CPDE Global Synthesis Report 2015 The State of Development Cooperation, CSO Enabling Environment and CSO Development Effectiveness May 2015 2 3 CPDE Global Synthesis Report 2015 Acknowledgements The State of Development Cooperation, CSO Enabling Environment and CSO Development Effectiveness Published by The editorial team is grateful to all the 23 country-based CSOs and authors whose contributions made this global report possible. Our gratitude is extended to the entire team that made this project possible Editorial Team: Roselynn Musa The Global Secretariat Jennifer del Rosario-Malonzo 3/F IBON Center Christopher Chanco 114 Timog Avenue Manja Bayang Quezon City Philippines 1103 May 2015 This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (sida), the Department of Foreign Affairs - Ireland (IrishAid), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFA TD-Canada). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of CPDE and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of aforementioned donors. This book may be reproduced in whole or in part with proper acknowledgement to CPDE. 4 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................................ 3 AA Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) AAA Accra Agenda for Action ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.................................................................................................. 5 AAAQ Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality BACKGROUND................................................................................................................................... 11 ACP Aid Coordination Policy ACSSC Association of Civil Society Support Centres INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................ 13 ADB African Development Bank AECID Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.................................................................................................................. 14 AEG Aid Effectiveness Group COUNTRY REPORTS AFF Aid Effectiveness Forum AFRODAD African Forum and Network on Debt and Development Albania................................................................................................................................ 31 AI Amnesty International AIDA Association of International Development Agencies Burundi............................................................................................................................... 41 AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act Cambodia........................................................................................................................... 50 ALOP Latin-American Association of Promotion Organisations ANDEN National Association of Educators of Nicaragua Cameroon........................................................................................................................... 58 ANND Arab NGO Network for Development ANR National Republican Association (Colorado Party of Paraguay) Czechoslovakia................................................................................................................... 70 AODE Alliance of Civil Society Development Effectiveness Ecuador............................................................................................................................... 82 APC All Progressives Congress APCI Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation Germany............................................................................................................................. 89 ASC Continental Social Alliance ASCA Agency for the Support of Civil Society Guatemala.......................................................................................................................... 98 ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations India..................................................................................................................................... 107 AU African Union BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China Kenya................................................................................................................................... 119 BCP Central Bank of Paraguay BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung Kyrgyzstan........................................................................................................................... 127 (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) Lebanon.............................................................................................................................. 138 BOE Official State Bulletin BPEDC Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation Mongolia............................................................................................................................. 147 BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa BS Budget Support Mozambique...................................................................................................................... 155 CACIF Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial Nicaragua............................................................................................................................ 166 and Financial Associations CADEP Centre for Analysis and Diffusion of the Paraguayan Economy Nigeria................................................................................................................................. 175 CAG Comptroller and Auditor General of India CARICOM Caribbean Community Palestine.............................................................................................................................. 187 CBN Central Bank of Nigeria Paraguay............................................................................................................................. 199 CBO Community-Based Organisation CCC Cooperation Committee for Cambodia Peru..................................................................................................................................... 209 CCER Civil Coalition for Electoral Reform CCSF Church and Civil Society Forum Spain.................................................................................................................................... 216 CDC Council for the Development of Cambodia Tunisia................................................................................................................................. 225 CDCF Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum CDF Cambodia Development Forum Vietnam............................................................................................................................... 237 CDM Municipal Development Council CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Zimbabwe........................................................................................................................... 251 CEIM Centro de Estudios e Investigación sobre Mujeres – LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS.................................................................................................................. 260 Centre for Studies and Research on Women CEPEP Paraguayan Center for Population Studies CHRD Centre for Human Rights and Development CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation CMDG Cambodian Millennium Development Goals 6 7 CN National Constitution FWNGO Forum of Women’s NGOs of Kyrgyzstan CODENI Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents GDCC Government Donor Coordination Committee CONCORD European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development GDP Gross Domestic Product CONFEBASK Basque Business Confederation GESP Growth and Employment Strategy Paper CONGDE Development NGO Coordinator – Spain GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation CONPES National Council of Social and Economic Planning GMD Grupo Moçambicano da Divida COSADER The NGO Collective for Food Security and Rural Development GNI Gross National Income COSEP Higher Council of Private Enterprise GNP Gross National Product CPDE CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness GNU Government of National Unity CSCPC Citizen Social Control and Participation Council GOI Government of India CSE Centre for Science and Environment GoKR Government of the Kyrgyz Republic CSJ Supreme Court of Justice GoM Government of Mongolia CSO Civil Society Organisation GPA Global Political Agreement CSOF Civil Society Open Forum GPEDC Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation CSR Corporate Social Responsibility GPP Good Governance Project CZDA Czech Development Agency GTEC Aid Effectiveness and Quality Working Group DAC OECD’s Development Assistance Committee GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation DAE Development Aid Effectiveness HAC Harmonization, Alignment and Coordination Donor Group DAG Decentralised Autonomous Governments HDI Human Development Index DCG Donor Coordination Group HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country DE Development Effectiveness HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome DevCoop Development Cooperation HLF 3 Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra DGEEC Department of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses (STP) HLF 4 Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan DGPOLDE Directorate General for Development Policy Planning and Evaluation HLF High Level Forum DNGO Developmental Non-Governmental Organisation HLM High Level Meeting DO Development Observatory HR Human Rights DP Development Partner HRBA Human Rights-Based Approach DPA Development Partnership Administration IATI International Aid Transparency Initiative DPCC Development Partners Coordination Council IB Intelligence Bureau’s DPF Development Partnership Forum IBSA India, Brazil and South Africa DTC Direct Taxes Code ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission EAP Economically Active Population ID Institute for Democracy ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States IDB Inter-American Development Bank ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean IDEAR Institute for Agriculture and Rural Studies ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council IDM Institute for Democracy and Mediation EE Enabling Environment ILO International Labour Organisation EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act IMF International Monetary Fund EFP Economic and Financial Program INDERT National Institute of Rural Development and Land EIA Environmental Impact Assessment INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation ENREPD National Strategy for Reducing Poverty and Inequality INSTAT Institute of Statistics of Albania EPH Permanent Household Survey (DGEEC) IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association ERD External Resources Department IPS Institute of Social Welfare ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Program IT Income Tax EU European Union ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation FAD Development Partners Forum JMI Joint Monitoring Indicators FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Kafa Kafa (enough) Violence and Exploitation FCONGD Catalan NGOD Federation KfW KfW Development Bank FCRA Foreign Contribution Regulation Act KR Kyrgyz Republic FDP Free Democratic Party LADE Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections FGM Female Genital Mutilation LDC Least Developed Countries FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade LEP Look East Policy FOCEM Fund for Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender FOI Freedom of Information LIA Livelihood Impact Assessment FONPRODE Development Promotion Fund LIC Low Income Country FoRS Czech Forum for Development Cooperation LOC Lines of Credit FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front) MAG Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock MDC Movement for Democratic Change 8 9 MDG Millennium Development Goal PAHO Pan American Health Organisation MDN Ministry of National Defence PAP Program Aid Partnership MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative PAPs Program Aid Partners MEA Ministry of External Affairs PASOC Support Program for the Structuring of Civil Society MEC Ministry of Education and Culture PBO Public Benefit Organisations MECIP Standard Model of Internal Control for Public Entities Paraguay PCEI Parliamentary Committee of European Integration MEFMI Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute PCG Partners Coordination Group MERCOSUR Southern Common Market PD Paris Declaration MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs PIL Public Interest Litigation MH Ministry of Finance PLANOSCAM Platform of CSOs in Cameroon MIC Middle Income Country PLC Palestinian Legislative Council MINMUJER Ministry of Women PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation MJ y DH Ministry of Justice and Human Rights PLRA Authentic Radical Liberal Party MLMUC Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction PM Prime Minister MMDG Mongolian Millennium Development Goals PNGO Palestinian NGOs Network MMDR Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Bill 2011 PNIO National Plan for Equal Opportunities MoF Ministry of Finance POSA Public Order and Security Act MoIM Ministry of Interior and Municipality PPP Public-Private partnership MOPC Ministry of Public Works and Communications PRF Poverty Reduction Forum MP Master Plan PRONASIDA National AIDS Programme MPD Ministry of Planning and Development PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy MPs Members of Parliament PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper MRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs PVO Private Voluntary Organisation MSP Internet BS Ministry of Health and Welfare PWC or PC Public Watch Councils, and, since June 2014, Public Councils MSSR Multi-State Societies Registration Law PWYF Publish What You Fund MT Ministry of Labour RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistence) MTP Medium Term Plan RGC Royal Government of Cambodia NANGO National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations RIS Research and Information System NASS National Assembly RWB Reporters without Borders NAYO National Association of Youth Organisations SAP Structural Adjustment Program NBS Nigerian Bureau of Statistics SAS Secretariat for Social Action NCDD-DDF National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Democracy Defence SCAAP Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa NDCP National Development Comprehensive Policy SDCP Strategy on Development Cooperation and Partnership NDP National Development Plan SDG Sustainable Development Goal NEEDS National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy SEAM Secretariat of Environment NFPO Not For Profit Organisation SECI Secretary of State for International Cooperation NGO Non-Government Organisation SECIPI Secretary of State for International Cooperation and Latin America NGOD Non-Governmental Organisation for Development SEDAMUR Support Services for Women NGOF The NGO Forum on Cambodia SEEDS State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy NHDI National Human Development Report SEGEPLAN Secretariat for Planning and Programming of the Presidency NHRC National Human Rights Commission SETECI Secretaría Técnica de Cooperación Internacional NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation SFIS State Financial Intelligence Service NSDP National Strategic Development Plan SFP Ministry of Public Service NSDP National Secretariat for Development Planning SFPFII Strategic Growth and Fight against Poverty Framework NSDS National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic SG Sector Group NSSED National Strategy for Social and Economic Development SGKh State Great Khural (Mongolian Parliament) ODA Official Development Assistance SHRC State Human Right Commission OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development SIL Social Interest Litigation OIC Office of International Cooperation SILC Saving Internal Lending Communities OJM Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth Organizat) SINAFOCAL National Training and Workforce Training OLCP Organic Law of Citizens Participation SLR Systematic Land Registration OMM Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Mozambican Women’s Organisation) SNNA National Secretariat for Children and Adolescents ONHRI Organ on National Healing Peace and Reconciliation SNPP National Career Development System OSBC Osun State Broadcasting Corporation SPSCS Support Program for the Structuring of Civil Society PA Palestinian Authority SRD Center for Sustainable Rural Development PA Partners Albania SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights SSC South-South Cooperation 10 11 STP Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Development SURE-P Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme Background TIZ Transparency International Zimbabwe TLAS Timber Legality Assurance System A decade ago, governments and major donors signed on to the Paris Declaration (PD), promising TSJE Superior Electoral Court a new era of development cooperation and aid effectiveness. Paris, however, came without TWG Technical Working Group clear provisions for civil society engagement in the agenda. UNA Universidad Nacional de Asuncion (National University of Asuncion) UNBO United Nations Burundi Office In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) at last acknowledged civil society organisations UNDCF United Nations Development Cooperation Fund (CSOs) as development actors in their own right, committing governments and donors to work UNDP United Nations Development Programme with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development UNFPA United Nations Population Fund (AAA, Art 20c). UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund UNWomen United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Busan recognised the need for all actors to play a complementary role in the achievement of USAID United States Agency for International Development development goals. One of the major features of the Busan Partnership agreement was the VAT Value Added Tax broadening of the development cooperation agenda to include other development actors such VENRO Association of German Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs as CSOs, private sector and emerging donors. The Busan High Level Forum (HLF) on development VNFOREST Vietnam Forest Administration effectiveness encouraged the participation of non-state actors as full and equal participants in VNGO-FLEGT Vietnamese NGOs Network for FLEGT shaping the agenda and developing the Busan Partnership agreement. Inclusive development VO Voluntary Organisation partnerships form one of the principles of the agreement, underpinning their common goals VPA Voluntary Partnership Agreement and differentiated commitments. Therefore, while AAA acknowledged the important role of VUSTA Vietnamese Union for Science and Technology Associations non-executive actors, particularly CSOs, business, parliaments and local governments, the WB World Bank Busan Partnership agreement elevates these stakeholders to full development partners with an WFP World Food Programme equal say in how to foster sustainable growth, reduce poverty and share prosperity. The Global WHO World Health Organisation Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) emphasised multi-stakeholder WIDE+ European Network ‘Women In Development Europe Plus’ cooperation to facilitate efforts to eradicate poverty and promote sustainable development. YACYRETÁ Binational Entity Debates over a post-2015 Development Agenda have seen a notable shift in the development YASA Youth Association for Safety Awareness discourse since its formation in 2011. ZAADDS Zimbabwe Accelerated Arrears Clearance, Debt and Development Strategy ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front All this paved the way for the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness and BetterAid, ZIDERA Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act precursors to the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), the main civil society ZIMASSET Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation platform in the GPEDC. ZIMCODD Zimbabwe Coalition of Debt and Development ZLHR Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights CPDE was founded on two key objectives: (1) to secure positive outcomes in policy and practice rooted in co-operation between development actors; and (2) to build CSO capacity for engagement in this endeavour. The Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness1 flows from this, as does the 2011 Siem Reap Consensus on the International Framework for Development Effectiveness that guide CSOs in carrying out the principles. Although CSOs are diverse in nature, they play a crucial role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships and in overseeing their implementation. In addition, some CSOs, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and foundations, contribute actively to development cooperation using funds raised from public and non-public sources, or implementing specific programmes and projects funded by official development assistance. They also complement the action of states by delivering services to citizens. CSOs contribute to development effectiveness though promoting sustainable change, within a democratic framework, that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality and marginalisation, through a diversity of instruments and policies. CSOs are thereby not merely actors of aid effectiveness; they are actors of development effectiveness. While recognising that civil society has played a critical role through, for example, introducing progressive discourses around development effectiveness, gender equality, democratic participation and a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development into official discussions leading up to 2015, it is pertinent to note that there are key issues that still need to be addressed. For instance, key issues concerning financing and means of implementation are 1 http://csoeffectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_istanbul_cso_development_effectiveness_principles_footnote_ december_2010-2.pdf 12 13 still to be tackled. Nevertheless, CSOs have done much to pressure governments to deliver on their commitments, within and beyond official negotiations, for a new development agenda. Introduction Central to civil society’s ability to contribute to that agenda is an environment where CSOs can The present report is a global synthesis drawing on contributions from 232 selected country raise their voices, influence policy debates and see real action on issues that concern them. CSOs on the current state of development cooperation, CSO enabling environment, and CSO development effectiveness at a country level. Geographic, political and socio-economic In this regard, it is important to recognise that the road for civil society has been far from criteria were consciously considered in selecting the diversified 23-country sample with a clear smooth, and problems plague the pursuit of an enabling environment for CSOs at a global and aim of generating quality data and conclusions credible enough to be applicable to a wider country level, not least the lack of internal capacity on the part of CSOs to engage meaningfully understanding of global trends. in the day to day affairs of development cooperation—a term which has at times referred more to cooperation between governments and the private sector, with only limited, tokenistic space Therefore, based on cross-country inputs and starting from an overview of development given to civil society. cooperation, this report attempts at bringing together critical perspectives on the current context for CSOs’ engagement in the enabling environment for CSOs, as well as assess the While gains have been made toward institutionalising civil society participation at the global added-value of their contribution (either through service delivery or advocacy activism) in level, at a country level, recent years have seen renewed threats to CSO autonomy and an shaping the development agenda and supporting development efforts—CSO development elbowing out of civil society in official policy engagements in countries both north and south. effectiveness. It will feed into the work of the CPDE platform, as well as on the work of its member CSOs around the world, galvanising future policy engagement initiatives at global and As development actors move from policy debates to implementation, there is urgent need for country level. Below are detailed summary and analyses of the trends and recommendations, taking stock of progress (or lack of progress) made on these issues through periodic reports as presented in the reports under the three areas of focus. that synthesise the experiences of CSOs on the ground in relation to other development actors. This is to be grounded in a concrete analysis of the nuances of CSO engagement and policy influencing at a country level, and the conditions for development success or failure. This exercise aims to bring together critical perspectives on the current context of development cooperation (DevCoop) at a country level, which in turn hinges on fostering an enabling environment for CSOs (CSO EE)—the legal, regulatory, fiscal and political frameworks in which civil society operates, engages with and pressures governments, holds other development actors to account and delivers services in support of development efforts—and actively shapes the development agenda as indicators of their development effectiveness (CSO DE). The CPDE Global Synthesis Report offers base-line analyses of development cooperation, CSO EE and CSO DE two years into CPDE’s existence, contributing to efforts to forge a clearer development effectiveness framework for the platform and its members, rooted in their experiences and sensitive to the diverse contexts in which they work. In addition to providing an initial base-line status on the current state of DevCoop, CSO EE, and CSO DE at a country level, it further aims to: • Provide the foundations for a monitoring report for CPDE that will evolve through time, with follow-up research based on the framework, themes and indicators developed in this initial report; • Sharpen local civil society critiques of current development cooperation policy and practice, and allow these analyses to contribute to CPDE’s work as a platform lobbying for concrete changes in development discourse at the global level; • Feed into the work of CPDE’s platform members as they carry out their work on the ground through an analysis of the contexts in which they operate, including the diverse actors and institutions that hinder or encourage progress on development objectives; • Provide an update in advocating for inclusive development, gender equality, sustainable development and other objectives in line with the Istanbul Principles in country level work; • Raise awareness on these objectives among CSOs and other development partners; • Fulfil CPDE’s own commitments as a platform in holding itself and other development actors to account; the report can be an important reference document for CPDE’s 2 Albania, Burundi, Cameroon, Cambodia, Czech Republic, Equador, Germany, Guatemala, India, Kenya, future policy engagement. Kryghiztan, Lebanon, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palestine, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Tunisia, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. 14 15 Summary of Findings Germany, the economic powerhouse of Europe and the third-largest OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee) donor, is currently allocating only 0.4% of its GNI to ODA, let alone the small donors such as Spain whose DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ODA/GNI ratio barely reaches 0.15%. Legal and Regulatory Framework Spain has reduced the number of development Governments, in all countries under review, are signatories to major international conventions on partners from 56 to 23, under the new mantra of human rights and all other laws and governing principles concerning development cooperation ‘do more with less’ and adapting an economist and inclusive development, particularly the Busan Partnership for Effective Development. approach by channelling ODA through loan However, their implementation remains dotted by yawning gaps. and credits. This has been viewed as a way of arousing recovery of Spain’s economy. With the The Busan framework is based on internationally-agreed and cross-culturally negotiated human decrease of aid from traditional DAC donors, right norms. This has been backed up by the notion that human rights are central to effective India’s development assistance has increasingly and sustainable economic and social development for all. An increasing number of multilateral grown. Its development co-operation has mainly and bilateral partnerships are committed to integrating human rights in their development been bilateral, and development partnerships cooperation policy. Each signatory state has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil these and assistance have mainly been based on needs rights, considering that the promotion and protection of human rights is a matter of priority for identification by the partner country. Rather the international community. than give loans and credits like Spain, India Country Report points out that India attaches few conditionalities to its development assistance in an effort to create rapport and build As indicated in these reports, much as the governments are signatories to these rights and have relationships with the recipient country. enshrined them in their constitutions, there should be no excuse for not implementing them. In Guatemala, for example, criminalisation of social struggles is on the increase; this has led to However, the recurrent blaming of the crisis for the ODA falls doesn’t seem to hold. In fact, incarceration of social rights defenders. Burundi and Zimbabwe have witnessed persecution recent AidWatch reports have argued that decline in meeting ODA targets is not inevitable. and even assassinations of civil society staff, volunteers and human rights activists. ‘Given that development cooperation budgets represent only a very small amount of EU states’ budgets, cutting them to reduce deficits looks like cutting hair to lose weight.’4 Starting from the It is imperative to realise that core civil society freedoms to express, associate and assemble, PRSPs5, ODA has supported and has been linked to some of the recent governance reforms which are contained in a vast body of international law and inter-governmental commitments, that sought to enhance the rule of law, public transparency and civil society participation.6 It are critical to civic existence and effective citizen participation. Nevertheless, in various contexts, is therefore understandable that some circles, both among donors and civil society, fears that civil society faces new and increasing infringements in exercising these fundamental rights and not meeting their target 0.7% of GDP, ODA could prompt a slowdown in the still much needed freedoms. reform process. Governance Context Only time will tell whether those fears are justified or not, but as traditional ODA is progressively overlapped by economic cooperation, it is crucial for CSOs to readjust their engagement The year 2015 comes as the implementation deadline for major international commitments: strategies to a changing playing field increasingly dominated by vested interests and powerful lobby groups. In almost every aid recipient developing • The 15-year UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were set to go hand country, civil society has enjoyed some space in in hand with the fulfilment by donors of the pledges made in Monterrey (2002) and decisive donor-government dialogue forums, even if Gleneagles (2005) only tokenistic. As ODA flows decline, this sort of ‘free- • The Busan Development Effectiveness targets reaffirmed the global commitment with ride’ won’t be of any help since key police dialogue the Paris/Accra-agreed aid effectiveness principles and called for a more proactive is likely to shift to ‘tables’ where seats aren’t invited/ engagement of other development actors (civil society, parliamentarians, private granted but rather claimed through bold strategies. sector and non-traditional donors) in the traditionally donor–government ‘business’ of development cooperation. Actually, understanding that those are just the expressions of deeper problems is crucial here In spite of being a long-standing and repeatedly endorsed donors’ commitment, the attainment because that will drive civil society’s engagement of the 0.7% target of gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance (ODA) has efforts to the underlying structural issues aforementioned. CSOs’ policy advocacy around issues fallen short throughout decades. Yet in the backdrop of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, such as the fiscal framework for mega-projects/multinational corporations, as well as their and more particularly the Euro zone recession, the fulfilment of that target turned even ricketier participation in the making of policies with potential redistributive effects, is therefore critical in than ever, with gradual falls in ODA flows being reported across the bulk of partner countries. In addressing those structural problems. middle income countries (MICs) such as Vietnam, this trend is said to be effectively reflecting a definitive phasing-out of donors from development cooperation interventions there. 4 AidWatch 2012. Aid We Can - Invest more in global development. Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/relief- web.int/files/resources/report_37.pdf With the due exception of some Nordic donors whose performance against the target has 3 5 The PRSPs outlines national programme for poverty reduction as a requirement for lending programmes with been remarkable, other major economies have persistently been way far from the target. the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and for debt relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). 6 Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations: Analysis of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of seven 3 According to the 2012 and 2013 AidWatch Reports, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands have Country Evaluations of Budget Support. November 2014. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/synthe- achieved the 0.7% target. sis-budget-support-evaluations-2010-2014_en 16 17 Czech Republic gives a good example of implementing CSOs’ own commitments and advancing Partnerships for Evidence-based Policy Advocacy: A Short Lesson from Mozambique multi-stakeholder initiatives that put women, rural populations and other marginalised groups into consideration. In 2011, Czech Forum for Development Cooperation (FoRS) adopted its code In order to be effective (mobilise public support and win over policy-makers), it is crucial for policy on effectiveness, with five key areas linked to the Istanbul Principles: grassroots knowledge, advocacy initiatives to be evidence-based. That is even more so when the aim is to influence transparency and accountability, partnership, respect for human rights and gender equality and macroeconomic and fiscal policy. That is precisely the challenge CSOs in Mozambique are confronted accountability for impacts and their sustainability. The code is to help FoRS members enhance with, as a gigantic extractive industry establishes itself in the country with outrageously excessive tax the quality and effectiveness of their operations. FoRS members agreed that breaching of ‘key benefits. indicators’ (e.g. corruption) could eventually result in the exclusion of a member from FoRS. This has also been incorporated into the FoRS Statute.7 CSOs immediately stood up to demand the government to review the contracts with the multinationals and rebalance the benefits structure in favour of a larger taxation on the multinationals’ profits. FoRS members carry out an annual self-assessment according to indicators related to each But CSOs usually lacked the technical expertise and institutional capabilities to gather, document principle. The FoRS secretariat monitors the annual changes and reflects learning needs in its and analyse data to structure the arguments for the intended policy change. CSOs turned then capacity building plans. The findings are shared at the FoRS general assembly and discussed to academic and research institutions (think tanks), which, in spite of having all the technical and by the working group on effectiveness. In addition to self-assessment, peer-reviews were logistical capacity to research and elaborate on macroeconomic policy issues, were also desperate introduced in 2013 where peers provide mutual feedback on using the code, prioritise learning for voices to help them get the message across in order to mobilise wider support beyond the strict needs, set concrete plan of actions and assess progress. boundaries of academia. With massive technical backing from research institutions, CSOs’ engagement in the debate around In Mongolia, legal provisions and institutional mechanisms are in place to allow for CSO ‘fiscal benefits to multinationals’ was galvanised to unprecedented levels, forcing the government to participation in policy and decision-making. However, such mechanisms are not being used admit a renegotiation of the deals with the multinationals. effectively. There exists no systematic dialogue between CSOs and government institutions. Interaction mostly takes place on an ad hoc basis. In Czech Republic, at the local level, CSOs are continuously consulted on issues such as community planning and regional development strategies. In some regions, local authorities sign partnership agreements with CSOs; in some In Mozambique, the fiscal framework in place for mega-projects in the extractive industry is far cases, these are only declarative, but in others, they lead to real cooperation. CSOs in Germany from desirable. But local CSOs’ efforts to reverse the situation over the last few years has been participated in dialogue with the government and influenced the government to develop a remarkable and is worth sharing, since examples of CSOs engaging to such degree in other common position on the post-2015 agenda. countries are rare despite the problem being somewhat common-place. The Busan outcome document places a considerable emphasis on the private sector’s role in As discussed earlier, the AAA (Art 19) refers very explicitly to the added value of the CSOs as development, stating that the private sector is important in ‘advancing innovation, creating independent development actors in their own right. Recognising civil society as ‘actor in its own wealth, income and jobs, mobilising domestic resources, and delivering goods and services. right’ is recognising that the emphasis of the development process lies in the constituency of Cooperating with the private sector has been the case in Kyrgyzstan, where a law on public- the CSOs. This is a very powerful quality of civil society engagement and, in many ways, does private partnerships provides a basis for long-term relationship between the state and private make the difference and/or complement/supports the drive of governmental development sector. cooperation. CSOs are not only aid donors but are channels and recipients who raise their own resources privately, or receive ODA to support their development activities or act as channels Civil society participates in the formulation and monitoring of the national development strategy, when playing an intermediary role between official donors and other CSOs. In Kyrgyzstan, generally through networks and umbrella organisations that coordinate groups operating in a donors do not recognise CSOs as development actors. This is evident in the fact that CSOs, wide range of domains such as health, gender, education, poverty, environment and so on. both national and indigenous, are not represented in the Development Partners Coordination While in some countries such as Zimbabwe it was noted that major actors from the civil society Council (DPCC). Furthermore, donors in the country do not solicit inputs from CSOs. participated in the national development strategy, in others, important actors were not invited to the consultations or their contributions were disregarded. Respondents cite a number of Political Context reasons for limited participation by CSOs. However, in Cambodia, CSOs were invited to join consultative meetings but their viewpoints and inputs are often ignored. In other instances, an The MDGs, as do the upcoming post-2015 development agenda and the introduction by many unreasonably short timeframe was given to CSOs to comment on extremely complicated pieces countries of targeted poverty reduction and social protection programmes, have increasingly of legislation. focused on targeting the poor and reducing inequality. For countries that have been successful in increasing the well-being of the majority of their populations over relatively short periods of Due to resilience and lobbying in Cambodia, CSOs’ inputs were accepted and incorporated into time, progress has occurred principally through state-directed strategies that combine economic a number of important policies such as the National Strategic Development Plan 2012-2014. In development objectives with active social policies and forms of politics that are complementary Kenya, civil society participated in the formulation and continues to participate in the monitoring and synergistic and that elevate the interests of the poor in public policy. of the national development strategy. Recognition of CSOs as playing a core role in public policy-making in relation to political On gender equality and women’s rights, while the government of Czech Republic, as in many institutions, the private sector and other development actors is an essential element to any other countries, has been formally promoting legal frameworks in favour of women’s rights transparent, accountable and democratic political system. It ensures the continuation of in political participation and other domains, in practice, poverty, inequality, and gender dialogue between citizens and decision-makers outside of election times. Ideally it results in discrimination continue to constrain women’s capacity to engage in governance as active policy and legislation being more responsive to the needs of the people they affect. CSOs play political subjects. an important role in such participation mechanisms, providing a link between citizens and decision-makers. Public participation is particularly important for marginalised groups such as minority communities and women whose voices are often neglected by decision-makers. 7 http://Internet.fors.cz/user_files/fors_code_on_effectiveness_en.pdf 18 19 statute gives powers to sub-national entities to directly negotiate grants with development Socio-Economic Context partners. This presents a challenge regarding coordination of development assistance, but more importantly the danger of donors ‘cherry-picking’ projects, geographical areas or even pet It is every government’s responsibility to end poverty and ensure equity in development. Recent sectors to the disadvantage of national priorities. An emerging theme from all country studies is decades have seen rising inequality and inequities, which are in turn partly responsible for the that ownership and inclusion need to go beyond government and donor partners to include civil world ‘lagging behind’ in realising targets of the MDGs. society, women’s organisations, parliament and other actors in the formulation and delivery of development policies. In spite of existing challenges of limited spaces for CSOs to operate and There’s striking and extensive evidence that much of the success in poverty reduction the world participate in public policy and decision-making process, few countries have demonstrated that has witnessed over the last decades was seen in East Asia, whereas poverty incidence in many indeed there is change and the government is involving them more in policy-making issues, parts of Africa and some parts of Latin America stagnated, and in some cases even deteriorated though the extent to which CSO positions are adopted remains to be seen. (Sachs, 20058). This inability to tackle poverty despite consistently strong macroeconomic performance is largely associated with a growth pattern highly concentrated on a single MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS extractive and export-oriented sector with extremely low job-creating capacity, shallow fiscal contribution and, therefore, a weak redistributive potential.9 To Government • There is need for governments to create formal spaces for effective dialogue with CSOs These structural fragilities undeniably have drastic effects on the stability of societies. The Boko and that CSOs are actively involved and represented in these spaces; Haram rebellion in Nigeria, the emerging military insurgence in parts of Paraguay, the growing • Remove regulatory barriers that undermine or make it difficult for CSOs to perform criminalisation of the Guatemalan society and the proliferation of armed gangs claiming no-go their role in development processes; areas in Cameroon are all expressions of social desperation as the result of the inability of the • Partner countries and donors should open dialogue on increased involvement of CSOs states to set the grounds for societies of inclusion, justice and dignity. in mutual government/donor accountability processes. Most country reports show that donor transparency and cooperation are still largely focused To Donors on government processes. CSO donor relations for policy dialogue are virtually non-existent • Provide support and encourage greater accountability and participation of democratic in many countries. CSOs’ autonomy from government, as well as their own accountability actors in development processes; mechanisms, needs to be strengthened. • Support capacity enhancement for CSOs through training and encourage the sharing of best practices at both the country and international level. There’s a widely held view that in most of the developing countries, civil society participation in government processes is designed to suit the interests of governments by ensuring the To CSOs fulfilment of a donor-imposed aid conditionality. Though this view may not be entirely and • Engage development actors to broaden the agenda from aid effectiveness to always true, reality on the ground shows that despite efforts, the real effectiveness of CSOs’ development effectiveness; engagement and participation in such policy dialogue forums is still pretty much questionable. • Global civil society should continue to advocate for donor and government accountability With donors and the private sector taking centre stage, civil society’s side-lined involvement and transparency in aid management. hasn’t in fact been far more than symbolic, and such attitude tends to be exacerbated by the somewhat widespread perception within partner governments and among donors that civil CSO ENABLING ENVIRONMENT society is fragmented and often lacking in capacity to engage meaningfully in development. In most of the developing world, the single-party regimes that followed national independencies The fast-rising BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), together with other small prevailed until the 1980s, when the waves of democratic transitions swept through in the newly emerging donors such as the Czech Republic, are undoubtedly imposing new dynamics aftermath of the 1970s’ stagflation which drove those economies to the path of structural in the global financial markets, allowing more options and greater room for bargaining adjustment programmes (SAPs) and later, the poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs). Drawing manoeuvres for the investment-thirsty developing countries. Yet, development cooperation as from a bitter lesson of the ill-designed SAPs, the World Bank and the International Monetry Fund such continues to be widely dominated by the traditional OECD donors, and the establishment of (IMF) established that the PRSPs had to be prepared by governments through a participatory functional multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms aimed at bringing together all these emerging process involving civil society and development partners.11 development actors to address harmonisation strategies and wider public policy challenges doesn’t seem to be a near target. Therefore, in many cases, the PRSPs provided one of the first opportunities of effective/ untied engagement of civil society in government processes. Drawing on that precedent, Whereas a fully-inclusive platform was legally institutionalised and tried in Lebanon but later civil society in most of the countries already enjoys some degree of representation in several paralysed,10 the dialogue arrangements in place hardly ever engage all the relevant actors dialogue platforms including donor-government talks. Yet, questions arise on the buy-in of its in most of the countries, being at best described as ‘quasi-inclusive’ (government–donors, contributions in such forums. government–civil society, government–private sector). Both in partner and donor countries, there’s mounting evidence of a shrinking space for CSO In Kenya, for example, devolved governments are an opportunity for resources to flow to the advocacy and effective influencing on development cooperation issues. In the early 2000s, while lowest levels of service delivery, hence potential for better impacts. However, the devolution CSOs in donor countries strongly campaigned and pushed for the allocation of 0.7% of GNI to ODA, CSOs in developing partner countries were campaigning side-by-side with governments 8 SACHS, Jeffrey. The End of Poverty: How we can make it Happen in Our Lifetime. Penguin Ed. 2005 8 Curran, Zaza. Civil society participation in the PRSP: the role of evidence and the impact on policy choices. PPA 9 The move towards regressive Tax systems (e.g. Nicaragua), is likely to worsen further the income gap between Synthesis Study. October 2005, London: Overseas Development Institute. the poor and the better-off. Christiansen, K. and Hovland, I. The PRSP initiative: multilateral policy change and the role of research. ODI 10 The Economic and Social Council, a platform that was expected to host discussions and dialogue between working paper no 261. 2003, London: Overseas Development Institute. 20 21 for the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) and multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI) debt Trade unions and labour organisations are subject to extensive restrictions imposed by law and cancelling initiatives in an unprecedented show of joint collaboration. Both trends not only government policies. This is evident in Lebanon, Paraguay and Zimbabwe. influenced development cooperation policies but also opened the ground for a greater and effective involvement of partner countries’ CSOs in the broader policy-making, starting from On the other hand, CSOs are failing to mobilise for and secure the rights of racial minorities, for conception and monitoring of the PRSPs. example, afro-descendants and indigenous Indians in Latin American and sexual minorities of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) in Africa and Asia. For the particular case of sexual In Busan, governments agreed to provide space for CSOs to exercise their role as independent minorities, legislation in most parts of Africa and Asia is still by and large rigidly prohibitive, and development actors. Contrary to this, a pattern cases of complete banning of any form of support to that cause are not particularly rare, which of deteriorating legal and political conditions renders the environment for LGBT-focused CSOs completely hostile. It is also worth noting for CSOs is increasing in a number of countries. that in countries such as Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan, there are restrictions of rights of the LGBT In Albania, registration of an association, community. This discriminates against them and is a violation of their freedom of expression, charity or foundation is not mandatory; freedom of association and assembly. however, one cannot operate legally without registration. Unlike Albania, the Burundi organic Another challenge to enabling environment is the application of out-dated, colonial era laws framework for not-for-profit organisations is which are not fit for purpose given contemporary realities of governance and the ways in which an impediment to the registration process of civil society has changed. Patchworks of different laws relating to different types of organisations CSOs in Burundi. This law gives power to the are a related problem. An extreme example is that of India, which has a more than a hundred- administrative authority, leading to abuse by year law that lumps together very different organisational forms. The same is the case with using vague grounds for denial of registration. Lebanon, with the Ottoman Law still being used to govern CSOs for more than a hundred years. The law does not allow for appeal. Further, in Although Albania has an agency for the support of CSOs (a public entity that provides funds for Kenya, the state has the power to declare a CSO unlawful or withdraw its registration. Laws in CSOs through public funding), the procedure for distribution of the funds is not transparent and Lebanon, Paraguay and Zimbabwe each prohibit certain ‘spheres of activity’ by CSOs, especially the criteria for selection of CSOs who are to receive funds is not clear. those dealing with governance and corruption. In Zimbabwe, the government frustrates CSO operations, for example by requiring them to submit registration details to the police and In other countries, though, progresses should not district administrators as a prerequisite to operate in the different districts. go over-stated without mention of particularly worrying challenges of looming insecurity The full realisation of the right to peaceful assembly is an essential condition for enabling (Lebanon and Nigeria); crippling violence and civil society. Recently, restrictions have been imposed against the right to peaceful assembly inequality (Guatemala); near economic stagnation in a number of countries. In Lebanon and Burundi, notification and authorisation to conduct and widespread unemployment (Cameroon peaceful assembly is required. and Zimbabwe); widening income inequality (Nicaragua, Cambodia and Paraguay), etc. Political polarisation has directly impacted enabling environment for CSOs. In Cambodia and Zimbabwe, the Cambodian People’s Party and Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU-PF) have As developing countries grapple with these dominated all aspects of governments and this has been recognised as underlining the need challenges amidst a growing democratic openness, for a strong and coordinated civil society. The Burundian government has, by default, branded a diversified civil society has emerged as a viable CSOs as being part of the opposition. development actor. However, in spite of national constitutions being generally ‘generously’ permissive with regard to the exercise of the fundamental CSOs-related freedoms, newer and Extra-legal attacks, including physical attacks on and assassinations of civil society staff, tighter regulations are tending to jeopardise those constitutional guarantees, reflecting the volunteers and activists were reported. In Guatemala, criminalisation of social struggles is on dropping trust and heightening suspicion of governments towards CSOs. the increase and has led to incarceration of social rights defenders. Burundi and Zimbabwe too have witnessed an increase of persecution of human rights activists. Such tensions threaten the progresses achieved over around two decades of consolidation of democratic participation practices. In fact, though many countries have institutionalised Countries such as Lebanon have prohibited certain types of online content or seek to impede diversified spaces of dialogue, the laws and regulations put in place are largely reflective of bloggers and other Internet users; Cambodia has introduced the cybercrime law, and lawsuits the undisguised appetite of governments to are often used as threat against journalists, reporters or anyone criticising the government. control CSOs’ activism. Such measures stifle the right of individuals and CSOs to receive and provide information, and to meet online and exchange ideas with civil society counterparts inside and outside their A recent case in Vietnam is particularly glaring. home countries. Mozambique is yet to pass a law on right to information. On the other hand, In 2002, the government of Vietnam issued the media in Mongolia, just as in other parts of the world, is being influenced by politicians. a decree outlining the legal framework for The media addresses their financial issues by signing off on closing agreements with political research-focused CSOs and then brought parties and huge companies. This clearly hurts transparency, journalistic independence and them (together with other professional social justice. Barriers in access to relevant public information also stand as a weakness with far- associations) into a government-controlled reaching effects for CSOs’ work. In Lebanon, this right is just not recognised. In Nigeria, though trade-union with a clear aim of guiding and the Freedom of Information Act was passed at the national level, only two of 36 states of the monitoring their members. Moreover, the federation have adopted it. Vietnamese government limited the scope of scientific and technical research by think tanks and other non-profit associations to 317 specifically approved topics. Topics not explicitly sanctioned by the law cannot be publicly discussed. 22 23 In Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia and Nicaragua, recent changes in legislation have tightened further the space for CSOs’ activism by introducing legal provisions to control and restrict their easily unravel into a promiscuous symbiosis with dramatic effects on CSOs’ public reputation and accessibility to desperately needed foreign funding. This move is, to a great extent, explained effectiveness. by the governments’ attitude of suspicion with regard to CSOs, as well as a stiff stance towards public criticism perceived as a foreign-plotted ‘direct assault on authority and unacceptable Yet, there are other models of CSO–government partnerships that should be further explored. meddling in the affairs of government.’ That is, for example, the model in place in Mongolia where, in order to reach out to issues such as environment conservation, the government outsources activities to on-ground CSOs under agreements that only include project-based operational costs, but without covering administrative In some cases, tax legislation also doesn’t help for CSOs’ survival. In Nicaragua, Kyrgyzstan, costs and without any long term, predictable and sustainable funding scheme. Vietnam and India, for example, CSOs have to report to the tax administration with the same costs, requirements and specificities as profit businesses do. Such perverse taxation systems only worsen the already dire financial situation of CSOs in those countries. Legal and Regulatory Framework Political parties and CSOs can make ‘unlikely’ yet good allies when it comes to lobbying against or barring perverse legislation proposed by government. In Cameroon, for example, they have Access to information and open data are crucial to establishing an open and accountable effectively collaborated in denouncing and blocking an anti-terrorism law that threatens the government. The access will enable the citizens to participate in the design, delivery and rights and freedoms of citizens. monitoring all of the development process. Today, freedom of information is recognised and enshrined in the constitutions of various countries the world over. However, this progress has But CSOs’ connections aren’t always benign. As Mongolia and Ecuador exemplify, CSOs’ links not been without its drawbacks. Legislation, policies and institutions that would operationalise can sometimes take a dramatic twist, driving CSOs to represent interests other than those they and entrench access to information in many countries across the globe remain either missing were supposed to, with severely damaging impact on their public reputation as well as on their or ineffective. mobilisation capacity. This is a central existential dilemma CSOs have to face every day: how to keep ‘afloat’ without giving in to someone else’s agenda. This limited access to good quality information makes it difficult to inform resource allocation, track expenditures effectively and measure progress appropriately. This is exacerbated by the absence of an access to information law in some countries to compel the custodians of public Quest for Survival: Implications for CSOs’ Funding Patterns information to make it available. Across the developing world and particularly in the countries covered by this study, CSOs are still Additionally, in other countries, what initially appeared to be breakthrough in terms of heavily dependent on foreign donors’ funding. However, the recent Eurozone crisis has prompted institutionalisation of access to information rights has turned to be a disappointment. Legislative donor governments to cutback in allocations to intermediary donor NGOs, with a dramatic knock-on pieces with provisions that appeared to be favourable to a culture of transparency turned out effect for the on-ground CSOs and NGOs. In Spain, for example, a more austere budget resulted in to be fraught with loopholes carefully embedded into or attached to them, practically keeping the disappearance of around 20–30% of intermediary NGOs in 2012. Most of the on-ground CSOs ‘business running as usual’: that depended on that funding were forced to shut down projects, as reported in many countries. In some cases, the crisis prompted a change in donor priorities, leading a number of them to either • ‘Security reasons’ and ‘state secrets’ are stated in Zimbabwe and Kyrgyzstan as terminate some of the CSOs-targeted programs or impose even tighter project requirements that justification to some restrictions in access to information. are sometimes hard to be met at the local level, turning the prospects of survival for the smaller or • In Cambodia, access to information rights is mired by a smothery over-statement of the emerging CSOs bleaker. anti- defamation, disinformation and incitement legislation. • In Mozambique, legislation on public disclosure and openness (e.g. Public Probity Act) But there are lessons to be learnt in this hiccup. The impact of the crisis was much severe to local is still rendered somewhat ineffective by dissonant ‘confidentiality provisions.’ CSOs in part because of the donors’ short-sighted and short-term project–based assistance strategy to CSOs, which has proved ineffective to allow the latter to develop more sustainably. Despite cross- This dosage of ‘legal dualism’ regarding accessibility of public information overwhelmingly country evidence suggesting otherwise, rather than supporting structured medium-term strategies of CSOs’ institutional capacity development, donors tend to favour the sponsoring of select projects, affects every dimension and area of CSOs’ intervention by hampering a knowledgeable and which amounts to an ad-hoc interventionism. Plenty cross-country evidence leaves no doubt that this effective engagement in public scrutiny, policy advocacy and policy dialogue. donor modus operandi left CSOs vulnerable and unprepared to shocks of any kind, including financial instability, which in turn set the stage for a crunching north to south chain effect on CSOs’ finances. Mozambique’s lack of transparency about aid flows and budget planning limits possibilities for the parliament and for civil society to scrutinise the government budget. In India, the government In Cameroon, Albania, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, local NGOs and CSOs are benefiting from does not provide information on ODA and other key policies issues on ODA. Government subventions. But, with eligibility criteria somewhat unclear, this line of funding has come under suspicion of being used as a government bait to lure, politically alienate and control or On a more positive note, Mongolia has a law in place that gives CSOs and private sector right to even co-opt dissenting voices (individuals and groups). access public information but within a limited time period. However, implementation of the law Public funding to CSOs heightens the risk of co-optation (of civil society leaderships) which is felt has been a challenge. as significant even in countries without such funding schemes. That is, for example, the case of Lebanon, where activism based on temporary/circumstantial coalitions among CSOs was a strategy Governance Context put in place by civil society aimed precisely at counteracting the risk of co-optation. Cambodia launched the NGO Good Governance Project (GPP) in 2004 with the objective of Bottom line, whereas public funding could address critical financial deficits of CSOs, it doesn’t seem strengthening the NGO sector, building trust among citizens and reinforcing accountability to to be the ideal source of resources for CSOs in the medium/long term. This partnership could stakeholders. In Nicaragua, since the current government assumed power in 2006, the national parliament has become highly polarised and its activity has been suspended at various times 24 25 tokenism. Perhaps as an effect of that tokenistic nature of the dialogue, CSOs’ engagement is failing to reach beyond ‘processes’ and therefore, the pragmatist call from Busan to ‘focus on over the years. The polarisation and tension within the chamber have turned development into results’ hasn’t unfortunately been appropriately responded. Political willingness is needed to a secondary issue and its role in this field has been limited to approving various development reduce barriers to CSO participation and fulfil these constitutional promises. loans. In Cambodia, CSOs lobbied for policy Though platforms for engagement at sector level have been created in most of the countries changes in the national strategic reviewed, the quality of participation has typically been poor. This is due to the nature of spaces development plan and their input were available to civil society, to government attitudes towards civil society participation and to weak incorporated; however, CSOs are at times capacity amongst those civil society actors who do engage. invited to comment when decisions have already been taken. It is felt on occasion Notable in Kyrgyzstan, the establishment of the Public Watch Council (PWC) creates a space for that the presence of CSOs is ‘window holding government to account. CSOs are represented in them. Other countries such as Albania dressing’ in order to meet donors’ calls for are making efforts to improve relationships with civil society through invites for consultations greater civil society participation. on policy/legal initiatives. In Mongolia, the government adopted the National Development Comprehensive Strategy which increases CSOs’ participation in state policy-making processes. It can be safely said that in a number of Furthermore, CSOs established the Civil Society Council which signed an engagement agreement occasions, vested interests do hinder with the government. CSO participation in governance and development initiatives in a credible manner. In India, for example, corporations have tried to In Cambodia, CSOs are represented in the country’s 19 technical working groups. In Cameroon, leverage their donations to choke competition and create favourable markets for themselves. CSOs sit in various commissions and have influenced and supported the passage of various Some have even tried to influence government policies. For instance, if there are NGOs bills such as the bill against female genital mutilation (FGM) and the protection of people living promoting small, distributed renewable electricity generation units on the one side, there are with HIV/AIDS. an equal number of dubious corporate-funded NGOs, promoting large centralised renewable energy units to develop a market for the corporates. Government-CSO Relations: Example of Vietnam Socio-Economic Context Taylor et al. (2012) mentioned that the growth in the number of CSOs existing in Vietnam reflects CSOs in many countries operate within different contexts. Sadly, many CSOs are trying to work a relatively more hospitable environment provided by the state for civic engagement. The in contexts that limit their ability to effectively undertake their development work. For example, development of a more vibrant civil society sector is a natural outcome of a more open economic in contexts which have legal restrictions on their rights and freedoms, challenging financial system and society, increasingly connected to regional and global trends and information networks. In addition, the government increasingly recognises that the complex nature of the development regulations, limited or lack of space for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, etc. process requires contributions from many stakeholders, and civil society organisations can play a constructive role in providing feedback to improve the effectiveness of government policies. This Funding mechanisms for CSOs cannot be said to be totally reliable, transparent and easy to relationship between the state and civil society in Vietnam is still very much evolving. The on- understand. In Albania, the funding of the Civil Society Support Agency is approved by the going lack of a clear legal framework for civil society organisations creates an uncertain operating Council of Ministers, according to the Law environment and reinforces the importance of personal networks in getting things done, rather than of State Budget. However, Kyrgyzstan a set of transparent procedures applicable to all NGOs. A Law on Associations has been debated and Nicaragua have prohibited foreign in the National Assembly in the past but was shelved following a number of disagreements over funding in a bid to curb terrorism and its provisions in the mid-2000s. Thus, enacting such a law would improve the position of CSOs in Vietnam. money laundering. This has had a negative impact on the operations of CSOs leading to closure of some of them. Political Context Further, Nicaragua has experienced an increase in government interference, In countries such as Kenya, Mozambique, Cambodia and Kyrgyzstan, civil society is already which saw the passage into law taxation part of institutionalised dialogue platforms. Yet, the ‘effectiveness’ question lingers on precisely of CSOs. This meant that CSOs must pay because there are hardly any mechanisms in place to ensure that governments adopt CSOs’ income tax. Vietnam, on the other hand, contributions. The example of Kenya where CSOs are invited to budget hearings without enough regulates the management and use of and timely available preparatory information is clearly symptomatic of the government’s half- foreign non-governmental aid. hearted willingness to open up to a wider and effective policy dialogue. In some cases, the ‘ineffectiveness symptoms’ in such dialogue forums are strikingly evident. In Cameroon, for MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS example, 37 ‘inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms’ were reported to exist in 2010. To Government Analytically, this sheer number is in itself an indication that the establishment of such mechanisms • Create an institutionalised and systematised process of deliberately seeking the inputs seems to be taken as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Furthermore, since all of CSOs in policy dialogue, through creating additional spaces for or by requiring CSO of those spaces were largely ‘created’ by the Cameroonian government rather than properly participation in various commissions relevant in planning, monitoring and evaluation; ‘claimed’ by civil society, one would argue in a more sceptical analysis that the establishment • Pass access to information laws to facilitate the work of CSOs; of these dialogue platforms is a conscious government strategy of fragmenting and controlling • Work with CSOs to develop the relevant legislation that not only anchors CSOs’ CSOs. The plummeting interest of Cameroonian civil society to engage and participate in these legitimacy within the country’s legal framework but also maximises their contribution dialogue forums is probably a result of this strategy. But effectiveness of CSOs’ engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogue is not only trapped by 26 27 for their right to occupy more spaces in the public sphere, gain access to more financial and in the development process of their countries; political resources and increasingly influence public policies and fostering social change. Sadly, • Harmonise overlapping legislative acts through a comprehensive review of legislation the promise of an enabling environment for civil society remains unfulfilled. Marginalisation for CSOs. of independent and vocal civil society groups and the failure to protect them in the exercise of their rights undermine the global compact on development effectiveness. Nevertheless, as the To CSOs evidence generated in this report shows, they often pay a heavy price for their work. • Define concrete strategies for opening up political space vis-a-vis other development actors to make room for more CSOs to engage. Legal and Regulatory Framework CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS In Peru, restrictive legislation is in place. NGOs working on issues which do not favour the government, including human rights, face scrutiny. Economic growth has been accompanied The report comes at a time of on-going profound changes within the civil society arena as a by a reduction of external assistance. However, there has traditionally been a strong local civil consequence of global geo-political and economic shifts. CSOs continue to face many challenges society, and encouraging signs include new rights granted for indigenous groups to be consulted. in response to these shifts, but they also present exciting opportunities for emerging forms of civil society to find their place and voice. CSOs have been actively involved in development programmes by both cooperating and assisting in the implementation of the state’s policies or programmes on the ground. A number There have been many efforts—driven mostly by the donor community—to develop CSO of organisations have tried to bring people together around common social concerns to interact capacity. However, these efforts have not been sustainable because they have been mainly with the state in constructive ways—conveying their concerns toward authorities and suggesting focused on achieving specific project aims with little emphasis on or prioritization for developing that state agencies improve existing policies and point out weaknesses in their implementation. strong, organisation-wide systems, structures and processes that are essential for sustainability. In order to improve their own effectiveness and accountability as independent development Vietnamese CSOs have developed a mode of advocacy, including soft advocacy, for example, through actors, and to ensure that governments and donors live up to their own commitments on non-confrontational policy advocacy vis-a-vis the authorities on social issues and climate change, development effectiveness, CSOs in Cambodia, Czech and Germany have developed a code of either through a series of CSO networks or together with VUSTA. CSOs build diversified network and conduct in the spirit of the Istanbul Principles. involve in different forums and dialogues in different levels, which bring voice and input from CSOs from communal to national and international dialogues. Compared to Cambodia, Czech and Kyrgyzstan, German CSOs participate in public policy changes through various working groups. In Paraguay, however, there is lack of a strong In Kenya, CSOs often establish loose coalitions to advocate for various causes. Active advocacy institutional framework for CSO participation in policy dialogues. coalitions include the CSO Reference Group, which lobbied and advocated for the passage of the PBO Act; the Decentralised Governance Non-State Actors; the Freedom of Information Kenya has established an aid effectiveness platform, despite the existence of an aid coordination Network; the National Peace Policy Advocacy Network; Kenyans for Peace with Truth and policy (ACP). In Zimbabwe, there is no formal platform that brings CSOs, government and Justice, which works on human rights, governance, and rule of law; and the CSO Leaders Forum, other aid players together to discuss development effectiveness. Furthermore, Zimbabwe all of which ably showcased the sector’s potential. This potential, however, has not been fully has undertaken various initiatives to strengthen development effectiveness and international realised because most of these organisations are faced with critical challenges related to limited relations with the donors, albeit with limited participation of CSOs and other non-state actors. institutional and technical capacities to deliver their mandates most effectively. Lack of financial Even though civil society has recorded many successes along the way, it continues to face both resources, poor internal organization and lack of timely access to information also contribute to external and internal challenges that curb its own effectiveness. These are challenges around severe limits to CSO development effectiveness in that country. the lack of timely access to information, capacity issues, misappropriation and inadequacy of funds, minimal collaborations between CSOs and shrinking CSO space, all of which make for a In Germany, VENRO sits in the gender working group and, together with other CSOs, severe limitation to CSO development effectiveness. successfully lobbied and advocated for the inclusion of sexual reproductive health issues within the federal ministry of economy (BMZ) budget. However, in Mongolia, they themselves have had trouble developing their own capacity to contribute effectively to development, but have People’s Empowerment, Democratic Ownership and Participation: Example of Kenya been moderately successful in lobbying for policy changes. For example, CSOs’ inputs were accepted and incorporated into a number of important policies, such as the National Strategic CSOs submitted memoranda to the Parliamentary Committee on Lands and Natural Resources and Development Plan 2012-2014. the Parliamentary Budget Committees during the public hearings across the country. As a result, the Kenyan parliament passed three land laws that incorporated many CSO proposals. Many CSOs also mobilised their constituencies to analyse and discuss proposed legislation and policies, including There is a risk that some CSOs may struggle to continue their work when many bilateral donors the County Governments Bill (2012), the Public Finance Management Transition Bill (2012) and the prepare to withdraw their fund resources. In addition to improving their capacity, CSOs also Leadership and Integrity Bill (2012). need to diversify their financial sources and explore other sources, such as private and corporate social responsibility. This requires CSOs to improve not only capacity but also visibility and/or credibility towards enterprises and corporations, the government and the public in general. A Evidence from the country reports show that CSOs operate in environments that are far from number of development partners fund local CSOs, either directly or via INGOs, but much of it is perfect. Many countries reported that their countries had adopted or are considering new NGO uncoordinated and mainly short-term project funding. framework laws which impose severe practical limitations on the ability of civil society groups to undertake their legitimate activities. Among other issues, many of these legislative developments MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS jeopardise the flow of foreign funding to domestic CSOs, provide the government with excessive discretionary powers to restrict CSOs from working on certain sensitive areas and permit the To Governments: government to arbitrarily and subjectively dissolve organisations without judicial oversight. • Inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue provides governments with a unique source of Furthermore, assassination of civil society activists perpetrated by both state and non-state important contributions to address the problems of an ever complex society. This actors continued with impunity. Even in the hardest conditions and times, CSOs are fighting 28 29 means that it is primarily in governments’ interest that such dialogue mechanisms are put in place and governments have to lead the way; • Government should relax the suspicious attitude towards CSOs and allow an environment that could enable them to build strong institutional capacity to meaningfully engage in the dialogue, as well as collaborate in social interventions. To Donors: • Support CSO to develop or implement self-regulatory mechanisms such as codes of conduct, strategy and management systems development to help streamline and protect the integrity of their work. To CSOs: • Lobby government over multiple and overlapping legal and regulatory regimes, which present difficulties in carrying out their work; Country Reports • Put in place mechanisms for monitoring compliance to the Istanbul Principles and accountability by CSOs. These should explicitly address leadership and integrity issues and include provision for an independent body to provide checks and balances in cases where the self-regulatory mechanism has failed; • Lobby for general framework of principles for collaboration between the government and CSOs, and other development actors; • CSOs’ choices of engagement areas have to be more strategic and results-focused in line with the Istanbul commitment to realizing positive sustainable change, as well as the Busan commitment of ‘focus on concrete development results’; • Fiscal policy should immediately be turned into a key area of CSOs’ engagement at country level. The assumption is that fair taxation systems could be the key to more inclusive growth, lower income inequality and lower social unrest; • Produce evidence-based advocacy in order to ensure that they engage meaningfully in dialogue and effectively influence policy-making. 30 31 Albania Summary This report presents the context in which various development actors in Albania contribute to the establishment and development of democratic forms of governance, including civil society organizations. It presents an overview of the environment in which CSOs operate, and their efforts to establish relations with other political actors in pursuit of sustainable development. The first part is concerned with the legal and regulatory framework impacting civil society activity in Albania, especially in regard to fundamental rights guaranteed by international and national laws and conventions, including the freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of expression. The report further describes the political environment in which CSOs operate, and the state of cooperation and collaboration with state structures on various socio-economic and human rights issues. This section analyses the presence of multi-stakeholder institutions that have enabled CSOs action at the political level. Government context is another issue of importance described in this report. Issues of development cooperation between local and international actors are discussed and evaluated based on recent changes in the political landscape over recent years. The report further looks into Albania’s socio-cultural context, which evaluates how cultural institutions, religious groups, media and other institutions portray or interact with CSOs, and how this influences public perception of civil society. The final part of the paper looks into the socio-economic context and the actions taken by CSOs to influence the design and implementation of the measures on poverty, economic development, inequality, among other issues, whether independent from or in close cooperation with the state and other development actors. A summary of main conclusions is presented at the end of the document, highlighting issues related to development cooperation, CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness. Introduction The development of civil society in Albania over the past two decades was hinged on major legal and institutional shifts that tended to create a more enabling environment for CSOs. The 1990s, with the end of totalitarian rule and the transition to democracy, marked a rapid growth of the CSO sector. Civil society developed concurrently with the creation and development of the private sector and a free market economy. The initial stages (1990-2000) saw CSOs focus mostly on providing direct charitable assistance to disadvantaged sectors of society. This shifted gradually towards a stronger focus on advocacy and political lobbying through public education and the promotion of human rights. Today, civil society organisations in Albania are institutions, encompassing a diverse array of civic groups and think tanks, both big and small. This role has been driven and nurtured by political developments in the country, as well as by the strategies and development priorities of international donors (mainly bilateral governments). Albania’s first CSO, established in December 1990 and operationalised in January 1991, was the Forum for Defending Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms (currently Albanian Helsinki Committee). Yet 24 years after the establishment of the first CSO, official data on the total 32 33 number of registered and active CSOs in the country is still lacking. According to a document Whilst the registration of CSOs is not mandatory,16 in practice, nearly all organisations can legally accessed upon request by Partners Albania,12 which listed all organisations registered from operate only by registering as an association, centre or foundation—these are the three forms 1991 to2014, there are approximately 8,449 CSOs registered in Albania, of which 6,263 are of organisation recognised by law.17 Registration, though, becomes mandatory at the moment associations, 846 are foundations, 1095 are ‘centres’ and 245 are under the category of ‘others.’ they are awarded a project or fund by a donor agency. The contracting terms for benefiting However, there is no clear data on how many of these are still active or have re-registered under from these funds require an act of registration of the organisation and the specific number of the law for CSOs of 2001. taxable or juridical person issued by national tax administration offices. Registration is carried out based on an application submitted to the Tirana Court of First Instance, which is the only Over the past 24 years, the CSO sector in Albania has provided a range of services to different public institution in charge of the registration of CSOs in Albania. Overall, the legal framework target groups and communities, and its presence has been visible in providing valuable for the registration of CSOs is considered adequate and allows for a relatively straightforward contribution to public welfare. process of registration and operation in line with international standards.18 For years in Albania, many initiatives of citizens’ engagement in defending priority issues of The legal framework in Albania guarantees the right to enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly.19 public interest can be counted, as well as cases of CSOs’ active involvement in consultations A specific law on assembly has been adopted and is being implemented in Albania. Experience with the government drafting new laws, reviewing and amending existing laws and developing shows that there are no major problems with the implementation of this law by CSOs. With strategic documents such as: the law ‘on measures for prevention of violence within families’; regard to protests and other forms of civil disobedience organised by CSOs, there have been law ‘on gender equality in Albania’; law ‘for the protection from discrimination’; National no cases of outright violation or repression. However, in more overtly political protests, such Strategy for People with Disabilities 2005-2010; National Strategies for Gender Equality and as those organised by specific political parties either directly or indirectly, protesters were against Domestic Violence; National Strategy of War Against Human Trafficking 2008-2010; assaulted and repressed. The events of January 21, 2011, where four protesters were killed National Youth Strategy and National Action Plans 2007-2013, etc. There is still a lack of legal under unclear circumstances by national guard officers shooting from within the Prime Minister mechanisms to ensure CSOs participation in this. building, were perhaps the worst in recent times in Albania. With regards to financial and structural development of CSOs, there have been improvements The law guarantees the right for every citizen to organise and participate in peaceful and non- since 2009 with the establishment of the Agency for the Support of Civil Society (ASCS), a armed assemblies and gatherings without any discrimination, although such forms of gathering governmental body of financial and capacity building support for CSOs in Albania using state should be announced previously to the state police inspectorates in order for them to secure funds. From 2009 onwards, through ASCS, the state accords 900,000 USD annually to CSOs protection and needed services during the protests. Restrictions are applied in cases when the projects. The Agency, though, is debatably judged due to the state source of financing and the assemblies compromise national security and public security, the protection of public order selection process of the preferable CSOs to support. The state-funded support has not been and prevention of crime, preservation of health or morals or the protection of the rights and seen as a good practice of funding. Since 2013, ASCS has undergone a process of reforming, freedoms of other people. through close partnership with CSOs, with the aim of improving the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs in the country. Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom guaranteed in the country. Albania offers constitutional and legal guaranties for citizens to express their opinions without restraint. The approved development strategies of the Albanian ministries and Council of Ministers address public for open consultation through the CSOs’ members and representatives, and the Any limitations, such as restrictions on hate-speech, imposed by legislation are described CSO sector is addressed by the current government as a partner for development. clearly and in accordance with international laws in the Penal Code of the Republic of Albania. Libel is regulated in the Penal Code of the Republic of Albania, Section VIII: Libel offenses against Despite efforts and some improvements in the relations between the state and CSOs, as a result morality and dignity. In 2012, the Ministry of Justice proposed changes in decriminalisation of of initiatives from both parties to establish a sustainable and effective partnership, the state has libel and defamation by making it subject of the Civil Code instead of Penal Code. However, the yet to fully recognise the importance and value of CSOs as an independent and crucial partner changes were not approved by the Commission of Laws in the parliament. The only change in national development. Along with the development of national strategies and action plans approved was the size of punishment for libel from prison to fines. with wide public consultations, the review of the CSO-related legal and regulatory framework and the drafting of a law on the establishment of the National Council for Civil Society are some On the other hand, the fiscal treatment of CSOs is not considered effective and appropriate of the biggest steps of an inclusive national strategic planning that the Albanian government is for CSOs, and this constrains CSO activity to some extent. There are no specific forms for undertaking as a deep reform for social services in the country, as well as introducing the social accounting and financial reporting of CSOs to the tax offices, sensitive to the characteristics procurement as a tool of contracting CSOs and other private providers for the deliverance of of CSOs, and these do not discriminate according to the size or nature of organisations. The social services and activities for people in need. CSOs, regardless of their focus and specifics in activities with public benefits, report to the tax administration of Albania with the same forms and specifics as businesses do. The Legal and Regulatory Framework This lack of clarity in financial reporting forms for CSOs is reflected in the sporadic cases Freedom of association is a constitutional right for any individual and legal entity with no of businesses’ support for CSOs, or in cases of services provided to businesses from these discrimination according to age, nationality, legal capacity, gender or ethnicity. The freedom organisations. This, along with few relations among CSOs and businesses, has limited the and right of association are guaranteed by the Albanian Constitution and the Civil Code13 and collaboration between these two sectors in the country. In the Albanian legal context, CSOs are made operationalised through the Law on Non-Profit Organisations14 and Law on the are referred to as ‘non-profit organisations’ and the concept is confusing, whereas the law that Registration of Non-Profit Organisations,15 which regulates the implementation of this right. regulates the registration and organisation of CSOs allows them to have economic activities 12 From the Tirana Court of First Instance (Accessed in April 2014) 16 Law No.8788, dated 07.05.2001 on “Non-Profit Organizations, Article 3 13 Law No.8781 , dated 03.05.2011, For Some Amendments to Law 7850 , dated 07/29/1994 “Civil Code of the 17 Idem Republic of Albania” 18 Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development Country Report for Albania, 2013, 14 Law No.8788, dated 07.05.2001 on “Non-Profit Organisations” Partners Albania 15 Law No. 8789, dated 7.5.2001 “For the registration on non-profit organisations 19 Law No. 8773, 23.4.2001 34 35 within their mission and scope of work at the same time. • Law No. 10, 221 dated 4.2.2010 ‘On Protection from Discrimination,’23 provides under articles 32/1/b/k, 33/1/2, 43/3 that not-for-profit organisations are bodies who have On donors, the financial reporting policies are smoother, but apply indispensably the rules the right to submit a lawsuit against discrimination, and provides for close consultative and regulations of the Albanian tax administrations. The grants awarded to CSO on calls from structures under the Anti Discrimination Commission. foreign or local donor agencies, though, are not subject of taxation. • The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania24 provides under article 6/4 the status In this regard, there is a need to improve current tax and financial reporting-related legislation of process observer for non-profit organisations (national and international), and through a separate framework for the CSO sector, along with a need for an increase in internal in article 85/1 provides for representative membership for non-profits at the Media transparency, accountability and democratic decision-making by CSOs themselves. Monitoring Board during elections. In conclusion, the policy and legal framework in Albania does enable CSO activities as they • Law No. 92/2014 ‘On Value Added Tax in the Republic of Albania.’ The amended law support the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of expression, and on VAT, after a long period of CSO lobbying, under Chapter ii, Article 3, exempts these they are implemented on the ground while reflecting the international commitments signed by organisations, including their sources of funds, grants, membership quotas and the government. By and large, CSOs operate freely without state interference in their internal donations, from Value Added Tax. Article 51/ë provides that goods and services used governance and activities. There are exceptions. For instance in 2011, the government fined the for providing social services and within the scope of work of non-profit organisations Mjaft Movement without any well-argued basis. The fine was amended by Mjaft Movement, and are also exempted from VAT. the Legal Court of Tirana decided on Mjaft’s favour in this process. • Law No. 146 /2014 ‘On Public Information and Consultation’ was passed in late October The Political Environment 2014 after more than five years of pressure from CSOs and assistance by the Albanian Parliamentary Laws Commission to draft and pass the law. Under article 2/4, this law The general assessment of legislation and practice shows that CSOs operate without formal provides a mechanism of public consultation for groups lobbying in the public interest, restrictions but are nevertheless constrained by limited funding and real policy influence.20 and also defines CSOs as one of the forms of interest groups for the purpose of this The CSOs register at Tirana Court of Justice according to the law ‘for the registration of non- law. profit organisations,21 and operate under the provision of the law nr. 8788, date 7.5.2001 ‘for non-profit organisations’ last amended in 2013. • The National Strategy on Gender Equality and Reduction of Gender Based Violence and Domestic Violence 2011 – 2015,25 the Decade Of Roma Inclusion National Action Moreover, the right of citizens and CSOs to participate in policy and decision-making processes Plan 2010-2015,26 which provided for policies for protection against any form of is not a specific right guaranteed by the Albanian legislation. Rather, this right derives from discrimination. Local and central government institutions, CSOs, active groups of general principles of a democratic political system, different laws and other rights guaranteed citizens, among others, are designated as interest groups and implementation partners by the constitution, such as the right to free access of information of public importance, the in both action plans of these strategies at the local and national levels until the end of right to petition to authorities, the rights to a healthy environment, the right to propose laws, 2015. the right to referendum, freedom of speech, among others. As a result of long advocacy and pressure by CSOs, the Parliament of Albania amended the Over the last 24 years, involvement of CSOs in policy-making has not been inclusive, with Electoral Code in 2012 stating that, ‘for each electoral zone, at least 30% of the multi-member some CSOs being favoured over others and otherwise limited to certain stages in political list and/or one of the first three names on the multi-member list must be from each gender.’27 decision-making processes, while transparency and access to information have been poor and This legally promoted gender equity, in the highest decision-making body of the republic. problematic. Despite this, implementation of the gender quota was limited in major political parties and was Although there have been cases of government consultation with CSOs on several legal subject to fines due to code violations. Women’s groups focusing on gender mainstreaming initiatives, these has mostly happened as a result of international pressure, in the context of the and equality promised to continue their struggle in monitoring and lobbying for proper gender country’s aspiration for EU membership status. For instance, the government consulted with quota application. CSOs on the action plan to Address the EC’s 12 Priorities mainly to comply with EC conditions. According to the monitoring by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), out of 39 With regard to CSOs, there are no specific provisions for CSO representation in government meetings conducted by the Parliamentary Committee of European Integration (PCEI) in 2012 advisory bodies, though some do sanction their creation. to discuss 28 draft laws and one normative act, only one civil society group was invited to participate. One example is the law on gender equality in society, which stipulates the creation of an advisory body, the National Council on Gender Equality, chaired by the Minister of Social Notably, CSOs influenced, through advocacy efforts in legislative and policy initiatives, the Welfare responsible for gender equality issues. It is composed of 10 representatives appointed preparation and adoption of: by the government, three being from civil society. Being a minority in these bodies, CSOs face difficulties in leveraging policy influence. • Law No. 9970, dated 24.07.2008 ‘On Gender Equality in Society,’22 provides under articles 13/1/c, 14/2, 17/1/a, 30/4 that not-for-profit and trade union organisations are actors of securing gender equity by monitoring, evaluation and advocating for its 23 http://Internet.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20English%20NDL.pdf compliances, along the central and local government institutions. last accessed December 22nd 2014 24 http://Internet.osce.org/albania/14464?download=true last accessed December 22nd 2014 25 http://shtetiweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/nsge-gbv_2011-2015_final_-_english.pdf 20 From the Tirana Court of First Instance (Accessed in April 2014) 26 http://Internet.al.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/The%20Decade%20of%20Roma%20Inclusion%20-%20 21 http://Internet.partnersalbania.org/skedaret/1233137516-NGORegistration_alb.pdf National%20Action%20Plan.pdf, last accessed December 23rd 2014 22 http://Internet.osce.org/albania/36682?download=true last accessed December 23rd 2014 27 Article 67, para. 6 of the 2012 Electoral Code 36 37 Overall, there are no precise and clear standards that enable CSO engagement in decision- Development as an advisory independent structure of the Council of Ministers making processes, which allow for CSO input, and in a timely manner, and CSO representatives are still not treated as equal partners in discussions over development cooperation and • Presentation of The Charter for Civil Society for adoption to the Albanian Parliament, sustainable development policies. as political document of cooperation between the state/government and civil society. The Governance Context • Adoption Albania does not have an official national strategy stipulating state support for the institutional • Preparation of the guidelines of the Albanian Government Politics in support of civil development of CSOs and which targets civil society as a whole. Nevertheless, there have been society attempts to draft political documents that regulate partnerships between the government and CSOs. Worthy of mention is the preparation of the Civil Society Charter by a joint task force of • Adoption of the Law on Public Information and Consultation.30 civil society representatives and the government, with the support of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in 2009. The aim of the charter is to further develop the partnership In conclusion, initiatives do exist between governments and CSOs to establish meaningful between CSOs in Albania and the government, both at the central and local level, thus creating a partnerships for development effectiveness; however, it is too soon to tell to what extent sustainable and favourable environment in support of fruitful cooperation. civil society is actually able to influence policy-making on the ground, with multi-stakeholder development cooperation still in its earliest stages. Another important development in state support for CSOs through public funding is the creation of the Agency for the Support of Civil Society (ASCS)28 in 2009. The Agency is a The Socio-Economic Context public law entity managed by a supervisory board composed of civil society representatives and government officials. Based on the law, the representatives of the organisations of civil society The new government established in September 2013 has designed and published strategies are appointed on the basis of their contribution and experience, according to proportional and action plans to tackle the socio-economic issues facing its citizenry since the long path of representation of the main and priority fields of development and the strategic priorities for the transition. ‘Transition’ in Albanian new history is not only a word but a phenomena dating 1991, development of civil society. with a change in the governance system from a totalitarian communist system to democratic system. This transitory period was not only for a timeline of 23 years, but also a symbolism of The political context after the election of June 2013 offers a much more positive and open economic, legal and political instability, continuous and never-ending reforms, permutation in approach by the government toward CSOs, and a momentum highly appreciated from the the rule of law prevalence and disturbed image of the country in Europe and worldwide. sector. CSOs are approached in consultations and dialogue on reforms and legislative changes on central and local level (though to different degrees). However, there is a need for critical The National Strategy for Employment and Skills promises a new comprehensive approach to fight analysis of the results of these consultations and the extent to which the input of CSOs are poverty through the integration of economical, educational (traditional and vocation education seriously taken into account in these debates. The country report on the enabling environment training) and entrepreneurial policies; a national action plan aims to ease unemployment after of civil society development in Albania, conducted by Partners Albania, Center for Change and years of socio-economic instability. This policy targets increasing employment by matching the Public management, under the initiative of Balkan Civil Society Acquis - Strengthening the educational system to the market needs, while encouraging social inclusiveness. CSOs, both on Advocacy and Monitoring Potential and Capacities of CSOs (February 2014)29 cites that 47% of an independent basis and sometimes in cooperation with governments, have played a significant Albanian CSOs surveyed and evaluated the level of involvement of CSOs in decision-making as role in assisting marginalised groups of citizens through poverty relief, empowering groups low. of citizens to demand for their rights through advocacy and lobby campaigns, and through capacity building for women and youth to be able to better access the labour market. In recent In December 2013, the national conference ‘Social Partners – Time for Action’ was organised years, this has aided the government in applying successful models of economic empowerment by civil society actors with the aim of establishing a dialogue with the Albanian government, for disadvantaged groups. The social enterprises model is one of these. Although there is no with the facilitation of Partners Albania. The conference resulted in a statement from CSO widely accepted definition, social enterprises are ‘enterprises that combine social purpose with representatives calling on the government to address the issues discussed. The main pillars of entrepreneurial spirit.’ They are companies that provide profit, but the profit is re-invested in dialogue between CSOs and government, presented in the conference, were as follows: providing products and services to reach a wider social impact in the communities they serve and operate. The model of social enterprises, for example, was initially introduced and applied • CSO sector involvement in policy-making and decision-making, and the state’s support from CSOs in the early 2000s, and are now being promoted even by government institutions as a in this process; good model to fight poverty and contribute to sustainable development and the empowerment of vulnerable groups of citizens, protect the environment and encourage respect for cultural • Support of the CSO sector through an enabling legal framework; diversity and social cohesion. • The CSO sector as a social partner of the state in providing services for citizens and Social enterprises in Albania operate at these main activity fields: employment of disadvantaged public institutions. groups of citizens, education (formal and vocation for people out of the state and private education system), economic development and social and childcare.31 In close collaboration Important developments have been made in 2014 in addressing the three main pillars, with business companies of banking and telecommunication, along with the support of as follows: international donors, there is developed support to establish emerging social enterprises through seed funding, smooth loans and donations to these enterprises, as well as support • Establishment of a technical inter-sector working group, with representatives from through employment facilitation and coaching for their target groups, mainly covering people CSOs and the government, for the creation of the National Council on Civil Society in social and economic disadvantaged situation. 28 Law No. 10093, date 09.03.2009 “For the Organization and Functioning of Civil Society Support Agency” 29 http://monitoringmatrix.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Albania_Country_Report-ENG.pdf , last accessed 30 Law no. 146/2014 “On public information and consultation” December 22nd 2014 31 http://Internet.partnersalbania.org/development_social_enterprises.pdf 38 39 The National Strategy for Employment and Skills (NSESD) also foresees in its objectives a special as ‘competitive and characterised by genuine respect for fundamental freedoms.’35 Along with focus on social inclusiveness and social and territorial cohesion, with a special focus on the the massive demonstration of public support on sporadic cases, both private and government development and support for social enterprises and attention to gender equity and women’s media portrayal of CSOs are generally favourable. Televised media offered considerable access to the labour market. A detailed action plan for the NSESD, however, has yet to become coverage of CSOs’ activities of public interest, and civil society leaders and activists appeared public. present regularly on talk shows and opinion-shaping in local and national media debates. On women’s economic empowerment, social assistance is paid to women instead of men The atmosphere of camaraderie amongst CSOs and the media is rooted within very limited (to reduce the possibility of abuse from alcohol or gambling on the part of male heads of elite of thinkers and speakers on public issues and the fascinating and a vanguard topic the households) and support schemes for employment in collaboration with the business sector CSO sector covers in its activities. Among other articles, the law defines basic principles of radio are being promoted. Though the relation with businesses is fragile and difficult to manage, both and television activities in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the government and CSOs are playing a good mediating role in reconciling business interests and guarantees impartiality and tax-free policy in transmitting messages of social utility or high with the needs of communities through better employment opportunities and work standards. interest for the wide public. The printed media, though, tends to have a more critical and analytical According to a Prime Minister order32 dating June 2014, the National Strategy for Development approach toward the sector, at times affected by the political influence of media owners. Since and Integration has been drafted since, a national document designed with the input of all 2013, some prominent CSO leaders have landed key government positions, and this has been ministries and core state institutions. The strategy is to be sent for approval to the Council of subject to criticism by the print media that insists on the watchdog and opposition role of the Ministers by December 24, 2014. CSO sector. Such individuals from a successful past in CSOs keep manifesting high civic values at serving the public, and have introduced new and daring trends of operations related to public The abovementioned actions and strategies, and many other legal initiatives for the enhancement services. Such is the example of the Minister of Social Welfare and Youth, former executive of of the rule of law and the development of the country, manifest a positive trend from the Mjaft! Movement, a very successful and voiced citizens’ awareness campaign initiated in 2003 actual government to open the ‘development issues of the nation’ to public consultations and to late 2009.36 collaboration. CSOs, among other public actors, have both the expertise and the know-how to assist government institutions with regard to socio-economic development, though much still Major religious institutions, despite controversies over lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender needs to be done in order to design clearer mechanisms for collaboration and participation at (LGBT) issues, also have a broadly positive attitude toward civil society, and have worked with the implementation of these strategies’ action plans. CSOs in providing charity and support for marginalised communities. The dialogue and partnership with business actors is of a special focus and it is manifested Another important implication of the CSO sector in decision-making, especially in specialised through the Albanian Republic’s Investment and Business Strategy of 202033 and its action plan. research, relates to the involvement of CSOs in the EU integration process. After Albania was This strategy orients the Albanian economy toward a smart, sustainable and inclusive economic granted EU Candidate State status in June 2014, each stage in the negotiation process involved model, aiming at a considerable increase of jobs that will improve the situations related to CSO experts in their respective fields. This form of open dialogue and consultations was by labour market and will improve living standards of Albanian citizens. Referring to the Institute the need for extended expertise and recommendations of the European Commission Progress of Statistics of Albania (INSTAT) data of the third quarter of 2014, the overall unemployment rate Report of 2014 . Further monitoring and analysing of CSO input in this process is needed. has decreased compared to the same period of the previous year. In conclusion, the socio-cultural context in which CSOs operate in Albania is hardly homogeneous, with different sectors relating to CSOs differently. The image of CSOs is still fragile and at times The Socio-Cultural Context convoluted by media and other socio-cultural organisations, leading to low confidence of citizens toward CSOs and their work. According to the CSO Index 2013,34 the public image of CSOs in Albania was evaluated as 3.9 out of 7. Though at first sight this is still a low score, this indicator was one of the four index Conclusions indicators that manifested improvement during 2013 for the CSO sector. The general public perception of CSOs improved between 2013 and 2014. Over the past 30 years, the CSO sector in Albania has been a dynamic force, serving various communities. Its presence has been more and more visible, providing a valuable contribution Over the past year, there were two major CSO initiatives that engaged citizens nationwide. These to the wellbeing of the citizens. But despite improvements in relations between the state and include the Alliance Against the Import of Waste Agreement (AKIP) and the Alliance Against the CSOs, the state has yet to fully recognise the importance and value of CSOs as an irreplaceable Import of Poisonous Materials (AKILH), which channelled spontaneous public anger towards the partner in the development of the country. Some of our suggestions to improve this situation possibility that chemical weapons imported from Syria would be stockpiled for destruction in include: Albania, according to possible NATO agreement. An initiative of AKILH, it rapidly turned into a wave of massive protests involving thousands of citizens from various political affiliations. AKILH • The policy and legal framework in Albania regulating CSOs economical activities should and citizens protesting (media, university and high school students and teachers, professionals, be improved and clarified. elderly etc.) pressured the central government and the newly-elected PM to say no to the action proposed by NATO. • Mechanisms for civic participation should be introduced and effectively implemented by all state institutions at the local and central government levels. CSOs were closely engaged in the monitoring of the parliamentary elections of June 2013. This included monitoring of financial funding and the voting and counting process. This gave a positive • Mechanisms and standards for public consultation processes should be established note to the legitimacy of the results, as evaluated in the ODIHR report, released in October 2013 and operational to feed national discursions over development cooperation and sustainable development policies. 32 Official Gazette nr.102, date July 3rd 2014 33 http://Internet.ekonomia.gov.al/files/userfiles/Business_and_Investment_Development_Strategy_17_03_14_fi nal.doc last accessed December 22nd 2014 34 http://shtetiweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/nsge- 35 http://Internet.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true gbv_2011-2015_final_-_english.pdf 36 Mjaft! Movement is an NGO that still operates in Albania but its visibility and impact has decreased with the 34 The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index For Central And Eastern Europe And Eurasia entrance of its original leadership in politics in 2009 40 41 Burundi • Inter-sectoral partnerships among state institutions, CSO and businesses should be encouraged and monitored in order to successfully fight poverty in the country. Summary Recognised as a development actor in their own right, civil society organisations have come to References play an essential role in governance. BIRATURABA believes that by making their voices heard on 1. Country Report: Albania, Country profile for the year 2012, prepared by Partners Albania, Center sensitive issues such as human rights, political transparency and the fight against corruption, for Change and Conflict Management, Regional Conference ‘For Europe of the Western Balkans,’ civil society organisations can inspire others to also contribute to the social, economic and 26-28 September 2012, Zadar, Croatia cultural development of the country at the national and local level. Increasingly, new actors 2. Employment and Skills Strategy, Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth, Albania 2014 have emerged in the development arena, from the private sector to civil society, spurring a 3. Partners Albania, Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development, momentum in multi-stakeholder partnerships in support of development initiatives at all Country Report for Albania, 2013 stages, from policy formulation to project implementation. A participatory approach has been 4. USAID CSOs Sustainability for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 17th edition, June 2014 adopted by donors in Burundi, with steps taken to allow financing for projects and policies for local communities. This has been the trend since the drafting of the SFPF (Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté), the Fight against HIV/AIDS National Strategy, the Governance National Strategy, among other milestones. Civil society organisations have enormous comparative advantages as development partners alongside state actors. Their advantages lie mainly in their rootedness in local communities, their interests and their broad sectoral and geographic scope. The flexibility of these organisations has been proven by CSOs working in various areas. But civil society in Burundi is quite young and is clearly facing a number of challenges. The larger ones are linked to the emergence of political opportunism, internal institutional and organisational weaknesses, and the fact that both the Burundian government and the wider public, even while being beneficiaries of CSO interventions, at times fail to support or appreciate the work of CSOs. Despite these difficulties, the engagement of Burundian civil society in development effectiveness is beyond doubt, but discerning among the sheer number of CSOs has proven difficult, given the lack of detailed information about these organisations, and the fact that all or almost all of them require constant funding support from external partners. The present case study presents the contributions of Burundian CSOs to the development effectiveness process. It comments on their own effectiveness as well, taking as its starting point an organisation that has contributed to poverty reduction in vulnerable communities through the Saving Internal Lending Communities (SILC) projects. It also takes stock of the economic, political, socio-cultural and legal contexts in which they work. Introduction Burundi has, for more than a decade, gone through waves of periodic violence that have severely strained the country’s political and economic institutions, and left major challenges in their wake with regard to the fight against poverty, corruption and the pursuit of peace and security. A significant proportion of the Burundian population lives under the poverty line, and social problems have grown to worrying proportions: from the growth of urban slums and the informal sector to higher rates of school drop-outs, mendicancy, crime and sexual violence. The gross national income has experienced some growth in 2013: from 4.2% in 2012 to 4.6%; inflation has slowed from an annual average of 18.2% in 2012 to 7.8% in 2013; and the budgetary deficit has also gone down from 9.1% to 2%. The primary sector has gone back 2% between 2012 and 2013, mainly because of the environmental conditions that have affected 42 43 coffee production. BIRATURABA’s SILC Program and its Contribution to Community Rebuilding While overall economic indicators appear positive, the vast majority of the population remains BIRATURABA’s SILC Program is inspired by the Grameen Bank (‘rural or village bank’) initiative founded poor and, through its numerous interventions in social welfare provision, civil society has often in 1976 by economics professor Mohammed Yunus in Bangladesh. Yunus was moved by the poverty he saw in his village, poverty he saw rooted in a history of usury and exploitation. acted as a means to compensate for the state in the context of the latter’s withdrawal from public services. Yunus began with 27 USD, which he distributed among 41 women in the village. It wasn’t until Yunus saw that the poor were eventually capable of reimbursing the loan that he started to approach the local Quite a few Burundian civil society organisations complement state efforts in welfare provision, banks and foreign donors, offering himself as collateral. The idea turned into a pilot project in 1979, thus contributing to development through their work in sectors such as health, agriculture, covering a whole district. The Grameen Bank was established as a formal financing institution in 1983. education, disaster rehabilitation and recovery, education and transparency and monitoring of the government, among countless other initiatives. The next sections focus on BIRATURABA The SILC credit system draws from the Grameen Bank and is rooted in the belief both in individual self- and the impact it is making in development effectiveness. sufficiency and financial responsibility, and in solidarity among the poor. Only by acting together can they carry out an effective fight against poverty, through a credit system founded on mutual trust. BIRATURABA’s SILC Program and its Contribution to Community Rebuilding SILC’s savings and credit system has also been inspired by other traditional methodologies such as the Kenyan merry-go-rounds. These associations allow other poor people to save enough money to buy BIRATURABA’s SILC Program is inspired by the Grameen Bank (‘rural or village bank’) initiative founded household implements and long-term investments. in 1976 by economics professor Mohammed Yunus in Bangladesh. Yunus was moved by the poverty he saw in his village, poverty he saw rooted in a history of usury and exploitation. Structure and general functioning of SILC Yunus began with 27 USD, which he distributed among 41 women in the village. It wasn’t until Yunus In conforming with the basic principle of the SILC system, the self-chosen members of a group set up an saw that the poor were eventually capable of reimbursing the loan that he started to approach the local SILC and set up a pool of money from which they can borrow. The goal of an SILC is, mainly, collecting banks and foreign donors, offering himself as collateral. The idea turned into a pilot project in 1979, savings and offering basic insurance services in a community without formal access to financial services. covering a whole district. The Grameen Bank was established as a formal financing institution in 1983. However, as soon as the amount of money saved by the members is enough, anyone is free to borrow The SILC credit system draws from the Grameen Bank and is rooted in the belief both in individual self- and must reimburse the loan at collectively-decided interest rates that allow for a steady and productive sufficiency and financial responsibility, and in solidarity among the poor. Only by acting together can flow of finance. they carry out an effective fight against poverty, through a credit system founded on mutual trust. The SILC are autonomous and self-generated. This is a fundamental characteristic of their operations. All SILC’s savings and credit system has also been inspired by other traditional methodologies such as the transactions are made during the SILC reunions, for means of ensuring transparency and accountability. Kenyan merry-go-rounds. These associations allow other poor people to save enough money to buy The savings and credit cycle is usually time-constrained. The members agree to save and borrow, as they household implements and long-term investments. wish, from the SILC’s accumulated savings, during a limited period of time. Structure and general functioning of SILC The SILC members are free to choose the activities in which they invest the money. In Burundi, the majority use it for agriculture, livestock farming, construction, basketry, mechanics, painting, sewing, In conforming with the basic principle of the SILC system, the self-chosen members of a group set up an hairdressing and other small enterprises. SILC and set up a pool of money from which they can borrow. The goal of an SILC is, mainly, collecting savings and offering basic insurance services in a community without formal access to financial services. The composition of the SILC can be limited to 10 members or reach up to 30 members. BIRATURABA has chosen not to exceed 25 people per SILC who can in turn divide themselves in small sub-SILC. Both However, as soon as the amount of money saved by the members is enough, anyone is free to borrow women and men can become members, but, in the case of a mixed SILC, at least three out of the five and must reimburse the loan at collectively-decided interest rates that allow for a steady and productive chosen members of the committee must be women. flow of finance. The SILCs meet on a regular basis, in agreed intervals. These meetings can be weekly or bi-monthly. The SILC are autonomous and self-generated. This is a fundamental characteristic of their operations. All transactions are made during the SILC reunions, for means of ensuring transparency and accountability. The management bodies of SILC consist of a general assembly and a management committee. The The savings and credit cycle is usually time-constrained. The members agree to save and borrow, as they general assembly is the supreme body from which the management committee is chosen and draws its wish, from the SILC’s accumulated savings, during a limited period of time. power. The members of an SILC agree on an internal regulation in order to better guide their activities. The SILC members are free to choose the activities in which they invest the money. In Burundi, the The SILC strategy majority use it for agriculture, livestock farming, construction, basketry, mechanics, painting, sewing, hairdressing and other small enterprises. The goal of SILC is to ensure that group members move from financial dependence. The persons participating in the SILC groups acquire a new mindset around development linked to self-reliance The composition of the SILC can be limited to 10 members or reach up to 30 members. BIRATURABA and self-initiative, freeing them from manipulation by loan sharks that, in the Mutimbuzi and Buterere has chosen not to exceed 25 people per SILC who can in turn divide themselves in small sub-SILC. Both communities, on average demand 100% to 400% interest rate over a two to four month period. Group women and men can become members, but, in the case of a mixed SILC, at least three out of the five members are then freed from cycles of debt and usury that increase the vulnerability of poor households. chosen members of the committee must be women. The goal of the methodology is to provide mutual aid, savings and loans services in communities that are The SILCs meet on a regular basis, in agreed intervals. These meetings can be weekly or bi-monthly. not able to access financial services from the formal sector. BIRATURABA’s interventions involve close trainings for the population, in a methodology of solidarity, internal community savings and loans. The The management bodies of SILC consist of a general assembly and a management committee. The basic principle of the methodology is that the members of a community choose among themselves to general assembly is the supreme body from which the management committee is chosen and draws its form small groupings (or associations) of 10 to 25 members. In each association and through the weekly power. The members of an SILC agree on an internal regulation in order to better guide their activities. or bi-monthly meetings, the members gather their contributions, allowing them to establish two funds: a solidarity fund and an internal savings and credit fund. 44 45 To facilitate the work, each group sets up an internal regulation and chooses a management committee one-year period, in which case they become autonomous associations, receiving sporadic support from of persons whose role includes organising all general assemblies. In the case of a mixed group (men and BIRATURABA once every semester for occasional trainings. women), at least three out of the five management committee members must be women. To assure that the transactions are not made outside of the group’s meetings, all the assets of the group (money, Over the past three and a half years, the accumulated value of the agreed loans is estimated at more documents) are kept in a metal box with three locks. than 2.5 billion BIF, which is around 1.5 million USD. The amount of generated interests by these SILCs is estimated at 720 million BIF, which is around 500,000 USD. These funds enable those living in extreme The keys of each lock are kept by a member of the group who is not a member of the management poverty to invest for the long term. committee, and the box is kept by a fourth person in a location agreed in general assembly. In order to open the box, at least four persons outside of the management committee are then needed. This reassures the members and prevents misappropriation by the members of the management committee. The Legal and Regulatory Framework Before the associations begin savings and distributing loans, they start with six training sessions on the following areas: The legal environment in Burundi remains quite constraining for the work of local CSOs, - Group formation, leadership and elections despite stipulations by the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi that proclaims the freedom - Development of the association’s funds - Drafting of the internal regulations of association in Article 32: The freedom of reunion and association is guaranteed, as well - Running of the management support as the right to create associations or organisations in compliance to the freedom of reunion - Meeting procedures and association law; and Art 19, which incorporates all the internationally agreed conventions - Meeting for the constitution of the firsts savings and loans ratified by Burundi as an integral part of this constitution. SILC’s impacts on the lives of poor/marginalised communities The organic framework for CSOs, statutory Order No. 1/11 of April 18, 1992, contains a variety of barriers for the registration of CSOs. This includes grey areas around the authorisation For two years, BIRATURABA has guided the people of the Buterere and Mutimbuzi communities with this procedure in which the power of refusal by administrative authority has led to abuse, where methodology, resulting in more 7,000 beneficiaries, 64% of them women. CSOs have been prevented to register by high government authorities. The law grants no right The female members of the SILC groups carry out income generating activities, which enable them to to appeal in the case of a refusal of authorisation, and authorities are under no obligation to contribute substantially to meeting the family’s expenses. respond to CSOs in a timely manner. The SILC methodology also strengthens social cohesion and solidarity, critical in the context of a post- In addition, Law No. 1/11, passed in June 2013 in modification of Law No. 1/025 of November conflict society. 27, 2003, will have major implications on the freedom of the press. Case of Masumbuko Jean With the enactment of this law, Burundi has fallen in the world rankings on press freedom, Testimonies from beneficiaries show that the SILC methodology has allowed them and their extended according to Reporters without Borders (RWB), noting that Burundi has dropped from 132nd families to escape the misery in which they were living. This was certainly true for Masumbuko Jean, place to 142nd.38 who is married and is father to eight children. He owns a small plot of land where he plants rice, which is not enough to feed his large family. Often Jean is forced to seek work as a day labourer in the fields of The law contains several worrying provisions, including the denial of protection for sources other farmers to meet his family’s needs. In these conditions, it is impossible for him to make savings for of information, potentially forcing journalists to reveal the identity of their sources to the buying seeds at the beginning of the rice season. authorities in the cases enumerated by the law ‘in infringement of the protection of the sources principle.’ In the beginning of each harvest season, Jean takes a loan that he must pay back four months after the harvest season, and at a very high interest rate. Left with no other option, Jean is often forced to accept the offers from loan sharks who roam the area at this time, looking to take advantage of vulnerable The most recent and valid example concerns information on weapons which could be in the process of farmers such as Jean. In practice, if the usurers give a sum of 10.000 BIF at the beginning of the season, being distributed to youth affiliated to CNDD-FDD ‘Imbonerakure’ where two correspondents of radio come harvest season, he will have to reimburse the loan with a sack of rice valued at 50.000 BIF, an ISANGANIRO and Bonesha FM (Eloge Niyonzima and Alexis Nkeshimana) appeared before the Tribunal interest rate of 400% for a four-month period. It is in these conditions that Jean carried out his rice de Grande Instance in Bubanza on April 21 and 24, 2014 to deliver the sources of information broadcasted activities, like the majority of his neighbours. on a likely distribution of weapons to the youth of CNDD-FDD party. Moreover, this information was contained in a confidential BNUB report that also alerted the Security Council about a possible genocide On his involvement with SILC, Masumbuko Jean had this to say: in preparation if care is not taken. Just as worrying is the ban on releasing information perceived to threaten order and public In less than three months as a member of the savings and loans group, I have received a 10.000 BIF loan to buy rice seeds. The group’s internal regulations stipulate a 10% interest rate. This means that I had to reimburse or state security, including information pertaining to national defence secrets and economic only 11.000 BIF. With the usurers, I had to reimburse 50.000 BIF for the same loan. You can then understand policies. The law allows for strong fines against journalists, without right to appeal to the that, thanks to this group, I have saved 39.000 BIF that I would have had to give to the usurers… National Council of Communications. The SILC methodology has helped more than 10,000 families in Burundi’s rural areas. BIRATURABA is The freedom to form unions and the right to public demonstration has also been put at bay seeking to expand in a few more provinces following similar successes. by Law No. 1/28 (December 5, 2013), which is intended to regulate street demonstrations and similar activities. Organisers of all public demonstrations must first secure written consent from However, challenges remain for Burundian civil society, and the next sections detail some of the reasons the authorities who have the sole right to deny the right to protest in the interest of ‘public for this—the country’s difficult political, legal, socio-economic and cultural environment. order.’ The administrative authority holds the right to send to all public demonstrations one or Some figures several government worker(s) mandated to ‘assist,’ and hold the right to suspend or ban the From 2010 to 2013 (June) BIRATURABA has provided support for more than 1,700 associations composed of over 7,000 members. Some associations are promoted after receiving support during a 38 Internet.sociétécivile-burundi.org : world ranking of press freedom, Burundi steps back 10 positions, February 2014. 46 47 demonstration, if the enforcement of public order demands it. development and peace consolidation. It consists of the partners coordination group (PCG), established in 2008, which allows for coordination, monitoring and dialogue between partners The law on syndicalism is just as repressive, giving employers the power to fire striking workers around issues of development and peace consolidation. The PCG hosts discussions among en masse and deny them monetary compensation in the context of union organisations that sector groups, a monitoring and evaluation group, the Strategic Forum and the High Level are often unable to provide their members resources to sustain their strike. This has had a Political Forum (HLPF), which involves all development actors, including civil society and the dampening impact on the morale of workers and exercising their right to protest. private sector, in the post-2015 negotiations. Overall, the legal and regulatory context in which CSOs work are far from conducive. The At the local level, provincial development committees, community committees for community requirement for all CSOs to have certificates of registration, subject to renewal by authorities development and hill development committees exist, where CSOs are invited to engage. While on a yearly basis, has been likened by many to a ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over their heads. official documents contain all details for their implementation, these development projects and While the right to form associations is technically guaranteed, this is subject to restrictions monitoring structures are operational in only a few provinces. that some analysts consider incompatible with the freedom of association, not least with the constant need for CSOs to constantly renew their registration. Burundian CSOs have, for some time, played a significant role, alongside the government and other partners, in strategic planning as well as in the process of development aid mobilisation—a There is, above all, no room for debate around the enactment of these new laws that role that has at least been acknowledged by the government. complicate relations between the state and CSOs, weakening hopes for establishing an enabling environment for civil society. For example, CSOs have participated actively in consultations organised for the drafting of the SFPFII. The consultations aimed essentially at CSOs and the private sector and were organised The Political Environment with the triple goal of clarifying their role in the SFPF process, clarifying the modalities of their participation as various sector groups of the PCG and to listen to their recommendations as to The political environment from which Burundian civil society has emerged is characterised by priority areas for the SFPFII. an almost militant disregard for political accountability and chronic insecurity as to sources of financial and political support, both of which depend on the whims of those in power. With After the drafting phase, CSOs accompanied the government in the Burundi’s partners CSOs broadly regarded as members of the opposition by default, successive administrations conference held in Geneva on October 29 and 30, 2013, with a collective message of pleading have sought to foster their ‘own civil society,’ as a way to counter CSOs more critical of their to support the government. policies. Some CSOs engage directly in the facilitation of access to financing from non-traditional Issues related to governance, security, corruption, democracy and the respect for human partners such as some Netherlands NGOs ATTEELO and Friends of Worlds. This is mainly rights remain politically sensitive. Criticism of public policies in these domains is perceived as the role played by BIRATURABA in the negotiations for financing waste management in the direct assaults on authority, as an unacceptable and inappropriate meddling in the affairs of Bujumbura municipality, allowing contact between designated authorities and the providers of government. Hence the episodic warning against whistle-blowers to: “Mind your own business!” technical and financial assistance. Cases of libel or slander are often levied against state witnesses testifying against corruption, who at times become targets for extrajudicial killings.39 The Socio-Economic Context Some politicians even regard civil society to be working for foreign intelligence, or a sort of fifth Burundian civil society has evolved in a context of years of ethnic strife, leading to divides along column of the opposition. Such accusations against journalists and CSOs often come amidst racial lines that have not escaped CSOs, and this stigma continues to attach itself to their work. attacks on the publication of abuses committed by the state. From the first moments of the crisis that followed the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, civil society found itself divided along ethnic lines, or were labelled that Globally, the political landscape is judged as rather constraining for CSO: ‘Relations with way, with some groups perceived to stand for one ethnic category versus another, severely governments are good only and if only you don’t touch the sensitive string.’40 The situation is weakening their capacity to work together on various issues. especially poor for women. Women’s rights organisations point to impunity with regard to cases of violence against women, the general infringement of women’s rights, the marginalisation Despite the impressive growth in the number of CSOs, broad cultural acceptance for civil of political participation for women in policy-making and delays in the adoption of the law society remains weak. Movements of solidarity around causes of general social interest are in for inheritance and marriage freedoms. The situation is made worse by the lack of judicial their infancy, with poverty and inequality—while providing ample reason for resistance—also independence and unwillingness to redress crimes committed by state agents, ranging from hindering their ability to sustain their activities. Members of CSOs often have limited time on corruption to torture and extrajudicial killings. their hands to work on a voluntary basis. Leaders of CSOs, in addition, are sometimes seen to be motivated by financial interest. Conflicts within CSOs’ over-funding are also a source of concern. The Governance Context Finally, while civil society engagement in governance is acknowledged on a formal basis, broad The Strategic Growth and Fight against Poverty Framework (SFPFII) exists currently in Burundi public support for the causes and principles for which CSOs advocate is still lacking. This has as the official legal framework for the consultation and coordination of actors working on hindered their ability to mobilise people and the financial resources for the promotion of these causes. At times, resistance to political impunity and corruptions is characterised more by silent 39 The emblematic case is that of the murder of Ernest Manirumva, on April 9 2009, who was the Vice-president resignation rather than activism. of the Observatory of Fight against Corruption and Economic Misappropriation (OLUCOME). Evidence points to high-level members of Police corps, but not a single investigation has been opened against them. Speculations The optimal functioning of any organisation depends on its capacity to mobilise the necessary about the reasons for the murder affirm that the victim was working on a big corruption case involving high-lev- resources for its projects. el members of the State. CSO involvement in the case in the search for the truth about the assassination has heightened tensions between Burundian civil society and the State. 40 NGAYIMPENDA, E., Rapport sur la société civile Burundaise, Bujumbura, 2012, P 29. 48 49 In Burundi, this has proved extremely complicated for two major reasons. Firstly, conditions consultative frameworks between CSOs and governments will allow, optimistically, for reforms of poverty in the country mean funding are hard to come by, if at all, and these are often not on this front. Though still few in terms of numbers, some organisations do relatively effective enough to sustain their operations. Resources from direct contributions by members cover work in the monitoring of development effectiveness and they have expanded their reach barely 1% of their annual budgets. There is also a need to improve the capacity of CSOs to beyond Bujumbura. While the government still hesitates to open the gate wide to civil society, engage in financial mobilisation. some CSOs have already taken the first steps towards development effectiveness. BIRATURABA is a living example. Secondly and largely for this reason, Burundian CSOs are for the most part dependent on external sources of funding. References While both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Cotonou Agreement speak about 1. Bigirimana, J., Analyse critique du projet de loi portant cadre organique des Associations Sans But the need for donors to align their funding in the interest of the priorities of the beneficiaries of de Lucre au Burundi, Bujumbura, 2013 aid, broad thematic or programmatic funding is often denied in favour of stand-alone projects; 2. Burundi’s Codes and Laws (December31, 2006) 3. Decaux, E., Les grands textes internationaux des droits de l’homme, Paris, La Documentation financing exists only for individual projects, while the Cotonou Agreement states that 15% of the française, 2008 financial contributions should be given to civil society. 4. Paris Declaration on the effectiveness of development aid, Paris from February 23 to March 3 2005 Dependence on external funding remains a crucial problem for organisations’ sustainability and 5. Foucault, M., Surveiller et punir, Paris, Gallimard, 1975 financial independence. Donors often have requirements that are not necessarily aligned with 6. Hugh Allen, les Communautés d’épargnes et de crédits Internes(SLIC/CECI) : Guide de l’Agent de the programmatic priorities of CSOs that work more closely with people on the ground. terrain, CRS, 2006, version 2.1. 7. Ngayimpenda, E., Rapport sur la société civile Burundaise, Bujumbura, 2012 Donors are more willing to finance awareness-raising and advocacy activities such as seminars, 8. Law no. 1/010 of March 18 2005carrying the promulgation of the Republic of Burundi’s Constitution, Bulletin Officiel du Burundi, n°3 TER/2005, p.1 to 35 but rarely long-term development efforts, and even less on long-term institutional support 9. Planche, J., Accompagner l’émergence et le renforcement des sociétés civiles, Mieux comprendre crucial for ensuring wages for non-profit workers or the provision of office space for CSOs. les enjeux, Gret, Août 2004 10. Republic of Burundi, Good Governance and Fight Against Corruption National Strategy 2011-2015 Cross-Cutting Challenges 11. Sebudandi, C. et Nduwayo G, Etude sur la stratégie et le programme d’appui à la société civile burundaise, Bujumbura, 2002 Burundian CSOs are broadly confronted by the following major challenges: • Lack of strategic alliances: While Burundian civil society is constituted by a wide range of organisations, including networks big and small, only a few CSOs have branches throughout the country. Many limit their field of action to Bujumbura or other key areas in provinces where they are established. • Lack of internal capacity: Many organisations have weaknesses linked to both internal and external. Some of these weaknesses are structural and often linked to the lack of member engagement factors and organisational difficulties, in particular the lack of democratic management and alternation mechanism at the head of the organisations. Some organisations are strongly centralised around a person or a small clique, limiting their potential for expansion. • Lack of vision and weakness in leadership: The future of CSOs relies heavily on the individuals, considered as locomotives or pillars for these organisations, leading them. The lack of clarity of vision on the part of CSO leaders is a major handicap in the development of civil society and its ability to contribute to lasting political and socio- economic change. Conclusion Burundian civil society is at its formative stage in its development, and is working in a difficult political, cultural and economic context. Difficulties are therefore understandable and expected. To meet these challenges, there is a need for CSOs to work and act together, if they are to carry any weight and exert influence vis-a-vis other actors in the development arena. In many instances, this is already happening with support from national and international actors who are appreciative of the role CSOs play in the development process and who are willing to invest in them in this regard. Nevertheless the political, legal, and socio-economic context in which Burundian CSOs work remain far from conducive to their development. The gradual implementation of formal 50 51 Cambodia Given the size, diversity and scope of work of the civil society sector in Cambodia, it is crucial to take stock of its role and contribution to national development. This report contributes to this endeavour by analysing the environment in which CSOs operate and assessing the areas where CSOs have been successful in making positive impacts on policies and on the lives of people on Summary the ground, while looking at the challenges they face and ways forward. Civil society in Cambodia encompasses a diverse array of organisations that have played an The report is organised into six sections consisting of the assessment of Cambodia’s legal and active and important role in poverty reduction and sustainable development during the country’s regulatory framework, political environment, governance context, socio-cultural context and challenging transition to democracy. While such a role has been recognised in a number of socio-economic context. Each theme includes an analysis of the successes and challenges national policy documents including the Rectangular Strategy, the Political Platform for the faced by CSOs, backed by concrete examples. A list of recommendations will be proposed as 5th Legislature of National Assembly and the new Strategy for Development Cooperation and a way forward for CSOs and other development actors to work together in the promotion of Partnership 2014-2018, CSOs are not regarded as development actors in their own right or development effectiveness. treated as such. The Legal and Regulatory Framework In recent years, legal instruments have been used against civil society to deter free speech and free assembly, and an already restrictive regulatory framework will be tightened even further As a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and with the introduction of a new law on NGOs and association. Although the relationship between Political Rights, Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), Cambodia has a binding government institutions and civil society has been slightly improved, trust remains low. While a commitment to create an enabling environment for CSOs to maximise their contribution to number of mechanisms for CSOs to engage in policy debates exist on a formal basis, de facto development. representation and actual influence over the direction of Cambodian politics are more difficult to assess. Until recently, CSOs in Cambodia have been operating in a rather relaxed regulatory environment. The Civil Code of Cambodia 2007 determines how NGOs and associations can be formed and Cambodian civil society works in a difficult cultural and political environment. Local mainstream registered, but this was not strictly enforced.43 CSOs are not subjected to government audit or media lack genuine autonomy, as coverage is often influenced by the Cambodian state. As a inspection, and government oversight is moderate. result, work by NGOs on sensitive issues such as land reform and national resource management is often not reported, limiting access to information for the public. While online platforms and However, in recent years, the Cambodian government has attempted to tighten control on the the social media have somehow enabled CSOs to circumvent state-owned media, the adoption CSO sector. The Penal Code 2009, the Peaceful Demonstrations Law 2009 and the draft NGO law of a cybercrime law could put a stop to that. place more stringent requirements and restrictions on the formation and operation of CSOs. Despite these worrying signs, there are also window of opportunities to increase the voice and space for civil society. The new Strategy on Development Cooperation and Partnership 2014- The Penal Code 2009, which establishes the legal framework for defamation, disinformation 2018 promises to increase the representation of national stakeholders and strengthen mutual and incitement, has been repeatedly used to restrict the freedom of expression of civil society.44 understanding and trust between civil society and state actors. It remains to be seen how these Independent media outlets find themselves closely scrutinised. Lawsuits are often used as commitments work out in practice. threat against journalists, reporters or anyone criticising the government. Mam Sonando, owner of Beehive Radio that broadcasts commentaries that are often critical of government, Introduction was arrested, charged with ‘insurrection’ and sentenced to 20 years behind bars. After an international public outcry, he was released after serving eight months in prison.45 Cambodia’s post-war transitional economy has made significant progress on development over the last decades. Cambodia’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP) has grown from 6% to 7% The right of peaceful assembly is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the annually since the late 1990s. Poverty rates have fallen sharply from 39% in 2003 to just 19.5% Cambodian constitution. Yet despite the Law on Peaceful Demonstrations that determines the in this year.41 With its GDP per capita exceeding 1,000 USD for the first time in 2013, Cambodia legality of non-violent demonstrations, requests for peaceful protest have often been refused is now among the few low-income, post-war countries to soon graduate out of Least Developed if they are perceived as politically sensitive.46 Use of police violence and threats of arrest have Country (LDC) status. also been used to intimidate protesters and prevent rallies from taking place. Civil society is a key development actor in Cambodia whose activities have contributed In November 2013, a protest by garment workers to demand higher wages and better working significantly to this progress. A study in 2012 showed that total annual expenditure by condition led to a woman being shot dead by security forces, with 9 others injured and over 40 international and local NGOs in Cambodia has been estimated at 600-700 million USD, and demonstrators arrested.47 In January 2014, 11 human rights activists and peaceful protesters is comparable to current total government expenditure on social services. In 2012, CSOs in were temporarily arrested during a demonstration to deliver a petition calling for the release of Cambodia implemented 4,000 projects across the country, employing around 43,000 people the 23 activists and strikers imprisoned earlier.48 and providing direct benefits to 1.3 million Cambodians.42 The right to own land and other properties is a human right, but Cambodian state has not There are currently around 1,350 NGOs and associations in Cambodia working on broad and done enough to protect this right. While the law exists, the processes to gain full private diverse range of issues, including political advocacy on human rights and the protection of the environment, building local capacity for poverty reduction and improving the livelihoods of marginalised people. 43 http://Internet.metheavy.com/File/Media/Civil%20Code-English%202007%281%29.pdf 44 http://sogi.sithi.org/admin/upload/media/125-rlhnfhw1371009220.pdf 45 http://Internet.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/cambodian-activist-mam-sonando-freed 46 http://Internet.sithi.org/temp.php?url=publication_detail.php&mid=4769#.VGYds8kmFzA 41 National Strategic Development Plan (2014-2018), 2014, Royal Government of Cambodia, Phnom Penh 47 http://Internet.cambodiadaily.com/archives/woman-killed-as-police-open-fire-during-garment-worker-clash 42 Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2012, CSO Contributions to the Development of Cambodia, -46896/ 2011, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, Phnom Penh 48 Lhttp://Internet.cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=alert_detail.php&alid=48&id=5 52 53 ownership of land are overly complicated. The onerous requirement, together with the high To enable CSOs to fully engage in the design, implementation and monitoring of national cost, has prevented millions of Cambodians from applying for official title of their property. development plans and policy, a more open and transparent political environment is needed. Since 2012, the government claimed it has granted 450,000 new titles, but the conditions and Promoting a culture of honest discussion and creating opportunity for dialogue for government rules governing these titles have not been made available to the public, and it has refused to let and civil society to provide meaningful input and feedback to each other is an effective way to NGOs monitor the process.49 build trust and establish long-term working relations. Since 2000, some 420,000 people have been affected by forced evictions and land grab,50 The Governance Context most of whom were not properly compensated. Threats and violence were used against land activists. The court is corrupt and could not provide fair trial for victims of land dispute. Rather In principle, the government recognises CSOs as important development actors. The Political than upholding the rule of law and punishing violators, the court system has instead been used Platform for the 5th Legislature of National Assembly states that ‘the government welcomes as a tool by land-grabbers to legitimise forced evictions and falsely prosecute housing rights the participation of international NGOs in the process of improving and developing the socio- defenders. economy, as well as supporting and promoting the practice of democracy and respect of human rights.’55 In practice, however, the extent to which CSOs are able to engage constructively and Access to information from the government is a big challenge for CSOs in Cambodia. Information meaningfully in governance is debatable. on investment, government income and expenditures and national resources development are not available for the public, and request for such information by researchers and NGOs for A number of mechanisms exist as a consultation platform for CSOs to provide input on study are often not granted. CSOs have been advocating for the law on the right to access to Cambodia’s development plan. One example is the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum information, which has been in the making for 10 years but still has not been adopted. (CDCF), a high level meeting organised by the government and its development partners, where NGOs have an opportunity to report on Cambodia’s development progress and challenges from The Political Environment the perspective of civil society. Ideally, the event is supposed to be held every 18 months, but the CDCF has not met in the last three years. Until recently, the relationship between the government and CSOs can be described as ‘untrusting.’ There was a lack of political will to engage CSOs in policy-making process, and the credibility Another channel through which CSOs can influence national policy is through their representation of CSOs was—and is—often questioned by policy-makers. The Cambodian government’s in most of the 19 technical working groups (TWGs). These platforms allow CSOs to provide overall attitude toward NGOs is more of suspicion than cooperation. Organisations promoting input on national policies such as the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). Questions democracy, transparency and human rights, in particular, tend to have a sour relationship with remain, however, on the quality of representation of CSOs, as each TWG has only one NGO government. For example, an international NGO, Global Witness, got kicked out of Cambodia representative and they are often not allocated sufficient time and space to speak. for issuing a series of reports exposing political corruption.51 CSOs can also participate as observers in the Government-Donor Coordinating Committee, an Nevertheless, the relationship between government institutions and CSOs has improved slightly important forum for both the government and its development partners to review progress in recent years. The government has now opened some space for CSOs to engage at the national every 12 to 18 months. They can offer feedback to the government and donors by preparing policy level. A number of line ministries have agreed to host regular meetings with NGOs with NGO position papers on joint monitoring indicators (JMIs). whom they sign a memorandum of understanding. For example, the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Land Management have allowed the NGO Forum (NGOF) to meet with them on To strengthen comprehensive partnership with all stakeholders, the government of Cambodia a quarterly basis to provide updates on environmental and land issues.52 A limited number of published a new Strategy on Development Cooperation and Partnership 2014-2018. Among consultative meetings have been done with NGOs on various draft law policies, although such a few positive signs in it is the transformation of the Cambodia Development Cooperation consultations are usually not announced in a timely manner and not enough time is allocated Forum (CDCF) into the Cambodia Development Forum (CDF), with an increase representation of for meaningful dialogue. national stakeholders and a focus on broader development effectiveness and financing issues. The NGO Forum has over the years advocated actively for more space for CSOs to contribute The new strategy also includes the commitment to continue the Government-NGO consultative to policy development. By building trust and maintaining good working relations with the annual meeting which is established to promote mutual understanding and information sharing government, the NGO Forum and its network partners have provided substantial input on a on development progress and challenges. NGOs are allowed to self-select their representative wide range of national policies and laws such as Housing Policy, Food Security and Nutrition to dialogue with the government. Possibilities also exist to implement joint activities between Strategy Policy, Pesticide and Fertilizer Management and Use Law, and Farmer Cooperative Law. CSO and government-led initiatives for development effectiveness. Nevertheless it remains to Most notably, due to their active involvement in the draft Environmental Impact Assessment be seen how these commitments are implemented by Cambodian officials. (EIA) law, 50% of CSOs’ inputs were incorporated into the final draft of the law.53 So far CSOs has been moderately successful in lobbying for policy changes. For example, While progress has been made in opening up space for CSOs, the extent of their engagement CSOs’ inputs were accepted and incorporated into a number of important policies such as the remains limited. In some instances, CSOs were invited to join consultative meetings, but their National Strategic Development Plan 2012-2014, EIA law, land policy, Cambodia Climate Change viewpoints and inputs are often ignored. In other instances, an unreasonably short timeframe Strategic Plan, etc. A sustained advocacy campaign by CSOs has also resulted in a delay of a was given to CSOs to comment on extremely complicated pieces of legislation. The NGO Forum perverse adaption of the NGO law which could negatively affect the formation and operation of was once given less than two weeks to provide feedback to a 215-page-long National Strategic civil society organisations in Cambodia. If adopted, the law will impose mandatory registration Development Plan 2009-2013.54 of all NGOs, a violation of freedom of association and other fundamental rights. The law will also grant the government more power than ever to control the activities of CSOs, limiting their 49 http://Internet.cambodiadaily.com/opinion/cambodian-government-must-reform-land-rights-laws-60612/ 50 http://Internet.cambodiadaily.com/opinion/cambodian-government-must-reform-land-rights-laws-60612/ democratic space. Fear exists that the law’s vague wording might be used to clamp down on 51 http://Internet.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/06/silence_of_the_lambs.html groups that are critical of the government’s policies. 52 Interview with staff of the NGO Forum on November 10 53 The NGO Forum’s Progress Report (January 1-June 30, 2014) 55 http://Internet.comfrel.org/eng/components/com_mypublications/files/289277114248434273_Political_Plat 54 Interview with staff of the NGO Forum on November 10 form_of_the_Royal_Goverment_of_Cambodia.pdf 54 55 While the windows for CSOs to engage at policy level are potentially more open, it is important Political support to enable CSOs to conduct such research is not visible. In fact, in some that their capacity and communication be improved. Currently, policy-makers are often instances, local authorities tried to prevent CSOs from conducting field investigations to collect unimpressed with the policy advice they receive; they are often dissatisfied with the way they hard evidence for their advocacy projects. For example, an investigation team from the NGO receive it due to the inability of many CSOs to make their findings accessible, digestible and in Forum has been blocked numerous times by local officials during its fieldwork on illegal logging, time for policy discussions. Therefore, capacity building for NGOs regarding the use of evidence- land disputes and other human rights issues.59 based approach advocacy and an effective communication strategy is needed to maximise the influence of CSOs in policy development. The Socio-Economic Context The Socio-Cultural Context Cambodia has a population of 14.5 million people and a GDP per capita of 1,038 USD in 2013. The majority of the population lives in the rural areas and are involved in agriculture-related Historically, Cambodia has not been characterised by a strong tradition of civic engagement; activities. The population, particularly those in the impoverished countryside, still lacks basic civil society centres on pagodas largely playing religious, social and developmental roles rather infrastructure and social service such as education and healthcare. The Cambodian government than representing societal interests against the state.56 Cambodians were also not used to is working with bilateral and multilateral donors and local and international NGOs to address actively engaging the government.57 Since the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) the country’s many pressing needs. in 1992–93, donors and international organisations have helped to create and expand civil society in an attempt to narrow the gap in power relations between the state and its citizens. The Cambodian government’s commitment in the past focused to a significant extent on poverty reduction. This was also a cornerstone of policy documents guiding the development of At the time, CSOs were perceived as playing a crucial role in providing and supporting basic Cambodia, such as the National Strategic Development Plans, the Rectangular Strategy and the social services strengthening human and civil rights and creating awareness of gender Cambodian Millennium Development Goals. In this regard, progress was made and poverty was sensitivity, environmental sustainability and addressing a wide range of other socio-political indeed reduced from 39% in 2003 to just 19.5% in 2014.60 and socio-economic concerns. However, because CSOs depended heavily on external funding, their agenda were predominantly donor-driven. The government has made commitments to inclusive growth, sustainable use of natural resources and democratic ownership. The National Policy on Green Growth was developed in Today, CSOs’ engagement with the government has improved considerably. Other than serving 2013 with the aim of enhancing the wellbeing and livelihood of all people, in harmonisation with the role as a basic services provider, NGOs have contributed to policy development, monitored ecological safety, through green growth basing on green economy, blue economy, environment government and donor policies and development practices and empowered marginalised protection, social safety nets system and upholding of national cultural identity. grassroots communities to claim their rights. Nevertheless, CSOs are perceived in different ways by cultural institutions. For instance, the majority of media, which is under the influence However, these commitments stand in contrast to the developments on the ground. While of the government, positively view CSOs engaging in health and education as they are seen as a the economy is growing, the growth is neither inclusive nor equitable. Inequality remains service deliverer and are less critical of the government. But CSOs working in areas of advocacy widespread. In urban areas, the expenditure level of the wealthier quintile is 10 times as high on sensitive issues such as land and natural resource management are often viewed negatively. compared to the urban poor.61 Development projects such as hydropower dam construction, In fact the media do not report and discuss CSO efforts, events or publications, hindering access mining and other projects have led to a rapid loss of forest cover with impacts on the water to information for the public. system, flora and fauna. For example, the China-funded 190-megawatt Kamchay dam in Kampot province in Cambodia has flooded more than 2000 hectares for projected forest and To bypass the government-led media, many NGOs have turned to social media networks has negatively affected the livelihood of local villagers.62 In another case, 1,500 families were (especially Facebook and Instagram) as a means of expression and sharing information. The use forcibly evicted as a result of a 79 million USD- development project of the Boeung Kak lake area of social media has so far gone unregulated by the government and provides an important tool of Phnom Penh in 2007.63 for CSOs to reach out to the public, and the youth in particular. However, freedom of expression on the Internet could come to an end when the proposed new cybercrime law comes into effect. Most CSOs in Cambodia operate according to the Istanbul Principles. To illustrate, in 2004, NGO According to the draft document, anyone can be punished for publishing information that is Governance & Professional Practice (GPP) was established to promote professionalism and ‘deemed to be non-factual, which slanders or undermines the integrity of any governmental good practice within NGOs operating in Cambodia. In 2007, the Voluntary Certification System agencies, ministries, at all levels.’58 CSOs are very concerned that, if adopted, the law can be (VCS) was developed following examples of other NGO accountability and good governance used to arbitrarily punish people who share controversial opinions online or air complaints models from around the world. VCS is an important tool that helps to ensure accountability and about the Cambodian government. good governance in the NGO sector. It is currently one of only two known NGO self-regulation practices operating in Southeast Asia. Evidence-based research does strengthen development cooperation practice at national and sub-national level. For example, the NGOF carried out research on access to land titles for poor Democratic ownership and participation of CSOs are a challenge as well. Although it is households, especially on the issue that some of these households had been excluded from mentioned in the constitution that Cambodia should be ruled according to the principles of Systematic Land Registration (SLR) processes in the past. The research was carried out with the liberal democracy and pluralism, elements of democracy such as a separation of power are involvement of development partners active in the land sector; being a member of the research almost non-existent. There are loopholes in the judicial law that provide the executive a free advisory board, the publication was presented to the Land Ministry. As a result, development hand to interfere in the judiciary system. The legislative branch is weak and is lacking autonomy. partners and the Ministry worked on a concept of avoiding exclusions that are currently being Laws are often passed quickly without comprehensive debates. Even though the opposition is implemented. 59 Interview with NGO Forum’s Land and Livelihood Program staff on November 10, 2014 60 National Strategic Development Plan (2014-2018), 2014, Royal Government of Cambodia, Phnom Penh 61 http://Internet.fao.org/docrep/012/i1664e/i1664e03.pdf 56 Collins 1998 62 http://Internet.ngoforum.org.kh/administrator/components/com_ngoforum/files/hcpr_kam_chay_dam_eng.pdf 57 Downie, S. and Kingsbury, D. 2001 63 http://Internet.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/ASA23/004/2009/en/ba799041-ea9d-4f49-bcc8-616b65780780/ 58 http://Internet.cambodiadaily.com/archives/cybercrime-law-may-silence-critics-ngos-say-56288/ asa230042009en.pdf 56 57 represented now in the National Assembly, their roles and voice are still limited. Access to funding is one pressing challenge for CSOs in Cambodia who rely heavily on funding from external donors, mostly international NGOs. While the donors’ funding mechanisms are responsive to CSOs’ programmatic priorities, the funding requirement has become more complicated, making it difficult for smaller CSOs to apply for funding. Because donors prefer to fund short-term projects with clear measurable results, and are not as supportive of non-project costs such as staff benefits or training, many CSOs are not able to develop their institutional capacity or build stronger organisations. Furthermore, funding continues to be on time-bound projects, limiting CSOs’ ability to plan strategically for the long-term. Conclusions and Ways Forward Cambodian civil society is diverse, active and eager to contribute to the national development agenda. As a signatory to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and Busan Partnership Agreement, Cambodia has committed itself to contributing towards an enabling environment for CSOs. While progress has been made, CSOs are still faced with many challenges that prevent them from contributing meaningfully to development effectiveness. The following are some suggestions to address some of the pressing issues discussed above. • Secure and expand democratic space for CSOs to contribute to development effectiveness through the protection and promotion of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. • Promote further dialogue between civil society actors and the government to increase mutual understanding, trust and partnership. • Facilitate inclusive engagement of civil society actors in policy-making, and facilitate their involvement in the implementation of development initiatives at all levels by increasing CSO participation in the TWGs, CDF and other development consultative platforms. • The government should facilitate and protect members of CSOs who conduct independent investigations into sensitive issues such as illegal logging, land dispute, human rights violations and corruption. • Increase support for strengthening the institutional capacity of CSOs to apply for funding to effectively implement their activities and meaningfully influence local and national development policies. References 1. Collins, V. (1998). Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia, Phnom Penh: Centre for Advanced Study 2. Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. (2012). CSO Contribution to the Development of Cambodia, Phnom Penh: CCC 3. Downie, S. and Kingsbury, D. (2001). Political Development and the Re-emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23:1, pp. 43–64: 46. 4. 4. Gätke, P. and Borin, U. (2013).The Kamchay Hydropower Dam: An Assessment of the Dam’s Impacts on Local Communities and the Environment, Phnom Penh: The NGO Forum on Cambodia 5. Royal Government of Cambodia. (2013). Political Platform of the Royal Government of Cambodia of the Fifth Legislature of the National Assembly, Phnom Penh: RGC 6. Royal Government of Cambodia. (2014). National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018, Phnom Penh: RGC 7. Royal Government of Cambodia. (2014). Development Cooperation & Partnerships Strategy 2014- 2018, Phnom Penh: CDC 8. Silverstein, K. (2012). Silence of the Lambs: For do-gooder NGOs in Cambodia, accommodation with the regime is very profitable. Accessed online via http://Internet.slate.com/articles/news_ and_politics/foreigners/2011/06/silence_of_the_lambs.html 9. The NGO Forum. (2014). Progress Report (January 1-June 30), Phnom Penh: NGO 58 59 Cameroon misconstrued as development actors, they were made to feel part of the problem; individual organisations continually having to defend their right to exist, or mostly calling on government Summary to be more accountable, eventually led to CSOs being deemed ‘social agitators’ acting under the influence of foreign powers.74 As the international development community steps into the Millennium Development Goal deadline of January 1, 2015,64 there should be no room for complacency over progress achieved Further, widespread corruption at all levels of Cameroonian society75 suggests that the link so far.Much criticism, of course, has been levelled at the MDG parent framework.65 between transparent governmental practices, stakeholder mutual accountability, respect for human rights and better development results has yet to permeate through all sides of the Global civil society in particular, despite numerous inputs in popularising the framework,66 has development debate. Far more important for those with little or no awareness of local civil often pointed to and always deplored its lack of inclusiveness; for the most part, civil society society’s key asks is the ‘Cameroonian exception’ of being a peaceful nation in a part of the actors felt left out of the mechanism’s closed circle-like policy-making bandwagon. At the time world deep in crises.76 of its adoption in 2000, the overall picture was thus of world citizens forever standing on the margins of change—critical decision-making processes not only affected their livelihoods but This report highlights the need to foster a socio-political climate that will be conducive to CSOs. shaped their children’s future. The government and other development actors are all working together in strengthening Cameroonian stakeholder ownership of the ‘common goals and shared principles’ vision on With the creation of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) in 2012, this all which SDGs and, by some measure, MDGs before them, were founded. The report will thus changed. Its umbrella platform, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation examine five strategic areas for effective development cooperation to work both in theory and (GPEDC),67 through its Indicator Two, placed civil society at the heart of the development debate, in practice, namely: as outlined in the Busan Commitments.68 CSOs were now actively sought for fresh ideas on how • Socio-economic context to eradicate worldwide poverty; their guiding values,69 the Istanbul Principles, readily upheld • Legal and regulatory framework by former ideological opponents. The balance of power between state, private sector and civil • Political environment society, finally, looked to have evened out. • Governance context • Sociocultural context But civil society in Burundi is quite young and is clearly facing a number of challenges. The larger ones are linked to the emergence of political opportunism, internal institutional and Last but not least, the report builds on the CPDE Case Study of 2013 where a number of key organisational weaknesses, and the fact that both the Burundian government and the wider recommendations were made. In addition, it touches on transversal enabling environment77 public, even while being beneficiaries of CSO interventions, at times fail to support or appreciate indicators such as CSO-private sector partnerships, migration, or regional terrorism, which were the work of CSOs. either not featured or emphasised in the initial Cameroonian Enabling Environment Report.78 Nevertheless, these growing trends affect not just the capacity of CSOs to optimise their gains, In October 2014, Cameroon’s 4th National Household Survey70 was launched in the country’s but that of the state to tap into these for its own survival. economic capital Douala. With only weeks to go before MDG D-Day, how much richer as a whole did Cameroonians feel? Were they hopeful for the future? Did having both the MDG framework The core rights of civil society—the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression— and Busan Commitments anchored in their country’s development policies make a difference propel and underlie all aspects of development.79 in their everyday life? Legal and Regulatory Framework Whilst prerequisite to Cameroon achieving better development results, these questions which would indeed be associated with result-oriented development policies were quickly Some analysts have suggested that the rule of law must be the bedrock for the present overshadowed by news that 40% of the country’s population still lives in poverty—the same economic recovery of Cameroon.80 It is therefore prudent for the country’s laws relating to civil percentage as half a decade earlier.71 What, then, had happened to its ambitious Millennium society to be independently assessed and open to reform to ensure that their implementation Development Goal72 commitments? How could things have improved so little? or interpretation does not prevent local CSOs from participating meaningfully in the socio- economic progress that they themselves are seeking. Part of the answer is to be found in the extent to which Cameroonian civil society has impacted SDG (Sustainable Development Goal) ownership at local level. In August 2013, a CPDE Pilot Since 1990, Cameroon devised a framework for NGOs and civil society entities to operate legally. Study on the Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Cameroon73 found that too much power The term civil society is now widely used locally to refer to organisations that are not set up for remained in the hands of public authorities and that this is having a negative incidence over civil the express, specific purpose of creating profit. The legal provision under which these entities society-state relations. In a nutshell, the Cameroonian study showed that when CSOs were not can work forms part of the French Civil Law which permits NGOs and CSOs to be registered by the Government of Cameroon under the Law on Freedom of Association (Law No. 90/053 of 64 https://Internet.un.org/millenniumgoals 65 http://Internet.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/2013/sep/24/millennium-develop- 74 http://allafrica.com/stories/201409041550.html ment-goals-data-interactive 75 http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/eliminating-customs-corruption-new-approaches-cameroon-afghanistan 66 http://Internet.un-ngls.org/orf/MDG/civilsocietyaction.htm 76 http://Internet.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa.aspx 67 http://effectivecooperation.org/ 77 http://Internet.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CSI-Submission-to-HLP_Enabling-Environ- 68 http://Internet.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf ment-for-Civil-Society.pdf 69 http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_istanbul_cso_development_effectiveness_principles_footnote.pdf 78 The CPDE Cameroon Case Study was carried out in September 2013 by Elomo Andela, African Representative 70 http://allafrica.com/stories/201410271119.html in the CPDE Enabling Environment Working Group (WG EE) 71 http://Internet.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ 79 http://Internet.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CSI-Submission-to-HLP_Enabling-Environ- CAMEROON_2010-2014%20COUNTRY%20STRATEGY%20PAPER.pdf ment-for-Civil-Society.pdf 72 http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300 80 http://Internet.commonwealthministers.com/special_reports/the_rule_of_law_the_way_out_of_economic_quag- 73 http://Internet.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2014_02_20_CPDE_Summary_Country_Evidence_on_EE.pdf mire_the_case_study_of_cameroon/ 60 61 19 December 1990), the Law relating to Cooperative Societies or Common Initiative Groups the necessity to diminish the capacities of Boko Haram to harm local people, denounced the (Law 92/006 of 14 August 1994), or both. anti-terrorism law as a threat to the rights and freedoms of Cameroonian citizens. CSOs and political parties have corroborated this view, vowing to block its adoption. Extension of the civil society legal framework in 1999 through an NGO law was designed to grant NGOS access to public funding only. This was followed by reports that some associations The Political Environment were claiming to have NGO status without prior registration. Cameroon’s presidential system of government was, until 1990, based on a one-party system. At best, the new regulatory environment for civil society has crystallised divisions within the Following extended popular riots to denounce this state of affairs, democratic reforms began sector, with four different laws created to regulate CSOs’ work: one for community-based in 1990 with the legalisation of political parties other than the Cameroon People Democratic organisations, one for associations and another for NGOs, while trade unions have had to rely on Movement (CPDM).84 The country’s most recent general elections held in 2011 were won by international provisions. This may explain why later adjustments brought in by the government CPDM, led by current president Paul Biya who has been in power since 1982. Amidst relatively are yet to produce a national consensus over the real merit of the resulting framework, as low voter turnout,85 CPDM accounted for close to 78% of the votes;86 for the first time in the shown among 2013 study respondents who were said to be unsure of what is entailed or who country’s history, two women, Edith Kabbang Walla of the Cameroon’s People Party (CPP) and benefits. Esther Dang of the Bloc for the Reconstruction and Economic Independence of Cameroon, vied. The 1990 law has a fundamental flaw. CSOs have been given a lot of information relative to According to figures from 2007, opposition parties in Cameroon number 207.87 The Social ‘public utility organisations,’ but objective criteria on how to become one are more difficult to Democratic Front (SDF) headed by Ni John FruNdi has long been the main challenger, with large find. percentage of his supporters coming from the Anglophone regions of the country. Yet, in the 2011 presidential poll, SDF was a distant second with just 10% of the electorate88 considering Human Rights and Civil Society in Cameroon them to be a credible alternative. Amnesty International (AI) has published a series of reports81 on the human rights violation Until a decade ago, political parties were still the dominant critical voice in Cameroon. Since in Cameroon. These highlights the ‘human rights violations that were ordered, condoned or 2005 however, and no doubt boosted by the Paris Declaration on Development Effectiveness perpetrated by the Cameroonian authorities in contravention of their national and international and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action,89 Cameroonian CSOs have found a new lease of human rights obligations.’ Threats against and ill-treatment of human rights defenders and life. HLF4 gave local civil society further momentum to demand for increased accountability journalists; denial of the rights to freedom of expression and association; harsh prison both from global organisations working in the country and, crucially, from poorly-managed conditions; torture and other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment; and failure to governmental projects. protect the rights of women and girls are all cited in successive AI papers as being a common occurrence in Cameroon. The Governance Context Other reports carried out that are parallel to AI’s paint a similar picture. For instance, the USDOS Following a decade-long socio-economic struggle, the government launched its National - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 – Cameroon lists Decentralisation Strategy in 2004, aiming to increase the capacity of citizens to implement further cases of interest involving human trafficking.82 localised poverty reduction strategies. Much of local civil society advocacy has since focused on the link between laissez-faire public sector governance and lack of encouraging development In November 2011, seven trade union members were arrested following a public demonstration results. organised by the Central Public Sector Union (CSP) in front of the Prime Ministerial Office in Yaoundé. They included Jean-Marc Bikoko, President of the CSP, and leading members of To the government’s credit, Cameroon is one of only 13 countries which gained recognition several education trade unions. They were charged with offences relating to an unauthorised from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) for their substantial efforts toward the demonstration, and their trial was continuing until the end of the year. eradication of hunger. Food security, by definition, is already a central theme of COSADER (The NGO Collective for Food Security and Rural Development) advocacy and the organisation’s Partial law reform is also said to be responsible for the security woes of Cameroonian CSOs due proposed law on agriculture is currently under study by the government. At the very least, to ‘public authorities’ selective interpretation of the individual law articles.’ This in turn had led this demonstrates the need for a national governance structure where the government and to the rights of civil society representatives being ‘constantly and gratuitously violated.’ CSOs can combine mutual learning and knowledge-sharing to help advance local development agendas. But a new anti-terrorism law which was being drafted by the Senate as of December 2014 is likely to complicate matters further. The draft law is a direct response from government to the The new state financial regime (NRFE) has since January 1, 2013 been enshrined in law no. Boko Haram insurgency that has resulted in civilian casualties in Cameroon’s northernmost 2007/006 of December 26, 2007. NRFE came into being following 45 years of the national budget towns and villages. As of November 2014, Cameroon had deployed 2000 soldiers and recorded law being governed by the February 7, 1962 provision. Implementation of the NRFE began in 32 deaths from attacks mounted by the Islamist group. The new law makes punishable by the 2009 and was to be effective in three sectors (institutional, regulatory and communication/ death penalty ‘activity which can lead to a general revolt of the population or disturb the normal information-driven) at central administration office level. Decentralised state authorities (CTD) functioning of the country’ and for ‘anyone who supplies arms, war equipment, bacteria and are set to benefit from the new regime from 2015. viruses with the intention of killing.’83 In their annual general meeting on December 12, 2014, PLASNOSCAM, whilst acknowledging 84 http://Internet.encyclopedia.com/topic/Cameroon.aspx 85 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroonian_presidential_election,_2011 81 http://Internet.amnesty.org/en/region/cameroon 86 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroonian_presidential_election,_2011 82 http://Internet.ecoi.net/local_link/278646/395111_en.html 87 http://Internet.dibussi.com/2007/06/cameroon_why_so.html 83 http://Internet.globalissues.org/news/2014/12/05/20390 88 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroonian_presidential_election,_2011 89 http://Internet.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf 62 63 a) Transparency and accountability: Getting Government on board (too) widespread and no remedial measures have so far been announced. Civil society activities to reduce the accountability deficit in Cameroon have taken different Various multi-stakeholder mechanisms, which are designed to foster dialogue and partnerships forms. These in turn depend on the range and continuity of resources at CSOs’ disposal; key between CSOs, public authorities and other development partners, have nonetheless been areas of intervention include investigating, monitoring, publicising and advocating for greater created by the government. consultation as well as access to information. Indeed over 3,000 organisations categorised under the not-for-profit umbrella now work alongside Cameroonian public authorities, political A study carried out by AID GROUP Cameroon95 in 2010 found that there were 37 inclusive parties, the private sector, technical and financial partners, and the international community at mechanisms in existence. In terms of focus areas within the relevant instruments, the study large, everywhere global development challenges need local answers. cited public finance, decentralisation, agriculture, forests and the environment, health and education. Positive outcomes are subsequently noted as being: Typically, CSOs are involved in education, health and agriculture sectors. Their inputs are helping to sustain a vision of social justice fundamentally at the service of local livelihoods. • Mutual learning among stakeholders Further, organised citizen engagement should increase the likelihood of Cameroon’s broader • Stakeholders having greater access to information SDG obtainment in line with the country’s plans to achieve emergence by 2035. This is highly • Greater opportunities for CSOs to directly influence policy debates and shape policy significant given the current national poverty rate of 40%. outcomes • Possibility of CS ideas being capitalised through the adoption of new laws, as evidenced It should be noted that ownership of these indicators by CSOs, whilst tolerated, is not always in the Social Housing Law initiated by the Resident National Network; also, the welcome. It often involves criticising the government’s track record, which public authorities agriculture law reform project proposed par COSADER in 2011. still largely regard as undermining to their political personas. There is also a need to engage in a constant balancing act, distancing themselves from opposition parties’ outright anti- Despite such advances in policy influence, there is still work to be done to convince some establishment propaganda whilst maintaining their independence. sections of civil society of the veracity of the aforementioned mechanisms. Back in 2013, improvement in access to information was the only policy-influencing indicator which overall Particularly welcome in this regard has been the establishment of national commissions in scored a higher proportion of favourable respondent views. This could in part be owed to CSOs which civil society actors sit on behalf of their grassroots constituencies. These include: such as COSADER having adopted a cooperative approach vis-à-vis the government who has in turn shown itself more willing to take into account CS views. • The Lake Chad Basin Commission • The National Decentralisation Council By contrast, issues of donor transparency and more responsive donor funding mechanisms • The Anti-Corruption Commission were also significantly raised during the CPDE Study of 2013, yet 71.6% of respondents in the • The National Commission of Human Rights and Freedoms 2013 Study considered the current funding mechanisms to be short on these indicators. On the other hand, only 12.35% per cent of respondents judged current donor mechanisms to be Bills supported by civil society have also been passed in the National Assembly, including a bill responsive enough to CSOs programmatic priorities. on the fight against female genital mutilation (FGM),90 and a bill for the protection of people living with HIV/AIDS.91 The Socio-Cultural Context b) Fighting corruption: Another common ground Cameroon is home to 230 languages. These include 55 Afro-Asiatic languages, two Nilo-Saharan languages and 173 Niger-Congo languages. This latter group is divided into one West Atlantic Since 2000,92 in an effort to weed out corruption, more than 100 former ministers, public language (Fulfulde), 32 Adamawa-Ubangui languages and 142 Benue-Congo languages (130 of administrators and state corporation managers have so far been convicted, charged with which are Bantu languages).96 embezzling public funds and plundering national resources.93 Football remains a key topic of conversation between Cameroonians of all ages and ethnicities. In the context of rampant corruption, the existence of civil society is viewed as one way to hold With regular appearances in major world tournaments, the Cameroonian Football Team government to account. CSOs, in large part thanks to their evaluation and monitoring activities (Indomitable Lions) gives hope especially to socio-economically disadvantaged youth. Some vis-à-vis Government, are now seen as antidotes to bureaucratic state institutions. have argued that its nation’s love for football has been a major contributing factor to Cameroon staying an otherwise peaceful nation. Others see football as a means to divert attention from Nevertheless, CSOs have found it difficult to perform that crucial role in the context of strained the real socio-economic issues affecting the local population. resources. For instance, the law on political party funding does not have a civil society equivalent. With no funding laws to support their activities, respondents pointed to CSOs having Much like the rest of Africa, in recent years, Cameroon has witnessed a proliferation of to carry the often excessive burden of self-financing, a situation exacerbated by CSOs not being independent churches. Government has taken drastic measures to stem this flow and random familiar with the official public funding channels due to ‘lack of system transparency and lack establishment of new religious cults in local towns and cities. In August 2013, President Paul of information, despite what appeared to be favourable provisions in the 1990 NGO/CSO law.’ Biya ordered the closure of nearly 100 Pentecostal churches, citing criminal practices by church pastors, which potentially undermine local security efforts.97 Cameroon thus has been able Furthermore, a system of ‘administrative tolerance’94 long adopted by the government has led to to preserve its strong Roman Catholic heritage. There are an estimated 4.25 million baptised associations openly receiving funding under as NGOs. Though illegal, the phenomenon remains Catholics in the country, 26% of the population, spread among 24 local dioceses.98 Here the 90 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Female_genital_mutilation 95 Aid Group resulted from the participation of Cameroon CSOs at the Paris HLF 91 http://Internet.who.int/hiv/en/ 96 http://newuh.wordpress.com/2012/12/13/cameroon-africa-in-miniature-in-what-sense/ 92 http://Internet.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-11-10-voa31-69822757/415526.html 97 http://Internet.africareview.com/News/Cameroon-says-church-closures-to-go-on/-/979180/1966272/-/ 93 http://Internet.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-11-10-voa31-69822757/415526.html ie8px9z/-/index.html 94 http://Internet.africareview.com/News/Cameroon-says-church-closures-to-go-on/-/979180/1966272/-/ 98 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_Cameroon 64 65 cohabitation of Islam and Catholicism is still a case of best practice and is often cited as a model The recent escalation of tensions in the Central African Republic led to the arrival of 184,000 of socio-cultural cohesion. refugees in Cameroon and is now thought to host the largest number of Central African refugees.111 As a case in point, Garoua Boulai—a council located in the northern part of the Equally, the influence of colonialism has led to the emergence of two distinct regional cultures: country—has seen the size of its population double, from 40,000 in March 2013 to 80,000 in the Anglophone and Francophone regions, speaking English and French respectively, use March 2014.112 A number of expatriate communities are also well-established locally. In 2007 it different legal systems. was estimated that 1,250 Americans live and work in Cameroon.113 Ultimately, its rich national culture and diverse geographical landscape, among others, have led Crucially, high literacy rates, a young population and having English as one of its two official to Cameroon being described as Africa in miniature. languages (French is by far the most understood114), to name but a few of Cameroon’s well- documented strengths, have not been enough to help transform it into an ‘economic miracle’ Fighting Boko Haram: Cameroonians on the Front Line in the sub-region. Many Cameroonians living abroad blame poor governance at home for their reluctance to return. One of the biggest socio-cultural threats in recent months can be attributed to dissident group Boko Haram, with the Cameroonian government having now declared a full-blown war against With migration now a global phenomenon115 and Cameroon itself having become a full-fledged its membership. In April 2014, the group who advocates for a ban on ‘western education’ destination for socio-economic migrants,116 it is difficult to say whether the country’s so-called kidnapped 270 schoolgirls in the Nigerian town of Chibok.99 Spreading fear and terror by killing brain drain117 is linked to fewer prospects in the homeland, or to Cameroonians also wanting innocent civilians and disrupting local livelihoods has been its hallmark, something which a piece of the expatriate lifestyle, one that often carries with it its own risks. On December 12, all countries in west and central Africa now have a duty to address. Indeed the international 2014, French newspaper Le Point published an article highlighting what some of these are: community has closely been monitoring events in these parts of the world and a lot is expected unexpectedly low wages, a solitary existence and for too many Cameroonian migrants still, the of Nigeria’s most affected neighbour Cameroon in terms of its capacity to stop the Boko Haram pressures inherent to being their family’s only breadwinner.118 ideology from flourishing on its relatively peaceful shores. Against this background, the removal of visa controls within Cameroon’s main economic The Socio-Economic Context block, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), had been set for January 1, 2014. Implementation of the Schengen-inspired119 scheme would have gone some way to Cameroon is a country of 22.3 million people,100 of which one fourth is aged between 10 and solving Central Africa’s major handicap of being the least integrated region on the continent.120 19.101 The world’s wettest nation is also evenly split between its urban and rural dwellers.102 It So far, there has been no clear indication as to when the measure will take effect and could shares its western border with Africa’s biggest economy, Nigeria.103 But compared to the latter, potentially provide a boost for the Cameroonian economy. Until then, Cameroonians wanting at least in strict socio-economic terms, Cameroon remains disadvantage based on a number of to visit neighbouring Gabon for instance will be subject to often tighter immigration checks than key development indicators, among which ‘a 2013 Human Development Index value of 0.504— travellers arriving from overseas.121 in the low human development category—positioning the country at 152 out of 187 countries and territories.’104 As Cameroon secured its independence from France in May 1960,122 gaining access to United Nations membership later that year, local peoples’ expectations were to see their country As the most important market in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa entering a new era of effective governance and greater prosperity. (CommunautéÉconomique et Monétaire de l’AfriqueCentrale, or CEMAC), accounting for 30% of the regional GDP,105 Cameroon only achieved a ranking of 161—out of 189 countries listed For a quarter of a century following independence, Cameroon was able to rise, perhaps surpassing for this purpose—in the World Bank’s 2013 Doing Business report, the same position it held in the aspirations of its citizens, by becoming one of Africa’s most prosperous economies.123 2012.106 While it had moved to 148th place by 2014, a new regression is already foreseen for 2015,107 with the country’s ‘ease of doing business’ parameters relegating it to number 158. Beginning 1986, however, its economy shrank drastically owing to low prices of oil, coffee and Equally, Cameroon’s economic growth is being closely monitored. In 2013, it reached 4.9% and cocoa, all of which are the country’s main exports.124 should have stayed around this level in 2014, and again in 2015,108 a noticeable recovery from a low of 1.9% in 2009.109 In the early 1990s, Cameroon took a more difficult turn largely due to structural adjustment programs125 advocated for by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which in For many Cameroonians, their nation’s dismal socio-economic performance and the perceived 1995 led to the local currency—the CFA franc—losing half its value.126 Of importance was the degradation of their own financial prospects are intertwined. Online discussion forums,110 for 111 http://Internet.unhcr.org/pages/4a03e1926.html instance, suggest that Cameroonians generally do not feel that their country is making effective 112 http://Internet.ipsnews.net/2014/03/cameroon-counts-cost-cars-crisis/ use of its plural socio-economic, cultural and environmental resources, not to mention its 113 http://Internet.encyclopedia.com/topic/Cameroon.aspx relative stability when compared to other countries in the sub-region. 114 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon 115 http://Internet.1stcontact.com/blog/migration/20-interesting-facts-migration/ 99 http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/10/world/africa/boko-haram-hunt-arwa-damon/index.html 116 http://Internet.iomdakar.org/profiles/content/migration-profiles-cameroon 100 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon 117 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_drain 101 http://Internet.unicef.org/infobycountry/cameroon_statistics.html 118 https://fr.finance.yahoo.com/actualites/qatar-bienvenue-enfer-121900268.html 102 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon 119 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area 103 http://Internet.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26913497 120 http://Internet.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Cameroun_EN.pdf 104 http://countryeconomy.com/hdi/cameroon 121 http://Internet.gfmag.com/global-data/country-data/cameroon-gdp-country-report 105 http://Internet.housingfinanceafrica.org/country/cameroon/ 123 http://Internet.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/RISP%20CENTRAL%20AFRI- 106 http://Internet.housingfinanceafrica.org/country/cameroon/ CA-ECCAS%20English%20FINAL.pdf 107 http://Internet.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cameroon 124 http://Internet.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/90925/Cameroon/55100/Economy 108 http://Internet.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Cameroun_EN.pdf 125 http://Internet.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADF-BD-IF-2001-37-EN- 109 http://Internet.gfmag.com/global-data/country-data/cameroon-gdp-country-report CAMEROON-PCR-STRUCTURAL-ADJUSTMENT-PROGRAMME-II.PDF 110 http://Internet.iomdakar.org/profiles/content/migration-profiles-cameroon 126 http://bux-toweb.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-cfa-franc-pros-and-cons-brief.html 66 67 categorisation of Cameroon the following year as a highly indebted poor country (HIPC),127 sharply since 2012. From 500 million FCFA at the initiative’s launch that year, it had risen to 600 a denomination widely used at the turn of the new millennium to describe the most socio- million FCFA by 2014. In November 2014, it reached the billion FCFA mark with the signing of the economically challenged nations in the world. 3rd phase of the agreement between the Cameroonian government and five districts.137 Having had 27% of its total debt subsequently written off in 2006,128 Cameroon reached a The government is said to have been encouraged to do more HLI projects after seeing promising milestone. In a country such as Ghana where similar debt relief initiatives were being undertaken, results from the programme’s implementation by selected communities; according to the the government was able to generate strong growth rates of 5% to 6%.129 This is not the case in Ministry of Economy, 350 young people have been trained in various fields, with 1,200 new Cameroon where growth is said to have stagnated at 3% to 4%,130 thus taking longer to trickle jobs created between 2012 and 2014 alone, of which 300 were reserved for women.138 Based down to the local population through adequate investment in health, education and other key on these findings, the government now aims to have 20% of the country’s investment projects socio-economic infrastructure. follow the HLI model.139 A 2009 World Bank report131 noted that Cameroon was not on track to meet the Millennium If Cameroon is to realise its 2035 vision as set out in the country’s GESP,140 initiatives such as Development Goal 2015 deadline. In fact, the report noted that the country will face social unrest this offer a glimmer of hope that a greater diversity of Cameroonians will share in the fruits of due to slow growth and incrementally high poverty and unemployment levels. In recent years, local development. concerns have been raised about the proliferation of armed gangs mostly comprised of unemployed youth who have turned parts of the country into no go areas.132 Cameroon ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on August 23, 1994. In 1992, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination When it adopted its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2003, amidst efforts to against Women (CEDAW) adopted General Recommendation 19 in which it confirmed that alleviate its HIPC burden, the government of Cameroon placed great emphasis on growth and violence against women constitutes a violation of human rights.141 The government’s initiative employment to help galvanise national development policies.133 In 2007, the government began to empower women all over Cameroon and to promote their influence in the community is thus a comprehensive consultative process to fully update the previous PRSP, resulting in cabinet in recognition of the pivotal role they play in uplifting living standards and alleviating poverty, subscribing to a new Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) in August 2009, covering particularly in the rural communities, which also falls within Cameroon’s overall development the period 2010-2019. plans.142 In 2006, faced with a decade-long economic decline, former Minister of State and Planning The government has made efforts to improve local socio-economic indicators, among others, for Cameroon Augustin Frederic Kodock had underscored the necessity to take action. This, by promoting women empowerment and reversing youth unemployment in collaboration Kodock134 said, could be achieved by affording Cameroonians greater purchasing power so as to with civil society. However, there are real concerns over the fact that a majority of the 13% of spur and, ultimately, boost consumption. Cameroonian youth who are economically inactive are female.143 Salary increase may not give a lasting solution to the economic problem, but it is imperative to At best, local unemployment statistics can be described as patchy, with the government often increase salaries as contribution to solving the problem.135 having to rely on external expertise to generate relevant data. This contrasts with news that four of the largest trade unions in the country recently vowed to As a case in point, the June 2006 survey carried out by the National Institute of Statistics showed take to the streets if their demands of a higher living wage (i.e. 62,000 CFA francs against the that 36.6% of university graduates were unemployed;144 nevertheless, it is still not known what current minimum guaranteed wage of 28,216 CFA francs)136 and better social security were still proportion of second-hand market sellers are state university graduates; but so widespread is unmet as of December 31, 2014. Following an increase in petrol prices in July 2014, the same the phenomenon that it has become symptomatic of lack of decent and well-paid jobs, whilst at trade movements had called for public demonstrations. In the end, talks were held with the the same time demonstrating government’s inability to optimally manage national tax revenues. government and the initial plans for mass movements were dropped. This has led to trade Cameroon’s informal economy has long been thriving, creating a shortfall in state revenue that unions losing their credibility amongst their constituents and members, many of whom cast the Cameroonian economy can ill afford. a doubt on the capacity of union representatives to advocate for better living and working conditions by and large. Extensive bureaucracy around setting up business, meanwhile, has done little to help young people choose the entrepreneurial route.145 Worryingly, a direct consequence of unemployment On a positive note, the grant provided by the Ministry of Economy to Cameroon’s townships to among Cameroonian youth has been alcohol abuse, with dozens of bars located near colleges promote the implementation of high labour intensity (HLI) development projects has progressed and university campuses having been forced to close in recent years as the Cameroonian 127 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:20260049~menuP- 137 http://Internet.businessincameroon.com/public-management/1411-5125-cameroon-s-townships-create-1-200- K:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html jobs-in-3-years-with-himo-method 128 http://Internet.turkishweekly.net/news/31050/-cameroon-sees-5bn-debt-erased.html 138 http://Internet.businessincameroon.com/public-management/1411-5125-cameroon-s-townships-create-1- 129 http://worldwrite.org.uk/debtanddevelopment.pdf 200-jobs-in-3-years-with-himo-method 130 http://Internet.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/30727886-EN-CAMER- 139 http://Internet.businessincameroon.com/public-management/1411-5125-cameroon-s-townships-create-1- OON-AEO2008.PDF 200-jobs-in-3-years-with-himo-method 131 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/01/11178210/sustaining-reforms-inclusive-growth-camer- 140 http://Internet.platform2035.com/index.php/cameroon-2035/cameroon-vision-2035 oon-development-policy-review 141 http://Internet.omct.org/files/2004/07/2409/eng_2003_03_cameroon.pdf 132 http://Internet.sipri.org/research/security/africa/case_studies/research/security/africa/uploaded/cameroon_ 142 http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/69585/ study_2011 143 http://Internet.youthpolicy.org/peacebuilding/2013/10/action-against-youth-unemployment-in-cameroon/ 133 http://Internet.cameroon-info.net/stories/0,17687,@,unemployment-true-figures-out.html 144 http://Internet.cameroon-info.net/stories/0,17687,@,unemployment-true-figures-out.html 134 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustin_Fr%C3%A9d%C3%A9ric_Kodock 145 http://Internet.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cameroon/starting-a-business 135 http://Internet.cameroon-info.net/stories/0,17687,@,unemployment-true-figures-out.html 136 http://Internet.wageindicator.org/main/salary/minimu-wage/cameroon 68 69 government tries to address this challenge. Cameroon, it must be noted, has some of the Cameroonian youth highest alcohol consumption levels across Africa.146 • Create a young entrepreneur award • Promote women and youth parliamentary discussions involving thematic CSOs Lessons Learned • Reform the civil society legal framework to reflect the diversity of actors working under the CSO label • Absence of rule of law: So-called ‘administrative tolerance’ has been detrimental to • Establish a multi-stakeholder post-2015 governance commission law observance across the board, with public authorities, CSOs and the international • Leverage stakeholders to adopt necessary reforms through the organisation of at least development community of Cameroon so far turning a blind eye two advocacy meetings in 2015 for post-2015 appraisal and monitoring of the Busan • Cameroon is often cited as a model (for peace and stability), yet this view is not shared Commitments by all; all too often civil society actors are seen as part of the opposition • The perception among parts of society is that free travels and governmental favours References could be the main reason why some join the civil society movement • All too often, the choice and identification of CS representatives at key governance and 1. Cameroun - Etat des lieux et perspectives d’avenir: Une nouvelle vision du future. Bernard Puepi, dialogue frameworks remain in the hands of the government when these should be L’Harmattan 2012 handled by civil society itself 2. Creating and Managing a Civil Society Organisation in Cameroon: Legal Framework and Managing Principles • Technical and financial partners (TFPs) prioritise their programmatic line of action over 3. Enjeux et défis de l’initiative PPTE au Cameroun, Centre de Recherches pour le Développent local civil society’s key asks. Durable en Afriique (CREDDA), Presses Universitaires d’Afrique (P.U.A) 2001 • A clause stating that public authorities must be notified of CSOs’ intention to hold a 4. Implication de l’entrée en vigueur des NRFE sur les CTD, Centre de Recherches pour le public meeting is repeatedly and deliberately being misinterpreted; more often than développement Durable en Afrique (CREDDA), 2013 not, CSOs are required to obtain a formal authorisation to host such a meeting 5. The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations, 2012 Conclusion 6. La décentralisation administrative au Cameroun, Jean-Claude Eko’oAkouafane, L’Harmattan 2009 7. L’Afrique Centrale, le paradoxe de la richesse: Industries extractives, gouvernance et développement social dans les pays de la CEMAC, Isaac Tamba et Jean-Claude Tchatchouang - This report has shown that many factors affect the capacity of Cameroonian civil society to play Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007 a meaningful role in the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The onus is on 8. Ma foi: Un Cameroun à remettre à neuf, Christian Cardinal Tumi, Collection livres religieux, its actors to find new ways to engage an array of development partners that have traditionally Editions Veritas, 2011 been on the other side of the development debate. 9. NEPAD in perspective: A New Development Agenda for the Peoples of Africa, 3rd Edition, The Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), 2007 On closer look, however, the government and the private sector have more in common with civil 10. Parce que tu es une fille: Histoire d’une fille excisée. AssitaKanko, Renaissance du livre, 2014 society than we have been led to believe. The fights against regional terrorism and corruption, 11. Planification des plans nationaux de développement conformes aux OMD: Le cas du Cameroun, the preservation of peace and stability and the environmental costs of globalisation, to name Isaac Tamba, Centre de Recherches pour le développement Durable en Afrique (CREDDA), 2012 12. Système national d’intégrité: Transparency International Etude Pays, Transparency International but a few common grounds, will all require long-term commitment from local development 2007 stakeholders. Because these issues are complex, resources to address them will come in many 13. Une alternative paysanne a la mondialisation neoliberale, Centre Europe - Tiers Monde (CETIM) forms as well, each with its own merit. et Via Campesina, 2002 The Millennium Development Goal framework and Busan Partnership have tested the capacity of the international development community in general, and that of Cameroon in particular, to embrace these multiple resources. Often it has been through citizen power being exercised at the expense of civil liberties being protected. Until and unless the two are reconciled, neither side of the development debate will make the kind of progress that is required to make poverty history. This is true of Cameroon where CSOs have never been stronger than when they focus on the common good and speak out for the voiceless. Indeed it is on this terrain that their next victories will not just be won but preserved for future generations of socio-political change agents. The Enabling Environment National Assessment (EENA)147 project currently underway in Cameroon will no doubt build on the present body of evidence. After the CPDE Study of 2013, and Synthesis Report in 2014, EENA is yet another tool to facilitate the strengthening of Cameroonian civil society and the improvement of CSO-government relations. Crucially, it is a reminder that the enabling environment should be everyone’s concern. Recommendations • Set up a skills and career forum in partnership with local public authorities aimed at 147 http://civicus.org/index.php/en/link-to-related-newsresources2/2110-enabling-environment-national-assess- ment-lebanon-country-report 70 71 Czechoslovakia however, have not been fully met. Equally missing is a clear and binding commitment to policy coherence for development. The Czech contribution to the global development is far from perfect.152 Summary Development CSOs associated with FoRS are the main focus of this study. They represent The Czech Republic, a relatively small donor country and only a recent member of the Development an important part of Czech ODA efforts and are key development actors that play multiple Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD roles: they implement projects; they are endowed with grassroots knowledge of problems and DAC), accomplished a transformation of its Official Development Assistance system in 2012. Yet challenges in partner countries; they work as mediators and defenders of interest of vulnerable increased commitments on ODA quality and quantity have still to be met, and political support groups; and they participate in political discussions. FoRS aims to become a focal point for for ODA remains low. In addition, while official documents proclaim the eradication of poverty strengthening the roles of development CSOs and enhancing their political recognition. These and inequality as an explicit priority of Czech ODA, the focus of ODA efforts is still influenced by CSOs together aim at ensuring that Czech ODA maintains the eradication of poverty and economic interests. inequality as its core objective, and that ODA is not affected by narrow political and economic interests. However, resource and capacity constraints still limit the effectiveness of their joint With regard to civil society participation, the Czech NGO platform FoRS (Czech Forum for efforts. Development Cooperation) has become a respected partner of Czech institutions and other development stakeholders since its foundation in 2002. FoRS members participate in shaping There are two other CSO platforms working in related fields: Association for Democracy ODA and related policies through monitoring as well as through direct engagement in strategic Assistance and Human Rights (DEMAS) founded in 2008 and currently composed of 13 CSOs, consultations. However, they also face funding constraints, some legal barriers (e.g. with this and Green Circle founded in 1989 that brings together nearly 30 NGOs working mainly in the year’s new Civil Code) and internal constrains related to insufficient capacities and resources. fields of environmental awareness and advocacy. Until recently, development CSOs worked While they advocate for the fulfilment of development commitments by the Czech government, with these platforms and their members on a rather ad hoc basis. In the context of the post- they too have adopted their own code on effectiveness. 2015 processes, the cooperation on policy engagement and awareness-raising has increased significantly. FoRS members participate in both inter-sectoral partnerships (with entities from the public, non-governmental and private sectors) and cross-sectoral cooperation (among development, The Legal and Regulatory Framework environmental and educational CSOs), and consider these as key areas for effective development. Key issues related to Czech ODA, an enabling environment for CSOs and CSO development Major international conventions on human rights, and other laws that concern civil society effectiveness are reflected in this study. All fundamental CSO rights153 are reflected in the Czech legal framework and mechanisms exist Introduction to implement them on the ground, including the right to information. However, in the field of ODA, there are significant financial constraints due to the modest ODA budget and one- The position of the Czech Republic as a development actor on the international stage has year funding schemes. Only in August 2014, the government issued a decree making multi-year changed fundamentally over the last 25 years. Formerly, Czechoslovakia was a donor country grants possible, but this system will only be piloted in 2015. in the ‘Eastern Block.’ With the end of the communist era, the Czech Republic as a transition country was, until recently (2006), an aid recipient. Today, the Czech Republic is once again In addition, issues have been raised regarding the new Civil Code (enforced since January 1, a donor, being the 37th richest country of the world148 and a member of the OECD DAC. The 2014) that requires new registration and changes in the statutes of many non-governmental current system of Czech ODA was (re-)established after the Czech Republic joined OECD in 1995 organisations. as the first transition country of the Central and Eastern Europe region.149 The Czech Republic accepted its share of responsibility and demonstrated its interest in addressing global problems The commitments made in the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership and other and sustainable eradication of poverty. The establishment of FoRS in 2002 and the accession international agreements are still not fully reflected in the legal or policy frameworks, and there to the EU in 2004 reinforced the impetus for change in the development cooperation system. are no explicit road maps to fulfil these commitments. On the other hand, some operational mechanisms have already been adopted. For example, there is an on-going policy dialogue In 2008, the Council for International Development Cooperation was established as a multi- between FoRS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the commitments from the Paris stakeholder coordination and advisory body for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 2010, the Declaration are included in the ODA Strategy, a grant scheme on triangular cooperation was Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Provided Abroad was launched in 2004 (the Czech government promoted this form of cooperation in Accra) and the adopted, forming the ODA system transformation and establishing the Czech Development Declaration on Good Humanitarian Donorship was approved in 2006. More recent commitments Agency (CZDA). In May 2013, the Czech Republic became a member of OECD DAC, which was from Busan (2011) and Mexico (2014) emphasise mainly support for private sector engagement declared big political success and a confirmation of positive progress.150 This increased the in development. international prestige of the Czech Republic and strengthened its commitments to aid quality and transparency, including the commitment to increase the ODA budget.151 These commitments, 152 FoRS, Country page for the CONCORD AidWatch Report (2014) 148 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014): What Czechia is doing (is going to do) to contribute to eradicate poverty in the 153 The Czech legal framework promotes and protects the respect of freedom of association including: world by 2015 and onwards. NGO View on Czech ODA, http://Internet.fors.cz/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ i) the rights of all individuals to form, join and participate in an association, at national and international aidwatch-final-4-web.pdf (only in Czech) levels, with legal entity status if the founders so desire; 149 TRIALOG Systematization (2014) (draft outcome document, page 79) ii) the right of CSOs to operate free from unwarranted state intrusion or interference in their affairs; 150 CPDE, The Journey from Istanbul: Evidences on the implementation of the CSO Development Effectiveness iii) the right to pursue a broad range of self-defined objectives, including to seek and secure funding from Principles (2014), http://Internet.csopartnership.org/the-journey-from-istanbul-evidence-on-the-implementa domestic, foreign and international sources; and tion-of-cso-de-principles/ iv) other basic rights, mainly the right to freedom of peaceful assembly; the right to freedom of expression; 151 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) and the right to communication and cooperation with others in all sectors, within and across borders. 72 73 CSOs’ ability to follow the regulatory framework and to access and use information Section of the MFA, and commercial tie-ups have been strengthened. Besides bilateral projects implemented by private companies, a new programme of development/economic partnership CSOs are only partially able to navigate in the complexities of the Czech legal system. (‘B2B’ or Business-to-Business) has been piloted since 2013.157 New tools supporting private Reasonable—timely and cost-effective—access to legal services is missing, especially in light of sector engagement including its cooperation with other actors are in the pipeline and CSOs are the new Civil Code, which is too complex (3,081 paragraphs). In addition, some implementing engaged in these discussions. regulations to this law are still missing. FoRS monitors Czech ODA and provides recommendations for its improvement. Some The Act on Free Access to Information was approved in 1999, and CSOs are technically able to recommendations related to the Czech ODA Strategy or to project cycle management are already access and use information essential to their work from governmental institutions, including reflected in policy documents and operational procedures. Since 2008, FoRS regularly publishes statistical data on financial flows according to the OECD DAC standards. However, the available a Czech Aid Watch report, evaluating the Czech ODA in the past year with the aim of spurring information is not sufficient and some data are provided only in a consolidated form, with no discussion with other actors.158 With regard to the private sector, FoRS acknowledges its role in disaggregated information on crucial social indicators (e.g. per gender, diverse actors or target development as a potential source of job opportunities, income (incl. taxes) generation, new groups). investments, knowledge transfer and capacity building. However, FoRS affirms that economic interests should be promoted by different tools than ODA. The primary goals of ODA should There is a need to improve publishing and accessibility of Czech ODA information. An important be poverty and inequality eradication. These goals cannot be met by economic growth alone. step is the foreseen adhesion to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in 2015. An In that regard, all development cooperation initiatives, including foreign investments and independent ODA monitoring initiative, Publish What You Fund, assessed the transparency of commerce-related policies, must not impact negatively on the rights of people on the receiving Czech ODA as ‘poor’ in both 2013 and 2014. In 2014, the Czech Republic fell from the 7th to the end of ODA.159 The engagement of the private sector, as well as of other development actors, 10th place among the EU countries in terms of transparency. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic must follow the cross-cutting ODA principles (good governance, respect for the environment remains one of the most transparent donors among the ‘new’ member states of the EU.154 and the climate and respect for human rights, including gender equality) and the principles of development effectiveness (ownership, transparency and shared responsibility for results). CSOs’ engagement in expert consultations on the legal system Consultations between CSOs and government representatives on key policy issues pertaining CSOs have limited capacity to engage in expert consultations on the legal system. In particular, to ODA continue both on a formalised and on an ad hoc basis. For instance, FoRS created ad small organisations have limited capacity and expertise to study and comment on the country’s hoc geographical working groups during the mid-term revision of the Czech ODA strategy. legal framework. FoRS endeavours to reduce these gaps by organising special workshops and However, the impacts of these consultations have still been limited—priorities are politically other information and capacity building events based on the needs of its members. driven and there is limited space for CSOs’ right of initiative. For example, the grants for bilateral or triangular cooperation can be provided only for the projects in several priority countries or sectors set by the government. The effects of open dialogue are also limited due to generally The Political Environment low political support for ODA and due to low decision-making power of civil servants engaged in these debates. It is therefore necessary to set more effective cooperation mechanisms with Democratic institutions and recognition of CSOs parliamentarians and with other ministries. The accomplished transformation of the Czech ODA system in 2012 concentrated responsibilities The ODA budget has stagnated in several past years (149.5 million EUR in 2013, only 0.11% ODA/ and ODA budgetary mechanisms under the MFA. The Act on Development Cooperation and GNI), a ratio of bilateral cooperation160 is only 27%, and support for least developed countries Humanitarian Aid defines eradication of poverty as the main goal, and identifies roles and is decreasing (comparing to 2012, there was 10% fall).161 This can partly be attributed to the responsibilities of different state actors. The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech reconstruction project in Afghanistan, which formed a significant part of the Czech ODA support Republic 2010-2017 is a programme framework that concretises the objectives and principles for LDCs. of Czech ODA, geographical and sector priorities and modalities.155 The organisational setting and division of competencies between the MFA and the implementing body CZDA seems to be CSO consensus on political objectives relatively effective, providing better planning and coordination. Development CSOs consider extreme poverty as one of the most pressing global problems. FoRS is a respected partner for state institutions and participates in consultations on strategic FoRS envisions the eradication of poverty through environmentally sustainable and socially just issues such as the Development Cooperation Strategy and its mid-term revision or on modalities development, human rights protection, conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution.162 of cooperation with the private sector. FoRS, together with the Platform of Entrepreneurs for Development, prosperity and decent life are not possible without environmental protection and International Development Cooperation,156 has an observer status in the Council for International respect for planetary boundaries, inter-sectoral cooperation and linking domestic and foreign Development Cooperation. FoRS is also represented in several working groups of the Council, as well as development and non-development agendas. ODA should contribute to economic for example in the working group on evaluations. growth that does not put in danger long-term conditions for a quality life that is enjoyed also by the most vulnerable population groups such as women, children, small farmers and elderly CSOs’ participation in policy formulation and development initiatives 157 FoRS, Country page for the CONCORD AidWatch Report (2014), FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) Only a few political leaders advance development cooperation policies and practices that 158 FoRS, ODA of the Czech Republic in 2011 - Perspective of the non-governmental organizations joined together address the structural causes of poverty and inequality. The current approach focuses more on in FoRS, Briefing paper (2012), http://Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/AW-brief-EN.pdf economic growth and pro-export policies. ODA now is under the responsibility of the Economic 159 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) 160 The bilateral ODA includes development and transition projects, grant programs for NGOs (including trian 154 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) gular projects), small grant program at the embassies, humanitarian aid, programs for migrants, scholar 155 There are other related strategies such as the National Strategy for Global Development Education (2011- ships, peace missions, and other modalities, plus monitoring, evaluation, and administration costs. 2015) or the Strategy for granting scholarships to students from developing countries (2013-2017) 161 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) 156 Internet.ppzrs.org 162 FFoRS Strategy 2011-2015 (2011), http://fors.cz/user_files/strategiefors_final19.12.2011.pdf (only in Czech) 74 75 or disabled people.163 Consensus on key principles of effective development was confirmed by and transparency. The role of Czech embassies is also unclear, and new guidance on institutional adoption of the FoRS Code on Effectiveness164 in 2011. competencies has not been completed yet. New development diplomats in priority countries should help improve the design and monitoring of development projects. The Governance Context Predictability and continuity of funding is fundamental for effective development cooperation. ODA policies and practices The up-to-date system of one-year grants within a fiscal year complicates the implementation of development projects or programmes and reduces their impacts. Based on the new Cooperation with five priority countries is defined by multi-annual cooperation programmes. Government Decree (August 2014), the system of multi-year grants and programme funding Projects in other partner countries reflect the priority needs in several generally defined sectors. will be piloted from 2015. The system of ODA tenders should also allow for multi-year projects, The Czech MFA prepares an annual implementation and financial plan of bilateral ODA with which is already possible in other areas, including for projects supported by the EU Structural a mid-term outlook for the following two years. These plans are negotiated within the Czech Funds or the environmental projects managed by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Council for International Development Cooperation. During the consultations on 2015 plan, Environment. FoRS remarked favourably continuity of the Czech ODA and the strengthened focus on human rights, but also provided a number of recommendations, including the need to increase and Mechanisms for the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of cross-cutting ODA principles better use the ODA budget. are still not fully in place.168 FoRS, in cooperation with the Czech Evaluation Society, prepared a guideline for assessing gender aspects in development projects, and this guideline has been In the frame of bilateral ODA, a special Transition Promotion Programme was established in 2005 incorporated in the Terms of Reference for evaluations since 2014.169 The ODA plan for 2015 as a financial instrument of the Czech MFA, with the goal of supporting democracy and human emphasises support of all generation of human rights, in accordance with the Policy Statement rights, in light of the Czech Republic’s history of social transition and democratisation. The total of the Czech Government.170 allocation for 2015 is 1.8 million EUR. Its projects are implemented in cooperation with Czech CSOs and their local partners, underpinning the importance of civil society in democratisation CSOs’ own commitments and advancing multi-stakeholder initiatives processes, with a broader notion of human rights.165 In 2011, FoRS adopted its Code on Effectiveness, with five key areas linked to the Istanbul The grant programmes for CSOs include a programme on awareness and education (0.54 Principles: grassroots knowledge, transparency and accountability, partnership, respect for million EUR in 2015), a programme on capacity building and partnerships (0.11 million EUR in human rights and gender equality, and accountability for impacts and their sustainability. The 2015) and a programme on capacity building of the platforms (0.09 million EUR in 2015). The code is to help FoRS members enhance the quality and effectiveness of their operations. FoRS CSO must usually provide 30% of own co-financing. This disqualifies many small CSOs. A special members agreed that breaching of ‘key indicators’ (e.g. corruption) could eventually result in the grant programme supports triangular cooperation with other donors, in particular with the exclusion of a member from FoRS. This is also stated in the FoRS Statute.171 European Commission (1.23 million EUR in 2015). A budget of 0.18 million EUR is then allocated for ODA evaluations. FoRS members carry out an annual self-assessment172 according to indicators related to each principle. FoRS Secretariat monitors the annual changes and reflects learning needs in its Czech bilateral projects are divided between CSOs and the private sector on a relatively even capacity building plans. The findings are shared at FoRS General Assembly and discussed by the basis. The projects implemented by CSOs receive 39% of the allocated bilateral budget, while working group on effectiveness. In addition to self-assessment, peer reviews were introduced the projects implemented by private sector receive 36%. Universities and other academic in 2013 where the peers provide mutual feedback on using the code, prioritise learning needs, institutions have 6%, and governmental and local authorities around 6% share. Most of the set concrete plan of actions and assess progress.173 projects are launched through public tenders, with most of the supplies provided by the private sector. CSOs can submit their own projects in the relevant grant programmes but must ensure FoRS is also engaged in designing and piloting a peer-learning process on effectiveness policies their own co-financing. and practices among member organizations of CONCORD. Though official strategy documents acknowledge development effectiveness, the Czech Open partnerships of entities from the public, non-governmental and private sectors are key Republic has never had a clear implementation plan to fulfil its commitments with binding assumptions for effective development cooperation. Though this is also an important aspect targets, indicators or time schedules. This has not changed much since Busan. Some positive declared in official documents, there is no systematic support for joint projects carried out by steps have been taken in terms of improving coordination and harmonisation with other donors CSOs, private companies and other actors. FoRS has thus initiated or participated in several and implementing bodies, such as involvement of the Czech Republic in so called Joint EU multi-stakeholder initiatives. Besides the on-going dialogue within the Council for International programming.166 New themes have emerged, such as the private sector’s role in development. Development Cooperation and FoRS participation in thematic workshops organised by the MFA During the mid-term review of the Czech ODA strategy, an increased attention was given to or CZDA, the first big inter-sectoral event was a FoRS International Conference on Development development effectiveness and sustainability of impacts. In the recent study, FoRS proposed Effectiveness organised during the Czech presidency of the European Council in 2009. The several measures to improve sustainability of the Czech ODA projects.167 process of searching for possible ways of cooperation with private companies as well as Constraints for inclusive engagement of CSOs 168 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) 169 FoRS, Czech Evaluation Society, How to mainstream the different roles, needs and priorities of women and The governance of ODA programs is still not fully satisfactory. For example, the usual cutting of men in development, humanitarian, educational and awareness raising projects (2014), http://Internet.fors. the budgets of the approved project challenges the principles of good governance, effectiveness cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FoRS_CES_Metodika_gender_projektyZRS.pdf (only in Czech) 170 FoRS position to the Plan of Czech ODA for 2015 and for a mid-term outlook till 2017 (2014) (only in Czech) 163 FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014) 171 http://Internet.fors.cz/user_files/fors_code_on_effectiveness_en.pdf 164 Downie, S. and Kingsbury, D. 2001 172 http://bit.ly/MmlxjC 165 FoRS Code on Effectiveness (2011), http://Internet.fors.cz/user_files/fors_code_on_effectiveness_en.pdf 173 CPDE, The Journey from Istanbul: Evidences on the implementation of the CSO Development Effectiveness 166 Internet.mzv.cz Principles (2014), http://Internet.csopartnership.org/the-journey-from-istanbul-evidence-on-the-implementa 167 Körner, M., Píbilová, I., FoRS, Sustainability of Czech ODA Projects (2013), http://Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/ tion-of-cso-de-principles/ uploads/2014/04/sustainability-web-FINAL_ENG.pdf 76 77 academia is on-going, and FoRS has commissioned several studies on this matter. CZDA and 2013 by FoRS and carried out by NMS Market Research agency (1,210 respondents).177 MFA representatives are invited to all FoRS expert events and they regularly participate in the FoRS general assemblies. According to the results of the FoRS survey, non-profit organisations should be the main recipients of financial resources for humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Traditional An important cross-sectoral cooperation of development CSOs (FoRS), environmental CSOs big NGOs, two of them are FoRS members, rank among the best known non-profit organisations, (Green Circle) and educational CSOs has begun during preparations for the European Year partly due to their engagement during humanitarian crises, e.g. after the typhoon Haiyan in for Development 2015. Recently, they presented joint ‘starting points’ for discussions about Philippines. The main argument that would persuade people to financially contribute is the the global development agenda post-2015 to the MFA, sharing a joint vision of the world— guarantee that their money will get to where it is intended. The main motives of both ODA one where all human beings enjoy the right to a secure, decent and meaningful life without and humanitarian aid were assistance to people in need, improvement of health situation in exceeding planetary limits. Beyond fulfilling the unmet MDGs, they will also strive for changes in poor countries and ethical and moral motivations. Support for education is also important, as diverse areas such as energy sector transformation, better monitoring of development efforts, well as maintaining the positive image of the Czech Republic in the international arena. On the education for global citizenship, tax justice, gender equality, the protection of biodiversity, other hand, support for the Czech economy and domestic businesses, as so often mentioned democratic participation by citizens in decision-making processes and access to justice.174 by politicians, does not belong among the key motivations for ODA according to respondents. In addition, 75% of respondents support at least maintaining or increasing the ODA budget, and FoRS sees the European Year for Development as an opportunity to draw public and political 85% of respondents support teaching the topic of global responsibility in schools. attention towards the global development problems. FoRS will aim both to raise awareness and to engage in the policy debates by clarifying Czech position to the post-2015 global framework CSOs do not discriminate (post-MDGs/SDGs). CSOs will also support the Czech negotiations in the United Nations and the European Council and will contribute to CONCORD, Beyond2015 and CPDE initiatives. In In the annual self-assessment carried out by FoRS members on the basis of the Code on addition, FoRS aims to increase dialogue and cooperation with the private sector, especially with Effectiveness, respect for human rights and gender equality has constantly been very well the Czech Business Council for Sustainable Development and the Platform of Entrepreneurs for evaluated (‘…members and observers strive to improve the situation of socially excluded and International Development Cooperation.175 other vulnerable groups and to strengthen their role in the society, with special attention to women and girls’ empowerment…’). The responsible approaches in this regard are confirmed The Socio-Cultural Context by peer reviews among the members and by concrete projects directly focused on these issues. The joint communication framework of FoRS proposes a series of rules including respect to Respect for diverse cultural, social and political views those values that aim at achieving sustainable development, eradication of extreme poverty, achieving gender equality, meeting human rights and preventing and peacefully resolving MFA and CZDA recognise and, in general, respect the diverse cultural contexts of countries conflicts, as well as not criticizing or defaming the work of other NGOs without any serious where Czech ODA projects are implemented. On the other hand, development diplomats ethical motive.178 in partner countries are still often missing and the role of embassies is unclear. There is insufficient political and financial support for in-depth research on development issues or for The Socio-Economic Context enabling CSOs to conduct such research (within limited budget for bilateral cooperation). The total ODA budget is modest, bilateral budget even more so, and specific support for research is Broadly shared understanding of the structural causes of poverty and inequality limited. Some surveys, advocacy or policy activities, trainings, conferences or internships can be partially funded from the ODA programmes for CSOs. Attention to the complex causes of poverty and inequality frame Czech development cooperation, as reflected in relevant policy documents. Recognition of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs, and public recognition of civil society Funding mechanisms are formally responsive to priorities of CSOs and governments in partner Though fundamental rights and freedoms are well recognised, some minority groups, including countries, but there are legal constraints for decentralised funding; only the Small Grant small NGOs, do not have access to national or European funding schemes due to restrictive Scheme for Embassies has been allowed. After the Czech Republic became a DAC member, the eligibility criteria or due to the required co-financing. For example, for the EC awareness commitment on untied aid has become more urgent. FoRS started preparation of an analysis projects, only consortia of at least 10 countries can apply. Some politicians also still challenge on this topic which will include a participatory dialogue with the members on potential effects the role of CSO sector—this may relate to the fact that this relatively new sector was created and impacts. only after the ‘velvet revolution’ of 1989. Reliable funding mechanisms for CSOs Lately, the role of CSOs in addressing development challenges has been well-received by the mainstream and social media. The public appreciates real life stories and the visible outcomes Funding mechanisms for CSOs are in general reliable, transparent, easy to understand, and of development interventions. disbursed impartially. CSOs contribute to poverty alleviation and equitable development through community work, on-the-ground service delivery, capacity building, policy advocacy Czech citizens’ support for development cooperation and humanitarian aid was confirmed by and lobbying. On the other hand, the ODA budget does not respond to emerging needs and to the results of the annual Eurobarometer opinion poll,176 and the opinion poll commissioned in the international commitments. There is still low predictability and no long-term programme funding. In addition, due to the modest ODA budget and due to inappropriate appraisal criteria, 174 FoRS, Inputs from development, environmental and other NGOs for discussions on global development agenda post-2015, addressed to the Czech MFA (2014) (only in Czech)175 Downie, S. and Kingsbury, D. 2001 even the approved projects get their budgets cut. This approach challenges the basic principles 175 FoRS letter to the MFA (deputy minister for non-European countries and economic diplomacy) (2014): of effectiveness and accountability for results. Engagement of FoRS in the European Year for Development 2015 (only in Czech) 177 FoRS, Opinion poll: Czech citizens significantly support development cooperation and humanitarian aid, Press 176 EC(2014): EU Development aid and the Millennium Development Goals, Special Eurobarometer 405: http:// release (2014), http://Internet.fors.cz/sdruzeni-fors/dokumenty/tiskove-zpravy/#.VF5-gdEtDIU (only in Czech) ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_405_en.pdf; EC(2012): Solidarity that Spans the Globe: 178 FoRS, Communication Compass for Development NGOs: Practical Tips and Suggestions for Quality and Europeans and Development Aid, Special Eurobarometer 392: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ Effective Public Relations (2014), http://Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/fors_manual_A5_Inter ebs/ebs_392_en.pdf net.pdf (only in Czech) 78 79 CSOs’ policy and advocacy • Code on Effectiveness adopted by FoRS in 2011, with practical monitoring mechanisms including self-assessment and peer reviews Besides basic requirements on meeting the commitments on increasing ODA budget, FoRS requires more proportionate disbursement of financial resources for priority sectors of the Challenges Czech bilateral ODA, in particular, for education, good governance and civil society. Czech ODA should focus on sectors where the Czech Republic can use the added values and own • Recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right is quite good at the transition experience. These sectors do not necessarily need to belong to the priority sectors political level, but practical instruments and means of implementation are still missing of central governments or big international donors, but they are still essential for sustainable and CSOs are still required to follow governmental priorities. ODA is still endangered development. Many national strategies do not reflect the principle of democratic ownership due to the short-term political and economic interests. and many do not reach the most vulnerable communities and actors. Educational, social and infrastructure projects implemented with the co-operation of various actors should complement • Lack of policy documents reflecting the Accra, Busan and Mexico commitments on each other and enhance their impacts and sustainability. These joint approaches should be increasing development effectiveness; absence of commitments on policy coherence reflected in complex programming. However, in the education sector, the budget decreased for development. There are no stated commitments of the private sector either from 1.12 million EUR in 2014 to 0.83 million EUR in 2015. Of the Czech bilateral ODA budget, 60% is allocated for the projects in the sectors of water and sanitation, agriculture and energy.179 • Limited budget for ODA and no plan to reach the related international commitments;180 however, a policy debate on increasing the ODA budget has just started. In order to increase effectiveness and contribution to poverty reduction and environmental sustainability, development CSOs have adopted their own commitments in the Istanbul • Relatively good access of CSOs to policy engagement is hindered by limited knowledge, Principles, with special emphasis on democratic participation, human rights-based approaches the lack of internal capacity and financial constraints, including modest budget and and gender equality. FoRS approved its Code on Effectiveness in 2011 and continues its low predictability of funding (e.g. core funding or mid-term framework agreements are monitoring initiatives through annual self-assessment and peer reviews. The self-assessments still missing among ODA modalities). CSOs have to nurture the capacity to organise have continually revealed two strongest areas: 1) respect for human rights and gender among themselves and lobby for concrete policy changes. The mechanism for internal equality and 2) transparency and accountability. On the contrary, the weakest area has been consultations must be strengthened in order to increase ownership and build wide accountability for impacts and their sustainability, concretely, a proper assessment of impacts. consensus on joint positions. FoRS addresses these gaps through targeted capacity building activities. • Further improvements of the evaluation system are needed, with a focus on Theory At European level, a peer-learning system for sharing experience and best practices among of Change, on systematic assessment of cross-cutting principles (good governance, national CSO platforms has begun. human rights and gender equality and environmental protection), and on the use of evaluation results. Conclusions • There is space for political dialogue but its impacts are limited due to low political Despite a number of positive achievements in Czech development cooperation over the past support for ODA. The European Year for Development 2015 is an opportunity to years, challenges remain in the areas of development effectiveness and the promotion of more increase awareness and engagement of various stakeholders, including the private equitable and inclusive partnerships of CSOs and other development actors. Key successes, sector, on ODA issues. challenges and lessons learned are summarised below. Lessons Learned Successes/Achievements • FoRS members are still in the process of learning appropriate ways to enhance development • Enactment of the Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian effectiveness in practice. Ways forward need to be built on the basis of an open and fair Aid and the Czech ODA Strategy 2010-2017 which highlights the key principles of relationship, peer-learning, willingness to improve, and sufficient capacities, resources and sustainable development time. Knowledge exchange with other CSOs, platforms and bodies such as CPDE has been essential. • Establishment of the Czech Development Agency and the Council for International Development Cooperation (and engagement of FoRS) • CSOs must engage actively in global policy debates—presenting their political messages with a realistic understanding of the limits of these engagements, and buttressing their • System of development evaluations (with some areas to be still improved) demands with their own commitments to development effectiveness • Relatively high and stable public support for development cooperation and humanitarian aid • An intention to access IATI in 2015 (FoRS will urge the MFA to fulfil this promise) • Engagement of FoRS in national, European and global strategic discussions on development effectiveness; increasing engagement of the private sector in policy dialogue 180 Despite the resumption of economic growth, total ODA/GNI ratio fell back to 0.11% in 2013 – the lowest percentage since 2007 (ODA budget stagnates in spite of the commitment of 0.33% ODA/GNI by 2015); multilateral aid amounted to 73% of total aid and consisted mainly of mandatory contributions (e.g. to the EU budget and the European Development Fund), instead of bilateral and triangular projects and programs; 179 FoRS position to the Plan of Czech ODA for 2015 and for a mid-term outlook till 2017 (2014) (only in Czech) the share of bilateral aid to Least Developed Countries is decreasing. 80 81 References 1. CPDE, The Journey from Istanbul: Evidences on the implementation of the CSO Development Effectiveness Principles (2014), http://Internet.csopartnership.org/the-journey-from-istanbul- evidence-on-the-implementation-of-cso-de-principles/ 2. FoRS Code on Effectiveness (2011), http://Internet.fors.cz/user_files/fors_code_on_effectiveness_ en.pdf 3. FoRS letter to the MFA (deputy minister for non-European countries and economic diplomacy) (2014): Engagement of FoRS in the European Year for Development 2015 (only in Czech) 4. FoRS position to the mid-term revision of the Czech ODA strategy 2011-2017 (2014) 5. FoRS position to the Plan of Czech ODA for 2015 and for a mid-term outlook till 2017 (2014) (only in Czech) 6. FoRS Strategy 2011 – 2015 (2011), http://fors.cz/user_files/strategiefors_final19.12.2011.pdf (only in Czech) 7. FoRS, AidWatch Report (2014): What Czechia is doing (is going to do) to contribute to eradicate poverty in the world by 2015 and onwards. NGO View on Czech ODA, http://Internet.fors.cz/wp- content/uploads/2014/11/aidwatch-final-4-web.pdf (only in Czech) 8. FoRS, Communication Compass for development NGOs: Practical Tips and Suggestions for Quality and Effective Public Relations (2014), http://Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/fors_ manual_A5_Internet.pdf (only in Czech) 9. FoRS, Country page for the CONCORD AidWatch Report (2014) 10. FoRS, Czech Evaluation Society, How to mainstream the different roles, needs and priorities of women and men in development, humanitarian, educational and awareness raising projects (2014),http://Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FoRS_CES_Metodika_gender_ projektyZRS.pdf (only in Czech) 11. FoRS, Czech ODA: Contribution to poverty eradication in the world – View of NGOs associated in FoRS – Czech Forum for Development Cooperation, AidWatch Briefing paper (2013), http:// Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/brief-web.pdf (only in Czech) 12. FoRS, Inputs from development, environmental and other NGOs for discussions on global development agenda post-2015 addressed to the Czech MFA (2014) (only in Czech) 13. FoRS, NMS Market Research agency, Attitudes towards development cooperation and humanitarian aid, Final report from the survey (2014), http://Internet.fors.cz/sdruzeni-fors/dokumenty/tiskove- zpravy/#.VGL8lNEtDIU (only in Czech) 14. FoRS, ODA of the Czech Republic in 2011 - Perspective of the non-governmental organizations joined together in FoRS - Czech Forum for Development Cooperation, Briefing paper (2012), http:// Internet.fors.cz/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/AW-brief-EN.pdf 15. FoRS, Opinion poll: Czech citizens significantly support development cooperation and humanitarian aid, Press release (2014), http://Internet.fors.cz/sdruzeni-fors/dokumenty/tiskove-zpravy/#.VF5- gdEtDIU (only in Czech) 16. Körner, M., Píbilová, I., FoRS, Sustainability of Czech ODA Projects (2013), http://Internet.fors.cz/ wp-content/uploads/2014/04/sustainability-web-FINAL_ENG.pdf 82 83 Ecuador through the passage of a law, or be approved by the president who delegated this authority to each minister of state, depending on the relevant area. Summary • Industrial legal entities: these are governed by the commerce law and the law of companies. Historically, Ecuador has been a country with a rich civil society and citizen participation that • Public law entities: these are governed by all current public laws and regulations. has been characterised by a culture of participation. Many factors could help explain this. It • The registration process of CSOs is dispersed among different line ministries and is a country with—like many countries in Latin America—relatively weak states; therefore, between the national and local levels. While criteria for registering, monitoring, and communities have looked for other mechanisms to solve collective problems. Essentially, closing CSOs are harmonised through an executive decree, the registration of CSOs is Ecuador is one of the Latin American countries with the greatest density of civil society done with the relevant line ministry. organisations. The 1998 Constitution defines the government as a ‘participatory entity’ and establishes The Ecuadorian civil society sector has had a long history, very dynamic and creative, in the sense the right of citizen participation in various areas beyond the electoral process. The 1998 that it has proposed ideas and new knowledge, often on the frontier of important debates. In Constitution further promotes citizen participation in the formulation of health and education the last 20 years, civil society organisations had provided several of the proposals for reform policies; in planning; in policies directed to youth and children; in policies and programs aimed and institutional changes that were reached in Ecuador’s new 2008 Constitution of Montecristi. at indigenous peoples, Afro-Ecuadorians and women; and in agricultural, environmental and Civil society organisations generated and constructed the social base for new ideas so that cultural policies. It firmly enshrines the right of citizens to participate in public consultations, in today Ecuador has rights for nature and is very progressive in the realm of other rights such as presenting bills to Congress, and in revoking elected mandates in cases of corruption. rights for women and rights to political participation. The constitutional and legal framework in Ecuador provides a solid base for citizens to access CSOs in Ecuador over the last decade have gained a more vocal role, demanding not only greater public information. As previously stated, the current legislation is the result of a civil society accountability and transparency from the state, but also greater opportunities to engage in and media campaign for legislation on access to information. However, while the constitution public policy-making and in the monitoring of state actions. Today, Ecuador has an active and was largely the result of heavy social mobilisations, the legislation on access to information is diverse civil society. It is composed of NGOs, foundations, think tanks, private and public sector the fruit of a collaborative effort between different non-governmental sectors and the congress unions; professional, business and neighbourhood associations; women’s, indigenous and to enhance citizen access to information. The constitution guarantees citizens’ right to access Afro-Ecuadorian organisations and a plethora of informal organisations, including, for example, information. In addition, two important laws, the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and church groups, sports clubs and youth groups. Transparency and the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information, further specify the state’s obligation to share public information and citizens’ right to demand and access it. Introduction Governance This paper gives an overview of the legal and regulatory framework and the political, governance, socio-cultural and socio-economic context in Ecuador with regards to CSO enabling The 1997, social uprisings gave rise to important constitutional and legislative changes that environment. Finally, this report examines the state of development cooperation in Ecuador. formed the basis for the creation of new public bodies that would allow for greater civil society representation and participation in policy-making processes. These include the Civic Civil Society Enabling Environment in Ecuador Commission for the Control of Corruption, the Ombudsman, CONAMU (National Council for Women), CODENPE (Development Council for Nationalities and Populations) and CODAE. Legal and Regulatory Framework The legal framework has also created a relatively enabling environment for innovative In Ecuador, the hierarchy of laws is made up of: the political constitution of the republic, participatory experiences at the local level. Some municipalities have established participatory international treaties and accords, organic laws, ordinary laws, regulations, decrees, agreements budgeting processes and some regional governments have initiated processes of participatory and resolutions. planning. From when Ecuador was established as a republic till 2007, the country has had 20 constitutional Diversity and Reach of the Citizen’s Participatory System in Ecuador charters and each one has been a manifestation of global trends and government in power. However, with respect to CSOs, the most significant charter was undoubtedly the one of 1906 With the passing of a new Political Constitution (PC) in 2008, participation in matters of public that ushered in new freedoms and profound reforms in the political life of the state. interest has been enhanced (PC, Art 95).181 The Citizens’ Social Control and Participation Council or the CSCPC (PC, Art 207) was approved in 2010, giving a new mandate to the state to promote The right of citizens to associate and form civic, non-profit associations is encoded in the transparency in elections.182 constitution and the civil code, and in a number of different laws. These support organisation of civil society in various areas and of various interest groups, including children, youth, students, In 2010, the Organic Law of Citizens Participation (OLCP, 2010) deepens efforts to: women, farmers, tourism professionals, lawyers, teachers and consumers. The constitution of “Promote, encourage and ensure the exercise of participation rights of the citizens, collectives, Ecuador further guarantees the right to free assembly for peaceful purpose. Despite this, there are no organic laws in the Ecuadorian judicial system that refers to the civil society; to regulate 181 “All citizens will participate, individually and collectively, in a leading role for decision making, planning, it, rules have been enacted using executive decrees. These rules have classified the operations, management of public matters and in the social control of State institutions and the society, its representatives orders and oversight of these organisations. in a continued process of common construction. T will be guided by the principles of equity, autonomy, public deliberation, respect for differences, popular control, solidarity and inter culturality. The Civil Code recognises three types of legal entities: 182 The CSCPC will elect the following authorities: Peoples´ Defender, Public Defender, Attorney General, Comp- troller General and members of the National Electoral Council, Contentious Electoral Tribunal, Judiciary Council • Corporations and public benefits foundations: these are non-profits governed by the and any other needed to designate the members of other bodies of State according to the Constitution and civil code and regulations. For them to become legal entities, they must be created national law. (Art 55 OLCP) 84 85 communities, peoples and indigenous nationalities, Afro-Ecuadorian peoples and Montubio, as well as legal organisations, to be main stakeholders in the decisions that correspond, the EU institutions remain the main multilateral donors while bilateral cooperation has experienced collective autonomous organisation and the permanence of public management that involves significant decreases. Main donor partners in Ecuador during this last period have been Spain, the participation of the people (Art 1, LOPC).” (Non-official translation) the US, Germany, Belgium and Korea. Development Cooperation and CSOs in Ecuador Reductions in Spanish ODA (from near 70 million USD to less than 8 between 2007 and 2013) can be explained by the internal situation of Spain. The global economic crisis and consequent Development cooperation flows have been on a downward trajectory in recent years. cuts in global aid. Nevertheless there have been increases in ODA from Belgium and Korea, in the first case, in the area of education and in the second case, in areas of research, innovation Trends in ODA to Ecuador and protection of national industries. In terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the country receives a comparatively Relations with the United States, whose ODA has been cut by more than half during this period, small amount of resources in the Andean sub-region, a little over Venezuela. According to the were weakened given to disputes in the political field. The government of Ecuador has criticised Development Aid Committee, ODA received in 2013 was reduced by almost 40% in comparison in particular the behaviour of USAID on national territory and its partner organisations, accusing to 2007. it of political interference against the national government (similar to situations in Bolivia and Venezuela). For some organisations, this represents an intolerant attitude on the part of the government, and for others it is seen as a legitimate action. In any case, this has impacted on the policies of the government.183 The distribution of ODA, with data from the SETECI 2012 reflect that the main source of finance is bilateral with 81%, followed by multilateral aid constituting 13% in funds and 21.9% in projects. This shows that NGOs are the ones that assign the least per project (121,657 USD), compared to the multilateral (336.000 USD) and the bilateral (645.644 USD). See Illustration 2. Table 1. Ecuador: Net ODA Flows 2007 - 2013 (USD millions of 2012) Illustration 2. Distribution of ODA in Ecuador by source of cooperation until 2012. Own source and elaboration: SETECI, 2014. Out of the 5, 6% that come from ODA by NGO, almost half of the resources are executed by NGOs registered in the system of the SETECI (44, 6%) followed by local NGOs (27%) and the Central Government (21.6% through only one project). See Illustration 3. 183 Some of the events that caused a tense relation between the governments of Ecuador and the US: The decision of not renewing the agreement on the US military base in Manta in 2009; the declaration of the US ambassador as persona non grata; the decision to grant Julian Assange asylum in Ecuador; and also in 2014 the retirement of anti-narcotics and the non-renewal of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication (ATPDEA). After a year of receiving a missive from the TSIC warning that the USAID could not start new activities or con- tinue the ongoing ones as long as the framework agreement between the two countries weren’t re-negotiated. Illustration 1. DevCoop trends in Ecuador according to main donors. Source: When this processes failed, the US embassy announced in September 2014 that they would cease operations in CPDE (2015), own elaboration Ecuador. You can find more information on this issue at <http://spanish.ecuador.usembassy.gov/policy/usaid. html>. You can also see declaration of TSIC’s Director Gabriela Rosero: ‘USAID cooperation is through interme- diaries and is not sustainable´” at <http://Internet.eluniverso.com/noticias/2013/12/21/nota/1941916/gabrie- la-rosero-cooperacion-usaid-se-intermedia-no-es-sostenible>. 86 87 Illustration 3, Distribution of international cooperation of NGO by type of executing entity until 2012 According to the assigned amounts, the NGOs concentrate their action in the modality of social development (39.1%), health (32%), environment (13%) and refugees (8%). See Illustration 4. One final and crucial point is the relation between CSOs and DevCoop since the Organic Law of Citizens Participation (OLCP) establishes, in Article 8 on citizens’ participation in international affairs, the possibility of calling for a referendum in the case of international treaties, as well as the freedom to call for legal solutions considering the origin of the external debt which should be subject to principles of transparency, equity and international justice. Conclusion The report addresses socio-economic progress in Ecuador during the past few years that are connected to current government policies and the leadership of President Correa. Poverty reduction is evident, including political stability, as well as improvements in infrastructure, all of Illustration 5. Origin of INGO´s in Ecuador. which have ensured popular support for the current administration. Similarly, the government Source: TSIC (2015) has opened up more channels for public participation, along the spirit of the 2008 Constitution, Illustration 4. Distribution of international co- which aims to deepen democracy in recognition of, and in harmony with, the country’s ethnic, operation of NGOs by sector of intervention political, and cultural diversity. until 2012. There are several positions shared in this document such as those from governmental institutions that affirm that what is needed is the recovery of the role of the state in planning and social As highlighted by Ayllón (2014), greater clarity is required since tensions exist over who balance, the centrality of human beings over business and the overturning of neoliberal policies should manage DevCoop (usually among the institutions in charge of planning, including the that have negatively impacted on Latin America for decades. Department of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Ministry). There have been difficulties putting it all into practice.185 (See: Molina, Toro and Celi186, 2011) On the other hand, CSOs continue to pressure the government and hold it to account for its weaknesses. In addition, there is no space for CSOs to work in with regard to DevCoop,187 and ODA matters are usually restricted to INGOs (registry, follow up, monitoring and catchment in the information The slowness of some institutions to enhance spaces for public participation and to solve critical system) since this is under the jurisdiction of the SETECI under the current model (Decree 812), knots that are a legacy of the past should also be noted. There is, in this context, a need to truly 187 and policies tend to follow along donor models. deepen democracy. 184 Carlos Arcos. (2001). Ecuador: Cooperation for development. A decade balance. Quito: AbyaYalaito: AbyaYala; Bruno Ayllón. (2014) Citizens’ Revolution and Well Living: challenges of South-South cooperation in Ecuador. Amawta. Research Seminars. Quito: IAEN. pgs 75-106; NSDP: available at: Internet.NSDP.gob.ec 184 Camilo Molina, Ana Toro and Carla Celi (2011). Between the citizen revolution and the difficulties for civil 185 For example, during negotiations in 2014 with the German Government, the agenda was led by the Strategic society: Shadow Report. Manila: Reality of Aid. Insertion Coordination of the NSDP and the TSIC had a more technical role. A controversy was generated when 185 It is worth mentioning that CSOs were called to attend thematic round tables and a follow up committee of German parliament members intended to visit the country to verify the use of funds intended for environment. effectiveness in the country but it reduced its phase, and there are expectations to re-activate it. On its side, the This was rejected by the Ecuadorian government who even said through the Foreign Affairs Ministry that the Foreign Affairs Ministry has called CSOs to become involved in UNASUR, although it hasn’t had enough impact. money of IC would be given back in this field if that was the case. 88 89 Germany While the legal framework for citizen participation and access to information has significantly improved in recent years, particularly with the approval of the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information, a number of supply-side factors continue to pose challenges for effective civil Summary society engagement. The capacity of the public sector to generate and disseminate information to citizens remains insufficient, and a weak culture of transparency and accountability continues In 2011, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (HLF4) broadened discussions to plague the public sector. around aid and development effectiveness and significantly enhanced the role of civil society in this context. The present report takes into account the various contexts in which CSOs operate • CSOs should enhance governance and internal accountability systems to systematically with regard to both Germany’s external development cooperation work and to the enabling subscribe to codes of conduct, employ external and independent evaluations, financial environment for civil society domestically. Moreover, it gives an overview on the approaches of audits and other measures to enhance transparency and access to information on German CSOs with regard to promoting their own CSO development effectiveness. organisational finances (including sources of funding) and programs. • Document good-practice examples of CSO systems of internal accountability, The report shows that, while departing from a good starting position, there is considerable transparency and access to information, and make these accessible on the web. room for improvement for Germany’s contributions to development effectiveness. This is true • Form a CSO-monitoring mechanism to ensure CSO accountability and transparency. not only on the part of the German government, which needs to comply with its international commitments on development quantity and quality, but also for German CSOs. Civil society References organisations in Germany operate with considerable freedom, both with regard to their policy engagement and funding mechanisms. Yet, within the area of co-financing, government 1. Arcos, Carlos Internet Edison Palomeque (1997): El Mito al Debate. Quito: AbyaYala. 2. policies have increasingly restricted the independence of CSOs and challenged their capacity to 2. Arcos, Carlos (2001): Ecuador, Cooperación para el Desarrollo: Balance de Una Década. contribute to development effectiveness. Quito: Comité Ecuménico de Proyectos. 3. Economical Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2014) Introduction 4. Flores, R. (2010, May 29). Gobierno anuncia depuracion de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales. Hoy. Retrieved on December 20, 2010 The HLF4 in Busan shifted international discussions from aid to a more holistic approach 5. La Prensa Latina (2010, May 30). Denuncia Rafael Correa la existencia de unas 50 mil rooted in development effectiveness. This included widening the view from a narrow and more ONG en Ecuador. Retrieved on November 20, 2010 technical perspective on development assistance toward the broader context of development 6. OSC Ecuador (2011, January 7). Manifesto del Colectivo de Organizaciones de la Sociedad and, correspondingly, to a broader spectrum of actors. In this context, civil society, whose Civil (OSC) sobre el Proyecto de Reglamento para Personas Jurídicas de Derecho Privado own principles for effective development were recognised for the first time in Busan, had an con Finalidad Social Internet Sin Fines de Lucro. Universo. Quito, Ecuador. important role to play. 7. Presidencia de la República del Ecuador [The Office of the President] (2008, March 25). Executive Decree No. 982. Accessed on July 27, 2009 In Germany, organisations that focus largely on development policy account for roughly 5% of all civil society organisations, but belong to the sector with the highest growth rates. However, three quarters of these organisations operate on a volunteer basis. Even the organisations with paid staff usually only have a small number of employees. Research counts a total of roughly 42,000 organisations that are active in the field of development policy (Krimmer, 2013b). CSOs operate in an environment comparatively favourable to development effectiveness: Germany is the third-largest OECD DAC donor and has actively participated in the development effectiveness process since it began in 2003. However, the level of engagement varied with shifts in political leadership and significant challenges remain with regard to meeting Germany’s international commitments on ODA as well as the Busan targets on development effectiveness. The present report gives an overview on the state of development cooperation in Germany as well as on the environment in which German CSOs operate. It pays special attention to their access to political decision-making processes and to public co-funding instruments that have impacts on the capacity of CSOs to act as development actors in their own right. Finally it also covers the contribution of German CSOs to development effectiveness. 186 Camilo Molina, Ana Toro and Carla Celi (2011). Between the citizen revolution and the difficulties for civil The report pays special attention to the member organisations of the Association of German society: Shadow Report. Manila: Reality of Aid. Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs (VENRO), which together turn over 1.3 billion EUR in 187 It is worth mentioning that CSOs were called to attend thematic round tables and a follow up committee of annual revenues and predominantly employ paid staff (as of 2009, VENRO 2011b: 4). VENRO, effectiveness in the country but it reduced its phase, and there are expectations to re-activate it. On its side, the founded in 1995, has about 120 member organisations and is the most important interest group Foreign Affairs Ministry has called CSOs to become involved in UNASUR, although it hasn’t had enough impact. of NGOs focused on development policy in Germany. Its members are active in private and 188 The last modifications were given by Executive Decree 16 of 2013. For this purpose, the TSCI modified its regis- church-based development cooperation, humanitarian aid as well as development education, try process and updated the projects form in 2013 and 2014. Currently INGOs are requested to register with the public relations and advocacy. following information: 1.) Their annual operational plan, 2.) Projects form, 3.) Report on the level of execution and evaluation of executed programs in Ecuador, 4.) Data update form, and 5.) Form of volunteers and experts. This is a requirement for the devolution of VAT valid in the country for NGOs. 90 91 German Development Cooperation future policy of the German government can be drawn from the German Position for the ‘Post- 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development,’ which reinforce the principles of transparency and Contributing 14.1 billion USD in 2013, Germany is the third-largest OECD DAC donor and accountability, good governance and rule of law, political participation and strengthening of civil allocates 0.38 per cent of its gross national income (GNI) to development cooperation (OECD society, as well as equal rights and the principle of non-discrimination (Bundesregierung, 2014). 2014: 305). This is a clear shortfall of its commitments to raise the ODA-budget to 0.7%, according to the EU timetable for ODA growth. The passing of the budget for the year 2015 removed any remaining doubts that the German government will miss the target of allocating 0.7 % of the BOX 1: Busan principles for effective development GNI to development cooperation by 2015. The Busan Outcome Document identifies four principles as prerequisites for effective development, which are to be applied to all development actors: ODA funds are disbursed mainly by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), but also by the Foreign Office (AA), the Ministry for the Environment and • Ownership of development priorities by developing countries the Ministry of Education, as well as by federal states and municipalities. While the BMZ has • Focus on results the lead role in development policy and controls the largest share of the funds (60%), the AA is • Development partnerships inclusive of all actors responsible for humanitarian aid (9% of the funds) (BMZ, 2014a). • Transparency and accountability also towards the intended beneficiaries, citizens and other development actors Combating poverty and hunger in German partner countries as well as the promotion of Source: Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) democracy and the rule of law are the overarching goals of German development politics (Coalition Agreement, 2013). The current Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dr. Gerd Müller (CSU), took office in December 2013. He precedes Dirk Niebel whose liberal party failed to be re-elected to parliament in October 2013. The Global Monitoring Report on the implementation of the Busan commitments, compiled by the OECD and UNDP in 2014, shows that Germany is near the donor average in the The political priorities set by Müller are food security and rural development, combating causes implementation of most of the targets in the effectiveness agenda. The German government, of displacement, as well as stabilisation and development in North Africa and the Middle East. like most donors, is therefore falling well short of the targets for 2015 (OECD/UNDP 2014). Müller also emphasises the need for binding international environmental and social standards within the textile industry. In October 2014, he launched an alliance of industry associations, Yet some progress has been achieved within the area of transparency. Since 2013, Germany importers and NGOs to press for a more socially responsible and ecologically sustainable has been reporting its ODA disbursements and development programmes in accordance clothing supply chain. However, the alliance works on a voluntary basis and has been criticised with standards set by the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). However, so far, the for failing to integrate key industrial players. Other aspects Müller wants to take forward are reporting only covers 37% of German ODA and accordingly falls short of the IATI standards climate and sustainability policies, as well as the post-2015 agenda. (Publish What You Fund, 2014). This is partly due to the fact that the AA is not taking part in the reporting and is 61st among the 68 donors in the Aid Transparency Index of the civil society While the former government emphasised private sector development as the best development initiative Publish What You Fund (Publish What You Fund, 2014). The BMZ, with its implementing strategy, Müller points out the need for a market economy based on ecological and social organisations German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and KfW Development Bank principles. NGOs in Germany welcome the political priorities set by Müller, although they see (KfW), ranks 17th and 20,th respectively. The schedule for further implementation of the IATI a risk that German development policy may focus too narrowly on individual projects and standards is viewed as only moderately ambitious by PWYF. initiatives, thereby neglecting Germany’s key role in global political decision-making, such as in the upcoming post-2015 or financing for development negotiations (CONCORD, 2014). With respect to the implementation of other indicators for measuring progress of the Busan Partnership, such as the predictability of payments, German development cooperation is Implementation of the Development Effectiveness Agenda slightly ahead of the donor average. For instance, 87% of ODA funds were disbursed as planned. However, in implementing the indicator ‘Aid on Budget,’ which measures the proportion of ODA The German government, represented by the BMZ, has actively participated in the debate on that make up the national budgets of partner countries and are thus subject to parliamentary the effectiveness of development cooperation since the Aid Effectiveness process was launched control, German cooperation lies well under the target of 85% with 48% (OECD/UNDP 2014: in 2003. In 2005, it was the first donor to put in place a plan of operations for implementing the 134-136). This relates to the traditionally high proportion of technical cooperation in German Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was updated in 2009 after extensive consultations development cooperation. Unlike financial cooperation, it is based mainly on consultancies with civil society organisations. However, the level of engagement in this area varied with carried out by international experts which, as a result, counter-acts the goal of increased the political leadership of the ministry, and a plan of operations for implementing the Busan ownership of partner countries as it does not use country’s own administrative systems to commitments is still due to be worked out. Under the leadership of Minister Dirk Niebel (FDP, deliver aid. 2009-2013), a national process was placed at the centre of German efforts toward more effective development co-operation, namely the merger of three German implementing organisations Beyond the quantity and quality of German development cooperation, policy coherence for tasked with the technical development cooperation (German Technical Cooperation, or GTZ, development remains a crucial challenge for German politics. According to the Commitment to German Development Service, or DED, and Inwent) to the newly-formed aid agency Gesellschaft Development Index, by which the Centre for Global Development regularly measures to what für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The merger was long overdue but has been criticised extent the 27 richest countries of the world help poor countries with their development policies, for failing to integrate the German implementing agency tasked with the financial cooperation, Germany ranks 13th place and is thus in the middle of the field (Centre for Global Development, namely the KfW Development Bank. At the same time, Niebel argued that more effective 2014). Germany’s mediocre showing is due not only to the level and quality of ODA payments, development cooperation would obviate the need for providing more ODA funds and meeting but above all to its political conduct in other policy fields, for instance, the insufficient German the 0.7% target (BMZ, 2013). The current leadership under Minister Dr. Gerd Müller so far has commitment to regulate the financial markets, high agricultural subsidies for German farmers not defined any priorities in the effectiveness agenda. Some tentative conclusions about the and German arms exports to poor and undemocratic governments. There is therefore a clear need to develop further awareness and expertise in development issues throughout German 92 93 ministries, combined with a clear structure to monitor how policy coherence for development is Co-financing and access to public funding embedded within other policy areas. According to the OECD DAC, 6% of German ODA is allocated to NGOs (OECD, 2011: 57). A large Enabling Environment for German CSOs part of this goes to churches and political foundations connected to major political parties. Within the BMZ budget, there are various funding sources for civil society. In the federal budget Advocacy work and access to decision making processes 2015 of the BMZ, they include about 775 million EUR and thus make up just fewer than 12% of the budget (BMZ 2014e). For the most part, these funds go to programmes abroad, mainly Civil society organisations are recognised as a mainstay of development cooperation in Germany channelled via German NGOs, with an additional 11 million EUR per year going to development (BMZ, 2014b: 5). Their involvement in development policy processes is comprehensive and, education in Germany. Funds of the BMZ are only given through project and programme in particular with the BMZ, there are fixed dialogue formats on a wide range of development applications, and long-term institutional funding or support is not possible. policy issues. These include regular conversations from the working level up to Minister Dr. Gerd Müller himself. There is also a regular exchange with other ministries, such as the Foreign On average, 50% of the revenues of development NGOs in Germany are donations or private Office, the Ministry for the Environment and the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Chancellery. funds (Krimmer/Weitemeyer, 2014:61). Public funding of NGOs is often complemented by a share of 25% contributed by the NGO itself in order to ensure ownership of the projects. In However, such dialogues have not been consistent and need to be formally institutionalised. recent years, the absolute funds for NGOs have increased in proportion to the development of the BMZ budget, and in particular the programmes Private Träger (Private Providers) and The relatively good access to political decision-making processes also manifests in dialogue with Förderung Entwicklungspolitischer Bildung (Funding Development Education) benefited from parliamentarians. For instance, a survey among members of the German Bundestag carried out funding increases, albeit on a relatively low level. Since 2012, Engagement Global, a non-profit by VENRO in 2011 found that more than 70% of the respondents regarded the activities and company owned by the BMZ, has been tasked with advising and processing NGO funding. contacts to NGOs as important or very important for their work (VENRO, 2011a:16). Governmental control of civil society activities BOX 2: The Charter for the Future The BMZ emphasises the independence of NGOs and their affinity to underprivileged population groups as two of their main strengths (BMZ, 2014c). Nevertheless, the federal government has A current example of broad participation of civil society in development policy processes is afforded by the drafting of the Charter for the Future. According to the ministry, the charter increasingly attempted to control civil society activities in recent years. For instance, within the is meant to ‘identify topics that move Germany.’ In a process initiated by the BMZ, ‘the voices programme Private Träger, which is an important instrument in the overall confusing funding and opinions of active and engaged citizens, the churches, as well as NGOs and associations system, funds are provided exclusively for thematic and regional priorities laid down by the that deal with development issues’ are meant to ‘contribute to the process of designing BMZ and awarded to NGOs under special funding conditions. In the past legislative session, this sustainable development goals’ (BMZ 2014d). Between April and September 2014, interested led to serious controversies between NGOs and the BMZ. The NRO-Fazilität Afghanistan (NGO organisations and individuals had the opportunity to participate in an online forum, as well Facility Afghanistan) was a particularly controversial case. Within this line of funding, the Minister as attend five thematic forums on the economic, ecological, social, political and cultural ordered to provide funds only to organisations that committed to aligning their projects with dimensions of sustainability. VENRO and its member organisations participated actively in this the political and military goals of the German government in Afghanistan. This sparked broad dialogue process. The result is the Charter for the Future, which minister Müller presented to the Chancellor on November 24. Although the process of drafting the paper has been resistance among civil society organisations, with the result that significant departures from the assessed positively by German NGOs, the implementation of the goals formulated therein funding requirements were implemented in practice. is as yet unclear. As this is a product of the BMZ, its implementation by other ministries is particularly doubtful. There are also no plans for incorporating the content into the German Although the political priorities of the current government (cf. Section 2) cover topics which negotiating position on the post-2015 agenda. correspond to some of the main subject areas of NGO work and are thus less controversial than the NRO-Fazilität Afghanistan, the fact that the BMZ thematically and regionally integrates Source: Internet.zukunftscharta.de civil society organisations into its development policy strategies carries significant risks for the work of NGOs. To the extent that German NGOs increasingly align themselves with the political Political dialogue with different intensity strategies of their donors, they risk moving away from the interests of their target groups. The comparative advantages of civil society development cooperation, which include cooperation In 2013, VENRO conducted a qualitative survey of political decision-makers, in connection with with local partner organisations and joint identification of project proposals, are thereby lost. the mid-term review of its strategy, showed that the association is regarded as an influential actor in professional development policy circles. However, outside of the development At worst, NGOs become service providers of official development cooperation. In recent years, policy circles, the influence of NGOs on policy-making appears to be far more limited. In the the risk of German NGOs being instrumentalised in the official development cooperation is all election year 2013, despite the political efforts of many development and humanitarian aid the more real since projects that will be funded within the framework of the so called ‘special organisations, development policy positions rarely made it into the election platforms of the initiatives’ are to prove their progress based on fixed standard indicators, allowing the BMZ big parties (VENRO, 2013b), and the ensuing coalition negotiations were also dominated by more room to directly influence the goals and contents of projects it finances (cf. Section 4). domestic issues. Another gap in the German co-funding structure lies in the fact that, although forming alliances, Although civil society organisations are an integral part of German development politics, their representing interests and finding common positions for political processes are central functions access to decision-making processes in other policy areas is much more limited. The limited of an active and critical civil society, there are no public funding options for these areas of work influence of the BMZ within the federal cabinet and the insufficient consideration of the for development NGOs in Germany. concerns of developing countries by the other ministries pose a central challenge to civil society actors in improving the coherence of German policies. The central challenge for German organisations with respect to the co-financing of their work lies in defending their independence vis-à-vis their donors. Further, reforming the funding 94 95 system, e.g. within the BMZ, should provide funding support for the formation of independent With more than 100 standards on good governance, communication, sound management and civil society networks. impact monitoring, the code of conduct is quite comprehensive. However, small organisations in particular often lack the capacity required to comply with the standards it sets. A survey CSO Development Effectiveness from 2012 shows that implementation processes within the organisations are also on-going with respect to the code on children’s rights (VENRO, 2012), although here, too, a number of German Development NGOs organise among themselves to advocate for policy changes and organisations are in need of support. develop further the quality of their work through the exchange of information and best practices. They have joined together within VENRO with the aim of strengthening their contribution to In addition, several VENRO working groups are currently drafting common principles on CSO more ‘Justice in One World’ (VENRO, 2009). The current strategy of VENRO (adopted in 2010 and development effectiveness that are meant to provide orientation for good project work abroad. valid until 2016) includes, among others, the need to strengthen VENRO’s role in influencing The principles in their current form originate from an on-going discussion about co-financing German positions on the post-2015 agenda, to influence political decision-making processes, to with the BMZ and comprise areas such as independence and pluralism of NGOs (VENRO, promote quality standards and to contribute to the abolition of structural disadvantages and 2013d: 2). They are to be supplemented by criteria such as gender equality, inclusion of people discrimination (VENRO, 2011). with disabilities and children’s rights, and the content is to be coordinated with further quality standards. Through various working groups, NGOs in Germany advocate for policy changes in the areas of gender equity, child protection, economic inclusion, social security and climate protection. Linkage with international debates One example of influencing decision-making processes relevant in the context of development effectiveness is the new BMZ gender strategy in which the VENRO gender working group While the discussions among German NGOs on what characterises CSO development successfully advocated for highlighting the topic of sexual and reproductive rights (BMZ, 2014f). effectiveness and how it can be improved are growing, they have been relatively isolated from The VENRO working group on disability (BMZ, 2013a) also intervened in the BMZ strategy for the international debates until now. For instance, in a non-representative poll among employees inclusion of people with disabilities, and highlighted the need to take up the issues of displaced of association members, only 12% of respondents stated that they work with the Istanbul peoples and the participation of people with disabilities within German voluntary services. Principles on CSO Development Effectiveness, while 42% have at least heard of them. However, a significant proportion of respondents (44%) stated that they have not heard of the Istanbul Currently, the post-2015 agenda negotiations have been a major focus of VENRO’s advocacy Principles at all (VENRO, 2014). This is particularly remarkable in that the topics of the Istanbul work. Together with coalitions of environmental and human rights NGOs, VENRO has organised Principles (cf. Box 3) are part of the work of German NGOs and play an important role both several conferences to develop common positions on the post-2015 agenda and brought these in their political work in Germany and in their project work abroad. Integrating the Istanbul into dialogues with the German government. Several of these positions are reflected in the Principles into the work of German NGOs could make these approaches more systematic and official position on the post-2015 agenda which the government published in 2014, such as provide them with additional legitimacy by linking them to international debates. the principle of universality, the multi-stakeholder approach and the promotion of sustainable production and consumption patterns worldwide (Bundesregierung, 2014). Box 3: Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness Besides these lobbying efforts, campaigning is an important instrument of German NGOs to Civil society organisations are effective as development actors if they: advocate for political commitment to end poverty. Since 2013, one focus of the NGO-campaign ‘Global Call for Action against Poverty’ is to mobilise for decent work worldwide. Ahead of the 1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice 2. Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women’s and girls’ rights elections in 2013, it motivated 246 candidates in parliament to support NGO demands such 3. Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation as enshrining core labour standards within international trade agreements or making legal 4. Promote environmental sustainability provisions on transparency and accountability for enterprises. Building on this initiative, a 5. Practice transparency and accountability manifest with concrete demands to implement decent work worldwide was supported by 197 6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity parliamentarians after the German parliament took office in October 2013 (VENRO, 2014a). 7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning 8. Commit to realising positive sustainable change NGOs have also developed several codes of conduct that form important tools to take forward Source: Internet.csopartnership.org accountability among German CSOs on their own development effectiveness. Best practice examples are: Impact orientation in NGO work • Code for development-related public relations work (1998) In the context of CSO development effectiveness, the question of impacts plays an important • Code of conduct on transparency, good governance and control (2008) role. German NGOs organise themselves within the VENRO working group on impact monitoring and connect with other actors within the DeGEval - Gesellschaft für Evaluation (Evaluation • Code on children’s rights (2009) Society) to take impact orientation of their own work forward. In a position paper from 2010, they argue for using impact orientation mainly as a tool of empowerment and participation of The codes contain guidelines for aligning CSOs’ work with standards developed among local target groups (VENRO, 2010a). This assumes that impact monitoring does not primarily the organisations themselves, and they are binding for all organisations that are members serve for reporting to donors, and rather NGOs apply their own instruments that match their of VENRO. While VENRO can verify adherence to the standards only in individual cases, the principles, goals and capacities. process of drafting the codes and the accompanying discussions within the association have sparked a positive dynamic among member organisations. A majority of the members who Related to this, the project NGO Ideas is an excellent example in which corresponding took part in an electronic survey about the code of conduct on transparency, good governance instruments for impact monitoring are being developed together with German NGOs and local and control in 2013 stated that they implement a large part of its standards (VENRO, 2013c). partners (Internet.ngo-ideas.net). This is in the context of civil society actors taking a more 96 97 critical stance toward current discussions within the BMZ about introducing standard indicators 6. BMZ (2014c): Akteure der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit: Nichtregierungsorganisationen Internet. across projects and programmes in the framework of the special initiatives (VENRO, 2015). Such bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/nros/index.html indicators, which are to be collected in a standardised manner in all funded projects, would 7. BMZ (2014d): Informationen zur Zukunftscharta - EINEWELT - Unsere Verantwortung. Internet. zukunftscharta.de/zukunftscharta/de/home/informieren result in the BMZ exerting increased control over civil society projects. 8. BMZ (2014e): Haushalt http://Internet.bmz.de/de/ministerium/haushalt/index.html 9. BMZ (2014f): Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik. Conclusion Übersektorales Konzept. BMZ strategy paper 2/2014, Berlin. 10. Bundesregierung (2014): Bericht der Bundesregierung. Eine Agenda für den Wandel zu nachhaltiger The present report shows that conditions in Germany are comparatively favourable for Entwicklung weltweit. Die deutsche Position für die Verhandlungen über die Post 2015-Agenda development effectiveness. Germany is one of the world’s largest donors and has shown für nachhaltige Entwicklung. 03.12.2014. http://Internet.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/ significant engagement within the development effectiveness process. There is a broad range grundsaetze_und_ziele/2014_12_03_Bericht_Post_2015-Agenda_komplett.pdf of civil society organisations active in the field of development politics that have considerable 11. Center for Global Development (2014): The Commitment to Development Index, Internet.cgdev. org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index freedom to act and contribute to development effectiveness through lobbying for concrete 12. CONCORD (2014): Aid Beyond 2015. Europe’s Role in Financing and Implementing Sustainable policy changes, as well as project work abroad. Development Goals Post 2015. Aid Watch Report 2014. 13. Krimmer, Holger and Jana Priemer (2013a): ZiviZ-Survey 2012: Zivilgesellschaft verstehen (final Nevertheless, significant challenges remain that restrict Germany’s contribution to development report), Berlin. effectiveness: 14. Krimmer, Holger (2013b) ZiviZ-Survey 2012: Bereichsauswertung „Internationale Solidarität“. ZiviZ – Zivilgesellschaft in Zahlen. Internet.ziviz.info/fileadmin/download/Auswertung_Internationale_ • Germany is off track to meet its target of allocating 0.7% of its GNI to development Solidaritaet.pdf co-operation by 2015, and the passing of the budget for the year 2015 removed any 15. Krimmer, Holger and Birgit Weitemeyer: Transparenz im dritten Sektor, Bündnis für Gemeinnützigkeit (Hrsg.), Bucerius Law School, 2014, Hamburg. remaining doubts that the German government will fail to deliver on its commitments 16. OECD (2011): DAC Peer Review of Germany 2010, Paris. for ODA growth. The German government should increase annual aid to 0.7% of GNI by 17. OECD (2014): Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable 2017 and agree to deliver climate finance additional to the 0.7% target. Development, OECD Publishing. 18. OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, • Germany falls short of many of the Busan targets for development effectiveness and OECD Publishing needs a firm political commitment towards better development cooperation. The 19. Publish What You Fund (2014): Aid Transparency Index 2014, http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org German government should work out a plan of operations for implementing the Busan 20. VENRO (2009): Statutes of the Association of German Development Non-Governmental commitments that includes a clear monitoring framework and allows civil society to Organisations, reg. Ass. Bonn. 21. VENRO (2010a): Quality before Proof. VENRO Policy Paper on Impact Monitoring, Bonn. hold the government to account for delivering on its aid effectiveness commitments. 22. VENRO (2010b): Stellungnahme zur Ausschreibung des BMZ zur NRO-Fazilität Afghanistan im Rahmen des Titels „Förderung privater deutscher Träger“, Bonn. • The German government should put in place a clear structure to monitor how 23. VENRO (2011): VENRO-Strategy 2011-2016, Berlin. development issues are embedded within other policy areas in order to increase policy 24. VENRO (2011a): Großes Interesse, große Herausforderungen – Entwicklungspolitik in der coherence for development in German politics. öffentlichen Meinung und im Parlament, Berlin. 25. VENRO (2011b): Eckpunktepapier für eine BMZ-Strategie zur Zusammenarbeit mit der • In order to promote an enabling environment for civil society in Germany, it is crucial Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin. to maintain the independence of German NGOs. The BMZ should therefore respect 26. VENRO (2011c): VENRO-Verhaltenskodex Transparenz, Organisationsführung und Kontrolle, Bonn. their right of initiative throughout their funding structure and resist the temptation of 27. VENRO (2011d): VENRO-Kodex für entwicklungsbezogene Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Bonn. imposing its own development priorities on German civil society. 28. VENRO (2011e): VENRO-Kodex zu Kinderrechten, Bonn. 29. VENRO (2012): Umfrage zum VENRO-Kodex zu Kinderrechten, unveröffentlichte • German NGOs need to both develop further their own principles and standards for Mitgliederbefragung. development effectiveness and advocate for policy changes in the political priorities of 30. VENRO (2013a): Ergebnisse des Midterm-Reviews (unpublished). the German government. To couple their debates more strongly to the international 31. VENRO (2013b): Was wollen die Parteien? – Die Entwicklungspolitik in den Programmen zur discussion processes on CSO development effectiveness would help to promote the Bundestagswahl 2013, Berlin. Istanbul Principles as one important cornerstone of CSO development effectiveness in 32. VENRO (2013c): Umfrage zum VENRO-Verhaltenskodex 2013, unveröffentlichte Mitgliederbefragung. Germany. 33. VENRO (2013d): Stellungnahme zur Überarbeitung der Richtlinien für die Förderung entwicklungswichtiger Vorhaben privater deutscher Träger in Entwicklungsländern BMZ-Titel 687 References 76, Bonn. 34. VENRO (2014): Partnerschaftlich zu mehr Wirksamkeit – Acht Fragen zum Thema Effectiveness 1. BMZ (2009): Operationsplan zur Umsetzung der Pariser Erklärung 2005 und des Accra Aktionsplans (unpublished member survey) 2008 zur Steigerung der Wirksamkeit von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Internet.bmz.de/de/ 35. VENRO (2014a): Manifest für Menschenwürdige Arbeit. Berlin. zentrales_downloadarchiv/grundsaetze_und_ziele/OP_Paris_Accra_03_2009.pdf 36. VENRO (2015): Nutzung von Standardindikatoren in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. VENRO- 2. BMZ (2013): Globale Agenda nach 2015 heute im Kabinett (press release) Internet.bmz. Standpunkt Nr. 1/Januar 2015, Berlin. de/20130821-2 3. BMZ (2013a): Aktionsplan zur Inklusion von Menschen mit Behinderungen (Laufzeit 2013-2015). BMZ strategy paper 1/2013, Berlin. 4. BMZ (2014a): Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Zahlen und Fakten, Berlin Internet.bmz.de/de/ mediathek/publikationen/reihen/infobroschueren_flyer/flyer/Faltblatt_FaktenMDG.pdf 5. BMZ (2014b): Strategie zur Zusammenarbeit von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft in der Entwicklungspolitik der Post-2015-Welt, BMZ strategy paper 5/2014, Berlin. 98 99 Guatemala right to culture and cultural identity, right to work, right to education, right to health, petition, free access to courts and state premises, right to strike, free access to information and state files and registers, among others. It further states that the government cannot prevent the Summary registration of CSOs on a legal basis, except for reasons of public order. Guatemalan civil society is today a reflection of the confluence of a number of historical factors, The Guatemalan legal framework for CSO work is quite broad, including Peace Agreements, including 36 years of internal armed conflict (1960-1996), as well as major political restructuring Civil Associations Registration Regulation, Social Development Law, National Persons Register after the signing of the Peace Accords (CIVICUS, 2011). Reforms, Public Information Access Law, General Budget of the State’s Income and Expenditure Law and its Reforms, Decentralization General Law, Urban and Rural Development Councils The process of democratisation has not been easy. However, civil society organisations have System Law, Municipal Code, Anti-Eviction Law, Tax Updating Law, Handbook of Procedures sought different mechanisms to get their voices heard and participate actively in national for the Budgetary Execution through Agreements with Non-Governmental Organisations and development. This has involved working together as a sector at the national and global levels. International Organisations, among others. However, the administration of justice in the country is poor and does not favour an enabling environment for the actions of CSOs. For example, the Yet despite the Busan agreements (2011), progress on the work of CSOs as independent Non-Governmental Organisations for Development Law (Congress of the Republic Order No.02- development actors has been limited, according to the Alliance of Civil Society Organizations for 2003) lacks clear provisions for its implementation. In the past five years, the criminalisation Development Effectiveness (AODE). As demonstrated through this case study on the political, of social struggles, especially those who claim indigenous and peasant rights, has affected the legal, economic and socio-cultural contexts in which CSOs work in Guatemala, the reduction of work of organisations. space and voice for CSOs in political life in the country has been alarming and is in contradiction to rhetoric heard at the international level. On the other hand, Guatemala is a signatory to various international treaties and conventions on human rights and other laws. Therefore, Guatemalan CSOs should increase their efforts to push for greater and more meaningful engagement in all political and development processes, with well-defined As part of its commitments to the Paris Declaration, the Guatemalan government, together with responsibilities for all stakeholders at national, regional and global levels. the Donor Group of G13 countries,190 organised two high level meetings in Antigua, one in May 2008 and one in November 2009. These meetings were supposed to ratify and then evaluate Introduction the progress of the commitments made by the country in Paris. Guatemala is a society of contradictions—one shaped by its complex history as one of the One critical weakness is that citizens generally are not aware of the implications of these most unequal and war-torn countries in the world. The Peace Accords, signed in 1996, raised international treaties and conventions, and are not in a position to demand or oversee their expectations and offered hope in the possibilities promised by the reconstruction of the country’s compliance. Worse still, government institutions, despite repeated efforts, lack the resources institutions. Eighteen years later, millions of Guatemala’s indigenous and rural poor look on in needed for the implementation of various projects and end up becoming isolated projects that frustration at how the same causes that led to the armed conflict are far from disappearing and respond only to the demands of the international community and not to what the country really have, in fact, worsened through the years. Guatemala today remains one of the most violent needs. countries in the world, a situation compounded by the growing gap between rich and poor. The Political Environment It is in this context that CSOs expected a ‘fertile ground’ for their work, but the government is yet to recognise them as partners in development. On the contrary, in recent months, there The Peace Accords191 (1996) are the only agreed national development agenda; however, these has been an increase in the criminalisation of CSOs by the central government, ignoring the have proven to be difficult to implement due to traditional power elites (military, economic, commitment as a country to foster an environment in which all the development actors can political) that have prevented these agreements from translating into tangible actions on the coordinate actions to meet the pressing demands of the people. ground, particularly to the Indigenous Peoples Rights, socio-economic issues and agrarian Reform, and the pursuit of justice for crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, CSOs have played an increasingly active role in recent years in defining the priorities of international development cooperation, primarily in the debate on development The political environment in Guatemala is one that is heavily dominated by military and state effectiveness. violence, where peace is understood in terms of the status quo and the ability to advance an agenda of privatisation, the protection of capital investments and the neo-liberalisation of This report highlights the legal and regulatory framework in Guatemala, its political environment the economy. A general climate of impunity and corruption has caused Guatemala to rise on and governance context, its socio-cultural and socio-economic context, and how all of these international indexes on common and organised violence. According to Velásquez (October factors together impact on development cooperation and the pursuit of an enabling environment 2014), this is a step back from the democratic aspirations expressed in the Peace Accords and for CSOs in Guatemala. the 1985 Constitution. These agreements were meant to address social conditions that gave rise to the Internal Armed Conflict through the consolidation of a democratic state with equity The Legal and Regulatory Framework and social justice at its core. 190 created in 1999, as a coordination between countries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, formed by the nine Guatemala is a republic, politically divided into 22 departments, governed by the same countries that allocate more resources cooperation Guatemala: Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, constitutional and legal framework. Norway, Spain, Sweden, United States, and the following multilateral organizations: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Program for Development, The constitution grants the same rights both for individual persons and CSOs, including the right European Union and the Organization of American States 191 The process of peace negotiation began in 1987 and ended with the Peace Accords, a dozen agreements to association and manifestation, freedom of expression, religious freedom, right to property, signed by the Government of the Republic of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity between 1991 and 1996. This formally put an end to the Internal Armed Conflict that lasted over 36 years, leaving a total of over 200,000 dead and missing persons, as well as thousands of orphans and widows. 100 101 flows in the country, and what information is available is limited to Guatemala’s relations with The year 2015 marks another election, but with few genuinely transformative political Colombia and Mexico, in sectors such as agriculture, industry and trade. alternatives. Public trust is at its lowest ebb, and few political parties exist with a serious proposal for change for the country, and few last any longer than 30 years. Despite its flaws, the To try to minimise this lack of information and coordination, the central government approved Guatemalan Left has gained some influence with its ability to forward a concrete ideology and the Policy for International Cooperation Non-Refundable through the publication of Government platform, though its electoral performance has been weak. Agreement 17-2015, made by SEGEPLAN to harmonise efforts. For its implementation, state agencies, public companies and decentralised, autonomous entities, including municipalities, The Governance Context should coordinate and inform SEGEPLAN on the external grants that they receive and manage. Guatemala is ranked 70 out of 178 nations assessed by the Foreign Policy Review on failed In addition, the Law on Partnerships for Economic Infrastructure Development (Decree 16- states,192 as assessed on a number of social, economic, political and human rights indicators. 2010) establishes the regulatory framework for the public sector to enter into contracts with The survey ranked Guatemala last in Central America. Its worst score out of the 12 indicators the private sector for the development of infrastructure. This law allows for the construction or was on economy inequality, with 8.1 out of 10 points. Other aspect evaluated by the survey was upgrading of roads, ports, airports, power projects or urban development with private funds. the number of atrocities committed against community groups and civil society organisations, The state is then expected to pay a commitment fee to private companies, which requires the ranking Guatemala high on the impunity index at 7.3 points, just below Libya. In addition, it is creation of a fund to repay approved projects and guarantee investments against risk. This ranked 83 out of 99 countries in the global ranking of countries, and position 13 of 16 countries commitment is to be counted as public debt. The law could have important implications in in the regional rank that are weak on Rule of Law according to the World Justice Project, Index of strengthening the historical control of business elites in national and economic affairs. Rule of Law (2014). This is because the country shows a low trend factor in terms of constraints of open government access and enforcement of justice. The Guatemalan government has tried to strengthen its capacity to design, manage and implement inclusive democratic public policies, but results have been scarce. Where government State institutions are weak in general, mainly: 1) because the political system is subject to institutions have been weak, CSOs have stepped in to improve their work primarily in the significant pressure from the vested interests of an entrenched oligarchy, and 2) public sector defence and promotion of human rights (children, youth, women, environment, etc.), service employees change every four years, with each new government. This has had implications on delivery and democracy. the continuity and consistency of public policies. CSOs continue to intervene through the use of public pressure, including street protests and However, what harms national governance the most is corruption, and Guatemala scored 33 civil disobedience. points out of 100 in the Transparency and Corruption Index (Acción Ciudadana, 2013 Report). The Socio-Cultural Context High rates of violence, lack of public safety, a weak judiciary and various corruption scandals implicating various state entities, plus the resurgence of vigilantism and parallel bodies of Guatemalan society is characterised by its rich and diverse culture owing to its four big ethnic justice, are causing an atmosphere of lawlessness where crime can flourish. groups: Mayas, Xincas, Garífunas and Ladinos. Collectively, with an estimated population of 15 million, Guatemala accounts for 36% of the total population of Central America, with a GDP The current government of Guatemala under the Pérez-Baldetti administration has pushed for per capita about half that of the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The agricultural a contradictory mix of policies—emphasising neo-liberal policies under an agenda for economic sector accounts for almost 15% of GDP and half of the labour force. competitiveness (export-oriented, energy-intensive, with an additional focus on tourism), while also claiming that the agricultural sector and inclusive development are its top priorities. Women make up 51% of the population, and men 49%. Indigenous groups represent 41% of Inconsistencies in government policy have made it difficult for CSOs to work in the country. the population and the non-indigenous ones, 59%. The total urban population is 46% and the In many cases, they have had to stand for the government in its obligations to the population, rural, 54%. Some 24 different languages are spoken in the country, with Spanish as the official especially in relation to education and health services. language. There is a clear lack of public policies that benefit the general population. There is little interest The distribution of income remains highly unequal, with 10% of the population accounting for in creating conditions for higher living standards and structural changes to promote sustained more than 40% of total consumption in Guatemala. More than half of the population is below the and sustainable human development. The Coordination of Non-Governmental Organisations poverty line and 15% live in extreme poverty. Poverty among indigenous groups, representing and Cooperatives (CONGCOOP), through its Institute for Agricultural and Rural Studies (IDEAR), 38% of the population, averages 76%, and extreme poverty rises to 28%. Of children under five continues to conduct research with high accuracy, providing data that allow channelling years, 43% are chronically malnourished, one of the highest rates of malnutrition in the world advocacy and political lobbying that can be translated into public policy proposals. (Banco de Guatemala, 2013). Some steps have been taken to address this. For instance, decentralisation and other policies Poverty in Guatemala disproportionately affects the Mayan indigenous groups of the country. aimed at creating new spaces for public participation, wherein authorities would consult with They account for less than a quarter of the total income and consumption. A typical Mayan community representatives and jointly make decisions regarding social investments catered worker earns less than 4 USD a day. Poverty rates in rural areas of Guatemala often exceed 90% toward the needs of the population, especially in rural areas. Implementation has been weak, (Cooperative for Education, 2013).193 however, given the lack of political will and any concrete proposals to take this forward. In relation to gender equity, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin The actual impacts of development projects are difficult to assess, and international development America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),194 equality indicators in physical autonomy highlights the cooperation through the President’s Secretariat for Programming and Planning (SEGEPLAN) and difficulties that women live daily in terms of sexual and physical violence by their partners or CIC has been poorly coordinated. For example, there is a lack of data on south-south cooperation ex-partners (17 annual deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013), child-mothers (15.4% in 2012), 193 http://coeduc.org/es/guatemala/pobreza.html 192 Prensa Libre, June 2013 - taken from the Foreign Policy Magazine 194 http://Internet.cepal.org/oig/WS/getCountryProfile.asp?language=spanish&country=GTM 102 103 unmet need for family planning (20.8% in 2009) and maternal mortality (140 per 100,000 live patronage politics and the absence of participatory mechanisms for social monitoring of the births in 2013). As far as autonomy in decision-making is concerned, there is a big gap in political national budget. Donors must ensure that policies on development effectiveness, transparency participation of women—in 2013 there were 2.1% of women mayors against 97.95% of male and accountability are not susceptible to exceptions, and that democratic clauses are applied to mayors. Mechanisms for the Advancement of Women (MAM), a government body tasked to government institutions so that resources are invested in addressing the needs and demands address this, is hierarchically dependent on the Presidential Secretariat for Women. of people on the ground, especially the most vulnerable. As to economic autonomy, inequality remains evident in the benefits received by women. Only Capacity of CSOs to Engage in Development Policy and Development Practice 32% of poor women in rural areas and 46.3% in cities have access to formal employment. Even non-poor women in rural areas account for only 50.9% of the workforce (in urban areas, 58.6%). “Civil society organizations best placed to manage public resources, are those with a focus on The women’s movement and the feminist movement have kept up the pressure to ensure public charity and actual relief delivery for the poor, and are best placed to align themselves with national policies in favour of women are implemented and respected in all government institutions. development objectives. A critical stance on government, with advocacy efforts aimed at broader societal changes, tends to limit the possibilities of NGOs to be incorporated into the new development However, as Velásquez (October 2014) points out, social movements in Guatemala have been dynamics..... It is essential for NGOs to maintain their autonomy, identifying from civil society those torn between the need to address their long-term goals and a kind of political short-termism, initiatives that take them away from the dependence established with International Cooperation which has prevented them from forging consistent strategies. Organizations.” This has meant that they are weak, they disappear, and they are victims of state repression or are co-opted by private companies. Today the hope is set on peasants and indigenous resistance Guatemalan CSOs are going through a period of transition toward development effectiveness, movements which have continued their campaigns in defence of nature and territory, despite in which many run the risk of disappearing due to dependence on international cooperation criminalisation and repression by the state and traditional corporate elite. and the subsequent incapacity to diversify sources of financing. This has sparked a debate among CSOs on the need to strengthen and reposition themselves in the new national and The Socio-Economic Context international context. Guatemala is ranked as a middle income country. However, this is not the case as Guatemala According to CIVICUS, there are more than 2,500 NGOs legally established in Guatemala, over has recorded high indexes of extreme poverty faced by peasant and indigenous populations 25,000 grassroots and community organisations, about 76 civil foundations, large numbers in particular. Its economy is pegged on an unsustainable model of development hinged on of civilian organisations linked to the churches, strong professional organisations and some the exploitation of natural resources, cheap labour and foreign aid dependence that militates with great power of influence such as the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, against inclusive growth and development. Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), as well as several academic institutions providing highly regarded research. It is clear that sharp ideological divisions and political polarisation The World Bank’s study, Evaluation of Poverty in Guatemala published in 2011,195 indicates persist among CSOs that have prevented the construction of long-range strategic alliances. that the country was able to reduce poverty levels from 56% to 51% between 2000 and 2006. However, official figures from 2011 indicate that poverty rose to 53.7%. The situation Currently, Guatemalan CSOs are highly fragmented, but clear efforts have been made in is particularly difficult in rural municipalities, covering 44% of the country. There, nearly 8 in coordination and solidarity on relevant themes and campaigns. It is imperative to strengthen 10 people live in poverty, according to the results of Rural Poverty Map 2011. The country is the role of CSOs as development actors and recover the role of independent verification of ranked 133rd out of 187 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index, and is government’s actions, while fostering dialogue between the people, government and other the fifth most unequal country in Latin America, with a Gini Index of 0.52. It has a tax burden of development actors. This demands better communication channels and better partnerships. approximately 10% of the Gross National Income (GNI). But inequalities are further deepening: For over four decades, Guatemalan CSOs have proved their ability to engage in development In rural municipalities, 8 out of 10 persons are poor (World Bank, 2011). In San Juan Atitlán, practices with significant political, social and economic progress; however, the fragility of Huehuetenango, poverty reaches 95%, and in the whole Department of Huehuetenango, governments and the lack of political will have continued to reduce the effectiveness of dialogue extreme poverty reaches 30.3%; Alta Verapaz, 41.2%; Quiché, 33.2%; and in Quetzaltenango, and negotiation spaces because of institutional weakness. 34%. According to poverty mapping by SEGEPLAN, the situation hasn’t changed. Nevertheless, political advocacies by CSOs on public policies have seen real results such as The annual income per inhabitant is estimated at 3,347 USD, and the public debt (internal and the approval of the law against Feminicide and other forms of violence against women, the external) is calculated at 130,000 USD, equivalent to 22% of GNI. The government’s emphasis Integral Rural Development National Policy, among others, that have had the leading, active on ensuring the ‘economic competitiveness’ of the country has turned it into a net exporter of and resolute participation of CSOs. raw materials, generally non-processed. The cheap labour costs of a largely illiterate work force with limited technical qualifications is seen as a ‘comparative advantage.’ Although CSOs in Guatemala do have the capacity for dialogue and advocacy, there are informal or extra-legal ‘advocacy’ channels by individuals or groups that achieve more and better results CSOs, on the other hand, have presented proposals for better distribution of the nation’s in less time (through influence peddling, campaign promises, extortion, bribery, among others), income and expenditures for the year 2015. The national budget is currently under discussion which tend to weaken or nullify the efforts of CSOs. and is targeted for approval at the National Congress. Adding up to a total of 71,840.8 million GTQ (14.71% of the GNI), the national budget will require a public debt increase of 15.6 billion As mentioned in the previous section, the decentralisation process has resulted in a more GTQ, while utterly failing to prioritise social expenditure. streamlined registration of CSOs in the municipalities; however, it is important to promote avenues for better training and support in the context of the decentralisation process and in The Guatemalan government’s budgetary priorities put at risk the democratic ownership the operation of the Urban and Rural Development Council System, with greater emphasis on of sustainable development processes by the population, stemming from the lack of a the communal and municipal levels that can promote more active political engagement for local comprehensive national development plan, high levels of corruption, the use of aid for communities. 195 http://Internet.bancomundial.org/es/country/guatemala/overview 104 105 CSOs should also push for the human rights-based approach (HRBA) as a development model, 8. Holiday, David Internet Palencia Tania. 1996. Mapping of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in which demands concrete changes in existing power relations. Implementation of HRBA is not Guatemala. easy, given highly skewed relations between governments and CSOs. 9. López B. and Mora A. 2011. Highlights of the cooperative sector in Guatemala. a mechanism for promoting development and Combating of poverty. 10. Morales López, Henry. 2014. Financing the NGO Sector, Goals and Challenges. Mesa de Articulation: One important starting point would be to initiate dialogue on development that is equitable, Central America and Mexico. inclusive and just, and emphasise that in the context of a world characterised by significant 11. National Action Network Managers. 2011. The Internal Trade in Guatemala. inequality and injustice, the pursuit of human rights—despite political slogans—has been 12. Velásquez, Helmer. 2014. Guidelines context. Analysis presented to cooperation agencies. rendered null and void. The principles and values of human rights must guide both public policy 13. World Bank, Evaluation of Poverty in Guatemala, 2011. and the work of CSOs in a political arena where market relations and public private foundations 14. Press AODE on the First High Level Meeting (HLM) of GPECD. are the order of the day. 15. http://Internet.bancomundial.org/es/country/guatemala/overview 16. http://Internet.cepal.org/oig/WS/getCountryProfile.asp?language=spanish&country=GTM 17. http://coeduc.org/es/guatemala/pobreza.html CSOs must take steps to improve both the quality of their political proposals and their concrete 18. http://prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Guatemala-puesto_70-estados_fallidos-Otto_Perez_ impacts for people on the ground. They should not only improve the quality of their proposals Molina_0_944905770.html but their impacts. 19. http://Internet.segeplan.gob.gt/2.0/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1972:ejecu tivo-aprueba-la-politica-de-cooperacion-no-reembolsable-&catid=25:ultima&Itemid=115 Conclusions 20. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/aidco/images/9/98/GUIA_SOC_CIVIL_FINAL_4_3_ V2.pdf The international context marks a new direction for CSOs who should be seen not only as beneficiaries of aid but as actors and development protagonists by governments, the private sector and international cooperation actors. This necessitates strengthening dialogue between all parties involved. It is important to recognise and address the dependence of CSOs on development cooperation for their institutional survival, in the context of reductions in ODA and financing. While CSOs will be most affected, their continued and active engagement in debates on policies, strategies, tools, mechanisms and programs is essential. This is made all the more difficult by businesses and private foundations that, under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility, are attracting and capturing more financial resources. This requires a frank and honest negotiation to allocate resources in education and training for capacity development for CSOs, which will result in higher quality in the execution of their development efforts, while strengthening democracy in the country. The political atmosphere in Guatemala is still far from fully conducive for CSOs. Mechanisms for dialogue among all sectors and actors should be established, with CSOs considered complementary to government allies and not perceived as adversaries. CSOs, meanwhile, must build medium and long-term alliances among themselves, prioritise the interests of the wider public, better coordinate their diverse agendas and work together if they are to regain institutional credibility. Efforts at the local, national, regional and international levels should be in tune with the new architecture of international cooperation and with due recognition of the role of CSOs in development effectiveness. References 1. Avancso (2003). The process of the metropolitan growth of Guatemala City. Research Papers No.18. Guatemala. 2. Becerra Pozos Laura, Pineda Luis, Castañeda Bustamante, Norma A. 2014. The environment in which civil society organizations in Mexico are developed. Mexico, D.F. Civil Democratic Alliance, Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy and DECA, Equipo Pueblo Organization. 3. Citizen Action. 2013. Independent Report IV Round – The MESICIC. 4. CIVICUS. 2011. The state of Civil Society Report. 5. Congcoop-Asecsa-Asindes Ong-Asorema- Congav – Congd Occidente. 2008. Report of the Third National Congress of NGOs, Transformation and Development. 6. ECLAC. 2000. Productive use of family and community remittances in Central America. 7. Falisse, M., Sanz-Corella, B. European Commission. August 2009. Mapping study of civil society in Guatemala. 106 107 India Summary Indian development assistance has risen in scale scope over the past decade. India is not a new donor, having provided its first aid package in the late 1940s, shortly after its independence. Until the turn of the century, Indian development assistance remained small compared to traditional DAC donors. However, Indian foreign aid has risen significantly over the years, and has reached countries beyond South Asia. This has been considered a bold step for a country with a significant proportion of its population still living in poverty. Particularly controversial has been India’s refusal to receive further aid from the UK government to project its status as a rising super power. This paper examines the historical underpinnings driving India’s approach to its development assistance programme. It also studies the evolution of its development assistance and the recent changes in its volume, diversification of lending instruments, regional refocus and increasing regional and global ambitions that drive its development assistance program. The paper also attempts to examine the enabling environment for the Indian voluntary organisations around the legal and regulatory framework, socio-economic, socio-cultural and political contexts as they relate to India’s aid programme and the capacity of Indian civil society. Lastly, the paper also attempts to examine the limited roles of Indian civil society in development effectiveness in the shrinking space. The paper attempts to study the contribution of Indian civil society organisations in development cooperation, while stressing the importance of actively involving Indian CSO in various development initiatives. India’s Development Cooperation India has pursued policies of south-south cooperation since independence, but only recently has its role in providing foreign assistance to low-income countries become prominent. India’s economic growth appears to be providing a basis for real technical cooperation, and the potential for a new type of aid policy. ‘Recognizing this, the Development Administration Partnership (DPA) was created in the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2012 to effectively handle India’s aid projects through the stages of concept, launch, execution and completion.’196 India’s development partnership is based on the needs identified by the partner countries and the effort of the ministry is geared towards accommodating as many of the requests received from partner countries as is technically and financially possible. DPA has started to create in- house, specialised technical, legal and financial skills in order to fast-track all stages of project Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report - July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012197 196 http://Internet.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm 197 http://Internet.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1039 108 109 implementation. DPA has three divisions. Currently, DPA I deals with project appraisal and lines of credit; DPA II deals with capacity building schemes, disaster relief, Indian Technical and India’s DPA: Salient Features of Policy Economic Cooperation Programme; and DPA III deals with project implementation. India’s foreign assistance programme was conceptualised based on a shared sense of history of Discussion colonialism and protracted independence struggles of developing countries of the south. Therefore, it focuses on partnership and solidarity among developing countries and adheres The growth of India’s economy over the past two decades (although it faltered in 2011-2012, to the salient features of south-south cooperation, which are respect for national sovereignty, followed by steady growth) has renewed India’s international prominence, with the country national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference and seeking to transition itself from one of the largest beneficiaries of North-South cooperation to a mutual benefit. leader in south-south cooperation. Instruments Under the aegis of south-south cooperation, India engages with other countries through the following processes: • Development Partnership Assistance (DPA) • Various multilateral fora such as G20,198 a group of five countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa called BRICS, another group called IBSA (India-Brazil and South Africa), IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association, formerly known as IOR-ARC) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). Little attention has been focused on India’s development assistance until recently because, historically, the volume of India’s foreign aid has been significantly smaller in US dollar terms than foreign aid from traditional DAC donor countries. That, however, has changed over the past few years. In 2012, the Indian government reported that 7,019 crore rupees or approximately 1.3 billion USD were budgeted for development assistance for the fiscal year 2013/14. India’s development assistance budget for 2012 was comparable to Austria’s foreign aid budget for the same year and higher than the foreign assistance of 4 of the 23 DAC countries in 2011 (OECD 2012199). Moreover, the trend of India’s aid commitments also differs markedly from those of the traditional DAC countries. India’s development assistance has grown dramatically, rising four-fold in the decade between 2003/04 and 2013/2014. By contrast, the total of foreign aid from DAC countries decreased in 2011 and is likely to stagnate in 2012. Finally, a dollar of development assistance given by India is not the same as a dollar given by DAC countries. The nature of Indian development assistance and the purchasing power parity of a dollar of Indian aid spent in India or in the recipient country means that a dollar of Indian foreign assistance has greater purchasing power than a dollar in foreign assistance from any DAC country. Source: http://idcr.cprindia.org/indian-development-cooperation Technical Assistance and Training through ITEC: The ITEC programme is managed by the DPA- II within MEA. The ITEC and its sister programme, SCAAP (Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa), lend assistance to almost 160 countries in Asia, Africa, East Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. In recent years, ITEC resources have also been extended to groupings such as G77, AU (African Union), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and CARICOM (Caribbean Community). The ITEC includes trainings, project assistance and project-related activities such as feasibility studies and consultancy services, sending experts on deputation and study tours. In 2013-14, over 8,280 civilian training slots were offered to ITEC partner countries for 198 G-20 Countries Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, programmes supported by the Indian government. Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, European Union* (The European Union is repre- sented at the leaders’ level by the presidents of the European Union and the European Commission and at the finance level Lines of Credit (LOCs): The Government launched the Indian Development and Economic by the rotating presidency of the European Council and the European Central Bank). Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) in 2004, under which the government of India backed concessional 199 OECD (2012). “Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession.”Retrieved March 10, 2012, from LOCs as provided by the EXIM bank upon the suggestion of MEA. http://Internet.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm. 110 111 of OECD nor considers development partnerships to be official development assistance (ODA), under OECD guidelines soft loans such as the concessional government of India-backed and Exim-bank distributed LOCs are considered development assistance. In addition, the Ministry of Finance in its guidelines for LOCs uses the OECD formula to calculate the grant component of its LOCs (see Table 1). Finally, borrowing nations must submit proposals indicating the projects, goods and services they plan on importing from India, and the Indian government gives funding priority to economic and infrastructural projects that are of mutual benefit – thus underscoring that these LOCs are to be seen as development partnerships between two developing countries. asdais paper gives an overview of the legal and regulatory framework and the political, The LOC decision-making process in India. Source: http://idcr.cprindia.org/blog/lines-credit governance, socio-cultural and socio-economic context in Ecuador with regards to CSO enabling environment. Finally, this report examines the state of development cooperation in Ecuador. These LOCs are provided in support of developmental projects and have replaced the earlier bilateral support provided by the Ministry of Finance. Legal and Regulatory Framework During the year 2013-2014, the Bank extended 24 LOCs, aggregating 1.77 billion USD, to support India is party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions200 and several additional weapons treaties, but export of projects, goods and services from India. not the 1977 Additional Protocols.201 In the human rights field, it is party to many major treaties but not the 1994 UN Convention against Torture. It has not adhered to the major instruments of A total of 189 LOCs covering 75 countries in Africa, Asia, CIS, Europe and Latin America, with refugee law nor has it ratified the 1998 Rome Statute. In December 2002, India signed a bilateral credit commitments aggregating 10.03 billion USD, are currently available for utilisation, while non-extradition treaty with the USA regarding the International Criminal Court. a number of prospective LOCs are at various stages of negotiation. The various aspects and facets of human rights have been enshrined in the Constitution of India, which can be claimed as the largest written laws of the world. The Supreme Court has adopted an activist approach in dealing with matters for the protection of human rights over the years involving judicial techniques such as PILs (Public Interest Litigation) and SILs (State Interest Litigation). Further, the Supreme Court, in disposing of various cases of human rights, have relied upon major international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Also, relating to protection of human rights, the whole Indian judiciary system requires major reforms, given a history of impunity and slow justice. The National Human Right Commission (NHRC) and State Human Right Commission (SHRC) need to be given more power, and an independent, effective investigation agency with sufficient personnel under their commands is required to be effective in the matter of serious violations. Inhibiting Environment of the Indian voluntary sector As far as Indian civil society is concerned, a number of restrictive regulatory and statutory requirements inhibit the proper functioning of their organisations, including: Old registration laws: The legal framework for registration of voluntary organisations or civil society organisations in India is based mostly on colonial era legislation, and fails to take into account the constitutional imperatives of a democratic India. For instance, the Society Registration Act of 1860 is more than 150 years old. Today’s civil action does not address the same issues that were addressed by the 1860 Act. Under Section 20 of the Act, societies which may be registered range from being of the nature of charitable societies, military orphan funds, foundations or for maintenance of libraries or reading rooms for general use among the members, among others. This signifies the age of the law and need for redefining organisations that can register under the Societies Act. Most of the VO registering laws have almost no regulatory content but merely India’s Bilateral Assistance under the DPA, BE=Allotted Budget serve as a listing of VOs. At the time these laws were written, no one had any idea that VOs expenditure (BE) 200 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part Mixed Views on Line of Credits in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so. It has been questioned whether lines of credit should be categorised as development assistance 201 Protocol I is a 1977 amendment protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of within and outside of India. However, the government of India officially considers LOCs as one international armed conflicts. It reaffirms the international laws of the original Geneva Conventions of 1949, but of its three instruments for providing development assistance and reports the interest rate adds clarifications and new provisions to accommodate developments in modern international warfare that equalisation support as development assistance. Moreover, although India is neither a member have taken place since the Second World War. 112 113 would play such a vital social role, generating social movements and designing public policies. record against a country or an individual in order to keep the entity under pressure and under a state There is a need for clear segregation and definition of the voluntary sector as any non-profit of under-development,” says the IB report. entity ranging from large private hospitals to private corporate schools, sports club foundations, among others, all registered under the same Act. This has led to ambiguity about the identity, Four NGOs were put under the scanner in 2012 for allegedly fuelling protests against the Kudankulam nature, scope and scale of the voluntary sector. Section 20 of the Act showcases the age of the nuclear project in Tamil Nadu. The accounts of several Indian NGOs were put in the watch list with law and the need for redefining the organisations that can register under the Societies Act. regard to allegations of funds diversion after a discreet probe by security agencies, with the help of The demand for periodic renewal of registration in some states has complicated matters for Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and Central Economic Intelligence Bureau. voluntary organisations. Apart from this, societies registered in certain states are not allowed to operate outside the state of registration. This creates serious issues for VOs wanting to work in of knowledge about the sector and its functioning that the organisations have to suffer. The cross border areas or in multiple states. complex administrative procedure for taxation has been reported as a major problem by civil society. This issue was however addressed in the 2007 National Policy on voluntary sector; and it is hoped that the government will take this up at the earliest so that Indian VOs are benefited, The Political Environment protected and regulated by a suitable law. Much has happened in the country with the election of Narenda Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Resistance to Rights based work – the relationship of the voluntary sector with the government is Party in May 2014. The new ruling party carefully blended promises of economic development— mixed, faced by a convergence and divergence of interests between governments and civil society reforms, better services, more jobs and security for all—with references that were both religious actors. Service delivery initiatives by civil society, as in the case of organisations collaborating and cultural. with local governments on village water schemes, are deemed uncontroversial. However, when organisations raise more political concerns, for instance by speaking out against corruption, These ideas were rarely explicitly articulated but were nonetheless clear in the new Prime then the relationship becomes more confrontational. To control the activities of the civil society Minister’s choice of Varanasi, the holy city on the Ganges, in contravention of electoral sector, stricter provisions such as the FCRA 2010 and the Direct Tax Code Bill 2009 have been codes, behind the stage at meetings. There have been more assertive statements directed at introduced. It is felt by majority of the representatives from the sector that FCRA 2010 has been neighbouring countries such as Pakistan—with which India has fought four wars, and China— introduced to restrict the flow of foreign contributions to civil society organisations. A leaked with which India has had conflict, and a promise that the new PM would create an India that Information Bureau (IB) report had recently alleged that protests against development projects no one could talk down to on the international stage. There was even an apparent threat to fuelled by certain foreign-funded NGOs had caused a presumptive loss of 2-3% to India’s GDP. revise India’s ‘no first strike’ nuclear weapons policy. This way, India is gaining more prominence in the global platforms such as G20, IBSA and BRICS, apart from showcasing its power in the Restrictive Taxation law transition from developing country status to that of a developed country, as it emerges as a leading economy in the south Asia region. India is also extending its support to neighbouring The Income Tax Act is designed to prevent leakage of tax revenue rather than allow VOs to raise countries such as Nepal, Bhutan and Burma, to aid in their infrastructural development. resources and spend them as per their needs, as an alternative to the government spending. In At the domestic front, India’s new government outlined an ambitious plan to try to remedy the the case of the current provision in section 2(15) of the IT Act, even the nominal recoveries made country’s persistent gaps in basic infrastructure such as electricity and water supply, while also from beneficiaries are considered profitable by the taxation system in India. These are not made pressing ahead with more futuristic investments in high-speed rail and so-called smart cities. for profit but to ensure efficient use of material, to give more control to beneficiaries and for It is known that the country is passing through an extremely difficult phase, and putting the ensuring sustainability of interventions. Similarly, as per the existing provisions of Income Tax economy back on track is paramount. This comes amidst the initiation of Swachcha Bharat Act 1961, surplus income can be accumulated for a maximum period of five years for specific Abhiyan, a campaign that aims to accomplish the vision of ‘Clean India’ by October 2, 2019, the projects. Such provisions are restrictive and create hardship for a large number of CSOs or 150th birthday of Mahatma Gandhi. Packaged as ‘beyond politics’ and ‘inspired by patriotism,’ VOs. On the other hand, taxation authorities do not understand the non-profit sector and often the campaigns expected to cost over 62,000 crore (10 billion USD). More than three million confuse the terms “bidding and contracts” as a profit-making business. It is due to their lack government employees and Indian students are going to participate in this event. Many civil society organisations are expected to participate in the campaign, which has acted to reinforce the divisions between CSOs oriented toward service delivery and those more open to political contestation. The IB report says that while caste discrimination, human rights and big dams were earlier chosen by international organisations to discredit India at global forums, the recent shift in the choice of issues The PM has said he wants to ease infrastructure bottlenecks and pursue more business-friendly was to encourage ‘growth-retarding campaigns’ focused on extractive industries, genetically-modified policies. The government seeks to boost foreign investment, particularly in defence companies, organisms and food, climate change and anti-nuclear issues. and offer incentives to promote labour-intensive manufacturing, while simplifying tax laws. It would also undertake measures to attract private investment in the coal sector. According to the report, the funding for such campaigns came from foreign donors under charitable garb for issues ranging from protection of human rights, violence against women, caste discrimination, The government pledged to create a universally affordable healthcare system, put toilets in religious freedom, and so on, or to provide a ‘just deal’ to the project-affected displaced persons or for the protection of livelihood of indigenous people. every home and connect every Indian school to the Internet. But Modhi’s inaugural address offered no details as to how these projects would be financed or carried out. The NGOs become the central players in setting the agenda, drafting documents, writing in the media, highlighting scholars-turned-activists and lobbying diplomats and government, it says. “These foreign At the end of the fiscal year in March, the Indian government’s budget deficit was equivalent to donors lead local NGOs to provide field reports which are used to build a record against India and 4.5% of gross domestic product. This significantly limits its capacity for new spending without serve as tools for the strategic foreign policy interests of the Western government,” adds the report. more revenue or cuts elsewhere. “The strategy serves its purpose when the funded Indian NGOs provide reports, which are used to in- Critics have accused the new PM of focusing too much on big business and urban Indians ternationalise and publicise the alleged violations in international fora. All the above is used to build a instead of the rural poor. 114 115 Along these lines, the government has promised to forge new public-private partnerships to overhaul India’s infrastructure, set up civil nuclear power projects, build 100 smart cities with financial crunch. The situation is even worse for organisations working on rights-based issues. modern telecommunications and create a network of high-speed railways. Overall, the socio-cultural situation for CSOs is not so good, and they face limited political It has also promised to set up industrial regions aimed at making India a ‘globally competitive support. manufacturing hub,’ including for defence manufacturing, while also developing India’s tourism industry. The Socio-Economic Context The Governance Context India faces a number of socio-economic challenges. With the onset of globalisation, Indian society has witnessed rapid changes that have compounded these problems. This has resulted India’s development cooperation policy is based on a holistic approach (including trade and in an increase in the number of CSOs that have stepped in to undertake various development investments) and is comprised of two main pillars: 1) economic cooperation, focusing on trade and service-oriented initiatives. These organisations come in various forms. and technology flows among developing, including the removal of discrimination in institutional and regulatory frameworks; and 2) technical cooperation, focusing on technical capacity building Despite India’s rapid economic development, it can be said that India has the best of both the through training, exchanges of experts and sharing of experience and know-how. First World and the worst of the Third World within its borders, and faces unprecedented human security challenges. India now has 410 million people living below the UN poverty line—37.2% ‘India attaches little conditionality to its grants and also gives beneficiaries a greater voice in the of its population, and actually 100 million more people than in 2004—and millions of India’s process. India’s assistance is focused on promoting goodwill, long-term economic development rural poor are faced with food price inflation of up to 17%. Sixty per cent of Indian labour is still and promoting influence rather than exporting skilled manpower and repatriating profits. It agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants into a modern economy focused mostly on promoting local capacity. However, there are indications that India is moving may be an extremely painful process.210 And while Indian infrastructure such as roads, civil from exerting soft to hard power. The goodwill generated could very well get diluted with India aviation, ports, and telecommunications have experienced noticeable improvements in recent emerging as a major donor.’ years, electricity, railways, and irrigation still need significant investment. India also continues to lag in social infrastructure, such as education and healthcare.211 These social inequalities have Although the focus of Indian development cooperation has primarily been bilateral, New Delhi fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency, affecting vast areas throughout eastern has taken part in the OECD-led international dialogue on development. This process seeks and central India and whose 20,000 insurgents have been identified as the ‘greatest internal to enhance agreement on norms governing development assistance, promote information security threat’ facing the nation.212 These internal issues pose the first challenge to India’s rise exchange between providers of assistance, and create a global regime under which there as a great power, as its aspirations for global prominence depends on domestic stability. The would be better coordination of delivery, more sensitivity to the needs of recipient countries requirements for domestic stability in turn shape India’s international needs. Pant asserts that, and objective yardsticks for impact assessment. This dialogue has strengthened mutual ‘The biggest challenge for India remains that of continuing to achieve the rates of economic understanding regarding perceptions of aid and development cooperation, both among growth that it has enjoyed in recent years. Everything else is of secondary importance. … Unless ‘southern’ actors and between the north and south. India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy ambitions cannot be realised.’213 One of the main challenges in documenting the development assistance policy of India is The Indian government recently lauded the fact that they were huge donors of charitable aid to the lack of sufficient information. Researchers resort to estimation and manual gathering of Africa. That being said, policies regarding VO or CSO activities overseas, as dictated by the DTC, information from different sources, and the voluntary organisations depend on the limited are very different from those that exist among other donor nations. Presently, money collected materials available on the ministry of external affairs website, use their own channels or create in India for public benefit activity overseas is taxed at the highest rate in the nation.214 So despite their own database by constant research. civil society being very vocal in challenging various socio-economic issues, their voices remain mostly unheard. The Socio-Cultural Context Challenges As discussed in the previous sections, the Indian Society Registration Act is almost 160 year old and has never been updated, and various big and reputed educational, religious and private The contribution of voluntary sector in India cannot be undermined, especially when one CSR bodies are registered under the same act and are considered voluntary or civil society looks at the huge contribution the sector has made toward the country’s social and political organisations. The government, media and the larger public are mostly unaware of this fact development. Nevertheless, the government has always had many reservations regarding the and hence treat them as one. This has also created misunderstandings and, on many occasions, working pattern of the sector, especially their empathy towards the rights and entitlements of media has come up with news on how large of chunk of foreign money is coming to the voluntary the marginalised. Also, very little information has been made available to the public on India’s organisations, which have further maligned the name of the sector. foreign policy and ODA policy—in that context, the establishment of the DPA offers some hope. At the same time, awareness is low among the general population on issues relating to India’s For example, in June 2014, the IB document has criticised foreign-funded NGOs and is now global footprint and broader policy issues and debates. It is very important for the people to available in the public domain. This report was badly circulated amongst various media groups, understand India’s positions on international matters such as foreign aid, and India’s positions which generated intense public debate and negative perceptions of the civil society sector. and commitments at the international forums including BRICS and G20 in order to get their Meanwhile ‘several corporates have tried to leverage their donations to choke competition voices heard and demands taken into account. So far, Indian VOs and CSOs themselves have and create favourable markets for themselves. Some have even tried to influence government policies. For example, if there are genuine NGOs promoting small, distributed renewable 210 Bardhan, Pranab. “Crouching Tiger, Lumbering Elephant? The Rise of China and India in a Comparative electricity generation units on the one side, there are an equal number of dubious corporate- Economic Perspective”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol 13, No 1, p51. funded NGOs on the other side, promoting large centralised renewable energy units to develop 211 Bardhan, “Crouching Tiger”, p52 a market for the corporates.’ 212 Pant, “Indian Foreign and Security Policy”, p231 213 Pant, “Indian Foreign and Security Policy,” p226. 214 VANI, 2011, Review of Legal and Fiscal Regulatory Mechanism of Voluntary Sector: Comparing India and the Also, with India declaring itself as a donor country and an emerging developed economy, most World, http://vaniindia.org/Download/regulationstudy.pdf sources of multi-lateral funding have closed down, putting many VOs and CSOs in a major 116 117 much to learn on these issues. It is crucial for the government to be fully transparent to civil society on their foreign policies in line with commitments made at the global level. interested in engaging in the development work from the government side in different countries CSOs work closely with people on the ground and have a better sense of the sentiments of the whenever required. It was a huge achievement as VANI, along with PRIA, created the directory common person. There is, however a different side to this story. Indian CSOs are not allowed and provided the first copy to DPA. This will provide a great opportunity to some grassroots- to work in other countries apart from a handful selected, based on criteria not known to most level organisations to gain visibility at the national and global levels. organisations. Indian CSOs are not allowed to work abroad and most development projects in other countries are mostly government-to-government affairs. In exceptional cases, the Access to Justice: Utilization of Innovative Good Practices in the Villages through RLEK215 government selects specific CSOs to work on development projects. In this context, the media and lawmakers are important stakeholders in the process of building more accountable and RLEK is training paralegal workers identified in target areas to strengthen the legal support transparent dialogue between government and civil society groups. system for marginalised communities at the grassroots level. These paralegal workers are seen as emerging barefoot community lawyers. Intensive training is given to them on various socio- In addition, civil society has come under intense government scrutiny and surveillance, the legal issues, including: fundamental and constitutional rights; rights against police atrocities; latest expression of which was the leaking of an IB report in August 2014. The leaked report rights of SCs & STs against caste-based discrimination and atrocities; MGNREGA, motor vehicles released the names of some 70 organisations that were in the IB list. Voluntary Action Network compensation; writing RTI application; process for availing benefits of free legal aid; process of India (VANI) ran a huge media campaign by clarifying the confusion in various newspapers and registering FIR; forests rights; special rights of women; prohibition of child marriage; prohibition TV channels, apart from writing to the finance minister, commerce minister, related secretaries of female feticide, among others. of the government departments appealing to lend their ear to the situation of NGOs. The case didn’t get any attention as it was a deliberate attempt to provoke the newly-formed government There are many organisations in India working for the rights of people who are engaged in into ‘taking action’ against the civil society sector. environmental issues. Centre for Science and Environment (CSE)-New Delhi has worked towards pushing for policy changes promoting people’s rights. It has been advocating for the profit- After VANI saw the list of some 4000 VOs on the website of FCRA department of MHA in 2011, sharing provision in the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Bill 2011 (MMDR). the information was immediately conveyed to the members and other contacts of VANI. It has The organisation’s report on the bill, Sharing the Wealth of Minerals, looks at profit-sharing in been organising consultations with some senior persons including CA, financial consultants, different countries and then does an analysis of what it would mean in the context of India’s and lawyers and affected VOs, apart from attending various meetings with the government, mining industry. CSE was one of the first organisations to talk about the concept of benefit/ especially with the Ministry of Home Affairs (FCRA Department) on a regular basis. profit-sharing from mining in the publication Rich Lands, Poor People. They then worked very closely with the Ministry of Mines as they drafted the MMDR Bill. The organisation has since Apart from this, VANI has been doing various advocacy campaigns for national registration released the profit-sharing report in Orissa and Jharkhand. CSE sent its representations to the laws as a result of which the government came up with a Multi-State Societies Registration Law Parliamentary Standing Committee and the Group of Ministers, which accepted some of the key (MSSR) that was not well taken by the voluntary sector. Now VANI is running a massive advocacy recommendations of the report and incorporated them in the MMDR Bill.216 campaign to have a national registration law for civil society organisations in India, and is also working toward making a more transparent and democratic model for formulating the law. Ways Forward Successes/Achievements As an emerging donor, India should develop its financial assistance credit line framework to carry out proper governance and reporting structures. This way, India would be seen as a Development actors in India have been working very seriously toward meeting their country capable of executing sovereign debt workout, lending to a perception of the country as commitments with regard to development cooperation. a reliable partner in nation building. On the part of civil society, steps have been taken to emphasise the need for greater transparency As a new entrant, India is faced by some shortcomings such as institutional problems, an and accountability through self-regulation, and VANI, being the apex body of Indian voluntary inadequate system for monitoring and evaluation and the lack of a more transparent decision- organisations, took some important initiatives in this direction. making process with regard to aid size and agreements with partners. As part of south-south cooperation, India’s profile is constant in its history of being a developing nation with domestic When VANI was formed in 1988, it was mandated to promote value-based voluntarism in socio-economic challenges that is, however, willing to share their experiences with other society. Among many interventions toward this end, VANI defined a set of norms and standards countries (Chaturvedi, 2012). of good governance practices for those voluntary organisations, which became its members. This is precisely why none of VANI’s member has ever been included in periodic ‘black lists’ With the creation of DPA, India should now be able to articulate its development cooperation by the government. VANI’s campaign to reform the policy and regulatory environment for agenda in a well-defined manner where its unique model of ‘development compact’ depicts voluntary organisations in the country is based on this premise of making the governance of diversity in engagement though trade and investment, technology transfer finance through such institutions more transparent, accountable and effective. It is also a strong aspect of the credit lines and capacity building by means of a flagship program. India’s aid assistance program National Policy on Voluntary Sector in the country. is mostly dedicated toward creating technical capacities and the provision of production support. To create a lasting mark on development cooperation, India needs to finely balance its domestic The Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC) was launched at a seminar held on politics with a desire for greater international status. January 15, 2013 in RIS (Research and Information System), a think tank body of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The idea was to have a forum for exploring various facets of development It is very important for the government to understand the civil society or voluntary sector cooperation that would also seek to draw upon India’s own experience. VANI and some leading organisations such as PRIA, Development Alternatives, Gram Vikas, CBGA, among others, are 215 RLEK is implementing Access to Justice Project supported by Department of Justice, GOI- UNDP in fifteen districts the founding members of FIDC. During one of their meetings, the DPA, Ministry of Welfare of three states in India namely, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The project aims at legally empowering the asked for an NGO directory, a list of genuine voluntary organisations in India, that would be marginalised communities, including minorities, with a special focus on women. 216 http://Internet.cseindia.org/node/4982 118 119 and its contribution to social development. The government should be more open about the potential role of this sector and make the procedures simpler to enable them to work in foreign countries where their services are required. Regular meetings and dialogues with the sector’s Kenya practitioners and creating a directory of organisations on specialised theme are important tasks. It is also important for the government to train and do capacity building workshops for voluntary organisations on various thematic issues. Summary In addition, there is a need to renew and update the taxation system for CSOs working in foreign This report is a desk study that aims to assess the degree to which various development countries. Also, like private bodies, voluntary organisations should also be allowed to work on actors contribute to democratic forms of governance that include civil society (development development projects abroad independently apart from their engagement in government- cooperation); the ability of CSOs to respond to changes in their socio-political contexts is in turn initiated plans. a measure of the enabling environment in their countries (CSO enabling environment), as well as an indicator of their own effectiveness (CSO development effectiveness). Above all, there is a need for greater transparency on the part of the government, and a willingness to share information on key policy issues debates on a public platform. In the quest to achieve the country’s development goals and contribute to development CSOs themselves need to demonstrate high levels of transparency and accountability both cooperation, the government of Kenya and development partners have taken steps to downward toward communities and beneficiaries, and upwards toward the government, harmonise, align and coordinate their activities with the aim of increasing the efficiency and donors and civil society through self-regulation. There are various models of self-regulation effectiveness of aid. Following the Third High Level Forum in Accra, Ghana, the government has such as self-certification and accreditation, or at least following the criteria of due diligence. As taken stronger leadership of the whole development effectiveness agenda, with a sharper focus discussed earlier, the voluntary sector is highly regulated in India, with various ministries and on delivery of the Paris, Accra and Busan agendas, in partnership with not only the development monitoring mechanisms. partners, but with CSOs and other partners as well. However, though there has been more partnership, it is evident that this engagement is more form than substance, and the country But a system that keeps the independence of the sector intact as well as enables civil society’s systems in place are still weak. role to act as a check on other social sectors needs to be developed. It is important to recognise civil society’s role as an independent actor with a vital contribution to make to the democratic CSO empowerment and equal participation in decision-making and in all aspects of the development of India, and is thus on equal standing with the media and other social sectors. development process remain prerequisites for substantive development effectiveness. This is evidenced by the current governance reforms where the government has recognised the References inclusion of parliament, citizens and CSOs as an underlying principle in development planning. Though the pivotal role of CSOs is recognised and emphasised today, concerns are also raised— 1. “100 Million More Indians now Living in poverty”, The Economic Times, 18 Apr 2010, http://economictimes. and not only by governments—about the accountability of CSOs and their ability to show results indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/100-million-more-Indians-now-living-in-poverty/ articleshow/5829267.cms and demonstrate impact. This has in turn fuelled the need for CSOs to have a set of values in 2. Agrawal, Subhash, 2007, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case, International place that essentially guide their development work. While there has been notable progress in Development Research Centre, Partnership and Business Development Division. the areas of promotion of human rights and the embodying of gender equality and equity, a lot 3. Banerjee, Kaustav, 2010, Social Development Index, Social Development Report 2010, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. still needs to be done to ensure CSO effectiveness in pursuing equitable partnerships, mutual 4. Bardhan, “Crouching Tiger”, p52 learning and sustainability in CSO work. 5. Bardhan, Pranab. “Crouching Tiger, Lumbering Elephant? The Rise of China and India in a Comparative Economic Perspective”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol 13, No 1, p51. 6. Dunning and Narula (1994), “World Investment Report”, UNCTAD, pp 237 A new enabling legal environment is essential in ensuring good governance by the CSOs 7. Gopinathan, S. (2007), Overseas Investment by Indian Companies: Evolution of Policy and Trends, Mumbai: on the one hand, while protecting legitimate civil society activity on the other. It provides a Reserve Bank of India (2007), available at http://Internet.bis.org/review/r070122c.pdf. 8. Goswami, Tandon, Bandhopadhyay (2012), Civil Society in Changing India: Emerging Roles, Relationships and pertinent framework for the engagement of CSOs in executing their mandate. Despite notable Strategies, Internet.pria.org achievements in engagement of global processes, the reality on the ground reflects little change 9. Governance Indicators for 1996-2008, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ wgicharts. in opening real spaces for CSOs in official dialogue mechanisms. Challenges still remain as xls (accessed: 06 June 2013). 10. Gupta, Sanjeev, Catherine Pattillo and SmitaWagh, 2006, Are Donor Countries Giving More or Less Aid? Review evidenced by shrinking CSO spaces in official processes, as well as general lack of an enabling of Development Economics 10, 3: 535-552. environment as development actors. 11. http://Internet.financialexpress.com/news/foreignaided-ngos-are-actively-stalling-development-ib-tells-pmo- in-a-report/1258034 12. http://Internet.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=107 Efforts continue to go into addressing the gaps in the current legal and regulatory framework, 13. http://Internet.narendramodi.in/pm-launches-swachh-bharat-abhiyaan/ as well as strengthening the capacity of the CSO sector, factors that will go a long way in 14. http://Internet.scribd.com/doc/229511459/IB-Report-NGOs-June-2014 strengthening their engagement in shaping policy decisions in the country. 15. India’s Global Footprints (2013), VANI publication 16. Neumayer, Eric, 2002, Is Good Governance Rewarded? A Cross-National Analysis of Debt Forgiveness. World Development 30, 6: 913-930. Introduction 17. OECD, 2012, Creditor Reporting System Aid Activities Database, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (last accessed: 24 May 2013). 18. Pant, “Indian Foreign and Security Policy”, p231 The principles established in Busan call for ownership and leadership of development strategies 19. Raghavan P.S., 31st January, 2013’India’s Foreign Policy: New Initiatives for Development Partnership,Internet by aid recipient countries, a focus on results that matter to the poor in developing countries, (speech, New Delhi,) Aspen Institute India (available at http://Internet.anantaaspencentre.in/pdf/p_s/india_ inclusive partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust and transparency and foreign_policy.pdf) accessed 21st May, 2014. 20. Sarma, EAS, (2014), The Intelligence Bureau and Its Not Very Intelligent Report on NGOs, Economic & Political accountability to one another. They also emphasise the need for recipients of development aid Weekly, Vol - XLIX No. 26-27, June 28, 2014 to work together and form partnerships, to have a greater influence in designing development 21. Sharan Vivan, Campbell Ivan and RubinDaniel , (2013), Special Report , India’s Development Cooperation, Charting New Approaches in the Changing world, July-2013 strategies and to guarantee that the funds will be used effectively in projects. Suffice to say, 22. Sung Won Kim, David P. Fidler, and Sumit Ganguly, “Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human therefore, that translating Busan commitments into reality is everyone’s responsibility. No Security”, World Policy Journal, Summer 2009, p64 commitment can be implemented by one constituency or stakeholder alone. In trying to 23. Trade-Related South-South Co-Operation: India, OECD document, http://Internet.oecd.org/dac/aidfortrade/ South-South_India.pdf translate the shared principles into practice, CSOs have since adopted the Istanbul Principles to 24. VANI, 2011, Review of Legal and Fiscal Regulatory Mechanism of Voluntary Sector: Comparing India and the strengthen effectiveness of their own development efforts. World, http://vaniindia.org/Download/regulationstudy.pdf 120 121 In trying to do this, the sector has been keen on working on its credibility and accountability, has been the urgent need to rework the development assistance architecture to involve as especially with the growing realisation that a few bogus actors can damage the image and many stakeholders as possible in determining how best different streams of financing for reputation of the wider sector. Evidently, there is also great effort going into pursuing equitable development can address the socio-economic needs of emerging and developing economies partnerships, sharing knowledge and committing to mutual learning. across the globe. Previously in Kenya, there existed no major policy framework in the dialogue. The structure of In Kenya, in particular, the quest for sustainable socio-economic development has been a dialogue was mainly centred between government and development partners, and it was clear challenging endeavour, influencing some policy shifts. The strident call has basically centred on there was a continued lack of participation of a wide range of stakeholders, especially CSOs. poverty reduction, inclusion of those excluded from the enjoyment of the benefits of economic The growing debate around aid effectiveness called for a broader engagement with CSOs. Now growth and the redistribution of productive resources. What have consequently changed are the through the monthly aid effectiveness group meetings, the government is increasingly playing strategies to achieve the objectives of sustainable human development focusing on improving its leadership role, with the continued participation of development partners and CSOs, in an the quality of life of the majority poor. These have changed to now include policy-makers, effort to promote aid and development effectiveness through improvements in harmonisation, implementers, civil society, local communities and other stakeholders. CSOs in particular have alignment and coordination in Kenya. Reality of Aid Africa Network is one of two CSOs that are been very active in poverty reduction interventions, especially at grassroots levels. They do represented in these meetings and has been instrumental in the development of the Mutual so by empowering grassroots to articulate issues, strengthen their capacity and influence the Accountability Framework, and in pushing for CSOs to be recognised and included in the aid direction of their lives. Their active involvement has also been noted in the monitoring and architecture, among other things. evaluation of poverty reduction efforts, for example, in participating in the implementation and progress report of international convention declarations such as the World Summit on Though there has been undeniable progress, due to challenges in areas of access to useful Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), among information, capacity issues and shrinking space for CSOs, among others, the complete others. achievement of these principles have not been a reality, especially for Kenyan CSOs. The civil society in Kenya has tremendous roles to play in the Kenyan landscape. They have been vital in In the quest to achieve the country’s development goals, development partners and the the promotion of peace and security, ethnic cohesion and religious tolerance, and are playing an government of Kenya have taken steps to harmonise, align, and coordinate their activities with important role in the implementation of Kenya’s vision 2030. They are doing this by setting a civil the aim of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of aid, and of reducing transaction costs to society agenda in respect to vision 2030, focusing on health, education, water and sanitation and government in line with Paris Declaration 2005. The Harmonization, Alignment and Coordination housing under the social pillar, as well as mainstreaming of other key issues such as gender, the Donor group (HAC) was established in 2004 as a subgroup of the Donor Coordination Group environment, the marginalised, the vulnerable and persons with disabilities. Civil societies are (DCG), with World Bank as permanent co-chair and an initial membership of seven bilateral and doing this alongside the government and private sector, among other development partners. multilateral agencies. In 2008, after the Third High Level Forum in Accra, Ghana, the government felt the need to take stronger leadership of the whole aid effectiveness agenda, and it was Even though there have been many successes in the sector, it continues to face challenges around agreed that all HAC meetings will be held at the Treasury Building which houses the MoF, and the lack of timely access to information, capacity issues, misappropriation and inadequacy of that all meetings would be jointly chaired by the government and development partner co-chair. funds, minimal collaborations between CSOs, and shrinking CSO space, all of which make for a severe limitation to CSO development effectiveness. A further need arose to review the HAC group based on the recommendations to restructure it. A review of HAC was finalised in February 2009; this was followed by a retreat in September Therefore, in order to maximise the successes and address the challenges faced by the country 2009 in order to discuss the recommendations. An outcome of the September 9-11, 2009 Aid post-2015, the challenge that lies ahead will be to establish development policies that are clearly Effectiveness Retreat recommended that the Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG) would replace the influenced by civil society’s positions on human rights, democratic ownership and inclusive HAC group and would be firmly rooted in the External Resources Department (ERD), Ministry of partnerships, and practices that push for international standards on an enabling environment, Finance, with increased participation from the Planning Ministry, along with the then Office of more so in the thematic areas of development cooperation, CSO development effectiveness the Prime Minister and other line ministries. and CSO enabling environment. The AEG continues the role of the HAC, but now with a sharper focus on delivery of the Paris, This desk study aims to contribute to a global report that intends to bring together critical Accra and Busan agendas. It serves as the information clearing house collecting and sharing perspectives on the current context of development cooperation, CSO enabling environment information about emerging good practice at sector level, analysing and addressing challenges and CSO development effectiveness at country level. The report is divided into four sections. to achieving the Paris/ OECD indicators and reporting on their progress. It reports to the The first section touches on the degree to which various development actors contribute to Development Partnership Forum (DPF) on the aid and development effectiveness agenda. democratic reforms of governance that include CSOs. The second section highlights the nature of the environment within which Kenyan CSOs operate, including the successes and challenges The following reveal the extent to which the set of principles agreed on in Busan is working to they encounter as they execute their mandate. The third section is about CSO development enhance effective development cooperation in Kenya: effectiveness as an indicator of their own effectiveness. The last section draws a conclusion from the evidence and offers a few recommendations all development stakeholders should • Less aid but more partnership. Despite spending a relatively small proportion of consider going forward. external resources (an average of 5% of total government revenues), the government of Kenya continues to foster good, working relations with development partners. Perhaps Development Cooperation due to the need to attract other resource flows such as foreign direct investment, loans and other private flows that also depend on good foreign relations. Development partners have made considerable progress in expanding and improving the quality of official development assistance (ODA) since the agreements on the Millennium Development • Systems are in place but are weak. While the government of Kenya has introduced Goals in 2000. This has seen a culmination of a series of high level meetings and commitments country systems to ensure that resources are administered prudently, they remain that date back to 2003 in Rome, Italy, to 2011 in Busan, South Korea. The common narrative weak and vulnerable to corruption. This continues to discourage effective partnerships 122 123 for financing development in the country and creates uncertainty on external resource inclusion of parliament, citizens and CSOs as an underlying principle in development planning. flows. There are now structured mechanisms in place in the bid to achieving this, with specific reference to the issue of budget hearings. However, the extent to which this has made a real contribution • Development partners maintain stringent processes. Stringent processes for towards the budget outcomes is questionable. While they have included ad hoc invitations to negotiating project terms, approval and monitoring preferred by some development civil society, they are also conducted with an absence of public information about the process. partners slow down implementation of projects and concessions that lead to low absorption of development finances. The pivotal role of CSOs is recognised and emphasised in a number of international agreements today, for example, the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness. But, • Engagement is more form than substance. Engagement with development partners at the same time, concerns are also raised, not only by governments, about the accountability from emerging economies, civil society and private sector on development cooperation of CSOs and their ability to show results and demonstrate impact. There is, therefore, a growing has increased. However, the depth of engagement is yet to be seen to influence interest and demand from not only donors, governments and development practitioners, but patterns of resource allocation on development programmes in the country. also from a range of CSOs—from large international non-governmental organisations to local community-based organisations—for practical tools to assess and evaluate their performance, • Progressively, the space for CSOs is shrinking. While CSOs do not operate in a hostile and capacity to deliver results and be accountable to their constituents. environment in Kenya per se, compared to the neighbouring countries, there is an emerging trend of active alienation of CSOs and shrinking of democratic space that sets Captured below are some of the ways Kenyan CSOs have fared and are faring in the domestication bad precedence for effective development cooperation. of the Istanbul Principles: • Access to information. There is limited access to good quality information, which Respect and promote human rights and social justice: There is a great aspiration to ensure makes it difficult to inform resource allocation, track expenditures effectively and that Kenyans have effective exercise of their human rights, and the sector has played essential measure progress appropriately. This is exacerbated by the absence of an access to roles in facilitating this progress. For instance, many CSOs also mobilised their constituents to information law to compel the custodians of public information to make it available. analyse and discuss proposed legislation and policies, including the County Governments Bill (2012), the Public Finance Management Transition Bill (2012) and the Leadership and Integrity • Devolution. Devolved governments are an opportunity for resources to flow to the Bill (2012). lowest levels of service delivery, hence, potential for better impacts. However, the devolution statute gives powers to sub-national entities to directly negotiate grants Embodying gender equality and equity while promoting women and girl’s rights: CSOs with development partners. This presents a challenge regarding coordination of have been at the forefront of protecting and promoting women’s rights, supporting actions development assistance and more importantly, the danger of donors ‘cherry-picking’ for gender responsive budgeting, resource planning, allocation and expenditure for gender projects, geographical areas or even pet sectors to the disadvantage of national equality, women’s empowerment and the pursuit to ending violence against women. One of priorities. the evident outcomes from CSO involvement is women no longer being underrepresented in leadership, and discriminated against in legislation. There is no universal formula for achieving the ultimate goal of poverty alleviation, and development effectiveness needs to incorporate learning from successes as well as failures. Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation: CSOs have Building mutual trust and responsibility (related to timely and transparent decisions and played a substantive role in promoting effective citizen participation, especially in the devolved operational financing on the donor side and effective, and transparent use of the provided government, and generally in the implementation of the constitution. The increased level resources on the recipient’s side), open communication, learning from mistakes and paying of citizen engagement in the devolution process has had a lot to do with the civic education attention to impact evaluation are key success factors of development cooperation. programs initiated by CSOs. The Reality of Aid 2010 global report clearly captures that only when development cooperation Promote environmental sustainability: The National Environment Management Authority is recast as a relationship of committed solidarity in the fight against inequality can it lead to (NEMA) is the overall environmental management authority in Kenya and is responsible for social and environmental justice. coordination, supervision and regulation of the management of the environment and natural resources. CSOs are also involved and their areas of concern such as environmental protection, CSO Development Effectiveness natural resources management, urban greening and waste management, development of alternative community livelihood systems, capacity building through training, education Civil society organisations make a difference in international development. They provide awareness creation among the communities, enhancement of health and sanitation services, development services and humanitarian relief, innovate in service delivery, build local capacity water harvesting, etc. and advocate with and for the poor. Acting alone, however, their impact is limited in scope, scale and sustainability. As such, governments have increasingly accepted CSOs as policy interlocutors Promote transparency and accountability: There exist gaps in the current legal and regulatory and intermediaries that promote civic participation and representation of minorities and framework including difficulties in monitoring compliance and accountability by CSOs. But disadvantaged groups in decision-making processes. With increased democratisation, the PBO Act seeks to achieve a new legal, regulatory and institutional framework for public reductions in conflict, and advances in information and communication technologies, more benefits organizations (PBOs) in Kenya with one of the main principles being to ensure high room has been opened for progressive partnerships between CSOs, policy-makers and other standards of governance, transparency and accountability by PBOs. It advances and demands development actors in Kenya. good leadership and accountability from PBOs in line with the spirit of Chapter 6 of the new constitution on leadership and integrity. CSO empowerment and equal participation in decision-making and in all aspects of the development process remain prerequisites for substantive development effectiveness. This Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity: The country has a large CSO sector undertaking is evidenced by the current governance reforms where the government has recognised the a wide spectrum of activities in health, education, environmental sustainability, governance, 124 125 just to mention a few. All these organisations now see the need to work within the national CAP 164, and Trustees Act CAP 167 have been unable to adequately accommodate the diverse development plan and the government’s vision 2030, and also wish to adopt stronger evidence- spectrum of civil society organisations. based advocacy roles, guided by the human rights-based approach. However, while considerable progress has been made in the last three years in terms of quantitative engagements for Kenyan Consequently, gaps in the current legal and regulatory framework exist, including: CSOs with other stakeholders at the global level, much still remains to be done qualitatively at the country level. • Multiple and overlapping legal and regulatory regimes presents difficulties for those seeking a harmonised reporting framework; Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning: Combining the spread and • Difficulties in monitoring compliance and accountability by CSOs; reach of government with the depth and flexibility of CSOs is one of the most effective methods for achieving development objectives. The process of ceasing to view the state and civil • The current CSO laws are centralised in Nairobi and presents challenges to the spirit of society as adversaries, with the gains of one party being the loss of the other, has worked to devolution as enshrined in the new constitution; promote the kind of engagement that opens civil societies up to see the need to quickly fill their knowledge and skill gaps to address and enhance the ways they learn from their experience, • Inadequate mechanisms and processes of self-regulation for CSOs in Kenya; The from government, other CSOs and development actors. current laws for CSOs do not explicitly address leadership and integrity issues as provided for in the constitution; Commit to realising positive sustainable change: Needless to say, CSOs must have robust technical capacities, efficient management systems and focused leadership structures if • Absence of an independent body to provide checks and balances in cases where the development is to be sustainable and centred on people. Unfortunately, limited capacity self-regulatory mechanism has failed; continues to be a major hindrance to the achievement of sustainability in CSO work. • Absence of complaints and dispute resolution mechanism for CSOs and their members; Though Kenyan CSOs have a commitment to the Istanbul principles, there is dire need to • Lack of a general framework of principles for collaboration between the government strengthen their capacity to sustainably discharge their mandates efficiently. There have and CSOs. been many efforts—driven mostly by the donor community—to develop CSO capacity over the last three decades. These efforts have not been sustainable because they have been The government recognised these weaknesses through the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2006 which mainly focused on achieving specific project aims with little emphasis on or prioritisation of states that the existing fragmented and uncoordinated legal and institutional framework gives developing strong, organisation-wide systems, structures and processes that are essential for CSOs multiple avenues for registration. This Sessional Paper recommended harmonisation sustainability. Today, Kenya’s government, civil society and development partners recognise of the overlapping legislative acts through a comprehensive review of legislation for CSOs in that for these organisations to deliver their mandates effectively and sustainably, capacity Kenya. strengthening initiatives must address organisation-wide systems for leadership, management and governance. They must adopt an integrated approach that addresses knowledge, skills Since then, several CSOs in Kenya, under the umbrella of the CSO Reference Group spearheaded and attitudes of individuals; the systems, structures and processes within organisations; and a campaign to mobilise CSOs to participate in the development of a new enabling legal, institutional culture and environment in order to generate sustainable results. regulatory and institutional framework for CSOs in Kenya. This process led to the development of an all-inclusive bill for CSOs engaged in public benefits activities, the PBO Bill 2012. CSO Enabling Environment PBO essentially means a voluntary membership or non-membership grouping of individuals or CSOs in Kenya essentially exist to promote the public good, support democratic development, organisations which is autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit-making, organised and operated social cohesion and tolerance within society and respect for the rule of law. They complement locally, nationally or internationally, and engages in public benefit activities. the primary duty of the county and national governments to provide essential public services. As such, a new enabling legal environment is essential in ensuring good governance by the After the successful consultation and drafting process of the PBO Bill, it has since been passed CSOs on the one hand, while protecting legitimate civil society activity on the other. It provides a as an act and received assent by the former President Mwai Kibaki on January 14, 2013, but pertinent framework for the engagement of CSOs in the implementation of the new constitution. unfortunately is still awaiting commencement. This delay falls short of the constitutional best practice threshold of a bill being commenced 14 days after it has been passed by parliament The bill of rights and the principle of the freedom of association, as enshrined in the constitution, and assented to by the president. It also continues the atmosphere of uncertainty for PBOs allows all Kenyans to establish associations, including CSOs, without necessarily registering provoked by the recent attempt to seize 85% of their assets and foreign funding. The delay also them. Chapter 4 of the constitution provides for the rights and fundamental freedoms for each falls short of the government’s promise to create and maintain an enabling environment for all and every individual. Article 19 (1) States that ‘The Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s to work towards the fulfilment of national development goals. democratic state and is a framework for social, economic and cultural policies.’ Article 36 provides for the freedom of association, which includes the right to form, join or participate in The PBO sector comprises of 8,800 organisations, employs over 250,000 Kenyans, has a the activities of an association of any kind. combined annual budget of 80 billion KES and directly provides essential services to millions of Kenyans. Needless to say, it requires proper regulation and coordination, and the delay Despite engagement in global processes, little change is reflected on the ground in terms of in commencement of the act negatively affects this. This is because the PBO Act makes for opening real spaces for CSOs in official dialogue mechanisms. Challenges in shrinking CSO the formation, operation and growth of PBOs, and establishes a regulatory and institutional spaces in official processes and general lack of an enabling environment still remain. While framework within which PBOs can operate. CSOs are diverse in nature, there are many registration and regulatory regimes for CSOs in Kenya, making it difficult for effective legal and statutory compliance and accountability for Key Highlights of the PBO Act: CSOs. The various laws including the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, the Companies Act Cap 486 (for Companies Limited by Guarantee), Societies Act CAP 108, Trustee Perpetual Succession Act • Prescribes minimum provisions to be included in the governing documents of PBOs, as 126 127 well as financial transparency and reporting by PBOs; Kyrgyzstan • Advances and demands good leadership and accountability from PBOs and Regulator in line with the Spirit of Chapter 6 of the constitution; Summary • Provides for an institutional framework for principled partnership between government and PBOs at all level; The Kyrgyz Republic before 1991 was part of the Soviet Union. The transition from socialism to • Allows PBOs to determine standards, certification and adherence to a professional a capitalist market economy has since shaped the course of economic development. Poverty code of conduct; today is at all-time high, reaching rates of 37%. Lack of jobs has led to high levels of migration, one of the most significant characteristics of the current socio-economic context of the country. • Allows different types and forms of CSOs doing public benefit work to operate under As UNDP estimates, the total number of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan is between 700 a single act. thousand to a million—this in a country with a population of little more than 5.5 million. Status of PBO Act as of the Moment: Development remains dependent on external ODA. In the context of high levels of corruption, poor management of ODA, growing inequality and big burden of debt repayment, it is crucial • Commencement date of the ACT is yet to be set by the cabinet secretary that CSOs remain engaged in aid and development effectiveness processes at the national and • Miscellaneous amendments introduced to the ACT international levels. There are positive aspects with regard to CSO engagement in development, but in general, CSOs lack institutionalised space in the spirit of ‘partnership for development.’ • Work on rules and regulations continuing with consultation with various PBOs at county level There are no multi-stakeholder discussions over critical aid and development effectiveness issues. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan’s CSOs are proactively taking steps toward meaningful Conclusion participation in the aid and development effectiveness process. But a lot remains to be done to improve the enabling environment for CSOs’ effective involvement. Women, feminists and A great deal of progress has been made by the country in developing a policy framework and women’s organisations and movements play key roles in development at all levels. CSOs are, a structure of dialogue which is no longer dominated by the government and development in addition, concerned with restrictive laws relating to CSO voices, access to information and partners, but which includes participation of other development stakeholders, especially CSOs. advocacy initiatives. With this milestone achieved, the third sector has wasted no time in taking advantage of the opportunity to not only complement the government in providing services, but also play the Introduction much needed advocacy role in speaking for the rights of citizen at all levels. This, however, has not been without its many challenges, the most severe being the continued shrinking space of Kyrgyzstan is a comparatively young state, receiving independence upon the collapse of the CSOs to carry out their work. Efforts continue to go into addressing the gaps in the current legal Soviet Union in 1991. It is essential to recognise the political transition as a persistent challenge and regulatory framework, as well as in strengthening the capacity of the sector—factors that that has shaped the current development context. will go a long way in strengthening their engagement in shaping policy decisions in the country. The transition from socialism to a capitalist market economy led to the progressive fragmentation Some recommendations: of major economic and social infrastructures, including the privatisation of a number of public services. This led to sharp rises in poverty rates throughout the 1990s, alongside heightened • Full implementation of the PBO Act 2013 so that its provisions on self-regulation, social inequality. In Kyrgyzstan, social development faces a number of key challenges, financial probity and good governance can be realised including poor governance, lack of accountability, weak democratic country ownership, lack of transparency, weak rule of law, lack of civil society engagement in public policy-making and high • Strengthen country systems to ensure that resources are administered prudently in levels of corruption. But the Kyrgyz Republic has been re-classified from a low income country order to encourage effective partnerships for financing development to a lower-middle income country, according to the 2014 Income Classifications released in July 2014 by the Bank’s Office of Development Economics and Chief Economist.218 • A more deliberate effort by the government and donors to strengthen institutional and technical capacities of CSOs and their coalitions to deliver their mandates most Broadly speaking, democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan are quite strong—civil society effectively organisations, professional associations, community groups and political parties are active and References diverse. Yet state policy on CSOs is somewhat controversial. On one hand, the state appears committed at enabling growth and strengthening CSOs through the adoption of conducive 1. See “Development Cooperation Report, 2011” accessed at http://Internet.keepeek.com/Digital- legislation and institutionalisation of CSOs’ engagement; on the other hand, though, it limits Asset-Management/oecd/development/development-co-operation-report-2011_dcr-2011- space and tries to gain control over CSOs through other legislative means. Over recent years, en#page5 there have been numerous attempts to control the work and funding sources of CSOs under 2. See “The state of Development Cooperation in Kenya” accessed at http://devinit.org/state- the apparent motive of protecting national sovereignty and combating terrorism. This took the development-cooperation-kenya/ 3. See Aid Effectiveness Kenya accessed at http://Internet.aideffectiveness.go.ke/ form of amendments in the registration requirements for public associations, which in turn 4. Reality of Aid 2011 report on Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness: Civil Society cracked down hard on funding sources for CSOs. Perspectives on Progress since Paris 5. See the Public Benefit Organizations Act accessed at http://Internet.pboact.or.ke/media-centre/ news/112-state-of-the-civil-society-sector-in-kenya 217 National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic.Women and Men of the Kyrgyz Republic.Bishkek -2014. 6. See “Institutional strengthening standards for Kenyan CSOs” accessed at http://Internet.msh.org/ P. 12 sites/msh.org/files/final-is-standards-for-kenyan-csos_feb2014_red.pdf 218 http://Internet.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/24/kyrgyz-republic-becomes-lower-middle-in- 7. See “The 2012 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa” accessed at http://Internet.usaid. come-country gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/CSOSI_AFR_2012.pdf 128 129 Kyrgyzstan civil society is working on several initiatives for aid and development effectiveness, Law ‘On Public Councils of State Bodies’ including monitoring of ODA at various levels. CSOs, under the leadership of the Forum of Women’s NGOs (FWNGO), have formed several groups focusing on these issues since 2007. In May 2014, the Kyrgyz President223 signed a draft of the law ‘on public councils of state FWNGO held a series of events on aid effectiveness in 2008-2011, including multi-stakeholders’ bodies.’224 From 2010 to 2014, Kyrgyzstan has experimented with this new and unique form consultations. In 2011-2014, FWNGO managed to integrate the issue of accountability for aid of institutionalisation of CSO engagement with the government. Public watch councils (PWCs) and development effectiveness into the CSO agenda. were started by a presidential decree in 2010 and in 2014, under a law on Public Councils, adopted by Joroku Kenesh (the National Parliament). A unique form of partnership has been The Legal and Regulatory Framework in Kyrgyzstan established by the Presidential Decree on Public Watch Councils, creating a new form of social and political engagement by the state with CSOs and business bodies. In 2011, the first PWCs The legal framework in Kyrgyzstan relevant to civil society is based on national and international were established. legislation. Kyrgyzstan is a signatory to major international conventions on human rights and other regulatory frameworks that concern civil society. At local and national levels, laws of the They have become a significant factor for strengthening various stakeholders’ relations with Kyrgyz Republic facilitate and do not hinder CSOs, including their ease of registration. CSOs the state in terms of transparency, accountability, democratic ownership of development and in general are regulated by a law ‘on non-commercial organisations’ which was adopted on the monitoring of state-led programmes and processes. Among the duties of the PWCs are October 15, 1999 and replaced a previous law ‘on public associations’ of 1991. structuring cooperation between a government body and civil society, through dialogue and consideration of citizens’ and CSOs’ proposals within the state body’s remit.225 There are more than 6,000 CSOs registered in Kyrgyzstan, but approximately only 1,500 are currently active as many of them have suffered due to lack of capacity and funding constraints. Public watch councils have since been renamed by the new law and are now simply called public Trends in CSO EE are mixed. Over the past decade, CSO-related reforms in the legal system have councils.226 in some ways enabled, and in other ways hindered, their freedom to operate in the country. The inconsistency is itself a threat to the opportunity for CSOs to contribute concretely to As far as laws are concerned, the freedom of association and right to peaceful assembly are Kyrgyzstan’s development. formally guaranteed in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the country does have a very progressive new law on civil society (2014), one of the In 2012, the parliament adopted the Law on Peaceful Assembly, which is based on democratic biggest achievements of CSO advocacy, which institutionalises the role of CSOs as a watch body principles and standards. Promoted by local CSOs, this law provides citizens and civic for state institutions, such as ministries and agencies. This law was finally signed in 2014, after organisations with greater political rights to organise and participate in peaceful assemblies. debates that stretched for nearly two years. However, despite a relatively favourable legal environment, CSOs in practice face a number of The other legislative change with potential impact on development is a law on PPP (public- challenges and violations of these rights. private partnerships) in Kyrgyzstan. This law was adopted by the parliament on January 12, 2013 and signed by the president of the Kyrgyz Republic in February 2012. This law provides a basis Negative Legislative Tendencies to Enabling Environment for CSOs in Kyrgyzstan for long-term relations between the state (state bodies, local authorities, municipal companies) and the private sector through state support of private investments.219 The year 2011 saw attempts to restrict political and legal space for CSOs—their voice, independence and access to information and resources—alongside damage to their the public Positive Tendencies to Widen and Strengthen Enabling Environment for CSOs in Kyrgyzstan image. According to the 2012 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, This proved so serious that the UN Human Rights Committee, at its 3060th meeting (CCPR/C/ Kyrgyzstan’s CSO-related legislation continues to be generally favourable.220 SR.3060227) in March 2014, notes, ‘reports of possible restrictions on non-governmental organisations in several legislative proposals, including restrictive reporting obligations to state Between 2011 to 2013, the registration process for CSOs has been simplified compared to the authorities in the draft bill on Fighting against Legalization (Laundering) of Criminal Revenue past.221 In previous years, CSOs had to collect and submit a huge pile of documents to register, and Financing Terrorist or Extremist Activity (Art. 2, 22 and 26). The state party should ensure but today it takes considerably less time and effort on their part. It is now possible to register freedom of association, in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant, and refrain from imposing CSOs at both the district and local government level. The National Sustainable Development disproportionate or discriminatory restrictions on the freedom of association.’228 Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic (NSDS) plans ‘to formalise, both in terms of legal requirements and in administrative practice, acceptable methods of collaboration between government Below are a few recent examples of legislation along these lines: and civil society. In order to ensure direct feedback, it is necessary to introduce the practice of civic involvement in assessing the quality of government and municipal services using best 224 See <http://Internet.president.kg/files/docs/ONS.PDF>. The law “regulates the formation of, and activities of, international and national practices’.222 Public Councils of Ministries, State Committees and Administrative Agencies, and is aimed at implementation of the public monitoring of activities of State bodies and their civil servants, of taking into account of public opinion in the decision-making, including during development and implementation of the State Policy” 219 http://Internet.president.kg/ru/news/zakony/299_prezident_almazbek_atambaev_podpisal_zakon_o_gosudarstven- 225 NurgulDzhanaeva. “Enabling environment for civil society in Kyrgyzstan: recent developments” in STATE OF CIVIL no-chastnom_partnerstve_v_kyirgyizskoy_respublike/ SOCIETY 2013: Creating an enabling environment. CIVICUS, P. 102-108. Athttp://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289 220 The 2012 Cso Sustainability Index For Central And Eastern Europe And Eurasia. http://peremena.kg/wp-content/up- 226 A more description of these new bodies was published in CIVICUS Report: 2013 State of Civil Society Report loads/2013/11/SCO-Sustainability-Index-in-Kyrgyzstan-2012.pdf <http://civicus.org/resources/reports-and-publications/the-compendium> 221 See new amendments to Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 of the law “On registration of legal entities and their branches” with setting 226 “Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kyrgyzstan” * in article 25 on Freedom of association dates, fees and peculiarities of registration - amendments of 13 December 2012 # 199 227 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download. 222 National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013-2017. aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fKGZ%2fCO%2f2&Lang=en 223 http://Internet.president.kg/ru/podpisannye_dokumenty/3965_podpisan_zakon_ob_obschestvennyih_sovetah_gosudarst- 228 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download. vennyih_organov 130 131 • On November 29, 2011, members of the parliament submitted a draft of the law ‘on foreign aid (assistance) to the Kyrgyz Republic and making amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the Kyrgyz Republic,’ for consideration of the parliament. On January 26, 2012, this law draft was divided into two drafts and again submitted to the parliamentary In addition, women’s empowerment is an essential part of strengthening aid management consideration with slight technical changes. These introduced new regulations for CSOs, and governance. The lack of significant participation of CSOs, including women’s NGOs, in the including the need to seek permission from various state institutions to receive foreign process remains a major concern. The lack of institutional space for CSOs limits the inclusion funding, even after passing registration in the Ministry of Justice. These changes, however, of the needs of poor and vulnerable groups; and there is a lack of measurable human rights were not approved and have not become part of legislation as a result of strong campaigning and gender equality indicators in the country’s domestic development strategies, and in the by CSOs. implementation and monitoring of development cooperation commitments vis-a-vis donor governments. A similar draft law was in the pipeline in September 2013, which blamed NGOs for acting as foreign agents and receiving funds from foreign sources. More than 80 CSOs in Kyrgyzstan While space for CSOs is formally guaranteed, the degree to which they are able to intervene signed a petition to national authorities with a call to reject the draft law which essentially in policy debates is greatly limited or is inconsistent. For instance, the National Council on deprived citizens of the right to freely form non-registered non-commercial organisations.229 Sustainable Development is chaired by the president of Kyrgyzstan, and out of the 23 members, only 4 are from CSOs, while the National Council on Gender Equality has an identical number • In January 2013, the State Office of the Financial Intelligence under the Government of of representatives.233 Yet the Coordination Council on Micro-Financing234 does not provide the Kyrgyz Republic (SFIS)230 initiated a draft law designed to combat money laundering for CSO membership235 among its 14 members, including government representatives, and and financing of terrorist activities, said to be based on Financial Action Task Force representatives from banks, international donors, and the private sector. The same was true (FATF) recommendations. The draft contained numerous provisions that would during meetings focused on the country’s national development priorities. In July 2013, a very prevent CSOs from receiving foreign funding by, among other things, requiring them important document was discussed and approved at the High Level Development Conference, A to submit additional reports to three state bodies and subjecting them to other forms Reform-Based Development Partnership for 2013 – 2017. The meetings provide for very limited of unwarranted scrutiny. Following recommendations of the FAFT, article 12, within space for CSOs. This limited participation was achieved only after intense lobbying on the part the framework of combating terrorism, the Kyrgyzstan Parliament initiated changes of the Kyrgyzstan CSO community. in laws to restrict CSOs. This was widely discussed and criticised by Kyrgyzstan CSOs. Nevertheless, the draft of the law with restricting amendments to the law on CSOs was The Restrictive Donor Attitude Towards CSOs registered in the Jogorku Kenesh on May 25, 2014.231 • On June 18, 2013, a draft law was submitted for public discussion by the National On the part of donors, however, relations with civil society have deteriorated of late. None Parliament ‘on introduction of changes and amendments to the Criminal Code of the of Kyrgyzstan’s major donors, apart from the World Bank, have solicited input from CSOs Kyrgyz Republic,’ aimed at protection of National Security Information from criminal in Kyrgyzstan in an open or institutionalised way to aid their development and partnership infringement. This was criticised severely by CSOs for its implications on political strategies. Where they do exist, documents pertaining to such projects are not made available transparency and freedom of information. in local or sub-regional languages (Russian, for example). • A discriminatory and stigmatising bill has since been passed that restricts the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, violates freedom of expression, Despite some positive initiatives by individual donors, the results from multi-stakeholder freedom of association and assembly and discriminates against the LGBT community consultations led by CSOs on aid and development effectiveness in 2011 is that the overall in Kyrgyzstan.232 The bill amends the Criminal Code, Administrative Code, the Law approach of donors downplays the role of Kyrgyzstan CSOs as development partners. on Peaceful Assembly Act, the media, and introduces a number of criminal and administrative sanctions against those who speak or act in a way that creates a ‘positive For instance, the country’s Development Partners Coordination Council (DPCC) does not attitude toward sexual orientation.’ include any national or local CSO. But among its members is the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan, an international private foundation, as well as major donor agencies in Kyrgyzstan. This CSOs and Development Cooperation demonstrates lack of recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right, on equal terms with other development actors. The request to include local CSO representatives was In 2013, the government of Kyrgyzstan took steps to ensure that the NSDS is implemented under rejected in June 2014. This goes against what the DPCC proclaims itself as: ‘The Development the close supervision/monitoring of civil society, with the aim to facilitate better collaboration Partners Coordination Council has been established with the purpose of improving multi-way between state bodies and civil society with respect to the achievement of strategic national flow of relevant information among donors, government agencies and civil society institutions. development objectives. This facilitates networking and broader collaboration within the donor community, a more constructive dialogue and shared vision with the government of the Kyrgyz Republic on country’s However, what remains unclear is the extent to which this process has contributed to priorities, and serves to strengthen overall aid coordination and management.’236 concrete changes in development policies, improvements in political accountability and the democratisation of policy-making. Kyrgyzstan CSOs do not have institutionalised space in the Furthermore, according to Article 23 of the Joint Declaration by the Development Partners of spirit of ‘partnership for development.’ There are no multi-stakeholder mechanisms for public the Kyrgyz Republic at the close of the High Level Development Conference July 10-11, 2013: discussion and debate over critical aid and development effectiveness issues. CSOs are poorly ‘We intend to measure and review progress towards the implementation of these commitments engaged in the design, implementation and monitoring of national development plans and and towards the achievement of a set of agreed national development targets. To that end, we policies. 229 http://civicsolidarity.org/ru/article/971/grazhdanskoe-obshchestvo-kyrgyzstana-obespokoeno-novym-zakono- 233 http://Internet.k-news.kg/society/16000_obyyavlen_konkurs_v_sostav_natsionalnogo_soveta_po_gendernomu_ proektom-o-nekommercheskih razvitiyu/ 230 On introduction of changes and additions to some Legislative Acts of the Kyrgyz Republic (into laws of KR “On 234 http://Internet.knews.kg/econom/17222_v_kyirgyizstane_zavershilos_formirovanie_koordinatsionnogo_sove- non-commercial organizations”, “On State registration of judicial persons, branches (representatives)”, “Criminal ta_po_razvitiyu_mikrofinansirovaniya/ Code of KR”). This draft law was initiated by three MPs – Bakiruulu T., Madaliev N., and Narmatova N. 236 http://donors.kg/en/about-us#.U_hv7_nV9PI 231 http://Internet.kenesh.kg/lawprojects/lps.aspx?view=projectinfo&id=126137 237 http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/Joint_Declaration_en.pdf 232 http://Internet.hrw.org/node/124275 132 133 will meet on a quarterly basis in the framework of the Coordination Council under the Prime Minister and a donors’ representative and will make public the outcome of such monitoring.’237 The economic development of Kyrgyzstan today relies heavily on external ODA. Volume of aid for 2014-2016 is 1.347 million USD.240 It is estimated that International Development Partners Despite these commitments, no multi-stakeholder consultations were initiated. A new vision have resources of over 2 billion USD available for new projects to support the Kyrgyz Republic of a joint accountability framework and a platform designed and offered by CSOs were hardly over the period of the National Sustainable Development Strategy 2013-2017.241 SSC – aid from taken seriously, apart from some efforts by the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic. Russia and China – has constituted a growing share of official ODA. However, HRBA principles, Kyrgyzstan has, moreover, not joined the first round of aid and development effectiveness as well as development effectiveness parameters and obligations, have not been followed and monitoring by the GPEDC. are not being monitored. Political Environment But the GoKR and country donors don’t have a concrete Action Plan for the implementation of AAA and the Busan commitments. Kyrgyzstan lacks a coherent aid and development • Access to Information - Public access to information concerning government is restricted coordination structure. Currently, ODA is coordinated by several state institutions that have in Kyrgyzstan, a lot of which is not open to CSOs and filed away as state secrets. A number been poorly organised, leading to a much weaker process of aid and development effectiveness of NGOs have contested these trends, favouring instead a process of judicial investigation monitoring, especially on the part of CSOs that have to deal with government representatives. initiated by a CSO ‘precedent.’ DCA and ICCO data show negative trends in relation to access Lack of transparency is another issue. For instance, an analysis of the SWAP242 application in to information, with 60.3% of the respondents finding it difficult to access information the healthcare sector and the subsequent decision to use it in the education sector were made on government budgets and policy decisions on development issues. Of the survey without public consultation. participants, 67.1% noted that it was significantly easier to get this information five years ago. In specific sectors, international development partners will work with the government towards • CSO involvement in Aid and development effectiveness in Kyrgyzstan - Overall, a sector-wide approach with a commonly-agreed upon strategy, focal point, financing plan and participation by CSOs in development cooperation and aid issues is weak. There is a lack monitoring and evaluation framework.243 of monitoring mechanisms to enable civil society to deal with these issues, and a need to institutionalise CSO engagement in development policy discussions. In Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 19 April 2013 - The Government of Kyrgyz Republic and the Donor Partners signed a democratic development is limited by weak government accountability, lack of transparency, Joint Statement regarding the modalities of future cooperation with all Donors in the Education lack of CSO engagement in public policy-making and high levels of corruption. Sector based on Sector Wide Approach to Programming (SWAP). It aims to harmonise and coordinate donor support, enhancing aid effectiveness and predictability of aid flows. Republic According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kyrgyzstan in 2012 scored poorly: less than of Kyrgyzstan Aid Effectiveness in the Education Sector 2010 is being discussed predominantly 300 - Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law - 12.8 and Control of Corruption – 10.4 on a scale at international sites such as - http://Internet.globalpartnership.org/content/republic- from 0 to 100. kyrgyzstan-aid-effectiveness-education-sector-2010 or http://Internet.worldbank.org/projects/ P132490?lang=en. Project Information Document (Appraisal Stage) - Kyrgyz Global Partnership With the economic development of Kyrgyzstan still heavily dependent on ODA, Kyrgyzstan CSOs for Education (GPE) - 3 - P132490 (English) December 19, 2013.244 Yet, these documents practically have taken steps to implement the PD, AAA and Busan agreements. The year 2013 marked are not accessible to the public. a CSO decision to develop a monitoring framework of the National Partnership on Aid and Development Effectiveness, with indicators based on GPEDC monitoring in Kyrgyzstan and plan In a situation of weak governance and high levels of corruption, as recognised by international of actions. organisations245 and by the GoKR,246 the role of CSOs is increasing importance. GoKR in NSDS stated that, ‘the legal and institutional side of preventive anti-corruption measures also requires CSOs also started a new social accountability process based on creating a new accountability strengthening and involvement of the civil society institutions as an integral part of any anti- process and timely and meaningful and systematic involvement of wide range of CSOs from corruption measures.’ all provinces and other stakeholders as active actors in this new accountability process. This spearheaded the creation and development of a joint platform to improve country accountability NGO played a big role in this process within the “Anti-Corruption Business Council” in 2012- in development and partnership processes. 2014. The NSDS stated that, ‘the key indicator of success of implementation of anticorruption policy will be the ‘confidence indicator’ of the civil society—its confidence in the results of the All public sector institutions and agencies must cooperate with CSOs, according to various national anti-corruption policy, which shall be constantly measured.’ It also included ‘unification national and international documents. These include the National Strategy for Sustainable of efforts of government and civil society in combating corruption’ as one of ‘priority areas’ of Development (NSSD – 2.6 ‘Strengthening of State authorities with civil society) for 2013-2017 the implementation of the National Anticorruption Strategy in 2013-2017. and a 2013 Governmental Program on implementation of the NSSD. The Kyrgyz government also signed on to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 2008) and the Busan outcome document (2011), taking commitments on improving accountability and transparency and work with CSOs. 241 http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/Joint_Declaration_en.pdf 242 SWAP, a sector-wide approach, is one of aid modalities. “Programme-Based Approaches (PBAs) emerged The Governance Context in the 1990s in response to growing evidence on the shortcomings of traditional, stand-alone aid projects…. They include general and sector budget support, sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) and similar programmes at NSDS clearly states that achieving the transformations and implementing elements of the a cross-sectoral, sub-sectoral or regional level” - http://Internet.aideffectiveness.org/Tools-Aid-modalities-PBAs- National Sustainable Development Strategy will require increased collaboration of the branches SWAPs.html. 243 http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/Joint_Declaration_en.pdf with civil society.238 Yet ‘government agencies still lack the citizen-centred and quality-first 244 http://Internet.worldbank.org/projects/P132490?lang=en approach in their services, which continues to disorient ministries and agencies.’239 245 According to Worldwide Governance Indicators Kyrgyzstan in 2012 scored poorly - less than 30,0 - Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law - 12,8 and Control of Corruption – 10,4 on a scale from 0 to 100 246 The NSDS recognises that “Corruption is still a real threat to the national security of Kyrgyzstan. GoKR devoted 238 National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013-2017. P. 109. a chapter in the NSDS for 2013-2017 “2.6. Increasing effectiveness and ensuring transparency of governance 239 National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013-2017. Strengthening co-operation between the government and the civil society” 240 http://Internet.knews.kg/econom/17222_v_kyirgyizstane_zavershilos_formirovanie_koordinatsionnogo_sove- ta_po_razvitiyu_mikrofinansirovaniya/ 134 135 is working abroad. The total number of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan is estimated between CSO Development Effectiveness 700 thousand to 1 million, with majority of them working in the Russian Federation.’251 The majority of CSOs in Kyrgyzstan continue to depend mainly on foreign donors for financial Few opportunities exist for capacity development with regard to turning CSOs into development support, which provides mainly for the implementation of individual projects, as opposed to partners in Kyrgyzstan. There have been some attempts to train CSOs on aid and development long-term institutional funding. effectiveness issues, but the gap between demands and availability of resources is huge. According to the DCA and ICCC report:252 ‘Kyrgyz CSOs reported a decline in their levels of Kyrgyzstan CSO in October 2014 discussed details of implementation of the Istanbul Principles. funding. They felt that the situation was further exacerbated by the uneven distribution of scarce It is important to ensure that Istanbul Principles of CSOs effectiveness are widely discussed resources, and maintained that only a select few receive funds, while smaller CSOs struggle to and applied in our countries. This process will assist not only strengthening CSOs’ institutional get a share. Kyrgyz CSOs get most of their funding from foreign and international organisations. capacity but the cross sector interaction for mainstreaming for example of women’s rights However, the decline in funding has made maintaining a sustainable financial position for protection approach. In other words civil society is working on its effectiveness and accountability. Kyrgyz CSOs a cause for concern. The reasons can be attributed to a reduction in the number CSO development effectiveness is measured also by its sustainability. In August 2014, the NGO of donor programs available, stringent project requirements for accessing funds, and not least, Peremena held a dissemination of the results for Kyrgyzstan of the 2012 CSO Sustainability the introduction of anti-democratic legislative initiatives over the past five years, especially in Index for Central, Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Almaz Tajybai from Peremena reported that 2013. All of these elements contribute towards limiting CSOs’ ability to get support from abroad. CSO sustainability is scored at 4.0.247 According to this analysis, ‘the overall sustainability of civil As far as UN funds are concerned, CSOs are of the opinion that, while internal financial and society improved slightly in 2012. Improvements were noted in legal environment, advocacy, administrative requirements have increased, institutional support has diminished, making it and public image, while organizational capacity, financial viability, service provision, and increasingly harder for smaller CSOs to access financing. Kyrgyz CSOs believe that there is a infrastructure all remained fairly stable.’248 need for donors to be more transparent in the disbursement of grants and the monitoring of implementation.’ CSO advocacy capacity249 also improved slightly over the past year. CSO advocacy activities continue to be quite dynamic. CSOs gathered 30,000 signatures in favour of the draft law on The government has tried to address this through social order grants for CSOs from the state, lustration, which would ban corrupt officials from the previous two governments from getting and through the institutionalised participation of CSOs in the decision-making process in the government positions in the future. However, since the initiative did not receive the support ministry during the decision-making a process on selection of submitted proposals from CSOs. of the parliament or president, it is unlikely to move forward. Advocacy also prevented the But the law ‘On Social Services Contracting’ (July 21, 2008) has its limitations. A law on social adoption of bills that would have been harmful to civil society. For example, the draft Law on services contracting was enacted in 2008, which establishes a competitive tender mechanism for Foreign Gratuitous Aid would have introduced undue limitations on foreign sources of funding government financing (outsourcing) of social services provided by NCOs. Up to now, however, for CSOs. only the Ministry of Social Development has used this mechanism, even though it is available to other government agencies. Moreover, the volume of financing has been extremely low due to State authorities increasingly consider CSOs as experts and engage their services accordingly, the country’s economic hardships and deficiencies in implementation. Kyrgyz legislation does but relations between CSOs and government are not always effective. There is a need to build not provide conditions for economic (as well as entrepreneurial) activities of CSOs.253 capacity of CSOs to advocate for development oriented toward human rights and social justice, transparency and accountability. Nothing was done in the aid-reforming process as part of the PD and AAA implementation to facilitate an enabling environment for the empowerment of women. Women’s organisations At the international level, participation by CSOs in global processes has been limited due to should be recognised as development actors and development partners.254 Women, feminists language barriers faced by a majority non-English speaking CSO community. and women’s organisations and movements play key roles in development at all levels.255 The Socio-Economic Context FWNGO held a national conference where women expressed their position in demanding gender equality and women’s empowerment. In connection with this, it is necessary to include The socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan has not significantly improved during the last years. in the post-2015 development agenda and framework gender equality and women’s rights as a Lack of jobs led to a high level of migration, and it is one of the significant characteristics of the standalone goal, and to ensure that specific gender targets and indicators are integrated into all current socio-economic context of the country. Kyrgyzstan has a big informal sector, where sustainable development goals of Kyrgyzstan. To reach substantial and sustainable progress on human rights are not ensured and not monitored. ‘Aside from children, the self-employed, gender equality, the post-2015 development framework should prioritise these areas and put or people detached from the formal labour market, are most at risk of falling into poverty in women’s rights at the heart of the development agenda.256 the Kyrgyz Republic. Over half of all self-employed people are living in poverty, reflecting the subsistence nature of employment of most self-employed people in the Kyrgyz Republic.’250 As In Kyrgyzstan, there is a lack of political attention to women’s issues, despite commitments UNPD informs, ‘the country’s economy is largely informal (40-60% GDP by different estimations), by the government, nor have donors fully approached women’s issues as a priority goal for especially in the service sector and agriculture. In 26% of households, at least one family member development. 247 The 2012 cso sustainability index for central and eastern europe and eurasia. Http://peremena.kg/wp-con- tent/uploads/2013/11/sco-sustainability-index-in-kyrgyzstan-2012.pdf 248 The 2012 cso sustainability index for central and eastern europe and eurasia. Http://peremena.kg/wp-con- 252 DCA and ICCO. How to Protect and Expand an Enabling Environment Kyrgyzstan.P. 7. at http://Internet.icco- tent/uploads/2013/11/sco-sustainability-index-in-kyrgyzstan-2012.pdf international.com/int/linkservid/BCAE3CFC-04D4-A66B-1BBF53C8CB065B65/showMeta/0/ 249 The 2012 cso sustainability index for central and eastern europe and eurasia p. 4. Http://peremena.kg/ 253 http://Internet.icnl.org/research/monitor/kyrgyz.html wp-content/uploads/2013/11/sco-sustainability-index-in-kyrgyzstan-2012.pdf 254 AAA, article 13 and 20. 250 The World Bank.Kyrgyz Republic: Growth Rebounds, Risks Remain. Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report No.5. 255 Women’s organizations key demands for Busan and 2012 DCF March 2014. P. 9.http://donors.kg/images/ECSP1_KGZ_Spring_2014.pdf 256 Statement of the January Women’s conference “Post 2015- Kyrgyzstan future – women’s vision”, held in Bishkek, 251 http://Internet.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo.html Kyrgyzstan in 22-23 January 136 137 There is no institutional space for women’s regular and systematic participation in aid and development effectiveness discussions and monitoring. It is a desirable to increase to at least monitoring processes. 30% women’s representation in all financial aid and development effectiveness, decision- • Access to resources should be guaranteed for development cooperation: country making and monitoring bodies and processes. development supported by aid must meet basic requirements in the promotion of human rights, gender equality, social justice and democratic country ownership. Conclusions • Lessons Learned • CSOs can and should engage with aid and development effectiveness issues despite a Despite a number of positive achievements in Kyrgyzstan development during the last several restrictive political environment; years, challenges remain in the areas of aid and development effectiveness, democratic • The internal capacity of CSOs to engage in these issues should be strengthened; ownership and inclusive partnership of CSOs and other development actors. Development and • Kyrgyzstan CSOs benefit from global CSO processes on aid and development ODA results for the people are not visible and lack proper implementation and monitoring. effectiveness, and CSOs can improve national advocacy initiatives through active There is no national social accountability framework for development results. There is a need engagement in global policy debates. to institutionalise CSO engagement in the development process discussions. The ability and capacity of CSOs to engage in these areas as independent development partners is also crucial. Key successes, challenges, recommendations and lessons learned are summarised below. Key Successes • The Law “On Public Councils of State Bodies” was adopted. After the adoption, CSOs References struggled long and hard against resistance by the president to actually implement it. Nevertheless, a consensus was reached, and in June 2014, this law became one of the 1. National Council for Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic: National Sustainable strong elements of the CSO enabling environment; Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013-2017. • Kyrgyzstan CSOs formed several platforms and groups to work on aid and development 2. The Kyrgyz Republic High Level Development Conference, July 10-11, 2013. Joint Conference effectiveness issues, which became a big focus for CSOs; Document. A Reform-Based Development Partnership for 2013 – 2017. 3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Brochure athttp://Internet.transparency.org/cpi2013/results • Increased capacity by CSOs, which proposed a joint accountability platform between 4. Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kyrgyzstan state and donors; 5. International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law, Llc (ICNl, Llc) Kyrgyz Republic: Analysis of the draft law • CSOs started their own monitoring of aid and development effectiveness with the first of the Kyrgyz Republic on Making Additions and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the pilot of complex monitoring of ODA in the Ministry of Healthcare of the Kyrgyz Republic. Kyrgyz Republic (the draft law on “foreign agents”). 30 May 2014 • The work of CSOs has been crucial in shifting public and state perceptions in favour of 6. Explanatory Notes to the draft of the law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Introduction of additions civil society. These include initiatives by FWNGO, the Coalition on Aid and Development and amendments to some legislative Acts of the Kyrgyz Republic” (law “On non-commercial effectiveness, Nash Vek/Our century, Anticorruption Business Club, Coordination organizations”, Law of the KR “On State registration of legal entities, branches (representational Council of PWC\PC and intra-working groups of PC in the aid and development office)”, Criminal Code of the KR. 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: List of issues in relation to the second periodic effectiveness area. report of Kyrgyzstan. Human Rights Committee, 110th session, 10 – 28 March 2014 • Challenges and Recommendations 8. Authors: Azimov U., Votslava U., Sayakova D. Monitoring Access to Information in the • The Kyrgyz government should stop passing laws that restrict CSO voices, access to 9. Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek: 2013. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Kyrgyzstan_Monitoring_ information and advocacy initiatives; Access-information_report_2013_en.pdf DCAandICCO. How to Protect and Expand an Enabling • Kyrgyzstan urgently needs a coherent aid and development coordination structure Environment Kyrgyzstan.athttp://Internet.icco-international.com/int/linkservid/BCAE3CFC-04D4- with institutionalised and full participation of CSOs; A66B-1BBF53C8CB065B65/showMeta/0/ • Carrying out aid and development effectiveness commitments in Kyrgyzstan needs 10. Nurgul Dzhanaeva . Article “Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan: Recent both political will and the appropriate means of implementation; Developments” in State Of Civil Society 2013: Creating an Enabling Environment. CIVICUS, p. 102- 108. At http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289 • The government of Kyrgyzstan and country donors must have a concrete action plan for the implementation of AAA and the Busan commitments; • There is a need for national legislation on aid and development effectiveness, reflecting AAA and Busan commitments and strengthening national democratic ownership of development; • The state should strengthen and expand the enabling environment for CSO engagement on aid and development effectiveness issues; • The international donor community should shift from symbolic recognition of CSOs to practical implementation of commitments in Accra and Busan; • There is an urgent need for multi-stakeholder dialogues in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2014, the Coalition for Aid and Development Effectiveness will receive its first monitoring results and its effectiveness will depend on the opportunities to discuss these results with all development stakeholders; • Women’s issues, at least in the form agreed in the National Gender Equality action plan, should be an integral part of the country’s development strategy with sufficient funding. The work of women’s organisations should also be supported by the state budget, and women’s organisations need to be part of all aid and development planning and 138 139 Lebanon The most important feature which affects civil society action is the right to create and operate free legal associations. In this regard, the law in force is the 1909 law or the Ottoman Law, which was passed under Ottoman occupation. It regulates the different stages of a CSO’s life, from Introduction registration to dissolution. The law is generally liberal, using the notification system contrary to the majority of Arab countries where the licensing system is applied. In fact, a notification Civil society in Lebanon has evolved through its activism and advocacy efforts, striving to reflect system (also known as declaratory system) is premised on the theory that associations are the needs and interests of people on the ground. Throughout Lebanon’s history, civil society formed solely by the will of their founders without any intervention by the administration; the organisations (CSOs) have been crucial channels for relief and development assistance, to a latter plays a passive role and notes the formation of the association by virtue of a declaration large extent compensating for the lack of state provision of basic social services. With stronger presented to the competent administrative authority by the founders. The notification is recognition of the role CSOs play as “independent development actors”, Lebanese CSOs have finalised by the delivery of a receipt for the declaration. On the other hand, under a registration sought to press the government and engage more closely in public policy-making. system, the formation of an association is subject to registration before the competent authority. Registration only occurs with the approval of this authority; thus, the administration plays an However, a number of challenges have hindered civil society at the national level. In its report, active role since it must acknowledge the existence of the association. CIVICUS highlighted the shrinking space for CSOs worldwide, noting that “there is an urgent need to democratise global governance, to support greater participation of citizens in decision- Civil society has been active in all stages of Lebanon’s history and has responded in various making and to engender an environment that enables civil society to substantively engage in forms to shortfalls by the state in the delivery of basic social services. In his article, Georges these processes.” Corm noted that the “The grassroots of Lebanon’s civil society date back to the political events seen by Lebanon in the 19th century, especially the popular uprisings of 1819, 1845 and 1858 Since independence, Lebanon has been a refuge for thinkers and free speech, in the troubled that were led by peasants.” Corm adds, “The history of CSO development explains the various Middle East region but a number of recent crises and military conflicts have impacted on the areas of operation of CSOs today.” flexibility of its political and social institutions with regard to civil society. In addition to the 1909 law, other laws and regulations governing the operation of CSOs assign With the end of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war (1975-1990) and the beginning of the reconstruction them under different categories, leading to inconsistencies implementing laws concerning civil process, CSOs were supposed to do more than provide services and relief; they were expected society. While the Ottoman Law governs CSOs providing development services and dealing to play an additional role in contributing to and calling for development through advocacy and with development and rights, alongside political parties, many organisations are subject to the political pressure on the state, especially on its socio-economic policies. licensing system. Labour unions and federations are subject to the labour law and to strict regulations and monitoring. The presence of the Syrian army on Lebanese territory (1990-2005), increased pressure on civil society activism in Lebanon; restrictions included unconstitutional and illegal regulations Overall, the political situation pressured, fragmented and weakened the labour movement, suppressing the freedom of association and severe practical violations which impacted on leading to negative repercussions on economic and social rights. In addition, youth and sports CSOs. While more CSO involvement in decision-making was expected after Syria’s army pulled associations, including scouts, are under the Youths and Sports Ministry’s supervision and are out of Lebanon, armed conflicts in many Arab countries, especially in Syria (starting in 2010 subject to the registration system. On a separate note, Palestinian refugees, who constitute and worsening ever since), burdened Lebanon and prevented civil society from playing a more a significant proportion of Lebanon’s population, are not allowed to establish their own political role with the flow of international resources and aid efforts shifting towards providing organisations, and are thus deprived of this right despite the fact that their presence in Lebanon relief for more than 1.5 million refugees. dates back to the 1940s and ‘60s. The concept of reciprocity applies in this case; it hits with the absence of a Palestinian authority caused by the Israeli occupation of Palestine. In light of the radical changes witnessed by Lebanon, and while Lebanese CSOs are numerous and diverse in reach and political persuasions, the conditions under which CSOs operate must Moreover, organisations working on LGBT rights are still illegal in Lebanon; a 2009 court ruling be assessed. This report helps analyse to what extent the Lebanese government and society made an improvement on this level and ruled that homosexuality is not against nature as facilitate CSO engagement and their effective role in development. condemned by Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code. Recently, there has been more talk about an enabling environment for CSOs; the latter can In addition to the freedom of association, other factors, rights and freedom influence the be assessed through the examination of the legal, executive and practical (or political) availability and enjoyment of an enabling environment for civic action, especially the rights of conditions within which CSOs operate, receive funding and are able to lead activities to reach expression, peaceful assembly and access to information. At the international level, Lebanon their goals. This possibility of reaching its objectives falls within the concept of “development endorsed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other relevant conventions effectiveness,” where activities and aid should support the development process. A guideline and thus has an international obligation to safeguard and guarantee the full enjoyment of these for developmental CSOs, known as the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness, rights. provides a framework for a CSO willing to engage in the development process. On a national level, freedom of expression is noted explicitly in the constitution and is consecrated The Legal and Regulatory Framework by law. However, implementation has been weak in practice. First of all, vague laws on freedom of expression mean they are often open to interpretation. In some cases, these same laws can The Lebanese Constitution endorses many basic rights and freedoms. The Universal Declaration be used, when the authorities find it necessary, to strangle civil society activism especially if the of Human Rights was later adopted by the constitution’s preamble (following the Taif Agreement political context and sectarian and political divisions are taken into consideration. Court rulings in 1990) and affirmed by the Constitutional Council. Lebanon has also passed laws providing and a number of new security laws also hinder free speech. implementation mechanisms and enjoyment of these rights and freedoms. This paper highlights the main aspects of these laws and sheds light on irregularities in their application and main Some examples of these include Article 386 of the Penal Code, which criminalises any loopholes. disparagement of the president, the courts, the army, public representatives, among others 140 141 and the Publications Law, which bans running any news deemed contradictory to public ethics or harmful to national or religious sentiments or national unity. The Political Environment and the Governance Context In addition, out of the many cases of activists or bloggers being sentenced based on current The political environment in Lebanon, which examines the recognition of CSOs as playing a laws, the Lebanese Court of Publications sentenced a journalist, Mohamed Nazzal, for having core role in policy-making, including the design and implementation of development plans published an article regarding judicial corruption. and policies, cannot be addressed without assessing at the same time the governance context within which they operate. The 2013 World Press Freedom Index reveals an increase of violations of free speech in Lebanon, and ranks the country 101st among 179 countries. The role of CSOs has extended from pure philanthropy and service provision to active engagement in public policy and decision making. Although a larger percentage of civil society With regard to Internet freedom, the publication court (an exceptional court established to still focuses on service provision and relief, more and more CSOs are taking part in advocacy and deal with issues related to defamation) now considers information exchanged via social media lobbying in order to address the root causes of social problems; namely wrong policy choices “a form of publication rather than private correspondence”. The absence of a law to deal taken so far by successive governments. Unfortunately, such efforts have not been met with specifically with online media or the Internet is being exploited by the authorities as a tool the same enthusiasm by political parties and actors which, on several occasions, have tended to strangle this form of communication. This situation calls for the adoption of a law that will to ignore popular demands. specifically address Internet freedom and which takes into account international standards and a human rights-based approach. Over recent years, Lebanon has been through something of a political deadlock affecting key state institutions due to political and sectarian divisions in Lebanon and more generally As for the right to peaceful assembly, Lebanon still adheres to the 1911 Ottoman law, known as throughout the Arab region. Lebanon has been without a president for more than 226 days; the Public Meetings Law. It adopts, as in the case of the association law, the notification regime former President Michel Suleiman’s term expired on the night of May 24-25, 2014, and no new which requires primarily notifying the administration, i.e. the Ministry of Interior and Municipality president has since been elected. This will have major negative repercussions on democratic (MoIM), of the place, time and objectives of any form of assembly, but theoretically does not life in Lebanon. require explicit permission from the authorities. Nevertheless, the law imposes a burden on those seeking to organise public assemblies, as it holds organisers responsible for making sure A study prepared by ANND on the enabling environment for CSOs in Lebanon, after a thorough these legal obligations are carried through. Another challenge facing peaceful assembly relates examination of civil society engagement in Lebanon, concluded that the effectiveness of CSOs to the attitude of the security forces and their use of violence against protesters in many cases. depends to a large extent on the existence and seriousness of dialogue, coordination and Limited accountability for the use of excessive violence by the authorities is a serious cause for communication mechanisms and channels between government institutions and civil society. concern. This situation places CSOs’ effective role as development actors in Lebanon, hostage to political will in the context of political paralysis and rivalries in the country. One of the main challenges facing CSOs and the accountability of a state’s institutions is the lack of free access to information. Access to information is not recognised in Lebanon, facilitating Success Stories or even encouraging corruption and bureaucracy. CSOs, as development actors, should be able to assess and monitor the performance of state actors. Non-recognition of the right to access Despite the limited number of organisations engaged in development and advocacy for a human information hinders CSO engagement in political advocacy and policy dialogue. It is worth rights-based approach from the government, a number of initiatives and campaigns addressed mentioning that a draft law on this issue was proposed by a civil society coalition, the “national policy and decision-making in this regard, and called for more transparency and developmental network for the right to access information”, to regulate access to information and its adoption, initiatives form the state. Over the years, CSOs have developed their own expert capacity and which will contribute much to the ability of CSOs to participate actively in the political arena. areas of specialisation in development work: “Specialisation in [CSO] work [has reached the level of professionalism] for some activists… one of the most important changes known by So for as long as the draft law is not endorsed, Lebanese citizens will remain deprived of one Lebanon’s civil society after 1990. Specialisation is now a basic condition for contributing to of their main rights and civil servants will continue to act arbitrarily, each according to his/her making public policies.” principles, interests and affiliations. Nevertheless, some specific regulations guarantee the right to access some type of information in Lebanon and offer a good example to be generalised; A successful example of the influence of civil society and its success in influencing public policies these regulations concern environmental information, land registration, real estate ownership, is the effort made by YASA (Youth Association for Safety Awareness), an organisation specialising electricity and telecommunications. in road safety. It took part in the discussions and all stages of the drafting of the new traffic law which was passed by parliament. This is a good example of an effective partnership. Another Another important precedent is the State Council’s recent ruling in favour of the right to the example concerns KAFA, an organisation calling for ending discrimination and violence against families of persons who went missing during the Civil War to know the fate of these persons by women. It drafted a law to criminalise violence against women and submitted it to the parliament receiving a copy of an investigation into the matter. through some lawmakers. The law was successfully adopted, with amendments. In addition, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) has contributed to transparency efforts Overall, the legal framework in Lebanon can be generally assessed as acceptable and permissive as an observer to the municipal and parliamentarian elections in Lebanon. of civil society engagement. Nevertheless, and as is the case worldwide, recent developments pose threats to the enjoyment of some rights and liberties. This situation requires genuine will In 2012, ANND and a group of CSOs sent to the Lebanese prime minister, upon his designation, to remove the ambiguous and wide legal dispositions which impact on the implementation and a letter reflecting Lebanese civil society’s view regarding the Cabinet’s policy statement and protection of basic civil liberties as has been noted above. the government’s policies. The letter addressed all the concerns and issues deemed necessary alongside a list of recommendations. 142 143 ANND, in a national workshop to discuss EU’s policies towards Lebanon, urged the European dealing with the influx of refugees is underestimated by the Lebanese officials. In fact, a proper Union (EU) to involve civil society in all stages of its Neighbourhood Policy; civil society should not and organised response by these organisations can be decisive to whether the response to the only be asked to comment on outcome documents but should also be granted the opportunity refugee crisis is successful or not, since CSOs are present in operations at the grassroots level to influence the content and EU’s approach to Lebanon’s development priorities. in Syria. The private sector and its role in development: The role of the private sector in development should be well defined to assure a correct approach where civil especially economic and social In addition, there is lack of coordination among responders to the Syrian crisis. Duplication rights can be guaranteed. The profit-oriented nature of the private sector poses challenges for of the efforts has not ensured a long-term response to the ongoing crisis. Further, the initial these rights. With the increasing reliance on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), ANND decided reaction ignored the different needs of the refugees and host communities, leading to severe to engage and monitor these sorts of partnerships and launched work on the regional level cultural tensions between refugees and local Lebanese civilians. The responses so far brought to develop principles that will guide PPPs and guarantee their transparency and effective are temporary and unsuitable, “the refugee crisis is a medium-term problem and should be contribution to development. dealt with as such.” Challenges In sum, the governance context in Lebanon is one where the roles of various development actors are still not well defined and where state authorities still hold most of the responsibilities The state’s approach to development still needs to take into consideration the role of the though they are incapable and unwilling to assume them. It is imperative to institutionalise emerging actors. In reality, the examples mentioned above remain limited since there are no real relations between state institutions and the civil society in order to guarantee recognition of partnerships and forums for exchanging ideas, information and experiences between different civil society organisations as development actors in their own right. development actors. Civil society activists, when invited to dialogues or consultations with the government, are often invited on an expert, individual basis, and there are no mechanisms to Participation in Monitoring and Accountability guarantee that their opinions are actually taken into consideration. Some CSOs are hesitant when it comes to monitoring the government’s performance. In fact, Limited institutionalised dialogue: The Economic and Social Council is a platform expected to civil society is very reluctant and hesitant when it comes to monitoring the state’s performance host discussions and dialogue between different stakeholders, including the private sector and in some sectors, especially with regard to the national budget. In light of widespread corruption civil society. Its main role is to advise the state on its economic and social policies. However, and its influence on all aspects of life in Lebanon, there are no serious initiatives to shed the Council has been paralysed since 2005, rendering the main institutionalised platform for light on this issue. “A survey of CSO accountability’s attempts to monitor the state’s budget discussions ineffective. It is of critical concern to call for the revitaliSation of the Economic and reveals general hesitation. A key obstacle or hindrance to CSO accountability’s attempts relate Social Council in order to build bridges between all development actors. ANND called in different to the budget’s legal framework, which bans citizens’ access to information and undermines occasions to restore the Council and stressed this need in its reaction to the European Union’s transparency in the budget’s preparation. Lebanon is one of the countries that provide minimal (EU) National Action Plan with Lebanon. information according to the criteria of the International Budget Partnership Organisation. The legal framework does not guarantee official mechanism for citizen participation in the budget’s Weak accountability and monitoring mechanisms: The absence of freedom of information and preparation; it restricts most involvements to unofficial initiatives, which are not binding for the the lack of transparency initiatives for political institutions in Lebanon has made it difficult for state.” CSOs to monitor and hold authorities to account. Government institutions and administrations are beset by allegations of corruption and clientelism. In conclusion, consecutive policies adopted in Lebanon have led to higher unemployment rates while a coherent strategy to address the socio-economic challenges is absent. ANND and its The absence or weakness of accountability mechanisms for different stakeholders hampers member and partner organisations have continuously called for the adoption of a strategy effective development. One aspect of corruption relates to national funding mechanisms that aims to increase the productive capacities of Lebanon. CSOs must build on their previous which rely mainly on contracts sealed with relevant ministries. These contracts are influenced experiences and move from monitoring to more proactive positions, where they are able to by political and sectarian considerations; no clear and defined criteria are adopted for these put effective pressure on the state and propose concrete recommendations. Public discontent contracts, facilitating corruption and favouritism in contracting. against policy makers gives additional value for the role and potential impact of civil society and this situation must be exploited to fulfil its development role. When it comes to international partners and foreign donors, the funding mechanisms and overall relations between donors and CSOs ares facing some major challenges. The pre-defined The Socio-Cultural Context agendas of donors, which do not take into consideration national and local needs, have hampered the usefulness and effectiveness of aid. A more participatory approach should be adopted to Coordination and partnership among CSOs: Coordination between CSOs is characterised in allow CSOs to participate in defining or influencing the donors’ agenda and implementation most cases by its temporary character and limited scope. It appears that campaigns led over modalities. In fact, many CSOs are noting that donors’ agendas are not reflecting the real a limited number of issues and for a limited period of time impacts on the prospects for their national requirements and priorities. In addition to that, complaints regarding the intermediary success. Several examples bear witness to that fact, e.g. the National Network for the Right of organisations are rising in the Arabic region and Lebanon. These organisations take a part of Access to Information, the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER), the National Coalition for the aid (coordination or commission) and pass the project or donation to another organisation, Legislating the Protection of Women from Family Violence, etc. affecting “end beneficiaries” and hampering the aid effectiveness. In reality, “the temporary character of these coalitions reduces the risk of co-optation, and the The Syrian crisis repercussions as an example of bad governance: The bad management of limited scope reduces the number of stakeholders threatened by the campaigns”. The failure the conflict in Syria has had major repercussions on Lebanon, and attests to the importance of to establish permanent coalitions among CSOs can be partially attributed to the political and joining all efforts to guarantee a long-term and effective response: “The government must lead sectarian environment. In case a permanent structure is created, its efficiency on the long term the initiative by coordinating not only with international donors but also with municipalities, could be questioned. In fact, it will most likely be infiltrated to a point where it will lose its municipal unions and NGOs”. However, the potential and effective contribution of CSOs in credibility and neutrality. 195 http://Internet.bancomundial.org/es/country/guatemala/overview 144 145 There is an urgent need to reassess the ability of CSOs to strategise and cooperate among Conclusion themselves. Lebanon has faced difficult times and ongoing instability on all levels since its existence. The Religious and sectarian context: Lebanon is a multi-confessional state where religious affiliations failure of the state, the emigration of skilled labour, the destruction of infrastructures during carry significant weight in society. Many organisations have a religious orientation and base wars, the absence of governmental involvements in social sectors, and many economic and their contribution and operation on religious considerations. These are mainly service-delivery social challenges led to individual involvements to provide aid and to the expansion of CSOs or charity organisations. On many occasions, CSOs have had to confront religious authorities in Lebanon. In fact, the rise and dynamism of CSOs in Lebanon can be attributed to two facts: when advocating for their causes and pushing for their demands. The adoption of a civil code the sectarian mix and the weak state. With the absence of confidence in political parties, more and allowing for the celebration of civil weddings in Lebanon is one of the main demands of civil is expected from CSOs, which are being seen as complementary to the state and the private society and it is strongly opposed by different religious authorities. It can be said that religious sector. authorities and affiliations are one of the main challenges facing civil society, especially with regard to issues surrounding the family and personal affairs. Analysis of civil society’s role in development and democratisation in Lebanon: Development and human rights CSOs require more information sharing and the existence of serious Media and civil society: The media has generally portrayed CSOs and their value in politics in a mechanisms for accountability not only in the state, but in donors and international partners favourable light. Over recent years, partly as a reaction to the political and legislative paralysis in as well. A partnership for development effectiveness requires engagement of all partners to Lebanon, TV channels and media engaged with civil society and have highlighted their activities accomplish their respective roles, allowing others to do theirs while leaving the door open for and demands. This increased the public perception of CSOs, thus paving way for more sound accountability to ensure transparency. and important participation of CSOs in official processes related to the issues they cover. In addition, it allowed some to have power to mobilise people around secular political issues While there is a growing reliance on civil society to advance and advocate for the various rights in a country where the first appurtenance of people is to their religion. The media and the of Lebanese citizens (civil, social, economic, social, and environmental), the state must react coordination of its relation with civil society can help build a civil sense of belonging and help to better and engage in real discussions and dialogue with CSOs. Media can play a significant role shift focus to major developmental and socio-economic concerns. to disseminate and highlight developmental initiatives. Many factors threaten development initiatives in Lebanon and require case-by-case responses. Relations with research institutions: More agreements are being signed between CSOs and The armed conflict in the region, especially the neighbouring Syrian crisis, has caused a shift research institutions which aim to enhance cooperation in all domains. This collaboration has in aid towards assisting refugees and providing for the daily needs of the affected population. been constructive in terms of enhancing civil society’s capabilities in gathering, documenting This situation has hampered the implementation of a long-term development strategy for the and analysing information. This leads to more credible and effective recommendations that can country. be used and invested in increasing civil society involvement in public policies and boosting their influence on making policies and decisions. It is important to remind CSOs, the state and international donors alike of the responsibilities they are not assuming. Adherence to the principles set by the Paris Declaration can be of Universities are also encouraging and promoting civil and voluntary work in their premises great benefit for all actors, especially those on mutual accountability and democratic country by creating spaces for civil participation. Agreements and coordination with civil society ownership. is increasing as a sort of recognition of the key and important role played by CSOs on the national level. Examples include cooperation between the Lebanese-American University and The current situation requires stricter implementation of development effectiveness principles. Makhzoumi Foundation and the creation of the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship It may be important to focus on three factors or proposals that can contribute to better at the American University of Beirut. development effectiveness: Judiciary’s role in consecrating democratic practices and enhancing human rights in Lebanon: • Develop and implement code of conducts for CSOs according to the Istanbul Principles; Though some courts have had a negative impact on some rights especially extraordinary courts (mainly the publications and military courts), which hand down decisions that do not respect the • Create institutionalised channels for dialogue between public authorities and CSOs rights to defence or that violate some basic rights such as the right of expression, the Lebanese (working seriously on reviving the Economic and Social Council) and enable CSOs to judiciary is fulfilling in general a key role in consecrating rights and thus allowing civil society to influence policy choices (ownership principle); advocate for basic rights. Many CSOs are resorting to the judiciary, especially the State Council, to hold state authorities in check. Examples include the previously-mentioned State Council • Enhance and create effective accountability mechanisms: involving in and encouraging ruling about the right of the families of persons who went missing during the Civil War to know mutual accountability among development partners. This should include the process the fate of these persons. Another example is a ruling by the Council in which it annulled a of agenda-setting by donors and international partners since they should take into Cabinet decision to delay the implementation of the new traffic law: “The decision is absolutely consideration national and regional priorities and the needs of people on the ground. null and non-existent because it amounts to trespassing by the executive authority over the legislative authority.” The ruling came after Roads for Life, YASA and families of road accident References victims challenged the Cabinet decision on February 27, 2013. 1. ANND, The Referential Guide for Enhancing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights about Policy There is proof for the possibility of a promising future for CSO engagement in development. Questionability, 2013, http://Internet.annd.org/arabic/data/publications/pdf/45.pdf (Arabic). 2. ANND, Enabling Environment for NGO Action in Lebanon, Chaden Daif, 2014, available on the Nevertheless, on the socio-cultural level, it is mainly the sectarian context, including religious following link: http://Internet.annd.org/english/data/publications/pdf/34.pdf. and cultural divisions within Lebanese society which has fed armed conflicts which endangers 3. A group of Lebanese CSOs, Civil Society’s View Regarding the Cabinet’s Policy Statement and the the construction of a civil state and the efficiency of social work. 146 147 Government’s Policies, Beirut, 2012 (Arabic). Mongolia 4. CIVICUS, “State of civil society report 2014: reimagining global governance”. 5. Ghida Franjieh, “Civil Society’s Role Is Necessary to Enhance Questionability about the State’s Budget,” LCPS, December 2013, No. 8, p. 2 (Arabic). 6. Hardig A. (2011). The evolutionaries: transforming the political system and culture in Lebanon, Summary Thesis, American university, Washington D.C. 7. KaramKaram, Civil Society’s Participation in Making Public Policies: A Comparative Study of a Foreign loans and aid in the form of ODA have contributed significantly to Mongolia’s economy Number of Arab Countries: Lebanon’s Case Study,” p. 5 (Arabic). especially during the period of economic, social, and political transition in the 1990s. Today, 8. Makary (M.), “Notification or registration? Guarantees of freedom of association in non-democratic foreign aid still plays a significant role in addressing the country’s socio-economic problems. environments: case studies of Lebanon and Jordan”, ICNL, December 2007. However, aid has not brought about sustainable gains in poverty reduction, gender equity, or 9. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Lebanon 2013 Human Rights Report, in Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2014, p.14. environmental sustainability. 10. Georges Corm, “Captive of the Sectarian Structure and Foreign Financing: Civil Society in Lebanon Complements the State without Supervising It,” Future Horizons, No. 07, September/October Mongolia has been considered one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Since 2000, 2010, p. 61 (Arabic). economic growth has been on a yearly increase of about 8% on average. Between 2011-2013, 11. The Daily Star, “Lebanon’s Civil Society Sector: A Lost Continent,” November 27, 2014, http:// economic growth reached double digits. In terms of human development and household Internet.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-27/279050-lebanons-civil-society- incomes, Mongolia is ranked among the average performers (Middle Income Countries). sector-a-lost-continent.ashx#axzz3KP0viWM9. Ironically, the poverty level has risen to 27.7%,257 and the plight of the 20% lowest income earning 12. YASA, “The State Council Rules that the New Traffic Law Is Immediately Applicable,” July 22, 2014, persons has not changed since 2000, despite the economy’s seemingly non-stop growth. http://yasa.org/ar/Sectiondet.aspx?id=7&id2=4573 (Arabic). 13. The Makhzoumi Foundation, “A Cooperation Agreement between the Lebanese-American University and the Makhzoumi Foundation, http://Internet.makhzoumi-foundation.org/media/585 The Mongolian state has yet to build sustainable cooperative relations with Civil Society (Arabic). Organisations (CSOs) in terms of policy development, project planning and implementation 14. LCPS, “A newly created multi-donor trust fund must deal with Lebanon’s broader economic and budgeting in accordance with its development effectiveness commitments under the Paris problems”, 6 December 2013. Declaration (PD) in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, and the Global Partnership 15. LCPS, “The challenges of managing the influx of Syrian refugees”, 20 June 2013. for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), Busan, 2011. 16. Now Lebanon (15 April 2009). Freedom of information draft law announced, http://Internet. nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=88860. Nevertheless, CSOs have been active across the Mongolian society, and have been a real actor 17. The Legal Agenda, “The State Council Sides with the Families of Missing Persons and Strengthens Its Historic Ruling: The Prime Minister’s Office Faces the Challenge of Abiding,” June 2014, http:// in social development. CSOs have raised public awareness on human rights and ensured public Internet.legal-agenda.com/newsarticle.php?id=703&folder=legalnews&lang=ar (Arabic). participation in governance through information dissemination, research and policy advocacy. 18. Reporters Without Borders, “Legal harassment and harsh verdicts for media and information Over the past six years, CSOs have been working on foreign development effectiveness issues providers, 20 March 2014, available on: http://en.rsf.org/lebanon-legal-harassment-and- since 2008 united under one umbrella body structure called the Civil Society Open Forum harsh-20-032014,46024.html. (CSOF)”. Last year, the forum was renamed as Development Observers and continues its work 19. Helem, “Batroun’s Single Criminal Judge: Homosexual Relations Are Not Unnatural and Article 534 with national and foreign governments and non-governmental organisations. Does Not Apply to Them,” http://helem.net/ar/node/65 (Arabic). Overall, the government of Mongolia has made some efforts toward providing a more supportive legal and regulatory environment for CSOs, but such efforts have so far not gone much beyond official program and policy documents. Enabling Environment The Legal and Regulatory Context Mongolia is a signatory to a number of international human rights conventions and has taken part in a number of conferences and forums concerned with development cooperation and civil society. The 1992 Constitution of Mongolia258 affirms the right of citizens to ‘voluntary associations’, or the right to form civil society organisations. Article 16.10 of the Constitution states: “The right to establish political party and other public organisations in the best interest and consideration for the development of a humane, civic, and democratic society in the country.” According to The Law on Government of Mongolia,259 adopted in 1993, “Principles to cooperate with non-governmental organisation and public organisations” was approved for the very first time by the State Administrative Organisations. Also, the Law on Demonstration and 257 UN Development Project’s Deputy and Representative Tomas Ericson’s Report on International Anti Poverty Day on October 17, 2014ttp://Internet.mn.undp.org/content/dam/mongolia/Articles/20141017_ PovertyDayOp-Ed_Final_Mon.pdf 258 Law on Constitution of Mongolia http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/367?lawid=367 259 Law on Government of Mongoliahttp://legalinfo.mn/law/details/344?lawid=344 148 149 Gathering260 was adopted and implemented in 1994 in order to affirm the public’s right to In addition, the Government Action Program for 2012-2016265 adopted new laws on Public voluntary associations. Benefit Operations to create new funding options for CSOs. These allow for contracting of public services to CSOs and professional unions, and more scope for the latter to carry on some The Law on Non-Governmental Organisations was adopted in 1997 and followed by the mission of the duties of the state. for “Publics and communities to reconcile establishing of NGO and regulation of NGO operation.” The law includes provisions on the establishment of non-governmental organisations and The government program also allows for greater freedom for CSOs to go to court on behalf of specifies requirements as to their administration, structure, abolishment, and other duties. the general public or specific communities to protect their interests on issues of environmental protection, children’s rights, public health, and basic social infrastructure. Mongolia’s parliament, the State Great Khural’s (SGK) decision #12261 in 2008, adopted the National Development Comprehensive Strategy based on the Mongolian Millennium Development The state has also included issues concerning CSO participation in laws, decisions, policies, and Goals. Article 2.4 of the decision included “Ensuring state administration’s accountability, plans, but establishing an enabling environment for CSOs and capacity building issues have been transparency, pressing, information transparency and increasing CSOs and private sectors’ left out. There is a need for a concrete mechanism for permanent funds and tax benefits for participation in state policy-making processes”; Article 7.1, on strategic objectives, included CSO operations, which are currently project-based funding. Donor countries and organisations “Developing [the] political structure and democracy: sustainable support for CSO operation and have tended to ignore such issues as well. As previously mentioned, CSOs are technically free to initiating democratic administration mechanism between state organisations and CSOs”; and establish themselves, express their opinions, and organise demonstrations and to have access Article 7.2 remarks on the need to “[exercise] a direction that allows private sectors and non- to information, at least as far as the law is concerned. However, implementation has been more governmental organisations to handle some of the state responsibilities.”262 difficult due to a lack of concrete mechanisms for government transparency and meaningful participation of CSOs in policy decision-making, implementation, and monitoring. The National Security Act, adopted by the State Great Khural’s decision #48 in July 2010, was about “Ensuring public policy processing, equal participation and negotiation of non-governmental In addition, both the government and donor organisations have yet to genuinely accept organisation to monitor the government actions by supporting civil society development growth initiatives and decisions made by CSOs. For instance, it has been reported that “some donors and establishing legal and regulatory environment for CSOs that serve society and developing refuse to disclose information as they inform to cooperate with governments only. There is creative methods for statecivil society cooperation.” almost no information about loans or their amounts [due to limited information] that were collected by CSOs. Most of the 23 projects that were funded by loans were [mining] and power- The Law on Information Transparency and Right to Information263 was adopted in 2011 and it related projects. Only four donors have responded out of 26 were requested. There is a lack of included 42 articles on the need for state organisations to be transparent about their operations, CSO participation in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation [of development projects unless budgetary and procurement protocols and human resource policies. It also included 46 articles implementing organisations require some extra assistance.”266 on ensuring the public’s right to information and the law also provided individuals and CSOs to have access to information within a given timeframe, and issued responsibilities on the part of Political Context state institutions to declare information concerning their operations public. Supporting CSOs has been more intensive since 2008. For instance, former Prime Minister However, significant gaps remain in the implementation of the law on transparency. CHRD Batbold Sukhbaatar once emphasised in his speech made in 2008 that, “We have to learn from has faced intimidation by representatives of mining companies as well as by the Mineral central and east European countries’ practices to include CSOs and professional unions in Resources Authority of Mongolia, the agency responsible for the issuance of mineral mining policy-making and planning processes.” Soon after, the government created a new position by licenses. When requested information regarding mining contracts, an official of the Mineral the state to work with CSOs and create national policy documents together in order to build a Resources Authority shouted at CHRD’s staff, threatening to report their activities to the police stronger relationship with CSOs.” and investigate CHRD.264 In February 2008, Mongolian NGOs gathered together and established a Civil Society Council to The law clearly has not been implemented properly as it does not guarantee or provide for full work with the government and signed off an engagement agreement. Later in March 2008, the transparency or complete information from government institutions. government made resolution #93 to work with CSOs and ordered local governors to allow NGOs to conduct monitoring of the Mongolian economy, including state budget expenditures. This Another example is in the drafting of Mongolia’s 2nd Periodic Report of the Human Rights was the start of many mutual agreements signed between NGOs and government ministries Situation to the UN’s Human Right Council in January 2015. This report should have been for further engagement initiatives. produced by the government in cooperation with CSOs, but the actual drafting process bypassed civil society almost entirely. For this reason, the published report was strongly criticised by CSOs The drafting of a state policy on CSOs for sustainable development started in March 2011. The which concluded that the report could not possibly be considered a legitimate “national report.” “Draft State Concept on Civil Society Organisations’ Development” was issued by the working group, which was established by representatives from both the state and CSOs as ordered by 260 Law on Demonstration and Gatheringhttp://legalinfo.mn/law/details/252?lawid=252 the prime minister. The draft concept was adopted after discussion among all CSOs operating 261 Mongolia’s Parliament, the State Great Khural’s(SGK), decision # 12 in 2008 National Development in Mongolia. It was then discussed in government meetings and handed over to the State Comprehensive Strategy based on the Mongolian Millennium Development Goals http://legalinfo.mn/law/ details/7045?lawid=7045 Great Khural in May 2012. However, the draft was not discussed until both SGK and GoM were 262 LIt is indicated in “Implementing Plan for Economic and Social Development of Mongolia in 2009” by replaced after election. The political party that won the election did not continue the adoption of Government of Mongolia’s decision #2 in 2009, “Reflecting CSOs rights in related laws to conduct monitoring Draft State Concept on Civil Society Development, instead they agreed to improve related laws in state operation and implementing such rights by creating negotiation methods with CSOs in order to and regulations for NGOs and established a new working group from the Ministry of Justice in address facing social issues”, “Reflecting CSOs rights in related laws especially in the Law of Nongovernmen 2013 in order to make necessary amendments to the Law on Non-Governmental Organisation tal Organizations to monitor state organizations’ actions and establish mechanisms for dialogue between the and have started working on the new draft for the Law on Public Benefit Operation. government and CSOs on critical issues 263 Law on Information Transparency and Right to Information http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/374?lawid=374 265 The Government Action Program for 2012-2016- http://Internet.legalinfo.mn/annex/details/5591?lawid=8722 264 International fact-finding mission, Mongolia: The Situation of Human Rights Defenders Working on Mining 266 Operational report from CSOs working group to monitor implementation of Paris Declaration and Accra Issue http://Internet.forum-asia.org/uploads/books/2013/March/FFM-Mongolia.pdf Agenda for Action 150 151 It appears such changes only depend on a certain political party’s will that might be replaced in Achievements: “NGOs Ethic Codex/Principles” were adopted in 2007. Initially, it had 38 NGO the next election, rather than following medium and long-term strategic plans. In other words, members and then expanded. CSOs were accepted as social independent participants and rather than continuing work by former administrations, they prefer to initiate new projects and the government announced in 2008 that each year, January 31 will be the day for Civil Society plans for their elected term of four years. Organisations. CSOs have accomplished good practice and experiences in addressing social issues, drawing the government’s attention. Achievements: Mongolian CSOs have been engaged at the international level with some success. For instance, the “First Periodic Report for Mongolia’s Human Right Issues” was reviewed by the Better cooperation between the government and CSOs has begun and the state has started to United Nation’s Human Rights Council in 2010. The shadow seport was presented at the Council contract out some of its duties to CSOs. For instance, six ministries – including the Ministry of review meeting by a number of CSOs in Mongolia. After the review, the Council announced Social Welfare and Labour, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of the need to pay special attention to the Second Periodic Report, and assess whether the Education, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture – have signed off on engagement contracts with recommendations from the first periodic report were acted on. over 100 CSOs. The contracts amounted to a total of 957.8 million MNT in 2010. The amount has not been updated since, however, the Ministry of Environment and Green Development The Mongolian government accepted to implement 126 recommendations from the first has signed off on more than 400 million MNT worth engagement agreements with 45 NGOs in periodic report and conduct a midterm review, and sent the report in April 2014. The National 2014. Over the past few years, CSOs have united with each other as networks, committees, and Human Rights NGO Forum of Mongolia has sent 10 shadow reports, including those on legal unions to share best practices and accomplish better development results. CSO staff focusing and regulatory reforms, ondiscrimination, individual and political rights, environmental, mining on human rights issues have also been receiving better education on their respective fields as a and herdsmen rights; food and poverty; LGBT rights; disabled people and human trafficking for result of cooperation between CSOs and international organisations. the second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of the UNHRC in September 2014. Difficulties: Conducting monitoring on development effectiveness is next to impossible. Currently, we face government bureaucracy, lack of initiative for CSO capacity development on The Governance Context the part of donors, and CSOs’ own lack of funding and dedicated staff. In addition, when the government signs off on engagement agreements with CSOs, they only include project-based Mongolian CSOs are active throughout society and most of them concentrate on gender equality, operational costs but not administrative costs, and there is no sustainable long-term, financing rights for marginalised communities, human rights, environmental issues, poverty reduction for CSOs. The selection process for CSOs in such agreements is also often based on political and democratic development. They have also contributed favourably to human rights discourse considerations by government officials. This has had a negative impact on public perceptions in the country, increased public participation in policy decision-making, conducted surveys and of CSOs. monitoring work to advocate for sustainable development. The Socio-Cultural Context According to research267 conducted in 2013, only The National Security Policy adopted by State Great Khural in 2012 explicitly included a constitutional concept. Apart from the constitution, CSOs have had a difficult time improving their overall public image due to resource constraints this is one of the few documents that we can consider which followed the Busan Commitments. on strategic communications, but are well-recognised by partners, supporters, and communities Prior to this, civil society’s contribution to development was accepted and reflected in few where their services are directly felt. development policy documents, including the National Development Comprehensive (Strategy (NDCS) based on Mongolian Millennium Development Goals (MMDG), which was adopted by CSOs depend in part on the mass media in influencing public opinion. Unfortunately, the media State Great Khural in 2008 and the government resolution #93 to cooperate with CSOs. industry in Mongolia tends toward the yellow press and their news frames are limited within “Closing Agreement”268 with269 political parties, politicians, and businessmen. The media only However, these documents limit the participation of CSOs to monitoring alone. The National tends to take interest in civil society activity in the case of specific human rights violations or Development Comprehensive Strategy defined civil society’s role as “to conduct effective other exceptional events. There is a tendency to portray CSOs in a narrow light, as solely service monitoring of state organisations and their executive administration’ actions and to have their providers, or quotable sources for such issues as domestic violence or voter education, to the own voice for state decisions that reflect publics and communities” and CSOs development exclusion of drawing attention to the state’s own duties and responsibilities to act on these issues in democracy as “Supporting CSOs operations; formulating democratic mechanism issues. where it provides civil society and state mutual cooperation and developing civil society”. Unfortunately, even these are rarely implemented. The concept of Civil Society Development There are quite a few cases of mass media broadcasting false information270 to the public about has not been adopted as of today after being reviewed in March 2011 and handed over to State CSOs and their employees as requested by some politicians and businessmen. Yet reporters Great Khural’s meeting in May 2012 as a result of the elections. themselves can be victims in some cases by hurting someone’s reputation through libel or slander. Overall, the state has not followed through on its own policy to develop and consolidate CSOs, and has failed to reflect their role as independent development actors in national policy Over the past couple of years, CSOs have organised yearly training workshops for journalists documents, even though the state claims to accept CSO’s contribution to development. CSOs to provide them proper knowledge and education about democracy and human rights issues. are losing the opportunity for wider acceptance in society. They have themselves had trouble developing their own capacity to contribute effectively to development. This could have a Religious organisations prefer to focus on pure development or charity work as opposed to negative impact on democratic development and consolidation. Capacity development for CSOs is directly dependent only on their mission, strategy, human resource capacity and international 268 Mongolia was ranked at 80th country according to the world mass media freedom index in 2014 cooperation framework. Unfortunately, it is clear that some CSOs cannot afford to keep up with 269 This agreement is not to broadcast negative news about certain individual or organization. “Uniting Mission” full human resource capacity as a result of the world economic crisis, and the withdrawal of movement has disclosed that GoM has signed off on 40 Closing Agreements with mass media in 2014. Average international funding support for local CSOs. cost for one agreement is 5 to 10 million MNT 270 For instance: there was news about: “NGOs are taking advantages of fund under working against human in trafficking” and also on NBS TV broadcasted acquisition against CHRD for doing money laundry without even 267 “Politic, regulatory and philosophy issues of CSOs in Mongolia” Survey by Amarsanaa. J any evidences. 152 153 political campaigning. However, such organisations have worked271 with CSOs and shared their Challenges: Internal and external issues impact on CSOs’ attempts to secure development expertise on certain occasions. Cultural organisations mainly pay attention to preserving272 effectiveness objectives. For instance, the current Law of Non-Governmental Organisation does national heritage. CSOs need to conduct more research and analysis on social, development, not meet modern criteria, and there is a lack of monitoring due to funding constraints and lack economic, political, and cultural issues, but it has been difficult to secure funding from the of access to information. government. The government of Mongolia is contracting out necessary research analysis and surveys to research institutes such as the “Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Laws” only for There is no open standing for CSOs to make claims to court on public interest issues on behalf of a number of planned activities. Some ministries contract out research studies to CSOs. victims. Political parties have been inconsistent in the implementation of key development and CSO co-operation initiatives. Also, there are many difficulties, including the lack of coordination Achievements: Media institutions have recently broadcasted live debates and consultations among state organisations and ministries, lack of initiative by donor organisations for CSO on social issues like mining and the environment, while welcoming experts and analysis from capacity development, lack of core funding for CSOs and support for CSO staff, especially when NGOs and human rights campaigners. donors and government fund only operational costs, without taking into account the need for long-term financing for CSOs. Challenges: It has become common in the media to address their financial issues by signing off on Closing Agreements with political parties and huge companies. This clearly hurts Conclusion transparency, journalistic independence, and social justice, while negatively impacting on the public image of civil society and democratic processes. It is essential for the government of Mongolia and donor organisations to accept CSOs as independent development actors, and to establish an enabling environment for CSOs by The Socio-Economic Context improving the implementation of already existing policies commitments. Current events also clearly reflect on the need to speed up the review and amendment process of the current law Foreign investments have increasingly played a major role in the Mongolian economy through on non-governmental organisations.275 various projects. These projects, however, have not brought sustainable results in terms of environmental sustainability and poverty reduction. It is important to establish an environment where CSOs can have access to development policy information, projects and their implementation strategies and other information about projects In relation to debt, the government of Mongolia has utilised about 214.0 million USD in 2013 out funded through foreign loans and aid, while providing CSOs the opportunity to participate of a total 2.8 billion USD received as loan from donor countries and organisations between 1990 meaningfully in policy-making, assessing, and monitoring these projects. and 2013. There were 189 projects funded by such loans, of which 161 projects were successfully implemented, while 28 projects remaining are being implemented. There are 30 projects that The government of Mongolia must fulfill its commitments to the Paris Declaration, the Accra have fully paid back their initial loans, though 159273 projects are still following their related Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008 and the Busan Commitments in order to establish an enabling repayment schedules. Total debts incurred by the government of Mongolia reached MNT 10.4 environment where sustainable sources of finance and a favourable legal and regulatory trillion as of September 30, 2014. The government has been using such loans to contribute to environment exists for CSOs. It should translate, disseminate and popularise these documents the state budget, fund development projects, repay other loans, or give loans locally. and implement their provisions through a dedicated national plan of action. CSOF274 conducted a survey in 2011 to assess how the government of Mongolia, its ministries, Recommendations by-lateral and multi-lateral development organisations, as well as international financial organisations are fulfilling their development effectiveness commitments. The request to • CSOs should eschew “mission creep,” to lure donor funding. This detracts from their participate in the survey was sent to 12 ministries and 26 donor organisations. Ten ministries core mission and may undermine their reputation and that of civil society in general. and 10 donors accepted the request. The results of the survey revealed the following: Instead, their energies should be directed toward lobbying for greater access to GoM tenders, competitive donor funding, and the development of autonomous resources Employees from the ministries did not have capacity to answer many of the survey’s (membership fees or donations). questions due to unfamiliarity with certain terms on development effectiveness and cooperation. The survey also concluded that “Donors were only naming their projects • Donors should consider longer term commitments and the need to finance institutional to answer many questions but they did not provide any information whether they have and administrative costs, while bearing in mind the origins, purpose, and sustainability evaluated their projects in accordance to the country’s development and social issues and of the CSOs they fund. social issues strategy.” Information on development policies, implementation strategies and projects funded by international ODA have not been transparent. Distribution and • Donors should provide technical and financial support to expand current CSO preparation capacity is very poor. Government ministries and donors must take steps to efforts at institutionalization, while targeting programs that assist in the creation and address these issues. There is, in addition, no mechanism that was established for multi- development of community-based organisations (CBOs) and CSO branches outside of stakeholder discussions of development and aid effectiveness issues. Mongolia’s capital. They should also promote CSO umbrella organisations that may be more efficient and effective at social accountability. The Mongolian Government should 271 “Big Brother,” “Not Late,” “Sochi” and “The Last Decision” dramas were played in National Drama Theatre on provide appropriate mechanisms for CSOs to access information on development International Anti-Corruption Day and International Human Rights Day as ordered by UNESCO and Open projects funded through foreign aid and loans. Society Forum. 272 The State’s policy on cultural sector consists of 4 main sections including: 1) Increasing art and cultural role and its effectiveness in national development; 2) Establishing pleasant environment to encourage • Given the importance of CSO media relations, CSOs should double their efforts to communities to create cultural heritage and inherit, expand, own and distribute such heritages; 3) Protecting develop strong relations with various media outlets and individual journalists. Sound cultural heritages, inheriting and enriching them and 4) Advertising and publicizing Mongolian culture to the media relations would ensure publicity of civic engagement/social accountability world and expanding foreign cooperation. activities. 273 http://mof.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/%D3%A8%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%BD-%D1%82%D0% BE%D0%B9%D0%BC-2013-121.pdf 274 Civil Society Open Forum 275 Law on Non-governmental Organisations http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/494?lawid=494 154 155 • CSOs and the government should consider formal mechanisms to encourage civil Mozambique society and citizen input into the legislative process and policy formulation. This should be done in consultation with international donors, who may provide initial financial and technical support, including comparative studies of best practice. Civil society Summary input could include expert testimony, preparation of draft legislation, participation in working groups, and in public hearings on pending legislation and public policies, The collapse of the Party-State regime in the late 1980s and the establishment of a multi- which they could also help to disseminate. party constitution in 1990 stands out as the main landmark and legal reference point for the emergence of a vibrant civil society in Mozambique. References However, the pace of legal and political reforms that will enable full and effective engagement 1. Amarsanaa. (2013). Political, regulatory, and philosophical issues concerning CSOs in Mongolia. for civil society in governance has been markedly slow. CSOs are constrained by a legal and Available from http://Internet.ipsl.mas.ac.mn/mn/?page_id=1175 2. Citizens Oversight on Budget network. (2010). Tools for advocacy to ensure the transparency of regulatory environment in Mozambique characterised by hesitant legislation on one hand and government budget. Ulaanbaatar. political institutions that operate in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the days of the party- 3. Civil Council of Environment NGOs. (2009). Annual report. Ulaanbaatar. Davaadulam, T. (2010). state. The sluggish pace in reforms of the legal and regulatory system in the country appears to Good governance and Social Accounatbility terms. Ulaanbaatar. be the best that a conservative political establishment can do as it stands between its “comfort 4. World Mass Media Freedom Index. (2014). Mongolia ranked 80th in the world. Available from zone” and the pressures of an increasingly “noisy” civil society. http://Internet.eagle.mn/content/read/16007.htm 5. The World Bank, Social and Development Department. (2007). The Enabling Environment for Policy debates are still predominantly a winner – take all game between the two major political Social Accountability in Mongolia . Washington, D.C. parties in parliament with little space for other development actors to effectively engage. 6. National Statistical Office. (2005). Strategy document for ensuring economic growth and reducing poverty. Ulaanbaatar. Yet a few legislative victories and lessons learned have granted CSOs some room for tactical 7. University, Shikhii hutag. (2009). Mongolian state law, historical tradition and current situation. manoeuvres in the increasingly complex and polarised political arena. Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo printing. 8. Universal Periodic Review. (2013). Mongolia. Available from http://upr-mongolia.mn/index. The influence that CSOs have in Mozambique also reflects the still slow development of a critical php?language=2/English and active citizenry – in the context of a largely traditional society based on rigid hierarchical 9. World Bank. (2007). The enabling environment for Social Accountability in Mongolia. structures, where open criticism of public authorities is actively discouraged. Notwithstanding Washington DC the apparent waning of the Budget Support Partnership, Development Cooperation flows to 10. Velásquez, Helmer. 2014. Guidelines context. Analysis presented to cooperation agencies. Mozambique are still on the rise, and sources of financing are diversifying, reflecting broader, 11. World Bank, Evaluation of Poverty in Guatemala, 2011. 12. Press AODE on the First High Level Meeting (HLM) of GPECD. global changes in the aid landscape. 13. http://Internet.bancomundial.org/es/country/guatemala/overview 14. http://Internet.cepal.org/oig/WS/getCountryProfile.asp?language=spanish&country=GTM Nevertheless, aid flows as a proportion of the national budget have declined, lowering 15. http://coeduc.org/es/guatemala/pobreza.html the country’s dependence on external financing, with important implications for broader 16. http://prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Guatemala-puesto_70-estados_fallidos-Otto_Perez_ ownership over development policy. Still, the partnership instrument between the government Molina_0_944905770.html of Mozambique and the group of 19 donors providing the modality on budget support (G-19/ 17. http://Internet.segeplan.gob.gt/2.0/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1972:ejecu PAPs) is still far from responsive to the development effectiveness agenda. tivo-aprueba-la-politica-de-cooperacion-no-reembolsable-&catid=25:ultima&Itemid=115 18. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/aidco/images/9/98/GUIA_SOC_CIVIL_FINAL_4_3_ V2.pdf Meanwhile, implementation of the Busan principle of inclusive development partnerships has proved challenging in the face of apparent indifference among a number of development actors (G-19 donors, the non-traditional donors, private sector, sivil society and parliament). Opportunity for these actors who have initiatives for broad policy debates are still fragmented. There are hardly any regular mechanisms for multi-stakeholder dialogue established. The Development Observatory (DO), a government-CSO dialogue forum attended by G-19 donors as observers, seems to be the furthest Mozambique has been able to go in terms of inclusiveness of its development partnerships. Initiatives by CSOs to use the DO as a space for evidence-based discussions of selected government sectoral policies (introduced in 2013), certainly represents a huge qualitative leap in terms of the engagement of civil society in Development Effectiveness efforts. However, what remains unclear is the extent to which the government of Mozambique actually takes the contributions of CSOs on board. Mozambican CSOs tend to treat foreign donors and the private sector as circumstantial allies, while relations between CSOs and domestic political actors (parliament, government and political parties) are described by Francisco et al (2008) as “convenient tutelage.” Committed to the principles of Development Effectiveness, CSOs in Mozambique have refocused their attention on the need to address growing social inequalities and the contradiction between the country’s rising economic growth rates and macroeconomic performance amid disappointing performance on human development indicators. 156 157 In addition, the risk of Mozambican Public Debt rising to unsustainable levels has caused some Civil Society Enabling Environment CSOs to raise the alarm, given the potential implications of a debt crisis for the social stability of the country. The Legal and Regulatory Framework in Mozambique Introduction The Access to Information Act,278 approved by parliament in August 2014, represents a milestone in the efforts of Mozambican CSOs to push towards effective democratic participation and The present country report was commissioned by the CSO Partnership for Development citizen engagement in governance. Effectiveness (CPDE) and written by Grupo Moçambican oda Dívida (GMD) as the Mozambican contribution for the CPDE 2015 Global Synthesis Report on the State of Development Only now can Mozambicans fully enjoy a guarantee (access to public information) that was Cooperation, CSO Enabling Environment and CSO Development Effectiveness. granted to them in the constitution (of 1990 and 2004). Despite persistent pressure from a coalition of civil society organisations,3 the Access to Information Act had been on the After a brief review of the history of civil society in Mozambique, the report expands on the parliament’s waiting list since 2005 and the lengthy delays in its approval stands as stark following key areas: i) CSO enabling environment; ii) the state of development cooperation, and evidence of the incredibly slow pace of reforms on CSO EE. iii) CSO development effectiveness. Notwithstanding recent progress, the legal and regulatory infrastructure for CSOs inMozambique In the first theme, we discuss the: is still saddled by a number of flaws, including: • the legal and regulatory framework; Hesitant legislation: the disposition and content of legislation raises questions concerning their enforceability and effectiveness beyond the merely formal scope. • the political environment and; E.g.1: The newly enacted Public Probity Act is a glaring example. When it came into force in • the socio-cultural context. November 2013, it was highly praised as a bold step towards the strengthening of public transparency. However, the initial triumph was muffled when, to the disappointment of many, Next, we discuss in detail the governance context in Mozambique. The last part addresses the the Act still retained a regime of confidentiality in the declaration of rights, incomes, bonds, country’s socio-economic context. shares or any other kind of property and assets of public servants, which were supposed to be made public in the interest of effective public scrutiny.279 In fact, some CSOs claim the Act is in The Roots of Mozambican Civil Society direct contradiction with the Press Act.280 Mozambique’s history in part explains the belated emergence of a viable, independent civil E.g.2: Amidst reiterated calls for public transparency in the ongoing negotiations on Concessions society: 500 years of colonial rule under Portugal, followed in 1975 by more than a decade of for Natural Resources exploration, a counter-move by the government caught almost everyone communist rule under a one party state.276 by surprise. In August 2014, the executive, backed by a qualified majority in the parliament, successfully requested a parliamentary mandate to legislate by decree on the attribution of a The “third wave” of democratic transitions swept through Mozambique in the early 1990s, when special regime to the incoming LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry. 16 of civil strife following the proclamation of the country’s independence in 1975 came to an end. Amid waves of political and economic liberalisation policies, a multi-party constitution Decrees are by nature government orders subject to neither parliament debate nor public came into force in1990, opening the ground not only for the first general elections in 1994, but consultations, meaning that their content is only publicly known after the legislation is issued.281 also institutionalizing, among others, the right to free association,277 free assembly and free This effectively blocks the opportunity for CSOs to intervene in policy making on such critical expression. issues. Under the new legislation, and with extensive support and incentives from the international Institutional reminiscence: the burden of Mozambique’s recent history is still in a way reflected donor community, a flourishing associative movement found fertile conditions to define and in the character of the country’s institutions. Relations between citizens and the government empower itself not only by assuming a critical role towards state institutions and the political are still strained, in the context of a public bureaucracy which still mirrors to some extent the establishment, but also by its role in advocating for the pluralistic values of local democracy, operating logic of the Party-State. This is particularly true when it comes to public disclosure participatory development, and citizen engagement (Biza, 2009; Lourenço, 2009). issues (on openness, communication, and accountability) and there is widespread consensus that transparency and accountability become even harder to get by the further you get from the On the other hand, with an underfunded post-conflict government still barely capable of major cities. A strong civil society capable of holding the public administration in urban areas to providing essential goods and services, significant external funding allowed a segment of account is largely absent in rural Mozambique. emerging CSOs to complement the state as a welfare provider. Advocacy and social intervention simultaneously became the two expressions of the emerging CSO movement in the early 1990s and have since evolved to adjust to the changing reality of a 278 Faced with an apparently deliberate delay in the approval of the Access to Information Act, 9 CSOs country emerging from post-war reconstruction to a period of rapid economic growth. (individual organizations and platforms), decided to join efforts in a Coalition (Coligação DAI – Coligação do Direito de Acesso a Informação), in order to harmonise their actions and step-up political pressure. 279 “Lei de probidade pública com pontos que ferem a liberdade de imprensa”. Available at http://Internet. verdade.co.mz/destaques/democracia/34939-lei-de-probidade-publica-com-pontos-que-ferem-a-liber 276 From the late 1970s up until the late 1980s, Mass Organizations served as mere adjuncts of the Party State dade-de-imprensa. Accessed on 02 November 2014 [e.g. Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM), Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (OMM)] 280 Ibid. 277 The right to free association was introduced as a Constitutional guarantee in 1990 and regulated in the so- 281 CIP (2014). “Concessões no âmbito do LNG: Governo Insiste em Legislar sem Consulta Pública e sem called “Associations Act” a piece of legislation enacted in 1991 and applicable to all kind of associations. Transparência”. Edition no. 6/2014. Maputo. 158 159 Even with the yet to be passed Right to Information Act which turned back some of the Party- Individual CSOs have long advocated actively for reforms in Mozambique’s extractive sector, State era’s “anti-media legislation,” journalists, CSOs, and citizens in general claim that there are and are now working on a framework for joint activism initiatives in 2010. Eight CSOs284 still considerable obstructions in access to or disclosure of public information,282 limiting space participated in the Civil Society Platform on Natural Resources and Extractive Industry, a forum for public advocacy initiatives and critical citizen engagement. aimed at ensuring and promoting transparent, responsible, and sustainable management of the country’s natural resources, and envisaging a holistic approach toward development The Political Environment with greater sensitivity to the environment and the wellbeing of local communities located on exploration sites. Despite recent governance reforms, the enabling environment for CSOs in Mozambique still reeks of the legacy of the over-centralised, authoritarian and profoundly alienating logic of the The Socio-Cultural Context post-independence nation-building state – the first republic as described by Geffray (1990). For the political establishment, the emergence of active CSOs understandably marks a move away Mozambican society has traditionally been characterised by a rigid social hierarchy, where from its “comfort zone.” Therefore, the markedly sluggish reforms in CSO EE, reflect the half- questioning decisions from the top was seen as a direct challenge to authority. hearted willingness of a conservative political establishment to respond to the unavoidable internal/external demands of an increasingly “noisy” civil society.283 In a way, such traditional perceptions and power dynamics have been transposed to formal relations between citizens and the modern state. Budding democratic institutions in Mozambique are still struggling to take-off in a political This socio-cultural dimension of the Mozambican society can partly explain the stunted environment shadowed by political polarisation between the ruling FRELIMO and the leading development of a critical dimension of citizenship in the country, which has had implications opposition party (ex-guerrilla movement) RENAMO, leading to claims that all too often, the policy on the work of CSOs. agenda debate ends to turn into an over-politicised zero-sum game between the two former belligerents, allowing little, if any room, for other development actors to effectively engage in Media institutions, supported for the most part by public funding, also tend to be highly the process. The fact that the government, the state and the main political parties will only turn politicised, with “loyalist” elements portraying or explicitly favouring a one-sided perspective of or open up to CSOs when it suits them, led the 2007 CIVICUS Mozambique Country Report, to the public debates, raising questions as to their political independence. For instance, opposition categorically describe those relations as ones of “convenient tutelage”(Francisco et al, 2008). parties and the most outspoken CSOs and individual stand little, if any, chance of exposure in the official media (AfriMAP, 2009: 15). Therefore, in the face of such challenges imposed by the political environment, the limited achievements of Mozambican CSOs represent politically meaningful victories. One example While the national media is still overwhelmingly dominated by official channels, independent includes recent advocacy initiatives by CSOs which reaped surprisingly positive results, forcing media initiatives have emerged over the past few years, providing ample opportunities for at least two controversial legislative projects from the parliament to be reviewed: independent CSOs to get their messages across. In March 2014, nine CSOs marched to the Parliament Building (Assembleiada República), Public opinion is broadly supportive of the role the independent media can play, and is also demonstrating against what they denounced as blatant violations to women and children’s increasingly informed about, and supportive of, the advocacy initiatives of CSOs. Today, more rights in the project of the new Mozambican Criminal Code which had been approved by the than ever, CSOs have the ability to mobilise people around their advocacies, as proven in this MPs in December 2013. At the end of the march, a petition listing the articles viewed by CSOs year’s street demonstrations (referred to in the Political Environment section). as violating human rights in the project was handed to the Parliament’s Commission for Human Rights and Legal Affairs. A month later, all the CSOs’ demands had been fully accommodated by However, the still flimsy adherence of CSOs to values of integrity as well as internal democracy the parliament after a revision of the project. and transparency has marred public perceptions around CSOs. There is broad consensus that the legitimacy of CSOs depends extensively on their performance on this front (Values-Impact).285 In May 2014, CSOs took to the streets again to contest the “outrageously excessive benefits/ GMD, MASC (Civil Society Support Mechanism) and CIP (Public Integrity Centre)286 for instance, perks” granted to the president and MPs in the newly enacted President’s Rights and Duties Act have clearly been an example on that regard, for regularly making available to public access and Parliament Staff Regulation. In a country where widening social inequalities are a growing their respective annual reports and Accounts. With the example set by the leading CSOs, the concern, the contentious laws sparked widespread wrath and shock for clashing above all with smaller ones are also trying to adopt such good practices of transparency and accountability. the fundamental principles of justice, equality, and equity set out by the constitution. Street demonstrations and online campaigns called for the president not to push through with these The State Of Development Cooperation provisions in the law. Under enormous pressure and in a last-ditch attempt to save his own and his party’s popularity ahead of elections in October, the president returned the law proposal to The Governance Context the parliament, arguing that “he thought they had to be re-examined, taking into account their negative socio-economic impact as well as their heavy financial and budgetary implications.” From the early 2000s and particularly following the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD), Mozambique has been at the forefront of the implementation of the internationally-agreed aid effectiveness These, among other initiatives, are also learning opportunities for CSOs on organising for joint agenda. collaboration and solidarity in the context of a challenging political environment. In fact, with the polarisation of debates over public policy, only by advocating and mobilising together can CSOs In 2004, one of the world’s largest partnerships for budget support provision was set up in gain leverage in the development arena – one characterised by vested interests and powerful Mozambique, aimed at supporting the government in the implementation of the Poverty lobby groups, including that of the mining industry. 282 Ibid. 284 IBIS, Centrode Integrida de Pública (CIP),Instituto de Estudos Sociaise Económicos (IESE),WWF Moçambique, 283 The latest Mozambique Civil Society Index (Mozambique CIVICUS Country Report), suggests that rather than ObservatóriosobreMeioRural,KUWAJAJDA,AssociaçãoparaSanidadeAmbientaland Associaçãode Apoioe As a genuine, effective partnership with the Civil Society, State’s concessions favouring CSOs EE were all too often sistência Jurídicaàs Comunidades. oriented at pleasing the international donor community or fulfilling certain conditionalities imposed by them 285 Interview Comments from individual CSO members (07 November 2014) (Francisco et al, 2008: 25). 286 A major CSO working on Anti-corruption issues 160 161 Reduction Strategy (PRS) and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The most moderate analyses describe CSOs and those other development actors as By 2009, when this so-called Programme Aid Partnership (PAP) was going through its heyday, circumstantial allies – a description that reflects the irregularity of their dialogue, with each one the group comprised a total 19 budget support providers (MPD, 2013).287 After the withdrawal of them interacting only on an individual basis with the government on different platforms, of Belgium, Spain, and Netherlands, the group is now composed of 16 donors,288 though the none of which have proven inclusive enough. Attempts at bringing them under the same “brand” G-19 is still widely used to refer to them. dialogue platform in the spirit of the Busan Declaration are proving insufficient to pull them out of the sidelines particularly for the non-traditional donors and the private sector.290 The While the Euro-zone financial crisis ranked as the top reason for the exit of these three donors good news is that Mozambican CSOs have actually been ahead of the international directives in from G-19, their exit also comes at a time when the partnership around budget support provision that regard. Though the PAP is formally an exclusive government-G19 arrangement, a biannual in Mozambique is showing signs of waning, as confirmed by a recent report commissioned by government-civil society dialogue forum, the Development Observatory (DO), was established the European Commission (EC).289 within it in 2003 (before Paris and Accra), originally with the purpose of monitoring progress in poverty reduction.291 In 2008, when the world gathered in Accra to define the role of Civil society Through the aggregate volume of Official Development Cooperation (ODA) flows have kept in the aid effectiveness agenda, the Development Observatory experience in Mozambique had rising, budget support, as an aid modality that was a key source of optimism around the aid already been replicated from the central to provincial level by 2005. effectiveness agenda, is now falling into uncertainty. In 2013, CSOs began to use the DO as a forum for evidence-based discussion of selected Budget support as a share of total aid delivered to the government shrank from 39% in 2009 government sectoral policies. Yet since the DO is a largely consultative forum and contains to 31% in 2013 (MPD, 2014). On the other hand, the financial contribution of this aid modality no binding mechanisms to ensure effective follow up of the sessions, it is unclear whether the in Mozambique is declining both as a percentage of GDP (from a peak of 5% in 2007 to 3.1% in contributions of CSOs have actually secured the buy-in of the government of Mozambique.292 2012) and as a share of total public expenditure – from 18.8% in 2006 to 9.4% in 2012 (EC, 2014). In fact, the government’s stance toward criticism by CSOs on policy issues has been described While non-traditional partners have always opted for the project modality, G-19 partners are by some as invariably defensive, bypassing the active public debate on policy alternatives. now also switching back to financing individual projects, making it by far the most relevant modality in terms of ODA flows to Mozambique. This could portend a shift back to flag-waving While the traditional development cooperation arrangement between the government and aid behaviour prior to the Paris Declaration in 2005, when the bulk of aid went through donor’s [northern/traditional] donors (G-19) tends to be reasonably responsive to the internationally Parallel Implementation Units (PIUs) that allowed for little country ownership over development agreed commitments on country ownership principles, sustainable development, gender equity, initiatives and imposed serious managerial constraints. and development effectiveness, the cooperation mechanisms with non-traditional donors and private sector actors are still lagging behind despite the Busan agreements. As the implementation deadline of the Busan commitments in 2015 draws closer, few indicators are expected to make significant breakthrough (when compared to 2011). The dwindling share Emerging non-traditional donors have undoubtedly added value to the development of Programme Aid (including General Budget Support) in the total volume of aid disbursed to the cooperation landscape in Mozambique. Yet, the perceived capacity of the lending agreements government, is likely to significantly impact on the performance of other indicators, particularly between this group of donors and the government has given rise to some suspicion that certain those related to the use of national Public Finance Management (PFM) systems and procedures. “conditionalities” associated to some of those loans could be detrimental for the national interest over the medium and long-term, including the consolidation of a culture of government Nevertheless, though the fiscal importance of budget support is falling, the group of donors transparency and accountability. E.g. several CSOs and prominent individual activists in providing this modality of aid (G-19/PAPs) form what is still by far the most active and prominent Mozambique have openly expressed their discontent at the apparently promiscuous symbioses development cooperation platform in Mozambique and which still holds substantial influence between the local political elite and Chinese business interests, fearing that they might actually as a relevant forum of policy dialogue with the government. stem from those bilateral intergovernmental agreements (Chichava, 2009). Alignment of the PAP to the Paris and Busan Declarations is monitored and assessed through Throughout the text, this report presents some concrete evidence to show that development a Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), comprising a set of indicators for each of the key actors in Mozambique and CSOs in particular, are individually engaged in advancing quite a aid effectiveness and effective development cooperation principles: number of initiatives. However, engaging those individual actors (government, civil society, G-19 donors, emerging donors, private sector and parliamentarians) in a multi-stakeholder • Ownership of development priorities by developing countries coordinated action around common ground issues is still a formidable challenge. Over the • Donor’s alignment to national priorities next few years, the Mozambican political and policy spectrum is likely to become increasingly • Harmonisation of donor interventions divisive, and that could become an opportunity for civil society to take the lead in building such • Transparency and nutual accountability a platform of multi- stakeholder dialogue intermediation. Meanwhile, implementation of the Busan-adopted principle of inclusive development partnerships has proved challenging in the face of apparent indifference among a number of development actors (G-19 donors, the non-traditional donors, private sector, civil society and parliament). Opportunities for engagement among these actors are small, with hardly any regular mechanisms for multi-stakeholder dialogue as yet established. 287 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, Spain, Canada, the World Bank and the African Development Bank [MPD (2013)] 290 Interview with a leading CS representative (12 November 2014) 288 Ibid. 291 Interview with MPD Aid Coordination and Effectiveness staff (10 November 2014) 289 European Commission (2014). Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique. Vol 1 292 G19 attend the Development Observatory Sessions as Observers 162 163 Development Effectiveness: CSOs and Development Results Understandably, fears that a significant proportion of the population could end up sidelined and marginalised despite the mining boom has helped shape the focus and tone of CSOs on the The Socio-Economic Context issues of development inclusivity and sustainability. But Mozambique is also facing a looming macroeconomic threat that could have devastating Indicator 2005* 2014* impacts down the line. Wealth from mining is not expected to contribute much to the national economy at least until 2020, but the government, speculating on the potential for future GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current USA $) a 290 590 earnings, has embarked on a borrowing frenzy. Population, million a 21,01 25,20 CSOs are monitoring the rise in debt stock, and agree that betting on nothing but mining prospects is a risky affair. Recent moves by the government into the financial markets (including % Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line 54.1 54.7 loans worth US$850 million invested in tuna fishing and naval patrol vessels), have been at the (% of population) a (2003) (2009) heart of growing concerns that the public debt burden could be heading it on to unsustainable levels. Life Expectancy at Birth b 48.1 50.7 It is worth noting that CSOs, particularly Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (GMD), Instituto de HDI (Score) b 0.287 0.393 Estudos Económicos e Sociais (IESE) and Centro Terra Viva, were the first to sound the alarm on the risk of public debt unsustainability a couple of years ago, though the alarm probably sounded HDI (Ranking) b 168 178 louder for the authorities in November 2014, when the IMF Mission assessing the Mozambican Literacy Rate a 48.16 50.58 performance under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) called for a less expansionary budget and a narrowing of the fiscal deficit. (2003) (2009) Conclusions & Recommendations Prevalence of HIV 11.3 11.1 The present report concludes that amidst a challenging environment, CSOs in Mozambique total (% of population ages 15-49) a have, since the early 1990s, walked a long way, transforming themselves into relevant actors to be taken into account in the development process. Although the Enabling Environment is * Where 2005 or 2014 data were not available, the most proximate year has been used. Sources: a World Development Indicators 2014; b Human Development Report 2014 far from perfect, evolving social and political conditions as well as growing pressure from an increasingly knowledgeable public offers hope that the country will pursue its track of reforms, The average growth rate of the Mozambican economy between 2000 and 2012 was 7.5% oriented at allowing greater space for civil society. according to the World Bank Development Indicators 2014. Such robust growth rates compare favourably both with the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average (5.0%) and the Low-Income Ever since the debt cancelling initiatives in the early 2000s, civil society has engaged actively in Countries’ (LICs) average (5.6%). development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. However, the development cooperation framework in Mozambique is still quite fragmented and interaction between CSOs and other Yet progress on poverty reduction has been far from impressive. The second generation of the development actors lacks the necessary level of institutionalisation, tending rather to take an Mozambican Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARPA II) envisaged a reduction in absolute poverty ad-hoc character, according to the political conveniences of the moment. If the Busan target of from 54% in 2005 to 45% in 2009. However, the final PARPA II assessment in 2010 revealed that inclusive development partnerships is to be met, political commitment at higher levels will be no progress had effectively been achieved and poverty incidence rate stagnated at 54.7%. crucial. A third generation PRS (PARP 2011-2014) was then introduced, aiming at cutting poverty from Despite the growing complexity of the governance arena and the polarisation of the policy 54% in 2009 to 45% in 2014. With preparations for the final PARP assessment now underway, debate, CSO engagement with the Mozambican Effective Development agenda is showing signs Mozambique is still listed among the 10 poorest nations in the World (ranked as 178 among 185 of strengthening, particularly regarding policy advocacy. Over the last few years, and with the countries in the 2014 HDI report). strong support of independent media, CSOs have been strongly committed at generating an inclusive and comprehensive evidence-based public debate, on the country’s future. This is The paradox of a consistently brilliant macroeconomic performance and disappointing likely to play out positively on the quality of the public policies in the medium term. performance on inclusive human development has given rise to justified claims that social inequalities are on the rise, though the HDI reports indicate a stagnant income Gini coefficient, But if civil society’s presence is kept limited to consultative fora such as the Development equalling an average of 45 from 2000 to 2012. In fact, there is actually a visibly widening gap Observatory, it could take much longer for their proposals to be taken into account, if at all. CSOs between the increasingly opulent elites and the poor majority which already looms as a latent must find a way of stepping up their leverage towards decision makers and Joint Collaborative threat to the social, economic and environmental sustainability of the country, as many experts, Action could be an important strategy in that direction, so as to mobilise a wider support base activists and CSOs have repeatedly warned. for their advocacy initiatives. The perception of widening inequalities is augmented by the glaring contradiction between the increasingly eye-catching consumption patterns of the elites and slow-changing hardships of the poor. Today, the mining boom has raised perhaps unrealistic expectations on the performance of the economy, and if these are not at least partially satisfied in the medium term, pockets of unrest could emerge particularly in urban areas. 164 165 References 1. AfriMAP, Moçambique: Democracia e Participação Política. Discussion Paper by 2. AfriMAP AfriMAP and Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Johannesburg, (2009) 3. Biza, Adriano (2009). “Associações de Jovens, Estado e Política em Moçambique - da Herança a Novos Desafios (1975-2004)”, In Cidadania e Governação em Moçambique - Comunicações apresentadas na Conferência Inaugural do Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos. Maputo, 2007 4. Chichava, Sérgio. “Moçambique na Rota da China: Uma oportunidade para Desenvolvimento?”. In Desafios para Moçambique 2010. IESE, Dezembro de 2009 5. European Commission, Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique - Final Report. Vol 1. Available at Internet.oecd.org/derec/ec/Mz-BS-Eval-Final-Report-Vol-1.pdf , 2014. 6. Francisco, António; Mucavele, Albertina; Monjane, Paula; Seuane, Sónia. (2008). “Índice da Sociedade Civil em Moçambique,: A Sociedade Civil Moçambicana por Dentro - Avaliação, Oportunidades, Desafios e Acção”. Maputo, 2007 7. Geffray, Christian. “La cause des armes au Mozambique. Anthropologie d’une guerre civile”. Paris, CREDU-Karthala, 1990. 8. Lourenço, Vitor A. “Estado, Autoridades Tradicionais e Transição Democrática em Moçambique: Questões teóricas, dinâmicas sociais e estratégias políticas.” Caderno de Estudos Africanos. ISCTE. Lisbon, 2009 9. MPD. Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Mozambique, 3rd Ed. Maputo, 2013 10. MPD. Final Evaluation of the Government of Mozambique of the Performance of the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) in 2013 in the framework of the 2014 Annual Review Process, Maputo, 2014 166 167 Nicaragua thematic consultations refers specifically to issues of development effectiveness and the contributions of CSOs working in the fields of gender and development. National and regional consultations: Based on the Istanbul Principles’ perspective, in the year Summary 2010, the Civil Coordinator held two consultations, regional and national. This was the first CSO consultation in Nicaragua, achieved through our own resources and the support of the open The Civil Coordinator of Nicaragua (CC), established in 1998, is an umbrella organisation forum. In the consultation with the regions, the country was divided in six regions: West, North, composed of a diversity of Nicaraguan CSOs united by an inclusive vision for the nation. Since Central, Chontales, Caribbean and San Juan River, and the national consultation in Managua 2008, it has engaged in a series of High Level Forum debates, in Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan. with representatives of the regions in addition to the Civil Coordinator providing its regional delegates. This was the official representation of the bulk of Nicaragua’s national consultation Various laws and international conventions concerning civil society exist in Nicaragua, granting that saw the participation of other sectors beyond civil society: Government, private sector, and space to CSOs in accordance with the Busan Partnership, the Accra Agenda for Action and other other organisations that previously had not been involved. We managed to unite more than agreements. However, 2007 marked a repressive turn in government policies toward CSOs, 150 people at Managua in the national consultation according to a handbook developed by the which have been forced to find alternative means to survive. open forum. The political environment has changed and civil society organisations have worried about the In 2011, the Civil Coordination participated in the gender board, in the issue of development deterioration of democratic institutions, given moves to change the constitution which would cooperation and aid effectiveness having as our main reference points the Paris agreements, lift restrictions for re-election to the presidency, on top of concerns over the independence of Accra, and Busan outcome. the Nicaraguan judicial system. Over the past years, relations between the Nicaraguan government, CSOs, and International Political institutions are characterised by a breakdown of the social state governed by the rule of Development actors have been strained at best, with civil society left out for the most part. law, violating the independence and the separation of powers, and favouring the concentration The International Cooperation matrix has changed with the withdrawal of a significant amount of power among elites. This has hampered the exercise of rights and freedoms by CSO and of aid and support to CSOs, including for governance and human rights projects. citizens. The Legal and Regulatory Framework Most concerning for civil society are trends that would further liberalise the economy and open it up to foreign investors, as seen starkly with the establishment of a foreign enclave in Nicaragua has signed major human rights international conventions and other laws concerning Nicaragua’s territory, a concession given to a Chinese investor for a period of 50 years starting civil society that formally guarantee the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, at the beginning of the commercial operations and extendable for an another 50 years, for the and freedom of expression. They reflect the engagements made in the Busan Partnership, the construction of the $US 40-50 billion Interoceanic Grand Canal. Accra Agenda for Action and other agreements. Introduction These developments were reversed in 2007 with the change in government294 which sought to extend stronger control over the judiciary system, threatening its independence and ability Knowledge building and practice: In Nicaragua, the Civil Coordinator is the only organisation to protect these rights. Civil society had previously succeeded in defining appropriate spaces that has, since 2008, been building the ‘route of knowledge’ starting in the HLF1 in Rome, HLF2 through the legal framework provided by the Citizen Participation Law (Law 475); however, in Paris, HLF3 in Accra, until the HLF4 in Busan, all of which paved the way for a significant with the change in the government administration, other participation spaces for civil society reform of the international aid architecture, and the establishment of the five principles of the opened up through the so-called “Citizen Power Councils.” Paris Declaration: Appropriation, harmonisation, alignment, results management, and mutual accountability. In Accra, a commitment was made by governments of developing countries to Article 49 of the Nicaraguan Constitution stipulates that all Nicaraguan citizens hold the right to involve CSOs in the drafting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development plans, form organisation of urban and rural workers, women, youth, farmers, artisans, professionals, while Busan marked new commitments toward enhancing the quality of aid or development technicians, intellectuals, artists, religious groups, Atlantic Coast communities and settlers in assistance. general, free from any discrimination, with the goal of achieving the realisation of their rights and aspirations. In Nicaragua, these processes kick-started for both CSOs and the government a period of analysis, debate, and awareness-raising about these official processes to build a position on The Citizen Participation Law (Law 475, October 2003) institutionalised national, sectoral and development effectiveness based on Busan. territorial processes of advocacy, formulation and implementation of policies that were being developed de facto in different work schemes. Another law, the general law about legal non- Participation in the international arena: The Civil Coordinator has been participating in for-profit entities (Law Nº 147) was passed in 1992. Published in the official Journal Nº 102 of international debates over the future of development, and played a crucial role in the working May 29, 1992, this regulates the registration and operation of all non-for-profit CSOs existing in group for the open forum that led to the formation of CPDE. With CC was CSA, Bolivia’s UNITAS, the country. ALOP, among other organisations. The principle of CSO EE was developed out of these processes. At the local and regional levels, laws for civil society include the Law of Budget Transfer to Since 2009 and the formulation of the Istanbul Principles, the Civil Coordinator, has stressed the Nicaragua’s municipalities law (Nº 466 approved July 2, 2003), and the Municipalities Law (Nº 40 second principle: Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girl’s rights in all of July 2, 1988). of our proceedings. Various institutions have been developed for this purpose, but are currently weak or non- One of the key methods for the development of this common framework for CSO development functional: effectiveness is through a series of national, regional and thematic processes. One of those 294 From Enrique Bolanos (Constitutionalist Liberal Party PLC) to Daniel Ortega (Sandinista Front of National Liberation FSLN) 168 169 Since 2007, CSOs and development agencies have largely refused to accept the national • National Council of Economic and Social Planning (CONPED) - an institution established government’s blackmail and conditionalities. Some have had to close down their offices while by the constitution of the republic, articulating all the country’s economic, social and searching for ways to maintain financial sustainability. This is on top of some loss of credibility productive sectors, the COSEP and the SME and CONIMIPYME. on the part of CSOs due to government propaganda, shrinking space for public dialogue, and negative press from the largely state-owned national media. • CONADES - National Development Council CSOs have been accused of receiving illegal funding for “irregular and unusual operations” • CONAPINA - like CONPES, this brought together all the economic and social sectors and according to the Register and Control Directorate of the Ministry of Government (MIGOB). The CSOs for the monitoring and application of child and young adult protection policies, criminalisation of civil society has seen the government impose sharp restrictions on external who make up more than half of the national population. funding mechanisms for CSOs, especially in the case of non-state funding. • The CDD and the CDM institutions established by the LAW Nº 475. This has hampered opportunities for cooperation between NGOs and other organised sectors of civil society, especially for independent organisations most critical of the government. • Sector boards for education, health, production, food security, water, and other utilities - these functioned with the participation of the government’s highest level After a series of legal battles and five-month long protests, the attorney of the republic issued a officials in cooperation with civil society. resolution which dismissed the report presented by the MIGOB, after which the persecution of NGOs should have ended.295, 296 However, the government of the Ortega Administration that took office on February 2007 has not articulated in a meaningful manner through its official documents and actions its plan to In addition, NGOs were in the past tax exempt, but a recently introduced Tax Agreement Law carry out the Paris Declaration, despite having initiated in July 2007 a dialogue through the (Law 822), transitioned the country to a regressive ID tax system, which now requires all non- Global Board and through the Budget Support Annual Meeting. The previous government, governmental associations to pay Income Tax, as well as a direct and personal tax. as a signatory country of the Paris Declaration, left the Operational Development National Plan. However, the new government after a process of negotiations with the International The Political Environment Monetary Fund published the Economic and Financial Program (EFP), where it is pointed out that “the elaboration of the EFP has a content and a scope relatively different to the National Changes to the political constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua were approved under Law Development Plan,” due to considering that the former makes a “short and medium term 854, passed in February 2014. These changes have led to a further centralisation of power in the financial programming” and the NDP is a “long-term strategy”. In that context, the EFP will not executive branch of the state, supported by the military. Moreover, the constitutional reforms replace the NDP but both will complement each other. were passed without popular consultation on the initiative of a group of congressmen from the parliament following instructions from the president. There is no clear mention in the document of the Paris Declaration, although the issues of harmonisation and alignment come up with reference to the country’s financial capacity CSOs are worried over the deterioration of democratic institutions, and wonder if this marks a to address gaps in its economic infrastructure and basic services expenditures in sufficient new authoritarian era, as the new constitution allows for indefinite re-election for the presidency, amounts to achieve the MDGs. in addition to stronger executive powers to appoint civil servants according to the whims of the ruling party of the day. The Nicaraguan government has, for the most part, stayed on the sidelines of the international This has accorded broader political and judicial scope to the president in a National Assembly negotiations around development effectiveness, which would permit a more equitable made submissive to his dictates. convergence between the government, donors and CSOs, strengthening aid effectiveness and CSO effectiveness. For its part, the government has set up parallel allied structures which critics The new constitution has stripped the National Assembly of the powers to oversee the allege have created barriers for CSOs and inclusive participation in governance. performance of political posts like judges, leaving their appointment to the discretion of the Executive, which is under no obligation to do so in the context of democratic debate. It has also It has tried to support organisations sympathetic to the government’s party under the Citizen invested in the president much stronger powers over the military, and to issue executive orders Power Council’s denomination, through the Order 03-2007, under the reform of the Law 290 to organise paramilitary forces at his prerogative. without having the authority to do so. With a new Presidential Order 112-2007 in November 2007, the Citizen Power Councils (CPC) and the Offices of Citizen Power were created, which With the approval of the law No. 854 on the 10th of February 2014, partial reform to the would be established in all of the country’s administrative structures, in communities, counties, constitutional politics of the republic of Nicaragua for the next years looms a new political neighbourhoods, districts, municipalities, departments, autonomous and national regions. A scenario. parallel structure has been created, responding to the party in government, independent of those already established by the Municipalities Law and the Citizen Participation Law. Indeed, In the new political constitution, Daniel Ortega, for his position as president of the republic, is the Departmental Development Councils (CDD) and the Municipal Development Councils (CDM) invested as supreme leader and commander-in-chief of the armed forces (army and police), Bodies of Local Power are actually being replaced by the Citizen Power Councils and the Citizen allowing him to manipulate them through Executive decrees and the organisation of paramilitary Power Offices. Political tensions have emerged as a result of this, although the potential for forces at his disposal and control. cooperation between these different council formations does still exist. The Nicaraguan Centre for human rights (CENIDH), in its annual report 2013, stands out as So far the Nicaraguan government has also prevented CSOs from receiving funding from the mechanism used to “restrict freedom of expression, manifestation or organisation to abroad. CSOs like the Civil Coordinator, the Women’s Autonomous Movement, and OXFAM have intimidation, threat, aggression, and the criminalisation of social protest. Some leaders who in fact been accused of money laundering, being the main targets for government control, while chasing away cooperation aimed at governance projects. 295 Public Ministry. District’s Attorney. DISTRICT’S ATTORNEY RESOLUTION File Nº 4805-JD-08. PUBLIC MINISTRY, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, January 22 ,2009, 9 AM 296 http://cinco.org.ni/es/news/category-2/persecucion-politica-sobre-cinco-Internet-osc/ 170 171 were able to exercise that right were suppressed, arrested, and brought to the judge’s order, in focused on soliciting the advice of CSOs on the technical aspects of development initiatives addition to continue to use the forces of shock related to the Sandinista Front, becoming one without touching on broader political concerns.300 force state with apparent complicity and support of the police forces.297 The Governance Context It should be pointed out that vested interests have long shaped policy-making in Nicaragua, with political parties often in cahoots with powerful businessmen united in the Superior Nicaragua is a country with a population of 5.9 million inhabitants,301 of which 52% are young Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). COSEP’s lobbyists were deeply involved in the process men and women. Both population groups have been described as highly vulnerable for age, of changing the constitution, and were only recently exposed for these activities. In November gender, and geographical reasons, and have historically been excluded from national political 2013, the Episcopal Conference described constitutional reform as unnecessary, pointing out life. their suspicions as to the real motivations behind it: political strengthening of the president and the further enrichment of the presidential family and an entrenched oligarchy. The Political Constitution of Nicaragua establishes in its Article 7 that Nicaragua is a democratic, participative and representative republic. For the Civil Coordinator, Nicaragua is a country Article 2 of the original political constitution of the pepublic expresses: “National sovereignty with a judicial framework which, even despite the recent constitutional reforms, in theory, resides in the people and it is exercised through democratic instruments, deciding and guarantees and enables CSOs to proactively engage in development initiatives. But to be able participating freely in the construction and refinement of the nation’s economic, political, and to fulfil their objectives requires strong political will from the government to reduce barriers to social system.” It adds that the people will be able to exercise such power in a direct manner CSO participation and implement these constitutional provisions. through referendum and plebiscite and other procedures established in the current constitution and laws. Social policies, such as the Zero Hunger Program, Productive Bonus, Zero Usury, Plan Ceiling, among others, for the most part seek only temporary solutions to deep-rooted socio-economic This was altered fundamentally by the latest constitutional reform law, which is only the latest problems, and are often subject to partisan and patronistic politics. The reduction and in a series of laws that have begun chipping away at the citizen participation system and the eradication of structural inequalities, which CSOs have long worked hard toward, is not yet a rights of civil society. reality. Since 2007, new laws justified a combination of policies of discrimination, persecution, division In its official discourse, the Nicaraguan government has been promoting a judiciary framework and criminalisation of organisations critical of the government. in favour of women’s rights in political participation, access to property, gender equality, the eradication of violence against women in practice; however, economic and political conditions Nor has the government acknowledged the role that CSOs, trade unions, and other social sectors for most women in Nicaragua militate against their participation as active political subjects and play as key actors in development, and has largely avoided engagements with civil society at the the exercise of their full rights as equal citizens. national level. With regards to CSOs, their role as social actors and their capacity to engage in advocacy, On top of the withdrawal of budgetary support by foreign donors to CSOs since 2007, this organisation and mobilisation have been reduced to various factors including: 1) The reduction has worn down a number of organisations, which have since chosen to avoid critical political and/or suspension of financial assistance to CSOs due to a shift in donor priorities to other positions as much as possible, refocusing attention to relatively uncontroversial service delivery thematic axes and geographical regions; 2) self-censorship caused by fear of critical political and development initiatives. Civil society organisations have seen reduced funding on the part positions and the possibility of state repression; 3) The co-optation by the ruling government of the international cooperation agencies, by aggression and persecution that the current party; 4) lack of internal capacity, including for coordination, planning and long-term strategies; government has promoted. The most affected have been mainly the members of the federation 5) resources allocated for development projects are often implemented by donor agencies in of organisations, NGOs, FONG including the centre’s initiatives and advisory services (CISAS), the absence of civil society participation. the National Institute for Health of Social Management, and the Nicaraguan Institute of Human Promotion (INPRHU).298 Despite an exceptional constitutional framework and laws that should ideally protect the fundamental rights and public freedoms of CSOs and ordinary citizens, actual implementation However other sectors, especially the private sector – including the burgeoning micro-tourism has been next to impossible given the lack of political will. and real estate industries – are engaging in dialogue with official institutions like the Tourism Institute, as well as with NGOs and unions that work in these sectors. The Socio-Cultural Context In other areas, the Nicaraguan government has shown some interest in engaging CSOs, for Nicaragua has a population of 5.9 million inhabitants, and is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and example in discussions over new Free Trade Agreements.299 In such cases, it is possible to insist pluricultural society. Making up the majority of its territorial area, the Caribbean coast is formed on space for CSOs in official debates, though for the most part, these are apolitical affairs, of the south and north autonomous regions rich in water, lumber, and mineral resources. These territories are populated by indigenous populations, including the Misquitas, Mayagnas, Zumos, Ramas, and those of mixed Afro or Spanish descent. 297 The most paradigmatic case is the young people mobilized in #OcupaINSS to support a group of elders who complained about their pensions. On June 22, 2013 paramilitary forces composed of workers from the Currently, some 500,000 girls, boys and adolescents approximately are outside the formal municipality of Managua and members of the Sandinista youth disappeared 4 motorcycles, 9 digital cameras, 27 mobile phones, 4 Ipads (tablets), 25 briefcases with documents of identity, 3 computers, 8 glasses, 11 debit school system, and more than 200,000 girls and boys between the ages of three and five are and credit cards. In the eyes of the police, which has been declared a victim of dark interests at the time, also child labourers. 3 watches, 2 Ipods, 3 guitars, 1 cajónperuano, 1 passport, 1 of Littman stethoscope, 1 sphygmomanometer and 6 memories of cameras they stole. Although the most significant theft was of 7 vehicles that until today Growing unemployment, inequality, and the lack of social protection have meant that over 60% have not appeared.http://Internet.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/17587/ocupainss-un-ano-de-impunidad, http:// Internet.cenidh.org/media/documents/docfile/Informe_CENIDH_2013_FinalWEB.pdf 298 http://Internet.elnuevodiario.com.ni/imprimir.php/43050 300 Interview of Key Actor 299 Interview of Key Actor 301 Source: World Bank, last update September 2013.obre-cinco-Internet-osc/ 172 173 of young people have expressed a willingness to leave the country, according to CSO network Nicas Migrants. According to official figures, the flagship program of the Sandinista government has delivered approximately 128, 336 productive bonds since its creation until 2014, the years with greater The remittances that these workers send reached 1 billion USD over the past year alone and boom in 2008 and 2011, both being corresponding to election days have served as a support for their families. The Grupo Venancia, a feminist movement, has found in an investigation305 that the Zero Hunger Poor healthcare and education systems are have not contributed to holistic perspectives programme goes through tough times, not only because of the budget cuts that will be in 2015, for integral human development and are characterised by low quality of service. Budgetary but by the many challenges facing its implementation in rural areas. Although they claim that deficiencies have led to serious shortfalls in investment in basic social services. the programme had a positive impact in improving the families’ diet, the “dynamics of gender have not been sufficiently transformative.” As stated previously, state control of the media has served largely to neutralise political dissent. “While it has generated certain changes in dynamics to families and women feel that they The Socio-Economic Context acquire certain decision-making powers, this program does not break, but it reproduces the sexual division of labour,” says the research. “It may be that women earn more self-esteem, but On a formal basis, Nicaragua is said to have achieved relative macroeconomic stability and the role of the men remains intact.” modest economic growth, even as the country is characterised by a weak economy with a low productive capacity. The economy remains dependent on the export of agricultural products Ironically classed as “lower middle income” by the World Bank with relatively high rates of Gross and raw materials vulnerable both to climate shocks and the vagaries of the world market. Domestic Product (GDP), Nicaragua continues to suffer from high rates of poverty and inequality. Imports of intermediate consumer goods and basic food items exceeded exports by 1 billion The difficulty of maintaining decade-long, growth in GDP of over 5% while reducing structural USD annually over the past years. inequalities and ensuring the protection of democratic institutions has placed Nicaragua in what has been called the Middle Income Trap. This has been compounded by the lack of economic diversification, the decline in real industries, and the continued neo-liberalisation of the economy. Policies continue to be implemented All this is on top of proposals for mega-projects like the Bolivar’s Dream Refinery, the Tumarin with a technocratic emphasis on defending macroeconomic stability, in accordance with the Hydroelectric Power Station, and projects for oil, gold and silver mining. The underlying premise recommendations of institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Far is that such projects are to create lasting jobs for young people from resolving the structural causes of socio-economic dependence and inequality, these have been promoting the development of the agro-export economy. The economic future of Nicaragua has been compromised by the establishment of a foreign enclave on Nicaraguan territory, through a concession given to a Chinese investor306 for the A regressive and unequal tax policy has widened gaps between rich and poor, with consumer construction of the 40-50 billion USD Interoceanic Grand Canal. The enclave is to last for 50 and indirect forms of taxation favoured over a progressive income tax. Government policies years from the beginning of commercial operations, and is extendable for another 50 years. have fed the rapid divestment of natural resources like forests and mines into the hands of The company is to manage virtually all aspects of the project including design, development, politically connected elites,302 foreign investors303 and financial corporations. engineering, financing agreements, construction, property, ownership, maintenance, and administration of a traditional canal and a series of subprojects. In addition, gaps in the labour market and lack of adequate training for workers have led to rising in formalisation of the national economy. Workers suffer a lack of income security, low The handover of national territory to the HKND Company was enacted through Law 840, or the wages and an overall decline in unionisation, while workers in the informal sector and in export Special Law for the Development of Nicaraguan Infrastructures and Transportation, relevant to enclaves have been left especially vulnerable to abuse. the canal, free trade area and associated infrastructure. Recent Free Trade Agreements have been signed with the United States (DR-CAFTA), on top of To date, the company has yet to fully disclose the details of the mega project, and its social and an Association Agreement with the European Union (ADA), both of which seek to expand the economic benefits are as yet unclear. market of goods and services through a substantial reduction of custom duties on imports. For this reason, the Academy of Sciences of Nicaragua (ACN) has encouraged a series of High dependence on Venezuelan aid has, in addition, been used to finance populist and highly workshops on the canal, which would be the most ambitious infrastructure project not only in partisan projects like the Zero Usury and Zero Hunger programmes mentioned previously. the history of the country but of the whole continent and has prepared a document307 showing the results of the study for debate. According to the national survey of measurement of the level of life (Encuesta Nacional de Medición del Nivel de Vida, EMNV) of 2009, whose database was published by the National Recommendations Institute of development information, (Instituto Nacional de Información de Desarrollo INIDE), only 12.5% of the population said to have been beneficiary of the government’s social programs • Real citizen participation in Nicaragua, and opportunities for CSOs to interact with other funded primarily by ALBA CARUNA (Zero Usury , Zero Hunger, Streets for People, Houses for the development actors at the national and international level, are weak in Nicaragua. People, etc.) which, according to the survey, would have only benefited, among them, the 3.2% of the population.304 • Urgent and thoroughgoing measures are needed to address this, through better 302 Small and medium forest producers have denounced the privileged treatment of Alba Forestal company communication between all development actors, while acknowledging the roles and Albanisa linked be protected by the government in the case of ordering release ten harrows with illegal wood responsibilities of each of these actors. seized by the army, which had been retained by inconsistencies 305 http://grupovenancia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/InvestigacionHambreCero1.pdf 303 B2Gold Corp. a Vancouver based gold producer with two operating mines in Nicaragua, and a strong 306 Mister Wang Ying owner of the ChinWei company and HKND, http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=list& portfolio of development and exploration assets in Namibia, Nicaragua, Mali, Burkina Faso and Colombia catid=3 304 Encuesta de Hogares sobre Medición del Nivel de Vida 2009 - Inide, Internet.inide.gob.ni/bibliovirtual/.../In 307 Academy of Sciences of Nicaragua. The Interoceanic Canal through Nicaragua. Contributions to the debate. forme%20EMNV%202009.pdf Managua, 2014 174 175 • With respect to the aid effectiveness agenda, few opportunities exist for CSOs to Nigeria engage the Nicaraguan government, and the challenge for civil society would be to define concrete strategies for opening up political space vis-a-vis other development actors. Summary • Nicaragua is a country with a judicial framework which, despite the recent constitutional This paper analyses the challenges facing Nigeria in its developmental process in the global reforms, in theory, guarantees and enables the proactive role of civil society in arena through three indices: development cooperation, the enabling environment for CSOs, and development. their development effectiveness. Each of these thematic areas is considered within the purview of some country-specific indices of performance such as the legal and regulatory framework, • Political willingness is needed to reduce barriers to CSO participation and fulfil these the political environment, the governance, and the socio-economic context. constitutional promises. The paper scores the federal government of Nigeria high in terms of ratification of international • Civil Society Organisations need to promote the study and application of an enabling instruments and churning out legal and regulatory frameworks in relation to its socio-economic environment for CSOs at the domestic level, while developing and promoting new and political operation, including its development cooperation. Unfortunately, the paper argues development paradigms for Nicaragua. all these frameworks are mere beautiful paper policy documents as government lacks the political will to walk the talk. Nigeria’s malaise is leadership failure. This explains why there is so • Develop new ways of exercising citizenship and new leadership to allow CSOs and much sleaze in the system permeating into government ministries, department, and agencies, citizens to participate actively and meaningfully in policy-making. and reaching the fabric of the leadership, including the cronies and allies of government while the leadership seems helpless. • Formulate and define strategies for state civil society engagement through a process of dialogue to promote consensus depending on the development and the construction The author considers some specific issues making Nigeria’s political environment unconducive of a national agenda. not only for politicians themselves, but also for the minority, the youth, the poor, the women, and invariably to international investors. The paper identifies contentious separation of powers, • A genuine national development strategy should consider at least two fundamental internal conflict, impunity, media clamp downs, systemic corruption, unemployment, menace issues: improving the educational levels of the population and promoting the country’s of Boko Haram, among others, as a threat to Nigeria’s development and economic prospects. scientific technical development. Of grave concern is the Nigeria’s dwindling economy, whose pangs Nigerians are feeling, • On women’s rights: while the government has been formally promoting a judicial already has over 70 % of population, and is living in poverty, including many unemployed young framework in favour of women’s rights in political participation, in practice poverty, Nigerians whereas the executive and the parliamentarians are living in opulence. The paper inequality, and gender discrimination continue to constrain women’s capacity to decries Nigeria’s economy managers’ lack of foresight, which poses some challenges to the engage in governance as active political subjects. Nigerian economy which include falling oil prices reaching as low as 73 USD per barrel, declines in foreign exchange earnings, and devaluation of the Naira from N155 to N168 to a dollar as at • Recent reforms to the Nicaraguan Constitution tend to favour the concentration December 2014. Case studies are provided for a better understanding of the situation. of presidential power and the interests of big business. Indeed, we have seen the breakdown of the social and democratic state governed by the rule of law, which has Concluding, the paper clamours for a consistent fight against corruption and impunity which breached the exercise of fundamental human rights would consolidate democratic gains. It challenges government to focus on restructuring both human and infrastructural capital, considered the potent instrument of development, while civil • Re-establish a social state governed by the rule of law, assuring the respect of human society should be involved in development cooperation in the spirit and letters of Accra Agenda rights, gender equality, sustainable development, sovereignty, and peace. for Action, and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. • Civil society should be allowed space to participate in all aspects of development Introduction projects, from implementation to evaluation, in line with the strengthening of democratic institutions. For their part, CSOs should continue to engage in proactive dialogue with Located in the West African sub-region, Nigeria is bounded in the west by the republic of Benin, other development actors, as they demand the reactivation of mechanisms for citizen in the north by Niger Republic, in the northeast by Chad, in the east by Cameroun, and in the participation in governance. south by the Atlantic Ocean. With a population of 177.5 million, Nigeria remains the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous in the world (Population Reference Bureau, 2014). With a presidential system of government, the country consists of 36 states and a federal capital territory (Abuja) and 774 local government areas with 109 senatorial districts, 360 federal constituencies, and 990 state constituencies. The country is further subdivided into six geopolitical zones, comprising north-central, north-eastern, north-western, south-eastern, south-south and south-western zones. English is Nigeria’s official language. There are more than 350 ethno-linguistic groups, yet Nigeria recognises three major ethnicities: Hausa-Fulani (mainly dominant in the north), Igbo (in the east) and Yoruba (in the southwest). These groups incidentally double as the three predominant indigenous languages in the country, though other languages such as Edo, Efik, Fulani, Fulfulde, Idoma, are widely used in their communities. Similarly, three major religions are practised in Nigeria – traditional faith, Islam and Christianity. The last two imported religions are dominant 176 177 in the country. Rivalries among ethno-religious groups have been a source of instability since 1991. Nevertheless, questions about religion and ethnicity have not been included in the national census whose results have always been controversial (Library of Congress – Federal The lack of an enabling environment for CSOs could stifle their development effectiveness, due Research Division, Country Profile: Nigeria, July 2008). to widespread political impunity and anti-people laws and policies. One example is a bill pending before the National Assembly titled Establishment of the Non-Governmental Organisations Nigeria is blessed with both human and natural resources. It is, for the most part, an oil state, Regulatory (Establishment, etc.) Agency of Nigeria Bill, 2014. This bill seeks to provide for, among having transitioned from a predominantly agrarian to a petro-chemical economy in the early other things, the establishment of the Non-Governmental Organization Regulatory Agency of 1970s. Nigeria has proven oil reserves which are the 10th largest in the world, while its proven Nigeria for the supervision, coordination and monitoring of Non-Governmental Organisations, natural gas reserves are the seventh largest in the world and the largest in Africa. In addition to Civil Society Organisations, and Community- Based Organisation in Nigeria, and for Matters a skilled workforce, Nigeria has abundant mineral resources such as hydrocarbons (petroleum Incidental Thereto. CSOs are wary that this could be another way of entrenching the government and gas), coal, tin, lead, lime stone, gold, quartz sand, iron ore, aluminium, nickel and zinc to bureaucracy, with stricter protocols governing their activities. As one of the clauses in the bill mention but a few. Despite it all, over 70% of Nigerians still suffer from poverty, hunger, and puts it, “a project shall not be implemented unless it has been approved by the relevant ministry disease (Winjobi, Tola 2011). and registered with the agency,” Regulatory mechanisms for CSOs already exist,312 making the proposed bill unnecessary and irrelevant apart from a new fee charged to each NGO, seeking to The Legal and Regulatory Framework register with a government agency. Nigeria scores highly in terms of signing and ratification of major international and regional On the issue of freedom of expression, Nigeria has passed into law Freedom of Information instruments and conventions.308 There are also regional policy frameworks such as the Abuja Act 2011, but the law has faced controversies in actual implementation. Though passed at the Call for Accelerated Action towards Universal Access to HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria national level, only two states – Ekiti and Lagos states – have enacted their own version, while Services by 2010, African Health Strategy 2007-2015, Maputo Plan of Action for Implementing it is not yet applicable in the remaining 34 states of the federation. The implementation of the the Continental Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) and Rights Policy Framework 2007-2010, act has been so problematic in view of the conflicting court judgments in Abuja, Edo, Lagos, and and NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP). Guaranteeing the Oyo states. This situation has hampered the work of CSOs, while information and public records freedom and rights of individuals, and curtailing impunity in Nigeria are the Constitution of the are still not freely accessible to all. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Freedom of Information Act, Electoral Act, National Human Rights Commission, National Gender Policy, and regulatory frameworks such as Independent Corrupt The Political Environment Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, etc. The separation of powers in Nigeria has been tenuous, with the presidency often arbitrating between the national and state assemblies in what often amounts to a political showdown of However, policy implementation is fraught with irregularities. A few examples would suffice corruption and impunity. for illustration, using corruption and impunity as a case study. Apart from national security, corruption and job creation remain top issues that Nigerians want the government to address Building democracy, as expressed in the Busan Outcome Document and Accra Agenda for in 2014, according to the results of the 54th Independence Day Special Edition Poll.309 Though Action, has proven to be a challenge. In practice, minority positions often win out over the Nigeria has two key anti-corruption bodies, the problem proportion remains entrenched and has majority, with popular participation in democratic institutions little more than a ruse. This increased at alarming rates. Yet the government still treats the issue with kid gloves, shielding makes some people opine that democracy in Nigeria should be redefined as government of corrupt officials from prosecution. The federal government’s insincere war on corruption and the few by the few lording it over the majority. Blatant acts of illegality and corruption have opportunistic protection of suspected government officials have eroded public confidence in infected all arms of government, especially at the legislative and executive level in some states political institutions. Since 2013, the current Minister for Petroleum Resources Mrs Diezani of the federation. The police have, in addition, proven a ready instrument in the hands of the Alison-Madueke and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) have been under executive for various political vendettas. The ruling party, Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), has investigation by the National Assembly for their alleged involvement in 10 billion NGN (over 64 unfortunately encouraged and embodied violations of the rule of law. This was seen clearly million USD) private jet lease scam. Yet the probe has been stalled by the petroleum minister, at the Ekiti State House of Assembly where, with the tacit support of the federal government, who has gone to court challenging the locus standi of the House of Representatives, which police protected seven PDP lawmakers against 19 APC lawmakers, when the former group would have called her to stand trial on how she spent 10 billion NGN as a rental fee for the jet. purportedly sacked the incumbent Speaker of the House and his deputy. 310 As of press time, both Mrs Madueke and NNPC have refused to honour invitations by various committees set up to probe the allegations against them.311 Nigeria’s ridiculous democracy played out earlier on Monday, 17th November 2014, where a controversial and surreptitious sitting by the seven PDP lawmakers in Ekiti State House of Assembly reportedly screened and cleared three commissioner nominees. Constitutionally and 308 These include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of according to the Standing Orders of the House, the required quorum for legislators to conduct Discrimination against Women, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, African Charter on Democracy, the business of the House is one-third of the total number of the legislators. In other words, Elections and Governance, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, African Convention on the the seven lawmakers did not meet the threshold of at least nine members out of 26 to sit, Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating let alone to consider the serious business of the house, like appropriation and ratification of Corruption, African Youth Charter, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of appointees. There are 26 members in Ekiti State House of Assembly, if 19 members were on a Women in Africa, Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the Treaty radio programme in Akure, only seven should be sitting in the assembly; and if they were more Establishing the African Economic Community. than seven it means they were rented. Yet the seven claimed they were 10 to form a quorum! 309 Conducted in the week of September 22nd 2014 byNOIPolls So, where did they get the additional three ghost members? (Hardball – Power and A Shadowy 310 According to her lawyers, if she needs to answer the call of the honourable members, she has to seek the Trio; the Nation, Thursday November 20, 2014 p.72) President’s approval or consent the action which many Nigerians see as “a panicky measure to prevent National Assembly from performing its constitutional role of checking the excesses of the Executive” (Ikhilae, Eric. #10 billion In addition, the political environment in Nigeria has been ridden by internal conflict, regardless jet probe; Alison-Maduaeke, NNPC knows fate December 17: The Nation, Thursday November 20, 2014 p.5). of attempts by the government to project a different image abroad. Security is the greatest 311 Oyesina, Tunde N10bn jet Scandal: Alison-Madueke frustrating probe, Reps tell court New Telegraph Wednesday, November 5, 2014 312 These include the Corporate Affairs Commission, National Planning Commission and related structures at the state level. 178 179 of all the three challenges (security, corruption, and job creation) facing Nigeria. The unsafe political environment is a threat to Nigeria’s development and economic prospects as there would not be any development in the face of destruction of lives and property. If a country Nigerians including Senator Alli Ndume, Azubuike Ihejirika, and Ali Modu Sherif as sponsors of wishes to solve social inequality, it must place education at the centre of development efforts, Boko Haram. The former Borno Governor Ali Modu Sherif314 is a close ally of both the Nigerian but terrorism would not allow education to thrive. Nigeria has since been classified amongst president, and the government of Chad. Unfortunately, none of these people have been terrorist countries going by the spate of unabated killings and destruction unleashed by Boko questioned by the Nigerian authorities. Similarly, prosecuting terrorist suspects in the court of Haram, an Islamist sect dominant in the country’s northeast. The spate of attacks on schools law has become problematic for government, reinforcing the belief of citizens that the federal and churches later extended to mosques, and the slaughter of school children and women have government is an accomplice in terrorism in Nigeria. For example, the suspected mastermind been unprecedented, reaching their apogee in the mid-April 2014 abduction of 276 girls from of the April 2014 blast in Nyanya, Abuja, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, asked the federal high court their secondary school in Chibok in Borno State, though 57 of them courageously managed to to release him from incarceration, following the inability of the federal government to bring escape, leaving behind 219 girls for government to bring back from the gulag of Boko Haram in fresh charges against him, and asking for a sum of 100 million NGN in damages against the Sambisa Forest. respondents – the Directorate of State Security (DSS) and Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF). The case of Boko Haram is worth emphasising on in view of the grave security threat they pose not only to Nigeria, but also to the neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroun. Indeed, Worse still, government often resorts to self-denial and a campaign of calumny against the Islamist sect presents a dangerous socio-political environment for both state and non- opposition and CSO activists on the activities of terrorists in Nigeria. For instance, denials by the state actors in Nigeria to operate as the environment is not conducive. Unfortunately, Nigerian government with regards to the abduction case led to conflicts between the federal government government cannot offer what it does not have – an enabling socio-political environment. and the ruling party on one hand, and the opposition party and CSOs, on the other. CSOs, For instance, the ferocious Boko Haram killers had taken over and occupied about 16 local piqued by the government’s slow response to the case of the kidnapped girls, built a media government areas across the three states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe; and hoisting their campaign tagged #bringbackourgirls while the government and its quasi-NGO supporters flags and installing the caliphate regime in some of the conquered territories. Specifically in formed #releaseourgirls propaganda in order to counter the CSOs, which had gained both local Adamawa by Tuesday, November 4, 2015, Madagali, Gulak, Michika, and Mubi towns had been and international sympathy. The former hashtag focuses attention on the government’s own taken over by Boko Haram in spite of the fact that the listed towns were under dusk-to-dawn responsibility; it is the constitutional duty of government to protect its citizens while the latter curfew. The terrorist group was having a field day as they were seen patrolling Mubi town while passes the blame on to Boko Haram who should release the girls in its captivity. others were at strategic locations brandishing their riffles, but asking the residents not to panic or run away. In addition, they held open courts and preaching sessions just as they changed Nigeria’s political environment is not favourable to various social groups, especially the middle the name of Mubi town to Madinatul Islam. Ironically, Boko Haram warlord provided security class, the youth, and the poor who have been disempowered and prevented from running for during the market day of Uba town while promising to continue to give traders and residents political office. There is no level playing field for everyone as election to high positions, across who might like to come to the area utmost security as long as the latter comply with Islamic nearly all the political parties, has become a cash-and-carry affair. The two major political parties rules (Abdul, Ibrahim; New Telegraph Wednesday, November 5, 2014 Boko Haram renames are guilty of this even as they are subsuming and buying other parties less able to field their Mubi, Madinatul Islam p.3). own candidates. Though free for women aspirants, the party’s nomination fee, for example, is beyond the reach of common people as the presidential nomination and expression of interest Boko Haram appeared to be gaining the upper hand to the extent that the Nigerian soldiers form costs as much as a whopping sum of 27.5 million NGN (177,419 USD) and 22 million NGN deserted the battlefront, running for their lives by tactically retreating to neighbouring (132,000 USD) respectively for all progressives congress (APC) and PDP. This winner-takes-all Cameroun for safety. It grew worse at a time that demoralised soldiers protested against the syndrome, with political positions going to the highest bidder, is against the spirit of democratic military hierarchy’s ineptitude and insensitivity to the welfare and security of the troops, and ownership and mutual accountability. This works against development effectiveness as only they were tried for mutiny. Worse still and in appreciation of the Nigerian government’s losing the affluent and powerful can assume positions of authority and might not be accountable to the war against terrorism, the Nigerian defence authorities announced they had brokered a the majority who have little or no say in governance because of their disadvantaged positions. ceasefire agreement with Boko Haram warlords, only for the latter to deny such agreement as a ruse, following it up with fresh rounds of bombing and killing just hours after the premature In addition, the recent clampdowns on the Nigerian press, from the outright closure of media ceasefire. houses, to the seizure of large numbers of newspapers are seen as anti-establishment. A recent case in point was the confiscation in the first week of June 2014 of thousands of copies of The official response to terrorism has been weak at best, to the extent that people begin to several newspapers, most notably the Daily Trust, The Nation and Leadership, and the sealing suspect the government itself as an accomplice in the Boko Haram saga. Sheikh Muhammad of their distribution points in several major town across the country by soldiers (Bayo Oladeji, Mahmoud Turi, leader of El-Zakzaky Muslim sect in Kano, in December 2014, declared that there November 13, 2014). was no way the federal government could exonerate itself from the activities of the Boko Haram sect. Speaking to reporters at the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Press Centre, Sheik Turi All this is perpetrated by government agencies, especially by the security forces who always act added, “It is an open secret that the present government cannot exonerate itself from all these under the guise of protecting the national interest against terrorism. State-run media has played mayhem that is happening in the country. It is so obvious that whatever may be the reason, a significant role in this, often sparking outright wars between various media entities, which nobody in the country can tell us that the government is not aware or has no hand in what is have become an expression of partisan politics, exacerbating tensions between various factions happening, the government is fully responsible and there is no doubt about it.”313 of the central and local governments. Such controversies reach a disturbing crescendo during electioneering and political campaigns where media violence often further fuels the already The president himself once admitted that there were Boko Haram sympathisers within his charged political atmosphere, especially in opposition states. There are numerous examples government, which makes it difficult to resolve the insurgency. The hired Australian interlocutor of this, but the outstanding one is in the southwest Nigeria, which pitted a state-owned radio between Boko Haram and Nigerian government, Davis Stephens, has named prominent (Osun State Broadcasting Corporation) in Osogbo against a federal government-owned Crown FM in Ile-Ife. 313 Even the Governors of the northeastern States affected by the insurgency had on various occasions expressed 314 “A 2010 Intelligence report by a Nigerian security agency suggested that Mr. Sheriff was personally involved the same sentiment. For example, “Governor Gaidam believes that President Goodluck Jonathan has a very urgent in the recruitment, training and dispatch of Boko Haram fighters, under the full cover of Idris Deby, the Chadian responsibility to explain to the people of Yobe State and people all across the affected states why murderous and president” (Premium Times 7 December 2014). callous insurgent and criminal attacks are still on the rise despite the State of Emergency”. 180 181 brutally teargas them, the country descent into anarchy, fascism, and a police state appears Both have offered conflicting reportage on election results, along partisan lines, calling starkly real indeed. Unless they bow to reason and show restraint, President Goodluck Jonathan into question the independence of a supposedly free and open press. and the security agencies may soon violently push Nigeria into an abyss. Despite Nigeria’s disastrous past experiences, it is depressing that Jonathan has failed to appreciate that only The Governance Context a primitive society seeks to resolve its political disagreements by force of arms. This executive gangsterism is outrageous as there is no justification for a violent assault on another arm of A history of mis-governance and corruption has reinforced civil society’s demand for transparent government by the executive, and it is a pointer to the increasing misuse and abuse of the and accountable governance. There has been no improvement in Nigeria’s corruption ranking, state by the presidency. The Inspector-General of Police Abba and Director-General of the DSS going by the Corruption Perception Index 2014 released by Transparency International,315 which Ita Ekpenyong are doing Nigeria a great disservice by using their personnel as political muscle ranked Nigeria 136th out of the 175 countries surveyed for the report. when their loyalty should be to the Nigerian state, not to those who temporarily control the levers of power. As these fascist tendencies are threatening the very survival of Nigeria’s civil Corruption has permeated every fabric of the society. Embezzlement and mismanagement of rule, all stakeholders should rise in protest against this rapid descent into perdition (Editorial: funds in government circles are well-entrenched in nearly all arms of government. The presidency Invasion of National Assembly is an ill-wind; The Punch Wednesday November 26, 2014 p.30). alone has a fleet of no less than 11 presidential jets316 while plans are underway to acquire even more at the expense of taxpayers. Travel expenses of officials often cost the government tens In general, governance in Nigeria has assumed dangerous dimensions as officials at all levels of thousands of dollars, at clip money better spent on anti-poverty programmes. Monies for all have paid less and less attention to critical development issues. Rule of law has given way to these must have undergone appropriation regimen, but the point is, the president is living under impunity, “keeping control of the state takes precedence over formulating policies that benefit a heavy moral burden because his opulent lifestyle is not consistent with what he preaches. For society” (Pierre Englebert, 2014). As a result, development projects are often abandoned, example, Nigeria does not have a national carrier yet the president and his cronies fly about in salaries of civil servants come irregularly if at all, state resources are being plundered, industrial both presidential and private jets; Nigerian citizens travel in rickety motor vehicles on sorely bad disputes have become ever more pronounced, and basic public services are of persistently road networks, decimating their lives, yet the president travels in choppers. low quality, while terrorism gains ground by the day. Political patronage also persists in civil society, with politicians openly sponsoring NGOs of their own to support them, reminiscent of Governance in Nigeria is synonymous with power arrogance, executive recklessness and Abacha military era. The more visible and vociferous among these groups is the Transformative fiscal indiscipline. The former Minister for Aviation Mrs Stella Oduah was not lucky as she was Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN), which is heavily financed by the government, with proceeds unceremoniously removed from office as a result of opprobrium over invoiced 25 million NGN from the oil bloc. It is an open secret that TAN’s membership is an assemblage of government bulletproof cars. One wonders what a civilian minister would need two bulletproof cars for. contractors; their lead coordinator being the chief executive of Capital Oil Ltd, whose lawfully The current Minister for Petroleum Resources Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke widely believed to seized assets by Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) were recently released by be a sacred cow and crony of the incumbent president is stifling all efforts by the National the order of government (Odigie-Oyegun, The Guardian Tuesday November 18, 2014318). The Assembly to probe the allegation against her pecuniary incontinence of 10 billion NGN jet scam. legislative and executive arms, at both national and regional levels, are devising underhand In addition, a private jet was used to ferry a sum of 9.3 million USD arms deal to South Africa, tactics to pave the way for electoral victory in 2015, in a country where elections and state which is against the CBN cash-less policy; the seized cash was linked to the federal government violence are near-synonymous.319 for the purchase of arms while the jet belongs to one of the Pentecostal Ministers believed to be a friend of the president. It was widely rumoured and reported in the media that some members At the international level, however, Nigeria has proven itself adept at gaining positions of of the House of Representatives indeed had taken between 20,000 USD and 50,000 USD bribes leadership on issues of development effectiveness,320 even while attempts at better cooperation in order to truncate the motion to probe the seized money (The Nation Thursday September 25, with CSOs domestically have been shallow at best. Similarly, CSOs in Nigeria have played 2014 p.4). This goes to show that the legislature has its own share of sleazebag. Mr Faruk Lawan, an active role in development cooperation, especially in relation to MDG 8 – Developing a key member of Integrity Group in the National Assembly had his hand soiled with 628,000 USD Partnerships for Global Development. While the government has not engaged the AAA or bribe in exchange for not publishing the names of the cartel behind petroleum subsidy scam. Paris Declaration (Winjobi, Tola 2011) and GPEDC back home, civil society has been active in collaborating under different networks and coalitions, such as the Civil Society Partnership Relations between the National Assembly, especially the lower chamber or the House of for Development Effectiveness, to discuss implementation and monitoring of development Representatives, and the executive have always been tense, even as the judiciary strives to cooperation, including ODA. There is a need for the Nigerian government to recognise CSOs as remain impartial. Successive presidents have often sought to stay in power by manipulating development actors in their own right. other arms of government. This has erupted in violent conflict as seen starkly in the invasion of the National Assembly by the police and members of the state security in November 2014. The recent outburst of the Inspector-General of Police against Rt Honourable Aminu Waziri 318 Capital Oil ltd was said to have been involved in the fuel subsidy scam which is under probe by the House of Tambuwaal as the Speaker of the House of Representatives is a clear pointer to abuse of power Assembly and disregard for constitutional authority by the executive. Some days earlier, the police had 319 The Presidency is “...deploying strong-arm tactics, and the nation’s resources whenever he (Dr Goodluck stormed the NASS, locked the gates, and tear-gassed politicians to the extent that the National Jonathan) deemed necessary; whether in dismantling the Governor’s forum, which threatened his re-election bid, or sacking errant Governors through instigated impeachments” (Okotie Chris, Jonathan’s race in whirl wind Assembly was locked at the order of the Senate President David Mark.317 of crises. The Guardian Internet.ngrguardiannews.com Tuesday November 11 2014 p.19). Indeed, at the eve of Goodluck Jonathan’s declaration for his second term bid when on Monday 10 November 2014 over 50 students This violent invasion of the National Assembly by the presidency, using the police and other in Potiskum had earlier been murdered cold blooded, he said, “Government Science Secondary School in Yobe security agencies, is a grave threat to the survival of democracy in Nigeria. When armed police State was bombed by the insurgents, killing our promising young children who were seeking education to build the invade the precincts of the national parliament, lock out the speaker and other legislators and country and support their parents”. And Mr President displaying insensitivity to the lost lives still went ahead on Tuesday 11 November 2014 in an orgy of wild celebration declaring his ambition to contest the 2015 presidential 315 http://transparency.org/cpi2014/results election. 316 http://Internet.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/171947-jonathan-governors-others-keep-long-motor- 320 Nigeria has been represented at all High Level Fora (HLF), beginning from HLF1 in Rome in 2003, through Paris cades-private-jets-nigeria-struggles-falling-oil-revenues.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter in 2005 to HLF3 in Accra in September 2008 (Winjobi, Tola 2011), HLF-4 in Bussan and HLM in Mexico while it 317 http://huhuonline.com/index.php/more-news1/4753-david-mark-orders-closure-of-national-assembly-as-ten- held the Co-Chair position on the HLM/Global Partnership for Effective Development Corporation till April 2014 sion-escalates 182 183 correct economic problem before successfully pursuing the objective of securing the economic Meanwhile, the presence and support of development partners321 in Nigeria is an opportunity wellbeing of the common man under the unfolding 2014-15 austerity measures” (The Punch. for many CSOs to take a proactive role in development initiatives. United Nations Development Monday, 08 December 2014 00:00). No sooner the Finance Minister made this statement Programme-Democratic Governance for Development (UNDP-DGD) for example, supported than the Nigerians began to be confronted with the news of the falling in crude oil prices, and many Nigerian CSOs to provide their inputs in the review of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal devaluation of the Naira – the nation’s currency. Republic of Nigeria in 2012, while other partners also supported CSOs in the area of advocacy on the Freedom of Information Act, peace and conflict resolution, voter education, poverty This deceptive economic logic posited by the finance minister made the former president, alleviation scheme, access to justice, climate change and environmental justice, among other Olusegun Obasanjo, cry out that what the public knew or saw of the economy was not what the issues. economy truly was, adding that “the Nigeria’s economy is in the doldrums, and the government is a liar.323 According to Chief Obasanjo324, the often-quoted GDP growth did not reflect on the However, there seems to be shrinking space for CSOs in terms of funding as donor fatigue has living condition of most of Nigerian people, nor on most of the indigenous industries and set in, while some donors still attach some conditions to their grants. Nigerian CSOs are among services where capacity utilisation was almost 50%. other CSOs in Africa where there is a reduction of the amount of grants going to, for example, HIV/AIDS programmes, owing to Nigeria’s policy on same-sex marriage (anti-gay law), which is Among the current challenges to the Nigerian economy are falling oil prices reaching as low as not favourable to American and European donors. Many persons living with HIV/AIDS do not $73 per barrel, declines in foreign exchange earnings, and devaluation of the Naira from 155 have access to facilities such as anti-retroviral drugs because of the high cost attached to it, NGN to 168 NGN to a aollar. The persistent declines in oil revenue have affected the excess whereas these drugs were free in the past. crude account (ECA) from which both the federal and state governments draw their allocations. Financial pressures have caused the ECA to decline from 11.5 billion USD by the end of 2013 to a The Socio-Economic Context mere 4.11 billion USD (CBN, 2014). The reality of this economic crunch which she had defended or denied few weeks earlier made the Minister of Finance, for the first time, cry out for Nigeria With a population of about 177.5 million, Nigeria (Population Reference Bureau, 2014) has a to adopt austerity measures reminiscent to economic conditions of the ‘80s. These include a GDP of 521.8 billion USD, an annual economic growth rate of 6.5% and an inflation rate of 8.1% tight fiscal policy, a reduction in the allocation to the states and local governments from the (NBS, 2014). This is a considerable improvement in the economy over the previous years where federation accounts, a reduction in the general cost of administration, better administration of in 2009, Nigeria had173.0 billion USD in GDP and 166.8 billion USD in 2007 (CIA, 2011). Nigeria’s tax regimes, and a cut in both recurrent and capital expenditure in 2015.325 external (foreign) reserves stood at 36.85 billion USD by November 2014, while the excess crude account was 4.11 billion USD (CBN, 2014). While its value of import totalled 91.6 billion USD, Already, Nigerians are feeling the pangs of the economic crisis. With over 70% of population Nigeria’s value of export was 56.4 billion USD (Renaissance Capital, 2014), an indicator of poor still living in poverty, many young Nigerians remain jobless while the executive and the management of the economy. Oil still accounts for 75% of the government’s revenue, while parliamentarians live in opulence. The controversial salary package of the political office holders it accounts for 95% of foreign exchange earnings. If care is not taken, the non-investment or is taking about 25% of the total overhead costs in each fiscal year. Each senate member of the disinvestment in the oil and gas sector by major international oil companies might deal a great Federal Republic of Nigeria, for example, earns 29,479,749 NGN monthly, and in a year this blow to Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy. amounts to 353,756,988 NGN.326 Meanwhile, the minimum monthly wage for workers in Nigeria is pegged at a paltry sum of between 18,000 NGN and 18,500 NGN, which is 0.062% of the The Nigerian government has, over time, put in place measures to curtail poverty, reduce monthly salary of a senator; yet many states cannot afford to pay this. If the yearly salary of a unemployment, and improve economic development. Replacing National Economic worker is 216,000 NGN (1333 USD) and that of a Nigerian senator is 2,183,685 USD, meaning it Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) and State Economic Empowerment Development will take an average Nigerian worker 1638 years to earn the yearly salary of a Nigerian senator Strategy (SEEDS), economic policy is Vision 20:2020, the Nigerian government’s current official (The Economist, 2014). socio-economic policy framework, which aims to turn the country into one of the top 20 economies of the world by year 2020. This is mostly focused on the oil sector. While the National Directorate of Employment and National Poverty Eradication Programme are age-old structures The business environment is also poor in Nigeria,327 in the spate of erratic power supply and essentially created to tackle the issue of poverty, Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment unreliable credit sources. Compare to other countries in MINT (Malasia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Programme (SURE-P),322 with its various subsets, is one of the pillars of the transformation and Turkey) of which Nigeria is one, it is not easy doing business in Nigeria due to inadequate agenda of the federal government for the progressive ‘deregulation’ of the petroleum industry. SURE-P programme ensures that the federal government’s part of the savings from fuel subsidy removal or reduction is applied on critical infrastructure projects and social safety net programmes that will directly ameliorate the sufferings of Nigerians and mitigate the impact of subsidy removal. Since the current government has broken away with its predecessor in terms 323 Nigerian govt lying about state of economy — Obasanjo. http://Internet.premiumtimesng.com/news/top- of lack of commitment and introduction of its own economic agenda, the realisation and the news/171944-nigerian-govt-lying-state-economy-obasanjo.html benefit of Vision 20:2020 is a mirage following the death of Umar Yar A’dua. 324 “We had not adequately prepared for the rainy days in the management of proceeds from oil and gas resources. With crude oil purchase by the U.S. from Nigeria going down by some 30 per cent in the last three years as a result We are made to believe that Nigeria currently has 6.5 annual economic growth rate. The of shale oil revolution, things are not looking up in the oil and gas sector, and hence, in the economy. We will all sink deeper in poverty, except for those who have corruptly stashed money abroad and who will start to bring question is: is this rate sustainable, and does economic growth translate to socio-economic such illegal and illegitimate funds back home to harvest more Naira. All the economic gains of recent years and the development? During a media address in November 2014, the Minister for Finance Mrs Ngozi rebuilding of the middle class may be lost.In the end, more businesses will close down, business men and women, Okonjo-Iweala “played down the correct diagnosis of the economic ills and wished away, or entrepreneurs and investors will incur more debts. Foreign investors may temporarily stop investing in a downturn acted in denial of, the serious problem,” facing Nigeria’s economy without first accepting “the economy. Because of the Naira depreciation, workers, particularly in the public sector, will ask for pay increase, which may be justified, but will 321 Among these development partners giving both technical and financial support to CSOs in Nigeria are USAID, 325 Dapo Fafowora 2014 Nigeria’s financial and economic prospects for FY 2015. In: the Nation Thursday, November OSIWA, Friedrich-Herbert-Stiftung, OxfamNovib, EC, and UN systems like UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, among others 20, 2014 322 http://sure-p.gov.ng/main/index.php/about-sure-p/sure-p-secretariat/policy 326 $2,183,685.00; exchange rate: $1 = N162. These figures are much more than what obtains in other climes: United States - $174,000.00; Britain - $105,400.00; South Africa - $104,000.00; France - $85,900.00; Kenya -$74,500.00; 184 185 infrastructure and credit facilities. Getting credit facilities from the government is as difficult as getting tax holiday to encourage local industries to survive. On power supply, Nigeria – with a population of about 170 million – is battling to supply its citizens with a mere 4000 megawatts of electricity. Contrast this with South Africa which, with a population of just 54 million, supplies its References citizens with 45,000 megawatts328 and they are planning to increase this to 100,000 megawatts 1. Atiku Abubakar (2014), “Jonathan poses threat to democracy”. Nigerian Tribune Friday very soon. Partly as a result of this, Nigeria’s major industries are relocating to neighbouring November, p.3. countries like Republic of Benin, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, serving as production centres, while 2. Abubakar Tsav (2014), “NASS Crisis shameful”. Nigerian Tribune Friday November, p.3 Nigeria is serving as the marketing centre. 3. Bayo Oladeji (2014), “The Importance of Freedom of Information Act” Leadership Newspaper, November 13. Conclusion 4. Chijioke Nelson (2014), “Nigeria ranks low on domestic credit among BRICS and MINT’s economies”. The Guardian Tuesday November 11. There is a serious need to pay attention to the development of Nigeria’s infrastructures and 5. Dapo Fafowora (2014), “Nigeria’s financial and economic prospects for FY 2015”. In: the human capital. Development cooperation, especially with regard to civil society and private Nation Thursday, November 20. 6. “FG behind Boko Haram – Sect leader” 05 December, 2014http://Internet.thestreamng.com/ sector, should be taken seriously at both international and domestic fronts. Development fg-behind-boko-haram-sect-leader/ projects should be implemented thoroughly and honestly while Nigerian politicians, at all levels, 7. Ikhilae, Eric (2014), “#10 billion jet probe, Alison-Madueke, NNPC know fate Dece 17”, The must be held to account for their failure to stem corruption and impunity in the country. Nation, Thursday November 20, p.5. 8. NOIPolls Limited, Internet.noi-polls.comNOI-Polls, Abuja 900247 Austerity measures should be imposed on government officials, not on workers and the poor 9. Okotie Chris (2014), “Jonathan’s race in whirl wind of crises”. The GuardianInternet. who are at large not part of this economic quagmire. The fat salaries of politicians should be ngrguardiannews.com Tuesday November 11 p.19. checked and reduced to acceptable levels. Governments at all levels should prune the numbers 10. Oyesina, Tunde (2014), “N10bn jet Scandal: Alison-Madueke frustrating probe, Reps tell of their political aides, reduce administrative costs, and minimise overseas trips that waste so court” New Telegraph Wednesday, November 5. 11. Pierre Englebert (2014), “ Burkina Faso’s reverberating crisis”. International New York Times. much of the public coffers. Saturday and Sunday November 15-16, 2014 p.10 12. Premium Times (2014), “Ex-Borno Governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, in secret visit to arms-laden Nigeria needs to adhere to both AAA and Busan GPEDC principles of democratic ownership, Chad-bound plane detained in Nigeria” inclusive development partnership, transparency and accountability. Until CSOs and private 13. http://Internet.premiumtimesng.com/news/172597-ex-borno-governor-ali-modu-sheriff- sectors are provided enabling environment to maximally operate as development actors in secret-visit-arms-laden-chad-bound-plane-detained-nigeria.html 7 December 2014 their own right, the government’s developmental efforts would all be a ruse coloured by lack of 14. The Economist (2014), “Of Nigeria and Mathematics: Salary of Nigerian Senators” Special transparency and accountability. Inclusive partnership that ensures that no one is left behind in Report 24 November 16:10:13 development process is nothing about CSOs if it is not about them. 15. The Punch (2014), “Naira devaluation and austerity measures” Monday, 08 December. The Stream (2014), “Nyanya bomb blast mastermind demands N100m compensationhttp:// Internet.thestreamng.com/nyanya-bomb-blast-mastermind-demands-n100m- compensation-fg/04 December. 327 In its Ease of Doing Business Report 2014, the World Bank rated Nigeria 147th out of 189 countries which is a further deterioration from its ranking of 137th in 2013 – inadequate infrastructure and unfavourable domestic credit being some of the major factors. Domestic credit t the private sector in Nigeria is abysmally low compared to any of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) while compared to any of the MINT countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), Nigeria ranked poorly. In the MINT economies, Malaysia recorded 117.8 per cent four-year average in credit to the private sector and 124.3 per cent in 2013. Indonesia extended a 33.4 per cent four-year credit facility to the private sector and 37.9 per cent in 2013 while “Nigeria had 13.2 per cent for three-year average in credit to the private sector, 11.8 per cent in 2012, with 2013 record not available” (Chijioke Nelson, 2014 p.23). 328 http://Internet.southafrica.info/about/government/sona-170614e.htm#.VIwtMSjBvIV#ixzz3LmOS2mi3 186 187 Palestine Summary This report aims to examine the elements that indicate the possibility of an enabling environment for civil society in Palestine. The report highlights the importance of existing international agreements that affirm the necessity of the partnership between CSOs and other stakeholders in the development process, including the government and the private sector, as stated in the Busan, Paris, and Istanbul agreements. The report assesses the political, governance, legal environment and the social, cultural and economic contexts in which CSOs work in Palestine. Overall, the political environment is not conducive to civil society’s role in development due to barriers imposed by the Israeli occupation. In addition, the PA also faces significant weaknesses due to the bureaucratisation, clientilisim, and high levels of corruption in state institutions. Nevertheless, the history of the civil society in Palestine attests to its ability to move past these constraints, motivating these organisations to work more on reinforcing their key messages on development, human rights, and democracy. One notable success was the passage of NGO law number 2000/1, which allowed CSOs space for independent monitoring of the government. This has motivated NGOs to improve their own effectiveness, transparency, and accountability and proper democratic governance so as to play a monitoring role for the government’s performance in the context of defending the interests of the poor and marginalised. The report further outlines Palestine’s socio-cultural context, reflecting on the historical roots of the civil society based on the idea and mechanisms of voluntary work and democratic participation in the process of change. CSOs have since played a significant role in the fight against corruption and pushing for genuine democratic institutions and human rights. In the economic and social context, the report touches on issue of funding for CSOs, where they have increasingly become subject to donor agendas, which has impacted on the independence and strength of Palestinian civil society. The report further assesses the reconstruction operations in the wake of the 2014 Gaza attacks, which lasted for 51 days. This led to the institutionalisation and legalisation of the siege instead of resolving it and ending it. On that note, this report concludes that the Palestinian civil society is in need of a proper environment where CSOs can play a positive role in development and national reconstruction, which continue to be hampered by the occupation, disunity among domestic political actors, and donor agendas. Introduction Civil society is recognised as a critical actor in development cooperation and peace, in line with a series of international agreements on development effectiveness, from Paris to Istanbul to Busan. It is along these lines, that the report aims to assess the state of civil society in conflict-torn Palestine, including the political, cultural, and economic structures that emerged with the founding of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the context of the Israeli occupation and invasion. The report also aims to disclose the extent to which the legal environment empowers civil society and its relations with other social groups and development actors, as this relates to their impacts on development. 188 189 It concludes with recommendations to help empower civil society organisations to work toward square meters off the Palestinian lands along the eastern and northern borders of the Gaza an environment that promotes peace, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Strip and prevented 20,000 farmers from their right to access agricultural land near its borders, Palestinian CSOs emerged within the fabric of the First Intifada (1987-1993), alongside trade which are about 18% of the overall agricultural land in the Gaza Strip. It also set a fishing area unions, political parties, and professional associations in the uprising. Many found common not exceeding six nautical miles and thus reduced the number of fishermen. This has also cause in a vision for development that prioritised marginalised and vulnerable social groups deprived the Palestinians from investing in potentially massive amounts of natural gas off the under the framework of national liberation against the Israeli occupation. CSOs worked actively Gaza coast and also deprives the Palestinians to the right to communicate with people in the in agriculture, health, and other sectors with the aim of achieving institutionalisation within an West Bank as one nation, while also preventing trade and export. independent Palestinian state. Volunteer work committees had already been formed by the 1970s and early ‘80s in order to assist farmers during the olive harvesting season. Voluntary The Israeli blockade caused the deterioration of economic and social conditions in the Gaza health programmes were also instituted as a form of political mobilisation to confront the Strip, particularly after the three Israeli offensives in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 respectively. building of illegal Israeli settlements and land confiscation. These targeted crucial infrastructures, including schools, mosques, production facilities, as well as roads, water systems and high residential buildings. The Israeli offensive in 2014 was perhaps The atmosphere of the First Intifada boosted support for CSOs, which was enhanced with the the bloodiest and most destructive in terms of the amount of destruction and the impact left establishment of the PA in 1994 after the Oslo Accords. This increased the number of CSOs on various aspects of life. working in the fields of agriculture, health, labour, youth, democracy, human rights, women, among other sectors. Sixty-five per cent of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip currently live below the poverty line and about 29% of them live in extreme poverty. Also, 55% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are The most prominent organisations focused on promoting democracy, human rights and unemployed, while 67% of them suffer from food insecurity. Water is polluted and unfit for sustainable development, while others remained affiliated with political Islam movements human use, while a significant number of homes do not have access to basic water or energy which focused on charity and humanitarian relief. Organisations affiliated with Fatah also joined utilities. the PA.1 Each year, Gaza’s labour market receives 16,000 graduates from different universities. A large Economic and Social context number of them have been left unemployed. Agriculture has declined from 12% in 1994 to 6% of GDP, while the industry is at 11%, from a previous 18% of GDP. The Israeli Occupation While statistics indicate that living conditions in the West Bank have improved slightly, they are Donor countries began hosting regular meetings to finance the PA to secure the continuity of much less than what is aspired for, and poor living conditions and infrastructure reflect decades the “peace process” after the signing of Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PA in 1994. of illegal occupation, Israeli settlement building, and exclusion of Palestinians from accessing The first meeting was held in Washington, where 2.4 billion USD was approved as aid to the PA critical resources and controlling their own borders. to cover its budget and expenditures in addition to covering its operational and development projects. Later, the donor’s regular meetings were pursued to support the PA and its bodies, About 24% of West Bank’s population is poor and 30% suffer from food insecurity, while rates of ministries, and institutions. unemployment reach 25%. West Bank’s agriculture reaches only 5% of GNP, while the industry contributes 16% of GNP. The impetus for supporting the peace process has since faded due to the Israeli occupation and abandonment of its obligations toward the Palestinians under the Fourth Geneva Convention, While West Bank does not lie under a tight Israeli siege and despite a moderate flow of the convention which obliges Israel as an occupying power to bear financial, economic, and donor funds,21 especially following the resumption of US-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace legal responsibilities over the Palestinian people. negotiations in Annapolis,22 decades of occupation have continued to undermine economic development. Twenty years have passed since the Oslo Accords, and it is evident that donor funds have achieved none of their desired goals. The Israeli occupation has continued its unjust practices, Development “Cooperation”: Support or Political Blackmail land confiscation, illegal settlement, in addition to the apartheid wall and turning the West Bank and Gaza Strip into virtual ghettos and cantons. During occasions when the Palestinian Authority attempted to change political course during peace talks, donor funding tended to be reduced or withheld. Political blackmail was clearly The Gaza Strip has existed under a tight siege since mid-June 2007, while the West Bank at work when pressure was exerted on the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, after the continues to witness an accelerated process of Israeli settlement building. Israel seized control outbreak of the second Intifada as punishment for his refusal to sign the Camp David Accords of the Jordan Valley area which covers nearly 23% of the West Bank, and seized the area behind under the auspices of former US President Bill Clinton, with participation of Israeli former PM the wall which covers 14% of West Bank. The occupation also seized 85% of water basins located Ehud Barak. Another instance of political blackmail emerged when Abbas headed to the United in a number of strategic locations and built settlements near the seized areas.2 Nations, where Palestine gained a status of non-member observer state in September 2012. Financial blackmail occurred through: As the Israeli occupation and invasion prevents the Palestinians access to its own resources • Israel freezing VAT clearance revenue ‘tax money’ that it deducts in favour of the and borders, this has violated Palestine’s right to develop as declared by the United Nations Palestinian authority as agreed in Paris Economic Protocol (PEA); General Assembly on December 4, 1986; the right which requires Palestinian sovereignty over • Donors stopped funding and refrained from committing financial pledges as a result of its borders and resources as a precondition for just and equitable development.3 US and Israeli pressure • The Israeli occupation has essentially turned the Gaza Strip into a large prison. It implemented This exploited the PA’s bureaucratic structure, which employs 140, 000 people. This large the unilateral disengagement plan and imposed a tight siege on the Gaza Strip and cut 300 number of employees put the PA at risk of collapse with the withdrawal of funding. 190 191 Funding and Non-Governmental Organisations Political and Governance Context Since 1994, the PA received a total of $ 23 billion, of which 9% was dedicated to non-governmental Governance, Civil Society and Political Reform in Palestine organisations including universities, trade unions, and non-profit institutions, which reveals the It is clear that sound governance foundations are based on sovereignty of law and the separation limited share of CSOs and added fuel to accusations by the PA of the amount of funding flowing of authorities are still missing in the PA. Corruption and political patronage prevail in a context to these organisations. The funding was distributed to non-profit organisations as:23 where executive authority dominates other branches of government. This has led to weak • 29% for emergency relief projects political accountability and justice frameworks. • 23% for human rights and democracy projects • 24% for technical assistance and capacity building With the creation of the PA in 1993, Palestinian CSOs pressed for political reforms grounded • 6.5% agricultural, anvironment, water projects in the rule of law, fair elections, and a democratic system based on the separation of powers • 10% private sector projects and judiciary independence in an “independent state of Palestine”, where public rights are • 6.5% projects of financial, economic, and social development, including anti-poverty respected, including the rights to freedom of expression and association, peaceful assembly, projects and the right to political and trade union participation, regardless of religious, ethnic, gender, or other considerations. These rations reflect a state of imbalance, the prioritisation of donor agenda, and a lack of commitment to implementing local and national agenda. For instance, it is disturbing to note CSOs have their reform campaign against corruption in light of the corruption report issued by that the share of agricultural reaches only 6.5%, while short-term relief projects continue to the Legislative Council (PLC), which traced questionable business connections with some Arab constitute 29% of funding, while the share of agriculture is meant to cover land, water, and food states as well as political cronyism and clientelism.9 security, while also providing employment opportunities. These ratios reflect donor attitudes, which tend to focus on short-term humanitarian relief and technical assistance programs, as The Israeli occupation and the international community exploited these allegations of opposed to long-term economic and social development projects. corruption and the absence of reforms that weakened the chance to achieve good governance, to put pressure on the PA leadership. This happened particularly after the failure of Camp David Whereas there is an imbalance in the funding distribution to non-profit organisations, there Accords in 2000 and US accusations against the PA for bearing responsibility for the failure of is an imbalance in the Palestinian authority’s general budget. Even in the best conditions, the the peace talks. agricultural budget has reached not more than 1% since the establishment of the Palestinian authority. The share of security reaches 33%, whereas the share that covers health, education, Israel sought to turn the tables against the PA, claiming instability is rooted in the inability of and social affairs combined reaches only 18%.27 the PA to enact domestic administrative and financial reforms, as opposed to the history of the Israeli occupation, which has, for so long, deprived the Palestinian people of their basic United Nations: A Partner or Obstruction to Development? rights, including the right to self-determination, the right to control natural resources, as well as freedom of movement of both goods and individuals. Following massive destruction caused by the latest Israeli offensive that began in July 2014 and lasted for 51 days, the situation in the Gaza Strip has seriously deteriorated due to the In light of all this, the aim of the reform efforts of the Palestinian civil society is to build a mass destruction that hit critical infrastructure and production facilities as well as a number democratic, pluralistic, and transparent political system as a means to enable and strengthen of residential buildings in addition to many schools, hospitals, mosques and churches, water the Palestinian people to achieve their goal of liberation and act as an example of justice and plants and Gaza’s sole power plant, along with 90,000 houses of which 20,000 were completely freedom. destroyed in addition to streets, parks, and farms. In 2003, the Palestinian Basic Law was modified to shift some powers of the president to a prime There is clearly a need to end the Israeli blockade and allow for the free movement of goods minister, and pressure was exerted on the late president Arafat to appoint a Minister of Finance, and individuals through Gaza’s crossings, in addition to restoring the Palestinian people’s right and Minister of Interiors to be granted full powers. The Law of Independence of Judiciary Act to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by building air and sea ports. was also adopted to ensure the creation of a fair and impartial judiciary independent from the executive authority. Yet the UN has at times hindered these same objectives. The UN recognises that the Israeli blockade is a form of collective punishment under international law, and that the reconstruction Weaknesses in Governance and Vulnerability to External Political Pressures of the Gaza Strip cannot be achieved without ending the siege to allow the unimpeded flow of relief. In this context, it participated in the establishment of the tripartite agreement reached Civil society lobbied strongly for these reforms for years – indeed since the first general between the Israeli and the Palestinian government to supervise entry of reconstruction parliamentary elections were conducted in January 1996. materials into Gaza. The PA, however, only responded to these requirements as a result of pressures exercised by Yet the mechanism for entry of reconstruction materials into the Gaza Strip is impractical for the international community who warned of the withdrawal of financial aid from the PIAF. These it, in effect legitimises and legalises the Israeli blockade. Bags of cements are transferred into laws were not adopted, which reveals the fragility and vulnerability of the Palestinian authority the Gaza Strip only after an Israeli confirmation on the list of beneficiary families, and stores of to the international community and the decisions of donor governments. This also revealed the cement bags are monitored by surveillance cameras; hence, such a mechanism impedes the political immaturity of the Palestinian society, as a result of subjective and objective factors, to reconstruction process, while Gaza Strip remains dependent on UN humanitarian relief projects ensure the implementation of internal mechanisms to solve a variety of political problems and and programs as well as ODA in addition to other local and international relief agencies.8 strengthen a democratic civil society to influence decision-makers in the PA. In addition, the PA depends to a large extent on donor funds, on top of a significant expansion in PA employees since 2003.10 192 193 Community Participation in Reform Projects the elements of national independence, owing to the Israeli occupation. Unity should therefore be a priority alongside major political reforms, yet the governments of both Fatah in the West CSOs participated in the Government Reform Committee 2003, which drafted a ‘100-day Bank and Hamas in Gaza managed to thwart efforts to achieve unity through threats and plan.’ The plan included amending the election law to be based on parity between districts intimidation of these mini-Arab Spring movements with either party pointing to its rival for and proportional representation, to be enforced instead of the previous law, which was instigating ‘unrest’.12 based on districts to implement specific reform mechanisms. However, the plan has not been implemented due to difficulties in implementation, resulting from the creation of a bureaucratic National Consensus Government clientelistic system pervading the PA. The dispute between Fatah and Hamas continues, despite the formation of the national The repercussions of this were seen in the results of the second Intifada in 2000, which derailed unity government following Al-Shati agreements reached in April 2014 and despite ongoing the reform process. Other significant shifts in the Palestinian political system came from the Israeli offensives against the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. Such a situation necessitates death of late president Yasser Arafat and the 2006 parliamentary elections, which led to the the completion of the reconciliation process, although the Palestinian consensus government landslide victory of the Hamas movement, followed by internal splits in June 2007. This was due remains fragile and has not exercised its powers in Gaza since its formation. to a situation where the ruling party could essentially monopolise governance, which continues to lack a constitution built around principles of equal citizenship and full democracy. The weak performance of the consensus government means that the government is unable to restore critical institutions like the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the National Council, The period between 2000 and 2006 saw an upswing in the work of CSOs. A number of which will impede the ability of CSOs to work in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy, events and campaigns advocated actively for the rights and interests of workers, farmers, preventing its ability to influence development policy frameworks toward democracy and women, young people, and people with special needs. These were organised either through independence. workshops or meetings with competent commissions of the legislative council (PLC), or through official ministries. Other events included petitions and marches of solidarity to secure the CSO EE and DE implementation of policies designed to protect marginalised social groups and consolidate freedom and democracy in Palestine. Legal and Regulatory Framework for CSOs The collective experiences of CSOs played a key role in this area, in addition to the growing In 1994, Palestinian CSOs formed the Palestinian NGO Network which included a number of demands for major reforms to redress financial and administrative imbalances in the Palestinian Palestinian democratic NGOs that called for the establishment of a democratic civil society political system, in addition to the overturning of repressive policies exercised against CSOs, in in Palestine where rule of law, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and respect accordance with the guarantees of the Palestinian Basic Law, especially with regard to the role for basic freedoms and human rights prevail, to achieve a society free from occupation in of civil society in development in Palestine. accordance with the international law to enable Palestinian society to achieve sovereignty over its land, borders and resources. Political Divisions and Civil Society The Palestinian NGO Network assessed the transitional years after the founding for the PA as The split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank shook the political system in Palestine. After the toughest phase for civil society, in a context where the need to consolidate the gains of the June 2007 clashes between militants of the largest political factions of Fatah and Hamas, this project for national liberation at times sacrificed democratic ideals. consolidated their control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively. Palestinian CSOs and human rights organisations faced political arrests and limits to freedom Both Palestinian governments took decisions authorising control over CSOs, both unions and of expression and assembly, yet civil society continued to put pressure on the PA to enact fair NGOs, as well as those which belonged to political parties not aligned with the ruling party. policies favouring social protection for the poor and marginalised. Severe restrictions were imposed on CSOs, and even Fatah-affiliated organisations were The Palestinian NGO Network prepared a law to regulate the relationship between the prevented from commemorating the death of late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, except once Palestinian Authority and NGOs, particularly after many civil and security agencies increased or twice under tight control. Hamas, for its part, was also prevented from conducting political their control over the work of the NGOs, in addition to the increased media accusations of actions in the West Bank. A number of CSOs and unions affiliated to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in CSOs receiving funds and working for a foreign agenda. This was despite the PA itself receiving the West Bank were closed, when Hamas seized control over similar organisations belonging to funding from donor states. the Fatah party in Gaza Strip, under false pretexts. The Palestinian NGO Network managed to put an end to tensions between the PA and CSOs While measures were introduced toward the right to peaceful assembly as guaranteed by by pressing for the passage of a law to regulate CSO-PA relations, before it was adopted by the the basic law, many peaceful rallies have been suppressed both in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2000. The adopted law is called the Law of Civil Society For instance, Hamas militants in Gaza suppressed a picket organised by the popular front to Associations and Foundations No. 1/2000. demand that Hamas institute an independent body to intervene in the energy crisis in Gaza. Meanwhile in the West Bank, Fatah security suppressed protest, organised by PLO factions, The law supports independence of civil society work, while the PA retains the right to control calling for a halt to security coordination with Israel and protesting against high living costs.11 and monitor CSOs under the Ministry of Interior, which regulates their registration. Nevertheless, hopes for reunification grew when Palestine found itself swept up by the recent The Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) considered this an achievement that put an end to “Arab Spring”. Various youth groups organised simultaneous open sit-ins, first in Ramallah and government intervention which impeded their work. Despite flaws found in the mandatory the other in Gaza under the slogan “The people want to end the division”. The Palestinian case is registration process, PNGO demanded that the Ministry of Justice take this responsibility exceptional, in that there is an absence of a united political system in addition to the absence of instead of the Ministry of Interior. The network expressed reservations on many of the law’s 194 195 provisions, one of which is the process of registration that takes 60 days before the Ministry responds. The network demanded the adoption of a deposit system to work directly without parliamentary blocs and without the president’s approval. Both are clear violations by both waiting for a period of two months, i.e. to work after placing the deposit securities. It objected parties of the Palestinian Basic Law, which serves as the interim constitution.16 to the decision to dissolve the association that was granted to the Minister of Interior instead of a cross-court decision. Gaza’s Ministry of Interior took a series of measures aimed at weakening the independence of civil society work by amending the regulations in accordance with Article 47 of the Palestinian Yet the Palestinian Council of Ministers adopted in 2003 implementing regulations emanating Basic Law. The article was modified in a way that allows the Ministry of Interior to regulate CSOs from the Assembly Law No. 1/2000. The regulations include broad powers to the executive and coordinate their activities. Laws issued by the ministry, including Decision no. 48/2010, authority that reduced the independence of the civil associations. It emphasises increasing the prevent government employees from engaging in charitable and civil society activities. authority of the Ministry of Interior as well as the authorities of the other competent ministries in the areas of oversight and accountability. The irony is that the decision targeted the employees of Fatah only, which is considered as discrimination against employees based on political affiliation. The decision also violates the CSOs rejected conditions imposed on those wishing to register, which included obtaining a concept of volunteering on whose basis NGOs in Palestine were first established. The decision certificate of ‘Good Conduct’ also known as ‘Security Safety.’ again violates the Palestinian Basic Law as well as the Labour Law, which does not prohibit public employees from engaging in volunteer work. The decision subsequently deprived 70,000 Despite this, the Palestinian NGO Network has managed to work through these hurdles. employees of the Ramallah government in Gaza, who were ordered by the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to stay home following Hamas’ seizure of Gaza Strip in mid-2007, of the Fatah-Hamas Split and Non-Governmental Organisations opportunity to volunteer in NGOs. As a result, Hamas called them ‘The Refrained.’17 As a political split hit the Palestinian government in Gaza and West Bank, Dr Salam Fayyad, Gaza’s Ministry of Interior took measures to impose strict control over civil organisations that who was in charge of the Palestinian government, took a series of measures against charitable are not affiliated to Hamas, in search of regulatory gaps as a means to seize control over institutions and NGOs belonging to Hamas and Islamic Jihad and adopted policies that limited them. There are many gaps in these laws that can be exploited to regain control over CSOs. their work. The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, for his part, asked all the NGOs registered For instance, conditions for membership in rules of procedure of the assembly are derived according to the NGO’s Law No. 1/2000 to register once again with an aim to prevent NGOs from the internal regulations, which states that any person over the age of 18 has the right of belonging to Hamas and Islamic Jihad to register. Whereas, 102 other associations belonging membership in the general assembly. to the both mentioned movements were later closed under different pretexts. However, the only reason behind the closure of these associations was to seize control over them. Hamas, Hamas benefited from this article and forced Asdeqa Al-Marid Society (Friends of Patients), the ruling movement in Gaza, for its part, exploited the incident of the bomb attack against Al- affiliated with Fatah, to announce preparations for the administrative board elections. When Qassam brigades’ members on Gaza beach in summer 2008, to close 120 associations belonging the society announced that, Hamas called on its members to participate in the Society’s to Fatah movement in addition to a number of independent associations after raiding them and administrative board elections. Thus, Hamas easily managed to resolve the results of the confiscating their property. elections in favour of its members, resulting in the expulsion of Fatah members from it. The Palestinian human rights organisations and the NGO Network enhanced their coordination Hamas targeted a number of youth organisations. One prominent example for such targets and unified committees to address these violations. The West Bank-based organisations raised was its storming to Sharek Youth Forum in Gaza; the association which played a great role in the issue of the forced closure of their organisations in the Supreme Court of the West Bank, developing youth by providing them with skills training programs and involving them in summer and demanded the abolition of the politicised registration and reopening of the closed NGOs. camps. The forum’s activities bothered the Islamic movement, which were seen to compete Later, a delegation contacted influential figures in the Hamas government such as its Minister with Hamas’ own programmes and summer camps. of Interior, demanding that it restore the legal status of the banned NGOs.13 The Ministry of Interior therefore dissolved the forum under various pretexts, meanwhile, Palestinian CSOs managed to stir public opinion through networking and issuing statements. civil society activists tried to influence the members of the Legislative Council of Reform and The organisations managed to consolidate political blocs of both Fatah and Hamas to advocate Change Bloc. The bloc’s members, however, did not respond to activists’ calls. The court insisted and support the right to form associations and avoid exploiting the loopholes of each law and on approving the decision of the Interior Ministry and rejected human rights organisations’ executive regulations to seize control over CSOs.14 demands to cancel the ministry’s decision, which reveals lack of judicial independence.18 Attacks and democratic violations against CSOs have proceeded systematically. Hamas, for Meanwhile, in West Bank, groups sympathetic to Hamas were abused and violated by PA instance, secured its control over the legislative council through its Change and Reform Bloc, and security. The PA began collaborating more strongly with Israel after the Gaza-West Bank split, it enacted a raft of regulations and laws that weakened the independence of these institutions. with Israel warning of Hamas potentially launching a coup in the West Bank. The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also took a series of decisions by the law and under the pretext of disrupting the work of the Legislative Council (PLC), by working only through the The PA’s coordination with Israel as one of Oslo Accords’ pillars, which was deepened during Change and Reform Bloc without the participation of other parliamentary blocs.15 the period of the Palestinian internal political split by PA violations against Hamas-run charities, unions, bodies, student’s blocks, continued either through direct targeting or through procedures This issue has significant impact on the freedom and independence of organisations working and decisions that allows the PA Interior Ministry to seize control of these organisations. separately in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the split, the Palestinian president had issued 70 questionable laws in the West Bank, whereas Hamas has issued 45 laws in Gaza. There are 102 Hamas-affiliated associations that have been banned by the PA security in the West Bank, despite human rights organisations raising the issue at the Supreme Court which Notable is the fact that executive decisions by the PLO were made without the legislative ruled to reopen all 102 associations. council’s endorsement; meanwhile Hamas laws were adopted without the participation of other The West Bank government’s decision to form a body called ‘NGOs Body’ indicates the 196 197 government’s insistence to impose control over Palestinian civil society organisations. The body tried to intervene in the work of the NGOs, and it attempted to impose strict controlling procedures over these organisations. The Palestinian NGOs Network however stressed that About 80 international organisations operating in the Gaza Strip opened branches in the NGOs should already technically be managed by the Interior Ministry, and there is no need for aftermath of Sharm El-Sheikh Conference that was held on March 2, 2009, after the Israeli an additional NGOs Body.19 occupation’s offensive Operation Cast Lead. The conference promised an amount of 5.4 billion USD for the reconstruction of the war-torn Gaza Strip. The aim behind opening these branches Social and Cultural Context was opportunistic as these organisations sought to divide shares. The organisations dealt with the issue of Gaza’s reconstruction with a beneficiary mentality and according to market and Authorities have used “influential tools” like the media, the security forces, and intellectuals profit mechanisms. It is noteworthy that these organisations deduct a ratio not less than 40% to launch an aggressive public campaign against civil society, accusing it of following foreign or the resources to cover their administrative expenses, and to pay high salaries both to their agendas by receiving foreign funding. employees and the experts that they brought to work in specific missions. However, these organisations implemented direct projects without partnership with local NGOs, and they still CSOs, for their part, were able to address through their own cultural activities, confirming civil operate in the Gaza Strip. society’s historical and militant role in the national resistance movement. This role began long before the creation of the West Bank-Gaza governments and continued afterward with the aim The UN organisations drafted an administrative regulatory assortment called ‘clusters.’ of protecting the marginalised. Palestinian civil society continues to rally around a vision, based According to this assortment, each organisation leads a ‘sector’ cluster such as the protection on building a free society founded on freedom, democracy, and social justice. This does not cluster, food security cluster, water cluster, or health cluster. Most of the international non- imply civil society is entirely guilt-free, which is why CSOs must continue to fill in the gaps in their governmental organisations operating in the designated field participated in each sector of work and push for their ideals. the mentioned above. Some local non-governmental organisations are also selected for the leadership of the cluster. The debate continues between authorities and civil society. Recently, President Mahmood Abbas formed an anti-corruption body and has called for CSO representatives to join; but it The danger in this form of organisation lies in its potential to hinder the initiative of local NGOs was obvious that this body has been used to politically intimidate the opposition and the civil through UN leadership over the sectors’ clusters as well as by limiting other development society’s forces, in order to silence criticism of the government. objectives, which are currently dominated by humanitarian agenda in the Gaza Strip. The danger also lies in the attempts to usurp the cluster’s development work and disable the dynamics of CSO Development Effectiveness local development work.25 In this tough environment, Palestinian CSOs have sought to reassess their priorities. They have This same scenario was repeated in the Gaza Strip after the Gaza Reconstruction Conference in networks to coordinate and confront government measures taken against them, including Cairo, held in October 2014. repressive registration rules, raiding and shutting down of organisations alongside other measures. CSOs have managed to maintain their democratic and independent nature, despite Two months after the end of the Israeli summer offensive, donor states pledged 5.4 billion USD the difficult atmosphere in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. for Gaza reconstruction; half of which was allocated for PA’s budget while the other half, 2.7 billion USD, were allocated for the reconstruction process. After the conference, a number of In Gaza, for instance, PNGO, in partnership with human rights organisations, pursued the international NGOs sought to corner the majority of funding at the expense of local Palestinian violations against CSOs through various means, including petitions, workshops, statements, and CSOs. meetings with members of each the legislative council, officials from Ministry of Interior, and the Hamas government, including its prime minister, to clearly discuss the risks of measures A similar situation can be found in the West Bank, where international NGOs adopt the same already taken and adopt decisions aimed at reducing the role of civil society particularly in the mechanisms based on competing with local NGOs. areas of democracy and human rights. They also headed to court to repeal a number of these measures. PNGO has since tried to organise a series of meetings with the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA). It presented a position paper stressing the importance of Meanwhile, in the West Bank, the same lineup was made operational where all human rights partnerships on the basis of the Paris and Busan conferences in order to achieve a constructive organisations operating in the West Bank and Gaza were included, including PNGO, which impact on the development process. However, greater efforts are needed to get the relationship coordinated with a number of unions and other networks and founded the coordinating council back on track on the basis of partnership, not dependency, through a joint development vision.26 for NGOs. Conclusion The alliances mentioned above played a significant role in uniting against abuses against civil society organisations, while seeking to influence decision makers to maintain the independence A considerable array of obstacles face Palestinian CSOs, most notable of which are political and of civil society work and its role in the areas of democracy, human rights, and development. 20 administrative instability, rooted in the Gaza-West Bank split. The problems of Palestine stem from the Israeli occupation and the lack of support from the international community as well Funding Institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations’ Partnership or Domination as internal political weaknesses, including the entrenchment of the PA bureaucracy, clientelisim and political patronage, and the lack of rule of law, public freedom, and attention to the needs After the Gaza-West Bank split, many international non-governmental organisations as well as of the poor and marginalised. United Nations organisations changed their course of action with local civil society organisations. Although coordination and cooperation continued between them, the international non- Western government relations with Palestine continue to operate according to their respective governmental organisations began to compete with each other over sources of funding for the political agenda, and they have abjectly failed to put increased pressure on the policies of the non-governmental organisations through a policy of ‘substitution and replacement.’ Israeli occupation, which is the main obstacle to lasting peace and development in Palestine. Justice for the Palestinian people is possible only with an end to the occupation, an end to illegal Israeli settlement building, and a lifting of the Gaza blockade, in addition to genuine 198 199 independence for Palestinians, which should guarantee their right to secure their own borders and access local resources. Paraguay Barring this, the Palestinian people will remain under a state of oppression, Palestinian CSOs Summary will continue to work in the least ‘enabling’ of conditions, and real, lasting peace will forever be out of reach. The government of Paraguay claims to have taken steps toward improving development effectiveness in the context of better cooperation among various actors, especially with the References establishment of National Development Programs in 2005. Under the principle of alignment, partners in development cooperation commit themselves to supporting policies, strategies, 1. Al-Hasnawi-Anas-Intervention presented in the ANND meeting- Al-Machtal Hotel-Gaza-April/2013 plans, and budgetary frameworks developed by partner country governments. 2. The Strategic Plan-NGO Network-2014-2017-p.2 3. Niimat Dib-“Gain Government and The Arab Spring”-Publication of ANND-Al Farabi House- Beirut- However, under successive administrations - President Frutos, 2008; President Lugo, 2008; 2014-P.171 and President Cartes, 2013 - the active involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the 4. D.Ibrach Ibrahim-Reform in the Palestinian Society-Kanaan Institut –Gaza- 2003-p.37 design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of these policies has been quite limited. 5. Abu Ramadan Mohsen-Past Reference-Reform in the Palestinian Society-Gaza-2003-p.37 6. Annual Report of 2013-Palestinian Center of Human Rights-Gaza-p.98 7. The NGO Network in collaboration with some “democratic” political sides organized a broad The paper takes four angles of analysis to explain this situation: first, through a review conference under the title of “the people wants to end the division”-Al-HIlal Al Ahmar Hall- of the legal frameworks that facilitate the participation of CSOs in the country; the political Gaza-8/3/2011 environment in Paraguay that has limited or enabled the opportunities CSOs actually have to 8. Annual Report of 1998-Palestinian Center of Human Rights-Gaza-p.108 engage in advocacy; the socio-cultural context and the economic context in which CSOs work – 9. Abu Ramadan Mohsen-from the events of the CSO’s role in reinforcing the law governance in the all areas that must be addressed by the state and civil society, which have presented these as Gaza district –NGOs Network-Gaza- 19/July/2012-p.13 their key demands. 10. Nachwan Karam- from the events of the CSO’s role in reinforcing the law governance in the Gaza district –NGOs Network-Gaza- 19/July/2012-p.28 11. Interview with Abu AlKraya Abdel Aziz-Head of the Administrative Body of the Network “2008- It concludes that significant economic growth in Paraguay has had only a moderate impact on 2010” Gaza-Al Hilal Al Ahmar- 27/7/2014 reducing poverty rates among large segments of the population. Similarly, domestic political 12. Interview with Al-Hajar Adnan-Responsible of Legal Unit-Al-Mizan Center for Human Rights- uncertainties have shaken the country, not least with the impeachment of President Lugo in Gaza-2/12/2014 2012, which led to the persecution of leaders of social organisations, especially those working 13. Interview with Zgout Samir- Responsible of Field Unit- Al-Mizan Center for Human Rights-4/12/2014 in the field of human rights. 14. Statement around “the Deprivation of General Assembly employees from Volunteering”-NGO Network-Gaza- September 2010 The impact of cuts in financial support flowing to Paraguayan CSOs has had a dampening impact 15. Statement about “the Resolution of the Youth Participation Organization”-Network and on civil society. Over the last three years, at least 100 non-governmental organisations have had Organizations of Human Rights-Gaza-19/7/2011 16. Seminar titled “ the Influence of the Division of the Palestinian Authority on the Role of organizations to close their doors; and some 300 have had to downsize, restricting their areas of work and and its legal organization”-the Palestinian Center of the Human Rights Gaza-Commodore hotel- opportunities for political advocacy and engagement. Moreover, resources that the Paraguayan 22/5/2013 state allocates to social organisations are basically oriented to carrying out ‘charity’ work for 17. Television Interview with Abu Jach Mounjed-Member of the Coordination Committee of the NGO highly vulnerable populations. Network- 26/9/2014 18. Television Interview with Al-Arawi Issam- Director of the Kodos Center for Legal Consultation Granted, the country has progressed as far as the formal implementation by a number of 28/11/2014 government agencies and civil society policies related to the promotion and defence of human 19. Al-Barghouti Moustafa – the Israeli Settlement Increased After the Negotiations-Website-Arabic rights. In recent years, however, with the emergence of an insurgent group in the north, along 21-28/1/2014 20. Investment in Human Security for a Future Government- Human Development Report UNDP- with the sustained growth of drug trafficking groups, human rights have come under threat. Kodos- 2009-2010 p.29 There has been a further militarisation of social life, especially in the northern departments, 21. Al-Sourani Gazi-Siege and Division and their Economic and Social Impact on the Gaza District- Civil along with an increase in the activities of control and monitoring of civil society activities. Dialogue Website 26/8/2009 22. Human Development Report 2009-2010- Past reference p.139 In the area of gender equity and equality, there are important achievements such as the 23. The Follow Up of External Support of Palestinian NGOs in the West District and the Gaza district- considerable increase in school coverage, but at the same time there are also signs of higher Executive Summary center of Institutions Development and MASS Institut 1999-2008-Ramallah-p.4 rates of violence against women and girls. 24. Statement Paper directed to International NGOs in joint Meeting-NGO Network-Headquarters of NGO Network-Gaza-November/2009. 25. Facts of the Discussion Sessions-NGO Network-Gaza -2013 p.7 In the environmental field, the progressive growth of the soybean crop has displaced large 26. From the Facts of the Press Conference -Network+ Human Rights Organizations-Network groups of people, greatly expanding the number of displaced families now living on the Headquarters –Gaza- November/2014. peripheries of large cities, often lacking basic services, employment opportunities, and social 27. Toluwani Eniola (2014), “Nigeria now 39th most corrupt nation, says TI”, The Punch Thursday protection. December 4, p.3. The expansion of the agricultural frontier has led to the destruction of thousands of hectares of forests and the intensification of extreme weather phenomena, including stronger and more frequent bouts of El Niño and La Niña, droughts, and flooding. The practice of transparency and accountability remains a challenge in the country. While the 200 201 state has tried to launch a process of professionalisation of civil servants, corruption remains can join the Paraguayan Organisation of Inter-Municipal Cooperation (OPACI) on a voluntary widespread, even at the highest levels of government. basis. In light of this, opportunities for greater involvement by CSOs in the design, implementation, In the country, there are also a number of government agencies and civil society involved in the monitoring and evaluation of development policies in the country remains to be seen, though promotion, protection, and monitoring of human rights. Within this group may be mentioned the expansion of modern communications technology has facilitated broader exchanges among the figure of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, Legislative Committees on Human Rights, high civil society. level commissions within the legislative responsible of human rights, whose mission is to ensure the full exercise of rights by the citizens. Included here as well are Civil Society Organisations, Enabling Environment OSCs, church representatives, among others working in the field of human rights. Efforts have been made in this regard by the Human Rights Coordinator of Paraguay (CODEHUPY); The Legal and Regulatory Framework the Committee of Churches for Emergency Aid (CIPAE); and the Coordinator for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CDIA). The Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay (June 20, 1992) is perhaps among the most democratic in the world, with Title II listing fundamental rights concerning the dignity of the Another important factor in the protection of human rights is the Ministry of Women individual and establishing a precise system of guarantees for their implementation, while (MINMUJER) preceded by the Secretariat for Women of the Presidency of the Republic (SMPR), ensuring the principle of separation of powers. With the end of the military dictatorship, which operated between 1993 and 2012. The SMPR created by law No. 34/1992 was elevated to progress was made in ensuring human rights, the separation of political powers, and citizen the rank of Ministry by Law 4675/12 and regulated in 2013 by Decree No. 630.329 participation in governance. In the Republic of Paraguay, civil society organisations are governed primarily by the rules of law The constitution defines the state as a rule of law (Art. 1), respectful of the principles on which No. 1,183/1985 Act, establishing the Paraguayan civil code. democratic governments are based and guarantees the observance of civil liberties and the right to express autonomy, provided that public order regulations are not violated. In that Apart from the provisions of the civil code, other provisions of the Paraguayan legal system sense, constitutional norms grant wide scope for the exercise of the freedom of expression govern certain types of organisations such as neighbourhood associations, trade unions, and freedom of association. In addition, there is a wide range of additional rights to ensure the consumers, indigenous communities, and cooperatives among others. independence and autonomy of civil society organisations. For instance, Law No. 3,966/2010, Municipal Organic, regulates the creation and operation of The right and freedom of association is guaranteed by Article 42 of the constitution, which neighbourhood community boards and neighbourhood committees; Act No. 213/1993 established provides that everyone is free to join or form unions for lawful purposes, and no one is compelled the Labour Code, which regulates the creation, registration, operation, and supervision of to affiliate with a particular association. The arrangement of professional associations shall be labour unions and private sector employers, as well as federations and confederations of such regulated by law. Secret associations or those of a paramilitary character are prohibited. unions; while Law No. 1626/2000 on Public Service, regulates the establishment and operation of public employee unions, No. 1.334/1998, Act Defence of Consumers and Users, governs Previously, Articles 26, 28 and 32 of the Paraguayan supreme law established the principle consumer associations; Act No. 904/1981 established the Statute of Indigenous Communities, of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly and the right to information, guaranteeing the concerned with the recognition and protection of indigenous communities in Paraguay; and uncensored expression and dissemination of ideas and opinions without limitations other than Act No. 438/1994 on Cooperatives, regulates the establishment, organisation, and operation of those prescribed by the constitution. These provisions also guarantee every person the right to cooperatives among other organisations that can be considered CSOs. be informed and to have access to public sources of information. While no state institutions existing to control or monitor CSOs on a permanent basis, in the With regard to freedom of association, Article 96 of the constitution states that all private case of development partnerships engaged in public welfare activities, the government does and public workers (with the exception of members of the Armed Forces and National Police) monitor fiscal accounts with regard to file accountability. have the right to organise unions without prior authorisation. Employers also enjoy the same freedom of organisation. No one may be compelled to join a union and all democratic practices In 2005, the Frutos Administration began working towards alignment and harmonisation of established in the law shall be observed during the election of authorities and the operation of development policies, leading to more concentration among government agencies and the unions, which will also guarantee the stability of the union leader. The recognition of a union private sector, leading to a sharp decline in opportunities for participation by CSOs. These requires official registration at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. trends continued under the Lugo Administration. The government of the Republic of Paraguay is characterised by the separation of powers In addition, a study by the Mesa de Articulación de Asociaciones Nacionales Internet Redes de exercised by the legislative, executive, and judiciary. ONGs de América Latina Internet el Caribe, published in April 2014, indicated that “The Official Development Assistance (ODA) fell by 2.7% in 2011 in real terms.” Latin America became a non- Ministries are nominated and voted for at the council of ministers, while the secretaries report priority area for cooperation disbursements: the flow of Official Development Assistance (ODA) directly to the president of the republic, responsible for regulation and coordination of the to Latin America and the Caribbean reached only 7% of the global share in 2010 (latest figures), ministries. in contrast to Africa and Asia, receiving 37% and 30% respectively.330 At the level of sub-national governments, the council of governors is a forum for coordination in which authorities of the 17 state governments are represented. The Municipal Organic Law grants municipal authorities relative authority at the local level, and 329 Derogated by Decree No. 9900/12 330 Instituto de Comunicación Internet Desarrollo (ICD) Mesa de Articulación de Asociaciones Nacionales Internet Redes de ONGs de América Latina Internet el Caribe – Unión Europea. Aporte a la generación de propuestas de mecanismos de financiamiento de las ONG en el Cono Sur Internet Brasil. Abril de 2014. 217 pp. 202 203 The significant reduction in terms of development cooperation towards Paraguay has had a relations with a clientelistic and corrupt state. Nevertheless, relations between civil society and major impact on civil society. Over the last three years, an estimated 100 non-governmental government authorities have improved of late. CSOs have submitted to the authorities a number organisations have had to close their doors, and at least another 300, have been forced to of proposals aimed at improving various public services, and have also been actively involved downsize, restricting their areas of work. in developing mechanisms to monitor public policies. The campaign for fair tax is an example of this, alongside campaign work done in relation to pressing for higher budget allocations for The Political Environment for CSOs in Paraguay health and education. In February 1989, Paraguay began a transition to democracy331 after 35 years of dictatorship. Various social movements are gradually gaining ground, along with a greater capacity to propose The years of political transition were, for civil society, a learning process in the exercise of civil alternative laws and institutions, including various social policies related to poverty alleviation, liberties, in the context of new actors and responsibilities emerging in the socio-political horizon. child protection legislation, institutions such as the Ministry of Women, food security programs, and family farming. In 1992, a new constitution was sanctioned, guaranteeing full respect for human rights. This should have paved the way toward new sets of institutions under a multi-party system, though Furthermore, a study by UNICEF shows that social spending has grown in recent years in various the traditional dominance of a patrimonial presidential system has continued, even gaining social areas.335 Spending on education has seen a significant increase over this same period, legitimacy under formal elections.332 with an equivalent rise in investments in public health. However, other sectors have received relatively low amounts and occasional increases in public spending reflect only small changes In August 2008, Fernando Lugo assumed the presidency, after 60 years of dominance by the in short-term priorities. Colorado Party, and two decades into the political transition in the country. With 40.8% of the vote, Fernando Lugo was elected president of Paraguay, as the candidate of a coalition of Yet Lugo’s government, which was to conclude in August 2013, underwent a “political trial” political parties grouped under the Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC), which brought together initiated by the Chamber of Deputies on Thursday, June 21, and completed by the senate on various parties and movements of different political persuasions. Friday, June 22, 2012. These chambers decided, by a large majority, to terminate the mandate of Fernando Lugo as president. In his place was elected Federico Franco, who held the position Lugo’s government began establishing as a priority the strengthening of social policies, especially of vice president and whose presidential term ended in August 2013. those related to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities. Some view the removal of President Lugo as a breach of the social contract established since In September 2008, the government came out with its Social-Economic Strategic Plan (SSPE the political transition that began in 1989. Several analysts, civil society groups, and human 2008-2013), whose main objective was to improve the lives of all the inhabitants of the country rights activists mobilised actively, trying to defend the social gains that had been achieved without exception. In 2010, through the social cabinet, the government formulated the proposal under President Lugo, but the legislative machinery made it impossible to reverse the dismissal. for public policy, ‘Paraguay for All 2010-2020,’333 which launched a series of development initiatives and channelled resources to meet the growing demands of the population and the More recently, the administration of President Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), which began in creation of opportunities in the context of a human rights-based approach. August 2013, established as a cornerstone of his administration, “the reduction of poverty and the promotion of social inclusion and equity.”336 In 2008, the government implemented and expanded its strategy of Primary Health Care (APS), which aimed to reduce social exclusion, increase coverage and access to networks of The Cartes Administration has also established a National Development Plan (PND) for the comprehensive healthcare, based on the needs and health problems of the people. Gratuity of period 2014-2030. The PND has three strategic areas and four cross-cutting themes that health services is implemented progressively and free medicines are provided, based on a new articulate policies and specific guidelines of different sectors; with respective goals,337 these expanded basic listing.334 strategic priorities and transverse lines are: In the area of poverty reduction, under President Lugo, the Tekoporá Program expanded its • Reduction of poverty and social development coverage of families living in extreme poverty, from 14,000 families in 2008 to 112,000 families by June 2010. This has come alongside the growth of producer committees and mothers’ • Inclusive economic growth committees for families living in poverty, and efforts to build stronger links between local communities and state authorities relating to social policies (health, education, housing, etc.). • Greater integration of Paraguay into the world economy The establishment of the National Development Plans heralded moves toward more open The participation of CSOs in the development of these national strategies has been low. Their discussion on the need for greater civil society engagement in government development impact on shifting government priorities toward more inclusive development and on reducing projects. poverty and inequality has been unclear, even as the presence and visibility of national and international NGOs in the country has increased over the past two decades in the areas of However, public institutions remain weak, with many co-opted by vested interests, including corporations and local political and business elites that have secured their profits through their 335 UNICEF-Paraguay. Inversión en la Infancia en Paraguay Internet análisis de su impacto en algunos indicadores relacionados con la niñez. Asunción, Paraguay, Septiembre 2007. 331 After the coup led by General Rodriguez in February 1989 against Alfredo Stroessner who ruled for 35 years 336 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Presidencia de la República del Paraguay. Ministerio del Interior. 332 Ocampos, Genoveva- Refínela, Stella. Informe Democracia Internet Desarrollo. 2006-2007. Asociación Latino Decreto No. 391 “Por el cual se declara como Prioridad Nacional del gobierno la meta “Reducción de la americana de Organizaciones de Promoción-BASE-ECTA. Asunción, Paraguay, Junio 2007. Mimeo. 66 pp. Pobreza” Internet se encarga a la Secretaría Técnica de Planificación del Desarrollo Económico Internet Social 333 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Gabinete Social. Paraguay Para Todos Internet Todas. Propuesta de (STP) la elaboración e implementación del Programa de Reducción de Pobreza”. Asunción, 13 de septiembre Política Pública para el Desarrollo Social 2010-2020. Paraguay, 2010. Pp.129. del 2013. 4 pp. 334 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Presidencia de la República. Secretaría Técnica de Planificación 337 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Secretaría Técnica de Planificación del Desarrollo Económico Internet del Desarrollo Económico Internet Social (STP) - Secretaría General de la Presidencia Informe 2009. Gobierno Social (STP). Paraguay: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2030. Versión 9 de Mayo 2014. Asunción, Paraguay. Nacional. Julio 2009. 87 pp. 108 pp. 204 205 poverty reduction, environment and risk management, the defence of the rights of indigenous, By 2010, in absolute terms, approximately 2,197,000 Paraguayans lived in poverty, representing and aspects of governance. 34.7% of the population. Extreme poverty is accentuated in rural areas, 32.4% the Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) increased from 0487 to 0512 (2009-2010). Official figures show For civil society, one of the main challenges for the efficient and effective implementation that between the years 2003 and 2011, total poverty fell 12 points from 44% to 32.4%; while of public policies remains a stronger institutional framework, the establishment of effective extreme poverty declined by only three percentage points; rising from 21.2% to 18%. coordination - and allocation of functions without overlapping - rather than competition between public institutions, in order to accommodate the proliferation of plans, projects, and Between 2011 and 2013, the total poverty fell eight points, from 32.4% to 23.9%; and extreme programs, avoid duplication and seek synergies that support the actions of the state. High poverty fell from 18% to 10.2%. This decline in the poverty rate is largely due to the confluence barriers of mistrust between sectors (public and private) also make it difficult to agree on a of four factors: 1) The growth of gross household income, 2) job growth and better labour national development strategy that is shared broadly. participation, which has 3) stimulated consumption through better wages and higher human capital, and (4) food price stability.341 In recent years, the emergence of an armed movement in the north, as well as the rise in drug trafficking and arms smuggling, have accompanied increased calls for controls on the work Since the government of Paraguay enacted its Strategy for Poverty Reduction in 2003, much of of CSOs. Following the coup against President Lugo, threats, and intimidation against human the economic resources stemming from aid and international cooperation have been allocated rights activists increased. for this purpose. The support of the European Union between 2007 and 2013, amounting to 130 million Euros, was aimed at poverty reduction and the economic integration of Paraguay, Over the past three years in the northern provinces, especially in Concepción and San Pedro, as well as improvements in the education system. This was in line with similar levels of support the activities of CSOs have been severely curtailed. In April 2010, due to a series of murders that from the United Nations and the governments of Spain, Brazil, and Germany, among other occurred in the north, the congress declared a state of exception for 30 days in five departments countries. (San Pedro, Concepción, Amambay, Alto Paraguay, and President Hayes). Once again in 2011, a state of exception for 60 days was established, but this time only in the departments of The macroeconomic framework in Paraguay in recent years has been largely positive: a Concepción and San Pedro, and more troops were sent to the area. The state of exception relatively low foreign debt (13.2% of GDP for the period 2010)342 and significant GDP growth in suspended certain constitutional guarantees such as the right of assembly, while empowering 2007 (+6.8%) and 2008 (+ 5.8%), successfully enduring the first signs of the international crisis. the president to order arrests without warrants. The advent of the global recession, coupled with a severe internal drought, caused a period of negative growth (-3.8% GDP), out of which the economy rapidly recovered by 2010, resuming a As one of the first measures introduced by the government of President Horacio Cartes (2013- stellar growth trajectory at +18.3% GDP343 well above the average rate of the last five years (5.7% 2018), the National Defence Act was amended, which gives the president the power to mobilise GDP). Growth rates have so far stabilised, reaching 13.6 in 2013.344 the military in fighting the guerrillas without a declaring state of exception. In only a brief period of time, the north has become an area of widespread military tensions. At present, the country is the sixth largest producer and fourth largest exporter of soybeans in the world.345 Over recent years, soy cultivation has been increasing in geometric proportions. The Socio-Economic Context for CSOs in Paraguay From 833.005ha representing 39.6% acreage of major agricultural products in 2003, it reached 1,700,000ha in 2004, with soy production amounting to about 4,500,000 tons.346 Between the Paraguay’s social structure is built on decades of economic inequality, including the monopoly years 2006 and 2007, soy production reached 6,000,000 tons, yielding a cumulative growth of of land (large estates), and the chronic poverty of its smallholder peasant population. 57.9%. It is estimated that from 1974 to 2000 (26 years), land devoted to soybeans increased from 40 thousand to a million acres. Between 2000 and 2009, it reached 1,600,000ha out of 40 Land distribution of arable land has been patchy, leading to sharp development gaps between million hectares of Paraguayan territory.347 rural and urban areas, and entrenched inequality among social classes. For instance, large estates have been established at the border with Brazil, displacing local populations, despite While the country has enjoyed an economic bonanza in terms of the most dynamic sectors of being prohibited by law. the economy, which was reflected in an increase in the rates of taxation, funds allocated by the government for civil society organisations are still scarce. CSOs are mainly relegated to charity Small holder farmers constitute a significant share of the rural population. The Agricultural delivery. Census of 2008 showed that small farms of up to 20 hectares constitute 84% of the total, while larger farms of 50ha represent only 9% of total rural production units.338 In terms of the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, including economic policies, the involvement of CSOs is limited. Efforts like Paraguay Debate, or Monitoring Estimates from the Department of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses for 2012 show Paraguay’s Social Indicators conducted by the Coordinating Committee for the Rights of Children and population amounted to 6,672,631 inhabitants, of which 50.52% were men (3,371,117) and Adolescents (CDIA) are new, and still, small contributions and their inputs are not always 49.48% (3,301,514) were women. A 59.5% of the population resides in urban areas and 40.5% heard by government agencies. It has been in the field of human rights, through reports of live in rural areas. The age structure reveals a predominantly young country, where 58.7% of 341 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Secretaría Técnica de Planificación del Desarrollo Económico Internet the population is under 30 years and the age group 65 and older representing 6.6%.339 Most of Social (STP). Paraguay: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2030. Presentación Ejecutiva. Asunción, Paraguay. 46 pp. the population is concentrated in the central department and the city of Asunción, amounting 342 La deuda pública externa muestra una tendencia a la disminución por sexto año consecutivo pasando del to about 41% of the total population.340 53,4% del PIB en el 2002, a un 18% para el 2010. 343 Banco Central del Paraguay. Informe Preliminar 2010. Asunción, Paraguay, 2011. 344 Banco Central del Paraguay. Informe Económico Preliminar 2013. Asunción, Paraguay, 2014. 76 pp. 345 Banco Central del Paraguay. Estimaciones del PIB año 2010. Asunción, Paraguay, marzo 2010. 4 pp. En: http:// Internet.bcp.gob.py. 338 Gobierno de la República del Paraguay. Censo Agropecuario Nacional 2008. Volumen I. San Lorenzo, 346 Centro de Estudios Paraguayos Antonio Guasch. Editorial. Ética Internet Soja. Centro de Estudios Paraguayos Paraguay, año 2009. 105pp. Antonio Guasch. Acción. Revista paraguaya de reflexión Internet diálogo. No. 242. Abril 2004. 339 Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas Internet Censos. Resultados de la Encuesta Permanente de 347 Grupo Democratización Internet Construcción de la Paz (CDE, CIPAE., CODEHUPY, POJOAJU, RED RURAL, Hogares (EPH) 2012. Asunción, Paraguay, Diciembre 2013. SERPAJ-PY Internet Fundación Vencer). Acciones del Gobierno de Lugo para la Reforma Agraria entre agosto 340 Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas Internet Censos. Anuario 2012. Asunción, diciembre 2013. 329 pp. del 2008 Internet junio del 2010. Diciembre del 2010. 134 pp. 206 207 complaints about violations of human rights, where the Human Rights Coordinator of Paraguay In recent years, populations of Chinese, Arabic, and Brazilian descent have increased, and have has proved strong in confronting the views of government members. The media has also played been crucial in establishing Ciudad del Este as an important commercial district in the tri-border an important role in giving publicity to such content. area. Brazilian investors have gained a foothold in the country, in search of arable land and forestry projects. The Socio-Cultural Context for CSOs in Paraguay In the area of women’s rights, domestic labour by women, especially in rural areas, is often not valued and in the workplace, women receive lower wages or a mere 65% of men’s income, Paraguay is a multicultural and bilingual country, where almost 95% of the population is mestizo, and also have higher unemployment and underemployment rates than men.351 While the work and the remaining 5% is composed of indigenous and immigrants of various origins. One of the of women’s organisations has successfully drawn greater attention to the problem, significant most significant cultural characteristics of the country is the strong identity of its inhabitants gaps remain. with the Guaraní culture. This is expressed in many areas, but mainly through language. Most of the Paraguayan population are bilingual (Spanish-Guarani). Nationally, the predominant This is a situation compounded by high rates of illiteracy and lack of knowledge on human language spoken at home is the Guarani (59%), followed by the Castilian (36%), although in rights, especially in rural areas and among indigenous minorities. cities 55% of households communicate predominantly in Spanish. Conclusion and Recommendations Another feature of the country is the predominance of the Catholic religion (89%), with minority faiths making up roughly 10% of the population.348 CSOs in Paraguay have been an important pillar in the struggle for human rights in the country. After a long period of military dictatorship that ended in 1989, the last 25 years have shown The indigenous population is 108,308, representing 1.7% of the total population. Just over half steady progress toward a system of law that at least formally guarantees these rights. The (52.5%) live in the eastern region, and the rest (47.5%) in the western region. Considering the five constitution of 1992 was one of those achievements – the product of many years of struggle on main indigenous language families, 71.5% of them are in poverty. Poverty is more pronounced the part of civil society. for the Guarani (75.95%) compared to other families, but to a lesser degree for the Gauikuru 65.3%. Nevertheless, poverty, violence, and corruption that still plague the Paraguayan society suggest we are still a long way from a society that promotes the full exercise of human rights. This is all Poverty besets indigenous populations. Estimates show 61.7% of Guarani and 56.4% of Maskoy the more reason for civil society to press on. live in extreme poverty. Government programs are scarce and poorly resourced. The work of civil society organisations to demand rights for indigenous peoples has, however, paid off with The Istanbul Principles and their emphasis on the role of CSOs as development actors are a few favourable rulings in favour of indigenous peoples by bodies such as the Commission principles that encourage us not to fail in that attempt. The promotion of human rights and and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Examples include the judgment of the Inter- social justice is a core feature of a number of Paraguayan CSOs. Despite cuts to aid flowing American Court relating to the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, where the Paraguayan state to the country, efforts to promote, protect, and defend the rights of large population groups did not guarantee the right to ancestral property of the community (Judgment of 17 June 2005). have been kept up. The work of various human rights organisations, especially those related to This was similar to the case of the Indigenous Community Sawohoyamaxa, where again the farmers’ organisations, women and children’s groups have been at the forefront of this. Paraguayan state did not guarantee the right to ancestral property of the community (Judgment of 29 March 2006). Also in the case of the Indigenous Community Kaákmok Kásek, where again, While the country has made progress in the legal recognition and the establishment of laws the Paraguayan state violated the right to ancestral property (Judgment of 24 August 2010). In guaranteeing the work of civil society organisations, large gaps remain. Gender inequality, these three court rulings, the Paraguayan state was found guilty for failing to protect the rights violence against women and girls, and the exploitation of children and adolescents remain of indigenous people and was ordered to restore the ancestral rights of land ownership, and to pressing concerns. The wanton destruction of the environment, not least for the expansion of provide compensation to indigenous communities for all damages incurred. the soybean industry, has in addition caused massive displacement and major migration flows to the city. Other minorities include those from Mennonite, Japanese, and African descent. The first wave of Japanese immigration began in 1936, followed again in 1953, when the Paraguayan government The civil society organisations, as development actors in Paraguay, should continue to work opened its doors to all types of immigration in the Department of Itapúa, in solidarity with the to ensure the full exercise of human rights, promote environmental sustainability, and build countries devastated by World War II. Currently, some 7000 Japanese and Nike reside in the networks and effective partnerships that help share knowledge and forge a commitment to country; the Nike, a minority population, representing only 0.14% of the total population of social change. This is clearly a tall order, but considering the revival of civil society over recent Paraguay.349 years, CSOs can surely prove their strength as in their best years in the fight against the dictatorship. The black population, according to Ignacio Telesca, are descendants of slaves brought from Africa. A census made in 1799 found that 50% of Paraguay’s population was of African descent, References black or mulatto.350 The black population is a minority today (less than 0.5%). 1. Central Bank of Paraguay. Preliminary Report 2010. Asunción, Paraguay, 2011. 2. Central Bank of Paraguay. Economic Report 2013. Asunción, Paraguay, 2014. p. 76 3. Carrera, Carlos: “Study on Cultural Diversity and Human Development: categorisation 348 Carrera, Carlos: “Investigación sobre Diversidad Cultural Internet Desarrollo Humano: una caracterización of diverse ethno-lingusitic groups in Paraguay”. 3rd Annex. National Development de los diversos grupos lingüístico-culturales del Paraguay”. Diversidad cultural Internet desarrollo humano: Programme. Dialogue to identify ethno-linguistic groups in Paraguay. December 2004. una caracterización de los diversos grupos lingüísticos-culturales del Paraguay”. Anexo 3. Programa de 4. Cantero, Cristian. Interview with Ignacio Telesca. Ultima Hora newspaper. Print edition, las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. Diálogos sobre identidad Internet diversidad cultural en Paraguay. 19 May 2008. Diciembre 2004. 349 Kasamatsu, Emi. La inmigración japonesa en el Paraguay. Trayectoria de los 70 años. Nov. 2006. Mimeo. 5pp. 351 Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo-ONU MUJERES. Empleo, Género Internet Desarrollo 350 KCantero, Cristian. Entrevista a Ignacio Teresa. Diario Última Hora. Edición impresa, lunes, 19 de Mayo de Humano. Documento de Trabajo No. 1. Asunción, diciembre 2013. 34 pp.306 Mister Wang Ying owner of the 2008. ChinWei company and HKND, http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=list&catid=3 208 209 5. Antonio Guasch Centre for Paraguayan StUDUES. Editorial. Ethics of Soy Production. Peru Acción : Paraguayan journal for reflection and dialogue. No. 242. April 2004. 6. Department of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses. Results of the Permanent Houshold Survey (EPH) 2012. Asunción, Paraguay, December 2013. Summary 7. Department of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses. Annual Report 2012. Asunción, December 2013. p. 329 CSOs and NGOs in Peru have had an important role to play because of the country’s history of 8. Government of the Republic of Paraguay. National Agricultural Census 2008. Volume I. military rule and democratic instability. Today, a great number of NGOs exist in Peru, ranging San Lorenzo, Paraguay, año 2009. p. 105 from grassroots initiatives to nationwide organisations. There is also a wide range in terms of 9. Government of the Republic of Paraguay. Social Cabinet. Paraguay for All: Proposal for the type of work they undertake. However, human rights organisations, indigenous people’s Public Policy for Social Development 2010-2020. Paraguay, 2010. p.129 movements and environmental organisations are subjected to harassment and accusations 10. Government of the Republic of Paraguay. President of the Republic. Technical Secretariat from the government, companies, and the army. Journalists and clergy also face problems on Planning for Economic and Social Development (STP) – General Secretariat Report in pursuing their work. A law regulating the work of non-governmental organisations creates ot hte Preisdent 2009. National Government. July 2009. p. 87 obstacles to external funding for NGOs and allows increased interference of the government in 11. Government of the Republic of Paraguay. President of the Republic. Ministry of Interior. the activities of civil society organisations. Decree No. 391 “ By which ‘Poverty Reduction’ is declared a National Priority, for which the Ministry of Planning Economic and Social Development ( STP ) is responsible for Introduction the development and implementation of the Poverty Reduction Program”. Asunción, 13 September 2013. p. 4 Peru is a poor nation with very modest levels of industrial development and formal employment. 12. Government of the Republic of Paraguuay. Technical Secretariat on Planning for Peru experienced several military coups and democratic reversals during the second half of Economic and Social Development (STP). Paraguay: National Development Plan 2030. the 20th century. After the Civil War that rocked the country in the ‘80s to early ‘90s, Peru has Executive Summary. Asunción, Paraguay. p. 46 made political strides over the years; however, the country’s transformation has been marked 13. Government of the Republic of Paraguuay. Technical Secretariat on Planning for by abrupt changes marred by the crumbling of its democracy, a process accompanied by debt Economic and Social Development (STP). Paraguay: National Development Plan 2030. crisis, hyperinflation, and terrorism. Under the new elected President Alberto Fujimori and Accessed 9 May 2014. Asunción, Paraguay. p. 108. international pressure, Fujimori partially restored constitutional processes, leading to the 1993 14. Group for Democratisation and Peace-building (CDE, CIPAE., CODEHUPY, POJOAJU, constitution and the mostly free and fair 1995 elections, resulting in Fujimori’s re-election in RED RURAL, SERPAJ-PY Internet Fundación Vencer). Lugo Administration’s Action on 1995. However, a second wave of authoritarianism brought subtle infringements of freedom of Agrarian Reform, August 2008 to June 2010 December 2010. p. 134. Institute for the press, selective violations of individual civil liberties, and ultimately electoral manipulation, Communication and Development (ICD) Mesa Articulation of National Associations and which secured Fujimori a third presidential term in July 2000. Networks of NGOs in Latin America and the Caribbean– European Union. Contribution to the generation of proposals for CSO funding mechanisms in the Southern Cone and Over the last few years, Peru has experienced rapid economic growth; however, despite efforts Brazil. April 2014. p. 217 by the present government, Peru still has one of the highest rates on inequalities despite some 15. Kasamatsu, Emi. Japanese immigration to Paraguay. A 70-year history. Nov. 2006. social protection schemes aimed at providing support for the poorer elements of Peruvian Mimeo. 5 pp.bibliography society. 16. Ocampos, Genoveva- Rufinelli, Stella. Report on Democracy and Development, 2006- 2007. Latin American Association of Development Organisations-BASE-ECTA. Asunción, CSOs and NGOs in Peru have played an important role in national development because of Paraguay, Junio 2007. Mimeo. p. 66. the country’s history of military rule, democratic instability, and corruption. Although NGOs 17. United Nations Development Programme-UNN WOMEN.Employment and Human have long existed in Peru, an NGO boom begun in the ‘70s, under the government of the then Development. Working Document No. 1. Asunción, December 2013. p. 34 President Juan Velasco Alverado. 18. UNICEF-Paraguay. Impacts of investing in early childhood care in Paraguay. Asunción, Paraguay, September 2007. There was a second proliferation of NGOs in the 1980s with the re-emergence of a democratic government, which focused on grassroots issues. Because of the political environment in which many of these organisations emerged, they were committed to the idea of development that did not originate from a top-down approach. CSO Enabling Environment in Peru Legal and Regulatory Framework Article 2, paragraph 13 of the Constitution of Peru recognises the right of every person to join and establish foundations and various forms of legally recognised non-profit organisations, without prior authorisation in accordance with the law. In addition, the constitution stipulates that these organisations cannot be dissolved by administrative decision. Peru’s constitution also recognises, among other internationally recognised rights: • the right to equality before the law (no person should be discriminated against because of origin, race, sex, language, religion, opinion, economic status, or any other factor) (Article 2 2); • freedom of conscience and religion, individually or collectively (no one may be 210 211 persecuted for their ideas or beliefs, or opinion) (Article 2.3); The Law 28820 that raises the framework of this felony of attacks against communication ways • freedom of information, opinion, expression, and dissemination of ideas through and disturbances to allow effective prison in different cases. spoken or written word or image, by any media, without prior authorisation or censorship or impediment (Article 2.4); The D.S. 060-PCM-2007 that allows the intervention of the Armed Forces in support of the • the right to privacy, and the inviolability of one’s communications and documents National Police (30 days) to guarantee the running of entities, essential public services and (Article 2 7 and 10); protect vital points. • freedom of contract (Article 62);_2013_413 • property rights (Articles 70-73); The Law 29166 that allows Armed Forces the use of fire weapons to control internal order. • the right to participate, individually or collectively, in the political, economic, social and The legislative orders 982, 983, 988, and 989 to punish ‘Organised Crime’: immunity of policemen culture of the nation (Article 2.17); and and military, they describe public protest as ‘extortion’, raise the punishments for disturbances • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is also protected by Article 2 of the and sanction public workers participating in strikes with even disqualification. constitution, section 12, which states that “Every person has the right to gather peacefully without arms”. The Supreme Order 12-2008-DE/CFFAA, Regulation of the Law 29166, that authorises the use of lethal force to protect private property, ‘in compliance with the assigned mission’ and in ‘self- In 2009, legislation was proposed that would expand the powers of the Peruvian Agency defence’. It authorises the intervention of AF on issues of the field of action of the Peru National for International Cooperation (APCI), which regulates funding to NGOs. In this scenario, the Policy as ‘common felonies’ and ‘drugs.’ reduction of development cooperation funds adds to the attempts by the government to align NGO with the public policies and plans, and its different sector priorities, raising the tensions The legislative Orders 1094, 1095, and 1097, regulating intervention by army and police forces levels with the APCI that regulates the work of DNGO and that in practice is tantamount to during social conflicts and the prescription of crimes against humanity. monitoring the sector that promotes democracy and human rights. The Administrative Decision No. 096-2012-CE-PJ issued by the judicial power, orders that all In addition, the state has expanded several legal mechanisms to control NGO, trough the cases related with the Espinar and Conga conflicts, must be judged in the provinces of Ica and design of legal NGO registration and declaration mechanisms, and to regulate and monitor the Chiclayo respectively. international cooperation projects that they are implementing. Lessons Learned or Proposed CSOs have recently faced the excessive control of resources administered by the APCI. Under the legal framework, NGOs or any other group subject to the supervision and control of APCI must, There is a need of promoting a framework anchored on development effectiveness, promoting among other responsibilities, provide extensive reporting about planned activities, sources a joint approach, and overall participatory, allowing addressing in an effective manner the most of funding and other financial details. In fiscal matters, they complete the Taxpayers Single marginalised sectors. There are also needs for: Register, the Income Tax Exempted Entities Register, the Donation Recipient Entities Register • A flexible framework to implement intervention strategies: structural, organisational and they process the Profit of the General Sales Tax Reimbursement paid by the international and operational changes, and fund raising (fusion, groups, and branches). cooperation projects and the profit of the non-conveyance of the sales tax in the import of • A self-regulatory framework promoting the continuous improvement of the NGO’s donated goods. management and internal control systems: Improvement of the disbursement capacity, execution of independent evaluations, setting up of an accountability framework, In labour matters, they register work contracts and pre-professional internship agreements, putting into practice transparent hiring procedures, appointment of the public worker and arrange leasing contracts, voluntary contracts, labour mediation contracts, and outsourcing in charge of the ethical issues, and launch of an annual external audit cycle. contracts. • A self-regulatory framework promoting ‘transparency’ frameworks and exchange of information about the NGO work, proving the real impact of their interventions, of the There are problems in the adaptation of professional skills to the changes in the environment. external evaluations and audits. There is a need of discontinuation of the work relationship, no renewal of contracts and • A framework reducing the risks against the audit actions of SUNAT, APCI, and MPTE, dismissal of staff. Closings of work centres have also taken place. promoting the preventive evaluation of the quality of administrative, accounting, tax and labour systems; and the training in the register, declaration, and APCI audit The risk is also high for the reduction of tax relief mechanisms for organisations intervening in procedures. cooperation, like the exemption of the income tax and the profit of the sales tax reimbursement. • And a framework promoting the participation and protection of the citizen’s rights to free expression and their exercise, of transit and assembly, i.e. against any form of In addition to this, the risks originating in the legal framework of protest criminalisation, that criminalisation of protest, indispensable for the strengthening of democracy. difficult NGO interventions and actions, such as: Governance Context The Law 27686 that interpreted the Art. 3, to indicate that the citizens that want to carry out marches or public demonstrations must demand ‘compulsorily’ guarantees. This distorts the Policy-making is not neutral; it is an inherently political process. From the consultations, it seems freedom of assembly. that political factors have had greater influence on the policy making process from internal political factors, such as governmental structures and capacity, to international political factors The Law 27686 raises the punishments for the felonies of ‘disturbance’ and ‘obstruction to the that enforce policy change. functioning of public services’, placing punishments in aggravated cases as high as 10 and eight years respectively, to allow preventive prison. Citizens’ participation has long been acknowledged as a useful tool in enhancing efficiency in the implementation of enhanced public policies. It improves the responsiveness of development policies to the needs of citizens and supports their ability to make creative and innovative 212 213 proposals to solve development challenges. The last two decades have seen countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru develop new mechanisms to foster of 60,000 PEN or nuevos soles (about 23,000 USD) to a former police general, whom the citizen participation at the local level by creating citizen participation bodies, locally referred newspaper had linked to a family whose members faced money-laundering charges. A bill that to as “local councils.” These are institutional spaces where citizens, represented by civil society would replace prison sentences of up to three years for defamation, as stipulated in the current or community-based organisations, academics, and the private sector, come together with law with community service and fines, is still awaiting a vote in the legislature. Although the municipal authorities to discuss and make decisions on local development and governance congress approved the bill in July 2011, former President García lodged objections that must still issues. In particular, by allowing greater participation of groups that were historically left out be debated and voted on before the bill can become law. of decision making processes, such as women, youth, and indigenous populations, these local councils have made local governance more inclusive and representative. The Impact of the Reduction of Development Cooperation Funds Peru’s constitution (Title IV, Chapter XIV on Decentralisation) goes even further, mandating The reduction of cooperation funds for international cooperation DNGO and of non-refundable local councils at the regional level – called Regional Coordination Councils (CCR) - composed cooperation has been diminishing ostensibly in the last five years, affecting a form of organisation of regional public officials and civil society representatives, as part of the basic structure of and operating that, maybe, is coming to its end. regional governments. The general and prolonged crisis of development cooperation only aggravated by the financial The region’s laws regulate the different features of the local councils, such as their administration, and economic crisis from 2008, but that comes from long before, and that has been losing responsibilities and decision-making power, though to varying degrees. On the one hand, importance in the economy of the countries that seek development. In most of the countries of Bolivia’s 1999 Law of Municipalities (Title 1, Chapter 1, and Article 5) and its 2009 constitution the region, cooperation doesn’t reach 1% of the GNI, except in five exceptions: Haiti, Nicaragua, (Title VI, Article 241), for example, only mention the need for local governments to promote Honduras, and Bolivia. citizen participation in the design and implementation of public policy and development plans. On the other, Peru’s Organic Law of Municipal Government includes a quite detailed description The reduction is caused by several reasons: the international crisis, the prioritisation, and the of the local councils – called Local Coordination Councils (CCLs) - and their powers, and of the orientation of the resources to other regions like Africa and Asia, as well as the reduction of Concerted Municipal Development Plan (discussed further below) which is mandatory for all poverty indexes in Peru, and also the upgrading to the category of middle-high income country, local governments to create, and in which the CCL plays an active role. which is also considered a cooperation donor in the new scheme south-south. Peru’s Political and Economic Context The themes of cooperation have shifted as well towards secularisation, which explains the scale of the aid that countries like Colombia and Mexico receive. Also, a special importance In 2008, the international economic crisis had negative effects on the country’s economic growth is attached to issues like trade, technology, and investment as new priorities. Brazil has as a consequence of the fall in price and demand of minerals. In 2012, Peru leads the region’s become an important south-south cooperation actor, especially with Portuguese-speaking growth, and has gone from being considered a low income country in 2000 to a middle income African countries, with an amount exceeding 2 billion USD. The current leaders in international country, this leads to a huge reduction in ODA being received by the country. This period has cooperation for Latin America are the United States that has reduced its contribution, but is been marked as well by the electoral processes at different government levels, mostly 2011 for still the main contributor; followed by the IDB (that has replaced Spain) in the group of main being a national election process in which a high percentage of the voters had expectations cooperation providers; Germany which has increased its cooperation with 20%; the EU that has and hoped big changes (the Big Transformation, the roadmap) that could provoke big changes, reduced its cooperation but is still significant; and France, who has gained a place in the first structural ones in relation to the protection of nature, prior consultation, decent work creation, line of cooperation. Finally, it notes that the funds are distributed 23% for the Caribbean, 30% strengthening of the citizen participation spaces, and the decentralisation process. for Central America, and 37% for South America. There is a huge gap between the expectations of most of the population and the advancement CSO Models in Development Cooperation improvements that have taken place. Employment grew, but at a slower pace that economic growth and the employment growth has been a precarious one. We continue to have a The Istanbul Principles describe CSO as development actors (September 28 to 30, 2010); heterogeneous employment structure without wage increase and without social security. Busan Partnership for an Effective Development Cooperation, 4th High Level Forum on Aid Different forms of contracts make employment precarious, both in the public and private Effectiveness (November 29 to December 1, 2011); Nairobi Declaration for Development sector. Statistically, poverty and chronic child malnutrition has reduced, but child anaemia has Effectiveness (December 8 and 9, 2012). not diminished considerably as well as huge gaps in inequality remain. Our starting point is the need of a new approach for development building on the following Socio-Economic Context ascertainment: In recent years, public protests against large-scale mining projects, as well as other government “Uncontrolled globalisation and profit-based growth is a tragedy for the poorest and for the policies and private sector initiatives, have led to numerous confrontations between police and planet; inequalities have aggravated in all levels, causing multiple food, energetic, financial, and protesters and resulted in the shooting deaths of civilians by state security forces. climate crises that are still to be solved. One thousand, four hundred million people (70% of which are women and girls) still live in conditions of extreme poverty. The current inequality The use of lethal force against public protesters is an ongoing problem. The Peruvian police and between the richest and the poorest continues growing: 30% of wealth and global resources army appear to have used lethal force unlawfully. are in the hands of the 0.5 of the population. The “geography of poverty” is changing and most of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries.” Journalists continue to receive suspended prison sentences and face fines for defamation. In June 2012, a court gave two journalists from the newspaper Diario 16, Juan Carlos Tafur and CSOs, being independent development actors, have over time initiated and ensured sustainable Roberto More, two-year suspended prison sentences and ordered each to pay compensation alternatives and a rights-based approach for development; there are global efforts to advance the rights and development needs of the people; a bigger formal space has been opened for civil society. 214 215 Issues of concern persist around Effective Development Cooperation, among them its exclusive References reference to the human rights in general and its little attention to women’s rights, environmental sustainability, and decent work agenda. It also lacks an assessment of the failures of cooperation 1. ACT Alliance (2011, June) Shrinking political space for civil society action. in accomplishing its engagements. There isn’t a framework of accountability and there is a lack 2. Retrieved from: http://Internet.actalliance.org/resources/publications/Shrinking-political-space- of-civil-society-action.pdf of engagement of southern countries with the partnership as the process advances. 3. APCI (2006) Cooperación Internacional no reembolsable recursos financcieros • In these areas, common agenda can be set up in points such as prior consultation to 4. ejecutados 2006 (Publication. Retrieved 12.09.2008, from Agencia Peruana de Cooepración the communities, transparency in contracts, taxing, investments not affecting human Internacional: http://Internet.apci.gob.pe/archivos/COOPERACION2006.pdf. rights, etc. 5. Barr, R. (2003) Internet The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to • There is a need to have a fiscal policy, with a sense of justice, connected with the 6. Toledo’, Third World Quarterly, 24(6): 1161-1178. development model. 7. CIVICUS (2013b) State of Civil Society 2013: Creating an enabling environment. Retrieved from: • A critical interpretation must be done of the model that points that growth is equal to https://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289 development. 8. ICNL (2013c, October) NGO Law Monitor: Peru. Retrieved from: 9. http://Internet.icnl.org/research/monitor/peru.html • It is necessary to analyse how to refine more the new constructions or debates around alternative models as the vivir bien/buen vivir (live well/well living) • It is important to revise the role of communication media, which play roles of operators and position many times the agenda that don’t match the interests of civil society. • There is a need to strengthen the debate around gender equity and equality • There is a need to insist on the issues of interculturalism and multiculturalism • There is a need to take advantage of the institutionalisation and the coordination and relation spaces for integration. Conclusion There has traditionally been a strong local civil society in Peru. In recent years, there has been a reduction in foreign donor support for civil society so formal NGOs have suffered a proportional decline. Meanwhile, the Civil War and neoliberal legislation also reduced the prevalence of mutual support organisations as well as weakening formal labour organisation. Tensions between government and CSOs are not new neither exclusive of Peruvian context. They respond to a continuous and complex balance between the realm of the politics of the force (domination) and the realm of the politics of the consent (hegemony). Given a regimen type, the relationship between government and CSOs can be improved or deteriorated according to the movement of CSOs activities from welfare provision to advocacy issues. The underlying cause of the cyclical attacks against CSOs along history can be explained by the government’s need of taking control over CSOs resources, in order to avoid the use of these resources to opposite interests in the government agenda. Recommendations • Bilateral and multilateral organisations to fund civil society support programmes that are planned and implemented with local partners, and that respect and work with the local government, particularly at the sub-national level. More indirect support and needs-based interventions can minimise fears of external agenda, while strengthening local capacities where it is most needed. Donors should consider taking a long-term perspective when aiding NGOs and put in place robust exit and sustainability strategies to ease aid volatility. • Examining social media, emerging social movements and their impact on opening up space for civil society to hold governments to account, as well as assessing in which contexts social media and emerging social movements are relevant. Likewise, exploring whether the enabling environment depends on more than technological platforms but also social capital and pre-existing movement. 216 217 Spain initiative was also the basis for the preparation of a cooperation law357 that crystallised some years later. Summary Twenty years later, CSOs have mobilised again around the fact that these commitments have not Spain’s development cooperation initiative has evolved since the international community been fulfilled at all, despite promises by the Spanish government in numerous United Nations pressured the former government to adapt to a shifting international aid landscape, especially Summits, as ratified in the Monterrey Summit (2000), and in the Millennium Development Goals. those relating to HR and gender equality. The situation has in fact so deteriorated that there is talk of dismantling the aid system itself, built up over the past several decades. This report aims to analyse the current state of development cooperation and development effectiveness in the context of the current systemic crisis, as well as find out about the current The next section does not intend to address the whole Spanish cooperation system, but focuses compliance of the government in the promotion of a CSO enabling environment in Spain through instead on the analysis of national policies and mechanisms. the frameworks (regulatory, political and economic) under which civil society participates in the support of the development efforts as indicators of the effectiveness of Spanish development Development Cooperation in Spain cooperation. Spain’s cooperation model is characterised by the significance358 of decentralised cooperation, Since 2008, Spanish DevCoop initiatives have gone through severe changes, including drastic one that is financed and managed by autonomic and local (provincial and/or municipal) public cutbacks in funding, loss of institutional support for the Spanish International Cooperation territorial entities. It is a complex cooperation system marked by a diversity of approaches Agency (AECID), the weakening of gender issues as a priority, attacks on decentralised cooperation and actors involved. Its local-scale nature facilitates citizen participation and involvement in a initiatives, among others. These issues not only endanger the development cooperation system number of international development processes. Despite the obvious challenges and difficulties itself, but reflect a significant setback in relation to policy engagements and sustainable human in this model, especially relating to coordination, coherence and complementarity, the DAC development and equality engagements ratified by the Spanish state. itself appreciates its richness, suggesting that it could serve as a source of inspiration for other donors.359 Introduction Spain, in a short period of time, went from being an aid recipient country in the 1980s into one The year 2014 marked the 20th anniversary of the 0.7 campaign352 spearheaded by various CSOs of the biggest ODA donors,360 under the impetus of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011). organised through platforms at the national and municipal levels. This campaign, developed Zapatero’s administration marked a significant increase of funds allocated to ODA, although in the context of the Great Lakes crisis,353 came alongside the biggest social mobilisation for not without criticism.361 This was accompanied by modest reforms in the cooperation system, international solidarity in Spain, and prompted the government to sign the Solidarity Pact, by untying it from the economic, commercial or geopolitical interests of foreign policy. which it committed to gradually allocate 0.7% of Spain’s GNI to ODA. Development cooperation was consecrated as state policy by the 2005-2008 MP, the second The process began with a petition drive that was handed to in June 1994. Aside from the 0.7% quadrennial strategic plan, defining the country’s development policy, and was strengthened of GDP ODA allocation, the petition called for the improvement of ODA management, as with the signing of the State Pact against Poverty (December 19, 2007).362 These initiatives well as for greater transparency and orientation of development assistance efforts along an strengthened the engagement of Spain with the MDGs, including on poverty reduction, and the environmentally sustainable and human rights-based approach. engagement with human rights and gender equality, aid effectiveness and transparency. In September 1994, the first 0.7 camp out was organised in front of the Ministry of Economy Finally, the role of CSOs as relevant actors in cooperation policy was ratified, and the government and Finance. This mobilisation spread rapidly to all communities,354 along with a hunger strike. agreed to support their strengthening and promote their participation and multi-stakeholder dialogue. An institutional reform process was initiated for this purpose, culminating in the This was just one among a number of historic civil society mobilisations on aid and development creation of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.363 issues. As early as 1981, the collective Justicia Internet Paz355 (Justice and Peace), initiated a campaign that aimed at raising social awareness and pressuring the political class of the need 357 Law 23/1998, from July 7, of International Cooperation for Development. to allocate 0.7% of GDP to development cooperation ‘for reasons of justice, solidarity, and 358 The autonomic cooperation represented in 2010 8,66 % of the total net ODA of Spanish cooperation and survival.’ After being presented in the senate through a non-law bill,356 all the political parties 12,89 % of the total net bilateral ODA. with parliamentary representation signed a declaration promising to pursue this objective. The 359 DAC: “Development Co-operation Reviews: Spain 1998”. Series nº 27. OCDE. Paris, 1999. (pg 7) 360 The seventh in 2008, according to the DAC. 361 The Commitment to Development Index elaborated by the Center for Global Development highlights the role 352 In May 1972, in the occasion of a Trade and Development Conference, the UN adopted resolution 61 with of Spain as the country with the best improvement between 2003 and 2009. The index encompasses 7 dimen- the objective of allocating 0.7 % of the GNP of the most industrialised countries for ODA for the impoverished sions of policies related to development (aid, trade, investments, migrations, environment, security and technol- countries of the South. ogy). Among 22 donors, Spain was placed in the 7th position. The dimensions where it showed best scores were 353 This crisis was result of the Tutsis genocide in Rwanda by Hutus and the following exodus in April 1994 of in technology, migration and investments. However, it scored worst on security, environment and cooperation over two million Rwandans to neighboring countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa. in general. Focusing on this last one, Spain obtained a score of 4.3 (out of 7), placing it in 12th place This owes 354 The Spanish state is organised territorially in municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities. These to a reduction in the quality of aid caused by a number of debt-accumulating conditionalities, tied aid, the Communities refer to territories with common historic, cultural or economic characteristics, with a self-govern allocation of ODA towards middle income countries and the size of development projects. See: ROODMAN, D.; C. capacity for managing their interests. See the 1978 Spanish Constitution in its Title VIII “Of the territorial organi- PRIETO & E. LAZARUS: “Spain”, Commitment to Development Index 2009. Center for Global Development. 2009. zation of the State.” En: http://Internet.cgdev.org 355 This will be the seed of the CONGDE, formed in 1986, an entity that acts as the spokesperson of the sector 362 This Pact was signed by all the political parties with parliamentary representation and the CONGDE estab- with the institutions. Currently it is formed by 108 entities, of which 89 are NGOD and 17 Autonomic Platforms. lishes the political orientation of development cooperation. In: http://antigua.congde.org/uploads/descargas/ In all, the total number of NGOD associated to the CONGDE and the Autonomic Platforms is 496 NGODs. libro_pacto.pdf 356 Report of the Study Paper of the Spanish Development Cooperation Policy, of November 1994, where there is 363 Royal Act 1823/2011, date December 21 2011. a recommendation to develop a legislation for covering the existing lack of regulation. 218 219 are not expected to receive additional resources. Worse, the MP has neither a clear budgetary National Legal and Regulatory Framework framework with precise goals nor projected results, nor indicators to enable its monitoring. Regarding laws, plans, policies and programs concerning international development Given such issues, pressure and scrutiny from civil society is critical and a number of CSOs cooperation, it is worth underscoring that Spain is a signatory to most of the major existing agree that the IV MP ‘is not a strategic planning document with the conceptual and operative frameworks for aid both at international and European levels, especially the UN conventions clarity needed for orienting the Spanish cooperation in the coming years.’368 and action plans on HR, gender equality (such as the CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action), the Rio Conventions on environmental sustainability and norms regarding cultural diversity and Institutional Mechanisms and Instruments respect for indigenous peoples. In addition, the Spanish government has ratified international commitments on the MDGs and the development effectiveness international agenda, as well Shifts in development cooperation priorities have been accompanied by changes in institutional as its European frameworks, among them the European Development Consensus364 (December structures. The Popular Party, elected in 2011, recently reduced the mandate of the Secretary 2005) and the Lisbon Treaty (December 13, 2007). of State for International Cooperation (SECI), and subsumed it under the SECIPI, which merges the responsibilities of development cooperation with international relations for a particular The pledge made by the previous government to transform cooperation into a state policy was region—Latin America. The SECIPI is also responsible for the recently created Secretary General translated into the enhancement of strategic planning and management. The main instruments for Cooperation, which absorbed the functions of the former DGPOLDE. In addition, priorities for Spanish development cooperation are: such as gender have lost centrality and visibility in the organisational chart of AECID.369 • The Law 23/1998 of International Development Cooperation (IDC); Regarding transparency and accountability, engagements for policy monitoring and • The Master Plans (MP), which are of a quadrennial nature. They constitute the main evaluation have not been fulfilled. Annual plans are under parliamentary control, according planning framework within which goals and priorities are established, both sectoral to the Cooperation Law, yet the government announced reforms aimed at eliminating such and geographic, for Spanish IDC. The II MP 2005-2008 stands out as a milestone as it obligations and replacing them by annual reporting by the agencies. This announcement introduces HR-BASED approaches, while mainstreaming gender; stirred up considerable concern among CSOs as they consider this a measure that weakens • Other relevant strategic planning tools include: annual plans (PACI), country strategy the transparency and accountability of government decisions, and runs contrary to the IATI, of documents (DEP), cooperation sector strategies, sectoral intervention plans, and which Spain is a signatory. country partnership frameworks. When it comes to social participation mechanisms, despite the MP reiterating the importance of The current IV MP 2013-2016 marks a rupture as it introduces an approach that prioritises creating a framework for the participation of CSOs in governance processes, in practice, spaces the commercial and financial dimension through the promotion of the ‘Spain Brand’365 and the have not been promoted. In fact, as the CONGDE is denounced, we are witnessing a shrinking of participation of private entities for the achievement of development and poverty eradication.366 civil society space and inoperative cooperation councils.370 This exclusionary attitude on the part The private sector appears as a strategic ally pushing CSOs into the background. In addition, of the government can be seen in the inter-department Aid Effectiveness and Quality Working according to provisions for 2013, almost 70% of the total ODA was allocated through loans, Group (GTEC) in which neither CSO nor local administrations can participate. CSOs demand mainly to middle income countries. more information and participation in the building of a joint Spanish position regarding the effectiveness forums.371 This “low-cost” cooperation367 approach prioritises the commercial aspect of foreign policy over solidarity, a rights-based approach and the fight against poverty, as well as promotes the Cutbacks in ODA privatisation of aid under so-called public-private partnerships. This entails a great risk for the fulfilment and respect of international engagements and human rights, especially for women Development cooperation policies have suffered the most severe cutbacks compared to any and other vulnerable groups. other policy or public institution, although budgetary allocations to ODA are insignificant.372 So the struggle to make up for Spain’s financial deficit marks a change in state priorities. Under the motto, ‘do more with less,’ the number of partner countries have been reduced from 56 to 23, with the intended goal of increasing the efficiency and impact of ODA by There have been strong budgetary cutbacks since 2010, which the president of CONGDE, the concentrating more funds in a smaller number of countries. However, these recipient countries highest space for civil society representation, denounced as the effective dismantling of Spanish development cooperation.373 Spain leads the list of DAC member countries that have cut back 364 This consensus places poverty eradication as fundamental goal of the European Union (EU) development policy, and the Member States commit to implement its policies in way coherent with the Aid Effectiveness principles and 368 See the assessment of the CONGDE of the Draft 2.0 of the IV Master Plan of the Spanish Cooperation 2013- the MDG, as well as increasing the volume of ODA needed for the achievement of the goals. 2016. At: Internet.congde.org 365 Spain Brand is a State policy”, whose goal is “improving the image of our country, both inside as beyond our 369 With the reform of the AECID Statute in 2012, the Sector Cooperation, Gender and NGOD Directorate is borders, in benefit of the common good. In a global world, a good country-image is an asset that helps to back the renamed as Multilateral, Horizontal and Financial Cooperation Directorate. international position of a State politically, economically, culturally, socially, scientifically and technologically. In 370 See the assessment of the CONGDE of the Draft 2.0 of the IV MP 2013-2016: “the dialogue and consultation the current crisis context, the approach of the Brand must give priority to the economic terms, contributing to the mechanisms used with NGOD haven’t been as transparent as they should have, leaving a scenario of confusion recovery of the growth and employmenta”. At: http://marcaespana.es/es/quienes-somos/que-es-marca-espana. in the sector which we in the Coordinator echo… This shows a serious democratic deficit in the definition of a php public policy”. 366 The deep worry of NGODs for the instrumentalisation of the Spanish cooperation policy is resulting from the 371 See Assessment of the 2014 communication: http://Internet.congde.org/contenidos/descargar/attached- abounding information present in the MP in which it is envisaged that “(T)he Spanish Cooperation will work files/1157/original?1397034760 to promote the relations with other countries in which Spain’s strategic interests converge with the global 372 At its higher point it barely reached 0,5 % of the public resources invested annually. responsibilities” (page 39 and 41, IV MP.); or in relation to the identification of financial operations “open up a 373 In words of Mercedes Ruiz Jimenez, president of CONGDE, we are witnessing a change of model “(T)he space of opportunity very interesting for the achievement of synergies with the presence of Spanish companies in cutbacks are not only provoked by the current economic situation, by the crisis, by the wrongly called crisis, these countries” (page 183), among others. that I considered more an embezzlement. We are observing as well a change in the development cooperation 367 GÓMEZ GIL, Carlos: “La voladura de la cooperación española. Indicadores para confirmar el deliberado colapso model that had been being articulated and constructed in the last ten years” Interview in “Se está desarticulan- de la política de AOD”. http://Internet.rebelion.org/docs/170003.pdf do la política de cooperación”. In Vía 52 beta. Nº 19: Cooperación en crisis. January 29 2013. In: http://via52. 220 221 on their aid the most in the period of 2009-2012,374 with an accumulated cutback of more than Dismantling of Decentralised Cooperation 70%, leaving only 0.15% of GNI in 2012 ODA. A report affirms that ‘the recent cutbacks leave the Spanish cooperation, and specially AECID, in a financial situation so weak that [it] prevents The official cooperation model of the Spanish state is characterised by diversity and Spain from developing a cooperation policy that deserves such name.’375 decentralisation, given that various administrations (communities, provinces and municipalities) have respective cooperation structures and policies that complement the central government. The government has since adopted an economist approach. In this context of cutbacks the They differ, however in terms of their focus on HR, gender, poverty eradication, as well as the FONPRODE376 has been created, receiving a significant amount of resources. In fact, it is development effectiveness agenda. This model, which emerged from the demands of social estimated that in 2013, nearly 70% of ODA was channelled through loans and credits, which movements in the 1990s, is at risk of disintegrating for two main reasons: first, the cutbacks, places development cooperation at risk of turning into an instrument for stimulating Spain’s and second, the questioning of local competencies. economic recovery.377 To the reduction of state funds for ODA, we must add strong cutbacks to decentralised In addition, expenditure estimates are constantly broken, increasing the amount of funds cooperation. This has fallen 44% from the 2008 maximum of 613.5 million EUR. Thus, the not actually spent. In the period of 2008-2012, the amount actually spent was 75% of what autonomous communities allocated for ODA in 2011 an average of 0.13% of their budgets—the was initially budgeted:378 in 2011, nearly 30% of the ODA foreseen by the 2011 PACI was not smallest percentage in the last decade: ‘In absolute numbers, we can observe a setback from implemented, and while the budget that the government announced for in 2012 reached 2.335 the year 2009 of 71% for the autonomous communities and of 69% for the local entities, again million EUR, what was finally implemented barely reached 1.700 million EUR. way above the average cutbacks in the whole of the public policies [sic].”383 According to CONCORD, this has undermined Spain’s credibility as an international actor in Regarding territorial competencies, the ruling popular party turned development cooperation development cooperation. While the official numbers of ODA speak of 0.16% of the GNI, the real into an exclusive competency of the central administration.384The reform of the local percentage barely reaches 0.14% of Spain’s GNI.379 administration limits the mandate of municipalities for the planning and delivery of basic services, excluding for example gender equality385 and international solidarity, which become an Beyond the reduced availability of ODA funds, a number of key development cooperation exclusive competency of the central state. This goes against Article 10 of the European Charter projects and other commitments have not been fulfilled significantly, affecting the quality for Local Autonomy, ratified by Spain in Strasbourg in October 15, 1985.386 in development assistance. The refundable portion of Spanish ODA increased slightly over 5% of gross ODA in 2011. Cooperation in matters of health, education, and agriculture went This reform has been widely criticised by autonomous communities,387 as well as civil society. backwards, going against the goals of the III MP, by allocating only 7.46% of gross ODA to rural For the CONGDE, this reform is a serious threat for development cooperation policy.388 Even development and the fight against hunger, and not the 10% previously established.380 the state council itself, a consultative body of the state, has published a report questioning the constitutionality of the reform as it reduces ‘in excess’ municipal autonomy. The so-called 20/20 Compromise381 has also not been fulfilled. While in 2008 and 2009, 24.6% and 28%, respectively, of the bilateral deliverable ODA were allocated, in 2010, it fell to 15%, and Impact of the Political Context on CSOs and Development Cooperation even 10.2% in 2011. Neither was fulfilled in the gender commitment of allocating 15% of the sector-deliverable ODA to gender and SRHR programs.382 According to research conducted by CONGDE,389 non-governmental organisations for development (NGOD) are among the most highly valued institutions in Spain, with 99% of It is important to highlight the fact that Spain has been ‘invited’ on repeated occasions to respondents showing their support for work developed by CSOs. The results revealed that enhance the quality of its aid. According to the 2012 DAC report (Aid Untying Report), Spain respondents agreed (3.5 out of 4) on the need for Spain to maintain relations of development still keeps tying 30% of its bilateral ODA. Only 64.8% of its bilateral cooperation was free from cooperation with other countries. Furthermore, half of respondents supported an increase of conditionalities. 383 The reality of aid 2012, op. Cit.. 384 Law 27/2013, of December 27, of rationalization and sustainability of the Local Administration. 374 Countries with similar economic situations have made much more moderate cutbacks: Portugal (-13%) and 385 The elimination of article 28 of the Law 7/1985 of Basis for the Local Regime entails depriving local governments Greece (-17%) and other local entities of the competency in promoting equality, despite the fact that CEDAW is binding for all the 375 Prologue to the Report The Reality of Aid 2013 drafted by Intermon Oxfam. public powers including the autonomic and local ones. 376 Created by the Law 36/2010, of October 22, and whose functioning is regulated in the Real Decreto 845/2011 386 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in June 1985, it says in it art. 10: “1. The local of June 17, with which culminates de reform of the Development Aid Fund (FAD). Entities have the right, in the exercise of their competencies, of cooperating and, in the scope of the Law, associate 377 See report CONCORD: Aid Watch 2013. Op.cit. with other local Entities for the realization of tasks of common interest”. Art. 3: “Local Entities can, under the 378 Data extracted from the PCI forecats and monitoring 2008, 2009, 2010, 2022 and 2012, cited in GÓMEZ GIL, conditions eventually foreseen by the law, cooperate with Entities from other States.” See http://Internet.femp.es/ Carlos, op.cit. files/566-353-archivo/carta_europea_autonomia_local.pdf 379 In 2013, over one-third of all bilateral aid provided by France and Spain was inflated”. CONCORD: Aid Watch 387 See for example the Report of the vice-presidency of the Junta de Andalucía about the Draft bill of rationalization 2014, page 15. and sustainability of the Local Administration, http://Internet.cosital.es/images/andalucia%20alrsal1.pdf 380 Page 13 Reality of Aid Report 2012, Intermón Oxfam. 388 Position of the CONGDE about the proposal of reform of the Local Administration, of September 27 2013. During 381 Approved by the Social Development Summit of Copenhagen in 1995, its aim is orientate a donor’s ODA the year 2011, the Spanish municipalities allocated 95 million euro to Cooperation and Development Education towards the basic social needs of the recipient countries, equally committing both. This way, donor countries policies, of which more than 10% were allocated to initiatives promoting a critic citizenship, and engaged with commit to allocate at least 20% of the bilateral ODA for funding basic social services, while recipient countries social transformation and fight against poverty. Of the amount allocated to Cooperation and Humanitarian commit to, in turn, devote, at least, 20 % of their public budget for funding social expenditure. The goal with this Action projects (aprox. 85 millions), 80,78% was orientated towards interventions related with the delivery of basic is orientating international cooperation towards a more precise aid and of greater quality in the improvement of social services (education and health mainly). This reform entails, as well, the risk of disappearance of a local the live conditions of the most impoverished populations social fabric participative and active in Development Cooperation, at the same time that opens the door for the 382 Engagement acquired in the previous III MP of allocating 9% to gender and 6 % to sexual and reproductive privatization of public services. health and tights, respectively. 389 2010 CONGDE Report on the NGOs assessment and prestige “Así nos ven” (“This is how we are seen”), July 2010. At: http://es.slideshare.net/HumaniaTv/informe-congde-julio-de-2010-as-nos-ven 222 223 foreign aid despite the domestic economic crisis, since the south was more severely suffering Other Political Measures Affecting CSOs the effects of the crisis, and 15.8% argued for maintaining current levels of ODA. It is worth highlighting the tense atmosphere created by policy changes, in the form of legislative NGODs and CSOs are seen to participate in policy development cooperation in diverse ways. On measures, which have tended to reduce a number of civil, political and socio-economic rights. one hand, as implementers of development programs through partnerships with government This is true in the case of gender equality policies and the attempt to reform the current and other development actors and, on the other, by participating in political and consultation Reproductive and Sexual Health Law that attacks women’s right to choose, threatening the spaces where policies are designed and monitored. return of clandestine abortions, as well as the loss of the universal right for health, impacting especially on immigrant populations and the unemployed. Yet, despite strong public support for civil society,390 and the existing legislative framework—one broadly aligned with international commitments on human rights, gender mainstreaming and At the European level, the ruling party has notoriously managed to use the ‘One of Us’ campaign, development effectiveness—reality on the ground for CSOs has been more challenging. which aims at replacing the European prohibition of using aid for buying arms with the ban on funding CSOs supporting sexual and reproductive health.400 Years of austerity measures on public funding, described by some media as an ‘economic tsunami,’391 have exacted a heavy toll on CSOs. A study made by the Instituto Social ESADE There are, in addition, initiatives aimed at reducing the areas of social participation and protest, published in 2012392 estimated that 20-30% of NGOs have disappeared. According to a survey aimed at criminalising social movements. This includes the Citizen Security Law, commonly made by CONGDE,393 96% of CSOs of CONGDE have seen their public funding diminish, and known as a gag law, passed thanks to the government’s majority in parliament.401 almost half of them have been forced to close projects and abandon countries or areas of intervention they experience non-payments.394 There are considerable territorial differences, This law has been widely contested by other political parties and civil society,402 including with Madrid, Catalonia, and Valencia being the most affected communities, as well as sectoral police trade unions and judiciary associations.403 This law sanctions ‘conducts that constitute differences, which have negatively impacted CSO projects on human rights and gender equality. an excessive use of the right to reunion and protest,’404 which, according to most CSOs, seeks Adding to this is a significant loss of influence on the part of CSOs and the gradual loss of space to dissuade social protest and the exercise of democratic participation with heavy fines for for participation and political dialogue, due to limited action by the Social and Cooperation participating in demonstrations and even prison sentences. Councils,395 and many political voices and mass media questioning the need for international aid efforts and civil society. Along such lines, the Basque employer’s association, CONFEBASK,396 Conclusions has argued for an end to the legal status of some critical trade unions as representatives of civil society deserving of official recognition because, CONFEBASK argues, they act beyond what they In summary, (i) Spanish ODA has dropped 70% in barely three years, making it a leader among consider to be their competencies.397 the big DAC donors in the amount of cutbacks to ODA; (ii) AECID has ended up with an extremely scarce budget of 260 million EUR; (iii) gender and key sectors for women have suffered deep Nevertheless, CSOs have attempted to work within an increasingly difficult environment by cutbacks; (iv) the amount of refundable or unused aid has increased; (v) the tradition of widening alliances and networks of mutual support. For example, CONGDE has joined the decentralised, citizen-based development cooperation has been diluted; (vi) Spain has used recently created Platform for the Third Sector398 whose goal is to defend welfare against austerity development cooperation as an instrument of commercialisation and internationalisation of measures adopted in response to the financial crisis. We have even witnessed the merging of Spanish enterprises through the so-called ‘Spain brand’, and (vii) CSOs have been forced, due to CSO platforms for cooperation, HR and peace.399 funding constraints, to shut down projects, severely impacting on their constituencies. 390 The 83.7% of the people interviewed agreed that the NGOs should continue developing its work. 390 We are witnessing, then, the effective dismantlement of a relatively progressive development 391 See El Mundo: “La financiación de las ONG en España caerá más de un 30% en los próximos cinco años”, ELMUNDO.es; 24-04-2013. En: http://Internet.elmundo.es/accesible/elmundo/2013/04/24/solidari- cooperation policy, as aligned with international commitments, under the excuse of responding dad/1366807019.html to the economic crisis. Changes in Spain’s development cooperation model in favour of one 392 Cited in: “ONG: Crisis sin fronteras”, Periódico El País, 14/10/2012. En: http://sociedad.elpais.com/socie- based on the privatisation and internationalisation of Spanish enterprises and its commercial dad/2012/10/05/actualidad/1349466112_373825.html interests has impacted on the quality of aid itself, violating international solidarity engagements 393 They are data gathered in a survey sent to 86 NGODs and 17 Autonomic Coordinators whose data correspond and the application of the principles of HR, equity, justice, peace and environment. to 2012 and July 2013. This survey shows the critical survival state of the NGODs members of the CONGDE: a 6% considered that its NGOD would disappear or should merge with other in order to not disappear, while 57% of NGODs considered that their activities would continue to diminish even more during 2014, maintaining the application of the adjustment plans and the reduction of staff and offices. 400 See article: http://Internet.eldiario.es/sociedad/iniciativa-Oreja-eliminar-desarrollo-promuevan_0_139286820. 394 From the Junta de Andalucía, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the Generalitat Valenciana, and strong cutbacks html from the local governments of Madrid, Vitoria-Gasteiz, for pointing out some cases. 401 The Citizen Security Law was approved in Council of Ministers in November 2013, although with some changes 395 The Development Cooperation Council is a consulting body in which participate representatives of civil society after provoking a general refusal and being, finally, questioned by the very Judicial Power General Council, highest and social agents of cooperation together with representatives from the General State Administration. judicial body. During its drafting, the government pretended, among other questions, that the organization of a 396 It is the organization representing and defending the interests of the Basque managers. See: http://Internet. demonstration or public protest through the Internet should be considered as a “crime of belonging to a criminal confebask.es/ organization”, and the active and non violent resistance as an attack on authority. Both cases would be punished 397 See relevant news in: http://Internet.deia.com/2014/12/17/opinion/tribuna-abierta/ilegalizar-ela-lab-Inter- with imprisonment sentences from 2 to 4 years and fines up to 600,000 Euro. net-confebask; and http://Internet.noticiasdegipuzkoa.com/2014/11/27/economia/ela-atribuye-a-confebask-un- 402 Society has organised itself around various “Tides” and collectives: Education (Green Tide), Health (White Tide), golpe-de-estado-Internet-pide-apoyo-sindical-Internet-politico Equality (Purple Tide), social policies (Orange Tide). CONGDE participates in the Social Summit integrated by more 398 Created in 2012 by Plataforma de ONG de Acción Social (POAS), Plataforma del Voluntariado de España (PVE), than a hundred social, professional and cultural organizations, trade unions, and various Tides. Red Europea de Lucha contra la Pobreza Internet la Exclusión Social en el Estado Español (EAPN-ES), Comité 403 Association Judges for Democracy. In: http://Internet.juecesdemocracia.es/. See article in: http://Internet. Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad (CERMI), Cáritas Española, Cruz Roja Española and la cuatro.com/las-mananas-de-cuatro/2014/diciembre/15-12-2014/Bosch-Parece-Gobierno-ciudadano- Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles. It represents around 29.000 entities in the whole country, of private, protesta_2_1908405099.html voluntary and non-for-profit nature. More info: http://Internet.plataformatercersector.es/ 404 Bill of Organic Law of Protection of the Citizen Secutiry. Page 8: http://Internet.icam.es/docs/observatorio/ 399 It is the case of Catalonia, where the Federación Catalana de ONG por la Paz, and the Federación Catala- obs_30584.pdf na de ONG por los DDHH have merged in a single structure the FCONGD (Federación Catalana de ONGD). See http://confederacio.org/ 224 225 References Tunisia 1. Blandon, Mª Teresa, et al: “Impactos del desmantelamiento de la cooperación española en las organizaciones de mujeres: Miradas feministas de aquí Internet allí”. Cooperacció. Barcelona, 2013. Introduction 2. BOE: Constitución española. BOE nº 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1978. BOE-A-1978-31229. 3. Ley 23/1998, de 7 de julio, de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo. BOE nº 162, de 8 de Tunisia is in a critical moment in its history, emerging as it has from the ashes of the 2010 julio de 1998. BOE-A-1998-16303. revolution known as the revolution of freedom and honour or the Revolution of December 4. 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European Commission: “EC Publication of preliminary data on Official Development Assistance, 2012”. MEMO/13/299. 03/04/2013. 18. Gómez Gil, Carlos: “La voladura de la cooperación española. Indicadores para confirmar el The first phase is that immediately following the departure of Ben-Ali, a period characterised deliberado colapso de la política de AOD”. Revista ESBOZOS. Filosofía política Internet ayuda al by tensions between the government and civil society, a government formed by two leading desarrollo, nº 8. RIOS (Red de Investigación Internet Observatorio de la Solidaridad). Madrid, 2013. opposition parties which soon collapsed in the face of protests at Al-Kasba. págs. 32-45. 19. Intermon Oxfam: Informe La Realidad de la Ayuda 2012, IO, Barcelona, 2013. In the second phase, a joint agreement was made on a non-partisan government led by Albaji 20. La Realidad de la Ayuda, 2013. Barcelona, 2014. Kayed Al-Sabsi, a well-known political figure, and was negotiated by the temporary president 21. Martínez, Pablo; Martínez, Ignacio: “Ruptura del consenso Internet desmantelamiento: un análisis and another parliamentary head from the time of Ben-Ali. This resulted in the election of a de la cooperación española”. En: Anuario 2013. Hacia 2015: Visiones del desarrollo en disputa. Social Watch. 2014. national council aimed at writing a new constitution. 22. Millán, Natalia et al.: “La coherencia de políticas para el desarrollo en España: Mecanismos, actores Internet proceso”, Ed. 2015 Internet más. Madrid 2012. In the third phase, a temporary coalition government was formed that included the three most 23. Roodman, D.; et al: “España”, Índice de Compromiso al Desarrollo 2009. Center for Global voted parties (with the most seats in the council), which are the Nahda Movement, the Coalition Development. 2009. En: http://Internet.cgdev.org Party for Work and Freedom, and the Conference Party. This is the first official post-revolution 24. VARIAS Ongds: “Género en el IV Plan Director. Recomendaciones para la futura cooperación Tunisian government, with the Nahda party as the driving force with the highest number of española”.Red Activas, Madrid. Edición digital. 2012. seats in the council. This period was characterised by significant tensions, not least with regard to political differences between political parties. Nevertheless, the government managed to agree on a joint draft on the Tunisian constitution, which the Second Republic was based upon. The shifting political environment in Tunis reveals the importance of an effective and successful civil society committed to consolidating a democratic political system. This leads us to the following questions: • What role did CSOs play in supporting the shift to democracy? Throughout the democratic transition period, were there efforts to involve civil society more actively in national development? • To what extent can we say that the Tunisian experience formed a positive relationship between CSOs and the government? 226 227 Legal and Organisational Context Challenges Development Cooperation Challenges Faced while Writing and Implementing the Decree Achievements Decree no. 88 is considered an emancipatory text, which, despite its limitations, is the most significant with regard to international standards in the field of establishing, operating and • Current Association Law financing civil society organisations. Since the law’s passage, the Secretary General of the Government has received around 80 applications for the establishment of new associations.408 • Decree issued on Septembe 24, 2011 (Official Gazette on September 30, 2011) This shows that the decree has had a positive impact as it encouraged the liberation of the CSO sector in Tunisia, and that was the main and first objective of the decree. Changes stemming from the transition period saw more political space granted to organisations involved in the Tunisian revolution, including the Tunisian General Union of Labour, the However, the implementation of the decree, especially its finance and monitoring-related Democratic Women Association and the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights. In provisions, require deeper political and social changes. While the decree lifted restrictions cooperation with active political parties, these contributed to managing the first transitional on the establishment and operation of CSOs, it also reduced the state’s power to monitor government that followed the January 2014 revolution, as part of the Higher Authority for the the internal operations of associations. It relies on self-monitoring initiatives on the part of Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition. CSOs and voluntary provisions on transparency and governance. The law has faced problems in implementation in the context of the political transition period, which is still carving a This higher authority was in charge of preparing and issuing legal texts relevant to the National path toward building a democratic state and in which judicial and administrative monitoring Constituent Assembly elections, as well as for managing CSOs, political parties, and the press. institutions are still unstable. On September 24, 2011, the Higher Authority issued a legal decree for the work of CSOs or The references the decree makes to other texts to organise certain issues, such as state funding associations. Its preparation underwent several rounds of discussion, including a workshop and state assistance to CSOs, reduced the decree’s efficiency and the ability to implement it in organised in Tunis in June 2011, in cooperation with UNDP and Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition reality. These references are considered gaps and obstacles that limit the ability to implement Center, and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), with the participation of the decree as quickly as required. Moreover, these references do not allow equality among more than 50 representatives of CSOs giving their opinions about the project. The decree was CSOs, especially that the majority of associations in Tunisia are small associations that rely on explained and debated upon, ensuring a consensus-based law governing civil society. state funding to be able to organise their activities and do not have enough internal funding. The decree simplified the registration process for CSOs in accordance with international The implementation of sanctions is gradual, requiring first that the Secretary General of the standards and principles. Article 21 of the decree stipulates the following: ‘Any individual Government send a notice to the association, then a court must be requested to suspend is entitled to the freedom of forming associations with others, including the right to form the CSOs, after which a separate court request is required to dissolve the association. This associations and join them to protect their interest…’ It annuls the prerequisite permit system constitutes a serious obstacle to match sanctions to violations committed by the associations and replaces it with the authorisation or notice system, and also annuls the prerogative of the and to ensure that they respect the law. On several occasions, due to multiple violations Minister of Interior. committed by certain associations that resort to violence in their activities, public authorities considered that the penal system was no longer a competence of the executive power but a Associations or CSOs are no longer subject to a period monitoring before official registration. prerogative of the judicial power, and that it was no longer able to dissolve associations directly Instead the monitoring is initiated after CSOs are legally formed and this monitoring applies to on its own.409 the actual activities of CSOs. In the event that a CSO violates certain laws, notices are given to the association through the Secretary General of the Government, after which the courts can CSO Enabling Environment suspend its activities, issue penalties, or even dissolve the association, but crucially, no penalties would target founders of the association, which remain subject to provisions of the civil and Achievements penal codes in the event that they commit violations.406 The constitution of 2014 protects rights and liberties and ensures that their core values On the other hand, subsequent monitoring cannot lead to obstruction or termination of CSOs’ are respected, as indicated in Section 49. Moreover, it stipulated the necessity to create a activities, whether directly or indirectly. Rights including the right to access information from constitutional court for the first time in the history of Tunisia, and establish five independent government organisations, the right to advocate for political positions and assess the role of commissions in charge of developing the necessary plans of action to protect democracy. These government institutions are still protected; the exercise of which cannot be used as grounds commissions are relevant to elections, media, human rights, good governance, and sustainable for administrative control or for imposing penalties against CSOs. Moreover, members of these development. associations have legal protection against all kinds of arbitrary measures that public authorities used against activists and members of CSOs407 in the past, when they exercised their rights. Civil society participated in the activities of the National Constituent Assembly. Several CSOs were given the chance to speak before the assembly’s committees to present their political demands in general, and their proposals related to their legal and constitutional situation in particular. The National Constituent Assembly also organised an open day for dialogue with the associations in March 2012, to discuss the positions of the associations regarding the draft of the constitution. 408 Imane Abdul Latif, “Research about Associations and Decree 88: Legal Gaps and Financial Violations due to 405 The most significant of which is Article 21 of ICCPR issued under a UN General Assembly decision on December Lack of Auditing and Monitoring,” Al Sabbah 9/6/2013. 16, 1966, which was ratified by Tunisia on March 18, 1969. 409 Hammadi Al Jebali, Temporary Prime Minister, “The time when associations could be dissolved through 406 Decree 88, Chapter 8, Section 45. political will has ended,” Al Joumhouriya, 20/3/2013 de mecanismos de financiamiento de las ONG en el 407 Decree 88, Chapter 1, Section 5 to 8. Cono Sur Internet Brasil. Abril de 2014. 217 pp. 228 229 However, the new Tunisian constitution requires suitable laws to match its provisions and that As to ensuring the right to peaceful demonstration, it appears that the courts are generally ensure a state in which rights, liberties, and democratic civil organisations are respected. characterised by inconsistent jurisprudence when dealing with committed violations in terms of speed of public prosecution, and in terms of the nature of sanctions which are inconsistent By adopting a binding and compulsory regulation, the real revolution is now reflected in the and in many cases inadequate to the committed crimes. This has caused many to doubt the extent to which this constitution is respected, in the issuance of court sanctions in the event independence of the judicial system and the role of public prosecution and its relation to the of violations and in the significance of having a constitutional court to supervise the work of Ministry of Justice and the executive power. legislators when issuing laws. It is now also important to adapt laws so that they fulfil the new constitutional requirements, and review current laws to ensure consistency with the constitution. The most prominent sign of this contradiction is slow pace in resolving verdicts against activists from civil society, journalists and intellectuals, while at the same time delaying prosecution The Associations Law under the New Constitution of 2014 against people directly involved in violence.412 The relevant departments at the Mehdi Jomaa-led government, in cooperation with other Also, the media and the press have played a significant role in the protection of the right to ministries, have started to prepare a draft of a basic law relevant to organising associations to peaceful demonstration by covering different protests and providing information to citizens fill the gaps of Decree no. 88 issued in 2011. These gaps were objective and formal in terms of about different activities, with respect to freedom of expression and opinion and by following implementing the provisions of the constitution that stipulates that a basic law organising the the professional rules of the media. Since the revolution, Tunisia has gradually lifted restrictions work of associations should be enacted. on the media despite the retention of certain intimidating measures such as appointments by parties in key positions in the press, the trial of some journalists, and politically motivated In practice, many problems were encountered in implementing Decree no. 88, especially at the imprisonment. Notable too is the passage of decrees 115 and 116, which established an level of forming the CSOs’ dossiers, the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and funding official higher body for the media after some hesitation, due to the pressure of civil society and issues, in addition to suspicions that certain associations are involved in supporting terrorism. especially the Journalists’ Union the Association of Editors, the ‘Tunis branch for the Chapter 19 association’ and the Tunis Center for Press Freedom. Investigative media outlets have also The law is being drafted through sessions involving the participation of representatives of appeared and were able to unveil several infractions related to how government forces violated several ministries, including the Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Sports. It is the first phase the rights of demonstrators during the revolution and after. in which the provisions of the new law are determined, and participation in its drafting has been expanded to include CSOs and legal experts. There is also coordination between state Political Context departments, particularly between the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank, to be able to identify violations that fall under foreign funding of associations. Development Cooperation CSO Development Effectiveness Critical to effective development cooperation is the existence of open channels for dialogue between civil society and governmental institutions in a manner that retains the political Achievements independence of CSOs in the transition process. The independence of the judicial power is considered one of the main pillars of democratic Success Stories transformation and the main condition for the proper implementation of the law and the protection of basic rights and liberties. The Tunisian judicial system witnessed, after the The Role of Civil Society in Transitional Justice Revolution, major changes with the establishment of an independent judicial power, and the participation of many groups, chiefly, the Tunisian Judges’ Association, Tunisian Judges’ Syndicate The Transitional Justice project was, from the beginning, the result of a joint effort of a and the Tunisian Monitor for an Independent Justice System. Political discussions have also committee comprising lawyers, activists and representatives of the Ministry of Human Rights. resulted in a new law organising the work of the higher independent authority monitoring the This committee facilitated a number of consultations in different parts of the country. In the justice system. end, this resulted in the creation of the Truth Commission, the Compensation Fund, and the Employees’ Qualifications Examination Committee, in addition to legal departments specialising To ensure the respect of liberties, the Court of Appeals in Tunis issued an important decision in investigations of alleged violations of human rights and issuing relevant rulings. which states that rights and liberties stated in the previous constitution of 1959 are still in effect despite its annulment by the National Constituent Assembly in December 1, 2012 because the In addition to dealing with violations of civil and political rights, this law can address violations majority of these liberties are stipulated by international conventions ratified by Tunisia and by related to economic and social rights. These are aspects that make this law of special significance. other relevant international agreements, and because these vested rights and liberties cannot be relinquished in transitional periods preceding the development of permanent institutions.410 Many CSOs had joined the project of the Ministry of Human Rights, as part of their contribution to developing laws relevant to the path of transitional justice; however, after initital efforts were On another note, it is worth mentioning that the administrative justice system in Tunisia made in research and discussions, they were kept away during the actual drafting of law, which examined an appeal submitted by ATIDE regarding the methodology used by NCA to sort angered many of these parties. At that time, the NCA sought to exclude civil society members, out and select candidates for the new electoral commission. The appeal involved procedural especially those specialised or active in the field of transitional justice, from the work of the violations committed by the Counting Votes Committee. The administrative court decided to committee in charge of examining candidates applying for this commission. The process was accept this appeal and ruled that all procedures adopted by NCA to form the new electoral conducted in secret. The seats were divided among political parties according to agreements commission shall be void, based on the lawsuit filed by this CSO.411 included before the process began. This process clearly lacked transparency, pushing civil 410 The Appeal Court in Tunis, Decision issued on February 5, 2012 regarding freedom of movement and right to Pursuant to Article 9-3 of ICCPR: “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 412 have a passport. before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 411 This decision was issued by the administrative court in Tunis on September 19, 2013. reasonable time or to release.” 230 231 society activists to protest, after which many threatened to boycott the process of establishing institutions and to look for alternatives, while others defended electoral legitimacy and held to the Truth and Dignity Commission. Yet the transitional justice path is a participatory process, the institutions of power. All evidence seemed to indicate that the Tunisian model was about requiring all parties to meet and set aside political and partisan disagreements. to fail and fall into the trap of internal fighting like in Egypt. However, civil society institutions including the Tunisian General Union of Labour (the largest Tunisian labour union), the Tunisian CSO Enabling Environment Union for Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts, the National Lawyers Union, and the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights launched a national dialogue initiative that put an end Civil society contributed effectively to the success of all phases of the electoral process, either to the crisis and re-launched the transitional path. through advocacy and monitoring efforts, in order to establish transparency and integrity during elections. The initiative committed to maintaining NCA and helping it to achieve its task by providing support through national dialogues. National dialogue sessions succeeded in gathering all In this regard, the number of partners of the higher independent commission is estimated at 233 political parties and granting them the opportunity to agree on constitutional provisions they associations and organisations from all regions of the Tunisian Republic. These organisations had disagreed on within the NCA. The agreements presented to deputies were the result of and associations work according to a code of conduct signed with the Elections Independent this dialogue. A number of constitutional provisions were written outside NCA to be accepted Higher Authority (EIHA) for transparent and impartial monitoring and for the neutrality and by its members. In addition to the national dialogue and agreements, judges, human rights integrity of civil society. defenders, and members of the press played a significant role in amending constitutional provisions through union protests against provisions that could have led to transforming the Through outreach, follow up and monitoring, these partner organisations helped organise constitution into a tool for declaration of principles without any guarantees to protect their campaigns to raise awareness throughout the country on the importance of the voting process, implementation. and to show them how to participate in the elections. Challenges Their field of work also includes training and hiring observers to monitor elections, to follow up on the vote-counting process and detect violations. They are also in charge of monitoring The post-revolution environment in Tunisia is characterised by extreme levels of political the performance of EIHA, revealing breaches in its work and observing the extent to which it polarisation, especially with regard to those with links to the old regime, as well as the respects electoral law. Some of these organisations and associations have submitted reports resurrection of old divisions along ethnic and religious lines. about the flow of the legislative elections, starting from registration to the day of elections. A report by the Ofiya Coalition for Elections Integrity Monitoring mentions that the ‘electoral These divisions have impacted on CSOs that have generally relied for support either on process was overall satisfactory despite a few violations that were recorded but were not modernists or secularists on the one hand, and conservatives or Islamists on the other. This enough to doubt the elections results.’ has also resulted in convergence between the objectives of CSOs and certain political parties. As for ATIDE, it detected in its assessment of the elections of October 26, 2014 a few weaknesses This equation took some CSOs away from staking out an independent political path, and in the legal framework around which the elections were organised. According to ATIDE, these government institutions have at times been selective in their treatment of CSOs, banning the weaknesses require review and reform to improve the electoral legal system to ensure free, activities of some, while supporting others affiliated with members of the ruling party. democratic, transparent and fair elections. These confusions have also had a negative impact on the level of efficiency and usefulness ATIDE mentions that it managed to mobilise 3,100 volunteers, which undertook the task of of the majority of organisations especially those working on the political process. Legal texts observing the elections in Tunisia and abroad. submitted by several associations and organisations, such as the Tunisian Judges Association, were not taken into consideration during the drafting of the constitution, and all calls and The Role of CSOs in Monitoring the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) protests made to put pressure on the authorities were ignored. A number of CSOs, including Al Bawsala Association, have succeeded in observing the daily On the other hand, the participation of civil society in the democratic transition faces significant activities of the NCA from within. They calculate the percentage of attendance and absence challenges, namely: of representatives and the percentage of voting within NCA of each representative/deputy, and of each parliamentary group.413 Moreover, some specialised committees meetings were • Some CSOs are not fully prepared to take on the challenges posed by recent political open to certain associations when considering bills relevant to transitional justice, EIHA, and shifts, necessitating more capacity building to enhance civil society’s effectiveness in examining the new electoral commission membership applications. Other associations such lobbying and advocating for concrete changes in the national development agenda as ATIDE undertook the responsibility of monitoring discrepancy between texts ratified by the NCA plenary session and final texts published in the official gazette. This association was able to • Difficulties in securing sustainable sources of financing for CSOs, especially from prove that there are discrepancies between ratified texts and those published. foreign donors due to competing policy agendas or overly restrictive requirements CSO Development Effectiveness • Tunisian CSOs need a clearer sense of their long-term objectives, and achieve full transparency, internal democracy and accountability in all of their engagements As a result of the assassination of NCA deputy Mohammed Al Brahmi on July 25, 2013, many opposition deputies boycotted NCA activities. They demanded its dissolution since they considered it had failed to fulfil its mission and had become a tool of the ruling party. This led to political fallout, with some demanding the termination of the transitional democracy 413 Al Bawsala Association issues periodic statistics regarding work inside NCA, and its representatives always attend NCA sessions. Internet.albawsala.org. 232 233 Socio-Economic Context Governance Since 2010, economic growth has been slow, deteriorating significantly in the period after Development Cooperation the revolution. The fiscal deficit grew, investments declined and the youth unemployment rate increased. In 2014, growth stagnated at 2.3% and the major problems in the Financial For a time after the revolution, CSOs did find themselves in a positive situation where levels of Directorate and the current account increased compared to the year 2010 to reach -6.4 and freedom had increased, and the requirements of democratic transition made it necessary for -70% of GDP respectively. Better figures are expected in 2015, with the relative stabilisation of the new ruling authorities to make use of the support and competencies of civil society. the political scene. One of the major demands of many CSOs was certainly the importance and implementation of Unemployment however remains a major concern; a 15% rate in 2014 is remarkably high, with governance in order to rectify the situation and relation of the government and public sector 22.2% for females and 11.7% for males. institutions with public money. Moreover, the pressure exerted by these organisations led to the establishment of a new ministry for governance, which was required to deal with a large The informal sector has grown in the absence of a strong private sector, and the employment network of CSOs. Furthermore, this cooperation led to the development of a strategy against situation has proved especially hard for women. The percentage of women’s participation in the corruption and to the establishment of formal institutions of governance. Also, a partnership work force in Tunisia is less than 25%. The country has witnessed an increase in the poverty rate plan was developed between this ministry and civil society. and rising inequalities between regions, with poverty rates varying between 8-9% in the Middle Eastern Area and Grand Tunisia to 26% and 32% in the northern, western and central western. The TNOGP414 coalition is composed of the Tunisian Association of Public Controllers, the Tunisian Association of French Colleges Graduates, the Free Digital Culture Association, the The unemployment rate is high among university students, which has led to a growing skills Democracy Laboratory, the I Watch Association, the Organisation for Governance, Integrity, gap. The number of jobs added each year does not exceed 35,000 jobs, whereas the number of and Citizenship (OGIC), the Open Governance Group, the Open Tunisia Initiative, the Tunisian graduates entering the labour market annually is 60,000. The number of youth between ages Institutional Reform, SAWTY Association, the Touensa Organisation and the Tunisian Active 15 and 29 years stuck between work and studies is also concerning. In addition, the rate of Network for Social Accountability (TANSA). unemployed, uneducated, and untrained youth is high in all areas, but is especially bad in rural areas where rates of insecure labour and unemployment reach 63% among women. The TNOGP coalition is concerned with all issues that are important to civil society. It has called on all stakeholders to organise in order to identify key issues concerning them, and to shed light Development Cooperation on the importance of including active associations and citizens from different regions of the country in these discussions. These processes are intended to yield concrete suggestions that Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that is, promoting development and the government can take into consideration. To make things easier, the coalition put forward improving the socio-economic conditions of Tunisian citizens depends on the ability to support the idea of an online platform that can provide a common documentation database together all individuals and develop their abilities, restructure societies and organisations and support with some collaborative tools to assist in the drafting of a pilot action plan. these efforts through progressive policies and enabling institutional environment. The outcome of this consultation was the receipt of almost 600 suggestions through different The role of Tunisian civil society in achieving the MDGs had been limited on all levels prior to the adopted channels such as the public consultations portal, email correspondence, forums revolution, due both to the weakness of Tunisian CSOs and the lack of a developmental vision and others. This consultation helped in supporting participation of citizens and civil society in on a national level. Post-revolution Tunisia seeks to have a wider participation of CSOs at all determining the elements to be used in the drafting of a pilot action plan.415 stages of work on the MDGs and the future Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These activities also resulted in creating a national joint committee of the government and the The results obtained from fighting poverty and achieving socio-economic development over civil society to work on an open governance partnership. In this regard, a national committee the last few decades in Tunisia proved to be disappointing plans and programs created by was created. It is in charge of proposing an action plan for an open governance partnership and the successive Tunisian governments and did not succeed in ending poverty. Moreover, many following up on its implementation. The national plan for an open governance partnership is governmental development experiments failed and development was not sustainable. It is now expected to be announced by the end of September 2014. necessary to develop strategies based on partnership between sectors (the government, the private sector and the civil society), and mobilise all activists in society to work and coordinate CSO Enabling Environment to achieve sustainable development and reduce poverty. There have been real advances in citizen participation in Tunisia, facilitated by CSOs. A month The Tax System Reform Program entered its second phase after the diagnosis was made and the before the elections, all of the Moursa, ManzelBourqia, Tourz, and Qabes approved citizen- weaknesses and flaws of the current system were identified as part of the first phase launched chosen projects. These municipalities allowed their citizens to make the decision independently in 2012, with the support of the IMF. when it comes to investment projects that go along with the designated budget. Because of the collaborative budgetary mechanism, the citizens decided freely to spend 500,000 dinar in In this regard, a review of the fiscal base was held. It is the culmination of efforts made during Moursa, 100,000 dinar in ManzelBourqia, 200,000 dinar in Qabes, and 550,000 dinar in Tourz. two phases of the fiscal reform program. Four hundred participants were gathered, including representatives of the civil society, especially groups involved in the fiscal field, active groups The collaborative budgetary mechanism is considered a unique experience that CSOs worked in economic affairs namely the Tunisian Union for Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts, the on in collaboration with the German and the European Institute for Democracy, and has been a Tunisian General Union of Labour, the Confederation of Tunisian Citizen Enterprises, in addition success in more than one area. Mr QoreshJawhdo, the president of the associative movement to a number of fiscal experts. 414 The Coalition –Tunisian Open Government Partnership 415 http://Internet.article19.org/ 234 235 and an international expert in communication and development, announced that the “reform These difficulties and challenges must not undermine the importance of cooperation and of this mechanism and the continuous work it will contribute to the building of trust between dialogue between religious associations and secular CSOs. This agreement has evolved on citizens and municipality institutions will also allow the accomplishment of more project certain occasions into active partnerships promoting dialogue and tolerance. chosen by the people. To add to that, it will lead in fixing it in the regular municipality work and encouraging other municipalities into adopting it.” It added that “despite the administrative Relations Between the Civil Society and Donors and geographical difference between the four municipalities, the decision of re-working with this mechanism is a sign that the collaborative budget is not limited to one municipality but it There is a need for CSOs to redouble their efforts to better take into account national and applicable anywhere.” local realities to better target their constituencies. By contrast, donors tend not to take these issues into consideration and impose on certain organisations their own agenda bound to The Socio-Cultural Context international priorities that do not match local concerns. This explains why a great number of CSOs operate in specific fields like women’s rights and In general, cultural institutions in Tunisia need to become more open to civil society, while CSOs electoral reform while many other associations suffer from a disproportionate lack of funding in turn need to reach out to cultural institutions to have more influence on public opinion. as the goals they strive to achieve do not match donor priorities. Relations Between Civil Society and the Media This poses a real threat to the efficiency and sustainability of these CSOs, as well as to the independence of national government policy-making. Relations between the mainstream media and civil society are in need of improvement, perhaps through a cooperation strategy established by both parties. Conclusions Despite these hurdles, improvements in media freedom in Tunisia has enabled civil society Civil society is considered one of the major factors for a successful democratic transition. Amid to build a channel for communication with the broader public through television and radio heightened political and partisan tensions in the wake of the Tunisian revolution, CSOs can play programs, and also through the participation of important figures of civil society in national the role of mediator to ensure a smooth transition period despite these difficulties. dialogues. A summary of the contributions of civil society over the past four years is listed below: The freedom of the press also provided the opportunity for a diverse group of public and private media outlets to become visible to the public. As a result of this diversity, the public sector media • Abolishing the former law on CSOs and replacing it with a new law was an important outlets were pushed to develop their discourse and open their broadcast time to different first step toward creating an enabling environment for CSOs political parties and CSOs. Moreover, these liberties made it possible for certain associations to create their own radio stations at the local level, while the electronic media has also expanded • Changes in the new constitution was a major legislative achievement that guarantees in scope and significance. Many CSOs have begun using social media, especially Facebook, to basic rights and liberties and promotes the role of civil society in public life inform people about their activities and goals. One of the most prominent experiences is when the Association of Journalists opened their headquarters to other associations and participated • The presence of civil society organisations in different fields and sectors has grown in joint projects with other organisations. • Many important figures of civil society have gained positions in state institutions and It is worth mentioning that provincial radio stations contributed to creating a communication policy making processes either as independent figures or by joining political parties dynamic within each province among the different components of the local environment. • Successive governments have opened up, in differing degrees, to civil society, and One of the major challenges remains the ability of media to preserve its political independence. built partnerships with CSOs in various sectors, including in governance and electoral It also remains important to train journalists on civil society issues and problems in the context reforms of major changes in Tunisian society. • A ministry of state for CSOs is presided by an active figure of civil society, Mr Kamel Yet it should be pointed out that in the last report of Journalists without Borders for 2013, Tunisia Jendoubi has declined by four places, ranking 138 in the press freedom indicator, annually published by Journalists without Borders. On the other hand, the participation of civil society in development and democracy face a number of challenges including: Relations Between Secular Civil Society and Religious Groups • Many CSOs are not yet prepared to take on strategic developmental policies and The relation between CSOs and religious groups remains problematic as some religious groups plans, and are in need of capacity building through training, leadership building, and still doubt the legitimacy of civil society’s role in governance. Some of these groups have tried to research. There is a need for civil society to move from a purely oppositional stance to arouse suspicion against some human and women rights organisations. a position where it can actively shape alternatives for Tunisia’s future. On the other hand, many religious groups have been able to create a parallel network to civil • It is necessary to complete the democratic transition phase to foil all attempts to return society under the pretext that some CSOs are in contradiction to or are even actively against to the old regime and threaten liberties under various pretexts. religion. Many of these associations are not independent. They serve ideological radical groups that can even support and protect terrorism. • Threats to civil society stem not from the lack of enabling legislation, but from weak political will and efforts made to consolidate practices that contradict these same laws. 236 237 • Dependence on foreign funding could limit CSO agenda to the priorities of their donors. Vietnam This requires that CSOs preserve their independence and set their own priorities, programs and objectives based on the needs of their local constituencies. Summary • CSOs should adopt goals they can fulfil by establishing democracy within their own Before major reforms in its political system in 1986, Vietnam had groups or associations that structures, in addition to achieving full transparency in dealing with budgets, staying would have stood for today’s civil society organisations. Post-reform Vietnam saw the introduction away from suspicions and violations of law, and respecting work ethics within their of innovative policies that have created opportunities for more of these organisations to thrive. organisations. Charity organisations and local and international community organisations have blossomed in response to emerging social issues. Over the past few years, Vietnam has been grappling with • Tunisian CSOs should build stronger networks among themselves, especially in political a global environment that, from the economic perspective, has come with its own challenges. advocacy initiatives. This was especially true in 2014, where the country faced a number of socio-economic problems due to a slow global economic recovery and rising inequality among countries after the global recession. These difficulties have limited the development of all kinds of organisations. Despite these difficulties, civil society in Vietnam has pressed for a stronger role in political life, and has managed to influence the formation of state policies in recent years. It is in this context that Vietnamese CSOs have made their presence more strongly felt to the government. CSOs focus on the rural poor; a number of socio-cultural and economic factors impact significantly on the success of their implementation. The impacts of these projects are discussed at the end of the report, followed by the successes, challenges, and lessons learned. In general, CSOs in Vietnam have grown in number and made significant strides in capacity development. With supportive policies on the part of the Vietnamese Government, assistance from domestic and international donors, and the growth of CSO networks, Vietnamese CSOs will have more opportunities to operate efficiently and effectively. This has brought about considerable impacts on Vietnam’s development, especially for rural communities or ethnic minorities. CSO projects have helped address a number of social problems in Vietnamese society, bringing hope and visible benefits to the most vulnerable sectors of society. However, enhancing coordination and strengthening networking among CSOs would establish an even stronger environment for debate among civil society – the exchange of ideas, experiences and development initiatives – to support CSOs in their various fields of work. Besides, with reduction trend of ODA for MICs, CSOs in Vietnam is also facing new challenges and bringing other large opportunities, thus they need to improve their capacity and visibility to catch with these in the near future. This report provides the overall context in which CSOs have worked in Vietnam over time, and their role vis-a-vis other development actors. It provides an analysis of a specific case study involving SRD, using the following factors: the legal and regulatory framework in Vietnam, its political environment, its governance context, socio-economic context; and socio-cultural context affecting the development of CSOs in Vietnam in general. An analysis of SRD’s recent project, Implementing Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Promoting Good Governance for Forest Sector, outlines the factors shaping its successes as well as challenges faced throughout project implementation. A law detailing the implementation of the Science and Technology Law was applied and its effectiveness will be discussed in the political context together with some information about a network that supports the development of CSOs. Introduction Vietnam has made remarkable socio-economic progress at all levels. With rapid market-based development, the country is generating new governance practices, a growing private sector, a more vibrant civil society, with advances in communications and information technology. Poverty rates have fallen dramatically alongside rapid economic growth with Vietnam graduating to lower middle-income country (MIC) status in 2010. Vietnam is implementing the process of industrialisation and modernisation, with the goal of increasing income up to 1,500 USD per capita by 2020, an increase of more than seven times in comparison with that 238 239 in 1995. Government has announced hundreds of projects in several sectors including energy, to broaden the agenda from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. Thus, AEF has to agriculture, health care, society and transportation with the aim of achieving that target. To work out mechanisms and provide possible assistance to all the AEF stakeholders, especially implement these activities, Vietnam not only needs the assistance from government but also CSOs, INGOs, and the private sector to contribute to aid effectiveness agenda for sustainable depends much on Official Development Assistance because the development of Vietnam development. requires a large amount of investment, which is not sufficient if Vietnam just mobilises inbound. ODA becomes an important outsource to meet the requirement about finance for development The legal and regulatory framework, political environment, governance context, social-cultural investment of infrastructure, development of education, heath, agriculture, etc. context, and social-economic context under which CSOs work in Vietnam will be illustrated in more details in following parts with a case study of SRD’s recent project, Implementing Forest Political reforms in the 1980s in Vietnam involved establishing non-government organisations as Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Promoting Good Governance in the Forest a channel for civil society activity in authoritarian political systems by forming partnerships with Sector. FLEGT has been funded by DFID through Stitching FERN (FERN is an NGO and a Dutch domestic NGOs and pursuing ‘bottom up’ approaches (Thayer, 2008). Vietnamese CSOs have Stitching created in 1995 to keep track of the European Union’s involvement in forests and emerged and grown, responding to the country’s socio-economic development through a variety coordinate NGO activities at the European level) and implemented by SRD and VNGO-FLEGT of operational approaches and different themes, including charity work, independent research network from 2012–2014. FERN has participated in the development and implementation and policy advocacy (Taylor et al., 2012; Taylor, 2012). CSOs play a key role both in representing process of the EU FLEGT Action Plan to control illegal logging. In Vietnam, FERN is involved public concerns to the state and helping government address social and economic problems. in networking, researching, and knowledge-sharing with a variety of Vietnamese stakeholders. Vietnamese CSOs have proven to be highly effective in community development projects and Specific activities implemented in Vietnam include working with NGOs to complete a report on issues related to women and children, gender equality and HIV/AIDs. Vietnam is continuing on forest governance to help civil society identify their weaknesses and guide solutions to industrialisation and urbanisation, which means that issues such as the growing rural-urban deal with key issues through a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA). This has supported the gap, market-based employment skills, environmental degradation, labour exploitation and development of civil society networks to provide updated information and promote information human trafficking will need more attention from both government and civil society (The Asia exchange with our existing partners to keep abreast of recent developments, and support Foundation, 2010). The majority of NGOs in Vietnam, however, still have a traditional focus on coordination between civil society stakeholders. rural development and poverty reduction. Implementing FLEGT: Promoting Good Governance in the Forest Sector Over the past decades, the number of CSOs has grown rapidly, with around 2,000 registered CSOs across Vietnam in 2010 (Taylor et al., 2012). The small but growing number of Vietnamese CSOs is Forests in Vietnam play a critical role in the country’s ecological and economic development. operating in a challenging environment. They lack a supportive legal framework, stable financial Worryingly, forest areas are shrinking at an enormous rate. Many factors have caused the resources and institutional capacity (The Asia Foundation, 2010). There exist five categories decline in forest area: population growth, changing economic growth bringing changes in of CSOs in Vietnam, including: (1) mass organisations: women’s unions, farmer’s associations, consumption and production patterns, inappropriate governance policies, indiscriminate youth organisations, war veterans’ associations and labour organisations; (2) professional exploitation and relatively low public awareness of environmental problems. In response to associations and umbrella organisations, e.g. Red Cross, VUSTA; (3) voluntary NGOs: charities, this, SRD and VNGO-FLEGT network implemented the project, Implementing FLEGT: Promoting research NGOs, consultancy NGOs, health NGOs and educational NGOs; (4) community-based Good Governance in the Forest Sector, under the program of Forests Governance Markets organisations: service and development or livelihood-oriented, faith-based organisations, and Climate Programme. The overall goal of the programme is to use legal, institutional, and neighbourhood associations, and recreational groups; and (5) international non-governmental policy reforms to strengthen forestry management by enhancing community tenure rights and organisations (Norlund, 2007; CSO Roadmap, 2014). They are established according to different strengthening forest governance in Vietnam. Because forest-dependent communities often and rather complex regulations from Vietnamese government. Particularly, the concept of do not benefit fully from forest resources or receive a little or no benefit, tight governance civil society is still not much used in the Vietnamese political context. Official legal and policy of forest is necessary to support them and narrow the rural-urban wealth gap. Benefits from documents generally refer to CSO-type organisations as ‘people’s organisations.’ improvements in forest governance can guarantee sustainable livelihoods for local people. The project was conducted to deal with the problem of illegal logging, while the fact that illegal However, the term ‘CSO’ is increasingly being employed by scholars and practitioners, and the logging is a long-running and pervasive problem, causing enormous damage to forests, local state is beginning to open up to its use. These changes are due to increased recognition of the communities, and the economies of producer countries such as Vietnam, by advocacy of CSO role played by non-profit organisations and broader shifts in party policy, which has gradually networks through dialogues, meeting, etc. This programme is expected to have more potential accepted the necessity of the sector and its contributions to national development (MSD, 2010). to succeed as it seeks to address both the direct and more indirect causes of illegal logging, In Vietnam, relations between the state and CSOs have generally been favourable, with the which might include low awareness of environmental issues among local populations and weak government claiming it is more determined than ever to support the development of CSOs governance resulting in corruption and related issues around the lack of transparency and (World Bank, 2007). Progress Report on Aid Effectiveness in Vietnam (2010) mentions that the accountability. Aid Effectiveness Agenda in Vietnam in 2010 entered into a new period with the formulation and operation of the Aid Effectiveness Forum (AEF), focusing on the policy dialogue between The Legal and Regulatory Framework Vietnamese Government and all stakeholders, including donors, INGOs and CSOs. Formulation of the AEF which focuses on dialogue on aid policy, aid effectiveness linking with development The legal framework guiding civil society activities in Vietnam consists of individual decrees and effectiveness, and implementation of the Socio-Economic Development Plan 2011-2015 among laws covering established CSOs, their work, and relations with the state (Kepa, 2011). Sabharwal all parties, creating new aid partnership mechanism through improving the quality of dialogues (2011) indicates that there are five important decrees/laws currently in existence that govern and maximisation of contribution in process of developing the ODA Strategic Framework different elements of CSOs in Vietnam, which show clarity of purpose for cooperatives, CBOs, 2011-2015 and providing mechanism and possible support for inclusive participation of all and charities. Norlund et al. (2006) identify that the VNGOs, which have expanded since the stakeholders in AEF agenda. It is very important to engage the development actors together mid-1990s, have also called for better legislation. Decree 35, on the establishment of non-profit 240 241 science and technology organisations, was the most important step for VNGOs because many enterprise, creates numerous obstacles in the process of registering and developing a social groups are registered as science and technology organisations. In 1998, the Party Politburo enterprise. This illustrates the imperfect legal framework for CSOs in Vietnam, with overlapping passed a series of new regulations on the operation of professional organisations. Then in 1999, rules resulting in many problems for individuals or groups who want to establish CSOs in the prime minister promulgated a new legislation regarding social and charitable funds. The Law Vietnam. The process of establishing a social organisation requires complex and cumbersome on Science and Technology was passed by the National Assembly in 2000, and was particularly procedures and regulations, surrounding details about the board of founders, a management important for many development and training VNGOs that register with VUSTA as social and board, the number of members, capacity of founders, among other requirements. Such training organisations. Decree No. 81/2002 outlines the legal framework for CSOs working in requirements are normally difficult for startup social enterprises to meet. More flexible criteria the social sciences, and promotes work on social science through VUSTA (Kepa, 2011). and standards for establishing social enterprises are clearly required. However, the most important decision was the prime minister’s Decree 88 of 2003 concerning According to CSO (Roadmap, 2014), the relationship between civil society, the state and the party the organisation, operation and management of associations, including the first attempt to has also undergone significant changes in the last three decades. DoiMoi and the government’s define the legal status of local organisations and also aimed to clarify state management (and policy of ‘socialisation’ have enabled a more hospitable environment for citizen’s groups. In control) vis-à-vis associations and NGOs. This document is intended to be used as a trial run addition, an urban middle class and the growth in Internet use has facilitated increased access for the Law on Associations. The draft Law on Association was under renewed debate since to information and general levels of awareness, which again has impacted the state’s previous 2005 to replace the law from 1957 due to be presented to the National Assembly in 2006 after monopoly on organising civil society as part of the state system. The state has responded to the more than a decade’s discussion. The Grassroots Democracy Decree 79 (2003), for instance, emergence of CSOs through elaborating a regulatory framework that is complex and based on institutionalises the participation of local communities/CBOs/organisations of the poor in a system of approval and ongoing state supervision and management. development activities at the level of the commune, which is seen as an important step in the development of civil society in Vietnam. The Law on Cooperatives recognises cooperatives as Actually, most Vietnamese NGOs have registered under the VUSTA, one of the government- voluntary organisations functioning as independent economic entities. The Law on Science and organised professional unions that guides and monitors its members’ activities. VUSTA is also Technology recognises professional associations as independent service organisations, which a key player in development policy discussions with the government, and it aims to become are often the only option available to most development NGOs. more independent from the government. Through such channels, organisations with good relationships with VUSTA can establish common ground for policy advocacy. However, recent The government has provided a relatively more hospitable environment for civic engagement. changes to the regulatory framework have made registering, operating, and implementing That is the issuance of several legal documents in the process of being drafted, offering new programs/projects more difficult, especially in the context of an increasing number of CSOs opportunities for CSOs. However, recent changes to the regulatory framework for CSOs have over the past decade. Other organisations not under VUSTA must still follow similar procedures made registering, operating, and implementing projects more difficult (Taylor, 2012). Time- in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Vietnamese Government. consuming procedures and the realities of patronage politics in Vietnam tend to make it more difficult to set up CSOs in Vietnam. Political advocacy in this context is also found to be ‘Centre’ is the most common form of social enterprise in the country. Established as a limited and fairly difficult to practice. Non-profit organisations do not have to pay tax because centre, SRD has many advantages in terms of legal procedures to establish, support and philanthropy does not enjoy any kind of tax exemption, however, taxation was also found to access public funding. A centre is often referred to as an active form of NGO, based on the be an area that could easily be improved and have a much greater impact on development implementation of concrete development projects. SRD is under the supervision of VUSTA, so (Norlund, 2007). project implementation is shaped by VUSTA regulations. Even after securing donor support for the FLEGT project, SRD must still complete needed procedures for project permission with New CSOs in Vietnam are required to register with a relevant government body, a professional headquarter and local parties. All of these steps must obey regulations of current laws, including or umbrella organisation, a ministry or local government entity (Taylor et al., 2012). In order the provision for the ‘management and use [of] non-government aid,’ which is detailed in the to establish a new CSO, people might register under various legal categories and with a wide Presidential Decree 93/2009/ND-CP. range of professional, scientific and associations, while the scope of permitted activities and the reporting requirements are not particularly clear (Vietnam Report, 2014). Thus, a CSO registers The Political Environment depending both on the CSO approaches and willingness of particular umbrella body/agency to accept the CSO. A unified law on associations has been discussed at various points and levels Shanks et al. (2004) showed that defining characteristic of the political system in Vietnam is over the past decades, but has not proceeded. This legal uncertainty is a constraint on the the way at which policies and decisions are arrived through a complex process of vertical and development of Vietnamese CSO. horizontal consensus building. Taylor et al. (2012) explained that administrative procedures and the legal environment are key challenges for the development of CSOs in Vietnam. Recent The geographical distance also plays its role in registration of CSOs. The type of organisation administrative decisions have made the activities of CSOs, particularly science and technology also plays an important determining role: more CSOs in HCMC have been established as clubs or organisations, more complex. Decree 93/2009/N-CP regulates the management and use of charitable entities, and it is more natural for such organisations to register with provincial-level foreign non-governmental aid. Prime Ministerial Decision No 97/2009/-TTg defines a list of agencies such as the people’s committee, universities, and HCMC-based social and professional categories of science and technology organisations that can be established to only to 317 associations. Taylor el al. (2012) state many CSOs complained of unclear guidance from officials specifically approved topic. Ministry of Science and Technology Circular No 02/2010/TT-BKHCN and longer procedures for unconventional projects or initiatives. provides more detailed guidance on the establishment, registration, and operation of science and technology organisations. These new administrative guidelines emphasise state control on In addition, there is no legislation regulating the operation of social enterprises, and no specific the one hand and the technical role of civil society on the other, leaving little room for CSOs to legal status for social enterprises in Vietnam. The choice to follow a certain framework, especially engage in policy review and advocacy. for a social enterprise that is a hybrid between a non-profit and income-generating private While organisations are finding ways to adapt to these recent changes, they have also noted that many state officials have become more reserved and sceptical about civil society, viewing them as competing with or diminishing state power rather than as a collaborative partner in 242 243 the country’s development process. Vietnamese CSOs cannot publicly discuss subjects that are Investment (MPI) is currently working with CSOs to plan the development of the CSO Resource not explicitly sanctioned (Kepa, 2011). The Vietnamese government appears keen on defining Centre. Besides, in order to avoid a trap of MICs, one of the suggestions in evolving principles in advance the roles and responsibilities of new forms of civil society. Vietnamese CSOs have and structures that the government of Vietnam’s development partnership in coming years participated quite actively in the governance of areas such as land use and management, should do is applying partnership-based cooperation; bilateral partners have started to move forest and forest resources, among others, for many years, and their roles have gradually been away from traditional and sector-based support towards a new focus on mutually beneficial recognised by both local communities and local authorities at all levels. Many CSO networks are trading relationships, which involves new assistance modalities based on partnerships among being built to strengthen CSOs’ capacity, voice and involvement in national advocacy process. public bodies, academic institutions, NGOs, and private companies in Vietnam and the donor countries, which bring better information flows that Vietnamese institutions might choose the Taylor et al. (2012) mentioned that the growth in the number of CSOs existing in Vietnam support that best matches their need. reflects a relatively more hospitable environment provided by the state for civic engagement. The development of a more vibrant civil society sector is a natural outcome of a more open Since the Vietnam-EU VPA/FLEGT negotiation process started in 2010, in part to tackle the economic system and society, increasingly connected to regional and global trends and problem of imports, a handful of Vietnamese NGOs have joined the process. VNGO-FLEGT was information networks. In addition, the government increasingly recognises that the complex established in 2012; SRD is the leader of the network to support the negotiation process by nature of the development process requires contributions from many stakeholders, and providing comments to the draft annexes on timber legal definition (LD) and the timber legality civil society organisations can play a constructive role in providing feedback to improve the assurance system (TLAS). The main objective of the network is to participate and contribute effectiveness of government policies. This relationship between the state and civil society in actively and valuably in the process of negotiating and implementing VPA/FLEGT between the Vietnam is still very much evolving. The ongoing lack of a clear legal framework for civil society Vietnamese government and the European Union (EU). It contributes to the management plan, organisations creates an uncertain operating environment and reinforces the importance of protection and development of Vietnam’s forests, and the promotion of policies allowing local personal networks in getting things done rather than a set of transparent procedures applicable forest-dependent communities to access, use, manage, protect and develop forests equitably to all NGOs. A Law on Associations has been debated in the National Assembly in the past, but and sustainably. VNGO-FLEGT is responsible for: (1) sharing information and experiences on was shelved following a number of disagreements over its provisions in the mid-2000s. Thus, issues related to VPA/FLEGT; (2) supporting member organisations to build capacity related enacting such a law would improve the position of CSOs in Vietnam. to VPA/FLEGT; (3) coordinating activities related to VPA/FLEGT among member organisations in order to promote efficient operation of the network; (4) reflecting the relevant information Berliner et al. (2013) indicated the lack of civil participation in government; since DoiMoi, internal from local communities to the department of forestry and the other stakeholders. VPA/FLEGT politics and society in Vietnam have gradually progressed towards greater openness and space operates based on the principles of: volunteerism, commitment, equality and democracy, for civil participation. For example, the National Assembly is now more able to perform checks autonomy, transparency and updated information. and balances on the executive. Yet, greater openness and opportunities for citizens to actively participate in governance is needed. If Vietnam is to achieve its long-term vision of becoming Over time, the project has brought many meaningful outputs. The network has provided evidence a modern industrialised society, it needs to involve people further in the decision-making of a number of shortcomings with regard to the implementation of the law to the Vietnam processes. Respondents noted that many government officials do not understand the role of Administration of Forest (VNFOREST), while assisting the forest governance reform process civil society, or even the terminology of civil society and NGOs. In particular, local authorities which is carried out by the government. Simultaneously, issues surrounding implementation often view NGOs suspiciously, perceiving the term for ‘non-governmental’ to mean lacking or of forest protection and development law related to households and communities have been beyond government control. This reflects a serious information gap that needs to be addressed, included in a policy brief. This also enhances governance and regulations on the forest sector and underscores the prevalent view within the government that civil society organisations need and increases the potential for better economic and market opportunities for timber producers, to be controlled rather than encouraged. wood processors, and exporters. Effective participation in such consultations helps CSOs engage actively in national dialogues on FLEGT/VPA, providing comments on timber LD and TLAS for the Given this environment, it is not surprising that establishing close relationships with the negotiation between EU and Vietnam on FLEGT/VPA and convey them to policy makers (e.g. the authorities at different levels is vital to most organisations’ strategies and is a determining factor Vietnamese Negotiation Taskforce, VNFOREST) and the EU Commission in Vietnam. A number in the success of their program activities. The majority of CSOs either in Hanoi (78%) or HCMC of awareness-raising communication activities have been organised. (76%) emphasise on working with the government as part of their objectives. Respondents were clear on the importance of creating mutual understanding and setting up good relationships The Governance Context with authorities. Many CSOs encounter difficulties when they first reach out to authorities, especially at the local level. However, this tends to improve after a good working relationship is CSOs have played a strong role in both policy advocacy and service delivery for the poor, established and mutual understanding is achieved: 72% of organisations in Hanoi and 76% in especially in areas where the state has not been as actively involved. Recently, civil society has HCMC stated that they received good support from local authorities (Taylor et al., 2012). increased its capacity to channel the views and concerns of their local constituencies to public officials, conduct policy research and advocacy and monitor the government’s work. It is not CSO Roadmap (2014) indicates that the government increasingly recognises the positive yet clear whether the government will wind back opportunities for CSO participation. The low contribution of civil society to the national development of Vietnam. Service delivery is regarded level of civil society development in Vietnam limits their work on human rights issues, including as the most robust form of CSOs engagement in Vietnam. Support to public service delivery with labour and environmental rights, because the state does not fully recognise the role of CSOs as focus on socio-economic development, poverty reduction, and community development is still servants of the public interest. Sidel and Nam (2010) indicated that a review of VUSTA internal regarded as core mandate for many CSOs. While CSOs’ engagement in policy and lawmaking governance was carried out, showing clearly governance shortcomings and recommendations in process is limited, a number of civil society organisations have established relations with three areas: (1) strategy development; (2) management systems, including various procedures, government partners and are gradually engaging more in the policy process. job descriptions and decision-making processes; and (3) human resources management. It is indicated that CSOs continue to face a challenging environment. CSOs voiced real apprehension According to CSOs Roadmap (2014), the Vietnam Partnership Document calls for better CSO surrounding fundraising, staffing and organisational governance (Taylor, 2012). participation in the development partnership and includes a commitment to establish a local CSO Resource Centre, to help in building CSO capacity and networks. The Ministry of Planning and CSOs have increased their negotiating power vis-a-vis the Vietnamese government, which has 244 245 proved itself more open to CSO participation in policy-making. With regard to the forestry issue, because of reduction in aids for its poverty-focused programme in the country. ODA will decline the opinions and needs of communities on the legality of timber were successfully conveyed gradually in the coming years and fall away more rapidly. to the VPA negotiation delegation through the efforts of civil society. All of the feedbacks and comments received are partially valuable and appreciated by VNFOREST. It is clear that the Glennie (2011) finds that for some years, there has been pressure on donors, particularly the inputs from VNGO-FLEGT have been considered at least in part by the government, but with EC institutions, to increase the proportion of aid going to low developing countries (LDCs) and strong recommendations from the EU as a prerequisite for the VPA/FLEGT process. Therefore, low income countries (LICs). To do that, EC must reduce aid to MICs because some argue that WWF Vietnam (2014) indicates that in order to make effective contributions to the VPA/FLEGT aid should be focused on poverty reduction in the poorest countries. Therefore, many donors process, Vietnamese CSOs need to strengthen their own capacity, e.g. improve their knowledge, have reduced its aid to MICs, including Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, Norway and the skills, tools and organisational arrangements to fulfil their mandates and meet the expectations US, and DFID. A number of bilateral donors have already stopped their bilateral programmes of key actors so as to be more actively engaged in the VPA/FLEGT implementation process. for Vietnam, such as the Netherlands that stopped bilateral support in 2012, Sweden in 2013, Denmark in 2015 and DFID in 2016, which will have a substantial impact in some sectors/ The Socio-Cultural Context areas. It will be partly offset by an increase in non-concessional lending from the multilateral development banks, which may cause a loss in support for the social sectors (Vietnam Report, Vietnamese CSOs have been successful in intervening on sustainable agriculture and providing 2014). Besides, high speed growth and an unstable environment for development in Vietnam are livelihoods for ethnic minority communities across Vietnam. CSOs are committed to help poor also creating new challenges, straining state capacity and existing policy-making frameworks. and vulnerable people adapt to and mitigate the devastating impacts of climate change. On Absolute poverty still exists in Vietnam in both urban and rural areas, especially concentrating the ground, many CSOs’ projects range from livelihood adaptation, disaster preparedness strongly among ethnic minorities. Additionally, inequality is on the rise and that represents a to emergency response capacity. Vietnam is a multicultural country with over 54 different potential threat to Vietnam’s socio-economic stability and sustainable growth. ethnicities with socio-cultural diversity, which has been a challenge for CSOs working with local communities. Community-based CSOs are defined by their commitment to work directly with CSOs in Vietnam, thus, are gradually facing with shortage of fund for their activities, especially the local people to bring them full advantages from development projects, and sensitivity to for communal-based activities. CSO Roadmap (2014) indicates that ODA has been an important local opinions and perspectives is essential for their effective implementation. financial provider of funding to CSOs development. The current concern among CSOs is the shrinking funding opportunities and the expected decrease in grant ODA to Vietnam. According A variety of factors contribute to the successful implementation of any project. CSOs often focus to Berliner et al. (2013), international donors are changing the nature and traditional strategies on social issues such as poverty reduction, illiteracy reduction, improvement of livelihoods for of their aid/cooperation programmes for Vietnam and MIC due to its economic success. rural people, and building capacity for disadvantaged women or children, considering the socio- Instead of focusing on social provision or basic agricultural development, donors are switching cultural context as an important factor impacting on the success or failure of a project. Although their attention to issues of greater relevance to lower MICs about good governance, skills Vietnamese CSOs work with a variety of cultures and ethnicities, local people are usually open development, and labour market strengthening. Thus, CSOs also need to improve their capacity to share, co-operate and provide information to project officers. to catch this trend and have to seek ways to diversify their financial sources and explore other sources such as private and corporate social responsibility. This requires CSOs to improve not Currently, the social enterprise model in Vietnam is a new concept. There is no official only capacity, but also visibility and/or credibility towards enterprises and corporations, the recognition from the state. CSOs’ approaches to socio-economic issues in Vietnam tend not government and the public in general. to be understood clearly by local people, the mainstream media and traditional businesses. This results in cynicism of stakeholders about the nature of civil society organisations. The lack Besides, many of Vietnam’s development partners fund local CSOs, either directly or via INGOs, of trust and acceptance of the community create certain barriers for social enterprises when but much of it is uncoordinated and short-term in project funding. There is a risk that some working at the local level, and this has increased time, resource and opportunity costs, limiting CSOs may struggle to continue their work when many bilateral donors prepare to withdraw the ability to create positive impacts and project sustainability on the ground. CSOs often suffer their fund resources. According to Taylor (2012), CSOs in Vietnam remain highly dependent on from lack of cooperation and enthusiasm on the part of local authorities. foreign donor and most struggle to access sufficient public or private funding to support their activities. Thus, funding cuts would lead to serious problems for most of Vietnamese CSOs. Local conditions pose unique challenges to CSOs engaging with local communities. Various Taylor et al. (2012) find that many CSOs have suffered a series of funding crises in recent and geographic constituencies and communes have their own traditional socio-economic and in coming years. Limited and unstable budgets have undermined CSOs’ abilities to carry out cultural practices. These traditions have made it difficult for CSOs to introduce, for example, their activities, develop coherent long-term plans and retain staff, causing downsizing and office new agricultural techniques, with locals often hesitant to risk trying new ways of doing things. An relocation. additional difficulty impacting on local acceptance of CSOs is that implemented projects often take a long time for concrete benefits to accrue to communities. Moreover, human resources According to Taylor (2012), international donors have been crucial in supporting Vietnamese among CSOs are very limited. This affects the result and progress of projects. Furthermore, NGOs through technical and financial assistance. CSOs supported by international funds have there is a need to better link local agricultural producers to broader markets in a manner that recognised many positive impacts from these funding sources, especially through technical benefits locals. There is a tendency for private enterprises to take advantage of their position to support and organisational capacity building. However, there are no clear mechanisms for gain the highest possible revenues, at times at the expense of local communities. On the other engagement between CSOs in Vietnam and donors. Support between INGOs and domestic hand, local residents, in some cases, do not want to follow the project until the end. It is critical VNGOs, on the other hand, revolves around financing, knowledge building and technology in this regard for CSOs to be more sensitive to local traditions and socio-economic conditions to exchange, especially with regard to improve service provision by CSOs in health care and ensure smooth project implementation. education. International aid has also strengthened partnerships between VNGOs and INGOs, contributing to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between Vietnamese citizens The Socio-Economic Context and citizens from all over the world. With the trend of reducing ODA for poverty reduction and phasing out of traditional donors, Berliner et al. (2013) indicated that Vietnam has invested substantial resources into growth and Vietnam has also entered into a new challenging phase in its national development and its poverty reduction, while there is no attention in the capacity to generate obvious evidence on development cooperation. ODA flows decrease and become less concessional in nature 246 247 the impact of its interventions and using this evidence to advocate policy making for the past foresters, reduction of deforestation and degradation, better transparency and accountability decades. Thus, Vietnam has a great demanding requirement to improve the targeting of its in government procedures and policies, and support for local livelihoods. CSOs and local policy interventions and its public investments and to draw on wider sources of information and communities alike have come to engage more actively and constructively with the government. feedback from the community in addressing social and economic challenges and advocating changes. Kerkvliet et al. (2008) also indicated that CSO-state engagement is modest at the General Successes and Achievements national level, especially regarding policy-making, channelling citizens’ views and holding authorities’ accountability. CSO-state engagement is more substantial at sub-national levels, CSOs have strong economic and social impacts to Vietnam, which bring not only an active especially regarding conveying local residents concerns, providing services, and monitoring workforce, but also increasingly engage in health, culture, education, recreation, research, authorities’ behaviour than on policy. The CSOs involved are usually mass organisations in the consultancy and comment on policies, social services, community development, and other extent of national level engagements influencing policy outcomes. The weakness of civil society activities relating to evaluation and monitoring, etc. CSOs in Vietnam also help fill the gaps and in Vietnam is its modest impact on public policy issues such as human rights, social policy, assure that missing public goods are provided where there is lack of government resource and national budgeting, and on holding the state and private sector accountability. Civil society or failure of market and delivering public goods and services more efficiently. Besides, CSOs has had the most significant impact on increasing citizen awareness through informing and also help to ensure the transparency and accountability. Vietnamese CSOs have developed a educating communal people, empowering women and supporting development of sustainable mode of advocacy, including soft advocacy, for example, through non-confrontational policy livelihoods. advocacy vis-a-vis the authorities on social issues and climate change either through a series of CSO networks or together with VUSTA. CSOs build diversified network and involve in different According to Norlund et al. (2006), one of the genuinely important factors of the developments forums and dialogues in different levels, which bring voice and input from CSOs from communal and changes that have taken place in Vietnam over the last decades is high growth rate, which to national and international dialogues. Besides, climate change is a prominent advocacy issue accompanied reforms made towards a market economy and which has lifted a large part of in Vietnam. There are two CSO networks working actively on climate change: the NGO Climate the population out of severe poverty. This is also an important factor behind the considerable Change Working Group (CCWG), which is a forum for both Vietnamese and international CSOs, level of popular support for the present government. Vietnam’s socio-economic situation is and the Vietnamese NGOs’ Climate Change Network (VNGO&CC), which is for local CSOs and characterised by stability with high growth beginning from a low level of development. The their partners. VNGO-FLEGT is another network advocating efficiency for improved forest main problems that the country is facing are the still widespread poverty, increasing inequality, governance in Vietnam. and some internal conflicts. The social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. Many poor farmers tend to be more interested in the daily livelihood An example of achievements of the VNGO-FLEGT network: (1) In 2013, the network introduced than in political and civic rights. a full report on the Review of the Forest Development and Protection Law in three provinces, which contributed inputs and presented evidence of pitfalls in the implementation of the law to Over the past few decades, steps have been taken by the government to accommodate the the Vietnam Administration of Forest (VNFOREST) and therefore assisted the forest governance voices of small organisations and groups, expressing constructive criticism to government reform process by the Vietnamese Government; and (2) The Vietnamese Government has policies at the local and national levels. CSOs as service providers have helped improve the proven more open to CSOs, and the opinion and needs of communities concerning the legality quality of public services, especially in terms of reaching people at the grassroots level more of timber was conveyed to the VPA negotiation delegation. Specifically, the network gave effectively, compared to their government counterparts (Nhien, 2012). CSOs have been actively comments on the draft versions of the LD and the TLAS to VNFOREST. involved in development programmes by both cooperating and assisting in the implementation of the state’s policies or programmes. A number of organisations have tried to bring people Opportunities together around common social concerns to interact with the state in constructive ways, conveying their concerns toward authorities and suggesting state agencies to improve existing Strengthening citizens’ voices: more space will be needed to ensure that citizens’ views and policies and point out weaknesses in their implementation. experiences are heard and can be reflected in public plans, policies and Vietnam’s regulatory framework so as to improve their efficiency and relevance, and address local needs more Although Vietnam has made significant progress economically, it is still a new and developing effectively. Citizens’ involvement in policy-making and monitoring would also directly contribute country with low average income. Indeed, economic growth has come alongside a number of to addressing inequalities and corruption issues. Free media and free Internet, for example, emerging social and environmental problems. About 24 million people (28% of the population) would provide huge benefits to succeed in a new knowledge-based economy and to meet the need assistance and support for a better life, including the poor and near-poor, people with challenges that come with a modernised and young society such as Vietnam. disabilities, ex-convicts, HIV/AIDS patients, and the elderly. At the same time, there is a need to address social issues like crime and social violence, improving lifestyles, addressing the According to CSOs Roadmap (2014), the Vietnam Partnership Document calls for better CSO challenges of rapid urbanisation, food hygiene, waste disposal, pollution, and preserving cultural participation in the development partnership and includes a commitment to establish a local integrity. Clearly, it is time for the government to consider social enterprises as partners to share CSO Resource Centre, to help in building CSO capacity and networks. Ministry of Planning and the development burden, and assist the government in meeting its development objectives. It Investment (MPI) is currently working with CSOs to plan the development of the CSO Resource is necessary to enact legislation to create a legal and institutional framework to support the Centre. growth of social enterprises. Besides, in order to avoid a trap of MICs, one of the suggestions in evolving principles and The key for successful civil society participation in Vietnam will be for the appropriate parties structures that the government of Vietnam’s development partnership in coming years should to communicate externally on how civil society has functioned in in the country. Since then, do is applying partnership-based cooperation: bilateral partners have started to move away they know how to communicate with the Vietnamese government to maximise existing legal from traditional and sector-based support towards a new focus on mutually beneficial trading environment and social structures, and to clarify the functions and responsibilities of non-state relationships that involves new assistance modalities based on partnerships among public actors in a positive way to improve and inform the process. Visible impacts from this project bodies, academic institutions, NGOs and private companies in Vietnam and the donor countries, include improving the livelihood of forest dependent communities and gaining the respect for which bring better information flows that Vietnamese institutions might choose the support the rights of these communities on the part of local authorities. Improved forest governance that best matches their need. has contributed to the protection of forest areas, a notable reduction in the number of illegal 248 249 and information sharing is necessary to enable effective participation of board members, staff, CSO opportunities from EU’s priorities (CSOs Roadmap, 2014): and volunteers in CSO activities. • Promote an improved enabling environment for civil society organisations in Vietnam: the EU will support dialogue between the government, civil society actors, the private CSOs need to enhance their skills to design and develop appropriate capacity building, sector, and the general public to build trust and understanding of the positive assessment and development plans and improve their knowledge in planning and managing contribution of civil society in Vietnam’s development. organisational processes. Transparency and accountability are key focus areas that are • Promote a meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies: extremely important to CSOs. Training or workshops on these topics will help CSOs recognise the EU will ensure that in new bilateral and thematic programmes and sector and improve transparency and accountability within their own organisations. interventions, CSOs are mainstreamed so as to ensure their participation as partners in delivering services and in policy-making. The EU will continue to support CSOs to Evidence shows that progress is more sustainable when all stakeholders are involved in meaningfully engage with the government at national and provincial level in providing dialogue and debates around development. It is crucial to establish and support networks of policy recommendations, in monitoring policy implementation as well as to establish well-informed and effective civil society actors, capable of meaningfully interacting with the networks/coalitions for enhanced policy impact. government and the forestry industry in defining policies and subsequently implementing forest • Strengthening CSOs’ capacity to perform their roles more effectively: capacity building governance reforms. Lessons learned from VNGO-FLEGT network should be communicated to for civil society is critical, given the current enabling environment and actual operations those involved in national REDD and other forest-related policies to ensure these processes of CSOs. The EU will support CSOs across a broad range of areas related to internal strengthen rather than undermine each other. governance, sustainability and registration, capacities for improved service delivery to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups of society, capacities for advocacy Conclusions and policy engagement, as well as capacities for increased integration in regional and international CSO networks. New and emerging social problems require the careful consideration of development actors • Ensuring EU political support to CSOs: the EU will support all types of civil society at all levels. The emergence of social enterprises, beyond the private sector and state-owned organisations to enhance their engagement in policy-making process and to increase enterprises, has contributed greatly to resolving such issues. Despite many difficulties, their representation and contribution in high-level forums and dialogues. Vietnamese CSOs have been proven successful and will be crucial. The legal, political, • An example of opportunities deriving from building the VNGO-FLEGT network: (1) governance, socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts in Vietnam either enable or constrain VNFOREST’s plan to revise the law on forest protection and development; (2) VNFOREST’s the development of CSOs. In this light, the government of Vietnam is going to pay particular national stakeholder consultation workshop in 2014; (3) new donors supporting FLEGT attention to engaging people in CSO activities and should consider building a more complete through new funding; (4) VNFOREST calling on the network to comment on Annex 8 – policy package for instructing and assisting the operation of CSOs. Mechanisms and policies Public Disclosure of Information; (5) The existence of other funding resources for FGMC. need to be developed to create a stable legal framework for the operation of CSOs in Vietnam, Some network member organisations also received funding for FLEGT programmes creating favourable conditions for social initiatives to be easily implemented in practice, while such as FSMI, CRD, CED, among others. enabling and promoting the development of strong social entrepreneurship in Vietnam. CSOs, for their part, must ensure that they meet the standards and mandates they set for themselves. Challenges • CSOs in Vietnam have also faced a number of challenges in their development: • Making a good legal framework for CSOs is a long-lasting, continuing and repeating process that needs lots of effort, contribution and participation of relevant stakeholders and cross-sector. • Lack of capacity of most CSOs to meet the requirement of changing trend, especially with new priority focus areas because members of the networks have varying degrees of expertise. CSOs need to improve their capacity and staff; • Lack of sustainable fund resources for CSOs, especially for poverty reduction and healthcare sectors, key areas of many CSOs, because they are reduced from ODA, when Vietnam is MIC; • Lack of strong consensus in all CSOs networks. While there are many networks, members in networks might disagree on key issues; • Governmental organisations in general have tried to control the voice of CSOs and this has created divisions within CSOs networks; • Difficulty in accessing information and secondary data, especially in new topics and subjects Lessons Learned The network of CSOs must have a clearer strategy and plan of action to meet its specific objectives, along with a monitoring system to improve the operational effectiveness of the network. Moreover, it is necessary for all Vietnamese CSOs to build their capacity to participate in meetings, forums, workshops and programmes at various levels, especially in national and international levels. There is a need to build up information channels, engage CSOs in CSO networks and international forums. At the same time, improving management, leadership skills 250 251 Zimbabwe References Summary 1. Ben Kerkvliet, Nguyễn Quang A, Bạch Tân Sinh. (2008). Forms of Engagement Between State Agencies & Civil Society Organizations in Vietnam Study Report. Http://Internet.ngocentre.org.vn/ The country report for Zimbabwe traces the development effectiveness discourse from 1980, files/docs/Forms_of_Engagement_FINAL_COMPLETE.pdf when Zimbabwe gained its independence, leading to present-day Zimbabwe, as the country’s 2. CSO Roadmap, (2014).EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Viet Namhttp://eeas. europa.eu/delegations/vietnam/documents/press_corner/2014/20141110_civil_society_en.pdf experiences are embedded in its socio-economic and political context. While not a signatory 3. Edwin Shanks, Cecilia Luttrell, Tim Conway, Vu ManhLoi and Judith Ladinsky. (2004). Understanding to either the Paris Declaration or Busan Partnership, the country has closely followed these pro-poor political change: the policy process Vietnam. Oversee Development Institute.http:// developments, participating in crucial meetings and engaging local non-state actors in the Internet.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3902.pdf process, including CSOs and members of parliament. In the past two decades, Zimbabwe has 4. Gita Sabbarwal, Than Thi Thien Huong. (2005). Civil Society in Vietnam. https://Internet.globalpolicy. been characterised by a number of difficult economic problems, including infrastructure and org/component/content/article/176/32074.html regulatory deficiencies, international economic sanctions, policy uncertainty, a large external 5. Glennie, J. (2011). The role of aid to middle-income countries: a contribution to evolving EU debt burden, political tension, and high unemployment levels. For this reason, both donors and development policy. Working Paper 331. Results of ODI research presented in preliminary form investors played a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, especially in the run up to 2008 and 2013 elections. for discussion and critical comment 6. IreneNorlund. (2007). Civil Society in Vietnam: Social Organisations and Approaches to New Concepts. Manuscript received on 2007-07-30, accepted on 2007-08-29 Despite the onerous political, legislative and socio-economic context, it has been embedded 7. Irene Norlund, Dang Ngoc Dinh, Bach Tan Sinh, Chu Dung, Dang Ngoc Quang, Do Bich Diem, in the past few years that civil society in Zimbabwe is robust and diverse, particularly when Nguyen Manh Cuong, Tang The Cuong, Vu Chi Mai. (2006). THE EMERGING CIVIL SOCIETY AN compared to other countries in the Southern African region. Around 993 CSOs are presently INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM. Vietnam Institute of Development Studies registered as private voluntary rrganisations (PVOs) in Zimbabwe. They comprise a diverse (VIDS)/UNDP Vietnam/SNV Vietnam - CIVICUS Civil Society Index community ranging from humanitarian charities and community-based organisations, to 8. KEPA. (2011). Reflections on Vietnam Civil Society. developmental NGOs complementing government in service delivery, and governance-oriented 9. MSD. (2010). Vietnamese consultation. The open forum for CSO development effectiveness. civic associations. Their mandate encompasses critical watchdog functions in the democratic Report on the Vietnamese consultation. Open forum on civil society development effectiveness 10. Nhien Nguyen Huyen Thuy. (2012). The roles of Civil Society Organisations in enhancing grassroots governance arena such as election monitoring, political violence monitoring, corruption democracy in Vietnam. Master Thesis of Arts in Development studies monitoring, debt monitoring and tracking public opinion. The CSO sector in Zimbabwe, 11. Thayer Carlyle A. (2008). One-party rule and the challenge of Civil Society in Vietnam. Presentation however, is not operating in a fully conducive political and socio-economic environment. to Remaking the Vietnamese State: Implications for Vietnam and the Region. VietnamWorkshop, Zimbabwean CSOs are subjected to a whole spectrum of repressive legislation, executive action, City University of Hong Kong Hong Kong, August 21-22, 2008 administration, police procedure, extra-legal dispute resolution and case law, limiting their full 12. The Asian Foundation (2010). Civil Society development in Vietnam. http://asiafoundation.org engagement and participation on development effectiveness. 13. Tom Berliner, Do Kim Thanh, Adam McCarty. (2013). Inequality, Poverty Reduction and the Middle-Income Trap in Vietnam. http://mekongeconomics.com/dev/images/stories/FILE%20 The report provides insights into progress made within the country from 1980 to the lapse of PUBLICATIONS/EU%20Blue%20Book.pdf 14. UN Agencies in Viet Nam, Delegation of the European Union to Viet Nam and the Ministry of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2013 and the emergence of the ruling ZANU PF-led Planning and Investment of Viet Nam. (2014). Development Finance for Sustainable Development government, and explores various CSO interventions that have strengthened the discourse on Goals in Middle-Income Viet Nam Financing Viet Nam’s Development: Meeting the new challenges. development effectiveness. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vietnam/documents/eu_vietnam/dev_finance_en.pdf (Vietnam Report, 2014). Background and Introduction 15. WWF Vietnam. (2014). CSO capacity assessment for VPA/FLEGT in Vietnam 2014. 16. William Taylor, Nguyen Thu Hang, Pham Quang Tu, Huynh Thi Ngoc Tuyet. (2012). Civil Society in Vietnam The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC) – 2011 shifted Vietnam: a comparative study of CSO in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. The Asian foundation. the discussion from ‘aid’ to ‘development’ effectiveness, opening new opportunities for CSO 17. World Bank. (2007). Informal working group on people’s participation. Partnership note. engagement and alternative development paradigms. It was a culmination of the processes steered from the Monterrey Consensus, Accra Agenda for Action and the Paris Declaration. The BPEDC set principles that were accepted by all those involved in development cooperation, from donor and recipient country governments to providers of south-south cooperation, international organisations, civil society, parliamentarians and the local government. These were: • Ownership of development priorities by developing counties • A focus on results • Partnerships for development • Transparency and shared responsibility Amidst a challenging domestic and international environment, the Zimbabwean government has faced numerous challenges in implementing the country’s development agenda. The official discourse on aid is embedded in the socio-economic and political history of the country that has triggered key events over the years. This began in the 1990s, following the Land Reform Program, the rise of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the gradual collapse of the economy due to reduced agricultural activity and compensation payouts to war veterans and increasing isolation by the international community. 252 253 The economic crisis was instrumental in fomenting political agitation that led to the emergence The advent of the new constitution sets a window of hope in strengthening the development of a contested national political space with civil society organisations leading the national effectiveness agenda within the country as the constitution promotes civic participation, clamour to expand the constitutional space to protect and defend the social, economic and guarantees the freedom of assembly and association, promotes human rights and fosters good political liberties and rights of the citizenry. These increased demands for democratic space and governance. These are critical for CSOs’ engagement, participation, and development work. Since reforms in Zimbabwe and led the state to target CSOs through legislative and administrative the tenure of its office in 2013, the government has made efforts to engage with CSOs, as well interference, through a number of regulatory initiatives which are still in force today. The as the international community. For instance, Zimbabwean CSOs were consulted in the process relations between government and CSOs have remained problematic over the years. of the preparation of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) in the last quarter of 2013. The European Union has led a national and sector- The Zimbabwean government was accused of violating human rights, perpetuating political wide process, dubbed the EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society, following its violence and being corrupt in the years since the turn of the millennium. Simultaneously, decision to re-engage with Zimbabwe. It brought together government, CSOs, representatives of relations with the West soured. Western countries partnered in efforts to mount pressure on the international donor community, the private sector and marginalised groups. African Forum Zimbabwe to improve the political, human rights and governance state within the country. The and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) notes that, ‘Zimbabwe represents a unique United States promulgated the punitive Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act opportunity for aid to demonstrate development impact since the country is faced with a major (ZIDERA) in 2001 to curtail development aid and impose sanctions against the country. Western liquidity/credit constraint. This is the point in time when aid, if directed to national priorities in donor nations and organisations similarly halted economic aid and investment in Zimbabwe. the productive sectors of the economy (energy, infrastructure, agriculture), will demonstrate In October 2000, for example, the World Bank announced that it would extend no more loans its strength in filling Zimbabwe’s financing gap and, as such, finance investments rather than to Zimbabwe. Similarly, in 2002 the EU imposed restrictive measures on Zimbabwe through consumption.’ targeted sanctions, travel bans and arms embargo under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. The country was not able to access capital in the form of direct overseas development assistance, The Legal and Regulatory Framework foreign direct investment or cheap international credit, which deepened crisis. Confronted with these numerous challenges, Zimbabwe adopted the Look East Policy (LEP) by focusing on China, Civil society organisations, including foreign ones in Zimbabwe, are governed by the Private indigenisation and black empowerment policies. China, guided by pragmatic realism, embraced Voluntary Organisations Act [Chapter 17:05] (PVOs Act). The Minister of Public Service, Labour the LEP, stepping in to fill the gap left by the West. and Social Services administers the PVO Act for the registration and de-registration of PVOs. CSOs can also be registered as trusts in terms of the Deeds Registries Act [Chapter20:05], which The Government of National Unity (GNU) era improved the stalled international relations allows the Registrar of Deeds to register notarial deeds in donation or in trust. Trusts are dealt with the West within the country, in pursuit of fulfilling the Global Political Agreement (GPA) with by the Department of Deeds, Companies and Intellectual Property, which is administered commitments, by improving government CSO relations and promoting dialogue on development. by the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs. Trusts typically have unlimited objectives, which The impact of these processes is succinctly highlighted in the re-engagement by the European are often intended to benefit an identifiable constituency. Organisations can also operate as Union of the Zimbabwe government, which noted progress made in the country. This has seen unregistered voluntary associations or organisations, known as Universitas, in terms of the other European countries re-engaging the government, opening new lines of development common law. These entities have members, a constitution and activities that are entirely aid. It is important to note that aid in Zimbabwe is being channelled through UN agencies and for the benefit of their members. Such an entity is excluded from registering under the PVO local NGOs. This has worsened the strained relations between CSOs and the government, with Act. Currently, CSOs are advocating for a self-regulating mechanism that will allow NGOs to the government increasingly targeting CSOs, citing that the CSOs are receiving funding from execute their duties effectively without overregulation. The self-regulating mechanism is being Western countries to facilitate an agenda of regime change. coordinated by the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO). Zimbabwe is in a period of transition politically and economically, and this has impacted on In addition to the legal restrictions set up by the PVO Act through the Unlawful Organisations its international engagements since the ruling party (ZANU-PF) assumed office following the Act (Chapter 11: 13), the president can declare an organisation to be unlawful ‘in the interests 2013 Harmonised Elections. Zimbabwe’s transition is uncertain both in terms of process and of defence, public safety, or public order.’ This allows for interference with the running of an outcome. There are institutional factors that could promote positive change, while others organisation. The crackdown on Casals Associates Zimbabwe (CAZ), a USAID-linked organisation, militate against it. The central challenge for civil society working on development effectiveness is followed accusations of CAZ planning a political campaign to destabilise Zimbabwe through to influence the process of democratisation and keep the process on track, while blocking anti- funding of local CSOs. transition efforts that seek to drive the process towards political and economic instability. Civil society’s key challenge therefore is threefold: to fight government authoritarianism, to maintain The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act autonomous existence, free from running programs designed for them by the international (AIPPA), both enacted in 2002, further limit the operating environment for CSOs. In particular, donor community, and to avoid being appendages of opposition politics. the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) confer on the police several powers that might be used to undermine civil liberty and the collective right of citizens to assemble and organise. Moreover, Zimbabwe remains a fragile country, with the economy’s external debt hovering at 146% of its in 2004, there were attempts at legal reforms by the government through the elaboration of an GDP, up from 93% in 2007. With the elections having been sorted out, the country is expected NGO bill whose official purpose was to provide for ‘an enabling environment for the operations, to begin stabilising. However, issues of equity and illicit flows of Zimbabwe’s resources remain monitoring and regulation of all non-governmental organisations.’ The bill, which was enacted serious. In terms of debt servicing, Zimbabwe is only able to service 9.15% of its GDP, down by parliament but never approved by the president, was strongly opposed by civil society from 11.6% in 2007. Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP has gone down from 695 USD in 2011 to 659 organisations in the country for potentially violating the right to freedom of association. If in USD in 2012, representing a negative growth of -3%. Zimbabwe has a GDP of 8527 million USD, force, it would significantly extend government control over organisations provided for in the down from 8865 million USD in 2011. The country’s external debt burden grew to an estimated PVO Act. 10.7 billion USD, a figure which needs to be confirmed by the government as different offices of the same government provide different figures. Within the framework of the Accra Agenda for Action, CSOs and other non-state actors (NSAs) have an active role to play to support country development; they should therefore be part of country capacity development (CD) processes, both as recipients as well as providers of CD 254 255 support. While acknowledging that other non-state actors (e.g. political parties, local authorities, With the advent of the GNU brought to an end, the ruling party has assumed government and research institutes, media and the private sector) also have crucial roles to play, partner country in the past year, has been faced with internal factionalism that has seen a series of events which CSOs have a full range of roles as development actors and change agents, which include, but threaten development effectiveness and international relations. For instance, parliamentarians are not limited to, the delivery of basic services, support to local development, policy influencing who received support in their communities for development projects from the American in support of participatory and democratic governance, and the promotion of demand-driven Embassy under the Ambassador’s Special Grants Program are being fingered as sell-outs accountability mechanisms. In each of these roles, CSOs also play a key function in providing and part of a complex conspiracy for regime change. Political violence has since resurfaced. CD support—explicitly, through formally established CD support programmes or components With corruption scandals besetting the ruling party, allegations abound of the involvement of in ongoing interventions, and more informally, through development-related CSO interventions Western countries in a supposed plot to assassinate the president while removing individuals at the local level that implicitly contribute to develop the capacities of targeted communities as that were seen as conservative and moderate. While the government had developed a soft well as of CSOs themselves. approach in its first year, the same cannot be said for the coming years. The political in-fighting has further divided an already polarised country and CSO engagements with the government The new constitution of Zimbabwe, which was adopted in May 2013, contains a number of new at national and local levels are increasingly seen and labelled as tantamount to implementing provisions that could potentially enlarge the operational space for civil society in the country Western interests. In addition, this could create an impasse on CSO engagements with the given the necessary political will. These include respect for the rule of law and fundamental parliament, which is mostly dominated by the ruling party, a crucial actor in aid processes as rights and freedom. Moreover, there is a duty by the state to respect the rights set out by the noted in in-country consultations. Political temperatures are high across the country, which constitution. It includes the duty to respect, promote, protect and fulfil the rights and freedom could lead to various possible scenarios. as they are set out in the declaration. According to Amnesty International, there is a lack of political will in the process to amend and repeal unconstitutional laws, with the government Interventions under NAYO over the past few years include: continuing to use old laws that are repressive. The judiciary fared better than the parliament • Engagement with Parliamentary Portfolio Committees - To foster effective development, and other state actors in the promotion of the Istanbul and Busan Principles, offering a new NAYO has been engaged with parliament to feedback on its youth development work, dispensation on the promotion of economic, socio-cultural rights and CSO interventions and at the same time lobby for effective approaches that sprung development in between 2013 and 2014. A number of landmark judgments were delivered by the courts, Zimbabwe. covering a number of rights that include the right to water, the right to education, and freedom of expression and of the press with particular reference to criminal defamation. Zimbabwe is The Governance Context a signatory to several international human rights instruments, conventions and treaties, such as the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, and CEDAW among others, though there is less There is no formal platform that brings CSOs, government and other aid players together to effort by government to ratify some critical instruments such as Convention against Torture, discuss development effectiveness in Zimbabwe despite the existence of an Aid Coordination among others. Policy (ACP). During the GNU era, government made important strides in creating and fostering dialogue between the government, donor community and key development actors within NAYO has been holding several dialogues though its clusters in partnership with institutions civil society. The Zimbabwean Government launched the ACP in 2009 to provide a donor such as Zimbabwe Economic Society, Transparency International Zimbabwe, the World Bank coordination framework for effective planning and engagement, based on the Paris Declaration Country Office and NANGO. These dialogues focused on various thematic areas of development, on Aid Effectiveness of 2005. It contains guidelines, structures and objectives to support with young people playing a critical role in feeding into the processes. The Know Your Rights coherent interactions between government and partners. The shift from the humanitarian to Campaign, which began in 2011, has proved instrumental in raising awareness on the rights recovery phase coupled with the launch of Medium Term Plan (MTP) lays a strong basis for of youth and members of marginalised communities. It has strengthened civic and political reviewing current aid coordination mechanisms and structures in Zimbabwe. The coordinating rights, economic and socio-cultural rights and the reporting mechanisms within NAYO to mechanism includes monthly donor coordination meetings, thematic group meetings, and partner organisations within civil society such as Zimbabwe lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) Policy Oversight Committee for the Zim-Fund. These fora also provide platforms for policy and NANGO. dialogue. CSOs have been involved in the fora to contribute on monitoring, evaluation, and policy recommendations. Political Environment This process avoids duplication in the utilisation of donor funds, aligns external financial In Zimbabwe, CSO interventions and foreign aid are often seen through highly politicised and assistance with national priorities and avoids overlap by ensuring the prioritisation of the most partisan lenses. The relationship between most aid agencies and the government has been pressing development issues. The principles of the policy are centred on the Paris Declaration very volatile, with aid agencies criticised for meddling in local politics and being drivers of the on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action as it promotes government’s ownership regime change agenda. In this vein, aid agencies have been viewed by the state as largely and leadership of development cooperation management processes aimed at ending aid representing the interests of their donor countries rather than being genuinely philanthropic dependency. The ACP rhetorically speaks of national ownership to mean consultation and and are treated with suspicion. It is against such a background that in 2002, the government participation of civil society and the private sector, as well as mutual accountability that is suspended operations of several aid agencies. Since then, relations between the international reinforced through participatory approaches on formulation and evaluation of development aid community and the government of Zimbabwe have been characterised by mistrust. It has programs. The principle of managing for results is taken to imply working to achieve economic been observed that there is a general misconception about aid in Zimbabwe, where most recovery, poverty reduction and improved standards of living. At least on paper—though politicians see aid as an end in itself rather than a means to an end, with the end being poverty nothing much is tangible in practice—the government emphasises its commitment to enhance alleviation and socio-economic development. To this end, Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid effectiveness by taking full ownership and providing leadership in planning, management in Zimbabwe is fraught with lack of transparency, making it highly vulnerable to corruption by and utilisation of aid resources that become available to maximise benefits for the people of politicians who use it for their own vested interests, like gaining political mileage at the expense Zimbabwe. of national development interests. In terms of the core principle of development effectiveness, country ownership, the commitment by the government to a broad country-level policy dialogue including parliament, 256 257 local authorities and CSOs has largely been haphazard and mostly designed to suit the interests and resources. CSO mobilisation has been relatively weak in reaching out to ordinary citizens of the government as seen during the Busan consultations. For delegates to attend, one on development effectiveness. pre-condition was for consultations to be done in-country. This was also at the backdrop of dwindling aid within the health sector on HIV and AIDS program, which was 90% financed by aid NAYO has been running social accountability workshops in various provinces to engage state from the Global Fund and with government covering 10%. The best effort in this regard was the actors, youth CSO groups and local authorities to foster development that is centred on ‘Towards the Busan High Level Forum’ consultative workshop on Development Effectiveness accountability and community-led Youth and Governance Program (YUG). NAYO led the youth held in 2011. This was supported by the UNDP and the European Union and attended by sector consultations with the European Union Delegation, which is normalising relations with various actors within government and civil society. However, the workshop did not concretise the government and CSOs for a Country Roadmap 2014-2017. It mobilised youth organisations anything on development effectiveness. Rather, it agreed on the need for capacity building, that attended the consultative workshop, and is attending follow-up meetings between the EU accountability and predictability, national ownership of development processes, the integration and CSOs following the process. The process is seen as strengthening the government, CSO and of cross-sectional views in policy formulation and implementation and the role of parliament in donor community relations, as the consultative process has brought these together on several aid processes. Since that meeting, there has been no follow up mechanism to implement the occasions, cementing relations and collaboration which will be instrumental in development agreements. effectiveness. NAYO has also participated in debt and development initiatives through NANGO and AFRODAD, the recent being coordinated by IMF. Aid flows averaging 500 million USD per annum is not channelled through government coffers but disbursed through UN agencies and local CSOs who apply for funding and go through a The Socio-Cultural Context procurement process with the private sector. CSOs complement the government and do not necessarily align their initiatives with a fixed national programme or national priorities The work of civil society in Zimbabwe has been shaped by the country’s socio-cultural milieu. for development. This has raised pertinent issues surrounding ownership, effectiveness and The present government of Zimbabwe has its roots in an independence movement, which accountability, with the government calling for south-south cooperation and a review of the largely finds itself set against perceived values imposed by the West. The ruling party ZANU PF current aid architecture as the government grows impatient with Western donors. An expert believes in the Pan-African approach that values its independence from international norms, has described this scenario as ‘divergence’ between the donor country’s accountability and and this has affected relations between the government and CSOs over the past decades. CSOs the mutual accountability spirit. ‘Donor organisations are primarily accountable to their own mainly receive funding from Western donors and are perceived as agents for regime change, taxpayers and parliaments, and this often times makes it difficult for donors to practice the despite their contribution to and complementary role in government’s development efforts. Paris Declaration principles, like use of country systems when their citizens have concerns about corruption in developing countries,’ notes Dr F Bokosi, a policy advisor with the African CSOs in Zimbabwe have also largely failed to mobilise on key political issues due to internal Forum and Network on Debt and Development . divisions. In some cases, CSOs align themselves to this or that political party and have at times been difficult to distinguish from those in the ruling establishment. This was seen during the The government has undertaken various initiatives to strengthen development effectiveness constitutional, drafting process in which many apparently ‘independent’ CSOs were recruited and international relations with the donors, albeit with limited participation of CSOs and other under the banner of three major political parties; this has compromised the independence of non-state actors. These include: those CSOs involved. • The Zimbabwe Accelerated Reengagement Economic Programme (ZAREP) for the next 18-24 months. This should facilitate faster reengagement with development partners Nevertheless, CSOs in Zimbabwe, given their diverse nature and span of focus, have collaborated on policy issues. ZAREP will be a stepping-stone towards arrears clearance, debt relief with the media and churches, among other civil society entities, in pressuring the government to and new financing from the international community, including IFIs. promote development ideals, which have had a positive bearing on development effectiveness. • The Zimbabwe Accelerated Arrears Clearance, Debt and Development Strategy The Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF) is one such forum in Zimbabwe which brings together (ZAADDS) which resulted in the agreement between Zimbabwe and the IMF in May the church and civil society in the promotion of peace and reconciliation, following episodes of 2013 for a Staff Monitored Programme (SMP), which provides a window of hope for the political violence within the country. It has engaged cross-sectional actors in its interventions country to engage with the international community. with the support of the Organ on National Healing Peace and Reconciliation (ONHRI). NAYO • The establishment of the Zimbabwe Aid and Debt Management Office (ZADMO) within the sits within the forum representing youths. In addition, civil society has forged partnerships with Ministry of Finance in December 2010 to assume responsibility over debt management various media houses to foster policy dialogue, social movements and provide information to and strengthen government and civil society relations in ensuring transparency and active citizens in most cities across the country. These have had the participation of state actors accountability to enable development effectiveness. ZADMO is a recruiting staff and in some instances. has developed with the technical assistance from the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute (MEFMI), a comprehensive Capacity Development and Training The Socio-Economic Context Plan based on a debt management capacity needs assessment template. The advent of the new constitution has strengthened the operational space for CSOs to It is thus clear that to some extent the Zimbabwean Government has the ability to create an promote socio-economic rights within the country through the bill of rights and various enabling environment, as per Busan requirements, taking into account that it has already provisions that strengthen civic participation at both national and local levels. It is important created platforms for engagement with non-state actors, including CSOs, especially under to note that Zimbabwe is still recovering from a decade of economic decline that led to rising the umbrella body NANGO to augment the above processes. The DMO held various meetings levels of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment. The country is still confronted with aimed at resolving Zimbabwe’s debt and aid problems as well as raising creditors’ confidence major developmental challenges, manifested by high unemployment, rising poverty levels and in extending new credit line or scheduling debts. In such efforts, it has demonstrated the inequality, low savings and investment rates, and a decaying infrastructure. There is also a possibility of restoring relations between the country and the donor community. In Zimbabwe, high infrastructural deficit in energy, transport and water, which requires huge resources to the Zimbabwe Coalition of Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), Poverty Reduction Forum rehabilitate and expand. (PRF) and Women’s Action Group participated in the pre-Busan CSOs lead in aid effectiveness engagements, but failed in coming up with a nationwide CPDE program due to limited capacity CSOs have utilised political space to champion various development initiatives, given that the 258 259 country has yet to meet the Millennium Development Goals, such as ensuring environmental to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights. sustainability, improving maternal health and eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. Line • The capacity of key state ministries and institutions in Zimbabwe needs to be enhanced Ministries have seen the growing role that CSOs can play in this regard, with most holding to ensure the effective coordination of donor funds. Donors should therefore support stakeholder meetings to create roadmaps to work on targets which are set under the Zim-Asset the effective implementation of Zimbabwean Government initiatives, such as the Aid economic blueprint. However, at a policy level, the contributions of CSOs have not been taken Coordination Policy and SDGs. up by the government. A good example is the stakeholders meeting on the Metropolitan and • Development financing, and the promotion of an economic environment should be Provincial Councils Bills, which did not uphold constitutional provisions as they both did not premised on the respect for human rights and good governance. recognise the role of non-state actors like CSOs, curtailing development effectiveness at the • Strengthening social accountability from the local to national levels--transparency and local level. accountability in resource utilisation and mobilisation are crucial for development effectiveness and in curbing corruption. For its part, NAYO is implementing the AAAQ Water Project. This is a phased project that uses • Institutionalise and strengthen aid and development policy dialogue between the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality (AAAQ) framework (human rights-based governments, donors, civil society, parliaments, the private sector and emerging approach) to advance the right to water. The framework translates the general provisions of lenders to make it more participatory. the international human rights’ instruments and national legislation and policy into specific • A code of conduct for all partners to ensure more inclusive aid architecture is desirable standards, indicators and benchmarks for realising economic, social, and cultural rights. NAYO for development effectiveness. Memorandum of understandings (MOU) is a tool for partners together with the public participation platform members (seven local community-based setting out a shared agenda that defines the performances and reporting commitments organisations) under NANGO and to date have: developed contextualised AAAQ indicators to of both the governments and the donors in implementing of the aid. achieve the realisation of the right to water for Zimbabwe, and carried out a national research in all the five rainfall regions to establish the current state with regard the right to water. This year, Conclusion the project launched its report, Citizen Participation in Water Supply in Zimbabwe, which will be an advocacy tool for engaging an array of stakeholders, including donors and the government. Zimbabwe presents a unique case in development effectiveness as its socio-economic and Working as a consortium has meant greater reach for NAYO, improved resource mobilisation political processes have had a huge impact on the engagement of CSOs and other non-state and better cooperation from state actors and donors in the face of dwindling aid. actors in development cooperation. The country’s history has shaped their contributions and their level of participation. The strength of Zimbabwean civil society, despite a political NAYO presented a paper at the United Nations Forum on Minority Rights in Geneva 2011, environment curtailing their work, offers important lessons to other CSOs within the SADC which was at the invitation of and organised by the European Union and Minority Rights Group region in pursuit of development effectiveness. With the international community slowly re- International. The paper was titled Minorities at the UN – Improve Education for Minorities in engaging Zimbabwe toward opening new lines of credit, channelling aid to government led- Zimbabwe. It lamented the lack of government support on civic education and promoting rights programs and the engagement of CSOs by the government, especially through policy alignment, of minority groups and recommended that civic education on human rights be promoted. As a could point to a new dispensation in which the country can realise aid effectiveness. In this vein, follow-up to the development, NAYO held a National Minority Rights Conference in 2012, which the country needs to sort out its policies, refocus on a rights-based approach to development, led to the formation of the Minority Rights Coalition of Zimbabwe were NAYO is the secretariat. promote the role of civil society and adhere to international standards that attract international partners and end corruption. Cross-Cutting Challenges References • Inefficient parliamentary oversight role have forced donors to continue using parallel systems. This has resulted in donors using parallel structures, bypassing country 1. Action Aid (2005) ‘Real aid – an agenda for making aid work’. Internet.actionaid.org/461/real aid systems in the delivery of aid. report.html • Creating an enabling environment for CSOs, local authorities and parliaments has 2. AFRODAD (2002) Reality of Aid: Does Africa need Aid? Harare, AFRODAD Publications 3. AFRODAD (2013) Policy Briefing: Delivering on the Global Partnership for Effective Development proved elusive as the government lacks the political will. Cooperation in Africa, October 2013 • CSO interventions have been adversely affected by donor fatigue, lack of capacity and 4. Court, J. (2006) ‘Governance, development and aid effectiveness: a quick guide to complex resources, limiting their efforts on development effectiveness engagements. relationships’, ODI Briefing Paper, London, and ODI • Supporting CSOs as independent development actors in their own right, and 5. GOZ 2014. The 2014 National Budget Statement presented to Parliament by Hon. Chinamasa on commitment to an enabling environment for their work in all countries has been 27 November 2014. problematic. 6. GOZ, National AID Coordination Policy, Getting Zimbabwe Working Again, May 2009. • Engagements among the private sector, CSOs and local authorities on development 7. 7Progressio (2012) Zimbabwe: Unjust debt undermines democracy. Internet.progressio.org.uk effectiveness platforms have been limited. Lessons Learned • The ability of CSOs to form thematic coalitions and forge partnerships with other non- state actors such as the church and media has mounted pressure on the government, leading to interactions among the various groups on national development. • Increased citizen participation is critical in fostering cross-sectional dialogue and participation in development policy formulation and implementation. Recommendations • Parliament’s legislative, oversight and representative functions should be strengthened 260 261 List of Contributors Country Region Organisation Contributors/Authors Country Region Organisation Contributors/Authors Albania Europe Partners Albania, Klotilda Tavani Kosta Spain Europe Centro de Estudios e Rosa Blen Center for Change and Investigacion sobre Mujeres Agirregomezkorta Conflict Management Tunisia Africa Association ADO+ Dhouha Jourchi Burundi Africa BIRATURABA Jean Nkeshimana (It Concerns Us) Vietnam Asia Sustainable Rural Hoang Thi Huong Tra Development (SRD) Trinh ThiTuyet Cambodia Asia NGO Forum on Cambodia Heng Pheakdey Zimbabwe Africa National Association of Absoleme Mandizvidka Cameroon Africa NGO Collective for Food Elomo Andela Youth Organisations (NAYO) Security and Rural Development (COSADER) Czech Republic Europe Czech Forum for Development Daniel Svoboda Cooperation (FoRs) Ecuador Latin America Observatorio Cooperación/ Camilo Molina Ciudad Edgar Zamora Germany Europe Association of German Jana Rosenboom Development and Nicole Kockmann Humanitarian Aid NGOs (VENRO) India Asia Voluntary Action Network Jyotsna Singh India (VANI) Kenya Africa Reality of Aid – Africa Christine Saru Kyrgzstan Asia Forum of Women NGOs Nurgul Djanaeva Lebanon MENA Arab NGO Network for Chaden El Daif Development Mongolia Asia Center for Human Rights Urna Gombosuren and Development (CHRD) Mozambique Africa Grupo Mocambicano Orlando Penicela, Jr. da Divida Nicaragua Latin America Coordinadora Civil Marilea Reynoso Nigeria Africa Child, Adolescent and David Tola Winjobi Family Survival Organisation - Women’s Rights Action Group for Development (CAFSO-WRAG) Palestine MENA Palestinian NGOs Network Muhsen Abu Ramadan (PNGO) Paraguay Latin America Asociación Nacional de ONG Susana Aldama del Paraguay (POJOAJU) Peru Latin America Asociación Nacional de Josefina Huamán Centros (ANC) 262 263 264