their adversaries and give them a lesson which they will not forget»9 by exploiting their own points of strength. But, in Callwell’s view, the insurgents (or the irregular forces) were able to maintain the strategic advantage if opposed to a conventional approach. Compared with the Westphalian wars, and agreeing with Carl von Clausewitz’s “people’s war”, the “fog of war” in “small wars” was indeed thicker and the low of information poorer. As a solution, troops should comprehensively know and understand the theatre of operations and its actors. In this sense, Callwell noted that regular forces should be familiar with – in Victorian language – the «savages and semi-civilised races»10 or with – in politically correct terms – local cultures and customs to defeat the irregular enemy once for all11. So, he deduced «a most important military lesson [... :] in small wars the habits, the customs, and the mode of action on the battleield of the enemy should be studied in advance. […] all oficers should know what nature of opposition they must expect, and should understand how best to overcome it»12. In sum, more than a century ago and with a completely different international context, a British Colonel did not only focus on tactical approaches or technological superiority of regular forces to gain victory in an low-intensity conlict, but he stressed the respective importance of cultural aspects in elaborating military strategies, even though without a mandatory prescription. On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1940 the US Marine Corps codiied in its own Small Wars Manual13 the lessons learned from Banana Wars and Philippines insurgency14. Even by adopting substantially Callwell’s military approach,  Ibid., 21 7 Ibid. Ibid., 25 8 9 Ibid., 395 10 Ibid., 21 Nicholas J. Schlosser, “The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual: An Old Solution to a New Challenge?” in Fortitudine, Bulletin of the Marine Corps Historical Program, vol. 35, n. 1 (2010) 4–9 Callwell, Small wars: their principles and practice, 33 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, (Washington DC 1940). Reprinted in 2010 at New York. Keith F. Kopets, “Why Small Wars Theory Still Matters: The Extension of the Principles on Irregular Warfare and Non-Traditional Missions of the Small Wars Manual to the Contemporary Battlespace” in SmallWarsJournal.com (200) http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v6/kopets.pdf 11 12 13 14 37 the most important innovation concerned the interdependence between military and civilian aspects of the strategy, where military force was combined with diplomatic pressure and political intervention to stabilize a government which was «inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation»15. The key points of a successful strategy were four. I. Secure the most important areas and cities by deploying an adequate and, if needed, huge amount of troops. II. Attack steadily the enemy in order to maintain the tactical initiative. III. Create, train and mentor the national Armed Forces of the “liberated” country, meanwhile a central and democratic government was institutionalized, obviously according to American interests. Iv. Withdrawal of the US Forces. The overall process consisted in the “nationalization” of reconstruction and stabilization phases. Thus, on the one hand, the US – the Department of State and the military apparatus – had to work side-by-side with local security forces and civilian bodies; on the other hand, Americans had to prepare national institutions to take care of the country on their own. How to work together if not in presence of a mutual understanding? The manual indeed required that «all ranks be familiar with the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in the country in which they are operating. Poor judgment […] is certain to involve the commander of the force in unnecessary military dificulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests of the United States»1. As this paper is going to igure out, the above-mentioned principles are simply essential for today’s counterinsurgents. But, after the Second World War, both “small wars” manuals progressively sank into oblivion and they only became a suggested reading. §2. the age of globalization After the end of the Cold War and the opening of the “unipolar season”, an interesting update to the doctrine was made by US General Charles Krulak. In his concept, due to the globalization and the worldwide diffusion of new media technologies, the so-called “new” wars were characterized by three “blocks” of operations: humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping and traditional war ighting. In his own words, «in one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees […]. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart […] and inally they will be ighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day, all within three city blocks»17. 15 1 17 US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1 Ibid., 41 Charles C. Krulak, quoted in JoSEPH J. CollINS, “Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War” in The Journal of Conlict Studies, vol. 24, n. 2 (Winter 2004) 61–77 377 Because of the globalized and increased impact of media on Armed Forces, the soldier became the immediate symbol of US foreign policy: a sort of ambassador. As a consequence, he had to make the «right decision at the right time at the point of contact without the direct supervision of senior leadership»18. In other terms, soldiers had to cultivate an intuitive decision-making and be prepared to react in front of cameras by responding properly to a direct threat and minimizing the risk of obsessive media scrutiny. Therefore, they had to be differently trained to face the overall and enlarged pressure19. Krulak focused his analysis on the reactivity and on the intuitive human decision-making of troops, which must learn and show on the battleground «integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability»20. It was all about speed: stimulus and human response. According to Krulak, «technological or scientiic solutions alone will not be adequate to resolve these conlicts; nor will they be able to lift what Clausewitz called “the fog of war”»21: a century later, Callwell’s echo was still strong. However, Krulak’s analysis was not complete; there was indeed no emphasis on preparing soldiers to cultural aspects of the three block war. A warning that, during the 1990s, something lacked in this ield. Perhaps a legacy of the “Vietnam syndrome” or just a reminder of the traditional “American way of war”22. American General James Mattis and Colonel Frank Hoffman completed Krulak’s concept in 2005 when their article Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars23 was published on the US Naval Institute magazine. The so-called “hybrid wars” were those wars where «we can expect to simultaneously deal with the fall out of a failed state that owned but lost control of some biological agents or missiles, while combating an ethnically motivated paramilitary force, and a set of radi18 19 20 21 22 23 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War” in Marines Magazine (January 1999) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm A. Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, “The rise and demise of “Three Block War”” in Canadian Military Journal, vol. 10, n. 1 (2009) 38–45 Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War Charles C. Krulak, “Cultivating Intuitive Decision-making” in Marine Corps Gazette (May 1999) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cultivating_intuitive_d-m.htm «That phrase – popularized by the military historian Russell Weigley in his 1973 book – has come to refer to a grinding strategy of attrition: the strategy employed by Ulysses S. Grant to destroy Robert E. Lee’s army in 1864–65, by John J. Pershing to wear down the German army in 1918, and by the U.S. Army Air Force to pulverize all the major cities of Germany and Japan in 1944–45. In this view, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II were won not by tactical or strategic brilliance but by the sheer weight of numbers – the awesome destructive power that only a fully mobilized and highly industrialized democracy can bring to bear. In all these conlicts, U.S. armies composed of citizen-soldiers suffered and inlicted massive casualties». MAX BooT, “The New American Way of War” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003) 41–58 James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” in US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 131, n. 1 (2005) 18–19 378 cal terrorists who have now been displaced»24. These could be considered, in many ways, as the new “small wars” of the XXIst century. In general and compared with Callwell’s era, the international context is obviously changed, but military force still remains essential. Mattis and Hoffman noted that these “hybrid wars”, like the old “small wars”, could not be won on the battleield by focusing only (or mostly) on military technology. They found a key factor in extending the three block war by adding a fourth block: cultural training. They completed Krulak’s approach by moving the attention from a reactive perspective to a proactive one: information about language, habits and psychology of local population were put at the core of military training. It is intuitive that this affected the way how troops, both “sensors” and “transmitters” of information in an age when the time dimension is dramatically reduced, promptly communicate and broadcast their message on the battleield and indirectly to public opinion. The Mattis’ and Hoffman’s goal was to make certain that troops were as good «at reading the cultural terrain of an area as they are at reading a traditional map of the physical terrain»25. In sum, the fourth block aimed at increasing the “intellectual irepower” to deal with the interactions between Western forces and civilian populations. It wanted to inluence local people and offer them a substantial alternative to the ideology promoted by insurgents. When General David Petraeus enacted his famous doctrine – the so-called “COIN”, the natural acronym of “counter-insurgency” – to tackle Iraqi insurgents in 2006, he inally incorporated in his manual all the above-mentioned principles from “small wars” to “hybrid wars”2. It is possible to summarize the doctrine in eight milestones. I. Create a national, legitimate and democratic government able to run the country on its own legs. II. Coordinate both military and civilian efforts in order to move together toward a same goal. III. Subordinate tactical and military goals to political and strategic ones. Iv. Study in advance local cultures in order to understand and interact with local societies. v. Win hearts and minds of local people. vI. Prefer the use of intelligence to the use of force. vII. Spread widely the perception of security by getting from law the legitimacy of military action. VIII. Commit Armed Forces without time barriers because «the insurgent wins if he does not lose. The counterinsurgent loses if he does not win»27. 24 25 2 27 Ibid. Ibid. Headquarters Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5), December 200 http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency” in Military Review (March/April 2006) 49–53 379 In a very important article published on Military Review, the journal of Fort leavenworth28, academics and military personnel analysed Petraeus’ approach. They very cleverly highlighted, this time with a mandatory prescription, that: «soldiers and Marines must understand demographics, history, and the causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, approaches, and supporting entities for every player in the conlict. The interconnected politico-military nature of insurgency requires the counterinsurgent to immerse himself in the lives of the people in order to achieve victory»29. From this perspective, it became axiomatic that undertaking any military operation, without a comprehensive understanding of society and culture of the country where counterinsurgents ight, is extremely dangerous. §3. the adaptation of nato The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its involvement in Afghanistan, the today’s most important Western military operation, represent a signiicant case study to realize the “state of the art” of the doctrine. In 1999 NATO adopted the Peace Support Operations (PSO) framework, detailed in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.130, to legitimize its operations “out of area”, also called “non-article 5”. This document distinguished the PSO in six different categories: conlict prevention, peace making, peace keeping, peace enforcement, peace building and humanitarian operations. For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to deepen this categorisation. However, it is useful to stress that this AJP chose a higher level of analysis than the military doctrines above-reported, and it often preferred a too squared approach to these operations. So, the counterinsurgency dimension is very weak, and the document, like the next two similar ones31, should not be considered essential to conduct comprehensively a low-intensity conlict in the XXIst century. It was no coincidence that, when NATO took the lead of the international security mission in Afghanistan in 2003, there was no proper approach ready to be applied; in retrospect, the unpreparedness was clear. Recently, the then Deputy Secretary General, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, has remarked that in his book32. Only in 2008, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) David McKiernan gave troops a irst Joint Campaign Plan33 and, one year later, his successor Stanley McChrys28 29 30 31 32 33 The place where “COIN” was oficially born. Ibid. NATO Military Agency for Standardisation, Peace Support operations AJP-3.4.1 (July 2001) AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation operations and AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Support to Civil Authorities. Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, La strada per Kabul: la comunità internazionale e le crisi in Asia Centrale (Roma and Bologna 2009) See Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military operations, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Report Service (Washington 3 December 2009) 10 380 tal released a Counterinsurgency Guidance34, both readjusted on the basis of the handbook previously delivered by Petraeus to soldiers in Iraq35. In 2011 NATO illed up this gap and issued the AJP 3.4.4 named Allied Joint Doctrine For Counterinsurgency36, which can only be applied outside the territory of member States. Inside the document, there is a speciic deinition – even though very approximate – of “counterinsurgency” for the Alliance as a whole: it is «the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances»37. So, here the starting point is a synergistic approach or – in NATO language – a “comprehensive approach”, where «the human factor predominates»38 and military force «plays a vital but essentially supporting role»39. The role of technology is recognized as vital too, but only to collect and deliver information. In this sense, technology and information allow NATO forces just to “know” rather than to “understand” the complex environment. Consequently, what a successful strategy requires is a military personnel able to read and channel several information, and provide a proper interpretation of the events and, then, a competing, «transparent, timely, open, honest, veriiable and accessible»40 narrative against the insurgent one. According to the doctrine, «Understanding the population is to successful COIN what understanding physical terrain is to successful conventional land operations»41. As a consequence, «an eficient training program is essential»42, and, prior to the deployment, «adequate time needs to be allocated to cultural aware34 35 3 37 38 39 40 41 42 «We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. [...] We will not win simply by killing insurgents. [...] While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating. [...] an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition [...] The intricate familial, clan and tribal connections of Afghan society turns «attrition math» on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: 10 – 2 = 8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many other who will want vengeance [...]: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) [...] to win we need to much more than simply kill or capture militants. [...] The will of the people is the Objective. [...] We must know the people, their environment and aspirations, and work together with them to meet their needs. [...] Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation (with tribal, community, and religious leaders». International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (Kabul 2009) http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/oficial_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=438&d=120899210 It was initiated in 2008. NATO Military Agency for Standardisation, Allied Joint Doctrine For Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4 (February 2011) Ibid., 1–2 Ibid., 5–1 Ibid., 3–18 Ibid., 3–21 Ibid., 3–18 Ibid., 3–27 381 ness»43 and language skills. If there was a lack of them, once troops are deployed, a perceived cultural insensitivity toward local habits, traditions and tribal structures would increase the risk of isolation and provide to the enemy opportunities for propaganda and exploitation. Moreover, NATO doctrine afirms that this “cultural awareness” has to be a link between military and political decision-makers; for this purpose, a cooperation and a mutual exchange of information have to be institutionalized. For instance, since the planning of operations, «a picture as clear as possible is required from government authorities to determine not just insurgent strengths but other cultural nuances and inluences which can be brought to bear and have potential inluence and effect to aid a military commander»44. §4. Conclusions After more than a century of experience, Western counterinsurgency doctrines have identiied and codiied – maybe deinitely – the principle that military technology is not the main aspect to win the old or new “small wars”. Instead, emphasis has to be put on the soldier as human being able to study, understand and interact with different environments and cultures. NATO counterinsurgency doctrine inally prescripts what Callwell already (but only) suggested, that is: prior to the deployment, a selected training is necessary to improve individual and collective cultural understanding and language skills. And this has to concern both military and civilian authorities, bound to work together to read the overall terrain and uplift the “fog of war”. This mainly now, in a globalized “information age”, when «the new variants have a velocity that previous historical insurgencies never possessed»45. So counterinsurgency, information warfare and psychological operations, conducted through cultural means, overlap (and should overlap) more and more. In addition, on the battleield, commanders and soldiers must avoid mistakes such as those already made during the vietnam war by General William Westmoreland and repeated by the George W. Bush administration, in particular by the Pentagon and the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Iraq, that were: the extreme faith put on military technology and the adoption of a seek and destroy approach to tackle insurgencies, instead of one characterized by the use of force, of course, but above all mutual understanding, cooperation and openness toward local population4. 43 44 45 4 Ibid., 2–7 Ibid. Cohen, Crane, Horvath and Nagl, Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency An anecdote, told the author two years ago by an American oficer who served in Iraq during the hardest phases of insurgency, is very interesting. What saved his life – he said – was not bullets and “smart” bombs, but cups of tea drunk with Iraqi tribes. 382 In sum, only a harmonized synergy, comprehensive of a cultural understanding, can lead a “small war” to an ultimate victory. And this must be planned before undertaking any military campaigns, particularly now for the West in the current international strategic context. Otherwise, today’s results speak for themselves. * PhD Candidate at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart) in Milan, Italy. 383