Making sense of Naya Pakistan

International Studies, 2018

Pakistan's general elections held in July 2018 led to the smooth transition of power for the second time from one elected government to another. However, the elections were marred by serious allegations of manipulation of the electoral process by the military. The results were on predicted lines-a hung assembly in which the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerged with the highest seats. While Imran Khan's political journey has been a remarkable one, he inherits a country, which has become difficult to govern and faces a very difficult economic situation. Pakistan's second successful democratic transition shows clear signs of the emergence of a political system in which the military may just be happy with a form of guided democracy-a formal democratic structure maintained and legitimized by elections. Even if Imran Khan has come to power as a result of the manipulation by the military establishment, he cannot be taken for granted in the civil-military equation.

Strategic Analysis, 2024

The February 2024 elections in Pakistan threw up a hung parliament, with Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerging as the single largest party. The elections were a testament to the sustained political re-engineering by the powerful deep state of Pakistan to ensure a pliable civilian government amenable to its diktats. However, the results were contrary to the expectations of the powerful establishment, which wanted to diminish Imran Khan’s role in Pakistani politics and took all possible measures, ranging from disqualifying him from contesting elections to disallowing his party to use the symbol it was assigned earlier. In the aftermath of the elections, Imran’s party was kept out of power, and a coalition consisting of parties opposed to him was stitched together to lead the government. This article seeks to analyse the state of Pakistani politics both during and after the elections, and identify the challenges Pakistan is going to face in the days to come.

Esta publicación han sido posible gracias a la subvención concedida por de la Agencia Española de Cooperación al Desarrollo (AECID).

1981

Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States and the West has been underlined in recent months by the commitment of several forms of eco-1 nomic support to the Zia ul-Haq regime from a variety of western sources. The example of the Shah of Iran, however, should serve as a reminder that strategic Simportance and acceptance of western aid are not necessarily guarantees of 4 long-term stability. The Pakistani case is further complicated by the lack of clarity concerning the legitimacy, or even the intentions, of the present military regime. General Zia, even after four years in control, continues to assert that military rule is only a temporary, transitional phenomenon, but his is unable to say when the temporary will end or what will emerge from the transition. Still further questions arise concerning the role of Islam within Pakistan's present and future political arrangements. It is therefore helpful to attempt an assessment of the internal stability of the present regime and to speculate on the possible directions in which it might evolve. In an article written shortly after the July 5, 1977, military coup, I argued that Zia and his fellow generals did apparently intend to return power to civilian hands after their ninety-day "Operation Fairplay" culminated in elections. However, two developments ultimately changed these plans. First, the unanticipated intractability and popular support of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became an increasingly obvious threat to the military and eventually led to the first cancellation of elections. Secondly, other priorities rose in importance and supplanted the holding of elections as the major tasks ... i of the military regime. These included (1) the elimination of Bhutto and his / '" political machine (pursued under the aegis of "accountability"); (2) Isldmization; T1=s pape was prepared for Ohe Department o! State as Pairt of its exterl research prooram Views or con:'usic.s CoM L tained herem shod o, be interpreted as reprerenra ti ;

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In the beginning, Musharraf got a God-given opportunity, but unfortunately he lost it. When the corruption-ridden Nawaz Sharif regime was ousted, he was widely acclaimed as a hero by the masses in Pakistan, as if a Messiah has descended upon them from heaven to solve all their problems. But his later performance constantly decreased his support. All the previous governments were supporting Taliban against Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Under heavy American pressure, his turnaround of this policy was hailed in the West but loathed by the Pakistani masses, which see him as a traitor of Pakistani national interests, as his policy resulted in bringing the Northern Alliance into power, which had never been friendly to Pakistan. The first act of a Minister of the Alliance was to fly to India direct from the U.N. sponsored conference in Germany and issue a joint statement with India against Pakistan. After betraying Taliban, he betrayed all those Mujahedeen who were fighting for Kashmir's cause since 1948 for the implementation of U.N. resolution of 1948 and 1949 for a free and fair plebiscite under U.N. supervision. He did this to pacify and please India and to present his credentials of faithfulness to the United States in accordance with his January 12 speech promises. Thus he succeeded in demoralizing all Kashmir Mujahedeen, to whom he had called as 'freedom fighters' in his earlier meetings with Vajpayee in Agra. His record of betrayals continued further to encompass his previous colleagues and Generals. He silently sacked all of them who had brought him into power, like Gen. Usmani, ex-Karachi corps commander, ISI chief and several others. He took away the Islamabad corps from the control of Gen. Aziz, who had deposed Nawaz Sharif in a military coup on the ground while Musharraf was hanging in the air, about ten minutes away from his probable death. Gen. Aziz was duped by a promotion to a higher rank of a toothless ceremonial position. He made all these personnel changes after firmly securing his own position by extending his own expired tenure as Commander-in-Chief. The Economist has summarized his 'achievements' in the following words: "In three years as Pakistan's leader, General Musharraf has largely bleached out the Islamist colour given to the armed forces by a former dictator, Zia ul Haq. The top ranks have been purged; many lower-level officers with over-zealous views are being discreetly retired." The secularists have been lauding him as a Pakistani Ataturk. Islamists regard it as a betrayal of 'the ideology of Pakistan'. The Economist has confirmed this betrayal that in three years he 'has largely bleached out the Islamist colour'. His record of betrayals, as seen by the Pakistani public, is too long. Finally, he

and above all promulgation of the eminent 18 th Constitutional amendment. One way or the other, these reforms helped to a conduct Constitutional struggle in Pakistan took almost four decades to attain an atmosphere where a peaceful transition from one democratically elected government to another could become possible. For the first time, the government of Pakistan People's Party, under President Asif Ali Zardari, successfully completed its five years term. The PPP government, time and again, introduced a number of administrative, political and constitutional reforms including the electoral reforms, neutrality of Election Commission, consensus on caretaker government, independence of judiciary a free and fair election in 2013 resulting a nonviolent power transition to the majority party. Present study strives to dig-out the facts that made this transition of authority possible. This is an historical research; therefore, historical research method along with descriptive method is used to understand the existing phenomenon.

Global Asia, 2008

Pakistan AD2000, 1989

This paper was written as part of an exercise in Future Forecasting I thought it may interest some, who are interested in understanding political transformations in Pakistan : Predicting the fu tu re dire ctio n o f a political system is a hazardous task. However, given some understanding o f historical experience, socioeconomic conditions, changes in the international environm ent and p o licy choices exercised by the decision making elites o f a state, one can forecast (w ith some c re d ib ility) the like ly d ire ctio n o f its p olitica l developm ent.