Tatian, Celsus, and Christianity as " Barbarian Philosophy " in the Late Second Century

Tatian, Celsus, and Christianity as “Barbarian Philosophy” in the Late Second Century Matthew R. Crawford Australian Catholic University ***DRAFT 15.03.17*** The gures of Tatian and Celsus have rarely been considered alongside one another. This is partly due to the fact that Tatian is easily overshadowed by Justin and Clement, those more well known philosophical gures on either side of him, while Ceslus is most often associated with Origen, who did a great service to posterity by preserving the only surviving fragments of Celsus’ work in his rebuttal to the pagan’s attack. Yet, as I want to argue in this paper, when these these two thinkers are compared with one another, there becomes apparent a striking degree of overlap in their presuppositions and methodology, revealing that they were both operating within the same philosophical framework, albeit coming to two diametrically opposed positions. The primary modern scholar who has considered these two alongside one another is Arthur Droge, whose 1989 monograph argued that Celsus’ polemical tract against Christianity was a response to Justin Martyr, and that Tatian’s Oratio was in turn an answer to Celsus.1 Droge was in fact building upon the earlier work of Carl Andresen, who had pointed out a number of parallels between Celsus and Justin Martyr in order to argue that Ceslsus’ polemic was specically a reaction against Justin.2 In Droge’s account, not only was Celsus responding to Justin, but Justin’s own student was defending his teacher! In my view, Droge relied too heavily upon an overly precise dating of both Celsus’ True Doctrine and Tatian’s Oration, putting the former in 175-176 and the latter in 177-178,3 and also pointed out insufcient evidence to substantiate the claim that Tatian was responding to 1. Arthur J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie 26 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989), 72-81, 97-101. 2. Carl Andresen, Logos und Nomos. die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 30 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1955). Andresen’s work won many followers but was not without its detractors. See especially Gary T. Burke, “Celsus and Justin: Carl Andresen Revisited,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 76 (1985): 107-16, who dismantles many of Andresen’s supposed parallels. Various other attempts have been made to connect Celsus with other second- and third-century Christian apologetic works. For a discussion of the problems attendant to many of these attempts, see Robert J. Hauck, “Omnes Contra Celsum,” The Second Century 5 (1985/86): 211-25, who remains open to the idea that Celsus may have been responding to Justin. Hauck does not discuss a possible link between Celsus and Tatian. 3. Droge, Homer or Moses, 74-75, 99. The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Celsus’ anti-Christian tract.4 A fuller comparison of the two works does in fact turn up a number of close parallels, and a detailed analysis of these might offer further evidence to support Droge’s contention. This, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper. Here I want to focus on what I take to be the most signicant of these parallels, namely the way in which each author understands philosophical and cultural history, and the place of themselves and their opponents in that history. Indeed, I will argue that the arguments of Tatian and Celsus are formally identical, with each appealing to a former period of philosophical insight, seeing themselves as the latest instantiation descending from that unsullied point, and their opponents as the unfortunate victims of deceptive attempts to imitate that pure tradition. Because the degree of similarity between these two has largely gone unnoticed, the majority of this paper will be devoted to an exposition of their respective arguments, highlighting parallels along the way. While the analysis of this theme in these two authors is an insufcient basis for making precise claims about which author was responding to the other, the similarity is, I suggest, of a sufcient degree to conclude that both Tatian and Celsus were a part of the same conversation amongst Christians and pagans, likely in the 170s or 180s. Moreover, I will argue that the common philosophical background that each author shared, combined with Christianity’s marginalized status at this time, helps to account for one of the most unique aspects of Tatian’s treatise, namely his proud ownership of the label “barbarian,” which is without precedent in the prior historical record. In this respect, philosophical debate amongst Christians and pagans at this time centered around competing narratives of intellectual history that accorded to Hellenistic παιδεία very different positions vis-à-vis non-Greek, or “barbarian” nations. In other words, the comparison of Celsus and Tatian illustrates, rst, that the emergence of the Christian intellectual in the second century was from the outset contested; second, that Christians like Tatian largely took on from their opponents the terms of the debate; but, third, that this did not prevent them from making fundamental criticisms of the Greek culture of the second sophistic in which they operated. It is necessary rst to begin with an examination of the origins of this notion of philosophical history among Stoics and Middle Platonists. Then I will offer a close reading of Celsus’ True Doctrine and Tatian’s Oration. Finally, I will conclude by highlighting the political and social consequences of their respective positions, which illuminates 4. A similar assessment was reached in Peter Pilhofer, Presbyteron kreitton: der Altersbeweis der jüdischen und christlichen Apologeten und seine Vorgeschichte, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 39 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), 286-87. -2- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) the challenge facing Tatian’s notion of “barbarian philosophy” in the late second century. To begin, however, a brief introduction to these two gures is in order. Tatian hailed from somewhere in Syria or Assyria, received a thorough education in Hellenistic παιδεία, and apparently became a practicing sophist in the mid-second century. At some point he converted to Christianity and became a student of Justin Martyr in Rome, eventually gathering to himself his own students, though the only one whose name we know is Rhodon.5 Tatian became infamous as the supposed founder of the heretical sect known as the Encratites, and though his role as leader of this group is unlikely, he did reject marriage as a “corruption.”6 He left behind two inuential works, one a gospel version known as the Diatessaron, which survives in fragments and later daughter versions, and the other a short, highly polemical work known as ὁ λόγος πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας (“Oration to the Greeks”), which will be the focus of the present paper.7 Various attempts at a precise dating of the Oration have been offered, though none have won wide acceptance. The most that can be said is that, based on how Tatian refers to Justin in Or. 18.6, it likely came after the latter’s execution in 165.8 We know even less about Celsus. Because the older identication of him with the Epicurean Celsus, a friend of Lucian of Samosata, has been abandoned, all we known of him is what can be gleaned from the fragments of his work preserved in the refutation by Origen. These suggest that he was writing sometime between 160 and 240, though more likely during the reign of Marcus Aurelius given how he describes the persecution Christians are facing.9 The fragments cited by Origen came from a tract with the title Ἀληθὴς λόγος, True Account or True 5. For a longer introduction to Tatian’s life, see Jörg Trelenberg, Tatianos. Oratio ad Graecos. Rede an die Griechen, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 165 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 1-8. 6. On the reports of Tatian’s heretical tendencies, see my forthcoming article, “The Problemata of Tatian: Recovering the Fragments of a Second-Century Christian Intellectual,” Journal of Theological Studies (2016). 7. On the title, see Josef Lössl, “Zwischen Christologie und Rhetorik: Zum Ausdruck ‘Kraft des Wortes’ (λόγου δύναμις) in Tatians ‘Rede an die Griechen’,” in Logos der Vernunft - Logos des Glaubens: Festschrift Edgar Früchtel zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. F. R. Prostmeier and H. Lona, Millennium-Studien 31 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 129nn.1-2. In this paper I will be using the edition of Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos. For an English translation, see Molly Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 8. On the various dating attempts over the past 130 years, see the judicious survey in Trelenberg, Tatianos. Oratio ad Graecos. Rede an die Griechen, 8-15. In Or. 18.6, Tatian refers to Justin as θαυμασιώτατος, the same epithet used for Polycarp in Mart. Poly. 5.1; 16.2, a parallel rst pointed out in the edition of Miroslav Marcovich, Tatiani oratio ad Graecos, Patristische Texte und Studien 43 (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1995), 1-3. 9. On these issues, see Michael Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.7, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1994), 5188-5193. -3- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Doctrine, and represent the rst attempt at a philosophical refutation of Christianity.10 Although I make no presuppositions about one author writing with an awareness of the other, the comparison of the two gures is justied on the basis that they were both likely writing in the late second century, perhaps even both in the late 160s or 170s, were drawing upon the same strand of Middle Platonism, and were deploying it to undermine the positions of their respective opponents. They therefore give us a snapshot of what a debate between a Middle Platonist pagan and Middle Platonist Christian would have looked like in the late second century had they sat down to talk to one another. I. The Development of Philosophical Interest in Ancient, Barbarian Wisdom When one encounters claims in early Christian texts that Christian truth is older than Greek philosophy, it is tempting at rst blush to dismiss these claims as merely the sort of cultural one-upmanship that had been used as a polemical tool for centuries.11 However, by the time that Christians like Justin, Tatian, and Clement began making these assertions, they were drawing upon and interacting with a more specic, philosophically inected version of this interest in cultural antiquity and primacy, one that took its inspiration from Posidonius and was instrumental in the creation of what is today called Middle Platonism. This process of development has found its most lucid explication in the 2001 monograph by G. R. Boys-Stones, to which the following survey is heavily indebted.12 The roots of this tradition go back to the earliest strata of Greek literature, as seen, for example, in Hesiod’s myth of the rst generation of humanity as a “golden race,” superior to the generations that followed, and his myth of humanity originally living under the bountiful and benevolent reign of Cronus (Works and Days 106-201). Plato drew upon this Hesiodic imagery in the Statesman 269C-274D, describing his- 10. In what follows I will be citing Celsus from the Sources chrétiennes edition of Origen’s treatise: M. Borret, Origène. Contre Celse, SC 132, 136, 147, 150, 227 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967-1976). The attempted reconstruction and translation of R. Joseph Hoffman, On the True Doctrine: A Discourse Against the Christians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) is best avoided. Much better is the older translation by Henry Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). For a recent attempt to recover the original arrangement of Celsus’ fragments, see Johannes Arnold, Der wahre Logos des Kelsos: eine Strukturanalyse, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 39 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2016). 11. The denitive account of the history of this theme remains Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton. 12. G. R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of Its Development From the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). -4- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) tory as a series of alternate cycles of rule by Cronos and Zeus, the former a kind of golden age. In the Timaeus he explained that humanity was created with a predisposition to philosophy, the necessary condition for achieving happiness (47A-B, 72E-73A, 75E), and that primitive humanity lived in a pre-philosophical state in which vice was absent. Finally, in the Laws, Plato described a series of periodic catastrophes wiping out human culture, which are only survived by those uncivilized persons who live in the mountains (677A-D), such that history is constituted by cycles of primitive ages each requiring the redevelopment of human culture. Aristotle followed Plato on several of these points, though he signicantly modied him in at least one respect. He too afrmed cycles of destruction, but denied Plato’s contention that no advanced culture survived these periodic cataclysms. The philosophers who reached the pinnacle of cultural achievement at the end of each stage, just before the coming destruction, would not themselves have survived, since they lived in cities, but fragments of their wisdom were preserved in mythic form among those uncivilized persons who did survive: Whether a ‘saying’ counts as something wise: Why not? Aristotle says about them that they are remnants of an ancient philosophy saved by their brevity and acuity when it was lost in the great destructions of mankind. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ παροιμία σοφόν· πῶς δ’ οὐχὶ σοφὸν περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ὅτι παλαιᾶς εἰσι φιλοσοφίας ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνθρώπων φθοραῖς ἀπολομένης ἐγκαταλείμματα περισωθέντα διὰ συντομίαν καὶ δεξιότητα.13 And again: Fragments of the thought of the ancient, the very ancient thinkers have been handed down to us in the form of a myth, to the effect that these [planets] are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. The rest has been added later in a mythological form to inuence the beliefs of the vulgar, for the benet of the laws, and for pragmatic reasons. παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν·14 The early Stoics seemed to follow Plato in holding that earliest humanity lived in pre-philo- 13. Aristotle, fr. 13 (V. Rose, Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886)). Translation from Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 29-30. 14. Metaphysics 1074a-b (W. D. Ross, Aristotle's metaphysics, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924; repr. 1970)). Translation from Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 28. -5- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) sophical bliss, but this position was altered by Posidonius in a small but signicant manner when he insisted that philosophers were responsible for the invention of the various arts that constitute human culture.15 As summarized by Seneca, In that age, which they call “golden,” Posidonius thinks that the government was in the hands of sages. They were restrained in their actions, and protected the weaker from the stronger. They gave advice, both to do and not to do; they showed what was useful and what was useless. Illo ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum posidonius iudicat. Hi continebant manus et inrmiorem a validioribus tuebantur, suadebant dissuadebant que et utilia atque inutilia monstrabant.16 The list of arts that philosophers were responsible for included architecture, mechanical tools, farming, and pottery, among others. Posidonius also seems to have held that there were three original philosophers in mythical times, one for each continent: Mochus the Phoenician, Atlas the Libyan, and Zalmoxis the Thracian, corresponding to Asia, Africa, and Europe.17 His inclusion of non-Greek sources of ancient wisdom set a decisive precedent for later philosophy. The next signicant stage in the tradition I am tracing is represented by the rst-century CE Stoic Cornutus, who held that the poets had not merely preserved corrupted nuggets of ancient philosophy in mythical form, but rather that the ancient philosophers themselves had originally expressed their ideas in allegorical form, and that through a corresponding allegorical exegesis of myth one could reconstruct this hidden tradition.18 A second signicant innovation brought by Cornutus was his realization that if Greek myth had preserved vestiges of the wisdom of the rst philosophers in allegorical form, the same might be true for other cultural 15. Boys-Stones argues that such was the early Stoic view on the basis that Seneca, in his refusal to go along with Posidinius’ revisionist account, represents the earlier Stoic position (Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 18-26). 16. Seneca, Epistle 90.5 (O. Hense, L. Annaei Senecae Ad Lucilium epistolarum moralium quae supersunt (Leipzig: Teubner, 1938)). Translation from Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 46, modied. 17. The attribution of this theory to Posidonius was made by O. Gigon, “Die Erneuerung der Philosophie in der Zeit Ciceros,” in Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne, Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique 3, (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1955), based on a comparison of Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Phys. 1.363 and Diogenes Laertius, vit. 1.1, and has been followed by J.H. Waszink, “Some Observations on the Appreciation of ‘the Philosophy of the Barbarians’ in Early Christian Literature,” in Mélanges offerts à Mademoiselle Christine Mohrmann, (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1963), 52; Droge, Homer or Moses, 15; Kendra Eshleman, The Social World of Intellectuals in the Roman Empire: Sophists, Philosophers, and Christians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 193. 18. On Cornutus, see especially Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 49-59. On Stoic exegesis more broadly, see Peter T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers At the Limits of Their Texts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 3. -6- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) traditions as well: Many and varied myths about the gods were woven among the ancient Greeks, just as many arose among the Magi, many among the Phrygians, and again among the Egyptians, Celts, Libyans, and other races. Τοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας περὶ θεῶν γεγονέναι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς Ἕλλησι μυθοποιΐας, ὡς ἄλλαι μὲν παρὰ Μάγοις γεγόνασιν, ἄλλαι δὲ παρὰ Φρυξὶ καὶ ἤδη παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις τε καὶ Κελτοῖς καὶ Λίβυσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔθνεσι19 With these two changes Cornutus had provided the presuppositions necessary for a debate over which cultural traditions best preserved the primitive wisdom of the ancient philosophers. The older a cultural tradition could be shown to be, the more authoritative it might become, and, conversely, the more one culture could be shown to be derivative of another, the less useful it would be for the project of recovering the fragments of the earliest philosophy. It was against such a background that Apion and Josephus would square off against one another in the rst century CE over the history of the Jewish people. In Apion’s charge that the Jews had left Egypt as fugitives, the more damning accusation was not the felonious nature of their origin as a people, but rather that they were a mere offshoot of a much more ancient culture.20 If this claim were true, then Jewish culture and religion would lose all credibility as a legitimate expression of ancient wisdom. Against Apion, Josephus argued extensively both for the antiquity of the Jewish people and also for the fact that they originated elsewhere before entering Egypt, thereby ensuring their independent status as an ancient nation. Moreover, he turned the tables on his opponent, paraphrasing Plato’s Laws 3.677d in asserting that it is not Jewish culture, but Greek culture that “will be found to be modern, and dating, so to speak, from yesterday or the day before” (τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἅπαντα νέα καὶ χθὲς καὶ πρῴην, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, εὕροι γεγονότα).21 According to Josephus, the wisest Greek philoso- 19. Cornutus, De natura deorum 17 (C. Lang, Cornuti theologiae Graecae compendium (Leipzig: Teubner, 1881)). Translation from Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 56. 20. See Josephus, AA 2.8-32. On Apion and Josephus, see especially Droge, Homer or Moses, 35-47; Louis H. Feldman, “Origen’s Contra Celsum and Josephus’ Contra Apionem,” Vigiliae Christianae 44 (1990): 105-135; Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 193-206; Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 66-75, 85-90. Boys-Stones argues for a shift in anti-Semitic polemic in the rst century CE. Whereas the earlier authors such as Hecataeus, Manetho, and Lysimachus had relied on charges of “misanthropy” and “cultural isolation,” the inuence of Stoic philosophy upon later Greek historians such as Apion moved the debate to the question of antiquity and purity of tradition (p.75). 21. Josephus, AA 1.7 (B. Niese, Flavii Iosephi opera, vol. 5 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1889)). In the Laws passage Clinias states that the various arts and sciences were unknown for thousands of years and only revealed to persons ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθὲς καὶ πρῴην γεγονότα. The parallel between Josephus and Plato here was highlighted by -7- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) phers such as Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics had in fact derived their conception of the deity from Moses.22 The degree to which Josephus had imbibed the Stoic view can be seen in his assertion that the Jewish patriarchs were the inventors of technical arts like astronomy and geometry.23 In other words, they fullled the role played by Posidonius’ ancient sages. Both he and Apion were therefore operating on the same Stoic-inspired conception of philosophical history, and within this framework the antiquity and independence of a people and its culture became the fundamental issues for either asserting its superiority or rejecting its degeneracy. But this theme was not always put to such polemical ends. In the rst century CE Philo argued that the number of the wise on earth is small but not nonexistent, and he claimed that “Greece and the land of the barbarians are witness of this” (μάρτυς δὲ ἡ Ἑλλὰς καὶ ἡ βάρβαρος), listing the seven sages of Greece along with the magi of the Persians, the Indian gymnosophists, and the Essenes from Palestinian Syria.24 Moreover, unlike Josephus, Philo was willing to concede that traditional Greek theology and mythology contained vestiges of the ancient wisdom which could be recovered through allegorical exegesis, the same sort of exegesis that he applied extensively to the Jewish sacred scriptures.25 A similar view can be found in the Middle Platonist Numenius, who exploited the Stoic view in a novel way. In his treatise On the Academics’ Dissension from Plato, he rst sought to move back to the ‘real’ Plato by scraping away the barnacles that had grown upon his philosophy among the Peripatetics and Stoics, as well as the Skeptical Academy.26 With this step accomplished he was then in a position to reach back even further to Plato’s sources, especially Pythagoras, to identify the sources upon which Plato Droge, Homer or Moses, 43. 22. Josephus, AA 2.167-68. 23. See JA 1.105-6; on which cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 88-90. 24. Philo, Quod omnis probus liber sit 73-75. Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 46-47, who points out that Philo’s approving use of the term βάρβαρος is a feature not found in Josephus. 25. For Philo’s estimation of Greek mythology, see De opicio mundi 133; De providentia 2.40-41; on which see BoysStones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 90-95. 26. On this aspect of Numenius’ thought, see Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 138-142. On Numenius in general, see especially Michael Frede, “Numenius,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987); John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. To A.D. 220, Rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 361-379. On the parallels between Numenius’ ideal of homodoxia within a philosophical school and the development of heresy within early Christianity, see Eshleman, The Social World of Intellectuals, 206-210. -8- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) drew to formulate his philosophy: On this point [the nature of the godhead] it will be necessary, having stated and drawn conclusions from Plato’s evidence, to go back to Pythagoras, and tie it in with his doctrines; then to call in the respected nations, comparing such of their mystery rites, doctrines, and institutions as the Brahmans, the Jews, the Magi, and the Egyptians have laid down, and as are conducted in conformity with Plato. Εἰς δὲ τοῦτο δεήσει εἰπόντα καὶ σημηνάμενον ταῖς μαρτυρίαις ταῖς Πλάτωνος ἀναχωρήσασθαι καὶ συνδήσασθαι τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ Πυθαγόρου, ἐπικαλέσασθαι δὲ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα, προσφερόμενον αὐτῶν τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰ δόγματα τάς τε ἱδρύσεις συντελουμένας Πλάτωνι ὁμολογουμένως, ὁπόσας Βραχμᾶνες καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Μάγοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι διέθεντο.27 As illustrated by this passage, the importance of Plato for Numenius and other Middle Platonists of his ilk, is not that he was at all innovative, but rather that he set forth the most successful and therefore authoritative reconstruction of this ancient wisdom drawn from a variety of sources, including barbarian ones.28 Plato, therefore, serves as the standard against which the wisdom of the barbarians is compared, and, conversely, investigation of the ancient wisdom can conrm Plato’s authoritative genius in assembling or reconstructing that ancient wisdom.29 Hence, what distinguishes Numenius’ interest in ancient and barbarian wisdom from general cultural arguments about antiquity and primacy is that for Numenius this has become an explicit philosophical methodology intended to produce dogmatic results. He does not merely concede the existence of occasional nuggets of wisdom among ancient traditions, but holds that central to the philosophical task is the sifting of the traditions of a variety of nations to explicate Plato’s thought. Among those barbarian nations listed by Numenius at the end of the preceding passage, the Jews held a special place, as seen, for example, in his rhetorical question, “For what is Plato, but Moses speaking in Attic Greek?” (Τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων).30 Moreover, Origen reported that Numenius repeatedly quoted Moses and the 27. Numenius, fr. 1a (É. des Places, Numénius. Fragments (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1974)). Translation from BoysStones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 116. 28. Cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 114-122. This openness to barbarian wisdom had its detractors. Diogenes Laertius particularly opposes “the notion that philosophy’s chief task is to recover a universal ancient wisdom rst propounded and preserved by barbarians” (Eshleman, The Social World of Intellectuals, 199), though, as Eshleman argues, this stance puts him well outside the mainstream of his day (pp.191-99). 29. Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5194, lays emphasis on the attempts from Posidonius onwards to “reconstruct” the ancient account that was presumed to have existed. 30. Numenius, fr. 8 (des Places). On this theme in Numenius, see Waszink, “Some Observations,” 54-55; Droge, Homer or Moses, 64-65, 70-72; Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 113-116. -9- The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) prophets, providing them with an allegorical interpretation.31 Philo and Numenius, therefore, present a version of this Stoic theme that is less polemical and more open to deriving wisdom from a variety of cultures, though for each philosopher there is no question about where the nal authority lies—in the Jewish scriptures for Philo and in Plato for Numenius. Nevertheless, the power of this idea to discredit one’s opponents, especially when they hailed from a culture other than oneself, was alluring and, as we shall see, proved central to the polemical projects of Celsus and Tatian. II. Celsus’ Conception of Philosophical History and Christian Deviance Both Celsus and Tatian are best classied as Middle Platonists, and both represent the strand of Middle Platonism that incorporated the Stoic belief in an ancient philosophy and the corresponding methodology one could use to recover that past wisdom.32 Of the two, Celsus had probably received a better philosophical education. In his brief recounting of his past life in the Oratio, Tatian mentions training in παιδεία (Or. 42.1), his practice as a sophist (Or. 35.1), and his initiation into mystery religions (Or. 29.1), but notably never alludes to formal philosophical training of the sort that Justin, in his Dialogue with Trypho, claims to have received.33 This suggests the possibility that the only philosophical training he had received was that which he learned from Justin in Rome, especially since many points of similarity appear between the thought of the two.34 I will rst consider Celsus’ understanding of the “ancient phi- 31. C. Cels. 4.51. 32. On Celsus as a Middle Platonist, see Frede, “Numenius,” 5191-5192. That Tatian was inuenced by Middle Platonism was the contention of M. Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), and is now the consensus view. Cf. Emily J. Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian, Routledge Early Church Monographs (London: Routledge, 2003), 74-109. 33. On Tatian’s educational background, see Molly Whittaker, “Tatian’s Educational Background,” Studia Patristica 13 (1975): 57-59; Robert M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 130; Dimitrios Karadimas, Tatian’s Oratio Ad Graecos: Rhetoric and Philosophy/Theology, Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 2000-2001 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2003); Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians At Rome in the First Two Centuries, trans. Michael Steinhauser (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 285-291; Lössl, “Zwischen Christologie und Rhetorik,”; Matthew R. Crawford, “‘Reordering the Confusion’: Tatian, the Second Sophistic, and the So-Called Diatessaron,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum, 19 (2015): 209-236. 34. See the comparison at Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos, 195-203. Though several important points of difference between them have been highlighted by R. Hanig, “Tatian und Justin. Ein Vergleich,” Vigiliae Christianae 53 (1999): 31-73. - 10 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) losophy” since he, more so than Tatian, represents a more standard Middle Platonic version of it, in contrast to the revisions to it made by the latter. A. Celsus’ Understanding of Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy Aside from authoring the earliest surviving polemical tract against Christianity, Celsus is also signicant for the fact that he, as Boys-Stones points out, “gives us the clearest evidence we have for the wholehearted adoption into Platonist thought of the Stoic theory of ancient wisdom and its preservation.”35 Moreover, the theory of ancient wisdom is not merely incidental to the goals of his anti-Christian treatise, but in fact serves as its most important theoretical principle, as indicated by its title, since Celsus goes on to dene the ἀληθὴς λόγος as the ἀρχαῖος λόγος.36 Indeed, there is scarcely an element in Celsus’ True Account that does not presuppose the Posidonian understanding of an ancient tradition. Early in book one, Origen points out that Celsus “supposes that between many of the nations there is an afnity in that they hold the same doctrine” (Συγγένειαν παρὰ πολλοῖς τῶν ἐθνῶν νομίζων εἶναι ὁ Κέλσος τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου).37 This is “an ancient doctrine which has existed from the beginning, which has always been maintained by the wisest nations and cities and wise men” (ἀρχαῖος ἄνωθεν λόγος, περὶ ὃν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ σοφώτατα καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἄνδρες σοφοὶ κατεγένοντο).38 Celsus names a particularly broad range of nations that are heir to this ancient wisdom, includ- 35. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 106. Cf. Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5194: Now there are two reasons why Celsus is of particular interest in this regard: (i) Celsus, apart from Numenius, seems to be the rst Platonist for whom this [i.e., Posidonian] view, which later, in some version or other, would become commonplace among Platonists, is attested. (ii) In his case there is abundant material to reconstruct this view, at least in his particular version, in quite some detail.” Heinrich Dörrie, “Die Wertung der Barbaren im Urteil der Griechen. Knechtsnaturen? Oder Bewahrer und Künder heilbringender Weisheit?,” in Antike und Universalgeschichte. Festschrift Hans Erich Stier, ed. Ruth Stiehl and Gustav Adolf Lehmann, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), 165-168, also recognized that the theme of “barbarian wisdom” entered a new phase in the late second century, exemplied especially by Celsus, who shows how deep an inuence Posidionius had. In his estimation, this phase represented a departure from the earlier antithesis between barbarian and Greek and was marked by “die Universalität ihrer Methodik” (p.173). 36. As also recognized by Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 106: “For Celsus’ argument against Christianity— that is to say, his primary argument (it is supplemented by many and various indictments)—is precisely that Christianity is vitiated by the youth of its foundations.” Similarly, Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 289, observed that “sein ganzes Werk von seinem eigenen Altersbeweis durchzogen ist.” For a catalogue of Celsus’ various criticisms of Christianity, see John Granger Cook, The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 17-102, who, however, does not seem to recognize the primacy of the chronological criticism in Celsus’ treatise. 37. Cels. 1.14 (SC 132.112). 38. Cels. 1.14 (SC 132.114). - 11 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) ing the Egyptians, Assyrians, Indians, Persians, Odrysians, Samothracians, Eleusinians, Hyperboreans, the Galactophagi of Homer, the Druids of Gaul, and the Getae, but notably excluding the Jewish people.39 In contrast to these ancient nations, Celsus held that the Greeks were comparatively young and without records of the ancient times due to “oods and conagrations.”40 Hence, even though he had a much more negative view of Judaism than Numenius, he agreed with him in acknowledging the important contributions made by non-Greeks: “the barbarian were capable of discovering doctrines” (ἱκανοὺς εὑρεῖν δόγματα τοὺς βαρβάρους).41 Nevertheless, this esteem for ancient barbarian wisdom in no way diminished in Celsus’ view the centrality of the Greeks in ancient philosophy. Rather, “the Greeks are better able to judge the value of what the barbarians have discovered, and to establish the doctrines and put them into practice by virtue” (κρῖναι καὶ βεβαιώσασθαι καὶ ἀσκῆσαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὑρεθέντα ἀμείνονές εἰσιν Ἕλληνες).42 Celsus therefore makes a distinction between the ancient wisdom and philosophy proper. Various δόγματα were discovered and preserved among the barbarians, but the Greeks uniquely excelled at the task of assessing what has been passed down, systematizing it, and putting it into practice.43 Like Numenius, Celsus thought that it was Plato who stands above the rest as the most authoritative of Greek philosophers, since he was the most successful at reconstructing the ancient wisdom and turning it into philosophy proper.44 Repeatedly he quotes Plato (Cels. 6.1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9), far more than 39. Cels. 1.14, 16 (SC 132.114, 116, 118). On this list see Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5194-5195. 40. Cels. 1.20 (SC 132.126). 41. Cels. 1.2 (SC 132.82). 42. Cels. 1.2 (SC 132.82). On this point, cf. Guy G. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 112 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 67. 43. Cf. Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5197: “Celsus thinks of philosophy as the scientic reconstruction and clarication of the true account, as its rational articulation and systematization.” 44. So Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 117: “Plato’s genius, in other words, did not lie for his interpreters in the novelty of his system: it lay precisely in the unparalleled success of his reconstruction of what Celsus was calling the ‘true doctrine’.” For Boys-Stones, it is precisely this premise which the Middle Platonists added to the Stoic conception of ancient wisdom, and which therefore brought Middle Platonism as such into existence (p.115). Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5198-5199, similarly recognizes the importance of Plato for Celsus, though he suggests a different reason for it: “Plato’s authority, to start with, is the authority of an ancient who still has a rm grasp of the true doctrine.” So for Boys-Stones, it is Plato’s reconstruction of the ancient wisdom that preeminently qualies him as an authority, while according to Frede it is Plato’s preservation of that ancient tradition that is central. Boys-Stone’s view makes better sense of the parallels with Numenius, and with Celsus’ statement about the Greeks’ handling of barbarian “doctrines” in - 12 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) any other philosophical source, and he may even have taken the title of his treatise from Plato’s Ep. 7.342a, which he quotes in Cels. 6.9.45 Origen even complains that Celsus cites passages from Plato “as though they were inspired utterances” (ἐνθέως εἰρημένων).46 Thus, in many respects Celsus’ view of the “ancient wisdom” appears as a fuller presentation of what can be gleaned from Numenius’ fragments. However, while Numenius was full of praise for Moses and thought he could uncover much wisdom in the Jewish scriptures, Celsus returned to the anti-Semitic stance that had characterized Apion’s attack a century and a half earlier. Like Apion, Celsus asserted that the Jews were “runaway slaves who escaped from Egypt; they never did anything important, nor have they ever been of any signicance or prominence whatever” (Ἰουδαίους ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου δραπέτας γεγονέναι, μηδὲν πώποτε ἀξιόλογον πράξαντας, οὔτ’ ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ’ ἐν ἀριθμῷ αὐτούς ποτε γεγενημένους).47 Moreover, Celsus’ claim that “nothing about their history is to be found among the Greeks” (μὴ πάνυ τι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίαν εὑρίσκεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι)48 probably served the same purpose as it had for Apion—to demonstrate that the Jewish people had no separate, independent existence until they departed from Egypt. Moreover, the intellectual history of the Jewish people corresponded to their social history, since the runaway slaves took with them elements of the ancient account that they pilfered from the Egyptians. Moses himself “heard of this doctrine which was current among the wise nations and distinguished men” (Cels. 1.21), but employed it to debased ends, such that the “goatherds and shepherds” who followed him “were deluded by clumsy deceits” (Cels. 1.23), which Celsus elsewhere terms “sorcery” (Cels. 1.26). B. Celsus’ Deployment of the Ancient Wisdom against Christianity These two premises, that there existed an ancient wisdom best exemplied by the Cels. 1.2. 45. Cels. 6.9 (SC 147.198), citing Plato, Ep. 7.342a: ἔστι γάρ τις λόγος ἀληθής, ἐναντίος τῷ τολμήσαντι γράφειν τῶν τοιούτων <καὶ> ὁτιοῦν, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ καὶ πρότερον λεχθείς, ἔοικε δ’ οὖν εἶναι καὶ νῦν λεκτέος. Cf. Robert Bader, Der Alethes Logos des Kelsos, Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 33 (Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1940), 2-3; A. Wifstrand, “Die wahre Lehre des Kelsos,” Bulletin de la Sociéte Royale des Lettres de Lund, 5 (1941/42): 391-431; Chadwick, Contra Celsum, xxi; Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5192. 46. Cels. 6.17 (SC 147.220). 47. Cels. 4.31 (SC 136.260). 48. Cels. 4.31 (SC 136.260). - 13 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Greeks and that the Jews had no claim to such wisdom by virtue of their origin as runaway slaves from Egypt, form the presuppositions for the entirety of Celsus’ broadside against Christianity. Throughout his diatribe he refuses to consider Christianity on its own terms, so to speak, but instead consistently engages in a comparative analysis of Christianity alongside other traditions. He rst compares Christianity with Judaism from which it sprang, creating a ctitious Jew to direct criticism both at Jesus himself (corresponding to book one of Origen’s Cels.) and at those Christians who believed in Jesus (book two of Cels.). The purpose of this exercise is to establish that just as the Jews were a corrupt offshoot of the Egyptians, so too were the Christians in relation to the Jews. Just as Moses was able to convince only “goatherds and shepherds” to follow him, so too Christianity is successful “only among the uneducated because of its vulgarity and utter illiteracy.”49 Jesus, like Moses, learned magic in Egypt (Cels. 1.28), and used sorcery to deceive these foolish people so that they became convinced that he was the son of God (Cels. 1.68). Celsus’ Jew then directs his gaze at Christians themselves, asking “Why do you take your origin from our religion, and then, as if you are progressing in knowledge, despise these things, although you cannot name any other origin for your doctrine (τοῦ δόγματος) than our law?”50 This quotation highlights the likely reason behind Celsus’ literary ction. If his imaginary Jew, who would be uniquely qualied to speak upon such matters, can demonstrate that Christianity has no other origin than Judaism, then, assuming Celsus’ own view of Judaism as debased Egyptian wisdom, Christianity can be regarded as nothing other than a corruption of a corruption. In other words, Celsus uses his Jewish character to bring Christianity into the closest proximity to Judaism by declaring “Christians teach nothing new” (μηδὲν δὲ καινὸν ἐν τούτοις διδάσκεσθαι φάσκων Χριστιανοὺς).51 While Christians would like to draw a line between themselves and their Jewish interlocutors by asserting their belief in Jesus as the Son of God, Celsus tries to negate this distance by having his Jew remove all justication for regarding Jesus as divine (Cels. 2.9, 17, 23, 30, 31, 33, 44, 49, 55, 75), attributing this false notion to his seditious disciples (Cels. 2.26). With the primary difference between Jews and Christians removed, Christians can claim to be little more than Jews who are even 49. Cels. 1.27 (SC 132.150). Celsus often denigrates the adherents of Christianity as uneducated fools: Cels. 3.50, 55, 75; 6.12, 14. In contrast, Tatian boasted in the fact that among the Christians all classes of people are admitted to the practice of philosophy (Or. 32.2). 50. Cels. 2.4 (SC 132.288). 51. Cels. 2.5 (SC 132.292). - 14 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) more deluded than usual. Hence, throughout the entirety of this section of the treatise in which he deploys a Jewish critic against Jesus and the Christians, the force of Celsus’ argument derives from his assumption that Judaism began as debased Egyptian religion. Once Celsus has done all that he can with his imaginary Jew, he next turns to a comparison of Christian doctrine with a variety of other traditions. Some Christian notions, such as the punishment of the wicked and the reward of the righteous he is happy to afrm, but with these commendable ideas Christians “combine misunderstandings of the ancient tradition” (τὰ τοῦ παλαιοῦ λόγου παρακούσματα συμπλάττοντες τούτοις).52 What follows is a series of case studies illustrating how pervasive this principle of “misunderstanding” is within Christian doctrine. For example, Christians use music to stir up their members into a frenzy like the priests of Cybele (Cels. 3.16). Moreover, unlike the Egyptians who set up images of animals like a monkey or a crocodile, but recognize that worship of these gures is in fact showing respect to “eternal ideas” (ἰδεῶν ἀϊδίων) rather than “ephemeral animals” (ζῴων ἐφημερίων), the Christians never move beyond the material reality to anything more profound.53 Indeed they are even worse than this, because they reverence the esh of Jesus which is “more corruptible” than the “gold, silver, and stone” out of which the images are made.54 Furthermore, Jesus’ supposed healing power pales in comparison with the deeds of Asclepius (Cels. 3.24). Similarly, Christian worship of the man Jesus was no different than “the Getae who reverence Zamalxis, and the Cilicians who worship Mopsus, the Acarnanians Amphilochus, the Thebans Amphiaraus, and the Lebadians Trophonius.”55 Christians also compare poorly against the mystery religions, which at least have moral standards that are required for membership (Cels. 3.59). Again, stories in the Christian scriptures may be shown to have resulted from Christians “misunderstanding what is said by the Greeks or barbarians” (παρακούσαντας τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησιν ἢ βαρβάροις περὶ τούτων λεγομένων).56 The Christian idea of a ood is merely a “debased and unscrupulous version” (παραχαράττοντες καὶ ῥᾳδιουργοῦντες) of the myth of 52. Cels. 3.16 (SC 136.42). 53. Cels. 3.17-19 (SC 136.44-46). 54. Cels. 3.42 (SC 136.98). 55. Cels. 3.34 (SC 136.80). 56. Cels. 4.11 (SC 136.208). - 15 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Deucalion,57 Moses “corrupted” (παραφθείροντα) the story of the sons of Aloeus when he wrote about the Tower of Babel, and the story of Sodom and Gomorrah was a debased version of the story of Phaethon.58 Similarly, the story of Genesis about the creation of humanity from the earth cannot stand up in comparison with the similar stories among “the men who claimed antiquity, such as the Athenians, Egyptians, Arcadians, and Phrygians ... each of whom produce evidence for these assertions.”59 After refuting Christian claims for the authority of their teacher Jesus, leaving them with “no authority for their doctrine” (μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τοῦ δόγματος),60 Celsus next undertakes to examine the “actual teaching” of the Christians, in order to demonstrate that it is nothing more more than “misunderstandings and corruptions of the truth which they have made through ignorance” (παρακηκοότες ὑπ’ ἀγνοίας διαφθείρουσιν).61 Here he has in mind the “fundamental principles” (ἀρχαί) which Christians discuss “in a vulgar manner” (οὐκ ἐμμελῶς),62 and again he provides his readers with multiple examples of this misunderstanding and corruption, this time based upon a series of quotations from Plato intended to demonstrate that Christians “misunderstand Plato” (παρακούσαντες τοῦ Πλάτωνος).63 Plato gives rational justication for his teaching (Cels. 6.10), unlike the Christians who are supposed to believe without argument what Jesus says, merely on the basis that he came down from heaven (Cels. 1.9). Moreover, specic Christian notions can be shown to be derivative of Greek wisdom. Paul’s denigration of worldly wisdom in 1 Corinthians 3.19 was “taken over from the Greek wise men,” such as Heraclitus and Socrates;64 Christian teaching on humility is a corruption of Plato’s teaching in Laws 715e;65 Jesus’ judgment upon the 57. Cels. 4.41 (SC 136.290). 58. Cels. 4.21 (SC 136.232-34). 59. Cels. 4.36 (SC 136.272-74). 60. Cels. 5.65 (SC 147.176). 61. Cels. 5.65 (SC 147.176). 62. Cels. 5.65 (SC 147.176). 63. Cels. 6.7 (SC 147.192). 64. Cels. 6.12 (SC 147.206-08). On Celsus’ interpretation of the New Testament, see Cook, The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism, 18-61. 65. Cels. 6.15 (SC 147.214). - 16 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) rich was “borrowed” from Plato’s Laws 743a;66 the Christian notion of a deity higher than the heavens resulted from a misunderstanding of Plato’s Phaedrus 247c;67 and nally the rule of nonretaliation was taken from Plato’s Crito 49b-e.68 Celsus’ general openness to the wisdom of other cultures can be seen in his positive appraisal of the “truths that are obscurely represented by the teaching of the Persians and by the mystery of Mithras,”69 referring especially to their understanding of the heavens, which Christians again have borrowed from (Cels. 6.23). In this passage he makes explicit the comparative method that he has been employing throughout the treatise: If one cares to study a mystery of the Christians side by side with that of the Persians which has been mentioned, contrasting them with one another and laying bare also the teaching of the Christians, one may then see the difference between them. τελετήν τινα Χριστιανῶν τελετῇ <τῇ> προειρημένῃ Περσῶν τὸν βουλόμενον συνεξετάσαι, ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις παραβαλόντα καὶ γυμνώσαντα καὶ τὰ Χριστιανῶν, οὕτω θεάσεσθαι τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν.70 Here Celsus particularly has in mind an astrological diagram he obtained from some Christian source, which bears obvious similarities to Persian sources. He goes on to suggest that the Christian idea of Satan was a “misunderstanding” of the “divine war hinted at by the ancients,” such as Heraclitus and Pherecydes.71 Similarly, the idea of calling Jesus “Son of God” was a Christian corruption of the tendency among “men of olden times” to “call this world God’s child and a demigod on the ground that it originated from him,”72 and the doctrine of the resurrection is a misunderstanding of the idea of reincarnation (Cels. 7.32). As Celsus acknowledges, this same method could be used in many other cases: What I have said on this point may be a sufcient example for all the other doctrines which they corrupt. And anyone who wishes to nd further instances of this will recognize them. 66. Cels. 6.16 (SC 147.216). 67. Cels. 6.19 (SC 147.226). 68. Cels. 7.58 (SC 150.148-50). 69. Cels. 6.22 (SC 147.232). 70. Cels. 6.24 (SC 147.238). 71. Cels. 6.42 (SC 147.278-80). 72. Cels. 6.47 (SC 147.296). - 17 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Ἀλλὰ τῶνδε μὲν πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα παραφθείρουσιν, ἀρκείτω τὰ εἰρημένα· καὶ ὅτῳ φίλον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν τι αὐτῶν ζητεῖν, εἴσεται.73 The passages cited above from Origen’s books two through seven sufce to demonstrate that, although Celsus’ discussion wanders over much territory including on occasion some positive explication of Platonic doctrine (cf. Cels. 7.36, 42),74 the most consistent theme running throughout the fragments is the comparative method which he uses to prove that Christianity is both derivative and a corruption of various aspects of the ancient wisdom expressed most clearly and authoritatively by Greek philosophy, and especially Plato. Hence, it is not simply the case that this is “one of the leading themes of Celsus’ treatise.”75 Rather, it is the most important theoretical principle that justies the comparative method that he employs throughout to discredit Christianity. III. Tatian’s Conception of Cultural History and Hellenistic Deviance If Celsus drew upon earlier anti-Jewish polemic in his attack on the Christians, Justin Martyr continued the line of defense represented by Josephus in arguing for the antiquity of Moses and the notion that Greek culture was derivative of Jewish wisdom. In his rst apology he claimed that Moses and the prophets are “older than all those who were writers,”76 a thesis that he later elaborated on at some length by suggesting that Greek mythology was dependent upon the Hebrew scriptures (1 apol. 54) and that Plato adopted Moses account of creation (1 apol. 58).77 In fact, “everything whatever both the philosophers and poets said concerning the immortality of the soul or punishments after death or contemplation of heavenly things or similar teachings” were taken over from the prophets.78 Justin’s position with respect to this is- 73. Cels. 7.58 (SC 150.150). 74. On Celsus’ Platonic doctrine, see Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5203-5212; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 400-401. 75. Droge, Homer or Moses, 80. 76. 1 apol. 23.1 (Denis Minns and Paul Parvis, Justin, Philosopher and Martyr: Apologies, OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 138-39). 77. For an elaboration of this theme in Justin, see Droge, Homer or Moses, 59-65, and for a wider discussion, drawing on Justin and other early Christian authors, see Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 151-202. 78. 1 apol. 44.9 (Minns and Parvis, 194-95). - 18 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) sue is easily understood as a slight modication of the thought of Numenius, and the number of similarities between the two authors has lead some to posit a direct inuence from the NeoPythagorean upon Justin or other early Christian authors who take a similar view.79 Regardless of the source from which Justin derived this view, the notion of Greek dependency upon Hebrew wisdom would have a momentous impact upon Christian self-understanding and argumentation. Boys-Stones is surely correct in suggesting that as part of the model in whose terms Christian orthodoxy was dened and asserted as a philosophical tradition of unique standing in the history of thought, it played a vital role in establishing the Christian Church as, arguably, the most historically successful achievement of the Platonists’ model itself.80 Given that he was Justin’s student in Rome, it is hardly surprising to nd this theme guring prominently in Tatian’s thought as well. However, I want to argue that the centrality of this theme for Tatian’s Oratio has generally been unrecognized. In fact, if Celsus shows to what degree Middle Platonists had adopted the Stoic view of ancient wisdom, Tatian does the same for the Christians. For the theme of ancient wisdom and its supposed corruption is not merely one of the themes of his Oratio, but instead is the dominant point that he argues throughout.81 Moreover, Tatian, to a much greater degree than Justin, demonstrates how effectively this idea can be weaponized and deployed against one’s philosophical opponents who hailed from a different culture. Finally, Tatian differs markedly from Justin in not just claiming to pass on ancient Jewish wisdom, but in going as far as claiming to be a contemporary “barbarian” sage representing an unbroken tradition of wisdom stretching back to the most ancient time. In these three ways Tatian develops the idea he learned from Justin: by making it central to his entire project, by putting it to overtly polemical ends, and by radicalizing it so that it formed the core of his self-identity and self-presentation to his audience. A. The Centrality of the Dependence Theme in Tatian’s Oratio 79. Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 54-56; Droge, Homer or Moses, 72. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 75, claims that Christian interest in barbarian wisdom did not come from Numenius or others like him, but instead from “their own particular viewpoint and sensitivity as Christian intellectuals,” in other words, “their Christian self-fashioning.” Stroumsa’s contention seems to me implausible insofar as it separates Christians too far from contemporary intellectual developments in the second century. 80. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, 202. 81. It is therefore unfortunate that in his otherwise excellent monograph Boys-Stones deals with Tatian only in passing. - 19 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Scholars, myself included, have often commented upon the lack of clear structure evident in Tatian’s sole surviving work, his Oratio. Molly Whittaker speaks for many when she writes, “The incoherence of the work as a whole is on a par with his often confused and incoherent arguments and the obscurity of his style.”82 I wonder, however, whether the incoherence of the work has been overstated. Tatian does, it is true, wander through a number of topics, throwing out allusions and references to an astonishingly diverse number of gures. However, the theme that unites the whole of the work is his claim to be presenting an ancient barbarian wisdom that surpasses everything he previously had learned in Greek παιδεία. At the micro-level, a structure to the work is often indiscernible. However, when viewed at the macro-level, Tatian’s Oratio falls into two halves, each with a distinct, yet complementary thesis: 1. Greek παιδεία is a corruption of true wisdom derived from demons who deceptively imitated the true Logos. (Or. 1-28) 2. Barbarian wisdom, represented preeminently by Moses, antedates the earliest Greek culture. (Or. 31-42) The hinge between the two halves of the discourse is Or. 29-30 wherein Tatian describes his own conversion, and at each stage of his diatribe, his argument only works if one assumes a Stoic-inspired view of ancient wisdom.83 The rst sentence of the treatise announces its theme: Do not maintain a totally hostile attitude to barbarians, men of Greece, nor resent their doctrines. For which of your own practices did not come from the barbarians?84 Μὴ πάνυ φιλέχθρως διατίθεσθε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, μηδὲ φθονήσητε τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν. ποῖον γὰρ ἐπιτήδευμα παρ’ ὑμῖν τὴν σύστασιν οὐκ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἐκτήσατο; What follows is a list of the inventions the Greeks pilfered from other nations, including divination, sacrices, astronomy, geometry, and the alphabet. The Greeks are therefore incorrect when they claim that these “imitations” (μιμήσεις) are in fact their own “inventions” 82. Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments, xx. See my fuller discussion of this problem in the forthcoming article “The Problemata of Tatian.” Especially helpful is the analysis of Karadimas, Tatian’s Oratio Ad Graecos, 9-24. 83. Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 253-260, recognizes that the “Altersbeweis” is the dominant theme in the Oratio but focuses almost exclusively on the latter half from Or. 31 onwards. 84. Tatian, Or. 1.1 (Trelenberg, 84). - 20 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) (εὑρέσεις).85 In the rst half of the Oratio, Tatian goes on to condemn nearly all Greek learning and religious practice, from rhetoric (Or. 1), astrology (Or. 9), mythology (Or. 9; 21), sorcery (Or. 16), medicine (Or. 17-18), philosophy (Or. 19; 25),86 acting (Or. 22), dance (Or. 22), mime (Or. 22), gladiatorial shows (Or. 23), theatre (Or. 25), music (Or. 25), grammar (Or. 26), and nally legislation (Or. 28). To be sure, Tatian aims a number of criticisms against these various aspects of Greek παιδεία, some of which could stand on their own in the absence of a doctrine of the “ancient wisdom,” but the fact that he begins his diatribe with this assertion suggests that the force of his attack depends upon the errant origin of his opponents’ culture. After completing this seeming wholesale denunciation of Hellenistic learning, Tatian claims to have tried all that the Greeks have to offer and found it wanting (Or. 29). He states that when I was by myself I began to seek by what means I could discover the truth. While I was engaged in serious thought I happened to read some barbarian writings, older by comparison with the doctrines of the Greeks, more divine by comparison with their errors. κατ’ ἐμαυτὸν γενόμενος ἐζήτουν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐξευρεῖν δύνωμαι. περινοοῦντι δέ μοι τὰ σπουδαῖα συνέβη γραφαῖς τισιν ἐντυχεῖν βαρβαρικαῖς, πρεσβυτέραις μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ Ἑλλήνων δόγματα, θειοτέραις δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων πλάνην·87 Though he lists some other features of these “barbarian” writings that he found appealing, it is their antiquity that he highlights rst and foremost, an assertion that derives its argumentative force from the sort of philosophical understanding of an ancient wisdom that I surveyed in part one of this paper. These were ancient writings containing humankind’s primitive wisdom, unsullied by later corruption. The fact that this is what Tatian has in mind is further evidenced by the nal sentence of this paragraph, when he states that this new teaching he encountered was “not something we had never received, but what we had received but had been prevented from keeping by our error” (δίδωσι δὲ ἡμῖν οὐχ ὅπερ μὴ ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ λαβόντες ὑπὸ 85. Tatian, Or. 1.2 (Trelenberg, 84). For a comparison of Justin and Tatian’s understanding of “imitation” with that of Lucian of Samosata, see Nathanael J. Andrade, Syrian Identity in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 277. 86. On Tatian’s attacks against philosophy, see Anne-Marie Malingrey, “Philosophia.” Étude d’un groupe de mots dans la littérture grecque, des présocratiques au IVe siècle après J.-C., Études et commentaires, 40 (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1961), 110-115. 87. Or. 29.1-2 (Trelenberg, 160). - 21 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) τῆς πλάνης ἔχειν ἐκωλύθημεν.).88 In other words, what he found in these barbarian writings was not something utterly new, but rather the pure truth that had been adopted and corrupted by Greek error. Following his description of his conversion, Tatian announces a new sub-theme in Or. 31: Now I think it is appropriate that I should prove that our philosophy is older than Greek practices. Moses and Homer will be set as our limits. Νῦν δὲ προσήκειν μοι νομίζω παραστῆσαι πρεσβυτέραν τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλοσοφίαν τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησιν ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ὅροι δὲ ἡμῖν κείσονται Μωυσῆς καὶ Ὅμηρος.89 This was a version of the same claim that Justin had already made, which went back to Josephus.90 However, as Droge has pointed out, Tatian goes far beyond Justin in the degree of research and learning that lie behind his account of the antiquity of Moses, producing what Droge refers to as a “scientic” argument that relies on a comparative analysis of Hellenistic chronological works.91 As Tatian describes it, he is “resisting you [the Greeks] with your own weapons.”92 Aside from a digression at Or. 32.1-35.2, which Tatian himself acknowledges as such, the remainder of the Oratio is resolutely focused on the argument for Moses’ antiquity. Moses, so he claims, was “the founder of all barbarian wisdom” (τὸν δὲ πάσης βαρβάρου σοφίας ἀρχηγόν),93 and, since Tatian holds that the Greeks borrowed all their learning from the barbarians, Moses must have functioned as the origin of all of Greek culture as well. After he concludes his argument for Moses’ antiquity, Tatian reafrms his initial education in Greek παιδεία, which was followed by his education in the philosophy that he preaches, and calls for his audience to examine his doctrines (δόγματα).94 But as noted in his account of his conver88. Or. 29.3 (Trelenberg, 162). 89. Or. 31.1 (Trelenberg, 164). 90. The continuity of this theme in Tatian with the tradition of Jewish apologetic is noted by Malingrey, Philosophia, 119; Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 255-257. 91. Droge, Homer or Moses, 91-96. Similarly, Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 254, 259-60, argues against the idea that Tatian’s presentation of this theme is “primitiv,” suggesting instead that that he is the rst author “der den Alterbeweis methodisch anzugehen versucht” by taking Moses and Homer as the “Eckpunkten seiner chronologischen Überlegungen.” 92. Or. 31.2 (Trelenberg, 164). 93. Or. 31.1 (Trelenberg, 164). 94. Or. 42.1 (Trelenberg, 190-92). - 22 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) sion, these two stages of Tatian’s education are not fundamentally at odds with one another since his conversion to Christianity was not strictly speaking something new but instead represented “what [he] had received but had been prevented from keeping by [Greek] error.” In other words, Tatian’s conversion did not require a wholesale repudiation what he had learned from Greek παιδεία, but instead placed all of that learning upon its proper foundation by going back to its true source. Hence, from the outset of his treatise to the conclusion, the philosophical notion of an ancient wisdom that must be sought out and adhered to undergirds Tatian’s entire argument. Apart from this presupposition, his attack on Greek culture loses much of its force and his demonstration of Moses’ antiquity is largely pointless. In fact, if we were to ask what it would look like for a second-century Christian author to write a treatise on this theme from his distinctly Christian perspective, I’m not sure we could come up with something better than what Tatian has offered us in this work. To be clear, the goal of the Oratio is not to argue for the existence of an ancient wisdom. Tatian seemingly assumes that both he and his hearers are already committed to the existence of such, and so it is within this framework that he seeks to demolish his opponents’ culture and promote his own understanding of truth. B. Tatian, the Demons, and Greek Paideia The way in which the second half of Tatian’s argument rests upon the premise of an ancient wisdom is clear enough, but the rst half would benet from a fuller explication since I have left out a key component of his account of the transmission of this ancient wisdom, namely, the means by which the Greeks have “imitated” barbarian wisdom. In fact, his explanation of this point represents one of the most distinctive aspects of the Christian adaptation of the Middle Platonic theme I have been tracing, and highlights one of the most signicant parallels between his scheme and that of Celsus. Tatian does not merely think that the Greeks borrowed directly from Moses and the prophets. Although his model would certainly allow for this, his primary emphasis is on a more metaphysical explanation. He implies that it was fallen angels, or daemons, who passed on to the Greeks a corrupted version of this ancient wisdom.95 In Or. 7, in the middle of his denunciation of Greek culture, Tatian gives a summary of his 95. On Tatian’s demonology, see especially Aimé Puech, Recherches sur le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien, suivies d’une traduction française du Discours avec notes (Paris: F. Alcan, 1903), 72-75; Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century, 133-136; Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos, 45-49. - 23 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) doctrine of creation and the subsequent fall of some of the angels, as a result of which they became “daemons.” As a consequence of this fall, these daemons turned their attention to humanity such that “humans became the subject of the daemons’ apostasy” (Ὑπόθεσις δὲ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστασίας οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται).96 In a striking move, Tatian directly identied the traditional Greek pantheon as this army of fallen angels, with Zeus, or Satan, as their leader (Or. 8.2). This malevolent band of beings led humanity astray and plunged them into vice, all in an attempt to make themselves look like gods. Tatian specied two ways in which the daemons accomplished this malevolent rule over humanity: the idea of astrological fate and the practice of medicine or sorcery.97 In the rst instance, the daemons pretended to make the “irrational ordering of life on earth” appear “rational by the arrangements of the stars,”98 as a pale imitation of the original “ordering” that God himself had carried out in the act of creation (Or. 5). Tatian goes on at length pointing out the absurdity of this notion of astrological fate invented by these daemons (Or. 9-11). Another domain wherein the daemons pretend to exercise authority is in medicine or sorcery. Tatian devotes any unexpectedly lengthy portion of his address to this topic (Or. 16-18), claiming that “pharmacy” (φαρμακεία) in all its forms is an “invention” (ἐπιτέχνησις) of the daemons.99 Notably here he uses the term φαρμακεία which could apply either to witchcraft and sorcery or to medicinal treatments, and Tatian seems to make no distinction between these two categories. He suggests that the daemons themselves are the ones who are responsible for causing diseases among humans, and that they do so in order that they can then bring healing and so be proclaimed as divine. The way they accomplish this is by concocting various kinds of medicine and then “producing effects in the areas where they have determined that each of these should be individually potent.”100 Thus, in Tatian’s view, both astrological fate and φαρμακεία are “hostile devices of deceiving daemons” (παραφόρων δαιμόνων ... 96. Or. 8.1 (Trelenberg, 102). 97. These are two of the three examples of forbidden knowledge communicated by the Watchers to humanity in 1 Enoch 7-8, which must have served as Tatian’s source, whether directly or mediated by Justin. See Richard Bauckham, “The Fall of the Angels as the Source of Philosophy in Hermias and Clement of Alexandria,” Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985): 314-15, 319-20. 98. Or. 9.1 (Trelenberg, 108). τὴν ἄλογον ἐπὶ γῆς πολιτείαν εὔλογον διὰ τῆς ἀστροθεσίας ἀποδείξωσιν. 99. Or. 18.1 (Trelenberg, 132). 100. Or. 17.4. - 24 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) ἀντισοφιστεύματα).101 It is true that Tatian stops short of a straightforward assertion that the Greeks learned all their τέχναι or παιδεία from daemonic sources, but only a decade or two later Clement of Alexandria makes this point explicitly, based on the same Enochic tradition upon which Tatian drew.102 Hence, his discussions of fate and φαρμακεία are probably meant to be representative of the rest of the technical arts as well. Assuming this is what Tatian wants to communicate, then in the overall development of his argument, the deceiving daemons perform for him the same role played by the sorcerers Moses and Jesus in Celsus’ diatribe against the Christians. Both authors felt the need to provide some account of the source of their opponents’ corruption by positing a perdious founder of their cultural tradition who took the ancient truth and twisted it in order to deceive the gullible. The fact that the daemons performed this function in Tatian’s account of the ancient wisdom theme also helps to account for why he launches into a lengthy discussion of demonology in the midst of his attack upon Greek culture. Clearly he regarded the two issues as intrinsically linked, which again suggests that there is more structural coherence to the Oratio than might rst be apparent. Moreover, the requirements of Tatian’s notion of ancient wisdom also help to explain why he takes the somewhat surprising position of arguing strenuously for the real existence of the traditional Greek pantheon and opposes their allegorical interpretation (Or. 21.5).103 He needed some sort of way to account for the corruptness of Hellenism, just as Celsus did for the Christians, and the classical Greek deities, transformed into Jewish-Christian daemons, provided a ready made solution.104 Given the centrality of the Greek pantheon to Hellenistic cultural identity, Tatian’s identication of them with the fallen angels, or daemons, of the Jewish-Christian tradition cuts to the heart of Hellenistic claims to cultural supremacy.105 Most of the features of Tatian’s account of demonology 101. Or. 12.10 (Trelenberg, 118). 102. Clement of Alexandria, ec. proph. 53.4 (O. Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus III, GCS 17 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1909), 152): ἤδη δὲ καὶ Ἐνώχ φησιν τοὺς παραβάντας ἀγγέλους διδάξαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀστρονομίαν καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας; discussed in Bauckham, “The Fall of the Angels,” 320. 103. Cf. Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos, 47. 104. Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos, 47, comes to a similar conclusion though he does not focus on the notion of an ancient wisdom: “Seinen schärfsten Angriff auf das Heidentum kann Tatian, dies hat er genau gesehen, nur unter der Prämisse der realen Existenz der mythischen Götterwelt platzieren.” 105. Cf. Trelenberg, Oratio ad Graecos, 47: “Die Dämonisierung der griechischen Götterwelt ist ein zentrales - 25 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) that I have just summarized can already be found in Justin (cf. 1 apol. 54.1-7; 2 apol. 5.2-5), who was himself likely drawing upon Enochic literature.106 What sets Tatian apart is the vehemence of his rhetoric, which demonstrates how effectively the idea of an ancient wisdom could be used as a means of undermining one’s opponents’ claim to cultural and intellectual superiority.107 C. Tatian, the “Barbarian” Philosopher The nal way in which Tatian develops Justin’s understanding of an ancient wisdom is his valorization of “barbarian” identity. Indeed, this is one of the most striking differences between the teacher and student. In an insightful but largely overlooked chapter for a festschrift, J. H. Waszink pointed out that among Christian sources the “positive conception of a ‘Wisdom of the Barbarians’ ... occurs explicitly for the rst time in Tatian’s Oration.”108 The Apology of Aristides, likely predating Justin and Tatian, acknowledged that the barbarians have philosophers among them, but says nothing positive about the barbarian nations, instead simply condemning them for their worship of images (Apol. Aristides 3).109 Justin’s usage of the label βάρβαρος is slightly different.110 On one occasion he explicitly identies the Jewish patriarchs as barbarians (1 apol. 46.3), and in three other passages he uses it simply as a contrast with “the Greeks” (1 apol. 5.4; 7.3; dial. 117.5).111 Most important is a passage in the Dialogue with Trypho where he states unequivocally, “we are not a contemptible people, nor a barbarian race, nor are we like the Carian and Phrygian nations” (οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος δῆμός ἐσμεν οὐδὲ βάρβαρον φῦλον οὐδὲ ὁποῖα Καρῶν ἢ Φρυγῶν ἔθνη).112 Thus, despite his insistence on the Motiv der Apologie, sie gehört zu den Grundelementen der Taktik der Diffamierung.” 106. See the summary of Justin’s demonology as it relates to this theme in Bauckham, “The Fall of the Angels,” 319; Droge, Homer or Moses, 54-59. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “The Book of Enoch: Its Reception in Second Temple Jewish and in Christian Tradition,” Early Christianity 1 (2013): 18, considers the possibility that Justin drew upon 1 Enoch, but suggests that he might equally have been relying on Jubilees. 107. Cf. Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 253, who notes that “Auch ihm [i.e., Justin] ist Polemik nicht fremd; was ihm im Vergleich zu Tatian fehlt, ist der aggressive Ton der Polemik.” 108. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 51. On this theme, see also Dörrie, “Die Wertung der Barbaren.” 109. Cf. Malingrey, Philosophia, 112. 110. Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 48-49. 111. Cf. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 65-66. 112. dial. 119.4 (P. Bobichon, Justin Martyr, Dialogue avec le Tryphon: Edition critique (Fribourg: Academic Press - 26 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) antiquity of Moses, Justin seemed to dislike the label “barbarian,” presumably because of the negative connotations the term carried among those educated in Greek παιδεία. In stark contrast to Justin, Tatian positively owns the label βάρβαρος and makes it central to his entire project. The word occurs thirteen times in the Oratio, always with a positive connotation, at least from his perspective. In the rst rst line of his discourse, cited earlier, he exhorts his audience not to despise τοὺς βαρβάρους, and in the second sentence he declares that all Greek “practices” came from the barbarians.113 Later on he points out that the Greeks should not be so arrogant as to refuse instruction from “those who follow a barbarian codes of law” (μὴ ἀναξιοπαθήσητε παρὰ τοῖς βαρβαρικῇ νομοθεσίᾳ παρακολουθοῦσι παιδεύεσθαι), which are presumably the same texts he has in mind when he later refers to the “barbarian writings” (γραφαῖς ... βαρβαρικαῖς) that led to his conversion.114 Acknowledging that some would use the label to refer to Christians, Tatian tells his hearers, “as for you Greeks what can I say except that you should not abuse your betters, nor, even if they are called barbarians, take this as an occasion for mockery.”115 Tatian’s own identication as a βάρβαρος becomes increasingly clearer in the second half of the Oratio. He declares that he has “said farewell” to Rome and Athens, and has instead “laid claim to the philosophy you call barbarian” (τῆς καθ’ ὑμᾶς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας ἀντεποιησάμην),116 and he imagines his hearers objecting that he is “innovating with new barbarian doctrines” (καινοτομεῖ τὰ βαρβάρων δόγματα).117 Tatian, however, saves to the very end the explicit declaration of his origin. As he concludes his discourse, he nally reveals to his audience his true identity: “Tatian, one who practices philosophy like the barbarians, who was born in the land of the Assyrians” (ὁ κατὰ βαρβάρους φιλοσοφῶν Τατιανὸς ... γεννηθεὶς μὲν ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γῇ).118 That is, Tatian is not mere- Fribourg, 2003), 502). 113. Or. 1.1. 114. Or. 12.10; 29.2 (Trelenberg, 118, 160). 115. Or. 30.3 (Trelenberg, 162). 116. Or. 35.2 (Trelenberg, 178). This passage illustrates the contention of Andrade, Syrian Identity, 263, that “Justin Martyr and Tatian conceived of Roman imperial power and the primacy of Greek classical performance as so mutually constitutive that they often conated them.” 117. Or. 35.2-3 (Trelenberg, 178). 118. Or. 42.1 (Trelenberg, 190). J. L. Lightfoot, Lucian: On the Syrian Goddess (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 534, juxtaposes Tatian’s decision to save his self-identication for the end of the Oratio with the authorial presentation in Lucian of Samosata’s On the Syrian Goddess, wherein the author, in the nal - 27 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) ly a convert to barbarian philosophy. Rather, as a native of the “land of the Assyrian” he himself is presumably a “barbarian,” and as such is uniquely authorized to speak on behalf of the philosophical movement he has joined.119 The fact that this revelation of his identity follows on from his proof of Moses’ antiquity as the “founder of barbarian wisdom” implies that Tatian himself is “the most recent in a long line of ‘barbarian’ sages of the Near East.”120 For a time it was conventional to suppose that the term βάρβαρος for Tatian simply meant “Christian.”121 Martin Elze put forward a different interpretation, namely that the term meant “uncultured” in contrast to the οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι (Or. 25.5) whom he was addressing.122 However, Waszink argued persuasively that this is a misreading. Tatian thinks of himself and his community as in possession of their own form of culture, or παιδεία (Or. 35.3), that is superior to that of the Greeks. Instead, as Waszink correctly observed, Tatian means to argue that “Christian doctrine is the newest form of the ‘wisdom of the Barbarians’.”123 In other words, the label βάρβαρος, in Tatian’s argument, carries all the ethnic connotations the word would paragraph, confesses that he as a youth partook of the rituals he has been describing, and that a lock of his hair remains in the temple up to the present time. Malingrey, Philosophia, 120, recognizes that Tatian ends his discourse “par une sorte de provocation qui donne au verbe φιλοσοφεῖν des résonances de triomphe.” 119. There is admittedly slippage here in the argument of Tatian’s Oratio insofar as the label “barbarian” papers over what might otherwise be regarded as important distinctions. Tatian himself was not Jewish (at least there is no reason to suppose he was), but identies himself as coming from “the land of the Assyrians,” and so implicitly as a barbarian. In contrast, the “barbarian writings” that led to his conversion were of course the Jewish scriptures, and the barbarian sage he identies as ὁ πάσης βαρβάρου σοφίας ἀρχηγός was Moses, the lawgiver of the Jews. Yet Tatian studiously avoids the term “Jewish” in the Oratio just as much as the label “Christian” or the name of “Jesus,” tendencies no doubt attributable to his rhetorical strategy. In other words, Tatian rebadges Moses as a “barbarian” rather than a Jew in order to be able to present himself, a fellow “barbarian,” as standing in continuity with his forebear. However, this sleight of hand is perhaps not as deceptive as it might rst appear. In the fourth century BCE, the author Megasthenes said that the Jews are to “Syria” what the Brahmans are to India, in other words “philosophers” (see the fragment of his Indica cited in Clement, str. 1.72.4, on which see Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic Period, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1981), 1.257; Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 62). Since the designation of a region called “Syria” overlapped with the ancient “land of the Assyrians,” it is a short step to regard Moses as a barbarian sage from “Assyria.” Josephus, however, clearly distinguished “Assyrians” from “Syrians” in AJ 1.143-147, on which see Nathanael Andrade, “Assyrians, Syrians and the Greek Language in the Late Hellenistic and Roman Imperial Periods,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 73 (2014): 304. 120. So Andrade, “Assyrians, Syrians and the Greek Language,” 313. 121. Cf. Malingrey, Philosophia, 120. 122. Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie, 25. 123. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 50-51. - 28 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) normally bear and is not simply synonymous with “Christian.” The recent work of Nathanael Andrade supports this view and extends it. He points out that in the rst and second centuries one did not have to live beyond the boundaries of the Roman Empire to call oneself an “Assyrian,” and so the common view that Tatian originated from the Persian side of the eastern border needs to be abandoned. However, Andrade has perceptively demonstrated that in the late Hellenistic and Roman imperial periods by calling themselves “Assyrian,” “Greek-writing Syrians framed themselves as a certain type of Assyrian. They were socially distinct from other Assyrians, but they still shared a heritage as either descendants or heirs of an ancient Assyrian people.”124 In other words, Tatian’s revelation of his identity at the climactic conclusion of the Oratio is not just a geographical statement, but is instead a claim to continuity with the ancient “Assyrian” ἐθνός, in distinction to the ethnic and cultural heritages represented by Greece and Rome. Whatever misgivings Justin must have had over the term βάρβαρος, Tatian apparently did not share them. In fact, I suggest that Tatian’s valorization of his “barbarian” identity is a genuine novum in the history of Christian theology, and, indeed, in the history of post-Hellenistic philosophy. Philo’s acknowledgement that the barbarians had philosophers among their number falls short of the sort of self-identication and self-presentation as a “barbarian” philosopher that one nds in Tatian. Tatian’s contemporary Melito of Sardis forms a useful point of contrast. Addressing Marcus Aurelius in his lost Apology, Melito acknowledged that “our philosophy formerly bloomed among the barbarians,” but then quickly qualied this admission by pointing out that it “owered among the nations under you, during the great rule of your ancestor Augustus.”125 Melito’s mention of “barbarians” here is surely a euphemism for Judaism, and in this respect he resembles Tatian’s usage of the term.126 However, he is careful to identify himself not with the “barbarians” among whom this movement began, but instead with the respectable peoples now ruled by the descendants of Augustus, the Romans 124. Andrade, “Assyrians, Syrians and the Greek Language,” 300. See especially his analysis on pp.302-05 of the different connotations carried by the terms “Assyrian” and “Syrian” in the early imperial period, and his discussion of Tatian on pp.311-16. 125. Melito, apud Eusebius, HE 4.26.7 (Gustave Bardy, Eusèbe de Césarée. Histoire ecclésiastique, Livres I-IV, SC 31 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951)): ἡ γὰρ καθ’ ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία πρότερον μὲν ἐν βαρβάροις ἤκμασεν, ἐπανθήσασα δὲ τοῖς σοῖς ἔθνεσιν κατὰ τὴν Αὐγούστου τοῦ σοῦ προγόνου μεγάλην ἀρχήν. 126. Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 49, who recognizes that, in contrast to Melito, “the term has a wider meaning in the Oration of Tatian.” - 29 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) from whom he is seeking to win tolerance.127 Writing around the same time as Melito, Tatian in contrast presents himself as standing in unbroken continuity with the “barbarian” origins of Christianity. To be sure, the theoretical presuppositions for such a claim were already laid in Numenius, who believed that the barbarians were in possession of various δόγματα. Recall that even Celsus included the Assyrians in his list of ancient nations who had preserved humanity’s primitive wisdom. Yet a yawning chasm remained between conceding the existence of nonGreek wisdom, and claiming to speak as a representative of some such tradition over and against Hellenistic παιδεία. Numenius, despite being from Apamea in Syria, never in the surviving fragments claims to be “barbarian” and he likely would have agreed with Celsus that it took Greek philosophers like Pythagoras and Plato to sort through the wheat and the chaff of barbarian ideas so as to discern the truth and systematize it into proper philosophy. Tatian, in contrast, leaves no role for the Greeks and their philosophy. As a contemporary representative of barbarian philosophy, he himself is fully equipped to discern the truth and instruct others in it. This was a strikingly bold and original position for an intellectual in the second century to take, and it likely resulted from the marginalized status of Tatian and his community, especially following Justin’s martyrdom. An instructive analogy here can be drawn with the history of the appellation Χριστιανός. Although it likely originated as an outsider term, used by Romans in hostile encounters with followers of Jesus, the word eventually came to be used by those within the movement as a badge of pride, a sociological phenomenon evident in analogous cases of marginalized groups up to the present day.128 A parallel trajectory is evident in Tatian’s Oratio. While it is clear that his unnamed opponents are attacking him for his adherence to “barbarian” philosophy (Or. 35.2-3), he, rather than shunning the label, by the end of the discourse positively owns it (Or. 42.1).129 No doubt this stance partly derives from the fact that 127. See also the fragment in Eusebius, HE 4.26.6 in which Melito implicitly expresses disdain for the barbarians when he asserts that not even “barbarians enemies” are worthy of being treated in the way the Christians in Asia are being persecuted as a result of the imperial decree. This statement suggests that he shared his opponents’ negative assessment of barbarian identity and was far from embracing it as did Tatian. Pace Malingrey, Philosophia, 120, who supposes that Melito uses the term “en toute objectivité” in contrast to the “nuance de mépris” evident in its usage by Greeks and Romans. 128. See especially David G. Horrell, “The Label Χριστιανός: 1 Peter 4:16 and the Formation of Christian Identity,” Journal of Biblical Literature 126 (2007): 361-381. 129. The fact that the label originally came from opponents of Christianity, but was later adopted by the movement, was previously recognized by Malingrey, Philosophia, 120; Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 57. - 30 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) Tatian, if we take him at his word, was indeed from barbarian stock. However, it also likely reects the changed situation from the time when Justin’s school was in operation. Justin hoped, and maybe even expected, to be treated fairly and respected as a philosopher, and so minimized the distance between his movement and his intellectual milieu. In contrast, Tatian seems to have given up hope of such a positive appraisal, perhaps due to the outcome of Justin’s attempt, and so recognized that the only stance left was one of bold opposition. Tatian’s novelty in this respect might have set a precedent for later Christian authors. Following Waszink, I mention here just Clement of Alexandria, whose usage of the term βάρβαρος is much closer to Tatian’s usage than that of Justin.130 Clement refers frequently to the “barbarian philosophy” on behalf of which he advocates,131 and at one point even uses the phrase “we who are barbarians” (παρ’ ἡμῖν ... τοῖς βαρβάροις).132 Nevertheless, I suggest there is still a difference between Clement’s self-presentation and that of Tatian, since Tatian justies his claim to the title βάρβαρος on the basis of his origin in the “land of the Assyrians.” Clement never makes such an assertion, presumably because he had no grounds for doing so, implying that he speaks on behalf of a barbarian identity that he has adopted in addition to his native Hellenism. As a result, Clement’s usage of the term lacks the overt ethnic claim present in Tatian’s Oratio. It might even be the case that Tatian is completely unique among both Christian and post-Hellenistic philosophical sources in his explicit identication as an Assyrian, or rather barbarian, philosopher who stands ready to instruct the Greeks about their errors. IV. Celsus’ Hellenistic Universalism versus Tatian’s Exclusive Barbarianism In the nal section of this paper I want to take the argument one step further to consider the political or social implications of the views that Celsus and Tatian present regarding an ancient wisdom. In an insightful study, Michael Frede has pointedly asked the question of 130. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 53-56. Similarly, Daniel Ridings, The Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in Some Early Christian Writers, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 59 (Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995), 232-233, suggests that Clement drew directly on Tatian with respect to this theme. Cf. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 70-71. 131. Clement of Alexandria, str. 5.8.51.1. 132. Clement of Alexandria, str. 6.17.151.2 (O. Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus II (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1906), 509). Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” 53. - 31 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) why, if Celsus was a Platonist, did he so vociferously attack Christianity, which in many respects is so similar to Platonism?133 After listing several specic doctrinal points, such as the incarnation and the resurrection, which clearly separated proto-orthodox Christianity from Platonism, Frede comes to what he takes to be the major stumbling block. Celsus’ Hellenism, intrinsic to which is his understanding of the “ancient wisdom,” is particularly suited to the political situation of the second-century Roman Empire, while Christians, in his view, arrogantly claim that they alone are correct (cf. Cels. 5.41). He is willing to afrm that the one highest God can be known under many names and that many nations preserve philosophical δόγματα among them. As a result, for Celsus “it is also a part of Hellenicity to respect that different nations of the Empire have their own traditional ways of revering this God and of respecting his order.”134 Indeed, this is no mere implicit point for Celsus, but is something he comments on explicitly, and this “attempt to provide some kind of philosophical justication for the existing political order”135 is a distinctive feature of his treatise against the Christians. In brief, Celsus’ theology is particularly well suited to his politics. He holds that by worshipping Helios or Athena, or any of the other lesser divine beings, one is in fact “worshipping the great God,” since “the worship of God becomes more perfect by going through them all.”136 Similarly, Celsus expresses a hope that all the inhabitants of “Asia, Europe, and Libya, both Greeks and barbarians” could be “united under one law.”137 The connection between these two intellectual spheres is explicit. In Celsus’ view “the rulers and emperors among men ... [do not] hold their position without the might of the daemons,” with the result that to refuse to engage in the emperor’s cult is to provoke daemonic retribution.138 Moreover, Celsus fears that if Christianity were to succeed in its ambitions of converting the entire Empire, the existing social order would be completely overturned as “earthly things came into the power of the most 133. Michael Frede, “Celsus’ Attack on the Christians,” in Philosophia Togata II. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. J. Barnes and M. Grifn, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 227-228. 134. Frede, “Celsus’ Attack on the Christians,” 237. Cf. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy, 45-46. 135. Frede, “Celsus philosophus Platonicus,” 5201. 136. Cels. 8.66 (SC 150.326). Cf. Cels. 5.41 where he states that it makes no difference what name one uses to refer to Zeus. 137. Cels. 8.72 (SC 150.340). 138. Cels. 8.63 (SC 150.318). - 32 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) lawless and savage barbarians.”139 Celsus therefore, in the nal fragment Origen preserves of his treatise, calls on the Christians to “accept public ofce in our country if it is necessary to do this for the sake of the preservation of the laws and of piety.”140 In light of these passages, Frede is surely correct in discerning that Celsus regarded Christianity as “a threat to Hellenism in an obvious way,” and that for this reason “Christianity was also perceived as threatening the Empire.”141 He does not consider whether Celsus was responding to a particular opponent, and it would be hazardous to claim without further argument that Tatian was the target of his attack. However, Tatian does at least throw into the sharpest relief the sort of concern that Celsus had, since Tatian not only rejected Hellenism but in its place advocated for an exclusive barbariansim. Although Tatian himself never draws out the political implications of his self-presentation as a barbarian philosopher, it is not hard to see what they might be. His valorization of barbarian identity and lineage might easily translate into a political program that sought to resist the Roman imperium, the sort of usurpation that actually did occur in the following century with the Palmyrene uprising under Zenobia.142 Hence, although Celsus may not have been responding directly to Tatian, the latter’s Oratio rep- 139. Cels. 8.68 (SC 150.330). 140. Cels. 8.75 (SC 150.350). It is therefore not correct to say that “Celsus was interested not in excluding Jews or Christians from society but only in stressing that they were not intellectually respectable” (Feldman, “Origen’s Contra Celsum and Josephus’ Contra Apionem,” 113). On the contrary, Celsus is deeply concerned about the social consequences of Christianity and suggests that if Christians do not conform, they deserve to be punished and excluded. 141. Frede, “Celsus’ Attack on the Christians,” 237-238. On the challenge to imperial power represented by the apologists, see Elaine Pagels, “Christian Apologists and the Fall of the Angels: An Attack on Roman Imperial Power,” Harvard Theological Review 78 (1985): 301-325: “Had Marcus Aurelius and his colleagues bothered to read such impassioned diatribes, they might well have perceived at once the Christians’ essentially subversive message. While claiming to be exemplary citizens, Justin and his fellows attack the whole basis of Roman imperial power, denouncing its divine patrons as demons, and its rulers—even those most distinguished for their wise and tolerant reigns—as unwitting agents of demonic tyranny” (p.312). 142. See the suggestive interpretation of this event in Andrade, Syrian Identity, 313, 334-39, who argues that the presentation of Syrian identity in a number of rst and second-century authors, such as Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, “set important paradigms for how Zenobia and her court intellectuals could place Palmyra and Syria at the center of legitimate Greekness, alongside authentic Romanness. According to this logic, the Greeks of Syria did not imitate or deviate from the paradigms of ancient Greece. Instead, Greekness had originated in the Near East.” The parallels with Tatian’s reclamation of the label βάρβαρος are clear. See also the insightful analysis of the way in which Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess deconstructs the accepted categories of the second sophistic on pp.288-313. Tatian, I would suggest, accomplishes something similar, though in a much more overt fashion than Lucian. Andrade himself acknowledges the parallel between Lucian and Tatian on Syrian identity (p.264), but does not explore it extensively (cf. pp.272-73, 284-86). - 33 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) resents the most extreme version of the political threat that the Platonist perceived in the upstart religion of Christianity. V. Conclusion I began this chapter by posing the question of whether Tatian’s Oratio was a riposte directed against Celsus’ True Account, or whether the direction of inuence might have gone the other way. Although this investigation has not turned up sufcient evidence to claim that either author was responding directly to the other (future studies might however), I suggest that the signicant degree of overlap in their respective arguments at least indicates that they were a part of the same conversation amongst Christians and pagans in the late second century.143 Both authors assume that the cultural location, or more precisely the cultural genealogy of an idea has a direct bearing upon its claim to intellectual respectability. In fact, they suggest that consideration of that issue may be the most important factor in assessing a claim to wisdom or truth, with the result that they are both necessarily committed by their respective intellectual projects to engage in attempts at narrating history and locating oneself in it. Far from being a disembodied, ahistorical exercise, the philosophical programs espoused by both Celsus and Tatian have at their core the investigation of intellectual history. In other words, although Celsus and Tatian no doubt regarded philosophical knowledge as timelessly true, they also agreed that that knowledge was historically mediated, with the result that the process for discerning it was also inescapably historical. The centrality of the historical task is also evident in the fundamental role it plays in the polemical attempts of each author to discredit his opponent by locating him in the intellectual history each narrated. For Celsus, Christianity should be dismissed out of hand because it was started by the charlatan Jesus who used deceptive means to convince his followers that he was divine, as Moses had done to the Jews before, and then misunderstood or deliberately corrupted the truth to be found in ancient wisdom to mislead his followers. Tatian’s presentation of the history of Greek culture is precisely the same in formal terms. It began when the fallen angels, who had become demons, convinced the Greeks that they were in fact divine by engaging in a few cheap imitations of the one true God, with the result that Hellenistic παιδεία is rotten to the core. Whatever wisdom is to be found in it consists simply of 143. Similarly, Eshleman, The Social World of Intellectuals, 199, suggests that Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexandria were not directly responding to one another, but were “participating in the same cultural debate” over the sources of Greek culture, and particularly philosophy. - 34 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) the distorted shards of truth the demons had stolen and used for their own purposes. In this respect, the preceding analysis of Celsus and Tatian suggests that at the heart of their debate was not simply the widespread cultural form of the “Altersbeweis” that was succinctly expressed by Peter Pilhofer’s four points: 1) “Was alt ist, ist gut”; 2) “Was älter ist, ist besser”; 3) “Was neu ist, ist schlecht”; and 4) “Was neuer ist, ist schlechter.”144 According to this line of reasoning, if Moses is older than Homer, he is superior to the later upstart, a point that Tatian explicitly emphasizes. Yet the picture is more complicated than this insofar as the struggle between the likes of Celsus and Tatian was not simply over antiquity but also the role that should be accorded to Greek civilization over and against that of the barbarians in competing accounts of intellectual history. Yes, in one sense Celsus thinks that “what is older is better,” yet he also holds that what is old is not always guaranteed to be true, and that the ancient δόγματα scattered amongst the nations still fall short of proper philosophy. The Greeks, as Celsus concedes, in fact were not one of the most ancient nations and, due to natural disasters, had few written records of ancient events, but they were nevertheless the ones who played the singular role of reconstructing and systematizing the scattered fragments of ancient wisdom into a coherent body of knowledge. In this way, Celsus’ conception of the philosophical task only grants a degree of respect to ancient non-Greek nations and maintains the superiority of specically Greek intellectual life, especially Plato, despite the relatively speaking late emergence of philosophy. In contrast, Celsus’ pride in his Hellenized intellectual history is matched by Tatian’s bold self-presentation as an “Assyrian” practicing ancient “barbarian philosophy.” Indeed, Tatian likely formed his understanding of philosophical history in direct response to the sort of pride in Hellenism represented by Celsus, and he did so by exploiting a previously unnoticed weakness in the historical scheme to which Celsus and others like him were committed. If the barbarians were in possession of philosophical δόγματα why did they need the Greeks at all? What if all the Greeks had done was to pervert and distort the authentic wisdom that they arrogated to themselves from non-Greek cultures, under the likely inuence of malevolent spiritual beings? Hence, the conception of philosophical history represented by a thinker like Numenius had prepared the way for someone to claim to be a contemporary instantiation of an ancient “barbarian philosophy,” but no one prior to Tatian, so far as we know, had been bold enough to take that option, and he was likely goaded into doing so by 144. Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton, 8-9. - 35 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) the taunts of his detractors. Yet Tatian’s claim to intellectual authority, the reason he expects his readers should listen to him, is actually more nuanced and subtle than a mere identication as “barbarian.” Rather, Tatian’s narrative of his own history is just as crucial. His authority is construed as a three-legged stool. First, he himself is non-Greek in terms of his own personal origins. Second, he went through the same experience of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία that his hearers had undergone. Finally, he converted to Christianity, the “barbarian philosophy” he now claims to speak on behalf of.145 Each of these stages serves to authenticate his message to his Greek hearers. It was his training in Greek παιδεία that enabled him to reject it not simply out of ignorance, but as one who knew it from the inside, and it was his barbarian origins that presumably made him adept at recognizing the insufciency of the education he received in that παιδεία and the wisdom to be found in non-Greek sources. Tatian therefore speaks as someone who began as an outsider, became an insider, and then rejected it in order once more to become an outsider, though, as I emphasized earlier, this rejection is not an utter denial, since he describes his new philosophy as something that he had already known, at least in part. This element of personal history that is intrinsic to Tatian’s Oratio nds no analogue in Celsus’ scheme and the degree of importance granted to such personal histories among Christian thinkers may be one of the more distinctive features of the emergence of the Christian intellectual in the second century. Yet Tatian’s stance vis-à-vis Hellenism and his self-presentation as a barbarian philosopher had their limitations. For one, only those who were, like him, from barbarian lands could make the same claim to authority. Not everyone could assert that their conversion to Christianity, the “barbarian philosophy,” was a return to their non-Hellenized roots. Moreover, Tatian’s overt rejection of Hellenistic παιδεία would, if followed through, have resulted in a Christianity that was completely at odds with the prevailing culture of the Roman Empire. It would, in other words, have consigned Christians to a permanent ‘outsider’ status, since such a deant stance was in fact intrinsic to Tatian’s own conversion and his call for his hearers to do like- 145. Cf. Andrade, “Assyrians, Syrians and the Greek Language,” 313: “When Tatian reveals his Assyrian origins at the end of his text, it thereby authenticates his discourse on Greek and ‘barbarian’ wisdom that preceded it. But his Assyrian origins work in tandem with two other components that substantiate his credibility: his mastery of Greek learning (paideia) and his conversion to a ‘barbarian’ philosophy with which his Greek education was in many respects at odds. Together, these elements dene Tatian as the most recent in a long line of ‘barbarian’ sages of the Near East qualied to assess philosophy’s cosmic genealogy and to recognize its most sublime and pedestrian moments.” - 36 - The Emergence of the Christian Intellectual, ACU Seminar in Rome (27-29 July 2016) wise. For these reasons, Tatian represents a particular moment in early Christian intellectual history, one that would pass, but would also be taken up and transformed. At the risk of overschematization, if Tatian is the antithesis to Justin’s openness to Greek philosophy and hesitancy over the label “barbarian,” a new synthesis would be forged in Clement of Alexandria, who acknowledged the “barbarian” origins of his philosophical school and continued to describe it in those terms, even while taking a more constructive approach by seeking to appropriate the best of the wisdom of the Greeks, rather than simply denouncing Hellenistic παιδεία. - 37 -