CH A P T E R EIGH T The Rise of Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt St é p h a n e L ac roi x a n d A h m e d Z ag h l ou l S h a l ata In Egypt, like in the other countries affected by the Arab Spring, Islamists were not in the vanguard of the revolution. It took the Muslim Brotherhood and its disciples only a few days to join the movement, whereas it took considerably longer for most Salafis to throw their sup- port behind the protests. It was only on February 8, 2011 that the Salafi Call in Alexandria (al-da‘wa al-salafiyya), the largest “mass” Salafi orga- nization, officially authorized members to join the events in Tahrir Square. Once Mubarak was overthrown, on February 11, the Islamists again left the square. Beginning in April 2011, when the demonstra- tions resumed with some strength, the leftist young people and those with no particular ideological affiliation were again at the forefront, this time targeting the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). As a result, it came as a bit of a surprise when Islamists were increas- ingly seen at anti-SCAF rallies beginning in the latter half of 2011. This was particularly true since they did not belong to either of the major organizations of the Islamist nebula, the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafi Call, both of which chose to cooperate as compliantly as possible with the transition under military supervision. Although the newly emerging movement was not yet formally organized, its mem- bers already revealed a number of common traits. They openly claimed to be revolutionary and contended that the revolution could not accept 164 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata the presence of generals appointed or knighted under the former regime in positions of power. They advocated street protests and were wary of the institutional political game and of those who participated in it, including Islamists. They also claimed affiliation to Salafism, but they advocated an uncompromising version of it that was prepared to enforce “sharia here and now.” A single expression, Revolutionary Salafism, suffices to describe this movement, a new phenomenon on the Egyptian Islamic political scene.1 Since emerging onto the Egyptian political stage, revolutionary Salafism has become a major player. The purpose of this chapter is to explain this increased prominence by demonstrating the ways in which revolutionary Salafis have benefited from mobilizing networks and expertise that existed prior to the uprising. These political resources have been able to converge around the movement’s charismatic leader, Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail. We will also demonstrate how this movement has developed a broadly appealing discourse that emphasizes the two fashionable values of post-Mubarak Egypt: revolution and sha- ria. Finally, we will show how the movement’s rise has been aided by a political context in which established Islamist parties lost considerable credit when they were part of the institutional political game. Although revolutionary Salafism has been the target of ruthless repression, along with the majority of the country’s Islamists, it remains a significant force of mobilization. For that reason, this chapter will conclude with a few general remarks concerning the role of revolutionary Salafis in the protests since July 3, 2013. An Antiestablishment Salafism Although the term has only become fully relevant since the January 25 revolution, revolutionary Salafism did not develop in a vacuum. Indeed, in the prerevolutionary period, a number of groups that claimed adherence to Salafism rejected the cautious quietism advo- cated by the Alexandrian “Salafi Call” (al-da‘wa al-salafiyya), the largest and best organized Salafi organization in the country. Ideologically, many of these groups could be described as Salafi-Qutbi, since they combined references to both the Salafi tradition and the political writ- ings of Sayyid Qutb, the ultimate revolutionary of Egyptian Islamism. In terms of intellectual affiliation, some were inf luenced by a little- known but highly inf luential figure of Egyptian Islamism in the 1970s, Sheikh Rifa‘i Surur, who died in 2011.2 Others were students of more  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 165 contemporary sheikhs, including Mohammed Abdel Maqsud, Nash’at Ahmad, and Fawzi al-Said, all based in Cairo. These sheikhs were known during the Mubarak era to openly accuse the regime of impiety (kufr), while also distinguishing themselves from the jihadis by not advocating armed struggle. This had resulted in strong pressure from the police that led to arrests or house arrests as well as bans on preaching. Some of their followers had begun early on to organize themselves, however. The Salafi Front (al-gabha al-salafi- yya), which rose to prominence after the revolution, was clandestinely formed in Mansura around personalities such as Khaled Said.3 In Cairo, the Coalition to Support New Muslims (i’tilaf da‘m al-muslimin al-gudud ), run by students of Rifa‘i Surur, made speeches that were openly critical of the regime,4 while contending that they were concentrating most of their activities on defending Copts who had converted to Islam and were said to be harassed by their former religious community. Even before the revolution, this current of political Islam thus pos- sessed activist networks and expertise. As early as 2010, the organiz- ers of the Coalition to Support New Muslims were among the first Salafis to call for street demonstrations, notably in defense of Camilia Shehata, a Christian said to have converted to Islam and to be held by the Church against her will. Nevertheless, this current’s weakness was the dispersed nature of its membership, which communicated too infrequently due to its geographically scattered situation and police pressure. Revolutionary Salafism became unified and gained in visibil- ity in the aftermath of the revolution of January 25, 2011 because of the spectacular progress of Sheikh Hazem Abu Ismail, a charismatic leader who managed to unify the various groups and generate the unprec- edented growth of the movement. Born in 1961, Hazem Abu Ismail is a lawyer by training. The son of Salah Abu Ismail, an Azhari sheikh and Muslim Brotherhood personal- ity who represented the group in the Egyptian parliament in the 1970s and 1980s, Hazem himself joined the Brotherhood and was an unsuc- cessful candidate in the general parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2005. He was eventually elected to the Union of Lawyers in 2005 and, during the 2000s, his discourse drew him closer to the Salafi move- ment. By then, he was one of the rising stars of the Salafi wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he eventually left the group (the exact moment of his departure remains unclear—it has been argued that he only formally left after the revolution). He became known as a preacher on Salafi satellite television channels, where he appeared wearing a tunic and a turban. Although his discourse was generally apolitical, he 166 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata allowed himself occasional criticisms of the Mubarak regime, particu- larly during the Israeli attacks on Gaza in the winter of 2008. Despite this public position, he was not harassed by State Security, which sug- gests that he continued to be viewed as a second-tier Islamist figure. When the 2011 revolution began, he was among the first Salafis to demonstrate on Tahrir Square, together with the small groups men- tioned earlier. Most revealingly, in the days after the fall of Mubarak, he distinguished himself as one of the first Islamist leaders to warn the revolutionaries of the risk that the army would take over. On May 24, 2011, he announced his candidacy for the Egyptian presidential elec- tions, before the election date had even been set.5 Revolution and Sharia As a presidential candidate, Hazem Abu Ismail generated considerable publicity for himself and the movement he came to represent. As early as summer 2011, the small Salafi-Qutbi groups that had existed prior to the revolution began to consider him their natural leader, giving added impetus to his campaign. He became the incarnation of revolutionary Salafism, as his discourse focused on the major themes of the move- ment, although minor ideological and strategic differences still existed among the different groups. The first of these themes was the requirement for complete and immediate application of sharia (kamila ghayr manqusa). This demand was repeated like an incantation, although it did not constitute a well-de- fined political platform. The idea of sharia was presented as the obvious solution for all of Egypt’s problems. At most, revolutionary Salafi dis- course revealed concern for working classes, who were assimilated with the “oppressed” that both Islam and the revolution are meant to see tri- umph. Some intellectuals from the revolutionary Salafi movement took this idea to its logical conclusion in October 2012 by founding a small “party of the people” (hizb al-sha‘b). It targeted “laborers and farmers,” using rhetoric that some observers characterized as “Salafo-leftist.”6 The second theme, nationalism, at times Islamic and at others Egyptian, was brandished in defiance of “foreign powers,” particularly the United States and Israel. Hazem Abu Ismail was the only Islamist presidential candidate who openly opposed the Camp David agree- ment that has tied Egypt to Israel since 1979.7 He also paid extensive homage to Osama bin Laden after his death in 2011, praising him as a “Mujahid” in the line of “Abdallah Azzam and Ahmed Yassin.”8  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 167 The third theme was a proclaimed identification with the January 25, 2011 uprising, which he considered to be the beginning of a revolu- tionary process rather than its end. Like the “revolutionary youth,” and unlike most organized political groups, Abu Ismail and his supporters contended that the revolution did not end on February 11, 2011 and that it would need to continue until the nation had completely severed its connections with the former regime.9 This meant that they would have to confront the new executive power, which was the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), denounced as a legacy of the Mubarak era. The revolutionary Salafis were a central feature of pro- tests against the SCAF during two significant events. The first were the Mohammed Mahmoud Street clashes in November 2011, when doz- ens of young people opposing the Supreme Council were shot by the police. The second were the events of Abbasiya Square in April 2012, when approximately ten people were slain in front of SCAF headquar- ters. This anti-SCAF involvement first created a rather positive image for Hazem Abu Ismail and his partisans among secular revolutionary youth.10 For the revolutionary Salafis however, the word feloul (“remnant” of the former regime) would quickly be tied to the entire liberal movement, as if, from their point of view, it was impossible to be an authentic revolutionary without subscribing to a strict understanding of Islam. The Abbasiya events were a turning point, a fact that can best be understood by considering the situation in the spring of 2012. During the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, political polarization between Islamists and non-Islamists had reached a peak and was defined by deep mutual distrust. While they saw themselves as pursuing the revolutionary struggle against the SCAF by protesting in Abbasiya Square, the revolutionary Salafis were left virtually alone in confronting the army, joined only by a small contingent of April 6 activists. There were a number of deaths, and in the minds of revolu- tionary Salafis, there was one obvious conclusion: They were then the only remaining revolutionary forces. From then on, the revolutionary Salafis would target all non-Islamist figures, ranging from Tawfiq ‘Okasha, owner of the al-Faraeen chan- nel, through which he openly expressed nostalgia for the Mubarak era, to Bilal Fadl, a liberal journalist as well as a revolutionary from the outset.11 Within the National Salvation Front (NSF), reconciliation was under way from late 2012 onward between certain personalities linked to the former regime, such as Amr Moussa, and others such as Mohammed al-Baradei, who openly opposed Mubarak. Revolutionary 168 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata Salafis used this as proof that there was no difference between them. To improve their identification with the revolution, the revolution- ary Salafis attempted to appropriate its symbols. An Internet user close to the movement created a webpage “We are all Khaled Said—the Islamic version” to compete with the page “We are all Khaled Said.” The original page, which was more liberal, launched the first calls for the demonstrations of January 25, 2011. The “Islamic” page rapidly became one of the most popular within the revolutionary Salafi cur- rent, with tens of thousands of followers.12 The Birth of a Social Movement The strength of revolutionary Salafism lies in the fact that it was able to become far more than a continuation of the Salafi-Qutbi current that predated the revolution, however. When Abu Ismail became involved, his charisma and his uncompromising positions persuaded many young people to rally to the cause. Some of them came from the Muslim Brotherhood or the mainstream Salafi current, but many had no prior ideological or partisan affiliation. Among them some came from the “ultras,” football club supporters known for radical hostility toward the police. Revolutionary Salafism thus became a social movement, meaning an informal and heterogeneous movement of protest, uniting people connected to each other by a shared identity and a common enemy. The young people rallying to Abu Ismail then adopted a series of labels, corresponding to as many informal groups. Most chose names that referred to their mentor. The most important were Lazem Hazem (“we need Hazem”),13 Awlad Abu Ismail (“the children of Abu Ismail”),14 and Hazemoun (meaning both “the Hazemites” and “the determined”).15 The history of the creation of Hazemoun in September 2011, related by the founder of the group, Al-Miqdad Gamal al-Din, clearly illustrates the dynamics at work: My friend and I needed no more than an hour and a half of [Hazem Abu Ismail’s] conference entitled “Message to the great People of Egypt” to be convinced that this man was going to achieve great things and that God had spared him for Egypt’s sake at this cru- cial point in the country’s history. I left this conference a new man. For the first time, somebody had made me cry by speaking about slums and the situation of women. For the first time, I saw  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 169 someone who had both a vision and a real project. Someone who was sincere and pious, and extremely charismatic. I left feeling I was in a wonderful dream, but I was then struck by harsh reality. My friend said to me, “You know that the Muslim Brotherhood will never support him, and that there is little chance for him to be elected.” I answered, “We will support him and will help him whatever the costs, and if he loses, God will forgive us.” Al-Miqdad Gamal al-Din then explained his vision: Hazem Abu Ismail’s popularity is going to grow, and the masses will rally to his message because it is the truth. Abu Ismail will dif- fer from the traditional Islamist leaders in all his stances, whether on street protests, major crises, on crucial questions such as the constitution, the presidency and even on sharia. This is why this man will become a movement in himself; his partisans will evolve from simple voters to the bearers of a message and of a project. There will soon be a major betrayal by all the Islamist currents. This will lead to a tsunami in political Islam, towards the explo- sion of all entities of the past, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Call. Those who leave will be looking for other groups, representing a new message that is different from anything that exists today . . . This is why we have founded the “Hazemoun” movement. We chose this name, although it might not be the best, to bring “Hazem,” the man, into the spotlight and show that he now has disciples that only receive orders from him. The idea spread, the name became more and more common to signify Hazem’s partisans. With time they began to feel that they were more than just voters or members of a campaign. They were “the determined” reproducing the message and method of “Hazem.” And when Hazem dies, History will say that his message did not die . . . because now there will be Hazemoun.16 Abu Ismail also benefited from the indirect support of the jihadi move- ment. It was not that the jihadis necessarily joined the pro-Abu Ismail groups. In most cases the two currents remained separate. But it was obvious that Abu Ismail was the Egyptian public personality most respected by the jihadis after January 2011. The al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri explained, “[W]e disagree with Sheikh Hazem concern- ing his desire to impose change through secular constitutions that deny God’s authority and his right to legislate.”17 However, he then called on 170 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata Hazem and his supporters “to launch a popular campaign of preaching and incitation to complete the aborted revolution.”18 A Favorable Context This overview gives an idea of the enormous support that built up around Abu Ismail’s candidacy and ultimately surrounding his per- sonality. Even as early as winter 2011, his campaign was one of the most impressive. His candidacy was submitted to the electoral com- mission on March 30, 2012, resulting in a demonstration of thousands of his supporters on the Salah Salem Road leading to the commission.19 His file included over 150,000 signatures gathered by his supporters, a number far superior to those collected by his opponents. Beginning in March, polls were already crediting him with over 20 percent of the votes, and some polls considered that he would lead the first round. Additional evidence of the unique nature of the Abu Ismail phenom- enon was that, despite the fact that he was not backed by any formal party, he seemed to mobilize support more easily than any of his con- tenders. Every occasion to bring crowds into the streets was used. Abu Ismail’s supporters welcomed any opportunity to play street politics against institutional politics, even though their champion was running for the highest office. This sums up the ambiguity of his candidacy. As can be understood from Al-Miqdad Gamal al-Din’s words (quoted above), the presidential race was not seen as an end in itself but as a powerful means of promoting the message of revolutionary Salafism. Beyond Abu Ismail’s charisma, however, there were objective reasons for the extraordinary reception of this message, particularly within the Islamist movement. The developments of the year 2011 and early 2012 had a powerful impact on the two main Islamist groups in the coun- try, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Nour party, the political branch of the Salafi Call. Both Islamist forces had been forced to accept the rules of the game in order to earn a place in the transition under military supervision. For example, they cooperated with the army and withheld criticism of the institutional legacy from the Mubarak era. Upon entering politics in the spring of 2011, the Nour party even gave the impression of entering into significant compromise, expressing full support for the democratic process. The party explained that it would only gradually apply sharia and would not completely forbid alcohol or the wearing of swimsuits by women. It even included women (albeit wearing a niqab) on its list for the parliamentary general elections. All  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 171 of these positions were diametrically opposed to those expressed by the prerevolutionary Salafis. Just like the Brotherhood, the Salafis in the Nour party appeared to have forgotten the goal of establishing an “Islamic state”, or at least to have indefinitely postponed it. The Brotherhood and the Salafis entered parliament in a position of power in January 2012. However, since the executive remained in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, they found them- selves confronted with the wear and tear of power before they actually had a chance to exercise it. Nevertheless, many citizens considered them to be in charge and saw them as partially responsible for the deteriorat- ing socioeconomic and security situation. In contrast with these “soft” Islamists, the intransigence of the revolutionary Salafists hit the mark. Abu Ismail, the “incorruptible,” thus appeared as the only incarnation of the Islamist utopia that all others seemed to have abandoned. This account explains why the major Islamist parties, primarily the Brotherhood and the Nour party, opposed Abu Ismail, as well as why they were preoccupied by the formidable support for his presidential candidacy. This support even reached their bases and leaders. Inside the Brotherhood, discipline prevailed, and those who openly showed sup- port for Abu Ismail were rare. In the Nour party however, the situation was more critical. Party activists were enthusiastic about the charismatic sheikh and some of the most important ulema voiced support for his presidential campaign.20 Among them were Abu Ishaq al Huwayni and the Kuwaiti-Egyptian Sheikh Abdel Rahman Abdel Khaliq, founder of the Kuwaiti Salafi movement. Strictly speaking, neither of these figures belonged to the Salafi Call, but they exercised considerable inf luence over its ranks. When Abu Ismail gathered the necessary signatures for his candidacy, nearly ten Nour party MPs ignored the party line and offered their support.21 For the leaders of the Nour party and of the Salafi Call, the threat was real. Abu Ismail did not accept their authority and was too rebellious and too uncontrollable for them to agree to support him. Persisting in blocking him risked breaking up the party, however. Yasser Borhami, the leading figure of the Call, went so far as to accuse Abu Ismail of being a hidden “Brother,” thus seeking to play on the deep rivalry between Brotherhood and Salafis.22 Nothing seemed to diminish Abu Ismail’s popularity within the Salafi ranks, however. A spectacular turn of events occurred at that point, such as Egypt has become accustomed to since the 2011 revolution. On April 14, 2012, the electoral com- mission declared that Abu Ismail was barred from running for presi- dent because his mother had obtained American nationality while she 172 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata was living in the United States, in violation of Egyptian electoral law, which states that candidates cannot have close relatives who are foreign or binational. It was futile for Abu Ismail to plead manipulation—his candidacy was no longer valid. He was eliminated from the presidential race, to the immense relief of the Nour party and the Brotherhood and every other party who had feared his victory, in Egypt or abroad. Abu Ismail never offered a convincing explanation for the controversy that led to his elimination. He even used health problems as an excuse for avoiding public appearances until the summer of 2012. For all but his most devoted supporters (and he still has many), this scandal helped to tarnish the image of a man who until then had appeared to be a para- gon of integrity. Beyond Hazem: How to Institutionalize Revolutionary Salafism? The elimination of Abu Ismail from the presidential race raised the urgent question of how durable a movement centered on him would prove to be. For some of his supporters, revolutionary Salafism could only survive if it transformed itself into a political party. In truth, the issue was already being raised a few days before he was disqualified as a candidate, after Sheikh Abdel Rahman Abdel Khaliq proposed the idea. He contended, “For a president to be strong, he needs to have a strong, organized party supporting him.”23 Two days after Abu Ismail was excluded from the race, the imminent creation of a party “representing those who had identified themselves with his project” was announced. The new party was to be led by the Islamist intellec- tual Mohammed ‘Abbas and called “Hizb al-Umma al-Masriya” (the party of the Egyptian nation).24 Further announcements were issued in the weeks that followed, promising that the party would soon be launched. This never took place, however, and Hizb al-Umma al-Mas- riya remained what Egyptians call “a cardboard party” (hizb kartuni ). In late 2012, it was announced that another party representing Abu Ismail’s political line would be created in the near future. This time it was “Hizb al-Raya” (the f lag party). Unlike the previous party, this one was to be led by Abu Ismail himself. In March 2013, the creation of the party and of an electoral alliance called “the Coalition of the Nation” (Tahaluf al-Umma) were jointly announced, grouping Hizb al-Raya and six other small Salafi parties (Hizb al-Fadila, Hizb al-Islah, Hizb al-‘Amal, al-Hizb al-Islami, Hizb al-Sha‘b, and Hizb al-Taghyir).  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 173 Hizb al-Raya offices appeared in various Egyptian towns, and prepa- ratory meetings were organized, but the party was never truly able to organize itself and never obtained the authorization from the commis- sion regulating political parties. Circumstances certainly played a role in this. The announcement that the legislative elections, first planned for April, were postponed, which was followed by Morsi’s overthrow and the military takeover of the political process, stalled any hope for the initiative. Yet, there were deeper causes behind the difficulty for revolutionary Salafism to enter party politics. One problem was that the revolutionary Salafis lacked officials with both partisan experience and the necessary administrative skills. According to members, this was one of the major causes of the failure of Hizb al-Umma al-Masriya.25 There was also an inherent contradic- tion at work: if revolutionary Salafism’s raison d’être was the negation of the traditional political game in favor of radical change through street politics, transforming the movement into a party would carry the risk of political suicide. This explains why so many of Abu Ismail’s supporters, and even Abu Ismail himself, were initially so reluctant to join an institutionalized political game whose dangers they consistently denounced. The difficulty of dissociating the quasi-messianic figure of Abu Ismail from the revolutionary Salafi movement must also be con- sidered. The narrative offered by Miqdad Gamal al-Din cited earlier illustrates this enduring ambivalence: The revolutionary Salafi mes- sage was intended to go beyond the personality of Abu Ismail, but it remained closely tied to him. Moreover, how could the movement be transformed into a functional party when it continued to depend on a leader who was clearly not a politician and who preferred preaching on Salafi television channels to militant work? In the debate on the opportunity of establishing a party, certain activists expressed a preference for alternative modes of organization. This included a handful of young people from Hazemoun who were convinced that although revolutionary Salafism needed to go beyond the father figure of Abu Ismail, it first needed to remain a social move- ment, or else risk losing its identity altogether. From summer 2012 onward, various movements (harakat) that emerged subscribed to this view. Hazemoun was simply a school of thought, with no real structure or hierarchy or even an official spokesperson (although it had plenty of self-declared spokesmen). On the contrary, those emerging movements were structured around leaders, well-defined recruitment modes, imag- ery, and symbols (logos, slogans, etc.). Among these groups is “Tullab al-shari‘a” (“those who call for the sharia” or the “students of sharia”),26 174 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata whose members sometimes served as the tough security crew in the pro-Abu Ismail demonstrations. Yet, Tullab al-shari‘a never equaled the success of another group that emanated from the same movement, “Ahrar.” The Ahrar movement (“the Free”) was founded in September 2012 by young people from Hazemoun. Ahrar immediately took upon itself the mission of uniting other militants as well as Hazemoun members. The movement defined itself as “a youth movement uniting all types of young people craving freedom, at all levels . . . their own freedom, that of their country, of their land. They find the path to this freedom in authentic Islam, of which all Muslims should be proud.” While repeat- ing that its goal was to “apply Islam in its entirety and in its full beauty,” the movement also affirmed, following the original revolutionary Salafi line, its “independence from all organizations, parties, religious and political groups,” asserting that it “would defend the oppressed, what- ever their religious, political or intellectual affiliation.”27 This seem- ingly open rhetoric attracted a new audience to Ahrar, which included members of the “ultras,” who had become politicized during the revo- lution and played a key role in street fighting against the police. A particularly symbolic event occurred when the group recruited Sayyid Ali, known as “Sayyid Mushagheb” (Sayyid the Unruly), the “capo” of the White Knights, the ultras of the Zamalek club. Besides, the “ultra” culture was very present in Ahrar. Rather than official communiqués, one of the movement’s preferred modes of communication was a capella hymns sung to rhythms that were reminiscent of football chants. Ahrar also recycled the symbols of the “Anonymous” movement on its web page, including the mask from the movie “V for Vendetta.” This iden- tification with a certain “youth culture” helped open the doors for Ahrar to increase their visible presence on university campuses.28 Revolutionary Salafis under Morsi The year during which Morsi served as president placed the revolu- tionary Salafis in a delicate situation. Although they continued to see themselves as part of the opposition and did not hesitate to criticize the president, they generally supported the Islamist side when it came into conf lict with liberals or the former regime. The case of the con- stitutional referendum of December 2012 offers an example of this complicated balancing act. While most revolutionary Salafis privately acknowledged that the constitution was too secular and promilitary,  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 175 they avoided criticizing it in public and even occasionally defended out of fear that the other side might triumph. Similarly, in early 2013, although Abu Ismail made a few vehemently anti-Morsi speeches— criticizing, among other things, Morsi’s compromises with the former regime—he muted his comments as the alliance between liberals and feloul gained inf luence. This alliance would ultimately become the principal driver of the mobilization against Morsi on June 30, 2013. Beginning in the month of May, Abu Ismail warned against this mobi- lization, which he described as “criminal” and “counterrevolutionary”. Yet, whereas the liberals and feloul were successfully appropriating the symbols of the revolution, revolutionary Salafism, forced to support the existing regime and defend the institutional process, was losing its revolutionary energy. The only second-generation movement to stand tall against this compromise was Ahrar. It openly called for rejecting the December 2012 constitution, and, before June 30, 2013, made a point of opposing both the “blood merchants” (tujjar al-dam) in the opposition and the “religion merchants” (tujjar al-din) in the pro-Morsi camp in a song that was posted online, stating “they betrayed” (khanu) and ending with the slogan “the revolution continues.” Ahrar’s opposition to Morsi was also encouraged by the fact that Ahrar activists had been arrested in April 2013 during violent protests at Mansura University, and the movement had unhesitatingly blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for these arrests. Revolutionary Salafism was somewhat weakened and divided as June 30, 2013 approached. The movement remained a significant force of mobilization, however, and the new regime that took power on July 3 seemed aware of this potential. Yet, one of the weaknesses of revolutionary Salafism, with the exception of its youth movements and especially Ahrar, remained its inability to act independently from Abu Ismail. One of the first decisions made by the new regime was thus to place Abu Ismail in detention, where he was accused of falsifying documents to prove his mother’s nationality. He was arrested at his home on July 4, 2013. The “children of Abu Ismail,” now orphaned, no longer acted as a unified force, and most of them joined the Brotherhood in their strug- gle against the military coup. Nevertheless, the revolutionary Salafis continued to assert their difference for a while. In parallel to the prin- cipal Brotherhood sit-in in Rabi‘a al-Adawiya Square in Madinat Nasr, the revolutionary Salafis created their own sit-in in al-Nahda square near Cairo University. In the post-Morsi era however, the differences became increasingly blurred. Now that the Brotherhood had become at 176 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata least nominally revolutionary, the two groups were able to draw closer. In the wake of the violent dispersion of the sit-ins on August 14, both members of the Brotherhood and revolutionary Salafis could be seen in the pro-Morsi demonstrations. Once again, the only group to behave differently was Ahrar. Its activists refused to join pro-Morsi groups and tried to organise a “third path” (al-tayyar al-thalith) against both the Brotherhood and the mili- tary. They called for a protest on Sphinx Square in Cairo on August 30, 2013. At the beginning, their positions brought them close to Islamo-centrist Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh’s supporters, but the two groups quickly diverged over ideological and methodological differ- ences. After the summer, Ahrar participated actively in the protests on Egyptian campuses, as witnessed in dozens of YouTube videos. Despite a number of arrests, including the highly mediatized arrest of one of its founders, Ahmed ‘Arafa, the group was continuing to mobilize sup- porters in 2014. Conclusion One of the surprises in the aftermath of June 30, 2013 is that revolution- ary Salafism did not appear to be acting independently of the protest movement. In the absence of their charismatic leader or a functional organization of their own, many of Abu Ismail’s supporters joined the pro-Morsi side. As a consequence, many of those who demonstrated against the new regime were not from the Brotherhood but were instead sympathizers with the revolutionary Salafi movement. As for the Ahrar movement, it continued to stand alone, taking advantage of its strong foothold on university campuses, where it sometimes cooper- ated with radicalized Brotherhood youth movements such as Molotov or Walla‘ (“set it on fire”). The significant presence of revolutionary Salafis among the protest- ers, at a time when repression is in full swing, may have consequences. Indeed the revolutionary Salafis have a culture of protest that conveys more strongly anchored, latent violence than the Brotherhood. Many revolutionary Salafis were completely open about this potential, and in interviews that we conducted with revolutionary Salafis in the winter 2012, most of them argued that violence was not an issue at the time but that it remained a theoretical possibility. Most observers believe today that the presence of weapons at the sit-in in Rabi‘a al-Adawiya Square, the official justification for its violent dispersion, was marginal.  Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt 177 They all agree, however, that there was a significant armed presence at the al-Nahda sit-in. The regime also accused the Ahrar movement of violent acts, although its supporters denied the accusations. The current radicalization of a portion of the Islamist movement in response to brutal police repression has caused a resurgence of the ideas conveyed by revolutionary Salafism, ideas that could even find their way into the Brotherhood. A journalist who was in al-Azhar during large protests in November and December 2013 stated that, when he asked protesters where they got their inspiration, they all answered “Hazem Abu Ismail.” Revolutionary Salafism may have lost its mentor, but his ideas remain more alive than ever. Notes 1. For the first use of this term, see Khalil al-‘Anani, “The sheikh president,” al-Ahram Hebdo, April/May 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1095/sc5.htm (accessed February 22, 2015); see also Stéphane Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism,” Brookings Doha Center, June 2012. 2 . Interviews with Ahmed Mawlana, spokesperson for the Salafi Front, and Yahya Rifa‘i Surur, the son of Sheikh Rifa‘i Surur, Cairo, Winter 2012. 3. Not to be confused with the young man killed in Alexandria in 2010, whose murder helped mobilize for the revolution. 4. Interview with Khaled Harbi, one of the founders of the Coalition, Cairo, January 2013. 5. Regarding Hazem Abu Ismail, see his biography on his campaign website: http://hazem- salah.net (accessed February 22, 2015); see also the long article about him in the pro-Islamist newspaper al-Mesryoon: “qissat su‘ud Abu Ismail,” al-Mesryoon, April 20, 2014; and Ahmed Zaghloul’s interview with Hazem Abu Ismail in June 2011: http://www. islamyun.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=967: &Itemid=162 (accessed March 3, 2015). 6. “New Salafi party has curious policy mix,” Egypt Independent, October 23, 2012. 7. “Abu Ismail: U‘adi mu‘ahadat al-salam,” al-Ahram, September 13, 2011; http://gate.ahram. org.eg/News/115129.aspx (accessed March 3, 2015). 8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zsl3JXcSMQ (accessed March 3, 2015). 9. As a result, supporters of Hazem Abu Ismail kept alive a memory of him as one of the first leaders to call on young people to continue to occupy Tahrir Square until the “objectives of the revolution” were fully achieved. 10. At the time, he was described by young participants in the Mohammed Mahmoud events as “an honest and brave man” and “a real revolutionary” (interviews in late November 2011 on Tahrir Square during the events of Mohammed Mahmoud Street). 11. At a sit-in at the entrance of the Media City in December 2012, which revolutionary Salafis organized to protest the “corruption of the media,” the portraits of Tawfiq ‘Okasha and Bilal Fadl were placed side by side, close to those of Yusri Fuda and Mustafa Bakri. 12 . This page, like other pages of Islamist obedience, was suppressed after Morsi’s overthrow on July 3, 2013. 13. https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8 %A7%D8%B2%D9%85/268383156581609 (the page has been suppressed). 178 Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata 14. https://www.facebook.com/AwladAboIsmail (accessed March 3, 2015). 15. https://www.facebook.com/Hazemon (the page has been suppressed). 16. “Hazimun . . . wa ma‘rakat al-umma al-qadima,” April 2, 2012, https://www.facebook.com/ Hazemon (the page has been suppressed). 17. “Ra’y al-duktur Ayman al-Zawahiri fi istib‘ad al-Shaykh Hazim,” https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=NplGSJ0JpPA. 18. “Al-Zawahiri yutalib Hazim . . . ,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnA4DNsKoKI. 19. h t t p : // w w w . s h o r o u k n e w s . c o m / n e w s / v i e w . a s p x ? c d a t e = 3 0 0 3 2 0 1 2 & i d =6171ac37–4f5c-43be-bdaa-c78670df32d3 (the video has been suppressed). 20. “77 min mashayikh al-salafiyya fi masr yad‘amun Abu Isma‘il,” http://lojainiat.com/main/ Content/77- (accessed March 3, 2015). 21. “7 nuwwab bi-l-nur yukhalifun qirar al-‘ulya li-l-hizb wa yu’ayyidun Abu Isma‘il,” al-yawm al- sabi‘, March 7, 2012. 22 . “Yasir Burhami ila shabab al-tayyar al-salafi: inna Hazim Abu Isma‘il min abna’ al-ikhwan,” April 17, 2012, http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?477996- (accessed March 3, 2015). 23. “Al-shaykh Abd al-Khaliq yad‘u ansar Abu Isma‘il li-ta’sis hizb jadid,” April 10, 2012, http:// www.islammemo.cc/akhbar/arab/2012/04/10/147630.html (accessed March 3, 2015). 24. “Itlaq hizb al-umma al-masriyya bi-ri‘ayat al-Huwayni wa Abu Isma‘il ,” April 16, 2012, http:// onaeg.com/?p=61528 (accessed March 3, 2015). 25. Interviews with revolutionary Salafi leaders, winter 2012. 26. Interview with Khaled al-Shafi‘i, one of the founders of Tullab al-sharia, Cairo, April 2013. 27. “Mabadi’ harakat al-ahrar fi ‘amaliha,” October 11, 2012, https://www.facebook.com/ AhrarMov (accessed March 3, 2015). 28. This was visible on the Ahrar movement Facebook page, which was shut down in February 2014.