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   u   fter Saladin assumed military command over Egypt as vizier in 1169, he took the opportunity to take full control of the region when the Fatimid caliph al- dīd died in 1171. Following the replacement of the Fatimid regime by the Sunni regime of his own family, the yyūbids, Saladin looked to expand his territory towards the Kingdom of Jerusalem.1 He immediately started planning a campaign against the Franks but at the same time did not support Nūr al-Dīn against the Franks which caused tension between them.2 fter the death of Nūr al-Dīn in 1174, Saladin gradually took control of Syria while still proclaiming the O
 against the Christians occupying Jerusalem. 3 His restructuring of the army is one explanation for his military successes.4 However, this paper will focus on Saladin¶s larger Title: Bahā¶ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād describing the enthusiasm of Saladin when reviewing his troops before the battle of Hattīn. Ibn Shaddād, 
       , trans. by D. S. Richards ( ldershot: shgate, 2002), p. 72. 1 On these events, see: . R. zzam,  (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2009), pp. 73-97 and M. Cameron Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson,  
  
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 31-57. 2 Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 47-57. 3 side from the discussion whether Saladin¶s proclaiming of the O
was mainly for the purpose of unifying the Muslims under his rule or if he was genuinly convinced to undertake the Holy War and liberate Jerusalem. See also Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 59-95 and 155-56; zzam,  , pp. 98-109 and Ibn Shaddād, 
       , p. 49. 4 See Hamilton . R. Gibb, µThe rmies of Saladin¶, in   
     , ed. by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 74-90 and Y. Lev, µInfantry in Muslim rmies during the Crusades¶, in      
! 
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      $   % &      % '( #)   * + )  ,((,, ed. by John H. Pryor ( ldershot: shgate, 2006), pp. 185-207. military strategy against the Kingdom of Jerusalem from the moment he had full control over Egypt until the fall of Jerusalem after the Battle of Hattīn in 1187. We will make use of mainly the primary source material to outline the military events on which we will base our analysis.5 [    

 s early as 1170 Saladin launched an attack on the region of Darum6 and Gaza as a pre- emptive campaign against Frankish attacks into Egypt.7 It would appear that Saladin wanted to force the Kingdom into a defensive strategy so that he would not have to deal with large Frankish armies while establishing his rule in Egypt.8 The first attack on the Kingdom itself only came in 1177 because Saladin was occupied in Syria after the death of Nūr al-Dīn. He invaded southern Palestine from Egypt and King Baldwin IV, outnumbered, was forced to take refuge in scalon. Saladin did not expect the Frankish forces to be of any significant threat and his plundering army was scattered.9 Baldwin took advantage of this situation, and achieved victory in the Battle of Mont Gisard.10 This campaign was Saladin¶s only large attack into the coastal plain. However, it is doubtful whether his immediate goal was the taking of Jerusalem since he could have pressed 5 Because we are focussing on Saladin¶s point of view, the rabic sources on his life are of greater importance to this research than the Latin sources. The main source of information is the chronicle on the life of Saladin by Ibn Shaddād. The source is remarkably objective but it should be noted, however, that for the years between 1169 and 1188 Ibn Shaddād only reported second hand and is sometimes inaccurate in terms of chronology. See: H. . R. Gibb, µThe rabic Sources for the Life of Saladin¶, # , 25 (1950), pp. 58-72 and F. Gabrieli, µThe rabic historiography of the crusades¶, in    
$ , ed. by Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 98-107. 6 Or Deir al-Balah. 7 In the next year he recaptured ila on the Northern tip of the Gulf of kaba. See R. C. Smail,      -(./0--.' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 213-14. 8 Ibn Shaddād mentions that µhe began to make preparations for an expedition to attack the enemy¶s lands, to lay plans for this and to settle all arrangements¶. See Ibn Shaddād, 
      , p. 47. 9 William of Tyre mentions that the Muslims army consisted of at least 26,000 mounted warriors who were scattered up to the gates of Jerusalem. See !  11 ) 
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#  , trans. by E. . Babcock and . C. Krey, 2 vols (New York: Octagon Books, 1976), pp. 426 -32. 10 Presumably Tell Jezar (Gezer), about 6 miles southeast of Ramla. On the battle, see Smail,      , p. 185; Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 121-25; zzam,  , pp. 140-47 and Ibn Shaddād, 
       , pp. 54-55. the attack towards Jerusalem. This first campaign looked more like a scouting and raiding party than an actual attempt to seize the Kingdom. The outcome of the battle might have taught Saladin important lessons. The first conclusion he apparently made was that the coastal plane was not an ideal region for a campaign. The presence of important Frankish strongholds such as scalon, Ramla and Jaffa gave the Franks too many places to attack from or seek refuge in. Saladin presumably realised that the defensive strength of the Franks was not to be underestimated. 11 The wealth of the area, however, was a reason to launch subsequent raids on the region. The scattering of his army that caused the defeat at Mont Gisard apparently made Saladin realise that the best way to defeat the Franks is to launch more organised campaigns and to force the Franks into open battle with the numerically superior Muslim armies. lso, the Franks knew that the survival of the Kingdom depended on the strength of the field army and that, unlike Saladin, they did not have the necessary resources to levy another army after a defeat. That is why the Frankish military policy was dependent on the defence of the strongholds with the help of the field army and why they did not engage with the Muslims in open battle unless they were certain of victory.12        Saladin launched attacks on the strongholds of Kerak and Montreal13 in Transjordan as early as 1171 and 1173.14 ll the attempts to take these strongholds remained futile until 1189. These strongholds were a thorn in the side of Saladin because of their location on the main 11 The question remains why Saladin launched his later assaults from the mountain routes where an outnumbered army or stronghold can significantly hinder the passing Muslim armies. It is possible that the defeat at Mont Gisard made such an impression on Saladin that he refused to take the same route. It is more plausible that because of the war in Syria, the bulk of his forces were already in that region in later years and Damascus, taken by Saladin in November 1174, appeared to be a better base to start his assaults on the Kingdom, since there were more possibilities to manoeuvre. 12 See also Smail,     , p. 39. 13 Or Shawbak. On Kerak, see Smail,      , pp. 218-22. On Montreal see Smail,      , pp. 148-50. 14 However, the reason for Saladin¶s withdrawal in the first assault might be explained by the fact that Nūr al- Dīn was also attacking the Kingdom from Syria. If the Kingdom would fall at that time, N ūr al-Dīn would also claim Egypt. Saladin seems to rather have had the Kingdom as a buffer between him and his overlord so he would be able to establish his rule in Egypt. See Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 46-47. The attack of 1173 was not really aimed against the desert fortresses. Saladin rather wanted to drive out the Bedouins who were also attacking his caravans and offering their services as guide to the Franks. Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 60-62. route between Egypt, rabia 15 and Syria used by the armies, Muslim pilgrims and merchants:16 c     2 )   

  
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        317 In 1182 a combined force from Syria and Egypt met at Kerak, whereupon the Franks assembled their field army and marched to relieve the garrison. fter some unsuccessful assaults against the combined Frankish forces, Saladin had to lift the siege.18 The following year Reynald of Châtillon managed to get a small fleet in the Red Sea and launched a naval attack against Mekka.19 lthough an Egyptian naval task force quickly destroyed Reynald¶s ships, this bold action into the heart of the Muslim world surprised Saladin and made him even more determined to destroy Kerak. Once again in 1184 troops from Damascus, Egypt and rabia assembled at Kerak. gain the Latin army marched out from Jerusalem, but Saladin seems to have anticipated this and sent his forces north to intercept the Franks. The Franks apparently avoided Saladin¶s army and proceeded to Kerak. Saladin ordered his troops to plunder Nablus, which was µdevoid of troops¶, and after raiding the region Saladin¶s forces returned to Damascus.20 It is remarkable that his army was free to plunder the region north of Jerusalem, but he did not have the intention to attack the Holy City. If he had, it might have had the same outcome as the battle of Hattīn. Saladin had gathered a formidable force and since the field army was on its way to Kerak, he could have forced them into a disastrous open battle if he had turned towards Jerusalem. 15 Referred to as al-Jazīra in the sources. 16 Even with the presence of these Frankish strongholds, it seems that the Muslim armies were able to move freely in Transjordan. See Ibn Shaddād, 
      , pp. 64-65. 17 Ibn Shaddād, 
      , p. 48. 18 Ibn Shaddād, 
      , p. 62 and Smail,     , pp. 148-50. 19 . S. Ehrenkreutz, µThe place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle ges¶, O 
!  +   , 75 (1955), pp. 100-16 and 109-10. 20 Ibn Shaddād, 
         , pp. 64-66; Smail,      , p. 36 and P. M. Holt, 
   
  
) -(.50-,.- (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), p. 74.  The attacks on Transjordan can hardly be seen as attacks on the Kingdom since they were either specifically aimed to capture the strongholds or merely raiding expeditions of Muslim armies on their way to or from Damascus, as in March 1187 when Saladin gathered his troops for the decisive campaign of Hattīn.21   R 
 

 Even though the attack from Banias on the region of Sidon in the spring of 1179 turned out to be yet another raid with the intention of weakening the Kingdom, the Battle of Marj µ yyun 22 in June seemed to have presented Saladin with the opportunity to press the attack southwards after the Frankish field army was decimated.23 However, Saladin¶s actions were limited to the 24 destruction of the stronghold that the Franks were building at Jacob¶s Ford, thus discouraging the Franks from any offensive actions and further raids on Damascus. t this time he could not afford the risk of taking the bulk of his army that far south, while internal rivalry among the emirs in Syria and the constant danger from leppo and Mosul threatened his rule. 25 The same happened in the campaign of 1182 when Saladin mounted an expedition into Transjordan after Reynald of Châtillon broke the truce by attacking a caravan.26 The region of Montreal was raided in May and the Frankish field army left Jerusalem, leaving the Kingdom undefended. Saladin clearly anticipated this move and commanded an army leaving from Damascus to raid Galilee once again. Saladin could not provoke an open battle with the Frankish army in Transjordan and took his forces back to Damascus. The Franks drew back 21 Ibn Shaddād, 
      , pp. 71-72. 22 small valley between the Litani River and the Jordan, north of the valley of the Waters of Merom. On the battle, see Smail,     , p. 186 and Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 139-41. 23 In his letters to Baghdad, Saladin expressed his optimism to launch an attack on Jerusalem in 1179. However he would not yet have been strong enough for this endeavour. See Lyons and Jackson,  , p. 155. 24 Or Jisr Benāt Yâkūb, a crossing of the Jordan south of the Waters of Merom. See also Holt, 
    , p. 73; Malcolm Barber, µFrontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Campaign of Jacob¶s Ford, 1178-79¶, in 
  
  , ed. by John France and William Zajac ( ldershot: shgate, 1998), pp. 9-22 and Ronnie Ellenblum, µFrontier ctivities: The Transformation of a Muslim Sacred Site into the Frankish Castle of Vadum Iacob¶,  , 2 (2003), pp. 83-98. 25 See also Lyons and Jackson,  , p. 156. 26 Ibn Shaddād mentions that envoys of Mosul had urged the Franks to undertake hostilities against the Muslims. Ibn Shaddād, 
      , p. 57. to Sephoria, and when Saladin left Damascus in July to raid the region south of Lake Tiberias, they went south to meet him and it came to a confrontation in the vicinity of Belvoir Castle.27 It never came to a pitched battle between the two forces.28 Saladin could not risk going further south for the same reasons as in 1179, and in this case it would have been a tactical mistake to go into the heart of the Kingdom with the Latin field army cutting him off. Saladin had no other option but to go back to Damascus once again. In September of the following year, after taking leppo, 29 Saladin crossed the Jordan and raided the region northwest of the Valley of Jezreel, attacked the monastery of Mount Tabor and destroyed the Frankish reinforcements on their way from Kerak and Montreal. Guy de Lusignan led the army from Sephoria to the springs of µ in Jālūd and µ in Tuba¶ūn in the Valley of Jezreel.30 Because of the exceptionally large Frankish army, Saladin probably did not want to engage in open battle if a victory was not certain. fter all, there was still the danger of an uprising in recently captured leppo and threat from Mosul. gain the fighting march of the Franks resulted only in some skirmishes and Saladin was unable to cut off the supplies of his enemy and had to go back to Damascus when his own supplies were running out.31 The invasions of 1182 and 1183 both ended in a stalemate because the Franks could not be drawn into a pitched battle and because of the danger Saladin was still facing in Syria. This would change in the campaign of 1187 which was perfectly timed after Saladin made a treaty with Mosul in 1186. 32 He had an exceptionally large army and could attack the 27 Or Kaukab al-Hawa on the Naphtali plateau south of Lake Tiberias on the west bank of the Jordan. On the battle, see Smail,     , pp. 151-52. 28 Because the Frankish army used the tactic of the fighting march in which they advance towards the enemy without breaking the ranks and with the spearmen and archers keeping the enemy on a distance while the cavalry drives them back with controlled charges. The Muslims used their usual tactics of firing arrows from horseback while retreating, so the two armies never engaged in hand to hand combat. On the fighting march, see Smail,     , pp. 156-65. 29 See S. Lane-Poole,     
 6  
 7   O  (New York: G. P. Putnam¶s Sons, 1903), pp. 172-73 and Lyons and Jackson,  , pp. 173-200. 30 Unlike in 1187, the Franks, who gathered µlargest Latin army within living memory¶, were well aware of the necessity of water for the army. fter this campaign Guy de Lusignan was blamed of not engaging the enemy, which contributed to his fatal tactical mistakes at Hattīn. See R. C. Smail, µThe Predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183-1187,¶ in +       
     
    7   O , ed. Benjamin Z. Kedar et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben -Zvi Institute, 1982), pp. 159-76. 31 On these skirmishes see also: Ibn Shaddād, 
      , pp. 61-62 and Smail,      , pp. 152-54. 32 See zzam,  , p. 162. Kingdom without the danger of an attack from Mosul. The dramatic events at Cresson and Hattīn and the disastrous outcome for the Franks are well known. One could say that without the decision of Guy de Lusignan to take the army from Sephoria to Tiberias, without any possibility of provisioning the army and surrounded by Saladin¶s troops, the Kingdom might have lasted a few years longer.33 However, Saladin¶s strategy of weakening the defences of the Kingdom with constant raiding, together with his determination to take Jerusalem now that he was in full control of Syria eventually would have culminated in the downfall of the Franks.   ! "
R##  Ehrenkreutz calls the period between 1179 and 1187 µthe great offensive¶ in the naval strategy of Saladin. He successfully engaged the Christian ships in the Mediterranean and hindered the shipping of supplies and troops from Europe. 34 Since 1171 Saladin was determined to rebuild the Egyptian navy to its former glory.35 lready in 1179 Saladin¶s fleet carried out landings on the Syrian coast to raid the coastal area, they captured two enemy cargo ships and attacked the harbour of cre for two days. 36 These renewed Egyptian activities in the Mediterranean were clearly part of Saladin¶s strategy to weaken the defences of the Kingdom. From 1179 onwards, the Franks were almost constantly harassed from all 33 For the details of the events at the Battle of Hattīn, see: Benjamin Z. Kedar, µThe Battle of Hattīn Revisited¶, in 
 8    
     
  

   
 %O   %,9:O-.5/, ed. by Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1992), pp. 190-207. See also Denys Pringle, µThe Spring of Cresson in Crusading History¶, in 1  ; #  6  , ed. Michel Balard, Benjamin Z. Kedar and Jonathan Riley-Smith ( ldershot: shgate, 2001), pp. 231-40. 34 . S. Ehrenkreutz, µThe Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle ges¶, O 
!  +   , 75 (1955), p. 100. 35 He raised the pay of the ship crews, concluded treaties with Pisa for the shipping of building material, expanded his influence along the North- frican coast and set up a special institution for his navy. See Ehrenkreutz, µThe Place of Saladin¶, pp. 105-08 and also D. Jacoby, µThe Supply of War Materials to Egypt in the Crusader Period¶, O   ! )  , 25 (2001), pp. 102-33. In 1179 the Egyptian fleet consisted of eighty vessels, fifty for the protection of the Egyptian harbours and thirty to raid the Mediterranean and the coast of Syria and Palestine. Saladin was determined to stop the Frankish and Byzantine naval attacks on the harbours of Egypt such as the large attack on the port of lexandria in September 1174. See Ibn Shaddād, 
      , p. 50. 36 Ehrenkreutz, µThe Place of Saladin¶, p. 106. sides. Saladin¶s raids put the financing and the supplying of the Frankish garrisons and the field army under serious pressure.37 The operations before 1187 are similar to the operations in Transjordan. Saladin wanted to counter the attacks on his naval communication lines between Syria and Egypt and to stop the Franks from attacking Egyptian harbours in the same way as he had closed off the Sinai in 1170 from further Frankish attacks on Egypt. Saladin also incorporated his navy in larger campaigns with both naval forces and land forces. fter his campaign in Galilee in 1182 he commanded his fleet to attack Beirut while he besieged the city with a land army from Damascus. Capturing Beirut would have split the coastal territories of the Franks and provided Saladin with a naval base in Syria.38 The Latin field army, however, launched a counter attack from Tyre by land and by sea and Saladin had to lift the siege in ugust 1182. His navy was apparently still unwilling to engage a Christian fleet in open battle.39  
 It appears that before the death of Nūr al-Dīn, Saladin concentrated on securing Egypt from Frankish attacks. During the first years after the death of his formal lord, he turned his attention towards Syria. From 1177 onwards he directed his attention to the Kingdom again. fter the failure at Mont Gisard, Saladin spent the next ten years preparing for his decisive campaign. His military operations against the Franks had the purpose of weakening the defence of the Kingdom or were aimed at specific targets that stood in the way of his unification of the Muslims. From the moment that Saladin secured his position in Syria, the military policy of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was limited to defensive campaigns and some 37 In 1183 the Egyptian fleet intercepted a transport ship with 375 knights aboard with their armour and merchants with treasure. In the same year they also captured a transport of lumber . See Ehrenkreutz, µThe Place of Saladin¶, p. 110. 38 See also: R. Gertwagen, µHarbours and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer¶, in      
! 
 , ed. by John H. Pryor ( ldershot: shgate, 2006), pp. 95-118. 39 Ehrenkreutz, µThe place of Saladin¶, pp. 108-09. It seems that joint operations were of great importance in Saladin¶s strategy. Saladin also captured ila in 1170 with a simultaneous attack by land and by sea. Ehrenkreutz, µThe place of Saladin¶, p. 104. However, Saladin¶s navy appeared to be less successful in the larger campaigns after 1187. Saladin, after a successful joint operation to capture cre, laid siege around Tyre and commanded a naval blockade. This fleet, however, failed miserably and caused the failure of the siege of Tyre. Ehrenkreutz, µThe place of Saladin¶, pp. 110-11. raiding expeditions.40 Saladin forced the Franks to concentrate their forces in the field army in order to counter his larger attacks, which left the countryside of the Kingdom defenceless against his raids. Saladin realised that the Frankish defensive policy was only possible if both the strongholds and the field army were provisioned with enough supplies and manpower. By raiding the countryside he deprived the strongholds of their supplies and at the same time gave the feudal lords and cities less income. s a consequence, the Kingdom could not afford to maintain as many soldiers and had to call upon the defenders of the strongholds more frequently to partake in the campaigns of the field army. This way the strongholds grew more vulnerable and the Kingdom had to depend more and more on the success of the field army. lso by rebuilding the Egyptian fleet and raiding Frankish harbours and supply fleets, Saladin made sure that the influx of supplies and fresh warriors into the Kingdom was brought back to a minimum. This gradual weakening of the Latin forces helped Saladin in his ultimate goal: defeating the field army in an open battle and taking the defenceless Kingdom. 40 Like the one into Damascus in 1175. See William of Tyre, p. 411. ü$
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# , trans. by E. . Babcock and . C. Krey, 2 vols (New York: Octagon Books, 1976)  Edbury, Peter W. ed., 
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        ( ldershot: shgate, 1998) Ibn Shaddād, 
       , trans. by D. S. Richards ( ldershot: shgate, 2002) Loud, G. ., trans., µThe Conquest of the Holy Land by Saladin¶ (Leeds: University of Leeds, 2010) 
1 
 
 %      

  ) 0=  , trans. by Hamilton . R. Gibb (London: Luzac, 1932) R  R   zzam, . R.,  (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2009) Barber, Malcolm, µFrontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Campaign of Jacob¶s Ford, 1178-79¶, in 
  
  , ed. by John France and William Zajac ( ldershot: shgate, 1998), pp. 9-22 Beeler, J.,    6 #/'(0-,(( (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) Cameron Lyons, M. and D. E. P. Jackson,  
  
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) Edbury, P., µWarfare in the Latin East¶, in $   !  , ed. by Maurice Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 190-215 Ehrenkreutz, ndrew S., µThe place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle ges¶, O 
!  +   , 75 (1955), 100-16 ±  ( lbany: State University of New York Press, 1972) Ellenblum, Ronnie, µFrankish and Muslim Siege Warfare and the Construction of Concentric Castles¶, in 1 ;# 6  , ed. by Michel Balard, Benjamin Z. Kedar and Jonathan Riley-Smith ( ldershot: shgate, 2001) ± µFrontier ctivities: The Transformation of a Muslim Sacred Site into the Frankish Castle of Vadum Iacob¶,  , 2 (2003), 83-98 France, J., µCrusading Warfare and its daptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century¶, $       2, 15 (2000), 49-66 ±     
! 
  (London: Routledge, 2003) Gabrieli, F., µThe rabic historiography of the crusades¶, in    
$ , ed. by Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 98-107 ± µ! )   
  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) Gertwagen, R., µHarbours and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer¶, in      
! 
 , ed. by John H. Pryor ( ldershot: shgate, 2006), pp. 95-118 Gibb, Hamilton . R., µThe rabic Sources for the Life of Saladin¶, # , 25 (1950), 58- 72 ± µThe rmies of Saladin¶, in   
     , ed. by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 74-90 ± 
  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973) Hamilton, Bernard, 
# 7  
 >2 ? 
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   #   (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) Holt, P. M., 
   
  
) -(.50-,.- (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004) Hooper, N. and M. Bennett, 
)   !   
$ !  /:50-*5/ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)  Jacoby, D., µThe Supply of War Materials to Egypt in the Crusader P eriod¶, O    ! )  , 25 (2001), 102-33 Kedar, Benjamin Z., µThe Battle of Hattīn Revisited¶, in 
   8       
         
     
   
     
   %O   %,9:O-.5/, ed. by Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1992), pp. 190-207 Lane-Poole, S.,   
6
7 O  (New York: G. P. Putnam¶s Sons, 1903) Lev, Yaacov, µRegime, rmy and Society in Medieval Egypt, 9th-12th Centuries¶, in      
 $    %/
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  , ed. by Yaacov Lev (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 115-52 ±    # (Leiden: Brill, 1999) ± µSaladin (1138-1193)¶, in 
 !   # , ed. by lan V. Murray (Santa Barbara: BC-CLIO, 2006), 1060-63 ± µInfantry in Muslim rmies during the Crusades¶, in      
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   $  % &    %'(#) *+ ) ,((,, ed. by John H. Pryor ( ldershot: shgate, 2006), pp. 185-207 Lyons, Malcolm C., and D. E. P. Jackson,  
  
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) Oman, C., !  
!   
$ ! 4?'/50-,/5!1(London: Greenhill Books, 1998) Pringle, Denys, µThe Spring of Cresson in Crusading History¶, in 1 ;# 6  , ed. by Michel Balard, Benjamin Z. Kedar and Jonathan Riley-Smith ( ldershot: shgate, 2001), pp. 231-40 Pryor, John H., ; #
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 $    :*.0-@/-(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Sanders, P. ., µThe Fatimid State, 969-1171¶, in 
)     #4?   #%:*(0-@-/, ed. by Carl F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 151-74 Smail, R.C.,     -(./0--.' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956) ± µThe Predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183-1187,¶ in +    
   
  7 O , ed. by Benjamin Z. Kedar et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982), pp. 159-76 Smith, G. . ed., !
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  (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915)