Radical Democracy: Between Post-Marxism and Postanarchism. Reflections on Hegemony and Radical Politics

RADICAL DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN POST-MARXISM AND POSTANARCHISM. REFLECTIONS ON HEGEMONY AND RADICAL POLITICS Student: Mihai-Calin Caciuleanu, Faculty of Political Science, National University of Political Science and Public Administration Scientific coordinating: Assistant Professor Nicolae-Emanuel Dobrei INTRODUCTION 3 THE NEW STRUGGLE: THE POST-MARXISM OF LACLAU AND MOUFFE 7 DEFINITIONS AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANARCHISM 19 POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE 28 POST-ANARCHISM AND ITS THEORETICAL ADDITIONS 31 METHODOLOGY 40 CASE STUDIES 43 THE ROAD TOWARDS RADICAL DEMOCRACY 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY 70 2 INTRODUCTION The abhorrent transformation of Marxism into Stalinism and the events that followed created a momentum for the revival of anarchism, what Newman calls, following Bensaid, ‘a libertarian impulse’ in politics (Newman 2011; Bensaid 2005). The apparent failure of the communist project also brought about ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992), the full development of neoliberal hegemony that has been preoccupied, on one hand, with the destruction of the welfare state and, on the other hand, with the narrowing of the field of politics (Harvey 2011). So the ‘libertarian impulse’ can be seen from two perspectives: a contestation of hegemony, and the search for a new way of thinking about radical politics. In this respect, the post-Marxist project of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) aimed at renouncing the working class as the only agent capable of social change, developing a conception of antagonism that would be deemed ‘reactionary’ by orthodox Marxism. Since its first articulations in theory and practice, anarchism has contested more forms of oppression than other ideologies. Here, the obvious distinctions are articulated in the Bakunin-Marx debate during the First International that has culminated with the exclusion of the former. Anarchism contested not only the oppressive practices that arise in capitalism, but also incapacity of any state formation to ensure equal-liberty. This vision of egalibertarianism (Balibar 2004) resides at the heart of anarchist ethics, as Bakunin argues (Bakunin 1953). Saul Neuman’s critique of ‘classical’ anarchism revolves around claims of essentialism that span across the writings of canonical writers. In lieu of these claims about human nature, the development of history and the ontological opposition to the state as the embodiment of domination, he argues that anarchism should be sensitive to the developments of contemporary continental philosophy. This is due to the fact that political ideologies are composed and structured by philosophical concepts and argumentations (Freeden 2013). In this sense, anarchism should adopt features of post-structuralist theories, since they present not only useful theoretical frameworks, but also an intrinsic drive towards anarchist principles (Newman 2011). In sum, anarchism can tell one a lot about post-structuralism, as well as the other way around. So, if the moment is upon us for a return towards libertarian politics, how should we envision this return? In this respect, to projects come to mind: the radical democracy of the post- Marxists, expressed by Laclau and Mouffe, and the insurrectionist projects of postanarchism, develop by Newman. Both agree that a new contestation of neoliberal hegemony cannot be adequately brought forward just by restating anarchist (or Marxist) principles. These 3 theoretical frameworks need to be adapted, taking into account the diversification of power, per Foucault (1978; 1995), as well as the diversification of the agents that can bring about social change. For these reasons, both approaches look at New Social Movements (NSMs) as prolific examples of this change. This has not come without critique, especially on the side of postanarchism. For instance, Franks (2007) argues that there is no ‘post’ in postanarchism, since it does not represent a transcendence of 'classical' anarchism, but just another articulation, enslaved by its own dedication to some essentialist ideas. In this thesis, I start from three main questions: 1. Does Newman’s postanarchist framework prove itself to be a transcendence of ‘classical’ anarchism? 2. Has the practice of anarchism changed so significantly in the past two centuries in order to necessitate a new framework of analysis, specifically that of postanarchism? 3. Postanarchism and post-Marxism are, in many respects, synonymous in their goals and explanations. How should we think about the relation between these two approaches when discussing ‘radical democracy’? My main hypothesis is that, through radicalizing the notions of ‘classical’ anarchism, Newman manages to break open the limits of this ideological family, providing a new ethical framework through which struggles can be assessed and hegemonized, greatly helping the project of radical democracy. Finally, I will argue that this radicalization that postanarchism presents is more versatile and compatible with different forms of organization (including vertical ones, in certain conditions). My motivation for choosing this topic is double, both academic and non-academic. On the one hand, the reproaches that are put up against postanarchism have not changed the way in which Newman discusses his theory. That is, when Cohn (2002) published his critique in The Journal of Political Ideologies and argued that Newman misinterprets Bakunin’s essentialism, the postanarchist author did not address this by making some sort of correction towards his initial argument, publishing the same version of his explanation in ‘Postanarchism: a politics of anti-politics’ (Newman 2011) in that very same journal almost a decade later. While there may be various reasons for the author’s lack of a direct response or defense, I do not believe that we are talking about academic entitlement or something of this sort. Rather, I do not know what to believe. In this sense, a re-reading of Bakunin and Kropotkin through the lens 4 of post-structuralist theory was in order, if this thesis was to address some pressing questions in anarchist and/or radical political theory. On the other hand, in a more non-theoretical and non-academic way, the so-called ‘post-structuralist left’ has been subjected to a lot of critique from certain ‘classical’ anarchist or, likewise, orthodox Marxist movements for its ontological negation of ‘class’ as the only antagonism. This critiques is mainly the one leveled against thinkers and movements focused on group identity - the so-called ‘New Left’: although they promised a liberation from labels, they create new identity enclaves that, first of all, do nothing to meaningfully challenge neoliberal hegemony, and, second of all, put class in a certain less-deserving and less important position, thus weakening whatever frail class consciousness there could be. It is exactly this identity between the postanarchists/post- Marxists and New Left adepts that seems problematic to me. Given the fact that postanarchism does not change its focus from the old intrinsic goal of equal-liberty, a morphological approach towards the study of this evolution of anarchism may yield less results than using techniques of discourse analysis brought forward by the ‘Essex School’. As such, the methodological approach of this thesis will be the Discourse Analysis technique developed by Essex School to compare ‘classical’ anarchism to postanarchism, and look at three important examples of movements that present most obviously anarchist ideals. These case studies will be, in chronological order, (1) the ‘Haymarket Affair’ in the 1880s in Chicago, which culminated in the 8-hour work day; (2) Anarchist Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War; (3) the Occupy Wall Street movement in its beginnings. As both post-Marxists and postanarchists argue, the Occupy moment represents the spirit of the new way of thinking about radical democracy. Using both interpretations, I will argue that the insurrectionist tactics of postanarchism should be used in order to attain the post-Marxist vision of radical democracy. Starting definitions Throughout the introduction, I used several contested terms. For the purpose of this thesis, there are a number of definitions that need to be clarified, in order for the argument to be discernible. Poststructuralism One needs to make a distinction between poststructuralism and postmodernism, given the fact that these terms are sometimes used to define similar phenomena. While postmodernism defines itself by a rejection of positivist science and universal values, grand narratives, is 5 marked by cultural relativism, it defines a broader movement which can be seen in the 1968 cultural revolution. When adding the focus on polymorphous sexual orientations, postmodernism becomes a less radical way of resisting ‘hegemonic power relations and challenging material inequalities’ (Franks 2007). Moreover, given the fact that poststructuralism is closely associated with the theories of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Lacan, and Lyotard, this is, above all, an academic phenomenon. While it fuels, in one way or another, the postmodernist movements, those who participate in such gatherings do not need to use poststructuralist theories to carry on their struggle (Franks 2007). It is this latter theoretical framework that postanarchists and post-Marxists use when referring to the ‘post’ in their new ideological formation. Anarchism Anarchism, since its first use by P-J. Proudhon in identifying with this ideology, has come to represent not one, but rather a collective set of philosophical ideas (Țăranu 2005). As such, the task of providing one definitive description of the term for the academic purpose of this paper is compromised. As the anarcha-feminist Emma Goldman puts it succinctly, a basic definition of anarchism rests upon its etymological roots (“a” – [the] absence [of]; “arhe”- [a] ruler (Țăranu 2005)) and goes as follows: “The philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence, and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary”. (Goldman 1910) Poststructuralism and postanarchism I will use ‘poststructuralism’ to mean the ambiguous current that rejects essentialist notions of identity, starting with those of humanism, while, at the same time, admitting that there is no unique element (as it was the case of the ‘structure’ in Barthes, Althusser, and others- (Runciman 1969) that completely determines the subject. Rather, for postrstructuralist thinkers, the subject is constituted by ‘dispersed and unstable relations of forces - power, discursive regimes, and practices’ (Newman 2001: 14). The demarcations between ‘poststructuralism’ and ‘postmodernism’ is a thin one, subject to many controversies, that do not make the subject of this thesis. However, for heuristic purposes, it could be said that ‘postmodernism’ constitutes a wider cultural phenomenon, not restricted to the confined space of academia, as is the case with ‘poststructuralism’ (Eagleton 2003: 13). The 6 postmodern movement escapes the theory of poststructuralism, putting forward a politics that strongly supports diversity, fluidity, sexual liberation and so on, and is not strictly concerned with challenging the hegemonic power relations that mar our society or with material inequalities (Franks 2007: 130). As such, a starting definition of postanarchism is a philosophy that rejects oppressive power, analyzes the current state of affairs through poststructuralist lenses, rejecting ‘essentialist’ assumptions, and proposes means of resistance that renounce the old ideal of Revolution. Postanarchism, as a newly emerged political doctrine at the end of the 1990s, has been approached from a number of perspectives (Gordon 2007; Evren 2011; Newman 2004; May 1994; Koch 1993; Call 2002). This should be seen as the difficult emergence of a radical political theory that struggles to redeem old concepts and expand ancient barriers. In this thesis, I choose to study Newman for his continuous concentration on the ethical, political and theoretical sides of postanarchism, rather creating a very unique interpretation of this ideology (Evren 2011). While May (1994), for example, develops strategies of resistance for poststructuralist anarchism, Newman manages to construct a sound theoretical background for thinking of an anarchism puts anarchy as its starting point, rather than an end goal, as I will show during this thesis. THE NEW STRUGGLE: THE POST-MARXISM OF LACLAU AND MOUFFE The theoretical break that the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe represents stems from their bringing forward of the concept of ‘hegemony’, as a fundamental category for political analysis. This is due, in fact, to their partial rejection and reformulation of Orthodox Marxism, which has to be analyzed, in order to fully grasp their vision of the ‘social’ and of radical politics. The authors argue that there is no ontological basis for the privilege accorded to the working class, in face of other social movements. To do so, they argue that the crisis of Orthodox Marxism, after it introduces the idea that the superstructure influences the base, in order not to completely negate politics as an activity, produce a fissure. This consists in the fact that new theoretical explanations must be developed to account for the change in the paradigm, allowing for the Gramscian definition of hegemony to arise. Even though this definition produces a more ‘superstructuralist’ reading of social struggles, it is still based on giving a primacy to the working class. By analyzing the characteristics in nature and in constitution of the base, they reject the ‘essentialist paradigms’ and move to show that hegemonic articulations happen at the economic level in the same way in which they do at any other level of the social, allowing them to use hegemony as a democratic practice. 7 Hegemony: moving beyond Orthodox Marxism Marxism is based, among other things, on a vision of society and history as rational phenomena that can be understood using rationalist approaches (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 3). If classical Marxism is based on its analysis of the past, Marxism orthodoxy prioritizes the role of theory, as a means towards creating ‘a guarantee that [the historical] tendencies will eventually coincide with the social articulation proposed’ by Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 19). Orthodox Marxism, as it is in the case of Karl Kautsky, for example, combines Hegelianism and Darwinism, to be able to predict the course of history, and offer prescriptions for how the working class should act (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 20). Three consequences arise from this perspective, drawing from the distinction of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’: 1. The subject. The class identity of the revolutionary subject is established at the level of the base, and is fixed at that level. As such, one’s position at other levels must take the form of representation of interests. Politics is seen as part of the superstructure, given the fact that identity is formed at the level of the base. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 20); 2. Difference incompatible with the categories established by the theory. These take two forms, that of necessary phenomena and of contingent ones. Contingent differences are described as aberrations, in the statistical sense, and are approximated to the theory, maintaining its purity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 21); 3. Analysis of historical events. If Marxism is to be conceived scientifically, current events cannot escape the paradigm, they must be fixed as natural courses of history. In other words, the classification of a particular event is fixed a priori (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 21) In every form, the specific element1 is integrated in the abstract whole, giving birth to a strategy that can only lead to the ‘workers’ party’: the void left between theory and the current state of the working class, although it is presented as being resolved in the future, requires the mediation that only the intellectuals of the party can provide (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 25). 1 It is important to note that, although in the ‘Methodology’ chapter I presented the Discourse Theory definition of ‘element’, I will be using it in the common sense of the word to mean ‘a constitutive part of a whole’ until my review of Laclau and Mouffe’s book arrives at the point of discussing their concept of articulation. 8 The concept of hegemony fills a void apparent in the discourse of the Second International: events that could not be explained in any other way than as historical aberrations are introduced in hegemonization, as a contingent process (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 48). A hegemonic relation is one particular relation that appears and is perceived, and, as such, represented, as a totality (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: x). As such, hegemony is that articulation which takes the role of the whole, the universal, even though it is conceived in the particular. For the first time, moving beyond mere ‘class alliance’, ideology becomes the primary terrain in which the ‘historic bloc’, as a conceptual category that sees the relation between different social sectors and classes as the central point of analysis (Cox 1993: 56), is formed (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 65-67). Here, the Gramscian reading of ideology moves beyond systems of ideas or ‘false consciousness’, adding institutions to its conceptual morphology (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 67). Finally, when ideology has taken its position in the Gramscian analysis, we can see how his definition of hegemony opens up the political space. For Gramsci, hegemony is the creation of consent, and not merely dominance over the other (Gramsci 1999: 261). Radicalizing this notion, and applying it to the field of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe view hegemony as the process of bringing different identities together behind a common project, through the creation of a meaning that is more than a particular articulation (Howarth 1998: 279); hegemony structures the common imaginary, being the necessary condition for any other articulation (Laclau 1990: 64; Carpentier and De Cleen 2007: 269). Now, it is necessary to see how hegemony operates at the level of relations between subjects. For a hegemonic relation to be possible, two conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, there has to exist a particular arrangement of society that is not structurally determined. If all the elements are predetermined in the arrangements they will form, hegemony can never arise. However, if elements whose defining characteristics do not determine them to form a specific connection, but still they blend into a specific arrangement, through the influence of articulating practices, hegemonic relations can form (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: xii). Second of all, for hegemony to be able to exist, its subject must be conceived as a specific form of ‘universal’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: xii). The authors argue that hegemonic subjectivity arises from the dialectic between logics of difference and logics of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: xiii). As presented in the chapter on methodology in this thesis, logics of equivalence represent discursive practices that bring together seemingly different identities, putting them in opposition to a negative identity, so as to create a fundamental opposition; it creates the ‘us’ in the ‘us versus them’, by weakening the difference between subjects, to put it concisely (Carpentier and De Cleen 2007: 270). By creating ‘chains of equivalence’ 9 between identities (e.g. saying that ‘from the perspective of a communist, liberals and conservatives are just the same’ equates the former two identities), existing antagonisms are revealed. In contrast, the logic of difference destroys existing chains of equivalence creating the conditions for those identities to be captured in other discourses, thus obscuring existing antagonisms (Howarth 1988: 277). To allow for hegemonic representation, one particularity introduced in the chain of equivalence, ‘splits’ its identity, assuming a ‘universality transcending it’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: xiii). The specific universality of hegemony is formed: “[when] a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it […]. As a result, its universality is a contaminated universality: (1) it lives in this unresolvable tension between universality and particularity; (2) its function of hegemonic universality is not acquired for good but is, on the contrary, always reversible.” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: xiii, emphasis in the original). For the two authors, hegemony is necessarily contingent, whereas for Gramsci hegemonic formations always revolve around a structuring principle: the ontological antagonism between the working class and the bourgeoisie, giving every struggle a necessary class character, and thus maintaining the primacy of this concept in the field of the social. In these ways, Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of hegemony puts contingency at the center of discourse, allowing for political complexity as the precondition for the existence of political struggle, fundamentally opening up the space that was not previously accessed by different strands of Marxism. While Orthodox Marxism, after the additions of Kautsky, recognizes that the perquisites for socialism and, later on, communism are not determined spontaneously, and the intellectuals play a crucial role in bringing this historical movement, this was not done through a process of articulation, but through the ‘science’ of Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 85). Gramsci is the one that revolutionizes the conception of politics as articulation, and the social as a contingent formation, even though he maintains a construction of identity outside of hegemonic articulation, by relating struggles back to class character (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 69). 10 Escaping the economist paradigm As mentioned above, Gramsci’s historic bloc is articulated in relation with the working class, as its central point, excluding the formation of identity, in this circumstance, from the field of hegemonic articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 76). This keeps intact the notion that hegemonic articulations are only contingent, not a necessary characteristic of the social, and relates back to the economist paradigm, insofar as we still accept the premise of the economic level as determining classes. In order for the subjects of hegemony to be constituted at the level of the economy, there are three conditions that must be fulfilled, that correspond to three classical Marxist theses, according to Laclau and Mouffe’s reading (1985:76-77): 1. The movement of history must be based on developments within the base, in the Marxist conception, and thus exempt from influences at the level of the superstructure, such as political interventions. This corresponds to the classical Marxist thesis of the neutrality of the productive forces (T1); 2. Subjects’ identity must be homogenous and their relations to one another, within a particular class, must be unitary, determined by the laws of motion developed at the level of the base. This condition is developed within classical Marxist theory under the notions of the tendency towards the homogenization and impoverishment of the proletariat (T2); 3. There need to be ‘historical interests’, moving beyond merely economic ones, that arise from the position of the social agents in the relations of production. This is clearly the thesis of socialism as being of paramount interest for the working class (T3); Regarding T1, classical Marxism posits that the development of productive forces is a natural happening that tends towards progress, independently of human intervention and determining every element that has a role in the process of production (Sitton 2010). As such, the Marxian view of labor-power is one of a commodity. The distinction between labor-power and other commodities under capitalism is that its use-value is not extracted immediately, for the capitalists need to ‘make it produce labor’, and in doing that they must impose some relations of domination (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 78). Therefore economic development under capitalism is not merely a natural process, independent of the will of people, as it is necessarily influenced by the capitalists’ intervention in the production process to extract the maximum amount of labor. Moreover, a look at how these relations of domination are met by the workers gives rise to a political space within the process of production, as they resisted 11 some form of domination, forcing the capitalists to adapt their techniques (Gamble and Gregg 1995: 430). Such was the case of the syndicalist fight for the eight-hour workday that forced capitalists to rethink the ways of domination, given the new constraints won by the workers. This brings into discussion T2, regarding the homogeneity and unity of the working class. In classical Marxism, the working class seems to arise from two different mechanisms that can work independently of each other: a) the selling of labour-power in the wage system transforms the worker into a proletarian; and b) the role that is attributed to the worker in the production process makes them a particular type of industrial worker; this is the basis for the distinction between ‘relations of production’ (point a)) and ‘relations in production’ (point b)) (Burawoy 1981). Approaching this problem empirically, we can see that the industrial working class has diminished considerably, since Marx’s time, while the wage system has become the general rule (the case of the United States is an illustrative example, discussed in Baker and Buffie 2017). When one factors in the diversity that has appeared inside the ‘traditional working class’, with industrial jobs opening up to women and immigrants, one can draw the conclusion that this class becomes more divided, not homogenous, as there appears a ‘protected sector’ and an ‘unprotected’ one, based on skill and political practices inside the working place (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 80-82). One response to this has been to start a search for the ‘true’ working class that is not divided by different interests and subject identities (Poulantzas 1975, cited in Laclau and Mouffe 1985), inadvertently accepting that more and more subject positions that were attributed historically to the working class are marred by contradictory identities and interests, starting the discussion on T3 (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 84). It becomes apparent that this is a false problem and one would need to argue a very implausible definition of the worker’s thinking (such as that of a homo oeconomicus) to provide a claim at forms of historical interests that are a priori attributed to leading the struggle for socialism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 84-85). Going further than Gramsci: a new understanding of hegemony After this analysis one of the fundamentals of classical Marxism, that has spurred numerous debates, and has been the subject of various reinterpretations and adjustments, is abandoned. A number of conclusions arise, forming the basis for the ulterior arguments regarding the democratic practice of hegemony. First of all, after disproving the necessary character of identity in the form of class, the basis for it becomes unfixity, giving a purely relational character to identity, and fulfilling the 12 preconditions for the existence of hegemonic relations at every level of the social (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 86). Second of all, the unfixity mentioned above produce a number of effects on the dimensions of the social, revolving around political subjectivity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 86). We see that (1) if the ontological privilege accorded to the working class regarding socialism is disregarded, it means that ‘historical interests’ are just forms of hegemonic articulation, and that other democratic antagonisms can be perceived as equally relevant for the socialist struggle (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 86); this bring us to (2) the role of NSMs in the fight for equality. Here, the authors argue that the two main lines of argumentation that have prevailed at the end of the century, that of orthodox Marxism that saw these movements as counterrevolutionary and the neomarxist approach that believed these movements to take the place of the proletariat in the struggle for socialism, have to be disregarded. NSMs should not be marginalized in the socialist struggle, since there is no basis for a privilege attributed to only one existing antagonism, and the progressive nature of a given movement is not determined a priori but is constructed through hegemonic practices, in close relation to other such forms of organization (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 87); the problem arises, for now, when (3) considering that the analysis so far has only managed to create the perspective of the social as conceived of various unfixed identities, and there should be a link between various segments of one’s identity that gives rise to a meaningful way of discussing what Gramsci calls ‘the collective will’ (Coutinho 2009), as the sum of different social forces. Third of all, the Gramscian definition of hegemony was used to discuss the moment when a class was put into the position of fulfilling a task that was not, from a Marxist point of view, ontologically attributed to it (Gramsci 1999). However, the authors argue that hegemony does not lose its usefulness as a tool after the deconstruction of an essentialist paradigm (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 87). In order to fully develop their conception of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe start by denouncing the notion of ‘society’, which, in Hegel’s view is a totality and, subsequently, for Marxists, implies a form of unity governed by natural laws that can be brought to surface and analyzed, and they replace it with the ‘social’ as a space governed by unfixity and differences that cannot be sutured, in the psychoanalytical sense (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 93-96). However, the authors point out that this characteristic of the social does not tell us anything about the character of the identities of the subject, for it could still be viewed as necessary (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 96); as such, they appeal to and radicalize the notion of ‘overdetermination’, present in Althusser as defining multiple sufficient causes for the 13 determination of an element in the Symbolic Order (Althusser 1962). As we know from Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Symbolic Order constitutes the social field in which relations between subjects are formed, and in which one enters the field of language, making linguistic communication possible, and accepts the imposed rules of society, such as legal norms and ideological conventions (Lacan 1991: 230). If social identities are overdetermined, it means that in every subjective identity there appears the presence of another, thus preventing fixation in a determination rooted in an immanent law (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 99-104). An important break has to come into play before a true analysis of the social identities can be attempted in a discursive paradigm. The two rooted assumptions that limit discourse, namely 1) an opposition between discursive and non-discursive practices, and 2) the purely immaterial character of discourse are discussed here. The first assumption, present in Foucault, mistakenly identifies discourse as the practice of defining relations between complexes (such as institutions or techniques), while these structures are seen as being constituted outside discourse (Foucault 1972: 53-54; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107). The response here stems from a closer analysis of these complexes, which allows one to see a relational character of different positions of objects, constituted through discursive practices (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107). The second critique starts by affirming that discursive practices do not negate the existence of an objective world, thus eschewing the old idealism/realism debate; the discursive paradigm considers objects as incapable of forming themselves as such outside the conditions of emergence that are present in this system: the very definition of these objects depends only on discursive formations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). Furthermore, every discourse has a material character, not just a mental one, for such a practice necessarily refers to the material properties of the objects that come into play, not to the ‘idea’ of them (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). This is, for example, the central idea of Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’, in which he asserts that a speech act constitutes of language and the actions into which it comes into play (Wittgenstein 1983: 3, cited in Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). Radical democracy In order to understand what the authors mean by the radicalization of democracy, it is necessary to look at the different types of relations that constitute themselves in the field of the social. Laclau and Mouffe distinguish between three main types of bonds: subordination, oppression, and domination (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 153). These are necessary distinctions to be made in order to fully grasp the meaning of antagonistic relations, as they appear within 14 the field of the social. First of all, a relation of subordination is defined simply as a relation in which a subject is inferior to another by means of the latter being able to dictate actions to the former (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 153). This clearly has to do with power over another, in the sense of influencing one’s actions in a way that they would not have acted, in the absence of this influence (Dahl 1957). This does not seem to pose any intrinsic problems, at a first glance, as this could mean only the subordination of children to their parents, or of an employee to its employer. In principle, that is, this is not necessarily an antagonistic relation. In contrast, relations of oppression are those in which an agent negates the identity of another, in such a way that the latter cannot fully constitute their self because of this specific relation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 154). These are antagonistic relations, as we have seen from the previous definition. Finally, relations of domination are those relations of subordination that are perceived as being unfair, form the external perspective of an agent; thus, they can overlap or not with actual relations of oppression (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 154). The problem appears to be situated in the transformation of subordination into oppression (antagonisms). Here, the analysis drawn up by Jacques Ranciere creates an useful tool of analysis. Different subject positions in the net of discursive space do not necessarily imply antagonism, as it is only after the emergence of a certain (democratic) vocabulary that particular subject positions constitute themselves as antagonistic (2009). However, we observe that the growing bureaucratization of the social, constructed by a deeper meddling of the state in social relations, coupled with the creation of the Keynesian Welfare State in the postbelic period, that instilled the old egalitarian ideal to new areas of social life, and the spreading of mass communication, have lead to a transformation of social struggles and the appearance of new antagonisms that had yet to be integrated in the broader fight against oppression (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 158-164). This has contributed to the creation of the notion of ‘radical and plural democracy’, that calls for equality but even more so for autonomy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 166-167) that constitutes the final constructive chapter in the post-Marxist socialist project of the authors. For this concept to be able to exist in a way of assuring these newly understood ideals of quality and liberty, every identity, understood here already as non-unified, has to be valid by its own merit, not through a search for a fundamental principle - this constituting radical plurality ((Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 167). On the counterpart, the radical democratic aspect consists of the establishment of such identities is the result of the egalitarian ‘contamination’ spreading in the present day (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 167). In a first definition, the project of radical democracy consists exactly of this spillover of the egalitarian equivalent ideal to the growing number of spheres in the 15 field of the social - including here, of course, the old struggles for economic equality of the workers, but losing the privileged point they were accorded in traditional Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 167). Here we are entering into the field of the NSMs, which the authors hold are put under this conceptual label based on their opposition with the traditional workerist movements, which, in itself, represents a problematic conceptual dichotomy (1985: 170) But this logic, already at play in ‘the West’ do not necessarily ascribe a progressive character to the movements; indeed, feminist struggles or LGBT ones need not be articulated as Left-leaning politics, and can fall, as they sometimes did, under the hegemony of the neoliberal Right - as it was the case under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. or Ronald Reagan in the U.S. with some anti-state movements-, which only goes to show that the result and the general direction of this egalitarian displacement is conferred by means of hegemonic articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 168-170). Furthermore, the liberal- conservative hegemonic discourse, which masks market fundamentalism and anti-welfare policies under the guise of protecting individual liberty (mainly understood as non-constraint, but in other forms as well) represents a chance for the Left - although started from its failure to adapt to this discourse in the first place -, to adapt and create its own hegemonic project (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 170-175). This should start from an acceptance of the liberal- democratic discourse that prioritizes equality, followed by a radicalization of it through the extension of the egalitarian scope towards new movements that struggle against oppression (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 176). The main obstacles faced by the Left all start from the point of privileged a priori ideas, in the form of: 1) according ontological primacy towards the working class for social change (classism); 2) prioritizing state intervention to solve social problems (statism); 3) underlining the extreme importance of successful economic policies as being the source of clear benefic political effects (economism) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 177). The founding mistake that is at play here is, at the root, the Jacobin ideal of the Revolution, understood as a moment of break with the old organization of society from which the ‘rational’ re-planning would consequently follow, which cannot be seen as compatible with the fractured nature of the social - even in the Gramscian concept of war of positions, the revolution is merely a step, not the target itself (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 178). It is important to note here that Laclau and Mouffe clearly emphasize the need for socialism, as many antagonisms stem from the capitalist mode of production, but use it to mean the social appropriation of production only in the form of the decision of the people, not just workers, about the production of goods, the ways in which they are produced, and the means of distribution of the final product, so that socialism is only a part of the democratic revolution, 16 and not the equivalent of it (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 178). After moving beyond these theoretical setbacks, three main problems and answers emerge. Firstly, on the question of determining where in the field of the social antagonisms will appear and in what form should they be addressed by the Left. On this point, if one is to renounce the essential a priori thinking presented above, one acknowledges that there can be no fixed set of politics that the Left embodies in every context, as antagonisms can arise at every level and in every plan of the social - be it civil society, the state, the private sector, and so on - because all this distinctions that appear final in the field of the social are, in fact, greatly contaminated by the overdeterminance of other spheres (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 180). Focusing on the form in which the struggle against oppression should take, one is faced with a similar problem, when approaching the distinction between parliamentary or party- forms of representation and horizontal movements; either one could present advantages in a particular situation that make it suitable for the politics of the Left, but in others could seem more than problematic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 180-181). What emerges from this conception that the authors present is a renouncement of more than theoretical principles, but of political strategies themselves, for the betterment of a Left that does not seem to be able to adapt to the tactics of the Right. What this adaptation requires is an acknowledgement of the fact that the plurality of identities emerging now carries on a process of politicization that attack the public/private distinction in a more aggressive, so to speak, way than ever before (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 181). Secondly, let us look at the relation between this plurality of difference in relation to the ‘homogenization’ effect of hegemony, by the use of the logic of equivalence. The two logics are contradictory only in the case when they are taken to be explaining the social asa a totality: if equivalence could bring about the complete dissolution of the differences between the spheres of struggle of feminism and anti-capitalism or, respectively, if difference could produce a clear demarcation line between the uniqueness of one struggle and that of another; but the logics themselves come to play different roles in every antagonism, not affirming itself as dominant (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 182). From this arises a principle of radical democratic politics that acts as its precondition: an anti-dominating stance against claiming to know the transcendental principle of the social, be it an intellectual or political affirmation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 182). Thirdly, the simple spreading of the egalitarian matrix is not sufficient, on its own, to constitute the basis for radical democracy, because it is clear that different struggles, although articulated on the basis of the principles of this imaginary, are not necessarily constructed in 17 relation to other groups (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 183). This creation of a new common ground that moves beyond a coalition of groups represents the democratic character of the project: the demands of one group cannot be made at the expense of another, as it is this that truly constitutes the demand for equality (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 184). Here, the demands of liberty and the plural character of the project reemerge as central: because the social space is uneven, total equivalence can never exist, for the social is also structured in different fields - family, neighborhood, workplace, and so on (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 185). At the same time, although protection of liberty as self-fulfillment is paramount, this freedom is exercised in the collective space, not purely on the individual level, because rights imply social interaction (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 185). Strategies for the new order Following up on the third point, what type of political strategy should this project bring? The democratic matrix is not sufficient in creating a hegemonic project that could be seen as desirable from the perspective of the Left. As stated above, this is merely an attempt to eliminate inequalities and, although extremely valuable in itself, it cannot become hegemonic without a positive proposition for the reorganization of the social space (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 188). From the negativity that different struggles start with in their quest for democratic articulation must arise a positivity of the social; although they are in tension, they find different resolutions depending on the democratic character of the movements themselves, but also on the democratic status of other logics which are at play (the state, the economy, religion, and so on) , so they are very much kept, at least for some period of time, within the limits of the old order, needing different strategies that need to be articulated taking into account these particularities, and eschewing excessive utopianism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 190). A certain dose of utopian thinking, from which one can imagine the change of the present order beyond its limits, is certainly needed for a radical democratic project, as a counterpart to the positivity of the struggle (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 190). Finally, Laclau outlines more definitely how this hegemonic politics comes into play: through populism, in combining all the forces that are not part of the establishment in the form of the historic bloc (Laclau 2005). Clearly, this creates immediately two camps that are antagonistic in relation: the elites and the ‘people’. The logic at play here is that of equivalence, specifically in the form of bringing together movements that concentrate on different struggles in the direction of a key fight (e.g. anti-austerity), in a context void of ideological content (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The populist movement is the ‘holder of the empty 18 signifiers’ (Laclau 2005; Newman 2011b: 54). In this way, during some periods of time, a movement or ideal can take precedence over other struggles that subsume to it, while the populist group acted as a form of ‘leader’ to the people, in that specific struggle (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 192). DEFINITIONS AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANARCHISM The second part of the literature review concerning the purpose of this paper will start by looking at the most ideologically coherent - in that they are discernible - variations of anarchism, presenting the principles and main historical developments of these particular schools of thought. Moreover, I will analyze the case for postanarchism as a transcendence of ‘classical’ anarchism, as it will be the metric of determining whether or not this form of anarchism deserves to be taken more into considerations than other variations. Finally, when talking about ‘radical democracy’, postanarchism will play an important role. For heuristic purposes, let us say that the case of ‘radical democracy’ has two main components in the struggle for the re-extension of the democratic space: (1) populist parties that help challenge the institutional hegemony that neoliberal (‘elite’) parties currently have, and (2) horizontal movements, such as the Indignados of Spain, that develop and articulate new democratic vocabulary. Here, it is important to develop on what the ‘insurrectionist’ model that the postanarchists present us with has to teach the post-Marxist project about the strategy of the New Social Movements. Currents of anarchism Anarchism comes to have different ramifications that have a specific view of the path towards and the post-revolutionary framework of anarchy, I shall use a working definition that draws upon the ‘classical’ anarchists’ works. Thus, to the extent that it could be described as ideology, anarchism is an ideology that rejects almost all forms of authority, but always that of the State and the Church, suggests different non-etatist economic alternatives, and usually supports revolution as a means of achieving the anarchic state of affairs. The problem that arises at this point is the fact that while anarchism stands for absolute liberty and rejects social and political authority, there are several distinctions to be taken into account, regarding, to name but a few, the means of arriving at the anarchist social order (revolutionary vs. reformist), the social institutions that are to be kept (e.g. the nuclear family model), the appeal of the free market (communist vs. individualist) and so on (Nicolescu 2012; Kinna 2005). For the purpose of this introduction, this paper will adhere for now to the 19 main themes and characteristics of the various anarchist schools as presented by Nicolescu (2012), followed by a closer look at the basic yet compelling division based on economic and ethical principles outlined by Peter Kropotkin. According to Nicolescu (2012), some common principles include: 1. A particular vision about human nature 2. A critique of the current social order 3. A vision of a free society 4. A formula through which this free society can be accomplished 5. The rejection of the legitimacy of external governance and of the state It is here that we should take a closer look at the schemata of an anarchist society as envisioned by Kropotkin (1970:284). This vision is shared by most variations of anarchist thought, with some notable exceptions on the part of anarcho-capitalists (Nicolescu 2012; Kinna 2005:10-12). One of the most relevant differences is the particular perspective about the revolution, and about the functioning of an anarchist movement within the frameworks of parliamentary democracy. The anarchist society is one that is not ruled by laws imposed by State, but by rules and agreements that are freely and commonly decided between persons. These persons are organized in groups or associations, for territorial or professional reasons, and work together to produce and consume in order to satisfy their infinite desires and needs (Țăranu 2005: 95). Such a social environment would be ruled by these voluntary associations of people, in the form of permanent or temporary federations that would extend from a regional to an international scale (2013). It is within these federations that people would decide arrangements in all possible societal sectors of interest, ranging from education, to what could be seen today as ‘healthcare’, to the protection of the territory and so on. In Kropotkin’s view, this represents the natural tendency of human behavior and, he argues, it is in this anarchist state of affairs that monopoly of any kind would not ensue, thus leading to the necessary framework for every person’s complete individualization and possibility for personal development (2002); without the State to provoke fear, obedience, and servitude, one would be free to pursue any action in the direction of self-development, guided by their own reason and the ethical clauses of their group. Moreover, while the absence of the State is the necessary condition, it is inherently tied with the destruction of modern capitalism, which subjugates the people to the unfair and immoral wage-system and hinders human development. In this respect, anarchists represent the ‘left wing of socialists’ (Bakunin 1953) and subscribe to the economic principles illustrated by them, with the very important 20 observation that the economic monopoly of the state only means ‘state capitalism’, no matter what name it is given to it (socialist, Volkstaat and so on). It is nonsensical, Kropotkin argues, to trust the same institution that has been responsible for creating monopolies of the few to not become such a harmful (bureaucratic) monopoly itself. Thus, the only solution is decentralization of power, as presented above (Kropotkin 1970: 283-287). The division inside anarchism does not come, as it was already mentioned above, from fundamentally different general purposes, both from ethical and economic considerations. It should be noted that this paper will only focus on forms of anarchism that are, explicitly or implicitly anti-capitalist in scope, and, as such, will not discuss in depth the premises and development of individualist anarchism or anarcho-capitalism. As far as incipient classifications went, one distinguished between six main forms or schools of thought: communist, collectivist, mutualist, individualist, Christian and literary (Kropotkin 1970: 293-296). To complete the so-called ‘classical’ schools of anarchism – in the sense that they have produced the most important ideological contributions – this thesis shall present syndicalist, feminist and ecologist principles to complete the conceptual basis of anarchism. Let us quickly analyze the basic principles, as viewed by Kropotkin, of individualist anarchism and literary anarchism, as they will not be subsequently developed in the major chapters of this paper. An exception will be made for Christian anarchism, which will be presented briefly in the subsection dedicated to anarcho-communism, as their principles are similar in most respects (Kropotkin 1898). Anarcho-individualism comes into being following Max Stirner’s work (Kropotkin 1970). Individualism argued for a society in which one would be free from all external subjugations, be they physical or abstract, acquiring ‘ownness’, a form of self-ownership and self-mastery. One has to free oneself from this constraints and live a life in an amoral egoistic way (Kropotkin 1970; Stirner 1845). His conception is not one of pure self-interest because that would bind one to only a restricted purpose, thus binding them and defeating their autonomy. However, upon detailing his vision of ‘association of egoists’, he ascertains the fact that the well-being of these collectives should not be seen as the fundamental purpose of the individual; one does not work to satisfy the needs of the group, rather it functions merely as a support for the realization of one’s self. This realization, he concedes, may come at the price of other people’s interest or even of their life, others being seen from an instrumentalist standpoint (Stirner 1845). As such, acts of murder, rape and so on, are permitted in his vision of a free society of individualists. Although he argues that his amoral egoism is not 21 intrinsically immoral, such instances may appear. Stirner’s view clearly stands out as not aligned with the main schools of thought that will be discussed below. Literary anarchism presents the way in which anarchism is interwoven with intellectual work, drawing attention to the fact that this ideological family is not to be taken as ethically appalling or intrinsically simplistic and without substance. The presences of anarchist thought throughout history in both scientific and fiction works can only show that this ideal as embedded in human nature, such explaining its constant reappearance (Kropotkin 1970) Anarcho-communism Anarchist communism was historically seen as the counterpart of mutualism, in a time when libertarians tended to be grouped in one of these two competing camps (Seymour 1894: 3). In libertarian communism, private property is abolished as an institution through socialization, with the final goal of creating equal comfort - what could be called equality of outcomes, rather than a mere equivalence of rights (Kinna 2005: 16). The idea was to create a non- market system in which anyone could consume the created products, according to their needs, not according to the input that a worker had in the productive process (Kropotkin 1906: 34- 36). This system has its roots in the fundamental belief held by the author that mutual aid was the evolutionary mechanism through which society could flourish, not hindered by the egoism of capitalism or the authoritarianism of the state (Kroporkin 1891), Kropotkin maintains that the needs of individuals are not only physical, but also artistic or intellectual, so the labor system in society should fulfill three main criteria: 1) to educate all children in both physical and intellectual labor; 2) to spread across the range of necessary sectors in order to be able to assure the ‘right to well-being’ of all; 3) to be structured in such a way in which it would allow for as much leisure time as working time in a day (1906: 104-107). Kropotkian anarcho-communism values reform over punishment and advocates the destitution of the prison system (Marshall 1992: 312). All this cannot be acquired through reform and, in general, political organization, so anarcho-communists have been for a long period of time in opposition with both collectivists and syndicalists, remaining faithful to the idea that only a social revolution that would bring about the public property over the means of production could be the answer to present-day inequalities (Marshall 1992: 313-317). Anarcho-collectivism In the classification that Kropotkin makes, collectivism is shown to be the one that puts forward most vehemently its desires of federalism, this view coming into being when a 22 federation of unions broke of from the International Working Men’s Association. Bakunin affirmed himself as the ‘the leading spirit’ behind this new movement, according to Kropotkin (Marshall 1992: 311). He described a society in which one was free as long as everyone other was free, paving the way for a collective struggle against capitalism and the state, and envisioning a future in which the State is no longer needed and is substituted by a free federation of communes, fully autonomous inasmuch as they do not threaten the autonomy of other such communes (Bakunin and Dolgoff 1972). Every free commune and, in general, every collective would own the property and the means of production in their respective territorial area, and would issue labor-vouchers that would show how many hours one worked, taking into account the difficulty of the job. Thus, one would be allowed to purchase goods and services from the communal market (McLaughlin 2002; Bakunin 1953). This system was famously criticized by Kropotkin as reducing workers to their labor, no more different than a capitalist system, making the separation between the two socio- economic systems hardly distinguishable (Kropotkin 1891). However, it is necessary to point out that the collectivist view holds that a family or an individual should have the right to possess that which is needed for living, but not that which would interfere with other’s needs (Ward 2004: 2) - reminiscent of the distinction between possession and private property in Proudhon (1876: 42), to which we will turn our attention. Anarcho-mutualism The roots of mutualism can be found as far back as Proudhon. While he famously denounced private property as theft, one finds that he refers to property as it was then obtained and used (Proudhon 1876: 42). He argues, however, that possession is necessary to deflect the abuse of the State (Produhon 1876: 281). He offers a more reformist rather than revolutionary vision of arriving at his preferred anarchist state. He envisions a bank that would function on the basis of trust in which people could freely exchange products of their labor at cost value in a mutually beneficial exchange (Proudhon 1876: 280-282) – hence the name of this particular school of thought. Moreover, this bank would give out loans with no interest rate so that everyone could benefit from a loan and acquire property, so that private actors could not benefit from interest. In such a society, the practice of rent would completely disappear (Proudhon 1876: 42). Because of its possibility of anarchism without the necessity of expropriation, Proudhon’s cost-value mutual exchange plan has been applied by various individuals in their enterprises starting from the late 19th century (Kropotkin 1970). 23 A final remark regarding Proudhon’s ideological claims: the distinction he makes between types of property have come to be used as illustrating the difference between personal property (meaning that property which one uses directly to sustain oneself, or possession) and private property (meaning property that is not directly used by its owner and is employed in rent-seeking) (Proudhon 1876: 42) has come to play an important role in the radical Left’s critique of capitalism. Proudhon himself argues that, while the right to liberty and security, for example, can exist simultaneously for both the rich and the poor, the case of the right to property is different; more often than not, property for the reach means subjugation of the poor (Proudhon 1876: 177). As such, this is a right that should not be viewed as being absolute (Proudhon 1876). Anarcho-syndicalism From the start, it is clear that the anarcho-syndicalist movement is a working class privilege. Syndicalists stress the need for the abolition of the wage system that constitutes the basis of wage slavery, while underlining the fact that this deed cannot be carried out by the state, as the latter’s main task is defending private property (Rocker 1938: 9-11). The organization of the labour movement into syndicates and trade unions was directly tied with the post- revolutionary period (Kinna 2005: 19); the urban and rural workers, whose liberty was at stake, must learn to develop the skills and abilities necessary for taking control of the factories after the Revolution, and this meant striking and fighting their employers (Rocker 1938: 84-86; 88-90). Like all forms of revolutionary anarchism, syndicalism renounces parliamentarism and adopts an anti-political position. It promotes direct organization by the workers, not delegation to politicians, be they of the most socialist or not (Rocker 1938: 86- 87). The syndicate becomes the body for the birth of the new social order, and the collective agent responsible for bringing about the Revolution (Rocker 1938: 89). As far as economic organization goes, Rocker argues for free cooperation among the syndicates that form the federation, controlling a specific branch of production (1938: 106). But this should not be done within the national borders, and rather on the international level, stopping the apparent competition between the workers of different countries (Rocker 1938 106-108). Anarcha-feminism For anarcha-feminists, class conflict and the fight against the tyranny of the state cannot be imagined to bot attack the patriarchal oppression of women, as seen by the first wave of feminists (Goldman 1910: 166). Later on, this would come to include a specific gender 24 dimension, through which the fight against authoritarianism and capitalism would be tied to the eradication of the oppression of gender minorities (Rogue et al. 2012). Although some criticism of marriage and family at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th can be found in previously mentioned strands of anarchism, Goldman and other feminists specifically attack these institutions, arguing, for example, for free love, and for birth control, as a positive way of escaping the social conditions that prevented women from having autonomy over their bodies (Goldman 1910: 133-135). Goldman specifically was against homophobia and lesbophobia, marking a decisive break, at that point, through the extension of the liberation ideal to these groups (Katz 378-380). Eco-anarchism From the point of view of the eco-anarchists, the blame on ecological destruction rests on the state, no matter what form it would take, keeping in line with ‘classical’ anarchism, even though it is a later emerged current (Țăranu 2005: 192). Murray Bookchin, the first exponent of this ideological formation, launched in utopian criticism of the State and capitalism, from a perspective that put biocentrism at its ethical core (1977). A theoretician of post-scarcity, that he perceived to have already arrived the post-industrial world, he argued for the liberatory potential of technology, when used in an ecologically conscious manner (Bookchin 1977). As far as this utopia is concerned, the revolution is still the way to put an end to the oppression of nature by the sum of institutions that rule society, as it would allow a return to a state of nature, which also means a communion with the environment (Țăraanu 2005: 192). Problems in classification There is no singular, definitive classification of anarchism, in the sense that different students of ‘classical’ anarchism see this or that canonical writer as being part of some school of thought or other (Kinna 2012). That is, for Rocker, Kropotkin might be seen as a collectivist, while the Russian anarchist describes himself as being a communist (Kinna 2005). From a sociological standpoint, this is justifiable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the intellectual tradition of the continent varies significantly in philosophical definitions, giving rise to certain backgrounds that influence an anarchist thinker (Horowitz 2005). Secondly, cultural impediments, such as an adversity towards the label of ‘communist’, may influence a writer to use a certain label (Horowitz 2005). This can be very well explained using a morphological approach towards the study of ideology: in addition to logical constraints that create a certain arrangement of core, peripheral and auxiliary concepts, one has to take into account also the 25 cultural constraints that do (or do not) permit this or that formation (Freeden 2013). Moreover, anarchism has always been a very volatile ideology, given the very practical nature of it. Labels change over time, but the scheme offered above does not aim to pinpoint to exact and unmovable definitions, only to highlight the main ideas of the most important forms of ‘classical’ anarchism. For the purpose of this thesis, one should acknowledge the definitions offered in the previous section in the following way: ‘What do we anarchists believe? ... we believe that human beings can achieve their maximum development and fulfilment as individuals in a community of individuals only when they have free access to the means of life and are equals among equals, we maintain that to achieve a society in which these conditions are possible it is necessary to destroy all that is authoritarian in existing society.’ (Richards 1981: 129) In short, ‘classical’ anarchism can be only imperfectly reduced to certain categorical distinctions (Nicolescu 2012), but the fact remains that all left libertarian interpretations remain true to (1) a cooperative view of human nature that is perverted by the current capitalist system (2) a positivist view of science that forms the basis for the view regarding human nature, and (3) an ontological view of the Revolution, as a singular, all-encompassing event. The purpose of this chapter was, as outlined in the introduction, to offer a general description of the wider principles that constitute the similarities and differences between the main types of anarchism, as described philosophically until the turn of the millennium. Of course, it should be noted that I do not claim by any standard to have exhausted the intricacies and internal conflicts of these variants of anarchist political theory. Rather, I offered brief guidelines that will guide the normative and evaluative aspects of the later chapters of this thesis. ‘CLASSICAL’ ANARCHISM AND ESSENTIALISM The postanarchist interpretation of Bakunin’s text directs one’s attention to his argument that, first of all, human nature is altruistic in itself, and, second of all, humans have a certain propensity towards evildoing. In fact, all ‘classical’ anarchist have, to some degree, this view, taking into account certain important differences. This lies at the foundation of the debates between different types of economic solutions (Marshall 1993). The Bakunin-Kropotkin debate regarding the distribution of resources is illustrative in this sense. Kropotkin, in his communist view, argues for distribution of goods based on social need, while Bakunin is 26 skeptical towards the ‘goodness’ of human nature, and puts forward an economic system that encourages and requires work in order to obtain resources. The ‘classical’ anarchist perception of human nature differs radically from both liberal and Marxist interpretations of the concept. It is neither here, nor there, in the sense that it does portray human beings as having both an egoistic side, that is exploited and encouraged in capitalism, and an altruistic side, developed under conditions of social cooperation. While the egoistic side is recognized by all canonical writers, the difference lies in one’s capacity for cooperation and one’s willingness to participate in such a society. Kropotkin goes the furthest in his argument, discussing the biological perspectives of human nature. In this respect, he points out that mutual aid was a factor for the evolution of our species, and, as such, it can be seen as the basis for our new society (Kropotkin 1891). The point made by Kropotkin is technicist in nature, in the sense that it presupposes a radical liberating potential of technology, that is seen as was the Marxian notion of ‘productive force’ - outside the intervention of social behavior. The question of power is central to Newman’s own brand of anarchism. From this perspective, Bakunin and Kropotkin are not sensitive enough to the concept of ‘power’, in the sense that they explicitly reject some forms of power, while allowing others in a hypothetical anarchist form of organization (Newman 2001). Newman sees 'classical' anarchism as enamored to resisting some forms of power, but insensitive to others. Critics such as Cohn (2002) or Adams and Jun (2005) have pointed out that both Kropotkin and Bakunin are well aware of the undefeatable feature of social power, rendering Newman's view of a ‘contradiction’ within 'classical' anarchism pointless. But the postanarchism account does hold some water. In specifically rejecting some forms of power, more or less developed from social power, canonical libertarianism remains vulnerable from two perspectives: 1) by prioritizing, it becomes locally authoritarian regarding other possible struggles; or 2) by ignoring some parts of power, it leaves itself open to new forms of domination in an anarchist society, rendering the unique event of revolutionary liberation partially useless. In this respect, it is useful to remember that resistance to dominance does not ontologically emerge by itself in a practical manner. It is only through the creation of a certain democratic vocabulary that power relations become antagonistic or oppressive (Ranciere 2009). Furthermore, by adopting a contingent, flexible view of identity, the task of postanarchism is easily more defensible. From this perspective, the fixation, however small it may be, of 'classical' anarchism creates a rigor for cataloguing certain struggles as worthy of attention or 27 not. The point is that the context of 'classical' anarchism did not permit the existence of an exhaustive democratic vocabulary, and here it is simply a matter of citing trans people's rights. While this could be adopted in an anarchist society, by adaptation, it is still a matter of calculus, debate and, for a period of time, authoritarianism that does not distinguish itself from the parliamentary democratic environment. The idea is that contingency allows for the fluidity of struggles and actually calls for their constant reactualization. On the contrast, adhering to a certain belief about human nature that is not completely contingent, while also holding a positivist view of science and a scientific regard of history, transforms identities into definite points that are then used to judge oppressive relations. Fixed identities means, finally, fixed oppression, a certain realm that cannot be expanded so easily, therefore giving way to the kind of abuses that Newman cautions us about. This point is better explained form the point of view of post-Marxism. Although we can clearly see the relevance of Foucault's lesson, that wherever there is power, there is also resistance, the emergence of political resistance is not a natural result of power. Power creates relation of subordination, in the first place, it is not sufficient to explain the emergence of political struggles, understood here as movements that aim to change that social relation ‘which constructs the subject in a relationship of subordination’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 153) Only through the appearance of a new social imaginary - here, democratic principles - relations of subordination can become, or, more clearly, be understood as relations of oppression, entering the field of antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The problem with human nature is that it restricts the field of possible relations of oppression: any relation that denies one's essence is oppressive. While useful, this conception leaves out other possible relations that could arise from a new discursive formation, creating both a theoretical and a practical blind spot of which 'classical' anarchism can be found guilty. POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE This marks the starting point of the poststructuralist critique of ‘classical’ anarchism and, more generally, of essentialist ideologies. Perhaps it is better to make a distinction between poststructuralism and postmodernism, given the fact that these terms come to define similar phenomena. While postmodernism defines itself by a rejection of positivist science and universal values, grand narratives, is marked by cultural relativism, it defines a broader movement which can be seen in the 1968 cultural revolution. When adding the focus on 28 polymorphous sexual orientations, postmodernism becomes a less radical way of resisting ‘hegemonic power relations and challenging material inequalities’ (Franks 2007: 129). Moreover, given the fact that poststructuralism is closely associated with the theories of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Lacan, and Lyotard, this is, above all, an academic phenomenon. While it fuels, in one way or another, the postmodernist movements, those who participate in such gatherings do not need to use poststructuralist theories to carry on their struggle (Franks 2007: 130). It is this latter theoretical framework that postanarchists use when referring to the ‘post’ in their new ideological formation. Metanarratives in ‘classical’ anarchism Postanarchism starts from the Lyotardian rejection of metanarratives (Newman 2011: 316). Metanarratives are stories of justification that aim to validate the rules used by a theory in seeking an overarching explanation, and does so through an appeal to a final, universal truth of value (Lyotard 1984: xxiii). Two aspects of metanarratives are central to the postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ anarchism, stemming from the very same positivist position adopted regarding science. (1) Firstly, the implicit claim is that social is completely understandable through science and enquiry, be it an integrated whole or, as Marx views it, a total marked by internal divides. But the social bonds that once made possible at least the appearance of an objectivity in such epistemological claims theoretical are themselves dissolving. The ‘language games’ that constitute the representation of society change those social bonds (Lyotard 1992). As such, we see a plurality of perspectives (social identities, moral positions, religious identifications, and discourses) that make up the contemporary social. In this climate, there isn’t one truly coherent and dominant vision that can explain society. Even the neoliberal hegemony is constantly, if not effectively, challenged when it aspires towards being ‘objective knowledge’ about society. From this rejection of absolute scientific truth; (2) Secondly, as it is the case with Kropotkin, whose argument of human nature is based on evolution, the ‘emancipatory potential’ of the people and the inevitable rise against state authority are coupled with an optimistic view of science. Here, science is seen as a factor of emancipation, and a feature of humanity that inevitably drives progress and prosperity (Newman 2011: 317). A thorough critique comes from the field of philosophy of science, questioning why an ideology that is opposed to all forms of 29  authority leaves science unaccounted for (Feyarbend 1975). Taking this point further, the philosophy of ‘classical’ anarchism revolves around natural laws that govern social interactions and processes that are being distorted by the state, and this tendency is obvious throughout some parts of the history of ‘classical’ anarchism, as show in the first part of the review on anarchism. Science is as political as other fields, although it presents itself, or is seen, as a purveyor of objective truth. The immutable laws and principles that govern scientific enquiry are always challenged in the moment of a revolutionary discovery, on one hand. On the other hand, the legitimation of scientific knowledge is in crisis, as it is not based on universal truths, but on power and on capacity of exclusion that create this appearance of universality. In the contestation of undeserved authority, ‘classical’ anarchism remains silent on science. The dangers of scientism become apparent when focusing on NSMs, such as the struggle of trans people. Even in recent years, the idea that transgender people ‘suffer from an illness’ has taken its toll. Using this as a justification, neofascist militants violently attack, degrade, and dehumanize them. Moreover, in liberal democracies, such as France, it has been a judicial practice to solicit the expertise of a psychiatrist regarding the solicitations of trans people (to change their name, birth certificates, etc.) to determine if they are indeed the gender that they ‘claim’ to be, even going as far as to solicit mutilating sex change operation as a prerequisite for granting them their identity rights (Stack 2017). The point here is that gender identity is subjected to seemingly apolitical scientific practices. While the method of enquiry itself is subjected to internal politics and debates about the best use, its compliance with the dominant paradigm, and so on, the result is clearly political, even if one would argue that the method is not. This a problematic example of allowing ‘objective’ science to determine the faith of individuals, in an unscrutinized fashion. While the anarchist movements of today’s time are trans-inclusive and advocate trans liberation (Rogue et al. 2012), the theoretical argument that Kropotkin makes, taken to its conclusions seems to present this contradiction regarding the supreme egalibertarian ideal of anarchism. The problem of leaving complex decisions of identity to non-critically discussed practices, form an anarchist perspective, poses the problems of social nature for a radically libertarian philosophy. As a conclusion to these two discussions, the perspective of Focuault in his discussion of power/knowledge underlines the fact that the production of knowledge is a necessary product of power (Newman 2001: 80). This brings forward an interesting point, the distinction 30 between different types of power, the repressive and the productive. The final problem of knowledge is that it is not necessarily liberating, as ‘classical’ anarchists argue, but is more often than not a product of power that manages to reproduce it (Newman 2001: 80). POST-ANARCHISM AND ITS THEORETICAL ADDITIONS Anarchism rests upon the basic assumption that the human subject is pure in itself, as opposed to the unnatural creature of the state (Newman 2001). Human essence as naturally opposed to state power becomes one of the main arguments for the success of the revolution and the emergence of a new society, as it can be seen throughout ‘classical’ anarchist works. In this sense, humanity was seen as the face of resistance for anarchists to work with. If indeed, as Newman points out, ‘the place of resistance has become a place of power’ (Newman 2001: 5), there appears to be a fundamental rift in this line of thought that has immense implications for the anarchist mode of resistance to domination. I argue that this point can be interpreted in the following way: the pure point of resistance is intrinsically ‘contaminated’ by antagonisms, and becomes the basis of reproductions of previously uncontested inequalities. As such, a radicalization of anarchist notions requires a deep interaction with these problems, starting from the question of power. Poststructuralism, as an anti-foundationalist school of thought, becomes relevant for anarchism, form the perspective of the unmasking of power. Anarchist thinkers were concerned with this problem, central to the philosophy of anarchism, adhering, at the same time, to a set of humanistic principles. It is these last ideals that poststructuralism rejects, in its quest of unmasking power. Thus, the questions of power and subjectivity provide the link between the politics of anarchism and the politics of poststructuralism. When one addresses the apparent contradiction in ‘classical’ anarchism - that of the instinct to rebel and its counterweight, the desire for power -, one is left at odds. Anarchists have long proposed an essentialist idea of human essence as uncontaminated by power, that becomes the pure place of resistance against the ‘artificial state’ - the point which allows for a thorough critique and for the creation of an alternative that transcends the categories of the contemporary society; however, when looking at Kropotkin’s and Bakunin’s compromise regarding human nature, there appears to be a theoretical gap that needs to be filled. (Newman 2011: 49-51). 31 Stirner’s anti-essentialism First of all, one can look at Nietzsche, when the author there is no clear meaning in society. The lack of an origin of society, contradicting both the contractualist view and the ‘classical’ anarchist one, calls into question the sort of dialectical movement advocated, though in different measures, by Marxism and anarchism (Newman 2011: 51; Nietzsche 1989: 76). The essence of now is a moment of history, a pause in the play of forces that continually challenge and change the present meaning. This genealogical view will be later expanded upon by the post-structuralists. Second of all, Stirner, in his critique of Feuerbachian humanism, argues that the ‘human essence’ is merely an inversion of Christianity, in the sense that it replaces God with ‘Man’, contributing to the alienation of those who cannot exhibit the perfection that Feuerbach attributes to man (Newman 2001: 58). Thus, humanist essentialism, present in the works of ‘classical’ anarchists, presents just a new form of domination. Stirner’s anti-authoritarianism puts him on par with classical anarchists, rejecting the notion of capturing power. The only way in which humanity frees itself is by destroying the very place of power. For ‘classical’ anarchists, as we have seen, the place is found within the State, as an entity with its own logic of self-perpetuation. However, Stirner anticipates a poststructuralist critique, explored by Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, among others, exposing the main place of power that ‘classical’ anarchism is blind to - essentialism (Newman 2001: 55). Human essence is criticized, firstly, as fiction. Stirner sees human essence as resulting merely from Feuerbach’s insurrection against Christianity: all the predicates of God are now applied to man (Feuerbach 2008), keeping the same categories that produced religious alienation intact, instead of getting rid of them (Newman 2001: 61). In this way, anarchism, as the epitome of Enlightenment humanism, is trapped into this religious fiction, the very same that it wanted to and claimed to transcend. Secondly, Stirner operates with this critique of human essence as linked intrinsically to state power. This ideal of ‘Man’ is used by the State, in creating an authoritarian discourse that seeks to divide the normal from the abnormal (Stirner 1993: 240). Newman’s main argument revolves around the idea that this process of subjectification is ignored by the political theory of ‘classical’ anarchism. This process is orchestrated by the state, in the sense that it eschews obvious repression, and it creates, through discursive means, the individual as political subject, thus ‘ruling through him’ (Newman 2001: 63; emphasis in the original). Stirner is concentrating on the more obscure, and largely ignored, ways in which power operates on the individual, in the same way that Foucault will be. 32 Morality and rationality are ways in which power operates, in the same way as human essence is. The idealization of these virtues as uncontestable and sanctified becomes problematic for Stirner. They create the conditions for oppressions, by instituting a duality: either you conform to the norm, or you are an outsider (Stirner 1993: 360). While morality and truth are important, one should not ignore the fact that they are questionable, in certain circumstances, and should, as such, be questioned. Stirner’s break with ‘classical’ anarchism provides us with a very important task: to study the ways in which essentialism, be it controlled and supported by the state or not, creates the conditions for the individual’s servitude. The lack of freedom is double, in Stirner’s argument: 1) when these apparently trascendental principles are imposed from the outside, and 2) when individuals voluntarily subscribe to these ideas, limiting their own freedom (Newman 2001: 64). Resistance and power/knowledge in Foucault Third of all, the contingent view of history and meaning exposed by Nietzsche is ever present in postructuralism and post-Marxism. This becomes apparent from the start, in the texts of Michel Foucault. Foucault is known for his critique of Marxism, seeing Stalinism and its atrocities only as the logical conclusion to the hidden authoritarian currents that run through Marx’s texts (Foucault and Gordon 1980: 135). As such, a true confrontation of the problems that the USSR exposed should begin from addressing Marx’s own work. From the dialectics expounded by Marxism there arises a form of economic reductionism that is blind, as Bakunin argued at the time of the First International, to other forms of power, beyond those of the capitalist mode of production (Bakunin and Kenafick 1950). However, in a fashion similar to that of Stirner, Foucault is not concerned only with state power, but, rather, with forms of power that belong to different institutions and practices that follow their own logic of perpetuation and action (Foucault et al. 1971: 232). By seeing the state as a unified whole that is, in each case, to be destroyed, as the ‘classical’ anarchists wanted, or captured, as the Marxists wanted, both philosophies overestimate the capacities of the state, as an institution that is greater than the sum of its parts (Foucault 1991: 103). But the state itself has no essence of its own and is constructed by the practices of government, which, in turn, represent a set of actions and discourses - governmentality (Foucault 1991: 103). As such, the point of interest for a student of power is not the institution of the state, but how this construction that radical political philosophies refer to so much came to appear. This brings forward the fundamental problem that Newman discusses, namely that of resistance to power; 33 if power is dispersed throughout society, than revolutionary politics cannot attack its central point in the hopes of destroying its whole, because such a goal seems now to be unattainable. For this reason, Foucault introduces as his conceptual addition a form of political resistance that is as strategic as power itself, a relation of agonism, understood as ‘a perpetual battle, a relationship of mutual provocation’, employing the Nietzschean ‘war model’ in the form of ‘genealogy’ (Newman 2001: 79-80). This brings forward, as we have seen previously, the discussion of power and knowledge, but also the relation between morality and power. As Stirner has previously pointed out, morality is not, at its core, fundamentally opposed to power, or even to what the canonical anarchists would call repressive power. Different moral discourses have provided justifications for what today seems to be oppression in its pure form, form anarchist perspective, as it is the case of the good triumphing over evil, that has led to the justification for the existence of the prison (Newman 2001: 82). This does not seem to be a new idea, as morality and moral paradigms have been historically used in different contexts, and to distort situations in order to make them acceptable. However, the problem that Stirner, Foucault, and Newman put forward deals with any kind of moral discourse: it is a strategic mistake to believe that even a progressive moral discourse is free from essence, and indeed naturally opposed to oppressive power. As discourses existing in the realm of power, they cannot escape the same ties to power that are prone to any type of discourse and are, in this sense, impure, as they allow power to reproduce (Newman 2001: 82). The anarchist trust in rationality and truth as fundamentally oppositions to the characteristics of the state would have to be rethought. A continuation to Striner’s antihumanism, Foucault’s perspective on resistance is founded on the idea that power, while it may be productive or repressive, it is still oppressive, in the sense that it critically limits the individual to confined standards (Newman 2001: 87). The excess of power is reason enough for resistance, providing the Foucauldian ethics of Stirner’s insurrection. The prescription Foucault makes should be understood as an opposition to power that builds string principles and identities, but one that allows them not to get permanently fixed in the democratic discourse, as it is the case with natural rights of the Enlightenment (Newman 2001: 88). However, there seems to be a problem in finding an origin of resistance other than a simple reaction to power and this has constituted the basis for the most thorough critique of the Foucauldian notion of power (Fraser 1981). This problem is also discussed by Ranciere, who argues that there is an impossibility of radical resistance, until the appearance of a democratic matrix that calls into question existing relations of subordination (2009). Foucault tries to offer an answer, by arguing that resistance, even if it is 34 created by power, creates the dislocation necessary for a temporary escape from the grasp of oppression (Foucault and Gordon 1980; Newman 2001: 89). In this sense, resistance transforms into excess that cannot be confined by power. By going further, I would argue that resistance, once created, is self-perpetuating, producing new paradigms form its initial principles. As such, the creation of the initial democratic vocabulary allows for a continuous interrogation, not only of the opposed power, but of the principles of the progressive matrix. Furthermore, it is not necessary to think of resistance as solely reactive when focusing on local struggles. Even accepting the premise that all discourse is confined by power, initially, forms of resistance on the local level, while confined by broader discourses of power, can allow for growing outside the power they oppose. Feminist resistance in ultraconservative social environments may as well become trapped in another form of essentialized discourse through resistance, but on a local level, they force the limits of power and deny their reinstitution, through self-actualization. Foucault discussed what he calls ‘transgression of power’ (Foucault and Gordon 1980: 33-36), which dissipates, for it is only ephemeral. However, when one looks at this interpretation on a micro-level - as one should, given the modern characteristics of power that Foucault exposed - it becomes evident that power needs to readjust after the transgression. As such, continuous transgression can mean the destruction of the old limits of power, even if not of power as a whole. Here, it is perhaps time to offer a deconstruction of Foucault’s argument for the omnipresence of power. If power is ubiquitous, and, by its definition, in this case, absolute, then all identities are formed relating to that power, be it individual or that of a group, and would mean that its very identity as such would cease to exist (Laclau and Zac 1994: 16-18) - it should be noted that this analysis will be pointed out by Newman, in a later chapter. The conclusion here is that an analysis on the limits of power and on the possibilities here should look, as I have argued here, at power as dispersed, not as totality. Obviously, this runs against the idea of Revolution as a final destruction of power. My argument is consistent with both Stirner’s and Foucault’s interpretation of freedom, that allows for this possibility even in the most oppressive of circumstances, through the constant reinvention of the self, granting power over one’s subject position - or what Striner would call ‘ownness’ (Stirner 2014, Newman 2001: 90-91). The war-machine. Resisting capture Taking Foucault’s analysis even in a different direction, Deleuze and Guattari concentrate on the state, bringing it forward, like the ‘classical’ anarchists, as a central unit of analysis, as a perpetual form of organization (Newman 2001: 98; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 385). They 35 reimagine the connection between capital and state, in the form of signifiers that are silently accepted and perpetuated by individuals; this is why, in their view, some forms of philosophical thought, such as social contract theory, are complicit in oppression, for their role of legitimation of state power (Neman 2001: 99; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 385). Part of these ideas transforms into the territory of desire, where, like Stirner, the authors see that the individual has a desire to be subjugated; there is a figure of the state that gravitates above anti-authoritarianism (Newman 2001: 100). The analysis presented thus far is taken further, as Deleuze and Guattari begin focusing on the complicity of thought in state oppression (Heckman 2002) They create a new model of thought and culture that is opposed to the ‘arborescent’ one - the model that follows a chronological direction to determine causality and conclusions (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 25). In response, they propose a rhizomatic model, which is not centered and non- dichotomous (i.e. plural); this model creates a non-centered map that allows for limitless connections without narratives, promoting the idea of growth in any number of directions (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). In this way, the authors want to underline forms of non- authoritarian thought that values multiplicity over uniqueness (Newman 2001: 106). From this, the war-machine arise: a radical form of resistance should be concentrating on perpetual attempts to escape control, that do not lead to the grand final Revolution, but are rather affected by setbacks, follow different tactics, and allow for multiple concomitant struggles (Deleuze and Guattari 410-420). Deconstruction and ‘differance’. Derrida’s move beyond poststructuralism Newman concludes that neither Foucault’s ‘bodies and pleasures’ as the new basis of resistance in the face of sexual deployment (Foucault 1978, 1993; McWhorter 1999) nor Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizomatic thinking and war-machine strategy conceptualize resistance in away that could be adapted in the radical politics of today (2001: 115). What they do is destroy the subject, in the sense of disposing of it and not replacing it with anything plausible, allowing for essentialist discourses to re-enter, while Derrida tried to re-evaluate the subject (Newman 2001: 123). In the beginning, Derrida employs deconstruction, as a two-phased process: 1) the annihilation of binary oppositions in conceptual frameworks (such as rational/irrational) and the hierarchies that put one possible predicate over the other; and 2) revealing the internal contradictions of philosophy (Norris 1987: 19). Starting from a deconstruction of logocentrism, understood as the perceived superiority of speech over writing, of presence over essence, Derrida argues that exclusion employs dependence on the 36 ‘supplement’, as a necessary (although excluded) part of an identity (Norris 1937: 31). In this way, identity can never be conceived just as self-identity, as it is always influenced or contaminated by its supplement, and this could have important implications for radical politics: in the case of power, if it is the supplement of the identity of resisting subject, then there can be no uncontaminated point of a counterattack on power (Newman 2001: 117). The same holds true for power, if it were to be conceived in this way: it cannot be contained in a stable identity such as the State or the bourgeoisie (Newman 2001: 117). In this way, resistance cannot be possible just as a rejection of authority, for it would only reaffirm it, but would need to readdress the rules and the terrain on which this struggle is fought (Newman 2001: 118). To be able t accomplish that, Derrida’s concept of the ‘differance’ as an open, unstable, non-essentialist field of differences proves useful (Newman 2001: 123). The ‘infrastructure’ of differance is constituted as a myriad of interconnected differences and antagonisms that are irreducible to a ‘nature’ of the system, in the sense that they are non binary, non dialectical, forever open and horizontal (Newman 2001: 118-123). What this does is to provide the argument for why the complete identity is impossible, why not doing away with identity all together, because it does not affirm difference as superior to it; it transcends this binary because of the undecidability between the two options, choosing to unite the seemingly opposed terms, rather than choosing one side over the other (Newman 2001: 124- 125). In deconstruction, Derrida does not try to find an outside in the sense of an uncontaminated point, but rather uses the intrinsic limits of the inside in order to challenge the aporias and hidden contradictions he sees in philosophy (Norris 1987: 18-20). In this way, he creates a non-essentialist outside, that moves with the limits of whatever it is struggling against, creating what Newman calls the ‘radical outside’ that is not marred by its essentialist fixation (Newman 2001: 125). The Lacanian lack and the transgression of the Law However different this notion of the Derridian outside might be, when compared to the precursors discussed in this review, it still lacks the substance needed to theorize a politics of resistance, which is Newman’s primary goal: ‘how can we formulate a notion of resistance to domination that does not reaffirm the place of power by succumbing to essentialist temptations?’ (Newman 2001: 137). The discussion of Lacan, which will be used for the previously mentioned purpose, has to start from an understanding of the subject in the French psychoanalyst. For Lacan, the subject is fundamentally different than the Cartesian conception of self-transparency, because it is subjected to language, in terms of 37 consciousness, and wholly given meaning only through his counterposition against the chains of signifiers external to it, the Symbolic Order (Lacan 1977: 297). This is also what is meant by the Other, and thus the subject - (s) - is not central to the analysis, giving way to the signifier - S (Lacan 1977: 141). The main difference between this conception and that of various poststructuralists is that between the subject and the signifier there is always the lack, which becomes the fundamental unit for the constitution of the subject, for it means that determination is always imperfect because the subject cannot recognize itself in the Symbolic Order (Newman 2001: 138). This produces the alienation of the subject, who is given a symbolic identity to represent it, but this process is always characterized by a surplus of meaning between the subject and the signifier, given its incapacity to fulfill that identity in the Symbolic Order (Zizek 1990: 250-259). This excess of meaning - the Real - can never be represented, escaping the process of signification and causing traumatic effects, although it never existed (Lacan 1997: 306). For Lacan, the Real exists, in a way, at the limits of the inclusion/exclusion barrier in the Symbolic Order, for it is the former which does not allow the full constitution of the latter, existing within its limits, and creating the grounds for the notion of the ‘radical outside’ (Newman 2001: 141-142). This is why Foucault allowed for an agonistic relation between power and resistance (Newman 2001: 142). In the case of Lacan, a concept of power should have to take into account its constitutive lack: power claims to be absolute, although it is, to some extent, limited in scope (Newman 2001: 143). Lacan argues that, by way of the categorical imperative, the Law, while repressing pleasure, in the appearance, in fact produces the (perverse) pleasure of obeying - what he calls ‘jouissance’ (Zizek 1991: 39). This law of (repressed) pleasure is only the lack of the Law, and this could be seen to be the argument that Stirner makes when discussing voluntary obedience (Newman 2001: 144). It follow from here, as Lacan himself says, that the function of the law is permitted exactly through this transgression of it that gives pleasure to its subject (Newman 2001: 145). From this results the openness that the creative nihilism of Stirner tried to profit from: this logic of the Real means that, because identity is never complete, it is intrinsically political (Newman 2001: 147). This is precisely the start of Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic project (1985). Ethics, identity and politics in Newman What Newman’s project aimed to do is to expose the hidden authoritarian or possibly oppressive lines that ran through classical anarchist thought. As he says, this does not go into the direction of completely discarding or shamelessly discrediting the old anarchist 38 conceptions, but rather it aims to show that they have their limits, and those limits have to be expanded and reshaped (Newman 2001: 174-175). For this purpose, his vision of postanarchism tries to rebrand and radicalize some of the old notions and limits of anarchism. First of all, he argues that there cannot exist anti-authoritarian movements that function on no ethical limits at all, because of some simple dedication to a struggle against apparent domination, for that may hide other oppressive practices. The anarchist framework of equal- liberty, which saw equality and freedom as essentially compatible and undividable provides a starting point for this discussion, as it rejects any notion that full liberty is incompatible with full equality. However, there are instances in which these ideals come into clash with each other, a sin the current debates on freedom of expression, as including the right to discriminate: the freedom (in this case, of expression) of some could, sometimes, come into clash with the equality of others (in this case, an equality among people that does not permit the affirmation of one over another). This is brought forward by Newman in the following way: equality and liberty are not in an essential relation, be that of compatibility or mutual limitation - as it is the case in classical liberal discourse-, but are in a relation of contamination, that allows for no predetermined meaning, influencing one another through discursive formations, in the logic of the ‘empty signifier’ that remains void of essence and is interpretative (2001: 168). Political organization and postanarchism Instead of the old discourses that dominated politics in discussion of equality and liberty, Newman proposes ‘singularity’ as their new replacement - a respect for difference and a liberty of being different, that necessarily implies an quality of freedoms, that of individuality and that of difference, in order not to transgress the freedom of others (Newman 2001: 169). This is a similar conception to the one that Agamben shows in his concept of ‘whatever- singularity’: a love for the individual that includes all the its predicates, and not one resulting from essence (1993). From this arises a new conception of the fundamental antagonism that runs through the social, which stems from a basic difference in the conception of the political space: it is ‘politics’ versus ‘the police’, as Ranciere describes these concepts (Newman 2011a: 59). In this sense, ‘police’ would refer to what is generally seen as repressiveness carried out by the institutions of the state, coupled with the fundamentally unequal distribution of roles in society - the ‘proletarian’, the ‘illegal’, the ‘mad’ and so on (Newman 39 2011a: 59; Rockhill 2006: 3). By contrast, ‘politics’ is seen in the thought of Ranciere as the disruption of this process by the people (in the sense of demos) that intervene in the police order, without taking account of a privileged group that should lead this fight, a sit was the case of the proletariat in Marxism (Rockhill 2006:3). This is done by a process in which the excluded group demands the recognition of the rest, claiming for itself the representation of the universal, the whole of the social (Newman 2001b: 61). Newman draws on these thinkers to show that the space in which radical politics operates or should operate seems to have changed immensely, and essentialist conceptions such as ‘classical’ anarchism leave us without proper anti-authoritarian tools to go on. His own argument for the ethical framework of postanarchism is put forward as a type of indication about what the terrain of radical politics should look like: a set of micropolitical collective struggles that link themselves together, in a quest for unconditional equal-liberty. METHODOLOGY Discourse analysis is a widely used tool for analyzing social phenomena, and can be applied in a variety of domains, such as sociology, communication theory, psychology, and other domains (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). A particular brand of discourse analysis has been developed by the so-called ‘Essex School’, in political theory and analysis, which has its roots in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategies (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 24). This method is better suited for the kind of analysis that will be attempted in this paper, as it focuses on more aspects than traditional analytical ideology studies, introducing more levels of analysis that focus on identity and identity formation (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 24). The necessary condition for discourse analysis is the conception of the social as a discursive space, in that it allows for forms of representation that would be thoroughly impossible under a physicalist or naturalist conception of the world (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, x). Relations of representation and meanings are defined as real, as opposed to the view presented in the aforementioned perspectives. In line with discourse theory, political concepts, speeches, actors, and symbols do not have an intrinsic meaning in the political sphere; social phenomena can never become ‘total’. As such, the creation and fixation of meaning becomes the primary task of the political. This is done through ‘articulation’, as a practice of creating a relation between different elements, thus changing their previously attributed identity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105). The whole 40 created by the articulatory practice is called ‘discourse’, and that is the main object of analysis for the authors (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 26). Concepts that are used in discourses are brought under the category of ‘signs’ or ‘signifiers’ and their different positions within the structure of an articulatory practice are called ‘moments’, gravitating around the central concepts, called ‘nodal points’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112). The relationship between the signs and the nodal points offer the former specific meaning (e.g. the sign of ‘political liberty’ is positioned in different relations with the nodal point of ‘democracy’, in certain types of political discourses). In an articulation, all other possible meanings of a concept are excluded, thus creating the appearance of a ‘totality’. The total possible relationships between signs and nodal points that are excluded are called ‘the field of discursivity’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 111). A nodal points that defines the whole of the discourse, through which that discursive formation actually arises, is called a ‘Master Signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 111. In addition, the authors include the category of ‘elements’ to characterize those concepts whose meaning is still not fixated; the transition for ‘element’ to ‘moment’ is never complete (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 110). It becomes clear at this point that there is an ever-present threat to a particular discourse, in that other attempts at fixating the sign could disrupt the meanings ascribed (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 27). Additionally, ‘floating signifiers’ are those signs for which there is competition to describe meaning, for they are open to many different interpretations (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 28). Within a particular articulation, nodal points define floating signifiers, so they appear fixed in meaning, but competing discourses struggle to offer different interpretations for these signs, thus making the discourse only a temporary closure. Moreover, political discourses employ ‘logics of difference’ that stress the plurality, the rifts, and the cleavages in society, bringing the discrepancies between social forces in front. The counterweight comes from ‘logics of equivalence’ which seek to give the appearance of uniformity within a social group (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 127). As an example, a discourse about the struggles of the ‘workers’ employs a ‘logic of equivalence’, during which other identities of those that are being introduced in this group are rather ignored (e.g. maybe they would describe themselves as mothers, non-binary people, black men, etc.). By contrast, the logic of difference would point out to different struggles that are overshadowed by the grand label of ‘workers’ and would bring them forward. Both logics components are relevant in the contest for hegemony of a particular discourse, as it needs to keep a united front at times or to point out to difference, in other moments. 41 The last element of this theory that is useful for the purpose of analysis described in this thesis is ‘identity’. In order to be able to analyze identity, discourse theory draws on Lacanian concepts (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 42). Identity is created around what Lacan calls ‘master signifiers’, that in discourse theory become nodal points of identity (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 42). For a subject, identity is not something he owns, but something that is created by discursive representation, and which one can accept, refuse or negotiate; identity is always contingent and created through ‘chains of equivalence’ that put signifiers around a nodal point, in opposition to other chains, defining what one is and what they are not (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 43). In the present thesis, this analytical tool will be used to study three representative cases in the history of 20th century anarchist organization. Specifically, my analysis will concentrate on the evolution of the signifier ‘revolution’, in three representative moments in time, to show its departure from a unique moment of transformation of society towards a political tool, as we enter 21st century anarchism. The main thrust of postanarchism, as it will be shown in the next section of this thesis, is the abandonment of revolution in favor of insurrection. ‘Revolution’ is a nodal point in many radical discourses, and its definition has different impacts on the identity of the ‘revolutionary’ or the ‘anarchist’. In Newman’s work, these concepts play a major role in developing a post-structuralist practice of anarchism. When the category of revolution is completely abandoned, there appears a clear difference in the identity of postanarchist groups. My purpose here is not to show some form of a teleological movement in the history of anarchist organization, but to point out the discrepancies between different perspectives that shaped the anarchist movement. By using this method of analysis, it will become clear whether or not there is, in fact, any continuation between the historical developments in anarchist theory/practice and the propositions of postanarchism. More importantly, if Newman concentrates on the Occupy Movements as an example of what a non-essentialist movement can look like, although with some faults. If his perspective is to be applied in practice, meaningful analysis should concentrate on making a projection of an Occupy-like movement in the future. In the last section of this thesis, I will use discourse analysis to describe such a movement. The first case will be that of the incipient anarcho-syndicalist moment in American politics, specifically the case of the fight for the eight-hour work day. As I will argue, revolution loses its meaning of final liberation, remaining in an undefined future. Anarchism becomes a mode 42 of organization within the constraints of the capitalist economy, but there were efforts to keep the ideal of the revolution alive, as a purpose, but not as an event that could be happening in that specific moment. The second case studied will be that of Anarchist Catalonia, during the Spanish Civil War. The residents socialized private property and the means of production, for the purpose of creating an anarchist community. As it will be discussed in that section, this form of organization is consistent with ‘classical’ anarchist theories. Anarchist Catalonia was formed based on a trust in revolution as a means of achieving social change, and forming a new community, organized in line with anarchist principles. Finally, in the third case, that of the Occupy Wall Street in the United States, anarchists are merely inspired by the idea of revolution. The concept is completely void of meaning, in connection with the actual organization of the movement. Revolution as a final event becomes a tool of rebellion or, as Newman argues, insurrection. Throughout all these changes, the identity of the anarchist that forms part of such a group evolves as well, becoming more and more inclusive, stripping itself of essentialist conceptions. As I mentioned above, the final stage of my analysis will be a critical assessment of what a postanarchist vision would look like, in this framework. CASE STUDIES If in the Literature Review section of my thesis I concentrated on the principles that lay the foundation for ‘classical’ anarchist theories of State, power, and human nature, this section will focus on the pragmatic aspects of these strands of anarchist political theory. I am interested specifically in the type of political strategies advocated in different moments in the history of anarchism, which I will call here ‘political anarchism’. The focus on political anarchism, as opposed to the review of philosophical anarchism, can be explained by the process of creation of subjectivity. Whereas philosophical anarchism deserves the merit of creating theoretical grounds for emancipation, it tells us very few things about how anarchists act in the context of contemporary capitalism. Anarchism, as all ideologies, has a clear prescriptive nature regarding political action that influences the way in which political anarchists act. However, it is through means of action and the ‘application’ of philosophical principles that the world is actually changed. In this process of change and political action, the anarchist identity takes its true form and the relation with the Revolution with a capital ‘r’ comes to light. This forms the basis for the second part of my analysis in the present thesis. 43 This is particularly important for the case of postanarchism, as this political theory presents a brand of anarchism that ‘starts with anarchy, rather than ending with it’ (Newman 2015: 12). Some principles presented in the Review may appear problematic, not so much from a theoretical perspective - although this aspect will be discussed as well in the Conclusion-, but rather from a practical point of view. As such, the purpose of this section is double: a) to present illustrative case studies that mark different periods in the history of anarchism to highlight different understandings of the anarchist identity, the related subjectivities, and the Revolution; and b) to discuss Newman’s normative points in the context of a new anarchist identity. It should be noted that this is not a discussion of ‘evolution’, although the cases will be presented in chronological order. As I will argue during this section, there is by no means a teleological spectrum that can be applied to the history of political anarchism. Rather, different approaches concur at the same historical moment. The task at hand is, in my view, to identify certain illustrative practices that, by using the method of Discourse Analysis, can highlight the aforementioned points of interest. I start by discussing briefly the distinction between philosophical anarchism and the political practice, I then present the three chosen cases, in historical context, underlining the relation between certain actions and the revolutionary ideal, and finally I draw some guiding principles that influence the formation of political subjectivity. For anarchists, the problem of resistance to political authority takes many forms, from non- violent ones, such as protests, civil disobedience, tax resistance, sabotage, and others, to outright violence, in destruction of property, bombing or a full-scale war on the state (Nicolescu 2012). This problem arises, in a first layer of analysis, from the fact that, until the Revolution comes, the anarchist ideal can persuade actors to become politically engaged in want for reforms or to abstain from political engagement (an anti-political stance also expounded by postanarchist theory). As I will argue in the following paragraphs, both strategies have an underlying guiding principle: the trust in the Revolution. This hope for radical social change can be understood simply in the anarchist poet Hakim Bey’s words: waiting for the Revolution and wanting it (Bey 1991). In traditional anarchist political practices, another element is working for the Revolution, in the sense of devising actions that do not only provide for certain reforms, but also advance the movement in the apparently clear direction of the Revolution. This is the simple relation between signifier and signified that has been present in militant anarchist movements: different gestures of apparent uprising - distribution of propaganda, work sabotage, marches, destruction of property, and so on - are 44 signifiers that convey meaning to the signified of the ideal of Revolution. As far as waiting, wanting and working for the Revolution go, I propose the following conceptual tool of gradual analysis, in order to begin the discussion of the case studies: I use the signifiers 1) ‘waiting [for the Revolution]’ to mean the maintenance of an ideal of a perceived utopian and unattainable nature, by an individual or by a group, that creates and promotes anti-political and disruptive actions at a localized level rather than actions in the direction of reforms; the Revolution itself is a mechanism of History (in the deterministic sense), and thus outside the power of the subject; 2) ‘wanting [the Revolution]’ implies waiting with a desire, so it should be understood as maintaining the ideal as a very long-term unique purpose that requires intervention in the motion of History and creates the preconditions of taking reformist actions, besides anti-political and disruptive ones, having the additional purpose of involving more people in the anarchist practices; 3) ‘working [for the Revolution]’ should be understood as actively promoting the revolutionary ideal, that is seen as a clearly attainable goal, thus creating the subject as the agent of change, and devising actions that, at least in some part, advance the goal of the Revolution. The mass strike. Revolutionary plans and ideals in the American social revolutionaries at the end of 19th century Let us consider the first case, that of the so-called Haymarket Affair of the 1880s in Chicago, which saw the transformation of the workday, bringing forward a massive victory for labour movements worldwide. For anarchists worldwide, this event is a moment of joy, but marked by the tragedy of the execution of the social revolutionaries in the aftermath of the protests that turned violent after an explosion. The protests of May 1886 had their roots in the Congress of Socialists of the United States, in October 1881, being the first try at a large- scale organization of revolutionaries in the federation (Avrich 1986: 58). At that time, the Revolutionary Socialistic Party is born, as the first known national anarchist organization in the U.S. (Avrich 1986: 60). As a coordinating body, it failed to provide the necessary framework for the realization of common goals between different movements, but it provided a necessary step in the establishment of a militant activism that will coagulate in the revolutionary program after the arrival of the political anarchist and newspaper editor Johann Most, at the end of 1882 (Avrich 1986: 61). Author of the Pittsburgh Manifesto of 1883, hailed by labor movements as the founding basis for the social revolutionary movement, Most was a passionate revolutionary and propagandist, advocating for militancy of every form towards the final purpose of the socialist revolution, that managed to become the central 45 figure of American revolutionary socialism during the period of time leading up to the events of May 4, 1866 in Chicago. (Avrich 1986: 62-67). Prominent figures accompanied Most to the Pittsburgh Congress of 1883, and one can note especially the figures of August Spies and Albert Parsons (Avrich 1986: 68-72). The anarcho-syndicalism of Parson becomes visible in his vision of the union: “an autonomous commune in the process of incubation” (Avrich 1986: 73) that stands at the root of the formation of the new society (Avrich 1986: 73). More than being a means of reform, the union is thus seen as the vehicle for the revolutionary action, and for direct action in the direction of the Revolution. The general fixation of the social revolutionaries of the 1880s was on the dichotomous war between the rich and the poor (Avrich 1986: 67). This view is tied specifically with the concepts of work and wealth, and generally the great antagonism that mars society is between the poor masses, composed of skilled and unskilled workers, as well as the unemployed, as in out of work, and the non- working individuals, in the sense of never employed or those who are put outside the employable category. But as far as ‘working class’ is concerned, there is no account of sexual work, for example. Moreover, although there were principles advocating for inclusiveness of ethnicity in the revolutionary union movement, problems of racism that are not specifically tied to the economy are absent from the discourse of the broader social revolutionary movement of the 1880s. The absence of radical liberation discourse concerning the continuous subjugation of black people in those years and the fundamentally unjust, from an anarchist perspective, racial segregation is easily explained using Discourse Analysis. The chains of equivalence constructed by the anarchist movements in that time function on an essentialist primacy of antagonisms resulted in the wage system of the middle of the 19th century: ‘No matter if you are man, woman, black, Mexican, and so on, we are all poor until the capitalist system is defeated’. The anarchist identity is thus constructed using the signifiers attached to the signified of ‘economic antagonism’. This critique is not a repudiation of the strategy used during those years, as it is clear, from a left radical perspective, that the wage system, the division of labor, the unemployment welfare system and so on are clear sources of antagonisms. However, if the anarchist ideal is to be thought of complete equal-liberty - the egalibertarian ideal -, the ontological primacy of the working masses and the superiority of economic antagonisms imply a permanent prioritization of these specific interests, hegemonized in such a way in which to appear as the absolute source of inequality. I draw two conclusions from the analysis of the movements that brought about the Haymarket Affair: 1) it is necessary to ‘work’ for the Revolution, as an attainable goal defining a unique 46 event which ends all antagonisms created by the industrial capitalist system; 2) the political subjectivity created by this doctrine is one of a militant poor worker (even though they might be out of work) for whom socialism awaits. I believe that, from the perspective of the anarchist egalibertarian ideal, there could be drawn another perspective that eschews the problem of essentialism: the incipient social revolutionary movements of the United States at the end of the 19th century functioned on a populist logic and the concentration on economic antagonisms is presented as primary as it was the most visible in that particular spatio- temporal instance. Notwithstanding the fact that the primacy of the economic is the result of hegemonization and, to some extent, the depolitization of the racial cleavage in the Reconstruction Era after the American Civil War, a progressive populist logic should offer indications that it does not aim to perpetually prioritize a central interest specific to a certain group. The anarchist account of the movements born out of Revolutionary Socialistic Party supports the belief that the end of capitalist rule, brought by violent Revolution, would mean the birth of the ‘free society’, but that community is still created as an opposition of the current system, without programmatically addressing non-economic issues. The definitions of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ are defined only in relation to economic struggles, leaving out problems of political and civil rights unattended. Anarchist Catalunya. Libertarian communism and revolutionary success Half a century later, during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), one of the most famous examples of revolutionary anarchism put in practice captures the attention of radicals everywhere. In the eve of the Melilla War of 1909-1910, the Spanish government introduced a mandatory conscription in Catalunya, causing massive strikes and street fights, promoted by the main syndicalist federation in the region, Solidaridad Obrera (Workers’ Unity), formed only two years prior (Marshall 1992: 455). After the bloody struggles, referred to as ‘semana tragica’ (the tragic week), the government instituted heavy retaliatory measures, that would go on to form the basis of resistance for the upcoming movements (Marín Silvestre 2009). The unions that took part in the federation realized that a stronger organization was needed, this leading to the creation, in 1911, of the syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) (Marshall 1992: 455). As their ideological basis, they were attached to the principles of libertarian communism, dedicating itself to both revolutionary action, in a Bakunian fashion, and the creation of better work conditions (Souchy 2005: 440-441). The anarchist wing of the CNT was the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), which sought to counter the reformist wing within the syndicalist organization, moving it into a more radical and, indeed, 47 anarchist direction (Marshall 1992: 457). In doing so, it formed the secret revolutionary vanguard that Bakunin argued for, but instituted what opponents inside the CNT described as dictatorship, coming close to resembling the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks (Bookchin 1998: 214). Even before the start of the war, the revolutionary nature of the CNT-FAI was hard to miss: action and organizing was prioritized, while ‘philosophical discussions’ were ridiculed (Peirats 1972: 9-10); during the unrest of the Republican-Socialist coalition that ruled the country, the organization argued for ‘Social Revolution instead of ballot boxes’ (Marshall 1992: 459); finally, just before the start of the war, at the Congress of May 1936, the plan for the new society reemerged as a centerpiece of the ideology of the organization 2. Other principles included the abolishment of the distinction between intellectuals and manual workers, the destruction of prisons and courts of justice, the proclamation of free love, the opportunity for each commune in the upcoming federation to live by any anarchist standard, from the communist to the individualist (Marshall 1992: 459-460). It should be noted here that the author explains that these ideals were presented as principles of libertarian communism, not ‘blueprint[s] for a future society’ (Marshall 1992: 460). However, taking into account the fact that in less than two months, the process of collectivization would begin, revolution floating already in the air (Souchy 2005: 440-441), the wanting of the revolution necessarily transformed in working for the revolution, in the framework I designed earlier. Indeed, the culmination of the violent overthrow of the old regime in July 1936 was to be found in collectivization of agriculture and industry (Souchy 2005: 442) that followed - sometimes loosely, but still in adherence - the principles of anarcho-communism. Although the study and remembrance of the different struggles and victories of the CNT-FAI has its undoubtable academic merits in the study of anarchism, what interest me more, as I showed in the previous case study, is the concentration on various issues. In this case, the libertarian communist ideal and the anti-fascist guiding principle (Souchy 2005: 442) point in two rather different directions. First of all, as shown by the economic practice of the CNT-FAI, the class dimension was floating above every measure - as policies of occupation of work became instantly prominent, ranging from finding work for every individual to redistribution of excess revenue towards poorer industries, to maintain employment and wages (Souchy 2005: 442). It is easy to point out the fact that economic antagonisms marred Spain, as did State and Church oppression (Marshall 1992: 454), so this comes as no surprise at all. Nor is it 2 ‘Once the violent aspect of the revolution is finished, the following are declared abolished: private property, the state, the principles of authority, and as a consequence, the classes which divide men into exploiters and exploited, oppressed and oppressors’, quoted in Marshall, Demanding the Impossible 1992, p. 459. 48 unexpected that, second of all, while the nationalist Falange of Francisco Franco was gaining more and more traction (Marshall 1992: 460), the anti-fascist dimension of the anarchist revolution was equally powerful (Souchy 2005: 442). But these principles often came in contrast with other anarchist ideals. For example, the obligation to comply with the majority decision and not publicly criticize the movement (Marshall 1992: 457) is a clear violation of the anarchist idea of free enquiry and private judgement, that were for so long seen to be hindered by the State and the Church, as Bakunin (1970) would argue. Moreover, even the principle of non-differentiation between intellectuals and manual laborers seems to prove problematic, taking into account the aforementioned emphasis on the value of productive, industrial and agricultural work: there is a duty to produce for the community that is more prominent than the duty to think for the benefit of the community. However, the anti-fascist dimension pointed into a direction of social rights of minorities, because of the fascist program of defining non-citizens (Tamás 2001), which would come to be severely felt by women, Roma people, the Basque minority, the working class, and others during Franco’s regime (Preston 2013: 22, 34, 128). Franco’s fascism creates a strong social response on the part of the anarchists, who actively fought against this program. In a very particular state of affairs, during a demanding civil war, the CNT-FAI expounds principles that deal not only with the economic, although the class dimension is prevalent, but with social issues that are seen as separate of the economic, even though it does that in a purely reactive manner. That is to say it is not clear from their principles if fascism is the enemy, and thus these social issues become of critical importance, or their dedication to their understanding of liberty and equality would have emphasised these regardless of context. The Occupy Wall Street interpretation of anarchism Income inequality has become rampant in the United States, after the 2008 economic crisis, in the sense that people were awakening to the realization that global wealth was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few, leaving the many behind. The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement organized around this problem, using a slogan of rally that read ‘We are the 99%’ (Gitlin 2012: 5). It was started in September 2011, by the occupation of Zuccotti Park in the Wall Strict district of New York. From that point one, it was to be a constant insurrection against ‘corporate rule’, as some viral Twitter messages proclaimed: ‘Dear Americans, this July 4th, dream of insurrection against corporate rule,” with the hashtag #occupywallstreet.’ (Gitlin 2012: 10). Social media played a key role in it, especially in the political sphere of the Left, where the call to action had become one of the biggest news in 49 recent times, in just a matter of days (Gitlin 2012: 10-12). At the beginning of October, the first march on Wall Street ended with more than 700 people arrested in what would be the first government crackdown on the protesters, that was to continue with legal barriers and surveillance (Gitlin 2012: 232-236). The goals that emerged during that year of somewhat continuous activity were concerned with corporate accountability, changing the laws that allowed relentless financial speculation, and forgiving student loans (White and Lasn 2011). In its organization, the OWS used direct democracy to take decisions and promoted the encampment of the park, picketing corporations, and marches through the streets of New York (Gitlin 2012: 124-130). The biggest demonstration was held on May Day 2012, with more than 200.000 people reportedly going down the streets of the city. From the beginning, it appears clear that the logic of hegemony was at play here. No longer was it an issue that affected a group of people in particular, but it was a unique cause that had to be fought against, running at the core of every hegemonized group. The interplay of different struggles here has lead to a more specific set of demands, as were the ones mentioned above, but were kept under the Master Signifier of economic inequality, as to keep the opposition between demos and elites alive. It is useful to remember here one of the many posters that were put up which read ‘What is our one demand?’. This is even more interestingly seen when taking into account the fact that this is the original artwork put up by activists Kalle Lasn and Micah White during their first call to protest (White and Lasn 2011). This call to action, under the slogan that pits the popular forces against the greed of Wall Street bankers, created the basis for populist articulation of demands. Furthermore, it incited a spirit of continuous rebellion through a great number of interactions on social media, which managed to be used for the purpose of dissemination of message and propaganda. In the tool designed before, it appears as though one could not talk of the Revolution, specifically, as this was not, strictly speaking, a socialist claim. The various problems that were brought to light could be resolved while keeping capitalism intact. However, the methods and slogans have a revolutionary appeal, in the sense that they proposed the possibility of changing that which appeared unchangeable. This is not a discussion of violent revolution, in the sense of overthrowing the current order and seizing power. Rather, it is a democratic revolution, to some extent, in the sense of Laclau and Move, putting against the corrupt and corporate-tied politics of career politicians one that was based on mutual understanding and consensus, and sought to arrive at plural perceptions over a great antagonism. Hence it denounces Revolution apparently from the beginning, but also did not wait for it or want it, because Revolution had ceased to exist completely in this imaginary. What I mean by this is that the OWS does not implicitly fall 50 under the system devised earlier, because the meaning of revolution is drastically altered. This signifier represents a desirable and attainable, although improbable, political goal. While the Revolution is anti-political, in the sense that it suspends its course completely, this understanding of revolution is necessarily political. Anarchist principles, but not anarchism I would add here a fourth paradigm, as it is more than a case, in which I will briefly discuss various forms of anarchist utopian communities, formed within the current capitalist system. Those communities of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st that start from the example of the Paris Commune of 1871 adopt a non-revolutionary form of anarchism (Fiala 2017). In the post-scarcity society that was dominant the Western liberal democracies around the 1968 libertarian moment, there was indeed an important change in anarchist political practice. As economic antagonisms moved to the sides of the anarchist imaginary, a concentration on social life prevailed in the case of what has been dubbed the ‘New Left’, with its concentration on counter-culture, sexual liberation, and a progressive transformation of everyday life (Marshall 1992 540-547). Within this greater transformation in the political imaginary of the Left, there were groups concerned with ‘living anarchy’, in the sense of establishing autonomous communities, as were the hippie communes, whose form of resistance to the profoundly unequal society was taken up in the form of its rejection (Marshall 1992: 541-543). As Marshall points out, some of the slogans of the hippie movement (e.g. ‘Make love, not war!’) were influenced by the more libertarian strands of Marxism, specifically the wirings of Herbert Marcuse (Marshall 1992: 541). Their position was anti-political, but in a different sense than that of the traditional anarchists. While anti- politics meant the refusal to engage with the Oppressor on its own political terrain, the anti- political strategy of the communes and of the New Left libertarian movements means a refusal of the State-dominated social space. The disengagement with social life and the retreat to nature is perceived as the new form of resistance, as historical accounts point out (Marshall 1992: 541). This marks a very important break, as it is tied with the broader phenomena associated with counter-culture. While anti-political, previous forms of political anarchism devised localized forms of resistance and insurrection, as it was previously argued in this section. The form of resistance in the cases of the ‘new communes’ amounted to establishing counter-institutions in separatist forms of communal organization. The sexual liberation movement, which aimed to destabilize and critically challenge established norms about sexuality and sexual practice (Rogue et al. 2012), was imperfectly reproduced in the case of 51 the new communes. The understanding of ‘freedom as self-creation’ in the organization of hippie movements meant that, sometimes, traditional gender roles were reproduced and even accentuated (Marshall 1992: 544), meaning that the apparent libertarian impulse turned into a reconsolidation of patriarchal norms of sexuality and gender roles. The lack of accent on the broad themes of political, social, and economic equality and the prioritization of self- development without external constraints stems from the absolute rejection of imposed rules, starting from the bottom: rejecting the authority of the parents transitioned to larger levels of society, from school to the state. When the Yippie ‘leader’ Abbie Hoffman declared ‘Revolution for the Hell of It’ (Marshall 1992: 544), the signifier of ‘revolution’ had lost all its traditional meaning. ‘Revolution’ meant rejection of the current state of affairs, and, in the absence of a programmatic ideal, allowed for self-creation. This was perhaps best seen from a spiritual perspective (Marshall 1992: 543). The change was in swapping the general principles found in society, with very little concern for how the newly implemented principles of the commune might be problematic in themselves. As far as radicalism goes, these changes were radical in that they tried to oppose some meta- narratives present in the State-determined social. As such, self-creation brought about cultural change, but without regard to the abovementioned notions of equality. These self-creating appear post-ideological (i.e. apparently eschewing any categorical demarcation up until that point), taken as a whole, as they cannot be put under the same categorical distinction on grounds of perceptions about the individual vs. the community, the economic grounds of social organization, and so on. However, they cannot fall under the label of postanarchism, because, although have common ground with postmodernist criticisms of present society, fail in the most important aspect of non-essentialism. Instead of the rejected practices, the new communes of the ‘60s in the United States, new ones were put up, merely mirroring old antagonisms, creating new essentialist identities. New communes In spite of this criticism, there are other examples of new communes worth considering, for the purpose of this thesis. A useful example is that of the Federation of Egalitarian Communities, an association of autonomous communes in the United States that are based on equality of resources, labor exchange, providing free public services, and creating an alternative lifestyle (Nicolescu 2012: 314). These organizations manage to effectively criticize unequal practices and to swap them for progressive ones. Their principles could be attributed to Bakuninist collectivist anarchism, implemented within the realms of capitalism. 52 The paradigm of the new communes thus presents its final form in the silent acceptance of the current state of affairs, compared to traditional anarchist practices, not seeking the overthrow of the State and the dismantling of the capitalist system as a whole, but of replacing it, in the here and now. The new communes already live in anarchy, but the Revolution is completely devoid of its classical meaning. The burden of social change is not on a privileged agent, but it is also not placed on the sum of the antagonized subjects. Anarchy is a state of affairs that can be implemented without direct action against the abuses of the oppressive state, in the imaginary of the new communes. The charge levelled here is one of inaction, other than leading by example. For if there is any type of counter-hegemony, this is one that is not actively in contest with the dominant discourse, and it rather tries to attract followers in joining the separation, rather than actively resisting the present form of domination. The new communes abandon the ideal of equal-liberty for a comfortable idealized settlement that is not in the course of being disseminated. In the framework created before, I qualify these movements as avoiding all three options of wanting, waiting for or working for the Revolution, but on a localized level. By eschewing the problem of dissemination of resistance, this paradigm does not, strictly speaking, fall under the categories conceptualized above. The ‘new’ anarchism. A different understanding of political anarchism In contrast, the paradigm proposed by Newman, in abandoning the concept of revolution as a final event, in fact radicalizes its meaning. The fact that there is no ultimate salvation, that is predetermined, which one could not create, but to which one could only contribute, put the new anarchist in the full bare front of power. In this instance, when there is no end to power, only change, the new anarchist movement has to act properly, through direct action, or remain under the influence of the various ways in which oppression operates. The fact is that Newman’s project, following Striner, encourages an enquiry into the very nature of the oppressive forces. The critical system of assessment that can be extracted from the postanarchist ethics puts the anarchist in a context in which the assessment of a situation cannot be done based only on some theoretical background that states that authority is despicable, but rather on a positive proposal for the betterment of a particular situation. In this way, Newman neatly captures and conceptualizes the spirit of the various anarchist movements that have arisen after the turn of the millennium. For example, the tactics of the black bloc movements are specifically postanarchist in the sense that they are not only concerned with the economic dimension, or with ideological combat with the far-right, but 53 are voiding themselves of content, so that every struggle appears as ultimate. One can look at the various ways in which they were protesting the G20 meeting, on the one hand, and protesting for the rights of migrants, on the other hand (Newman 2010), to see that they are not revolving around a certain group or a certain cause. If this appears to sound like ‘classical’ anarchist principles is because it should. The old principles of fighting authority have remained true to this day, but is only their form, which loses the revolutionary aspect, and their infrastructure, that becomes self-questioning and constantly developing, that change. This where Newman’s radicalization of the notion of revolution comes: it is a revolution of the anarchist, a radical change that he undertakes, but also, in a more general sense, the revolution becomes a constant activity. Again, if by revolution, we understand, as Newman does, a final, irreversible event that is the source of change, then the only thing that has changed is its finality. The process of anarchistic living and the creation of a postanarchist imaginary create the grounds for unmasking power in such a way in which not changing actually becomes impossible. It promotes constant self-actualization, a state of perpetual revolution. This is what I mean by Newman’s radicalization. THE ROAD TOWARDS RADICAL DEMOCRACY How can Newman’s arguments help the project of radical democracy? I will begin by assessing the theoretical aspects of his work, discussing various critiques, after which I will try to construct a model of a party movement influenced by postanarchism. The new and the old in Newman’s work Many types of critiques have been levelled at postanacrhist thinkers, especially May and Newman, that I will try to divide into two main categories, for better appraisal. One will deal with the methodological aspects of Newman’s postanarchist critique, while the other will revolve around the various propositions that postanarchist theories explore. On the one hand, Adams and Jun (2015: 244-246) summarize and expand upon this first critique, that of selective reading of classical texts on the part of the postanarchists. Two main arguments are discussed, one dealing with an unjustified attention to apparently ‘canonical’ texts, not taking into account non-academic anarchist work (Adams and Jun 2015: 245) , and the second discussing the ‘intratextual’ method used by postanarchist thinkers, in the sense that they concentrate on some parts of the work of a certain thinker, not putting it enough in context with the broader intellectual developments that the thinker experienced (Adams and Jun 2015: 248). 54 The first argument implies that new theoretical developments should be inspired by broader writings and contextual practices, which should be criticized in a fair manner. In this way, it should give full weight to their premises and conclusions of the cited authors. Through the course of this thesis, I highlighted the main reproaches that postanarchists, and more concretely Newman, direct at what they perceive as being the ‘canon’ of philosophical anarchism. In light of this, there is a specific tendency to discuss well-designed arguments that inspire political practices. The fault here should not be on of disengagement with non- academic texts, because of the purpose of postanarchist enquiries. As I underlined in the previous sections, Newman is concerned with using poststructuralist approaches towards the further development of anarchist theory, as it is most widely-known, both inside and outside academia. Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Goldman, for example, have been used as basis for revolutionary anarchist movements (Ward 2004), so it is relevant to discuss their theoretical validity as informants of practices. Sure enough, there are many other relevant anarchist authors that have been left out - one could think of Rocker, Malatesta, Goldman, and others -, and this weighs down some aspects of the postanarchist critique that seek to identify hidden sources of antagonisms in ‘classical’ anarchism. However, furthering on the argument of selective choice of authors, it is problematic to concentrate only on arguments dealing with revolutionary forms of anarchism, as it fails to take into account the main political practices of the 20th and 21st century, in the form of political anarchism. The hermeneutical apparatus designed by postanarchist theories, giving special credit to poststructuralism, can and should be applied to movements practicing squatting, destruction of property, sabotage, occupying and so on. The reason for this was also explained in the case studies section: accepting the basic premise that ideologies and principles that come with it influence practices means that by deconstructing practices in their specific articulation leads us to a better understanding of the political theory informing it. In this sense, it is problematic to approach the study of anarchist history and to bring forward inconsistencies in a way that does not give full credit to the breadth of the full history of the anarchist movement. I have tried to underline the fact that the insurrectionist proposal put forward by the postanarchists fully supports non- revolutionary practices. Thus, a direct analysis of these phenomena would be of interest to these thinkers only if it could underline hidden essentialisms. Indeed, a greater concentration on revolutionary newspapers or propaganda pamphlet, through means of Discourse Analysis, as I have attempted beforehand, or other methods, could provide a greater insight into assumptions underlying the broader anarchist movement. 55 The second argument brings forward a methodological issue, regarding the decontextualization of the studied author’s position connects to a broader problem of historical account in political philosophy. In principle, it is valid to criticize a counter- argument that does not take into account further developments of the argument, as it becomes close to a straw-man. Indeed, in the case of Kropotkin, as I have pointed out, Newman concentrates on ‘Mutual Aid’ and ‘The State: Its Historic Role’ to describe the Russian author’s scientism, concentrating on three aspects: 1) the movement of history, 2) the liberatory nature of science, and 3) the positivist view of human nature. The arguments in the aforementioned paper deals specifically with the first question raised by Newman regarding Kropotkin’s approach. Adams and June (2015: 255-257) study Kropotkin's engagement with the science of his time, and with the main intellectual trends of the period, showing that the author ‘placed mutability at its heart’, allowing for regressive possibilities, and, after ‘Mutual Aid’, he no longer had the view that historical events are pre-ordained. Consequently, if the author further nuanced his opinion on the development of history, it is philosophically unsound not to take the argument into account, unless there is a belief that, on a large scale, the argument first put forward in ‘Mutual Aid’ is the one that produced more effects. This defense would have to rest on common perception about the book or known statistics among anarchist followers, but there is reason to doubt that this is where the postanarchist perception draws from. More plausibly, given the fact that the revolutionary principles in Kropotkin’s work are mainly structured in ‘Mutual Aid’, ‘The Conquest of Bread’, and ‘Fields, Factories and Workshops’ gives them primacy over more undiscussed works. To sum up, it is both historically and philosophically problematic, in abstract, not to discuss a certain piece of work in intellectual context, but there is reason to accept that a critique directed at the main writings has value. However, the argument in Adams and June (2015) proves that Newman was not right in attributing immutable principles to Kropotkin. The concept of power and the question of transcendence On the other hand, Newman’s critique does not solely rest upon an attack on the teleology of ‘classical’ anarchism. As discussed in the first sections of this thesis and in the previous paragraph. On several counts, ‘classical’ anarchism can be found guilty of essentialism - including here scientism and technicism, the existence and intrinsic value of human nature, moral universalism -, and that makes it undesirable in the present context, when the need is to develop a radical democratic movement. The mistake is, however, to imagine an impenetrable body of thought that has not changed over time. It is understandable, however, 56 to criticize widely available works to make broader points, but the investigative work is part of the basic philosophical requirements. Regardless of how one interprets the way in which Newman addresses the reading of anarchist oeuvres, this does not tell us anything about the usefulness of his own arguments. At the very least, Newman can be said, in my opinion, to construct an argument that fully represents the inquisitive and perpetually developing nature of anarchism and its ideals. In this sense, what one should understand when reading From Bakunin to Lacan is the fact that Newman manages to radicalize a somewhat existing tendency to question some of the positivist foundations of the Enlightenment. One of the criticisms that Newman received, on the part of Franks (2007), is the failure to transcend the limits that kept ‘classical’ anarchism confined. On the other hand, another criticism argues that Newman’s mistake in this book stems from a misunderstanding of the fact that both Bakunin and Kropotkin see an intrinsic conflict between the sociability and the individualism in the subject, and this eschews the problem of essentialism (Cohn 2002: 4). Furthermore, he argues that Newman misuse the term ‘power’, using it as a substitute for ‘domination’ or ‘oppression’, and mistakenly underlines that the ‘classical’ anarchists wanted to destroy power (Cohn 2002: 4-5). Firstly, it is obvious that there needs to be a different assessment of the degrees of power. As I have pointed out, Laclau and Mouffe offer a useful distinction. Power produces relations of subordination, by its very nature, but this is not necessarily one that should be resisted. As the authors argue, it is only in the moment when this relation of subordination constitutes itself as antagonistic - by not allowing the individual to constitute himself as an overdetermined subject, negating parts of one’s identity -, we can speak of relations of oppression; furthermore, by ‘domination’, they describe a relation of oppression that is perceived as being unjust (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 153-154). Cohn is right in pointing out that ‘classical’ anarchists were concentrating on relations of oppression, not on relations of subordination or on power itself (Cohn 2002: 4). However, he fails to consider that Newman specifically argues that the blindness of anarchism, created through holding through some immutable truths, creates the preconditions for the emergence of new antagonisms that may or may not be addressed (Newman 2001: 3). Irrespective of how they conceived of human nature, that is as intrinsically good or in dichotomous conflict, the problem is that ‘classical’ anarchists hold a particular view of an ‘essence’ of the subject, fundamentally affecting the way in which they conceive of anarchism. For example, because Bakunin did not share Kropokin’s optimistic view about the good nature of humans, he opposed the idea of the communal market, arguing instead for a form of labor vouchers, exactly because this was a dialectical opposition between egoism and sociability. In 57 Newman’s case, human nature does not play any role, because it is artificially constructed, and plays in the hand of the oppressor, be that the state or some other entity. The whole idea is that any conception of human nature, other than fluidity, creates the possibility for further oppression. Moreover, this exactly why Newman concentrates on power, as I have done as well. It is important to have an analytical perception of power, before one can talk about antagonisms, as it is equally important to define the ontology of oppression. Those who argue that the ‘classical’ anarchist are not against power itself should focus their attention on the main anarchist argument against the state: the State cannot be conquered, and there is no such thing as ‘revolutionary power’, because, by its nature, the State has its own logic of perpetuation, corrupting any individual, no matter how libertarian. It is for this reason that anarchist oppose the idea that the State could be used to set up broader and progressive limits of liberty and equality, as utopian socialists once imagined. Sure enough, limits can hide oppression, but the important idea is that the State cannot be used for its own dissolution because of the power that runs through it. It is here that (political) power itself is seen as an enemy. As a final response, in the case of Franks’ criticism, one would point out to the fact that Newman’s work is not a mere evaluation or an extraction of some principles, but a renewal of them in a radical direction, that has to do with lessons drawn from (pre-)post structuralist thinkers. As it was in the case of the Marxism, with Althusser’s intervention regarding determination in the last instance by the economy, which allowed more space for the intervention of the superstructure in the workings of the productive forces, there is a clear categorical distinction between a political ideology holding true some principles and one that changes them. Even more, in the case of postanarchism, as in the case of post-Marxism, there is, first of all, a critical introduction of different philosophical perspectives, drawn from post structuralism, and, second of all, a renouncement of old principles that have constituted the basis for previous versions in that ideological family. Both of these are combined with a radicalization of old ideals that create a transcending ideology that breaks away from the old barriers. In renouncing the limits of anarchist ethics, and the scientism and positivism of the ‘classics’, a new functional category, beyond ‘classical’ anarchism, is created. Anti-essentialism and non-essentialism. An assessment My own criticism regarding Newman’s postanarchism has to do with the non-essentialist identity in a different way. Newman describes, as we have seen, postanarchism as remaining dedicated to the grand egalibertarian ideal: the equal-liberty principle proposed by the 58 ‘classical’ anarchists rings true even today. But to put it in connection with a non-essentialist identity brings to light a hidden problem. In order to get to this issue, it is relevant to discuss non-essentialism and anti-essentialism. Non-essentialism implies an identity that is free of any essence, in the sense that it has already happened. In other words, it is a logical opposition between the previous identity and the sought out one. Anti-essentialism, on the other hand, implies a process of liberation that has not been completed. There is a constant struggle to free one’s self, the Ego of Stirner, from essence, that cannot arrive at the desired point of non-essentialism. The process of stripping away essence has to be a continuous one, in the sense that the subject must be conscious of the possibility of emergence of other essences. While it is clear that Newman discusses anti-essentialism, throughout his review of the precursors and followers of poststructuralism, he only posits this goal of non-essentialism as a new target for radical politics. Anti-essentialism is mainly implicitly argued, but insufficiently developed, as Newman’s work does not offer a strategy, for an individual or for a group, to strip itself of essence. As Stirner himself argues, individuals have become attached and even tied to their essentialist labels, which in turn implies that the process of ‘becoming-’, as Deleuze and Guattari would put it, is a painful one. In this respect, Newman even fails to provide an ontology of resistance, which would have helped develop his own conception of the anti-essentialist project. Before I discuss the nature of resistance, going further than Newman, it is needed to see what is resistance’s relation to power, in a more general sense. Categories and essences Insurrection against oppression logically implies the existence of the oppressor and of the oppressed. From its definition, it implies a binary logic, of the same type that Newman criticizes in his book. Indeed, it has been argued by some authors (Cohn 2002; Clark 1976) that this constitutes only the creation of a new essence. For example, Cohn argues, citing Clark, that the non-essentialist identity, by rejecting all categories, manages only to affirm itself as another essence. Strictly speaking, there is a mistake in this argument, concerning the rejection of predicates. Non-essentialism as a fixed identity would become possible from two perspectives: 1) if there existed an essentialist identity, as a predicate, whose logical negation would create a non-essentialist identity. The essentialist identity includes, from this point of view, all categories that are applied to the subject (woman, worker, cis, black, etc.), but a negation would imply the opposite of those (non-woman, non-worker, non-cis, non-black), excluding at least one predicate from the possible combinations that could be thought to 59 apply to a subject or affirming the opposite predicate. Newman does neither. He argues, following Stirner, that identity is contingent and should be left out to the individual to create (Newman 2001: 70). This is what he means by ‘freedom to reinvent oneself’ (Newman 2001: 71). The other possibility is, in my view, if 2) irrespective of what it contains, non- essentialism implies a set of fixed characteristics. This is perhaps more valid, in the sense that this process (an anti-essentialist one, as I have distinguished earlier) probably creates, at certain points in time, some forms of identity that could be described using the present power-subjected language. But taken as a process, this criticism is irrelevant, because of the flux of possibilities that anti-essentialism implies. That is, in the quest for non-essentialism, the subject would merely pass through fixed identities, always keeping in mind the goal of ridding oneself from them. For this reasons, strictly speaking, the anti-essentialist process and the non-essentialist goal do not go in the direction of reaffirming essence or becoming one themselves. If, as I have argued, the theory is coherent, what role does it play in the general democratic struggle? This is the question I set out to answer in this thesis, and the one I will be developing through the final part of this chapter. General and local power. Strategies of local resistance Regarding, I contend here that Foucault’s definition still stands, integrating, of course, the conception that power is never absolute: if power is everywhere - so we cannot have pure points of resistance, as in ‘classical’ anarchism -, resistance is everywhere as well. That does not appear as problematic to me, as it did for critics of Foucault that pointed out the purely reactive character of resistance. First of all, what is meant by resistance, throughout the entirety of this thesis, is specifically tied to current forms of domination and authoritarianism, and to the ones that humanity has already passed through. Wherever there appears to be rising a new form of oppression, different ethics and ideologies, especially on the side of anarchist ethics, can be applied critically to the situation, creating and disseminating the present reaction to injustice, thus unmasking power. What Newman has developed is a strategy for the construction of an ethics of resistance that can be as undefined as possible, without losing its meaning, that can be applied in virtually any situation, in order to critically assess the nature of power in that instance. As far as the unmasking of power goes, Newman’s project can be said to be theoretically valid. Second of all, as I have already argued when discussing Fraser’s critique, resistance is also constructive, even though it might have started out as reactive. Once power is unmasked and resistance is spreading, the limits of power can be 60 broken. Through self-analysis and self-questioning, a movement of resistance can redesign its methods, in order not to transgress the limits of the local power just to be caught up in another authoritarian practice. Here, I agree with the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe, and the one of Newman, when they say that this relation of resistance is always agonistic, as it does not culminate in a final overcoming of power, only in restricting and pushing back its limits. This is true in a general sense. However, let us presume this would mean on a national level. Resistance to authoritarian practices in the face of the entirety of the institutions of the state s a very tedious and difficult process and the ‘war’ between the two sides is rarely fast, in a paradigm of insurrection rather than revolution. For this reason, the limits of power reform and readapt to the contentions of the resistance, and the space in which the attack on power manages to transgress its limits is thus more limited, as far as time goes. For a general example, let us look at the problem of police brutality in the United States, during the two Barack Obama presidencies that continue under Donald Trump. A movement, such as Black Lives Matter (BLM) is confronted with a seemingly impenetrable protection of the department for guilty policemen, and more often than not, the murder is done with impunity, thanks to the justice system and its present biases and relations of domination. In this fight, BLM is confronted with various problems: should it use violence, should it support the right of individual to bear arms, should it try to represent the broader fight against racism in America, how should it deal with non-black supporters, and so on. Any response to this has the potential to enter in authoritarian relations of some degree. To be clear, this does not mean that BLM or other identity movements do not, in fact, make great strives in the direction of social progress. What it means is that they are certainly not immune to the traps of power. My point is that, in the case of local struggles, the terms of the fight are different. The decentralization of local administrations, as well as their more limited scope, does not necessarily mean that they are less prone to engage in authoritarian behavior. But it does mean that forms of resistance can better organize at the local level in order to dismantle an oppressive relation. Let us presume the same problem of police brutality. At first, it seems that the purpose of the movement itself is more limited, but the rhizomatic connections that can be created with other struggles are much easier to implement than in the case of creating a national justice movement. Local resistance can use exactly the sense of community that the neoconservative logic uses to justify oppression in order to transgress the limits of power in a much more meaningful way. Ousting a group of policemen by putting pressure on the local (e.g. town) council is much more effective because of the ease with which this movement can hegemonize the issue. Fundamentally, the power practice on a local basis has a more concise 61 and coagulated basis than the one on the national level, given the institutional context, and the social and political premises on which these antagonisms function. From this point of view, its limits are easier to expose and to transgress, whereas the capacity of local power to redefine itself in order to temporarily block the resistance is more limited. The new anarchism As I contended at the end of the Case Studies section, Newman’s postanarchism is both a conceptual and a prescriptive endeavor: on the one hand, I argue that he was trying to define some of the practical aspects of early 2000s political anarchism, in the sense of trying to explain the theoretical principles that were at play, making at least this part of the project to be concentrated on praxis, rather than theory, and, on the other hand, to expand the notions that he identifies by criticizing ‘classical’ anarchism and analyzing the ‘new’ political anarchism, giving his work a specific normative aspect. This becomes even more visible in his later writings. In ‘Postanarchism’ (Newman 2015), the author discusses insurrectionist politics as a complete rejection of authority, characterized by a refusal to communicate demands to the oppressor (Newman 2015: 32). He defines some strategies for action, such as indifference to power - starting from the already discussed Foucauldian concept of power, which sees it not as intrinsically bad, but as a force that is ever-present in the field of the social -, and collective indiscipline and disobedience, that disrupt the oppressive practices of the state by direct action (Kinna 2017: 1-3). In this, way, as he repeats several times, Newman wants to engage the ‘new’ anarchist in more of the practices that have characterized recent movements, that prioritize finding new ways to live ‘anarchistically’ in the here and now, rather than waiting for a revolution that will never come (Newman 2001a: 170-172). Hegemonic politics What has interested me throughout this paper, as it was seen from the review section, was Newman’s concept of power and his efforts in conceptualizing resistance when it seemed that the renouncement of the old principles would bring nothing but chaos. His politics of insurrection encouraged the design of new practices that would constantly challenge oppressive hierarchies, and the radicalization of the old ones. In my view, the concepts that he brings forward are of immense interest to the project of radical and plural democracy. Let us begin by saying that the ethics of postanarchism permits the symbolic representation of a general struggle of the people by a particular movement, that constructs other identities 62 around it, but is skeptical towards the political assumption of a ‘leading’ position in actual struggle (Newman 2011b: 55). Newman points here to a very neat distinction that will constitute the basis for my final argument: although, as we have seen, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the logic of equivalence cannot fully constitute itself as all-representing, in a plural and democratic matrix, Newman seems to hint at the possibilities of hierarchies as authoritarian, in an argument fairly similar to the old anarchist criticism of political representation. But there are notable differences here at play. First of all, in a general populist setting, when the holder of the empty signifiers could be a reactionary movement, for example, the critique of representation would be rather straightforward: developing hierarchies will be authoritarian, given the final goal of that movement. Indeed, the Bakunian criticism of the Marxian notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, in general, the anarchist attack on the vanguard party, rested on the fact that this social evolution (and then Revolution) was merely a reversal of denomination, that in no way could lead to the ideal of libertarian communism. From a postanarchist perspective, one could add that the any essentialism, resting on class or not, would lead to the same conclusion. Here lies an important premise that could be exploited: Newman maintains that hierarchy leads to oppression, but, in his case, it is only through reaffirmation of ontological hierarchies that lead to essentialism that political hierarchies actually constitute themselves as antagonistic. This leads us to face a possible opening: could the postanarchism of Newman support a progressive populist movement that is founded, as Laclau and Mouffe would put it, on the ideal of radical and plural democracy? As we know, the project itself implies a field crisscrossed with antagonisms in which we would see a reaffirmation of movements, taking into account the fractured nature of their identity and their broader political goal of equality and liberty. In the case of a progressive populist project, there could be no affirmation of a movement as the sole purveyor of truth, nor a hierarchy from which equality and liberty would be seen. In fact, even the egalibertarian ideal of the authors seems to be the same> the singularity of Newman, conceived even through the Stirnerite lens of creative nihilism allows for equivalency with Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of liberty to be different and equality of difference. It follows that a form of hierarchy between movements, founded on an a priori basis would be considered unsatisfactory by all of them. Nevertheless, fixation of one identity over the other is a theoretical possibility, although an undesirable one. It could be only through an effective process of hegemonization that this would not come to happen The question, as such, is a very practical one: if the only aspect that creates an incompatibility between the ethics of postanarchism and progressive populist representation is the possibility 63 of political hierarchization, is there a way in which this could be prevented? I would argue that this effect can be at the very least mediated, whatever form the populist movement would take. Postanarchism represents, more than anything, a conception about the possibility of oppression that tries to make one wary of the possibility of domination especially where one thought. That there could be no such thing. From this perspective, it is one of the best tools at hand to assess, in practical as well as theoretical manner, the feasibility of a movement, from the perspective of equal-liberty. The barriers of this ethic are lax and ever changing, and its conditions are minimal, so it seems that not meeting them is a problem for any movement that claims to follow this ideal. Through this measure, certain impractical or undesirable movements are initially filtered out. What remains is an amalgam of groups that struggle to find the best possible relation between themselves, through the maximum application of equal-liberty, in a specific instance. The nodal point that arranges the specific configuration of equal-liberty is the populist movement. Through its creation of a unitary goal, the specific chains of equivalence and difference create a particular arrangement of equality and liberty, in the interplay between hegemony and autonomy. Likewise, this interplay is agonistic, in the case of the progressive movement, for it needs to keep the balance between the individuality of every movement and the unity of the greater group. Newman introduces here the problem of the leader. He cites the examples of Peron in Argentina and Chavez in Venezuela, to which Laclau looks up in admiration (Newman 2011b: 55). The purpose of this leader is to function as an imperfect signifier for the movement and its temporary figurehead. I argue that, strictly speaking, Newman’s postanarchism should not be excluding symbolic leadership. In the case of populism, the leader functions in the same way as any other signifier (flag, coat of arms, etc.), with the purpose of expressing the intrinsic fracture of every identity that forms part of the group. However, personal representation without specific checks in place make it very implausible for the leader to not assume a directing role. While Laclau would argue that this is the very nature of hegemony, I think Newman would see this as a delegation of autonomy to the leader that is unacceptable. But is it possible to create some frameworks through which these political practices could come into being so as to satisfy the postanarchist ideal? A party of postanarchists? A possible way of thinking about anti-essentialist parties The creation of a mass movement would require, in Newman’s vision, processes of hegemonization that can bring together different groups under the great umbrella of insurrection. For him, as opposed to the post-Marxist authors, state has long lost its appeal as 64 a political arena and cannot be politically salvaged in order to be an actually progressive agent of change. However, his argument would appear to point in another direction as well: even in anti-essentialist practices, the presence of the State still haunts identity. Unless Newman argues reclusion from within the grasp of the state - which, if he does, is only half- heartedly, through the vague notions of ‘anarchist living’ or ‘creating autonomy’ -, one is still subjected to the power, and therefore the influence, of the state, in this case. Even in a practice of non-essentialism and resistance to involuntary servitude, we know that complete non-essentialism is not possible, as it would mean the absolute affirmation of every difference for itself within the confines of the same subject identity. In any case, what follows is that, on some level, as long as the state exists in interaction with the subject, the identity of the latter will be influenced by the former by means of power. This means, for me, at least, that the state cannot be completely done away with, on a political level, even if one would wish that. But, firstly, if there exists such a situation in which we have subjects that follow postanarchist ethics and use its framework for the evaluation of power, and, secondly, the state exercises political power over the individual (i.e. it is not to be ignored from a perspective of influence over the identity of the subject), the ideal of equal-liberty, as an ethical principle, permits the rise of a duty to help the others that are oppressed. It is the logic of unmasking power that drives insurrection and, consequently, an ethics of resistance that implies social bonding. Newman stresses very much the idea that his argument does not oppose the notion of community, or replace the movement with Stirner’s notion of the union of egoists, but in order to keep a notion of the social aspect of anarchism, one needs to see that his notion of anti-essentialism should imply that an individual who, for any number of reasons, would not follow this ethics is a ‘reactionary’. This would be to fall back into the false dichotomy that Newman so viciously denounces. Rather, if one is a ‘victim’, so to speak, of power, and not a purveyor of domination, the anarchist ideal of equal-liberty should extend to him, which in turn implies a relation between actors. I think that this ‘freeing’ from power, in the postanarchist framework, is not a messianic awakening of the working class or anything of the sort. Insurrectionist resistance, as I understand it, implies the active renouncement of authoritarian practices, and this would mean renouncing the figure of the savior. The concept of singularity manages to solve exactly this problem. The respect for one’s uniqueness, immanent of the concept of equal-liberty, cannot mean allowing inequality. This would seem to point into a direction of ‘duty to rebel’, but is important here to remember that an anti- essentialist conception of resistance is not compatible with an obligation to struggle. This 65 would itself mean the perpetuation of certain antagonisms. Think only how could one argue, form this post that victims of economic oppression have a duty to financially help others. It is precisely this exaggerated vision of moral absolutism that Newman wants to avoid. Rather, postanarchism employs what I would call a ‘possibility of mutual help’, in the sense that it allows for this type of personal collaboration, and promotes it through its ethics, but does not impose it. So, if postanarchism promotes mutual help, can it completely rule out the state as a political platform? Newman specifies that postanarchism implies an anti-political practice: a refusal of engagement with the oppressor, and a resistance to communicate demands. This is the dimension that I want to refer to. Politically, postanarchism opposes party formations and state politics for their hierarchical structure, but there are different directions in which this verticality manifests: in the case of the party, besides its infrastructure, the problem is one of representation and, therefore, of delegation of autonomy, which is contradictory to the postanarchist practice; in the case of the state, again, besides its infrastructure, it is, fundamentally, because it is not possible to create complete liberty through the imposition of strict limits, as the state necessarily does. Even if the state could be conquered, this old anarchist maxim would deny the fact that it could be used for progressive social change. But in the case of the party, I think the problem is one of a model. When Newman refers to party forms - for example, in his critique of Laclaudian populism that I mentioned in the previous paragraphs - he has in mind a traditional formation that has definite leadership, incomplete representation of its members and even less of the people, in general, and participates in political processes that are intrinsically complicit with oppressive power. The logic of hegemony present in the project of Laclau and Mouffe lays the theoretical groundwork for the creation of a mass movement. While postanarchism does not specifically talk of such a movement, it allows for symbolic representation that is intrinsic to the logic of hegemony, and recognizes the need for such a dimension in politics. There could be no other conception on the part of an ideological form that sees identity as contingent and fractured. The problem with active representation, as the practice of assuming for oneself what the people want, is problematic, as it implies a negation of political autonomy. However, the mere affirmation of representation, which forms the basis for hegemonic practices, is not, for the sole reason that it does not necessarily entail a uniformity of interest. The logic of hegemony, in a progressive mass movement, permits the temporary emergence of a particular struggle as a forerunner, while keeping a balance of interest that are plural and democratic. It is not a delegation, but a mandate, similar to the ‘classical’ anarchist conception of political decisions in between 66 federated communities: a common antagonism is put forward by the people, not decided in advance or through a given blank check. I would argue that a progressive movement which puts forward this demand is postanarchist - or radically democratic and plural - only to the extent to which it does not create a hierarchy of antagonisms, but extracts a common one. Furthermore, it is in the form of a mandate for people have the possibility and the duty to disavow a movement that does not fall into the limits of equal-liberty in that particular instance. Any claim of symbolic representation beyond a hypothetical renouncement would be liable of authoritarian tendencies. I would propose here a counter model, based on Ranciere’s argument that one of the faults of contemporary democracy is forgetting the practice of lottery as a means of preventing permanetization of positions (2009). First, if the need arises, we can accept the fact that there are political parties which follow the logic of hegemony that arise from movements, in order to gain better platform and produce or fight for structural changes, as were the cases of Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece. To create a ‘postanarchist party’, it would have to follow strict relational rules with the movement, in relation to symbolic representation. It is a party of the movement only in the context in which all members of the party are members of the movement as well. This would set the ground for a similarity of interests, at least in theory. However, the opposing principle, that all members of the movement should be members of the party, is not a requirement: while the party needs to have complete identification with the movement, as it exists as a symbol only to the extent to which it does not imply an outside element that could break this relation of identification. On the part of the movement, I think its contingency and radical openness are incompatible with a requirement of formalization, as it should be accessible and ever changing, without authoritarian formalities. To respect the non-hierarchical principle, the party is leaderless, not represented by a figure or by an elite, but, if the need arises, only by a mandated group or person, whose limits of negotiation are clearly and democratically established. Ranciere’s point comes into play regarding elections: as long as we are talking by a broad political change, such as anti- austerity, we accept that every member of the populist movement has an interest in that specific issue. Thus, it would be permissible to randomly select a number of individuals to be up for elections. The purpose of this is precisely explained by a postanarchist hegemonic logic. The people rallying against the elites should be able to identify with a broad cause, not with an ephemeral leader. The purpose of the movement and, indeed, of the party, is to be as void of content as possible, in a particular hegemonic struggle - with the explicit mention here that it is through articulatory practices that different individuals, who may see 67 themselves as pertaining only to specific subject positions, are attracted to the progressive goal, so a degree of autonomy between different interest is maintained A ‘headless symbolic leader’ is thus created through democratic lottery, with a mandate that makes him a delegate, not a representative of the movement as a whole. The mandate is symbolic of popular support and should be taken as a serious prerequisite for delegation. The radical contingency of the movement, its struggle against power, in general, make it an uncertain body, whose visions can change rapidly. This is precisely while it can act as counterweight to the authoritarian appeal of parliamentary politics. As this institutional framework presents rules that are designed to hinder insurrectionist dissent, the main role of the postanarchist party should be that of contestation. This is done in two ways: 1) a contestation of rules that create the authoritarian basis for parliamentary politics (be they procedural or customary) and 2) a contestation of the holders of power. A party that functions on the principles of postanarchism could never form a government or be the parliamentary majority, as it would run counter to the very notion of its existence. I would call its role one of the perpetual opposition, as its purpose is to disrupt, in the spirit of insurrection, the course of authoritarian politics. As the movement creates public unrest that threatens the rule of the political elites, so does the party create the same result in parliament. As sure as it would vote progressive public policy, if mandated, the party should always act as the agonistic catalyst inside the parliamentary body. Its radical role of disruption is also one that brings depoliticized issues into play in another important environment of contemporary politics. Finally, this is an insurrectionist project that subverts power: the contestation of the rules of the elite, inside their own political space, is an unmasking of the limits of power that postanarchists should strive for. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITS I started this thesis with the purpose of checking the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe against the postanarchism of Newman. Throughout the different chapters, I tried to show that they are more similar than it would have seemed at first. Most importantly, both visions are interested in achieving a new understanding of the possibility of coexistence between equality and liberty in an age of power, giving them interest in the prospect of radical democracy. Through an investigation of power and resistance, and a questioning of the fundamental principles that (seemed to) have run through the history of anarchism, Newman passes through some of the most well-known thinkers associated with post-structuralism, in order to find a possible solution to the problem of the point of resistance, and finally arrives at Lacan. 68 The process is fairly similar to the enquiry of Laclau and Mouffe from almost 20 years before, when they created a new understanding of antagonisms through the deconstruction of Marxist theory. The two projects run parallel to each other, for some parts, while intersecting in important aspects that provide a common ground for their final project of egalibertarianism. What I tried to show in this thesis is that they can influence each other in ways that are only beneficial for the future of radical politics. In the form of the party or in the form of a popular movement, radical politics is in need of a development that would be able to effectively counter neoliberal and neoconservative hegemonic forces. In this quest, I have started from brief and arguably incomplete definitions of anarchist currents. Anarchism itself is arguably a coherent ideology, but more of a family of different theoretical and practical approaches that follow the idea of complete liberty. This thesis cannot aim to present fully the extent of anarchist thought and practice, and some of the observations that I make might be affected by this fact. Furthermore, the topic of populism itself could be the topic of numerous doctoral thesis, and I treat it superficially, but only to the extent that I wanted to create a ‘collision’ between the works of Newman, on the one hand, and of Laclau and Mouffe, on the other, on a topic of seemingly agreed upon ground. Through this, I have focused my attention on (mainly) only one of their numerous works, losing a possible chance of engagement with other primary literature that dealt with this problem. Through this I mean that I believed the ideas that could emerge from a confrontation of these theoretical arguments were valuable in themselves, rather than possibly finding ways to go beyond the limits of those pages. Furthermore, one of the key problematics that could have been discussed in this framework I proposed was Newman’s rather abrupt renouncement of revolution. Although I have not argued that he is right in maintaining that insurrection should replace revolution, the former concept appeared as a break with traditional thinking and was of much more interest to me. 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