Chapter Four Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker Political power relations and structures in Turkey have historically been marked by frequent recourse to, and the relative weight of, authoritarian modes of go- vernance and forms of state in which the military as an institutional actor, and militarism as a technique of power, have occupied a central place. Various forms of domestic militarism have been a permanent feature of modern Turkish poli- tics, from open military regimes to a national security state, from the use of (or the threat of using) organized physical coercion to the securitization of politics, from the enormous power of the military-industrial complex to ideological- cultural forms of militarism.1 Yet now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this situation has slowly begun to change as Turkish politics has witnessed the emergence of dy- namic power relations between the military and the civilian government. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) government, which came to power in 2002, has carried out legal and institutional reforms to limit the role of the military in the political sphere, both as a requisite of the European Union (EU) accession process and also to consolidate its own political power. However, these changes are not without challenges. Hardliners within the military have perceived the AKP government as the successor to the political Islamist movement, seeing it as a threat to the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic. In order to weaken the incumbent government, military elites have undertaken several actions, ranging from coup attempts to the promotion of anti- AKP public campaigns. However, having a narrow internal social base and hard- ly any international support, these attempts by the military have failed, and the balance of forces in Turkish civil–military relations has been gradually trans- formed in favor of the civilian government. 77 78 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker This chapter argues that this transformation of civil–military relations in Turkey in the first decade of the twenty-first century is related to three factors: the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal threats, and the emergence of a domestic political actor with the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment. Regarding international conditional- ity, civil–military relations have been transformed, not only in Turkey but glo- bally, since the end of the Cold War. This trend has affected Turkey directly through the EU accession process. Following the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the EU declared Turkey a candidate country for membership, thereby making a concrete commitment to Turkey.2 However, the EU clearly stated that accession negotiations could not begin unless Turkey fulfilled certain political conditions.3 An issue long on Turkey’s political agenda, Turkey’s EU candidacy immediately stimulated political and legal reforms to comply with EU conditionality. Hence, the EU requirement that the role of the military be re- duced in civilian politics was the initial trigger for reform in civil–military rela- tions. However, international conditionality would not have created a similar ef- fect if Turkey had continued to experience a significant level of internal threat as it had in the 1990s. As Desch argues, the strength of civilian control over the military is based on the degree of internal and external threat faced by a given society.4 According to him, civilian control is worst in times of low external threat and high internal threat. In fact, in the 1990s, Turkey continued to expe- rience high levels of militarization in its domestic politics due to the conflict in the predominantly Kurdish southeast part of Turkey.5 The relative softening of the Kurdish issue after the capture of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, paved the way for the “normalization” of the Kurdish question and thus opened up a channel to challenge the interference of the military in domestic politics. Finally, and most importantly, it was the emergence of a political actor with the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment that enabled the transformation of civil–military relations. Since 2002, the AKP has won three successive elections with increasing electoral and popular support. This electoral support is exceptional, given that the post-1980 period was marked by a pro- tracted crisis of political hegemony, where no single party was able to govern alone.6 The AKP’s capacity has been its ability not only to gain strong electoral support but also to develop an expansive hegemony. The AKP’s project has revitalized the neoliberal hegemony by absorbing Islamism into the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-oriented secular neoliberalism. In doing this, the AKP has reinvented the populist strategies of Turkey’s center-right and pro- moted a restricted political reformism within the limits of its authoritarian popul- ism.7 The AKP’s authoritarian populism is crucial to understanding its political reformism, and also the limits to it. Populism is a mode of politics which con- structs the main axis of political conflict as lying between a power bloc and a popular-national bloc. In populist political discourse, the power bloc refers to those alleged to control political power, being mainly composed of the state  Beyond Military Tutelage? 79 elites. Yet, different types of populist politics (for example right-wing or left- wing populisms) construct the power bloc and the popular-national bloc with different social contents since they interpellate different social classes and social groups into these two blocs.8 Populism can thus be either democratic or authori- tarian, depending on whether it opens the political sphere to oppressed social classes and groups, and whether it politically empowers or weakens those groups.9 Turkish center-right parties, starting with the Democrat Party after 1946, generally adopted authoritarian populist politics. This authoritarian popul- ist tradition has always constructed the main axis of political conflict as lying between an alleged Kemalist civilian and military bureaucratic power bloc and a supposed culturally and economically excluded “silent Muslim majority” na- tional bloc, the latter including not only dominant classes, such as the bourgeoi- sie, but also the working class, the peasants, and the urban poor. This authorita- rian populist reading of democracy has been based on the idea of representing an allegedly monolithic national will against the power bloc’s tutelage.10 Such a reading, adopted most recently by the AKP, has defined both the rationale of and the limits to center-right political reformism. On the one hand, as the military is seen as one of the main institutions guaranteeing the state elite’s tutelage over the economically and culturally excluded majority, the AKP’s hegemonic project has necessarily included coming to terms with the military elites. In addition, as the AKP is born out of the political Islamist movement, the top military elite of the period have not accepted the AKP as a legitimate political actor. This has pushed the AKP to be more reformist in civil–military relations compared to classical Turkish center-right parties. On the other hand, the AKP has reproduced “Kemalism’s distaste for ‘politicization,’”11 because it has re- duced democratization to merely struggling against the state elite, relied on a monolithic and majoritarian understanding of national will, and resisted any kind of social opposition challenging the national will of the absolute majority. This authoritarian understanding of democracy has defined the inherent limits of the AKP’s civilianization agenda. In what follows, we will discuss this dynamic relationship between the mili- tary and the AKP government in the first decade of this century by dividing the epoch into three major periods, all of which signify a rupture in civil–military relations. The first period (2002–2005) is the period of reform, where the AKP undertook several reforms to transform civil–military relations to fulfill EU requirements. The second period (2005–2007) is the period of setback, where the AKP seemed to converge with the military on key political issues, although this period also witnessed a radicalization of the military’s discourse against the AKP government. The third period covers the time since the military’s e- memorandum of April 27, 2007, characterized by a transformation in the balance of power between the government and the military. Especially after the July 2007 elections, when it won 46.6 percent of the vote and gained 62 percent of the parliamentary seats, the AKP’s electoral strength was applied to an open struggle as the party began to challenge the political power of the military direct- ly through the trials of so-called Ergenekon suspects. 80 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker The Period of Reform and Readjustment: 2002–2005 The AKP became the leading party in the November 3, 2002 elections by win- ning 34 percent of the vote and gaining 65 percent of the parliamentary seats.12 With this victory, the AKP became the first party since 1991 to govern without coalition partners. During the AKP’s first term, the EU became the main politi- cal lever for consolidating the AKP’s power in two ways. First, the AKP’s pro- EU discourse functioned as a hegemonic apparatus to get the consent of various social groups, many of which were otherwise suspicious of the party’s inten- tions.13 Second, it served to consolidate the AKP’s political power, both domes- tically and internationally, vis-à-vis Turkey’s military and secular establishment. The EU was a very important factor in the transformation of civil–military relations between 2002 and 2005. In order to comply with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, the AKP pushed through major reforms, although another major motiva- tion of the reform agenda in this period was to curtail the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) political prerogatives and tutelage. For example, the Seventh EU Harmo- nization Package (Law No. 4963), passed on August 7, 2003, made significant amendments to the composition, role, and functions of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretariat General. The NSC, which was previously the main institution of army influence, was transformed from being an executive decision-making board into an advisory board.14 Moreover, the internal compo- sition of the NSC was radically altered: the majority of members were now to be civilians. Likewise, its secretariat, which had always been held by a high- ranking general, could now be a civilian, to be appointed by the president from a list of candidates selected by the prime minister.15 Even more importantly, the frequency of NSC meetings was decreased to once every two months instead of monthly. This amendment indirectly but effectively decreased the importance of the NSC in domestic policy-making.16 Moreover, with amendments to the laws on the Establishment of, and Broadcasting by, Radio and Television Corpora- tions, Wireless Communication, and the Protection of Minors from Harmful Publications, the NSC’s prior authority to nominate one member to each compe- tent board was ended.17 Besides the amendment to the structure and responsibili- ties of the NSC, the parliament annulled the provision in the Law on Higher Education, which allowed the General Staff to select one member of the Higher Education Council. At the same time, the softening of Turkey’s Kurdish problem, the so-called “normalization” process, provided the domestic conditions necessary for the EU reform process to occur. Turkey enjoyed a relatively violence-free period be- tween 2002 and 2005, during which time the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) declared a ceasefire. “Normalization” further advanced when the state of emer- gency, which had been declared in 1987 in eight southeastern provinces and gradually expanded to cover thirteen, was lifted in the last remaining two prov- inces in November 2002, right after the AKP won the 2002 elections. From 2003 until 2005, the AKP pushed through some reforms related to the Kurdish prob- lem, including abolition of the death penalty and a clampdown on the police use of torture, the release of political prisoners, greater freedom of expression and  Beyond Military Tutelage? 81 protection for the media, and some cultural, educational, and language rights— albeit very limited—for the Kurds.18 Although, the AKP was not able to create a Kurdish policy of substance during this period, it sought to find a pragmatic solution to the Kurdish problem. This solution would not include military con- frontation, which would have given the army the opportunity to reassert itself further in Turkish politics.19 While the AKP government was undertaking political reforms as a prerequi- site of EU accession, the military, which had always defined itself as the fore- runner of the westernization project, could not publicly oppose the EU reforms. This led some prominent scholars to evaluate the situation as another example of “concordance between politicians and officers in Turkey.”20 Others cheered the military’s extrication from politics as a consequence of Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the EU.21 However, it was soon revealed that hardliners in the military defensively resisted the impacts of the EU reforms. They tried to regain the influence they had had prior to the EU-related democratization reforms of the AKP government through various means, among which were coup attempts. In March 2007, the Turkish weekly magazine Nokta published the diaries of the ex-commander of Naval Forces, Özden Örnek.22 By this date, the political and public agenda was already full of reports that between 2003 and 2004, mili- tary hardliners led by the then commanders of the gendarmerie, land, naval, and air forces, had prepared four coup attempts called Ayışığı (Moonlight), Yakamoz (Bioluminescence), Sarıkız (Blondie), and Eldiven (Glove). Later on, the diaries of the pro-republican journalist Mustafa Balbay and the statement given to the prosecutor’s office by the then Chief of General Staff,23 Hilmi Özkök, provided further evidence of the existence of the failed coup attempts. The hardliners behind the coup attempts perceived the AKP government as an open threat to the secular foundations of the Republic and were highly dissatisfied with the EU reform process that aimed to cut back the military’s political power. These coup attempts were unsuccessful for several reasons. First of all, har- dliners in the military relied on the possibility of ratification of the Annan Plan in Cyprus as the most forceful justification for a coup. Thus, the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot part of the island deprived them of necessary public support. Furthermore, there were also internal splits within the military. For example, according to the diaries of Özden Örnek, it seems that Gen. Hilmi Özkök was known for having a tough anti-coup stance. The coup planners were also well aware of the lack of both international and domestic support for a mili- tary coup.24 Unlike previous military coups in Turkish history, these coup at- tempts had neither the support of the Istanbul-based big bourgeoisie nor the market-dependent new middle classes, who were very sensitive to economic stability. Finally, again unlike previous coups in Turkey, there was no external support, especially from the United States, for a coup. In sum, the potential so- cial basis of a possible coup was so narrow that it would have just mobilized the old urban middle classes and small parts of the new middle classes, whose main concern was their secularist, western lifestyles. Although there were signs that the AKP leaders were aware of the attempted coups against their government back in 2003 and 2004, trapped in power politics and being unable to penetrate 82 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker state institutions, they simply kept a low profile against the military.25 This ra- ther passive stance of the AKP government paved the way for a counter attack by the military in the following period, marked by the slowing down of the EU reform process and the remilitarization of the Kurdish question. The Period of Retreat: 2005–2007 The EU reform process slowed down in the aftermath of the rejection of the proposed EU constitution in France (May 29, 2005) and the Netherlands (June 1, 2005), which was interpreted by Turkish public opinion and the government as signaling resistance to Turkey’s membership. Meanwhile, among European politicians, on both the left and right, the concept of “privileged partnership” began to gain support as an alternative to full membership for Turkey. In Ger- many, the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and the Left parties began openly to oppose full EU membership for Turkey. As a result of these developments, the EU lost its functionality as a hege- monic apparatus in internal Turkish politics. The AKP’s political stance also suffered “Eurofatigue” and adopted a more nationalist-conservative tone.26 With the EU euphoria disappearing, the military started to counterattack the AKP, which had tied its political future to EU membership. On April 20, 2005, Chief of General Staff Özkök gave a speech at the War Academy in Istanbul. His re- marks covered every major issue of domestic and foreign policy, and focused especially on the Kurdish question and the EU. He claimed that the activities of the PKK had increased dramatically and accused the EU of acting as a mediator for the PKK. EU accession would be “no blessing,” he said, and it would not be “the end of the world” if Turkey did not become a member.27 Although the EU had been the initial trigger for reforms in Turkey, these developments diminished its soft-power leverage. This development was coupled with further remilitarization of the Kurdish question, as PKK operations and the state’s “anti-terrorist” activities in southeast Anatolia regained momen- tum at the end of 2005 after a bomb attack in the far southeastern town of Şemdinli on November 9, 2005. When local people apprehended three alleged perpetrators of the bombing, two were identified as officers of an unofficial military organization, the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism (JİTEM), while the other was a PKK informant.28 One of the JİTEM officers was allegedly linked to then Commander of Land Forces (and later Chief of the General Staff) General Yaşar Büyükanıt, who had served in the area between 1997 and 2000.29 This incident became known as the Şemdinli case. Following the incident, major riots broke out all over Turkey’s widely Kur- dish-populated southeast Anatolian region, in which a full investigation of the incident was demanded. The AKP government, in response, promised a full and transparent investigation. The Chief Prosecutor of the province of Van, Ferhat Sarıkaya, then drafted an indictment which also pointed to relations between the General Command of the Armed Forces and PKK informants.30 The prosecutor  Beyond Military Tutelage? 83 accused General Büyükanıt of trying to influence the judicial process by defend- ing one of the instigators of the bombing by saying he was “a good boy.”31 Sarıkaya also alleged that the bombing “was part of a series of similar attacks intended to provoke the security forces into a clampdown on the restive Kurdish region that would then unleash European criticism and jeopardize Turkey’s hopes of joining the EU.”32 The then Chief of the General Staff, General Özkök, reportedly contacted Prime Minister Erdoğan and asked for “necessary steps to be taken,” as members of the military had been accused.33 In response to the indictment, the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu—HSYK) dismissed Sarıkaya from his post and barred him from the legal profession.34 Thus the AKP government, in the Şemdinli case, preferred to make a compromise with the military, and the government’s chance of politi- cal and juridical ways of dealing with illegal state practices in the domestic con- flict of Southeast Anatolia was missed. Once the structural EU factor faded away and the military increasingly pressed the government to take a tougher stance on terrorism, the authoritarian face of the AKP’s authoritarian populism readily came to the fore. The AKP government adopted new anti-terror laws in June 2006, amending the Law on the Fight against Terrorism (Act No. 3713), which had been first passed in 1991. The amended Anti-Terror Law broadened not only the number and range of crimes which could be considered terrorist offences but also increased the penal- ties for such actions (such as insulting symbols of state sovereignty). The law also introduced legal restrictions on freedom of expression, the press, and the media, while reducing vital procedural safeguards for suspects of terrorist of- fences.35 As Patton argues, these amendments gave the military sufficient leve- rage to ensure that EU rights-based reforms were deemphasized and non- military solutions to the Kurdish problem were held at bay.36 Thus, the AKP’s strategy of establishing a partnership with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) regarding the Kurdish question ended up by re-empowering the TAF. Between 2002 and 2005, the TAF relinquished much of its structured, con- stitutionally legitimized influence on civilian politics through EU-inspired re- forms. However, setbacks to the EU project and increased militarization of the Kurdish question opened a new sphere of influence for the military. This sphere of influence was utilized mostly through informal means of leverage.37 A shift in the military’s strategy that had already started with the so-called post-modern coup of February 28, 1997—“February 28 process”—deepened, starting in 2005.38 Accordingly, the military’s strategy shifted from a “state-centered strate- gy to establish hegemony to a more de-centered, individual-based and informal practice of power in society.”39 That is, if failed coups characterized the period between 2002 and 2005 with regard to the military sphere, informal mechanisms of power characterized the 2005-2007 period. The typical informal mechanism of the period included public pronounce- ments, usually given by members of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) at official, public occasions like commemorations, anniversaries, or graduations. On these occasions, military officials warned the government and as such pressured the public to take necessary action against them.40 The second typical mechanism 84 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker was pressuring the government through collaboration with civil society organi- zations that the military asked to be civil guardians of secularism. In Turkey, as Cizre acknowledges, “most secular NGO’s, which are considered in theory au- tonomous vis-à-vis the state, have, in reality, been defined, structured and mobi- lized as the secularist frontline partisans . . . against the anti-secular ‘enemies’ of the regime.”41 This new strategy peaked after the appointment of General Büyükanıt as Head of General Staff in July 2006. He further reinforced the self- proclaimed role of the Turkish military as the guardian of Turkish secularism. At around the same time, the public debate around the headscarf issue came to the fore. A coalition was formed against headscarves being allowed on university campuses, which included members of the judiciary, deans of major universities, the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP), some civil society organizations, and the military. According to Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, this coalition presented “the Islamic headscarf as a sign of the hidden agenda of the AKP. The implication here is that the AKP will eventually replace the secular republican regime with an Islamic one.”42 Tension between the AKP government and the military further increased during the period of presidential elections in 2007. The AKP presented the Mi- nister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, as its presidential candidate. The TAF was opposed to his candidacy based on the fact that Gül’s wife wears a head- scarf, as well as his own involvement with political Islam. During a press confe- rence on April 12, 2007, General Büyükanıt stated that, “as a citizen and as a member of the armed forces, I hope someone who is loyal to the main principles of the republic and committed to the secular, unitary structure of the state—not just in words, but in essence—will be the president.”43 The presidential elections soon turned into a political crisis. In the spring of 2007, right before the start of the presidential election process, several rallies were organized by the Atatürkist Thought Association under the leadership of retired General Şener Eruygur44 in the largest cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir. Millions of people—named the “Republic Protests”— gathered to defend “secularism,” chanting “Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular.”45 Sharing similar concerns, on March 14, 2008, the Chief Public Prose- cutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals formally asked the Constitutional Court to close the AKP on the basis of its anti-secular activities.46 As these rallies were taking place, the Turkish General Staff published a memorandum on its website, later called the “e-memorandum,” on April 27, 2007, warning of the danger to secularism.47 The memorandum said the military was following with “concern” the debate over the secular system in the presiden- tial election and would “openly display its position and attitude when it becomes necessary.” The text continued: “It is observed that some circles that have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb the fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently. . . . An im- portant portion of these activities was carried out with the permission and the knowledge of the administrative authorities, who were supposed to intervene and prevent such incidents, a fact which intensifies the gravity of the matter.” 48  Beyond Military Tutelage? 85 This time, however, the AKP took a tougher stance and immediately an- nounced a counterstatement on April 28, stating that “in a democratic country governed by the rule of law, it is unimaginable for the General Staff, which is attached to the prime minister, to make a statement against the government. . . . It is regrettable that there were utterly wrong expressions about the relations between the government and the General Staff. All institutions of our state should be more sensitive and careful.”49 The AKP government, further, did not withdraw Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate but decided to fight back by seeking popular support for his candidacy. Thus, general elections, which were originally planned to follow the 2007 presidential elections, were rescheduled for July 22, 2007. A New Period of Civil–Military Relations? The 2007 Elections and Their Aftermath As expected, the general elections of 2007 were fought over secularism, the military–civilian divide and the presidential elections. By winning 46.6 percent of the votes, gaining 62 percent of the parliament and securing a majority of votes in 68 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, the AKP achieved a major victory in the elections. These elections made the AKP stronger than before, thereby trans- forming it into a powerful hegemonic party. With this newly gained strong popu- lar support, the AKP re-nominated Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate. On July 30, 2008, the Constitutional Court gave its verdict in the AKP’s closure trial. The court found that the AKP had shown signs of being “a focal point of anti-secular activities” but decided not to ban the party; however, it issued a “serious warning” and as a penalty decided to cut state funding of the party.50 Shortly after the verdict of the Constitutional Court, Gül was elected by the new parliament as the new President of Turkey on August 28, 2007. The success of the AKP in parliamentary and presidential elections signified a turning point, firstly in civil–military relations by eroding the power and credi- bility of the Turkish military, and secondly on the Kurdish question. Between 2002 and 2007, the AKP government had been able to penetrate—albeit limited- ly—the judiciary and begin to exert a more extensive influence over the police. During the new period, this increasing control over the police and judiciary would become crucial as the AKP began to launch an offensive against the mili- tary based on the evidence of military-inspired plots to overthrow the govern- ment. The Ergenekon Trials On October 20, 2008, following the uncovering of an arms dump and asso- ciated documents in an Istanbul house, the Ergenekon trial began. The trial in- itially involved eighty-six people, including some army generals, charged with 86 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker involvement in the “Ergenekon coup” plot. The trial led to successive and still ongoing waves of arrests of academics, politicians, journalists, lawyers, busi- nessmen, and high-ranking retired military officials. Among the charges leveled by the indictment are “membership of an armed terrorist group, aiding and abet- ting an armed terrorist organization, attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey or to block it from performing its duties, inciting people to rebel against the Republic of Turkey, being in possession of explosives, using them, and inciting others to commit these crimes, acquiring secret documents on national security.”51 The Ergenekon files revealed evidence about the three pillars of militarism in Turkey.52 The first pillar is the illegal state and military activities during the 1990s as part of the “low intensity warfare” against Kurdish political and armed movements. The second pillar is the so-called post-modern coup of February 28, 1997, which was staged against the political Islamist Welfare Party-led coalition government. The third pillar is the failed coup attempts in 2003 and 2004 against the AKP government. Despite the broad nature of the Ergenekon conspiracy, it seems that the chance for an all-encompassing coming to terms with militarism has been slipping away, for two main reasons. First, the Ergenekon trials have focused solely on the failed coup attempts, leaving aside other illegal deep state activities. For example, some ex-military officers who evidently took part in illegal practices during the Kurdish conflict in the 1990s have only been accused of being part of the Ergenekon terror organization that attempted to overthrow the AKP government. Second, the AKP government has preferred to use the trial to gain political leverage over the military. For example, the closed meetings between Prime Minister Erdoğan and Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt (on May 5, 2007), and between Erdoğan and the succeeding Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ (first on February 7, 2009, then on March 23, 2010, with President Abdullah Gül), resulted in the release of leading high-ranking generals who had been accused of taking part in the coup attempts.53 As the Ergenekon trials have been going on, many new documents have emerged, revealing military plots such as the Kafes Eylem Planı (Cage Action Plan) (March 2009), İrtica ile Mücadele Eylem Planı (Action Plan to Fight Reli- gious Fundamentalism) (dated April 2009), and claims about an assassination plan against a leading figure of the AKP, Bülent Arınç. In February 2010, forty people were arrested over an alleged 2003 plot (called “Balyoz”— Sledgehammer) to stir up chaos and destabilize the government to justify a mili- tary coup. Twenty military officers, including former heads of the air force and navy, have been formally charged with attempting to overthrow the govern- ment.54 The operation further increased the tension between the government and the armed forces. The Supreme Military Council meetings in August 2010 over a series of new appointments within the TAF further deepened the divide between the gov- ernment and the military. Traditionally, governments do not interfere in promo- tions and transfers within the TAF. However, this time, the AKP government vetoed the promotions of eleven high-ranking generals due to their alleged con- nections to Sledgehammer coup plotters, and the military’s plans to appoint Gen.  Beyond Military Tutelage? 87 Hasan Iğsız to head the Land Forces were thwarted for the same reason. The AKP government thus gave out a strong message that it would no longer remain indifferent to the appointment or promotion of army officers, which signified the beginning of a new era where, while each institution has its own area of respon- sibility, the last word belongs to the elected government.55 Kurdish Opening? Whether civilians have the upper hand in civil–military relations will deter- mine how the AKP government deals with the Kurdish problem and the party’s overall political future. Being well aware of this, the AKP government an- nounced its so-called Kurdish opening (also called the “democratic overture”) at the end of 2009. Although details of this reform program were never made fully public, one of the most important steps for reconciliation announced was en- couraging PKK members who were not involved in any armed attacks to come down from the mountains where PKK forces are based, and then be pardoned.56 The plan is also supposed to include the following elements: reinstitution of the former Kurdish names of districts and villages; eliminating the problems faced in the use of Kurdish first and last names; organizing social activities including sports, concerts, and exhibitions in the region; adopting social policies, including making the Kurdish language an elective course in schools; introducing new economic packages; implementing employment projects to reduce unemploy- ment; amending the constitution to include a constitutional citizenship that em- phasizes the cultural diversity of Turkey; strengthening local administrations; encouraging investments in the east and southeast; eliminating the obstacles to Kurdish broadcasting and private television; and amending the respective ar- ticles concerning political parties and election law that only allow campaigning in Turkish.57 The government’s amnesty approach, and thus the opening, however, back- fired when thirty-four PKK members, who the Turkish government had allowed back into the country from Iraq, announced that they had no remorse for their past actions, and had returned to Turkey not to take advantage of the AKP’s amnesty, but rather to represent the PKK. These demonstrations created a natio- nalist mobilization in the rest of Turkey, and the AKP decided to discontinue its plan to bring more PKK members back to Turkey.58 Military officials imme- diately criticized the policy, and insisted that the “terrorists” needed to disarm unconditionally and trust in the justice of the state. The problems the government experienced with its Kurdish opening are evidence of how the AKP’s authoritarian populism determined the way in which the party dealt with the Kurdish question. That is, as authoritarian populism conceives of itself as the only legitimate representative of the national will, equated to the electoral majority,59 it does not accept any other actor as an inter- locutor. In the case of the Kurdish opening, this meant bypassing legal Kurdish political parties as legitimate partners in dialogue. The process of the so-called Kurdish opening witnessed not only the neglect of legal representatives of the 88 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker Kurdish opposition movement but also involved several police operations against them. This exclusionary stance towards any oppositional actor resulted in both the renaming of the Kurdish opening as the Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi (National Unity and Brotherhood Project) and in the opening of an avenue for remilitarization of the question by TAF and the PKK. This return to violence posed a new challenge for the AKP government. By delegating the solution of the Kurdish problem to the military, and without integrating the Kurds political- ly, the chances of Erdoğan’s government ruling without military inference in politics became slim.60 Conclusion Political power relations and structures in Turkey have historically been marked by forms of state in which the military as an institutional actor, and militarism as a technique of power, have occupied a central place. The frequent recourse to authoritarian modes of governance has been the major obstacle to the democrati- zation process in Turkey. Yet now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this situation has begun to change as the balance of forces in the civil–military relations has been gradually transformed in favor of the civilian government. How can one explain the failure of military intervention in Turkey’s political life during the eight years of AKP government? How can one further explain the change of balance between the civil–military relations in favor of the former? This chapter has argued that the transformation of civil–military relations in Turkey is related to three factors: the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal threats, and the emergence of a domestic politi- cal actor with the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment. As a result of highly polarizing and exclusive tactics of the military elites, the AKP government was obliged to pursue a civilianization agenda in order to be able to remain in the political arena. Thus, the interaction between the civilian govern- ment and the military elites transformed the civilians into strategic democrats. In June 2011 elections, AKP won a decisive victory, taking 50 percent of the vote. The third electoral victory of the AKP was soon followed by another crisis. Three days before the Supreme Military Council meeting, on July 30, 2011, Turkey’s top military commanders, the Chief of Staff Gen. Işık Koşaner, together with the leaders of the navy, army, and air forces resigned from their posts. The decision to resign was made by the top generals when they failed to convince the AKP government to promote some of the military officers who have been charged in relation to Ergenekon trials. As of August 2011, about 250 military personnel are in jail, including 173 serving and 77 retired staff, in rela- tion to Ergenekon trials. In a farewell message, Gen. Koşaner said it was im- possible to continue in his job under this situation, as he could not defend the rights of men who had been detained. As a response, the AKP government ac- cepted the resignations and appointed Gen. Necdet Özel as acting Chief of Gen- eral Staff hours after the resignations. The resignation of top generals was with-  Beyond Military Tutelage? 89 out precedent in Turkish history. Yet, it had not caused a political crisis or a strong public response. Thus it was a symbolic turning point in the already trans- formed civil–military relations and marked the end of an era in Turkish politics. Notes 1. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Auton- omy,” Comparative Politics 29, no. 2 (January 1997): 151–66; Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu, eds., Bir Zümre, Bir Parti. Türkiye’de Ordu (İstanbul: Birikim Publications, 2004); Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça, eds., Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Publications, 2010); Ümit Cizre, ed., Alma- nak Türkiye 2005: Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (İstanbul: TESEV Publica- tions, 2006); Ali Bayramoğlu and Ahmet İnsel, eds., Almanak Türkiye 2006–2008. Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (İstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2009); Ayşe Gül Altınay, The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey (New York: Palgrave, 2004); İsmet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems, and Solutions (İstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010). 2. Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the Euro- pean Union,” South European Society and Politics 10, no. 1 (2009): 17–31. 3. Marcie J. Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What Has Happened to the EU Process?” Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3 (2007): 340. 4. Ibid. 5. Tim Jacoby, “Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in Tur- key,” Development and Change 36, no. 4 (2005): 641–65. 6. Faruk Atay and Ceren Kalfa, “Neoliberalizmin Krizi ve AKP’nin Yükselişi,” in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye’de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, ed. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Publications, 2009), 303–33. 7. Cihan Tugal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Yüksel Taşkın, “AKP’s Move to ‘Conquer’ the Center-Right: Its Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process,” Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (March 2008): 53–72; Zeyneb Çağlıyan-İçener, “The Justice and Development Party’s Conception of ‘Conservative Democracy’: Invention or Reinterpretation,” Turkish Studies 10, no. 4 (December 2009): 595–612. 8. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism- Populism (London: NLB, 1977), 143–98. 9. Stuart Hall, “Popular-Democratic vs. Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of ‘Tak- ing Democracy Seriously,’” in Marxism and Democracy, ed. Alan Hunt (London: Law- rence and Wishart, 1980), 157–85; Stuart Hall, “Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al.,” New Left Review 151 (May–June 1985): 115–24. 10. On Turkish right-wing populism see Nuray Mert, Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi (İstanbul: Selis Kitapları, 2007); İlkay Sunar, “Populism and Patronage: The Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey,” in State, Society and Democracy in Turkey, ed. İlkay Sunar (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publication, 2004), 121–31. 11. Menderes Çınar, “The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist Estab- lishment,” in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Ümit Cizre (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 109–29. 90 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker 12. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) came in second, winning 20 percent of the votes. Since no other political party crossed the 10 percent threshold required to gain a seat in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the AKP won two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. 13. See Ali Resul Usul, “The Justice and Development Party and the European Un- ion: From Euro-skepticism to Euro-enthusiasm and Euro-fatigue,” in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Ümit Cizre (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 175–97; Erhan Doğan, “The Historical and Discursive Roots of the Justice and Development Party’s EU Stance,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 3 (September 2005): 421–37. 14. For an evaluation of the role of the NSC and the possible effects of the EU amendments on this role, see Linda Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil- Military Relations in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 8, no. 1 (2007): 25–42. 15. Ibid., 31. Consequently, in August 2004, a former Turkish ambassador to Greece, Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan, was appointed as the first civilian secretary general of the NSC. 16. Soner Çağaptay, “European Union Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish Military: Ankara Knocking on Brussels’ Door,” August 12, 2003, http://Dergiler.Ankara.Edu.Tr/Dergiler/44/674/8592.pdf (accessed June 28, 2010). 17. Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt, “The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil- Military Relations in Turkey,” SETA Policy Brief 26 (2008). 18. Political Reforms in Turkey (Ankara: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007). 19. For more information on AKP’s Kurdish policy in this period, see Evren Balta Paker, “The Ceasefire This Time,” MERIP Online, August 31, 2005, http://www. merip.org/mero/mero083105.html (accessed November 21, 2010). 20. Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 215–31. 21. Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, “‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘De- militarization’ in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Im- pact of the European Union,” Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 4 (2006): 405; Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 3 (2005): 439–62; Metin Heper, “The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy,” South European Society and Politics 10, no. 1 (2005): 33–44. 22. Nokta, March 29–April 4, 2007, 22. 23. For important excerpts from these sources see Ertuğrul Mavioğlu and Ahmet Şık, Kontrgerilla ve Ergenekon’u Anlama Kılavuzu. Kırk Katır Kırk Satır-I (İstanbul: İthaki, 2010). 24. Nokta, March 29–April 4, 2007, 24; Mavioğlu and Şık, Kontrgerilla ve Ergene- kon’u Anlama Kılavuzu, 12–13, 282. 25. Kerem Öktem, “Return of the Turkish ‘State of Exception,’” MERIP, June 3, 2006, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero060306.html (accessed October 21, 2010); Belma Akçura, “Ergenekon Belgeleri 7 Yıl Kasada Saklandı,” Milliyet, August 7, 2008, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=97 5630&Kategori=siyaset&Date=07.08.2008&b=Sispercent20Perdesi&ver=63 (accessed December 3, 2008).  Beyond Military Tutelage? 91 26. Usul, “The Justice and Development Party”; Ümit Cizre, “The Justice and De- velopment Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?” in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Ümit Cizre (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 132–71. 27. Radikal, April 21, 2005. 28. Öktem, “Return of the Turkish ‘State of Exception.’” 29. Mehmet Kalyoncu, “The Assassination of Hrant Dink: Another Deadly Incident Destined to Remain Unsolved?” http://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/01/22/the-assassinati on-of-hrant-dink-another-deadly-incident-destined-to-remain-unsolved/ (accessed July 26, 2010). 30. See Öktem, “Return of the Turkish ‘State of Exception.’” The Şemdinli Investi- gation Commission of Parliament later revealed the existence of a secret protocol on Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (commonly called EMASYA). Signed by the General Staff and the Ministry of Interior in 1997, this protocol allows for military opera- tions to be carried out for internal security matters under certain conditions without re- quest from the civilian authorities. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Hakkâri Merkez, Yüksekova Ve Şemdinli İlçelerinde Meydana Gelen Olayların Araştırılması Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu 10 (Ankara, 2006), 322–24. 31. Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue,” 354. 32. Cited in Serdar Kaya, “The Rise and Decline of the Turkish ‘Deep State’: The Ergenekon Case,” Insight Turkey 114 (2009): 105. 33. Öktem, “Return of the Turkish ‘State of Exception.’” 34. Ibid. 35. “Turkey’s Anti-Terror Laws: Threatening the Protection of Human Rights,” KHRP Briefing Paper, August 11, 2008, www.khrp.org/.../165-turkeys-anti-terror-laws- threatening-the-protection-of-human-rights.html (accessed November 18, 2010). 36. Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue,” 354. 37. Ümit Cizre, “Politics and Military in Turkey into the 21st Century,” EUI Work- ing Papers RSC no. 2000/24 (European University Institute, 2000). 38. On February 28, 1997, the military-dominated National Security Council issued important decisions targeting the Refahyol coalition government, composed of the center- right True Path Party and the Islamist Welfare Party. Both the National Security Council decisions and the subsequent “February 28 process” aimed at impeding the supposed Islamization of Turkey. It brought about the collapse of the coalition government in June 1997. During the February 28 process, the military actively mobilized important segments of the population (business organizations, trade unions, NGOs, etc.) against the alleged threat of Islamism and got their active consent. Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 23 (Spring/Summer 2003): 309–32; Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party,” 132–71. 39. Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party,” 148. 40. Toktaş and Kurt, “The Impact of EU Reform Process.” 41. Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party,” 148. 42. Ayşe Saktanber and Gül Çorbacıoğlu, “Veiling and Headscarf-Skepticism in Turkey,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 154 (2008): 516. 43. Cited in Toktaş and Kurt, “The Impact of EU Reform Process,” 5. 44. Eruygur was later to be tried for his alleged participation in the 2003 coups against the AKP government. 92 İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker 45. The first rally took place in Ankara on April 14 just two days before the start of the presidential election process. The second one took place in Istanbul on April 29, 2008. The third and fourth rallies took place consecutively in Manisa and Çanakkale on May 5, 2008. The fifth rally took place in İzmir on May 13, 2008. 46. Such as a proposed amendment to the constitution to lift the headscarf ban. 47. Toktaş and Kurt, “The Impact of EU Reform Process,” 5. 48. Milliyet, April 28, 2007. 49. Radikal, April 29, 2007. 50. Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert, “The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 6 (2009): 953–68. 51. Bill Park, “Turkey’s Deep State,” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 5 (2008): 54–59. 52. For a very useful source on “Ergenekon,” see Mavioğlu and Şık, Kontrgerilla ve Ergenekon’u Anlama Kılavuzu. 53. Ibid. 54. “Top Turkish officers charged over ‘coup plot,’” BBC News, January 25, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8531486.stm (accessed November 15, 2010). 55. “Civil-military standoff in Turkey resolved, for now,” Hürriyet, August 9, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=standoff-resolved-for-now-civil-military- ties-still-at-odds-2010-08-09 (accessed October 18, 2010). 56. Göksel Bozkurt, “Details of Kurdish Opening Get Clearer,” Hürriyet Daily News, July 31, 2009, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=details-of-kurdish- opening-gets-clear-2009-07-31 (accessed November 15, 2010). 57. Ibid. 58. Soner Çağaptay, “‘Kurdish Opening’ Closed Shut,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/28/kurdish_opening_closed_shut? page=0,1 (accessed June 28, 2010). 59. Mert, Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi. 60. Aliza Marcus, “Troubles in Turkey’s Backyard,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/09/troubles_in_turkey_s_backyard?obref =obinsite (accessed July 9, 2010).