Nationalities Papers, 2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.775114 The “Orange revolution” and the “sacred” birth of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation Anton Shekhovtsov∗ Institut fu¨r die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, Austria (Received 18 July 2011; final version received 12 October 2012) The article analyzes the “sacred” dimension of the Ukrainian “Orange revolution”, its festive or carnivalesque quality, and properties of a communal ritual. The author argues that Ukrainian citizens who protested against the stolen elections in Kyiv found themselves in the liminoid situation of temporary egalitarian utopianism. This situation resulted in the emergence of communitas, and engendered a powerful feeling of the birth of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation. The festive nature of the “Orange revolution”, sanctioned by the overwhelming confidence in fighting for the rightful democratic cause, reinforced the impression of renewing the society along Western liberal democratic patterns. Keywords: Ukraine; Orange revolution; civic-republican nation; civic religion; carnival The “Orange revolution” in 2004 has become the most important mass civil uprising in independent Ukraine. The mass protests were sparked by the electoral fraud that allowed the corrupt regime of President Leonid Kuchma to declare the regime’s prote´ge´ Viktor Yanukovych as the winner of the 2004 presidential elections. The opposition led by the presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko resolutely rejected the electoral results and called their supporters out into the streets. The protests that collectively became known as the “Orange revolution” ended only in the beginning of January 2005, after Yushchenko had won the revote of the run-off and been officially declared as the winner by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine. The mass protests provided an opportunity to redress the political injustice, but was the electoral fraud the only reason for drawing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citi- zens from all over the country into Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti [Independence Square]? And was the election of Yushchenko the only thing that the protesters were longing for? In this article I suggest giving a negative answer to these questions, but in a positive way. Part of my argument, to be expounded below, is that the appeals to Ukrainians to “begin life from a new page” and “create this world” featured in the cam- paign song of Yushchenko’s party Our Ukraine (Rosava 2003) were more than poetic fancies. Rather, they mirrored the drive of a large part of the country’s population towards a unified political nation, and such an entity was believed to have come into being in the course of the “Orange revolution” – a “courageous public act” that “spawned a modern nation” (Gillingham and Tupy 2005). According to Volodymyr Mel’nyk writing in the wake of the “Orange revolution” (the fact that may explain a certain level of excitement), ∗ Email: anton.shekhovtsov@gmail.com # 2013 Association for the Study of Nationalities 2 A. Shekhovtsov it will not be an exaggeration to say that the year 2004, and especially the peak of the presi- dential elections in November-December, was a historic event. [. . .] The point is not about the change of the socio-political structure, but, first of all, about the people that declared itself a subject of its own history. Some believe that the years of independence were a time of for- feited hopes [. . .]. Of course, there were mistakes and slowdowns in the development of the state, but, simultaneously, a new Ukrainian political nation was being formed, and now it became aware of itself being a plenipotentiary, or absolute, subject of the Ukrainian histori- cal process. (2004, 48) In his work on the state and nation building in Ukraine, Kuzio subtly noted that “Ukraine [had become] an independent state [. . .] without a modern nation or united political com- munity enclosed within its borders” (1998, 1). The emergence of sovereign Ukraine on the global map occurred largely by default and apparently without any particular national effort as the Soviet Union met its peaceful demise, while “the same politicians and indus- trial managers who for decades had built socialism became founding fathers [. . .] of an independent Ukrainian state” (1998, 193). The people who inhabited the territories of Ukraine were not a nation, but rather a “mechanical assembly” of three main communities: Ukrainophone Ukrainians (mostly living in the West and Center), Russophone Ukrainians and Russians (mostly living in the East and South). Although this division is an obvious generalization (see Rodgers 2006, 49– 86 for a more detailed analysis), while “none of the three main ethno-linguistic categories can be considered a real social ‘group’, with a clear identity and fixed boundaries” (Wilson 1997, 23), it is still valid as it helps concep- tualize the persisting difference between these ethno-cultural communities. Could the modern Ukrainian nation be formed out of these ethno-cultural commu- nities? In 1998, i.e. in the “pre-Orange” period, Kuzio suggested that “ethnic Ukrainians [were] likely to be the only titular ethnic group from which the ethnic component of the political nation [would] be forged in this nation building project” (1998, 4). Reflecting on the “Orange revolution” retrospectively, Dominique Arel offers another perspective: he argues that “the Orange Revolution was about the birth of the Ukrainian political nation”, “yet this political nation is, as of yet, circumscribed to specific historical regions: the West and the Centre”, and “Ukraine’s biggest challenge, in the years ahead, is to extend the political nation to the East and South”, but “inclusion in the pol- itical nation can hardly come from a unilateral vision of how national identity ought to be construed” (Arel 2007, 52). Arel’s observation is significant, because – despite the wide promotion of the slogan “The East and West together” by Yushchenko’s suppor- ters’ and the fact that many Eastern and Southern Ukrainian citizens took part in the protests against the electoral fraud – the majority of supporters for the “Orange revolu- tion” came from the West and Center (Tanchyn 2010, 371) and were Ukrainophone Ukrainians (Sanchenko 2010, 162). 58.5% of Ukrainian citizens in the East and 66.7% in the South (58.4% of them were Russophones) considered the “Orange revolu- tion” a coup d’etat, while 67.9% in the West and 59.7% in the Center (62.7% were Ukrainophones) regarded the “revolution” as either a grass-roots protest or a conscious civic struggle for political rights (Mykhaylych 2008, 145 –146). Thus, when a student from L’viv who went to Kyiv to participate in the protests against the electoral fraud said that “[w]hatever [was] the outcome, [it was] surely the time of birth of the Ukrai- nian nation” (Rich 2005, 90), there should be no misunderstanding: the feeling that a political Ukrainian nation was being born during the “Orange revolution” was genuine, but this newly devised “imagined community” was acknowledged and embraced by only one part of the Ukrainian population, while unrecognized or rejected by the other.  Nationalities Papers 3 This newly imagined Ukrainian nation was – in Smith’s terms – a “civic-republican nation” (2008, 135– 159). Smith defines the ideology of the civic-republican nation as one that: posits a civic-territorial model, in which the nation is regarded as a territorially bounded and compact community, with a single code of laws and uniform legal institutions, mass partici- pation in political life, a mass public culture, collective autonomy and statehood, membership in an international comity of nations, and with the ideology of nationalism as its legitimation, if not its creative inspiration. (Smith 2008, 143) Smith also stresses that, in order to realize this ideology, the form of the government “must be republican and ultimately democratic” (Smith 2008, 146). The “Orange” project of a Ukrainian civic-republican nation contained a strong exclu- sive cultural element based on the ethnic conception of Ukrainianness. Serhy Yekelchyk identified this as a paradox of the “Orange revolution” arguing that “supporters of democ- racy [adopted] the language of moderate nationalists to create a civic state” (2007, 227). However, this is hardly a genuine paradox, as the civic status of republican nations does not exclude their ethnic elements, and, indeed, in the modern world, there are no purely civic nations (see also Kuzio 2002). What matters, nevertheless, is the degree of focus on the ethno-cultural component of a “civic-republican nation”; the stronger this focus, the less inclusive is a “civic-republican nation”. In the context of the “Orange revolution”, the focus on the ethno-cultural aspect of a modern Ukrainian nation was articulate and, to a certain degree, passionate, and this was one of the factors that antagonized many Ukrai- nian citizens, especially in the East and South, especially Russophone Ukrainians and Rus- sians. Therefore, the feeling that a civic-republican Ukrainian nation was born during the mass protests against the electoral fraud – a feeling expressed through speeches, publi- cations, slogans, music, etc. – was internalized by only one part of Ukraine’s citizens, who mostly came from the West and Center, and were predominantly Ukrainophones or bilingual. Smith argues that “modern nationalisms, starting with the French Revolution, are best viewed as forms of a secular religion of the people” seen as a “sacred communion” (2008, 187; 2000). Did the feeling – shared by a large segment of the population – that a modern Ukrainian nation was born during the “Orange revolution”, arise (at least partially) because of the proliferation of the “sacred” characteristics of this event? To address this question, I will focus on the analysis of the “sacred” dimension of the “Orange revolution”, its festive or carnivalesque quality, and properties of a communal ritual. On no account is this an attempt to reduce the socio-political event to a quasi-religious delusion. On the con- trary, this article aims at demonstrating how the mythological reinforces the political and enables it with indispensable means to secure the implementation of “purely” political agenda. To attain this aim I will first provide the conceptual framework for the current study and consider major concepts required for the analysis. Conceptual framework According to Gentile, the term “secular religion” describes “a more or less developed system of beliefs, myths, rituals, and symbols that create an aura of sacredness around an entity belonging to this world and turn it into a cult and an object of worship and devo- tion” (2006, 1). One type of secular religion is civil (or civic) religion, in the heart of which lies a myth of a sacralized secular entity.1 Nations, as secular entities, can be sacra- lized as well, and the core of the mythological ethos of nations is that they are “commu- nities of history and destiny that confer on mortals a sense of immortality through the 4 A. Shekhovtsov judgement of posterity rather than divine judgement in an afterlife” (Smith 1995, 158– 159). In his study of modernism, Griffin expresses the same idea when he demonstrates how the modernization- and secularization-induced erosion of the religious “sheltering sky” and the breaking up of the “sacred canopy”, which provided individuals with meta- narratives ensuring personal immortality and transcendence, gave rise to the belief that myths of a nation (or a race) were capable of providing the same metanarratives (2007, 70 – 99). The mythological concept of any modern nation (including those of a civic-republican character) offers transcendence and helps resist political alienation and social atomization. On the other hand, the democratic aspects of a civic-republican nation produce their own sub-myth of identifying the creation of a democratic nation with joining “the club of ‘normal’, Western-style democracies” (Umland 2007, 11). However, in order to become a driving force in creation of a civic-republican nation, this twofold significance of a pol- itical myth must be shared by a large active group of citizens and supported by certain pol- itical elites, i.e. the mythological ethos of a modern democratic nation should be identified and embraced, and “the West” should have a positive connotation. In “revolutionary” Ukraine, this political myth was embraced by only one part of the population, i.e. suppor- ters of Yushchenko. The issue of political myths employed during the “Orange revolution” received scant academic attention (Pavlyuk 2007; Yatsunska 2007), but the focus of these studies has been on electoral myths that were generally short-term manipulative techniques and turned out to be mostly irrelevant outside the temporal boundaries of the electoral process. Contrariwise, the myth of a begotten Ukrainian nation escaped the “suffocating” confines of practical instrumental usefulness. Furthermore, the symbolical birth of a civic- republican Ukrainian nation was not orchestrated by spin doctors or public relations experts, but – although being highly anticipated – occurred largely spontaneously. In order to conceptualize this “sacred” dimension of the “Orange revolution”, I will consider two major concepts: notions of carnival and communitas. The scholarly notion of carnival was introduced by Michail Bakhtin in his study of Franc¸ois Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel. Bakhtin linked carnivals with ancient pagan festivities associated with the agrarian rituals of death and revival of the nature. In the Middle Ages, carnivals became popular feasts, which were “second lives” of the people, “who for a time entered the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and abundance” (1984, 9). According to Bakhtin, the genuinely festive nature of all the feasts is conditioned by their “spiritual and ideological dimension”, which distinguishes feasts from holidays: feasts “must be sanctioned not by the world of practical conditions but by the highest aims of human existence, [. . .] by the world of ideals” (1984, 9). Unlike official feasts that assert hierarchy and inequality, as well as existing political and moral values (thus retracting from “the true nature of human festivity”), carnivals celebrate “tem- porary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order”, and mark “the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (1984, 10). Martin argues that although carnivalesque atmosphere allows disorderly behavior to be displayed within social frames where it is not normally permitted, carnival disorders are not meant to last, while the main function of carnivals is to actually “lead back to normal conditions of order”, and “demonstrate the necessity of a social order” (2001, 15). Similarly, Balandier suggests that “the inversion of order does not cause its abolition; disorder can be used to reinforce order, or to allow it to be reborn under a new figure” (1988, 117). The awareness of the transient nature of carnivalesque repudiation of hierar- chy draws carnivals closer to official feasts but they can never become identical due to the  Nationalities Papers 5 clear difference in their realization. Thus, carnivals are always filled with “the promise of a renewal of humankind on a more egalitarian and radically democratic basis” (Gardiner 1992, 52). Carnivals allow revelers “to vent their feelings about the power system and the performance of those in power”, as well as ‘renegotiate their identity by opposing their own conceptions of who they are to the rulers’ vision’ (Martin 2001, 18). Due to the festive rejection of established hierarchy and order, revelers unite around new visions of social participation and form a communion, which the anthropologist Victor Turner called communitas. Communitas is an unstructured communion of equal individuals and is juxtaposed against “society as a structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic positions” (Turner 1969, 96). Communitas emerges outside quotidian social structures, or, in Turner’s terms, within the liminoid space (1982). Similar to carnivals, the duration of communitas (anti-structure) is limited: “men [sic] are released from structure into communitas only to return to structure revitalized by their experience of communitas” (Turner 1969, 129). Hetherington insightfully highlights the political aspects of the liminoid experience as conceptualized by Turner: liminoid space is associated with “leisure activities and political protests that have a strong carnivalesque element” and seen as being one “associated with the individualism and personal freedom that such practices aim to achieve” (1997, 34). Yet Hetherington also notes the renewing force of the liminoid experience which produces “new symbols for new modes of living” (1997, 32). Ozouf analyzed political aspects of feasts, and, consequently, the “sacred” dimension of politics, in her La Feˆte re´volutionnaire, 1789 – 1799, published in English as Festivals and the French Revolution. Ozouf argued that the festivals of the French Revolution, being replete with “the exhilarating sense of beginning anew” (1991, 33), were a vivid example of the working of revolutionary culture that had given rise to a new society. The festivals offered revolutionaries “a victory over solitude” (“what is isolated is reunited with its own kind”) (1991, 17 – 18), and served as an instrument of transferring “sacrality” from the ancien re´gime to the new socio-political structure. In this article, I argue that the “Orange revolution” engendered a strong feeling of the birth of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation. The “revolution” started with the highly orga- nized protest activity. Since the political protests were protracted for several weeks, people from different regions of Ukraine who stayed on Maidan found themselves in the liminoid situation of temporary egalitarian utopianism, or, in Zolberg’s terms, “a moment of madness”, when “all is possible” (1972, 183). This situation gave rise to an increasingly powerful feeling of communitas that materialized in a political myth of a democratic Ukrainian nation. The festive nature of the “Orange revolution”, sanctioned by the over- whelming confidence in fighting for the rightful democratic cause, reinforced the impression of renewing the society along the Western liberal democratic patterns. Below I will provide empirical support for this argument by discussing primary and sec- ondary sources related to the “Orange revolution”. Orchestrating the liminoid space In order to understand how the myth of the birth of a modern, civic-republican Ukrainian nation emerged, we must first discuss the “mechanism” of creating the conditions that made it possible. In discussing the making of the “Orange revolution”, I will not touch upon the causes of the mass protests, as they are already thoroughly analyzed (Kuzio 2005, 2007a; Wilson 2005). Similarly, I will not deal with the problems that concern the role of various foreign NGOs in assistance to the “Orange” opposition in fighting 6 A. Shekhovtsov and exposing the election fraud or training the “professional protesters”, as they are both widely addressed by the researchers of the Ukrainian political process (Bredies, Umland, and Yakushik 2007; McFaul 2007; Wilson 2007), and largely irrelevant to this study. Instead, I will focus specifically on what contributed to the generation of the creative setting of the “Orange revolution”, or, in other words, what produced the carnivalesque liminoid space that engendered the powerful political myth of a begotten civic-republican Ukrainian nation. Here I will consider three main issues: (1) logistics of the “revolution”, (2) external maintenance of the protests, and (3) power of the imagery. The “Orange revolution” cannot be considered an isolated event. Rather it is a land- mark on a long and crooked path of Ukraine’s democratization supported by some political elites and opposed by the others. One can conveniently identify the victorious “Orange revolution” as an eventual success of the otherwise abortive mass protest campaign “Ukraine without Kuchma!” that took place in 2000– 2001 after the so called “cassette scandal” (Arel 2001; Kuzio 2007a) and unsuccessfully urged President Kuchma to resign. Although in 2004 the “Orange” pro-democratic forces gained their victory not lit- erally over Kuchma, they did inflict heavy losses on kuchmizm, the corrupt semi-author- itarian regime (or, rather, the mode of political thinking and behavior), represented by Kuchma’s prote´ge´ Viktor Yanukovych. The political opposition to kuchmizm had been growing since 2001, and in 2004 it was ready to do anything to defeat any Kuchma’s “successor”. Plan A was to win the elections. However, all the members of opposition understood that the regime would use all its administrative resources to interfere with the electoral process by resorting to voter inti- midation, protocol alteration, ballot box stuffing, and other abuses. The electoral fraud for the benefit of the pro-regime party For a United Ukraine at the 2002 parliamentary elections (Herron and Johnson 2007) provided a glance into the expected strategies of kuchmizm at the 2004 presidential elections. Since a presidential post in Ukraine was – in political and economical terms – much more significant than that of prime minister, the opposition knew beyond a shadow of a doubt that Plan A would not work. In its turn, Plan B implied extensive coverage and exposure of the regime’s fraudulent activities, as well as, most importantly, organization of mass protests against the stolen elections. The blueprint for Plan B was obvious: two successful “revolutions” against the stolen elections, i.e. the Serbian “Bulldozer revolution” in 2000 and the Georgian “Rose revolution” in 2003. Yet this obviousness implied elaborate logistics of the “revolution”, so everything required for the street protests had to be prepared in advance. Therefore, when on 18 November 2004, i.e. three days before the run-off, Yushchenko called his supporters to go out into the streets in case the regime stole the elections (Yanevskii 2005, 77), he knew that there would be tents, mattresses, field kitchens, food supplies, transport, and bio-toilets available for protesters to stay on the cold streets until the fraudulent vote was overturned. The initial organization of the protests was far from being spontaneous: it is interesting to recall that, while commenting on the “Ukraine without Kuchma!” protest campaign in 2000, which he never supported, Yushchenko stated that he “never trusted spontaneous outbursts” (quoted in D’Anieri 2007, 91). Another problem that needed to be addressed was ensuring that the mass protests would be both peaceful and growing. It was clear that the protracted, routinized protests would die out, while “revolutionary violence” would allow the regime to authorize riot police to suppress the protests. Therefore, the “Orange” staff built a stage on Maidan and invited popular musicians and bands to perform for the protesters (Klid 2007). As Roman Bezsmertnyi, the main superintendent of the protests, declared, their “mission was to keep the event safe – to turn it into a concert, into anything to avoid people  Nationalities Papers 7 confronting the soldiers” (quoted in Wolf 2005). At the same time, the all-star live per- formances contributed to the “festive atmosphere at demonstrations to keep people coming out in the cold” (D’Anieri 2007, 87). Last but not least, independent mass media played a crucial role in mobilizing protes- ters and providing informational support for the “Orange” opposition. As D’Anieri noted, “media outlets provided coverage to show that protests were growing, were peaceful, and were celebratory in atmosphere” (2007, 83). However important the logistics of the “revolution” might be for the organization of the protests, they were not sufficient. The “Orange” opposition arranged a political event, but only with the enthusiastic support on the part of common people, as well as elites and business people did the emergence of the liminoid space of carnivalesque ega- litarianism become possible. Fournier – although obviously exaggerating the level of involvement of “people from every region of Ukraine” – particularly stresses the signifi- cance of common people’s participation in creating the liminoid space: The tent city became a microcosm of the nation, with people from every region of Ukraine coexisting in the same space. [. . .] People from various parts of Ukraine came face to face with one another, lived together, and bonded through various acts of kindness and selflessness. [. . .] New forms of socialization on Maidan seemed to produce in people a sense of recog- nition of one another as equals, and as Ukrainians. (2007, 115) On 19 November, the “Orange” coalition made two applications for protest rallies of 30,000 people each to be held from 21 through 23 November 2004 (Yanevskii 2005, 79– 80). Yet neither the coalition nor the authorities knew how many people were ready to actively protest against the stolen elections. When on 22 November about 200,000 pro- testers appeared on Maidan and the adjacent streets, it was a great surprise for both sides of the conflict. The original protest turn-out and the consequent inflow of thousands of dissenters from various Ukrainian regions into the “Orange” tent city set up in the center of Kyiv raised the issue of their safety and accommodation. There were justified fears that the authorities would attempt to suppress the protests, but eventually this problem was solved in the course of the first week of the protests. First of all, the Kyiv City Council declared that Yanukovych’s victory was invalid, and Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omel’chenko informed Ukrainians that the city would not interfere with the protests (Wilson 2005, 125). Second, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) publicly refused to repress the dissenters (Arel 2007, 40; D’Anieri 2007, 93): several SSU generals addressed the audience from the stage on Maidan and warned the police against confronting the protesters (Yanevskii 2005, 126). Importantly, some university rectors permitted their students to demonstrate without risking to be sent down, while many business people allowed their employees to participate in the protests during the working time. Businesses and entrepreneurs also provided free food supplies, warm clothes and medicine. Common residents of Kyiv brought food and clothes for the dissenters too. Furthermore, Kyiv Mayor permitted the “Orange revolutionaries” to use the four-story Ukrainian House as their headquarters, as well as the Trade Union House and the ground floor of the Kyiv City Council for accom- modation and meals. In its turn, the administration of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy allowed the protesters to be accommodated in lecture rooms. The settlement of these issues meant the fulfillment of the dissenters’ physiological and safety needs, and the overall impression was even more profound due to the genuine benevolence and joyful enthusiasm of those people who contributed to the sol- ution of the above-mentioned problems. Once the basic needs were satisfied, the protesters focused exclusively on social self-actualization, or postmaterialist values, of which 8 A. Shekhovtsov participation and self-expression are most prominent in the socio-political sphere (Ingle- hart 1997, 43).2 Imagery was yet another powerful tool of orchestrating the carnivalesque space. Of course, the slogans like “Yes!”, “It’s time” [“Pora”, name of the leading civic youth organization during the 2004 presidential elections], “Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!”, or “Freedom cannot be stopped” were effective in mobilizing people for the protest cause. However, nothing could compare with the extensive use of color that gave the “Orange revolution” its name. It is interesting to note that, originally, the design company Belka & Strelka that pro- duced Yushchenko’s campaign materials had to choose between purple and orange, as they wanted a color that had been not widely used for political causes before. Eventually, the company turned down purple and selected orange as the official color of the campaign. Dmytro Maksymenko, director of Belka & Strelka, argued: “We knew that the main devel- opments were to take place in the fall, and orange, though a little daring, was likely to work well in the fall” (quoted in Sza´nto´ 2006, 66). Orange was a good choice: its obvious con- trast to the autumn coldness notwithstanding, it is commonly acknowledged as a cheerful, exciting and stimulating color (Collier 1996; Schaie 1961). One of the multimedia adver- tising agencies also holds that orange is associated with ambition, happy and energetic days, and, significantly, “with a new dawn in attitude”.3 The use of orange banners and ribbons, produced on the order of Yushchenko’s aides, was reinforced by the mass wearing of orange scarves, ties, raincoats, hats, gloves, sweaters, etc. In the latter case, orange was not only the color of the political protest; it also became the color of self- identification, a marker of belonging to a specific communion. As Olena Prytula, editor- in-chief of Ukrains’ka Pravda, who took an active part in launching the Internet-based orange ribbon campaign, recollects, Everybody who wore the orange colour would see other people on the streets and understand that we had something in common. [. . .] And it helped a lot to understand that you were not alone – that a lot of people thought like you. (quoted in Vera and Schupp 2006, 406) Eventually, emotional connotations of orange corresponded with and concurrently strengthened the communal trend toward reconsideration of national identity in terms of the “new modes of living”. The discussion of the logistics of the “Orange revolution”, the external maintenance of the protests, and the use of the color orange itself, reveals the dual origin of the “revolution”. On the one hand, it was a highly organized event, in which Yushchenko’s aides had invested a lot of time, money, effort, and human resources. In order to confront the stolen elections, the “Orange” opposition appealed to Ukrainian people to go out into streets. Thus, the mani- festation of “people power” was expected and anticipated, although nobody could foresee the actual number of the dissenters. On the other hand, what was not expected was the spon- taneous “enrichment” of the protests with new narratives and the emergence of communitas. Paraphrasing Bakhtin (1984), the “Orange revolution”, the significance of which was sanc- tioned by the world of democratic ideals, liberated the dissenters from the “prevailing truth” of kuchmizm and filled them with an anticipation of socio-political renewal. In the next section I will attempt to show how this experience resulted in the rise of a feeling that a modern democratic Ukrainian nation was born on Maidan. From communitas to a nation Yushchenko’s campaign team and the NGOs (most notably Pora), which organized the initial protests, indeed hardly expected that the concerts they arranged would turn into  Nationalities Papers 9 something more than a “revolutionary soundtrack”. As one of the Pora activists recollects, “from 2000 [they] studied the experience of non-violent revolutions in different countries – and one of the indispensable conditions contributing to these changes was carnivalesque atmosphere”.4 Bands and artists were supposed to play “to entertain the people, rouse them to action, lift their spirits, and show their support for Yushchenko” (Klid 2007, 119), as well as assisting the protesters “in staying for long periods of time and roughing the accommodation” (Kuzio 2007b, 140). Yet it is revealing that it was during the “Orange revolution” that some of the artists wrote songs informed not only by protest, but also nationalist sentiments. For example, the hip-hop band GreenJolly wrote the song “Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!” that featured the following lines: “We aren’t bydlo/We aren’t goats/We are of Ukraine/Sons and daughters/It’s now or never/enough of waiting” (GreenJolly 2005).5 In Ukrainian language, “bydlo” is a deroga- tory term for a faceless crowd of uneducated and uncivilized people. GreenJolly (2005) interpreted bydlo as people who could be easily deceived by the electoral fraud, and the band juxtaposed them against nationally conscious Ukrainians. The song clearly suggested that the “Orange revolution” offered people to choose between two identities, i.e. bydlo and Ukrainians, and the choice had to be made “now or never”. The fact that GreenJolly used this derogatory term to stigmatize a large segment of the Ukrainian society who did not support Yushchenko, yet again revealed the exclusive ethno-cultural element of the “Orange revolution” and, hence, of the imagined modern Ukrainian nation. Another hip-hop band TNMK expressed the idea of the birth of a Ukrainian nation on Maidan explicitly in the song “Pomaranchi” that was written during the “revolution”: “Good day, I am Ukrainian/This is my world, where I am the master/I came, I opened myself/ Today I was born” (TNMK 2005). Many politicians and political advisers, who were known for their critical views of the “Orange” protests, also perceived the “revolutionary” atmosphere as carnivalesque. Hanna Herman, Prime Minister Yanukovych’s press-secretary in 2004, comments on the nature of the protests: “There was nothing spontaneous. What was, however, spontaneous, was people’s outburst. Yet it was natural and could not fail to fascinate” (quoted in Andrush- chenko 2004). Contrary to Herman, who – her political position notwithstanding – was thrilled by the “Orange” protests, political scientist Mykhailo Pohrebyns’kyi recollects that he was somewhat afraid of the protests and notes that “the atmosphere was frightening for those who did not take part in the carnival” (quoted in Andrushchenko 2004). The speech of Moscow’s Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, who visited East Ukrainian city Severodo- netsk to participate in the All-Ukrainian convention of people’s deputies and local coun- selors, was even more telling, since he directly associated the “revolutionary feast” with nationalism and, at the same time, questioned the universal support for the “revolution”: “We see the bolstered orange debauch that pretends to represent the whole of the nation”. The Severodonetsk convention held on 28 November 2004 was a major separatist move of Yanukovych’s supporters aimed at the creation of autonomous South-Eastern Ukraine, and Luzhkov’s speech conformed to the theme of insurmountable ethno-cultural differ- ence between the stereotyped Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine. Extensive creative work was one of the distinctive features of the “Orange revolution” in comparison to the “Bulldozer” and “Rose revolutions”, which happened in relatively short periods of time and, therefore, did not duly allow for artistic creativity. The “Orange” protesters – impelled by the momentum of liberation from the suffocating dogma of regime-controlled mass media – wrote articles and verses, made up anecdotes, short satirical poems, and slogans, composed songs, drew caricatures and covered walls with graffiti. Almost all these “products” were then put on the Internet, so the sympathizers 10 A. Shekhovtsov and adherents all over the world could feel the spirit of Maidan, and, most importantly, feel a sense of belonging to the “revolutionary” communion. Satire and irony prevailed in the works of the protesters. Kuzio argues that “humour and ridicule broke down fear of the authorities which had played an important role in de-mobilizing the middle-aged and older generations and creating widespread apathy” (2007b, 136 – 137), but this is, perhaps, half of the truth. Ridicule is an integral element of folk culture and, hence, carnivals. Being a carnival- esque “marketplace”, Maidan was consequently a place of spontaneous folk revival. As Britsyna and Golovakha note in their insightful article on the folklore of the “Orange” feast, “awakening of a folk spirit, and its accompanying strong emotions, strengthened folklore’s function, while political street life enhanced folk fantasies” (2005, 3). However, the “Orange” revolution witnessed not only the revival of traditional Ukrainian and Soviet folk culture, but also the emergence of new folklore. To a certain extent, this new folklore embraced obscene elements, which only reasserted the carni- valesque “suspension of all norms and prohibitions”, as well as helped integrate the pro- testers into a communion of equal “rebels”. The revitalization of traditional folklore and the burst of novel urban folk culture contributed to a captivating feeling of the rise of a new nation: “The Orange Revolution fostered a new Ukrainian national identity trans- forming traditional symbols into a new political awakening. No longer a culture of vil- lages, in the streets of Kyiv, Ukrainians birthed new interpretations of music, poetry, and art”.6 Feelings such as these correspond with Sidney Tarrow’s argument that “protest cycles characteristically produce new or transformed symbols, frames of meaning and ideologies that justify and dignify collective action and around which a following can be mobilized” (1993, 286). Although the formation of Maidan communitas was crucial to the creation of the pol- itical narrative of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation, the role of the “Orange” leaders should not be underestimated. Yushchenko’s supposed dioxin poisoning that badly disfig- ured his face made him a victim of the regime and an object of compassion, but this image also played into the hands of his then close ally Yuliya Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko has been apparently the most popular female politician since the independence. At the time of the “Orange revolution”, she was also seen as a victim of kuchmizm, when she was arrested in 2001 on charges of forging customs documents and gas smuggling but was released a few weeks later. After her release, she joined the “Ukraine without Kuchma!” campaign and from then onward was known as a stark critic of kuchmizm. During the “Orange revolution”, it was Tymoshenko, rather than Yushchenko, who was endowed with genuine revolutionary energy, as Yushchenko – although charismatic – was seen by his supporters as a cultured and prudent, rather than radical, politician. By the onset of the “Orange revolution”, Tymoshenko’s image consultants turned her into an embodiment of a Ukrainian female archetype, goddess Berehynya, whose statue crowns the Independence Column on Maidan. The Berehynya myth has strong matriarchal and nationalist meanings, and in contemporary Ukraine this myth implies that, since Soviet “colonialism robbed men of their traditional status, women became the main bearers of nationhood and national identity and eclipsed men as the ‘stronger sex’” (Hrycak 2007, 154). As mythological Berehynya, Tymoshenko symbolically put allegedly poisoned Yushchenko in her ward and brought him to power. In her research on the female images in revolutionary France, Landes argues that “women [. . .] were constituted as political subjects in the new nation, not only through the practice of republican motherhood but also in and through the complicated process of visual identification with iconic representations of virtue and nationalism” (2001, 18).  Nationalities Papers 11 Rubchak (2005) and Kis (2007) provide valuable insights into the way Tymoshenko played both roles during the “Orange revolution”. Rubchak (2005) points to the fact that Tymoshen- ko’s hairstyle (a plait), a mixture of Maidan Berehynya’s national headdress and the mythi- cal French Marianne’s Phrygian cap, evoked the myth of “the mother of the Ukrainian nation”. In her turn, Kis, in particular, argues that this image was reinforced by Tymoshen- ko’s rhetoric: her extensive use of the word “warm”, which is deeply associated with the mother’s body in Ukrainian public discourse, as well as the expression “my kinsfolk” usually addressed to the protesters on Maidan (2007, 39). Conclusion In his 2005 inaugural speech, Yushchenko said, in particular, that, during the “Orange revolution”, “Ukrainians showed themselves to be a modern nation in the eyes of the world”, and continued: We, the citizens of Ukraine, have become a united Ukrainian nation. We cannot be divided either by the languages we speak, by the faiths we profess or by the political views we choose. We have the same Ukrainian fate. We have the same Ukrainian pride. We are proud to be Ukrainians.7 Similar ideas were echoed by Nadia Diuk who argued that a Ukrainian civil society emerged in consequence of the “Orange revolution”: Many people who had never had strong opinions on the use of the Ukrainian language nor felt a strong sense of identity as Ukrainians suddenly joined the revolution simply by sporting the color orange. [. . .] The color itself created a sense of new identity. This identity was one step beyond the blue-and-yellow variety that had primarily mobilized the regions of western Ukraine during the struggle for independence. This was a new identity that eastern Ukraine could also identify with. (2006, 82) The “Orange revolution” did display its civic-republican character, but the “new identity”, which it allegedly produced, had pronounced exclusionary traits based on the ethno-cul- tural understanding of membership in this “imagined community”. Large groups of citi- zens felt themselves either excluded from or irritated with the national project based on Ukrainian ethno-cultural traditions and presumably Western democratic values. This pre- vented Yushchenko and his supporters from extending the idea of a modern democratic nation to the regions where people were more in favor of Yanukovych, i.e. first and fore- most, the East and Center. Moreover, the protracted infighting between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko that started in 2005, as well as the consequent dissolution of the “Orange” political camp, contributed to the popular disillusionment in the realization of the promises of the “revolution”.8 With Yushchenko’s decline in popularity that began almost immedi- ately after he took the presidential office, the idea that the “Orange revolution” engendered a new Ukrainian nation became less and less relevant.9 There is no place for discussion of various reasons of the political failure of the “Orange” leaders that symbolically resulted in Yanukovych’s victory in the 2010 presiden- tial elections. At the same time, it seems legitimate to argue that the loss of trust in the “Orange” leaders was – at least partially – determined by the fact that the hopes that their supporters had put on them were too high. The powerful myth of a modern, demo- cratic Ukrainian nation that emerged in the liminoid space of the carnivalesque “Orange revolution” excited Yushchenko’s supporters to a degree where socio-political life was highly idealized and romanticized. In the turbulent “revolutionary” period marked by pro- nounced “sacred” characteristics, mythological reinforced the political cause, but the “mundane” “post-revolutionary” political process, when high expectations ended in 12 A. Shekhovtsov disappointment, failed to sustain the mythological and the myth of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation could not endure. Notes 1. The other type is political religion. Despite the name of the latter, both “religions” apply equally to politics, and the main difference between them is a form of political system they sacralize. Civil religions guarantee a plurality of political ideas, while political religions, on the contrary, imply an apotheosis of ideological monism, hence the usage of this concept in various studies of fascism and Stalinism (e.g. Griffin 2007). Since the “Orange revolution” has been democratic in its nature and character, the concept of a civil religion, rather than the political one, is relevant to my study, as democracy, believed to be the most appropriate system of government – at least in the Europeanized world – allows free disputes on socially significant notions. 2. It may be interesting to consider the “Orange revolution” a “postmaterialist revolution”. As A˚ slund argues, in 2004 “the economy developed at an extraordinary speed. Ukraine’s growth hit 12% [...], the highest in the country’s modern history” (2009, 164). Therefore, we can assume that the economic growth fulfilled the basic needs of both the elites and Ukrainian society and engendered a shift from materialist toward postmaterialist values, which implied an urge toward political democratization. 3. “Color Psychology and Marketing.” Precision Intermedia. Accessed 17 July, 2011. http://www. precisionintermedia.com/color.html 4. Quoted in Solod’ko Pavlo. “Lyudy, yaki stvoryly styl’ revolyutsii. Chastyna persha.” Ukrains’ka pravda. 22 Nov. 2005. Accessed 17 July, 2011. http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2005/11/22/ 3020805/ 5. The title of the song is the famous “Orange revolutionary” slogan. In its turn, this slogan is a Ukrainian remake of “¡El pueblo unido jama´s sera´ vencido! [The people united will never be defeated]”, a title of the song that was written in 1973 in Chile and then became associated with the international struggle for democracy. 6. “Sounds, Sights, and Folklore of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.” Ukraine.com. 2006. Accessed 17 July, 2011. http://www.ukraine.com/blog/sounds-sights-and-folklore-of-the- orange-revolution-in-ukraine 7. “Zvernennya Prezydenta Ukrainy Viktora Yushchenka do ukrains’koho narodu.” Personal’ny sait Viktora Yushchenka. 2005. Accessed 10 October, 2012. http://web.archive.org/web/ 20050205054743/http://www.yuschenko.com.ua/ukr/Press_centre/168/2167/ 8. “Lyudy rozcharuvalys’ ne v idealakh ‘Maidanu’, a v ikh nezdiisnenni.” Tsentr Razumkova. 2011. Accessed 9 October, 2012. http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/article.php?news_id=943 9. Interestingly, however, in 2007, the cover of Yekelchyk’s book (2007) still referred to the connection between the “Orange revolution” and a birth of a modern Ukrainian nation, as the background for the title was Lena Kurovska’s 2004 painting named “The Orange Revolution”. References Andrushchenko, Yaroslav, dir. 2009. 2004: Boi bez pravil. 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