Three Natures, Three Stages: An Interpretation of the Yogācāra Trisvabhāva-Theory

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33:185–207
Springer 2005 DOI 10.1007/s10781-005-0860-y M. D’AMATO THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION  ARA OF THE YOGAC   TRISVABHAVA-THEORY The trisvabhava-theory  has been considered to be one of the char- acteristic theories of Yogacara Buddhist discourse. This paper will examine that theory as it is presented in the Mahay  anas  utr  : kara  alam  (Ornament to the Mahay  ana  Sutras;  abbr. MSA) and its commentary, the Mahay  anas  utr  : kara-bh  alam  : ya (MSABh).1 The MSA/Bh refers as to the trisvabhava  (or trilaks: an: a) in a number of contexts, but there are three locations in which extended discussions of the three natures (or three characteristics) occur.2 While I will attempt to offer an exhaustive treatment of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh, incorporating every reference to the trisvabhava  or trilaks: an: a in the text, I will focus on the three locations in which that theory is most prominent. This paper will be divided into three sections: in the first section I will offer a brief introduction to the Mahay  anas  utr  : kara  alam  itself, placing the text in the wider context of Yogacara discourse; in the second section I will present an exegesis of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh, focusing on the contexts in which the theory is most fully elucidated; and in the third section I will offer an interpretation of the text’s three-nature theory, relating the theory to the doctrines of mind-only (citta-matra)  and representation-only (vij~  napti-matra). In short, according to my reading, the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh should not be interpreted as an ontological model simpli- citer, but as a soteriologico-ontological model, identifying three progressive stages of ontological realization, culminating in the per- fected, non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness. 1 When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I will use the abbreviation MSA/Bh. In this paper, by the term ‘‘the text’’ I mean the MSA and the MSABh taken together, by ‘‘the verse-text’’ I mean the MSA, and by ‘‘the commentary’’ I mean the MSABh. 2 These may be found at MSA/Bh 11.15–29, 11.36–43, and 19.48–56. 186 M. D’AMATO  ANAS ON THE MAHAY    ALAM UTR  KARA _ The Mahay  anas  utr  is a verse-text composed of some 804  : kara  alam verses, of which only 794 are extant in Sanskrit.3 This verse-text appears as an independent text only in the Tibetan canon. Normally the verse- text is accompanied by (embedded in) an extended prose commentary known as the Mahay  anas  utr  : kara-bh  alam  : ya, which divides the text as into 21 chapters. I date both the MSA and the MSABh to the fourth century CE (a bit more on this below). Two Sanskrit editions of the MSA/Bh are available: Le´vi’s edition of 1907 (French translation: 1911) and Bagchi’s edition of 1970, which is based on Le´vi’s edition but adds corrigenda to the text. In this paper, I will quote directly from Le´vi’s edition, since this is the earliest edition based on the most complete Sanskrit manuscript available. The MSA/Bh appears in the Chinese canon (Taish o, 1604) and in the Tibetan canon (MSA: T ohoku cata- logue no. 4020; MSA/Bh: T ohoku 4026). There are also two Indian subcommentaries to the text, both extant only in Tibetan.4 Various hypotheses have been offered regarding the authorship of the MSA and the MSABh. While I will not enter into that discussion here, I will indicate that I do not accept the (Chinese canon’s) attri- bution of the MSA/Bh to Asanga, _ nor do I accept the (Tibetan ca- non’s) attribution of the MSA to Maitreya (whether or not he is taken to be a historical person).5 I believe that a careful analysis of the structure and contents of the text indicates that the received verse-text is at least partially a compilation. I hypothesize that earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and com- mented upon by one person. And I take the result of this process to be the received text of the MSA/Bh.6 3 Nagao (1958: xiii), following the Tibetan text, specifies that MSA, Chapter 10, is comprised of 15 verses, rather than Le´vi’s count of 14. According to this reading, the three lines of commentary to MSA 10.9 constitute an independent verse. Thus the verse-text would be comprised of 805 (rather than 804) verses. 4 The two Indian subcommentaries are the Mahay  anas  utr  alam  kara-vr   ya of tti-bhas Sthiramati (T ohoku 4034; DT sems tsam MI 1b1–283a7, TSI_ 1b1-266a7) _ _ the and Mahay anas  utr   alam  ika of Asvabh kara-t ava (Tohoku 4029; DT sems tsam BI 38b6- _ may_ be considered subcommentaries in that they comment on 174a7). These works both the MSA (verse-text) and at least parts of the MSABh (prose commentary). Sthiramati and Asvabhava may be placed in the sixth century CE. 5 It should be noted that all of the colophons of the MSA/Bh (including those of the Tibetan and Chinese translations) identify the mahabodhisattva Vyavadatasamaya as the composer of the text. 6 These points are discussed more fully in Chapter 2 of my dissertation; see D’Amato (2000).  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 187 Regarding the MSA/Bh’s place in Yogacara literature, the fol- lowing points are worth noting. (1) In terms of structure, the MSA precisely follows that of the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh; ed. Dutt, 1966). But while the MSA and the BBh are nearly identical in structure, they are not as similar in their contents: although both discuss the same topics, the ways in which those topics are discussed often differ. For example, the BBh’s chapter on awakening (bodhi) makes no mention of many of the terms and concepts found in the MSA’s chapter on that topic, such as the embodiments of a buddha (buddha-kaya)  or the awarenesses of a buddha (buddha-j~  nana). While some have thought that both the MSA and the BBh are by Asanga, _ I disagree. Although the colophon of the BBh identifies Asanga _ as the com- poser of the text, both Hirakawa et al. (1973: vii–ix) and Davidson (1985: 23 and 25) point out that the two earlier Chinese translations of the BBh (Taish o, 1581 and 1582) do not name any author. Fur- thermore, Schmithausen (1969: 812) presents strong arguments for the hypothesis that the Yogac  arabh   as a whole represents the umi work of a number of authors over a period of time. Thus there is no conclusive evidence that Asanga _ was the author of the BBh; rather, he may have been the final redactor of the text, or perhaps the text later came to be associated with the Maitreya-Asanga _ complex. Given these considerations, and the fact that the BBh presents a less highly developed conception of buddhahood than the MSA, I think it is plausible that the BBh predates the MSA, and that the MSA derives its structure from the BBh. (2) The MSA is the text most often quoted by the Mahay  anasam  : graha (ed. Lamotte, 1973), and it is quoted once by name. From the list of texts explicitly quoted by the Mahay  anasam  : graha, it may be inferred that the author of the   Mahayanasam : graha considers the MSA to be an authoritative text. Since all of the traditional sources, including the colophon of the text _ itself, attest to Asanga’s authorship of the Mahay  anasam  graha, I think it is reasonable to identify Asanga _ as the composer _ of that text. And since Asanga _ quotes the MSA in the company of an authoritative group of texts, I would place the MSA before Asanga. _ To summarize, I would place the MSA after (an early recension of) the Bodhisattvabhumi,  _ but before the date of Asanga. _ Asanga’s date cannot be fixed with certainty, but it may reasonably be hypothesized that he was active sometime during the second half of the fourth century CE or the first half of the fifth. Thus the MSA should be placed before that time, i.e., in the mid-fourth century CE. And since I take the MSA and the MSABh together as the work of one 188 M. D’AMATO final redactor/author, I would also place the commentary in the mid-fourth century. Considering the broader history of Yogacara discourse, the Sam : dhinirmocana-sutra  has certainly been the most important and influential s utra for the Yogacara, and the Yogac  arabh   is the umi largest Yog acara s astra, containing (in parts at least) some of the oldest extant Yog ac ara material. If these two works are taken as representative of the first phase of distinctly Yogacara thought, then the second phase might be characterized by treatises that more sys- tematically (i.e., in their entirety) present a Yogacara point of view. Among the extant Yogacara treatises of this second phase, the MSA/Bh is certainly one of the earliest (along with the Mad-  hyantavibh  aga). I understand texts of this second phase to precede texts of the third, classical, phase of Yogacara thought, represented by the works of Asanga _ and Vasubandhu.7 Thus I would identify the MSA/Bh as an important text in the history of Yogacara discourse. In terms of its contents, the MSA/Bh may be described as a text primarily concerned with theoretical reflections on issues central to the practice of the Mahayana. Put simply, the MSA/Bh is more a theory text than a practice text: it is more a reflection on issues central to (its conception of) Mahayana Buddhism than an instruction manual for the attainment of specific Buddhist soteriological goals. The MSA/Bh does not, however, exhibit a particular concern with showing how the concepts and categories it employs are logically interrelated or with systematically working out their implications. Nevertheless, I think a careful analysis shows that the MSA/Bh does present a consistent discourse. We may get a better feel for the MSA/ Bh as a text concerned with theoretical reflections on the Mahayana through examining its presentation of the three-nature theory.  EXEGESIS OF THE TRISVABHAVA  ANAS IN THE MAHAY    ALAM UTR  KARA/-BH  YA AS _ _ The first extended discussion of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh occurs in the context of a group of verses dealing with the distinction between reality (tattva) and illusion (may  (MSA/Bh 11.15–29). These  a) verses are preceded by two verses on the investigation of reality (dharmatatva-paryesti); the first of these two verses (11.13) and its commentary state: _ _ 7 To complete this picture of Yogac ara thought, other phases would certainly have to be added, including for example that of the Indian commentators (e.g., Dharmapala and Sthiramati) and the distinctly Chinese phases.  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 189 tattvam: yat satatam : dvayena rahitam : bhrantes ca sam: nisrayah: sakyam : naiva ca sarvathabhilapitum : yac caprapan˜catmakam :/ jn˜eyam : heyam atho visodhyam amalam : yac ca prakr: tya matam : yasyakasa-suvarn: a-vari-sadr: s kles ad visuddhir mat a// Reality – which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible – does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, aban- doned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water. Here reality is said to be similar to space, gold, and water: it is naturally pure and defiled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on to state that there is nothing else in the world besides this funda- mentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh posits that, even though it serves as the basis of error, reality is funda- mentally pure. Thus we see a distinction between reality as it is in itself, and reality as it appears through error – when it is adventitiously defiled. The commentary to 11.13 aligns each of the three descriptions of reality offered in the verse with one of the three natures. Reality ‘‘which is always without duality’’ is the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava):  the imagined nature is without duality because of its absolute non-existence (atyantam asatvat).  Reality which ‘‘is the basis of error’’ is the dependent nature (paratantra-  svabhava): the dependent nature is the basis of error because imagi- nation occurs through it. And reality which ‘‘is entirely inexpressible’’ is the perfected nature (parinis: panna-svabhava):  the perfected nature simply does not have the nature of discursivity; it is inexpressible. MSABh ad 11.13 further states that the first – the imagined nature – is to be known, the second – the dependent nature – is to be aban- doned, and the third – the perfected nature – is to be purified. From this verse and its commentary we can see that the three natures are presented as a complete model of reality.8 The three- nature theory presents reality in three aspects: as an erroneous appearance, as a basis of error, and as it is in itself. Keeping these points in mind, we may now turn to the verses on the distinction 8 It should be noted that this ontological model is appropriately placed in a standard Mahayana context at MSA/Bh 14.34, which states that emptiness ( sunyat  a)  fully understood is threefold: the emptiness of the imagined nature, the emptiness of the dependent nature, and the emptiness of the perfected nature. MSA/Bh 11.50 also discusses three types of absence of nature (nih: svabhavatva),  although there only the parikalpita-laks: an: a is specifically mentioned. Furthermore, at MSABh ad 12.17 the three natures are described as without an inherent nature (nih: svabhava).  Thus the MSA/Bh understands all three natures to be empty. 190 M. D’AMATO between reality (tattva) and illusion (may  In the first verse of this  a). group (11.15), the text characterizes unreal imagination and the error of duality: yatha maya tathabhuta-parikalpo nirucyate/ yatha maya-kr: tam : tadvat dvaya-bhrantir nirucyate// yatha maya yantra-parigr: htam : bhr anti-nimittam : k a:st:ha-los: t: adikam: tath abhuta- parikalpah: paratantrah: svabhavo veditavyah: / yath a m ay a-kr: tam: tasy am: may ayam: hasty-asva-suvarn: ady-akr: tis9 tad-bh avena pratibhasit a tath a tasminn abh uta-parikalpe dvaya-bhrantir grahya-grahakatvena pratibh asit a parikalpita-svabh av ak ara veditavy a/ Unreal imagination is explained to be just like an illusion. Likewise, the error of duality is explained to be just like the effect of an illusion. Unreal imagination – the dependent nature – should be known to be just like an illusion – something formed from a piece of wood or a lump of clay, for example, that has the mark of error, and is apprehended through magic. The error of duality – the mode of appearance of the imagined nature, which manifests as subject and object in unreal imagination – should be known to be just like the effect of an illusion – the appearance of an elephant, a horse, or gold, for example, in an illusion, which manifests through the production of the [illusion]. In this verse and commentary unreal imagination (abhuta-parikalpa)  is said to be like an illusion, while the appearance of duality is said to be like the effect of an illusion. The trope of a magical illusion plays an important role in this group of verses.10 This trope is used because it allows for an important ontological distinction to be made, the dis- tinction between the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava)  and the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava). According to the commen-  tary, two aspects of the illusion need to be understood: the illusion itself, and the appearance of unreal objects that are the effect of the illusion. The illusion itself is identified with unreal imagination, which is then equated with the dependent nature. The effect of the illusion (i.e., the appearance of unreal objects) is identified as the error of duality; this is the mistaken construction of the play of appearances into subject (the self or ego) and objects (which are taken to be external to the self or ego). This construction of appearances into 9 Note that the term akr  : ti is only used by the text in this group of verses (11.15– 29), and has been translated as ‘‘appearance,’’ in the sense of ‘‘mere appearance.’’ The term ak  however, is used in a number of places throughout the text, and may  ara, be translated as ‘‘mode of appearance.’’ Furthermore, while the term akr  : ti has a negative connotation in the text, ak  has a positive connotation – e.g., MSA 9.2  ara identifies buddhahood as the attainment of sarvak  ara-j~  nata:  an awareness of all modes of appearance. 10 This trope also plays an important role in the Trisvabhavanirde  sa vv. 27–34.  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 191 subject and object is equated with the mode of appearance of the imagined nature. Continuing with the trope of the magical illusion, the next verse (11.16) states: yatha tasmin na tad-bhavah: param arthas tathes: yate/ yatha tasyopalabdhis tu tatha sam : vr: ti-satyat a// The non-existence of the [unreal object] in the [illusion] should be known as the ultimate [truth]. But the perception of the [unreal object] should be known as the conventional truth. Here the text brings the categories of ultimate truth and conventional truth into play. It states that in ultimate truth, no unreal objects actually exist in the illusion; there is only the appearance of unreal objects. And the perception of those objects of unreal imagination is to be understood as conventional truth. The commentary also states that the duality of the imagined nature does not exist in the depen- dent nature: although conventionally the dependent nature does appear to have the characteristic of duality, in ultimate truth, the dependent nature is devoid of the duality of the imagined nature. A later verse (11.19) clarifies the relationship between existence and non-existence: tad-akr: tis ca tatrasti tad bhavas ca na vidyate/ tasmad astitva-nastitvam : mayadis: u vidhyate// The appearance of the [illusion] exists, but the object does not; therefore both existence and non-existence are attributed to illusions, etc. Here the appearance of the illusion itself (earlier equated with the dependent nature) is said to be existent, but the objects that appear (earlier equated with the imagined nature) – the dualistic constructions that are the effect of the illusion – are said to be non-existent. So illusions and other such appearances have the characteristics of both existence and non-existence. The following brief chart summarizes the text’s claims regarding unreal imagination and the appearance of duality: unreal imagination appearance of duality metaphorically: the illusion itself metaphorically: the effect of the illusion ontologically: the dependent nature ontologically: the imagined nature it exists conventionally it does not exist conventionally (although it appears conventionally) Again, two aspects are to be distinguished here. There is the occur- rence of unreal imagination; unreal imagination does exist, just as an 192 M. D’AMATO illusion itself may be said to exist; and unreal imagination is identified with the dependent nature in the MSA/Bh’s tripartite ontological scheme. But there is also the appearance of duality, which is the false construction of unreal imagination into a distinct subject and distinct objects; this duality of subject and object does not actually exist, just as the objects which appear in an illusion do not actually exist; and the appearance of duality is identified with the function of the ima- gined nature. The final verse of interest to us in this section is 11.17: tad-abhave yatha vyaktis tan-nimittasya labhyate/ tathasraya-paravr: ttav asat kalpasya labhyate// Just as in the absence of the [effect of an illusion] the manifestation of its cause is perceived, so too in the transformation of the basis the unreality of imagination is perceived. Here the transformation of the basis (a  : tti) is introduced sraya-paravr into the discussion. According to the text, when the transformation of the basis occurs, the non-existence of imagination will be perceived. That is to say, when the transformation of the basis occurs, it will be understood that neither the conventional self or ego, nor the con- ventional objects which appear to the self or ego actually exist as such. They will both be understood to be constructions built up from the manifold play of appearances. This verse is interesting in that it links the three-nature theory to the process (or, better, set of related processes) known as the transformation of the basis. We will see this link clarified further in the next relevant section of the MSA/Bh. The next extended presentation of the three-nature theory (here described in terms of the three characteristics) occurs in the context of a discussion of the indicator (laks: an: a), the indicated (laks: ya), and the process of indication (laks: an: a)  (MSA/Bh 11.36–43). In these verses the indicator is described in terms of the dependent, the imagined, and the perfected (paratantra, parikalpita, and parinis: panna, respec- tively); the indicated is described in terms of the five abhidharma categories (vij~  nana, rupa,  caitasika, citta-viprayukta, and asam : skr: ta); and the process of indication – the process which allows for the association of the indicator with the indicated – is described in terms of the five stages of yoga (pa~ ncavidha yogabhumi).  The imagined characteristic (parikalpita-laks: an: a) is explained at 11.38–39. Here the imagined characteristic is said to be threefold: it is  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 193 comprised of the sign of the conceptualization of objects in terms of discourse (yatha-jalp   artha-sam: j~  na-nimitta), the tendencies (vasan  a) that arise due to that discourse, and the perception of objects (artha) that arises due to those tendencies. Thus the imagined characteristic is described as arising out of discourse: through discourse, objects are conceptualized, tendencies arise which are directed towards those conceptualized objects, and distinct objects are perceived. The perfected characteristic (parinis: panna-laks: an: a) is discussed at 11.41. In this verse and its commentary the perfected characteristic is described in three ways: in terms of non-existence and existence – it is non-existent due to the imagined nature of all phenomena, but existent in the absence of that imagination; in terms of non-pacification and pacification – non-pacification refers to the adventitious nature of the defilements (agantukopakle  sa), and pacification refers to the original purity of reality; and in terms of the absence of imagination – the perfected characteristic does not have the nature of discursivity (nis: prapa~ ncata). From these three descriptions we can see that the perfected characteristic is described in terms of the text’s conception of reality itself: it is existent, originally pure, and without the nature of discursivity. This point is made even clearer in the first line of the commentary to 11.41, which states that the perfected characteristic is thusness (tathat a). The dependent characteristic (paratantra-laks: an: a) is the object of perhaps the most interesting analysis in this group of verses. 11.40 and its commentary state: trividha-trividhabhaso grahya-gr ahaka-laks: an: ah: / abhuta-parikalpo hi paratantrasya laks: an: am: // tatra trividhabhasah: padabhaso ’rth abh aso dehabhasas ca/ punas trividh abhaso mana-udgraha-vikalpabhasah: / mano yat klis: t:am : sarvada/ udgrahah: pan˜ca vijn˜ ana- kayah: /vikalpo mano-vijn˜anam : tatra prathama-trividh abh aso gr ahya-laks: an: ah: / dvityo grahaka-laks: an: ah: / ity ayam abh uta-parikalpah: paratantrasya laks: an: am :/ The threefold–threefold appearance has the characteristic of object and subject; it is unreal imagination, which is the characteristic of the dependent. The threefold appearance is the appearance of words, the appearance of meanings, and the appearance of forms. Also, the threefold appearance is the appearance of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination. Mind is that which is always defiled. Apprehension is the five sensory consciousnesses. Conceptual discrimina- tion is the mental consciousness. The first threefold appearance has the char- acteristic of the object; the second has the characteristic of the subject. This [threefold–threefold appearance] is unreal imagination, [which is] the characteristic of the dependent. 194 M. D’AMATO In this verse and commentary we see that the appearance of words, meanings, and forms (or referential objects) is understood as one aspect of the dependent characteristic (paratantra-laks: an: a): it is the dependent characteristic considered under the aspect of an object. Considered under the aspect of a subject, the dependent characteristic is equated with the five sensory consciousnesses, mental consciousness, and the defiled mind. According to one standard Yogacara model there are eight forms of consciousness in all: the six basic forms of consciousness (mental consciousness and the five sensory consciousnesses); the defiled mind (klis: t:a-manas) which serves as the basis of ego; and the store consciousness (alaya-vij~   nana) which serves as the basis of all other forms of consciousness. The subject-aspect of the dependent char- acteristic corresponds to the first seven forms of consciousness. So from 11.40 and its commentary we may infer the following structure: dependent characteristic (paratantra-laks: an: a) object-aspect subject-aspect appearance of words mind (defiled mind) appearance of meanings apprehension (five sensory consciousnesses) appearance of forms conceptual discrimination (mental consciousness) [Note: these seven consciousnesses are based on the store consciousness] In order to understand the full import of these verses, it is necessary to turn to a following section of the text, MSA/Bh 11.44–49, which deals with the topic of liberation (vimukti). In this group of verses we see that liberation is equated with the transformation of the depen- dent characteristic. Verse 11.44 and its commentary state: padartha-deha-nirbhasa-paravr: ttir an asravah: / asrayah: // dhatur bja-paravr: tteh: sa ca sarvatrag bja-paravr: tter ity alaya-vijn˜  ana-par avr: ttitah: /pad artha-deha-nirbh as an am: vijn˜ananam : paravr: ttir anasravo dh asrayah: sr atur vimuktih: /sa ca sarvatrag avaka- pratyekabuddha-gatah: / The transformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms is the undefiled realm; it is due to the transformation of seeds; and it is a universal basis. ‘‘Due to the transformation of seeds,’’ means due to the transformation of the store consciousness. The transformation of consciousnesses – which have the appearance of words, meanings, and forms – is the undefiled realm, which is liberation. And it is a universal basis because this occurs for sr avakas and pratyekabuddhas [as well].  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 195 This verse and its commentary state that liberation is the transfor- mation of forms of consciousness which have the appearance of words, meanings, and forms; i.e., conscious modes of appearance which participate in dualistic conceptual constructions. The verse states that this transformation comes about through the transfor- mation of seeds, which the commentary specifies as the transformation of the store consciousness (alaya-vij~   nana). The term alaya-vij~   nana, which has come to be closely associated with the Yogacara, appears only a limited number of times in the commentary, and it does not appear in the verse-text at all. Here in the commentary to 11.44, as in the commentary to 19.49, the store consciousness is equated with seeds, as in the seeds that contribute to, and are contributed by, moments of defiled consciousness. So when there is the transformation of these seeds – of the store consciousness – the result is a transfor- mation of the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic. It may also be noted that this process – viz., the transformation of the object- aspect of the dependent characteristic – is said to occur for sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, as well as for bodhisattvas. The next verse in this section discusses the transformation of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. 11.45 states: caturdha vasitavr: tter manasas codgrahasya ca/ vikalpasyavikalpe hi ks: etre jn˜ane ’tha karman: i// Due to the reversion of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination, there are four supremacies: in not conceptually discriminating, in a field, in awareness, and in action. According to the commentary the reversion (avr  : tti) of mind, etc. means the transformation (paravr  : tti) of them. Recall that the com- mentary to 11.40 had identified mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination as the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic, so here the transformation of this aspect of the dependent char- acteristic is described. 11.46 and its commentary discuss the four supremacies in further detail: the supremacies are said to begin on the eighth bodhisattva-stage, and the supremacy in a field is said to be due to the complete purification of a buddha-field. Thus it is clear that the transformation discussed here – viz., the transformation of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is understood to occur only for bodhisattvas. Considering MSA/Bh 11.44–46 together with 11.40 we may see that the dependent characteristic is clearly linked to the transfor- mation of the basis (a sraya-paravr : tti). Indeed, one important 196 M. D’AMATO interpretation of the transformation of the basis in the MSA/Bh is the transformation of the dependent characteristic. As we saw above, the transformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms – i.e., the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is due to the transformation of seeds – i.e., the store consciousness, which is the ground of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. And the transformation of the mind, apprehension, and conceptual dis- crimination – i.e., the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is itself understood as a transformation of forms of consciousness based on the store consciousness. Thus it may be seen that the transformation of the dependent characteristic – both as object and as subject – entails the transformation of the store consciousness. A further important point to note from this discussion is that the MSA/ Bh directly links the three-nature theory with an important concept for soteriological attainments – viz., a  : tti. Thus while the sraya-paravr first group of verses we examined above (11.15–29) presents the three- nature theory as an ontological model, this group of verses presents that theory as a soteriological model: the three natures here do not represent a model of reality as much as a model of stages of onto- logical gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood. The final extended discussion of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh occurs in the context of a group of verses on thorough knowledge of the way things really are (yatha-bh  uta-parij~   nana) (MSA/Bh 19.48–56). The first verse of interest to us is 19.49, which states: pratis: t:ha-bhoga-bjam : hi nimittam : bandhanasya hi/ sasrayas citta-caittas tu badhyante ’tra sabjak ah: // The sign of bondage is the dwelling, experience, and the seed. Mind and mental factors, along with their bases and their seeds, are bound. In the commentary to this verse, the dwelling is identified as the inanimate world (bhajana-loka);  experience is identified as the five sense-objects of forms, sounds, etc.; and the seed – explained as the seed of the dwelling and of experience – is identified as the store consciousness (alaya-vij~   nana). Mind and mental factors, along with their bases and seeds, are understood to be bound. And the seed of mind and mental factors is identified as the store consciousness. We may represent this verse and its commentary through the following chart:  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 197 mind and mental factors whose seed is the store consciousness are bound to: the threefold sign dwelling = the inanimate world, whose seed is the store consciousness; experience = the five sense-objects, whose seed is the store consciousness; seed = the store consciousness itself. Viewing the verse and commentary in this way allows us to see the importance of the store consciousness to this interpretation. While it is the mind and mental factors which are bound to the threefold sign, when viewed in terms of their basis or source of origin, it is actually the store consciousness that is bound to itself. It is the store con- sciousness that is at the root of both the subjective aspect of experience (mind and mental factors) and the experience of objects (the threefold sign). The state of affairs described above is understood to obtain before the attainment of awakening. A following verse (19.51) – which introduces the three-nature theory into the discussion – describes how that state of affairs is brought to an end. tathatalambanam : jn˜anam : dvaya-gr aha-vivarjitam :/ daus: t:hulya-kaya-pratyaks: am : tat-ks: aye dhmatam : matam : // etena yatha-svabhava-traya-parijn˜ anat paratantra-svabh ava-ks: ay aya sam : vartate/ tat-paridpitam: / tathatalambanatvena parinis: pannam : svabh avam: parijn˜ aya/ dvaya- graha-vivarjitatvena kalpitam : / daus: t:hulya-k aya-pratyaks: atvena paratantram : / tasyaiva ks: ayaya sam : vartate daus: t:hulya-k ayasy alaya-vijn˜ anasya tat-ks: ay artham: tat-ks: aye/ Awareness whose object is thusness is free of grasping after duality and perceives the multitude of hindrances. In the destruction of that, there is the knowledge of the wise. What is pointed out by this [verse] comes about through thorough knowledge of the three natures as they are, in order to bring about the destruction of the dependent nature. The perfected nature is known through its object of thusness; the imagined [nature], through freedom from grasping after duality; and the dependent [nature], through the perception of the multitude of hindrances. So [knowledge of the three natures] is conducive to the destruction of [the multitude of hindrances]; [in the verse, the phrase] ‘‘in the destruction of that’’ means the destruction of the multitude of hindrances, which is the store consciousness. Here it is explained that when the three natures are properly under- stood, the dependent nature will be brought to its termination. The notion of bringing the dependent nature to its end should be 198 M. D’AMATO considered in the context of the verses discussed earlier (11.40 and 11.44–46), where we saw that liberation was interpreted in terms of the transformation of the dependent characteristic. At 11.40 the dependent characteristic was understood to be composed of two aspects: the subject-aspect and the object-aspect. And the transfor- mation of each of those aspects of the dependent characteristic was closely related to the transformation of the store consciousness. Here at 19.51 we also see that a close link is established between the dependent nature and the store consciousness (which is described in the verse as the multitude of hindrances). The dependent nature is said to be understood through perceiving of the multitude of hindrances.11 And when the three natures are thoroughly understood, the result will be the destruction of the dependent nature – which is also explained as the destruction of the multitude of hindrances, or the store con- sciousness. This interpretation may be linked to 11.13 (discussed above) which states that the dependent nature is the basis of error – and that it is something to be abandoned. An important point to be noted from this group of verses is that again we see that the three-nature theory is presented as a soter- iological model: when the three natures are properly understood, the destruction of the store consciousness will be brought about. So here the three natures are not only presented as a model of reality, but also as a model of forms of gnosis directed towards the termination of the state of spiritual bondage. This interpretation of the three natures as forms of gnosis directed towards liberation may also be seen at 13.1, which links the three natures to the three standard entrances to liberation: the concentration of the emptiness of the imagined nature ( sunyat   a-sam  parikalpitasya svabhavasya), adhi  the wishlessness (apran: ihita) of the dependent nature, and the signlessness (animitta) of the perfected nature.12 11 A link between the dependent nature and the multitude of hindrances may also be seen at MSABh ad 6.9, which states that the multitude of faults (do sa-sam: caya), which has the characteristic of hindrance (daus: t:hulya-laks: an: a), has its basis in the dependent nature. It should be noted, however, that the dependent nature is not mentioned in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of MSABh ad 6.9; see Le´vi (1911: 54), note 1. 12 The interpretation of the three natures as a model of forms of gnosis may also be seen at MSABh ad 19.77 and ad 19.78, which identify the understanding (bodha) of the three natures as a special understanding of bodhisattvas. And the link between the three natures and soteriological attainment may also be seen at MSABh ad 11.52, where the certainty that phenomena do not arise (anutpattika-dharma-ks: anti)  – an important Mahayana realization – is partially explained in terms of the three natures.  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 199  AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TRISVABHAVA One standard interpretation of the three natures may be given in the following terms. The dependent nature is the basis or substratum of reality; it is comprised of a dependently arisen, interconnected web of ever-changing representations, which are themselves empty of inherent nature. The imagined nature is the dependent nature when viewed through a matrix of conceptual construction; the imagined nature sees the dependent nature as comprised of distinct entities with enduring, inherent natures. The perfected nature, however, is the dependent nature viewed without the conceptual matrix of the ima- gined nature.13 The MSA/Bh’s interpretation of the three natures, however, differs in a not insignificant way from what I have offered as the standard interpretation. Before turning to the specifics of the MSA/Bh’s alternate interpretation, I wish to emphasize that in the corpus of Yog ac ara literature there is indeed strong support for the standard interpretation. In fact, it seems to me to be a solid interpretation of the three-nature theory as presented in the classical texts of Asan˙ga and Vasubandhu. But that a particular interpretation of a theory has become dominant should not prevent us from noting and considering alternate interpretations found in our sources. As Sponberg has pointed out (1983: 98): Any attempt to come to terms with the three natures is further complicated, however, by additional historical problems. Our confusion regarding the doctrine has arisen, 13 For one presentation of what I am calling the standard interpretation, see Williams (1989: 82–85) ‘‘The conceptualized [imagined] aspect is the world as it is experienced by everyday unenlightened folk, the world of really existing subjects confronting really existing and separate objects. It is… the realm of subject–object duality… . The flow of perceptions which forms the basis for our mistaken con- structions is the dependent aspect… . The Mahay  anasam  : graha describes it as the support for the manifestation of non-existent and fictive things (2:2)… . Over- negation is to deny the substratum [viz., the dependent] which really, ultimately (paramartha)  exists… . The final aspect is called the perfected aspect… . It is said to be the complete absence, in the dependent aspect, of objects – that is, the objects of the conceptualized [imagined] aspect (Mahay  anasam  : graha 2:4).’’ Further textual support for the standard interpretation of the three-nature theory may be found in the Trim  especially v. 21cd (ed. Le´vi 1925: 39): nis: pannas tasya purven : sika,  : a sada rahitata tu ya/‘‘The  perfected is the perpetual absence of the former in that.’’ As the commentary explains, ‘‘the former’’ means ‘‘the imagined nature,’’ and ‘‘in that’’ means ‘‘in the dependent nature.’’ According to one possible interpretation, the implication here is that the dependent nature exists as the substratum or basis of reality, which may be viewed improperly (in terms of the imagined) or realized for what it is (in terms of the perfected). 200 M. D’AMATO in part, from the often unacknowledged fact that the various sources we employ present the doctrine in different stages of its historical development. It is under- standably difficult to settle on one interpretation of the three natures when different textual accounts seem inconsistent. I would agree with Sponberg that it is important to remain exegetically sensitive to our sources, and not to assume that every presentation of the three-nature theory found in Yogacara literature should be read through the lens of one standard interpretation.14 Briefly stated, the difference between the MSA/Bh’s interpreta- tion of the three-nature theory and the standard interpretation is that the MSA/Bh does not emphasize the ultimate existence of the dependent nature. In the standard account offered above, the dependent nature is understood to be ultimately real since it is the basis or substratum of reality itself: although the dependent nature is empty of inherent nature, it does ultimately exist. In the MSA/Bh, however, the existence of the dependent nature is not ulti- mately affirmed (although it is, of course, conventionally affirmed). In discussing the non-duality of the ultimate, the commentary to 6.1 states that the ultimate is not existent because of the imagined and dependent characteristics, but it is not non-existent because of the perfected characteristic. This implies that the dependent char- acteristic does not ultimately exist. And in the commentary to 18.81, the dependent characteristic is said to be impermanent (anitya), as the imagined characteristic is declared to be. So here the dependent characteristic is not presented as the existent basis or substratum of reality, but rather is categorized with the (non- existent) imagined characteristic. Also at 11.13, the commentary states that the dependent nature is to be abandoned (praheyam). Such a statement would be unreasonable if the dependent nature were understood to be the basis or substratum of reality, given that the ultimate goal posited by the text is assimilation to reality itself. Furthermore, the commentary to 19.51 states that thorough knowledge of the three natures brings about the termination of the dependent nature. Again, this would not be reasonable if the 14 Of course I intend this statement to apply to one operating in an exegetical mode; in a philosophical mode, one may construct arguments intending to demon- strate that some particular interpretation of the three-nature theory ought to be accepted, or ought to function as the lens through which other interpretations are assessed.  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 201 dependent nature were understood to be the ultimate substratum of reality.15 So in the MSA/Bh, the dependent nature is categorized with the imagined nature, and is discussed in terms of the phenomenal or conventional aspect of reality. The difference between the imagined nature and the dependent nature, according to the MSA/Bh, is that the imagined nature is conventional reality viewed through a matrix of conceptual construction, where the representations that appear are taken to be distinct objects with inherent natures; in the dependent nature, on the other hand, the representations that appear are understood to be themselves illusory. According to 11.16, in ultimate truth, there is not the existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature.16 In the MSA/Bh, the perfected nature is the only one of the three natures that is posited as ultimately existent. In the commentary to 11.41, the perfected characteristic is equated with thusness (tathata),  an important term for ultimate reality in the text. And in the com- mentary to 11.13, the perfected nature is said to be naturally purified (prakr: tya vi suddha) from defilements, which is itself a characteristic of ultimate reality, as described by the MSA/Bh. And at 9.78, the 15 Further support for these claims may be found in the Sam : dhinirmocana-sutra’s  trope of the three natures in terms of having diseased vision, where the imagined is ‘‘like the defects of clouded vision,’’ the dependent is ‘‘like the appearance of the manifestations of clouded vision. . . which appear as a net of hairs,’’ and the perfected is ‘‘like the unerring objective reference, the natural objective reference of the eyes when that person’s eyes have become pure and free from the defects of clouded vision’’ (trans. Powers 1995: 83; Tib., ibid.: 82, 84; cf. French trans. Lamotte 1935: 189; Tib., ibid.: 61). One possible implication here is that viewing things in terms of the dependent – in terms of the manifestations of clouded vision – must be abandoned. I do not claim that every statement about the three natures in the Sam : dhinirmocana may be interpreted in terms of denying the ultimate existence of the dependent; after all, as Lamotte (1935: 25), May (1971: 276), Boquist (1993: Chapter 2), and others have pointed out, the s utra is probably a compilation, and seems to comprise different approaches to the three-nature theory. But Powers also translates the following relevant passage from a canonical commentary to the s utra –  the Arya-sam : dhinirmocana-sutra-vy  akhy  ana (Peking 5845): The other-dependent character is produced by the power of other conditions but is not [produced] through its nature. Therefore – since it exists merely [like] a magician’s illusions in terms of conventional truths – it is a lack of own-being due to being a lack of own-being in terms of production… it is not an ultimate lack of own-being because it is not an ultimate truth.… the thoroughly established {perfected} character is the ultimate. (trans. Powers 1995: 334, note 3) 16 Note that the claim, ‘‘According to ultimate truth, x is not in y,’’ does not entail that x or y must ultimately exist. 202 M. D’AMATO perfected nature is described as ultimately existent (parama-  while the imagined nature is described as non-existent.  a), vidyamanat Also, the commentary to 19.79 equates the comprehension of the perfected with buddhahood; in that buddhahood may be understood as the awareness of thusness, here the perfected is again related to thusness. Furthermore, the commentary to 20–21.60–61 states that purified thusness (vi  is the perfected (nis: panna), which suddha tathata) is the ultimate (paramartha). So here it can be seen that the perfected  nature is brought together with terms for ultimate reality. Therefore, according to the MSA/Bh’s interpretation of the three natures, it is not the dependent nature that is ultimately real or that functions as the substratum of reality; rather, it is the perfected nature that is ultimately real. The following diagram may further help to clarify the MSA/Bh’s interpretation of the three natures through showing how the three natures relate to the distinction between the conventional and the ultimate: CONVENTIONAL REALITY (phenomena) reality improperly viewed in terms of conceptual construction and the subject–object distinction: imagined nature reality properly viewed as unreal imagination, as an illusion where apparent objects are not taken as real: dependent nature ULTIMATE REALITY (thusness) non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness: perfected nature Again, it should be emphasized that conventional reality and ultimate reality are not taken to be distinct; conventional reality is reality as viewed from the perspective of sentient minds, while ultimate reality is reality as viewed from the perspective of buddha-mind.17 17 While I cannot, of course, enter here into the intricacies of Tibetan inter- pretations of the three natures, it is worth pointing out that the ontological status of  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 203 Given that the three-nature doctrine pertains to differences in perspectives on reality, it would be inappropriate to characterize this doctrine as a purely ontological model employed by the MSA/Bh. Rather, the text’s three-nature doctrine is better understood as a so- teriologico-ontological model: it is a model that identifies stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddha- hood. These stages of ontological gnosis may be specified in the fol- lowing terms. Ordinary sentient beings confront reality in terms of a subject–object distinction and thereby construct the flow of appearances into distinct entities with enduring natures; this is the level of the imagined nature. Then, when a sentient being comes to the realization that conceptually constructed entities do not themselves exist at all, but that the illusion which is the basis of these constructions (unreal imagination) does conventionally exist as an interdependent web of causes and conditions, that is the level of the dependent nature. Finally, when the termination of the illusion is brought about – when the basis of the matrix of conceptual construction is abandoned – (Footnote 17 continued). the dependent – i.e., whether it is to be understood as conventionally or ultimately existent – is indeed a point of controversy addressed by Tsong kha pa in his treatment of the Sam: dhinirmocana-s utra (see Hopkins, 1999: 153ff.; also see Hopkins, 2002: 233ff.). For example, Tsong kha pa cites the following passage as one which he intends to refute: Imputational {imagined} factors do not exist as either of the two truths [ultimate or conventional]. The dependent-arisings of other-powered {dependent} natures of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects [which are different substantial entities] exist conventionally [and do not exist ultimately], like magical creations. The thoroughly established {perfected} nature is the ultimate, and its existence in the manner of naturelessness also ultimately exists. (trans. Hopkins, 1999: 156) Also, from reading Hopkins’ work, it is my impression that the Jo nang pa inter- pretation of the three-nature theory seems to be closer to my interpretation of the MSA/Bh’s three-nature theory than Tsong kha pa is. In this connection, Stearns states that according to Dol po pa: The fully established [perfected] nature (parinis: panna) is the state of ultimate reality which can withstand rigorous and reasoned examination from the absolute point of view, and is empty of both the imagined and the dependent natures. In this way all the imagined and dependent phenomena are non-existent in reality, whereas the fully established [perfected] nature is fully established in reality, is never non-existent as the true nature of phenomena, and always exists in truth. (Stearns, 1999: 95) Stearns also points out that Dol po pa considers the Mahay  anas  utr  alam  to be  : kara Great Madhyamaka, i.e., a text presenting the highest teachings (ibid.: 218, note 26). 204 M. D’AMATO buddhahood, an unmediated awareness of thusness, is attained; this is the level of the perfected nature. The key, then, to understanding the doctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh is to interpret the doctrine in soteriologico-ontological terms: the three-nature doctrine is not a model of reality simpliciter; rather, it is a model of how reality is to be realized for the attainment of buddhahood. This interpretation of the three natures may be considered along- side the MSA/Bh’s presentation of the doctrines of mind-only (citta-  matra) and representation-only (vij~  napti-matra). The doctrines of mind-only and representation-only have sometimes been understood as hallmark doctrines of the Yogacara: it has sometimes been stated that the Yog acara is metaphysically idealist because of the claim that reality is ‘‘nothing but mind’’ (citta-matra)  or ‘‘nothing but representation’’ (vij~napti-matra). According to the MSA/Bh, however, the doctrines of representation-only and mind-only are not to be understood as ultimately valid, since in the end the goal is to realize that even mind does not exist.18 Thus in the context of our text, mind- only and representation-only (like the three natures) are better understood as soteriologico-ontological doctrines: they do not represent reality as it really is; rather, they identify stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood. As with the doctrine of the three natures, we may chart out the stages of ontological gnosis according to the doctrine of mind-only or representation-only in terms of the distinction between the conven- tional and ultimate aspects of reality: CONVENTIONAL REALITY (phenomena) reality improperly viewed in terms of the subject–object distinction; mind as distinct from the objects that confront it: duality reality properly viewed as nothing-but-mind; all phenomena reduced to mind: mind-only ULTIMATE REALITY (thusness) not even mind taken to exist: buddhahood 18 MSABh ad 6.6–9 states that a bodhisattva first arrives at mind-only (citta- matra),  but later realizes that even mind-only does not exist; and MSABh ad 11.47 states that a bodhisattva first attains the realization of representation-only (vij~ napti-  matra), but later does not even perceive the reality of that.  THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 205 As presented, we can see that the doctrine of mind-only is quite similar in form to the doctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh. But it may be interesting to note that the two doctrines are also similar in content. We may specify this similarity as follows. Regarding the first element in each diagram, the imagined nature and duality, both are described in terms of the characteristic of subject- object duality. Regarding the second element in each, the dependent nature and mind-only, we have already seen (at 11.40) that the dependent nature is interpreted as having two aspects, a subject- aspect and an object-aspect. We also saw that each of those aspects is understood to be caused by or grounded in the store consciousness (alaya-vij~   nana). Thus the dependent nature is interpreted in terms of the store consciousness – which is the basis of mind.19 The doctrine of mind-only may be described as the view that reality is nothing-but- mind, that all phenomena should be reduced to mind. If we under- stand the concept of mind to be linked to the store consciousness (as at MSABh ad 19.76), then we can see a link between mind-only and the dependent nature.20 At a more theoretical level, we may see that both the dependent nature (explained in terms of the store con- sciousness) and mind-only (according to which all phenomena are reduced to mind) are offered as psychological models for the inter- pretation of phenomenal reality. That is to say, both offer a mental explanation for what are understood to be the underlying processes of phenomenal reality: phenomenal reality is unreal imagination generated through the store consciousness, or phenomenal reality is nothing but mind. Finally, regarding the final element in each dia- gram, we can see that the perfected nature may be related to the stage of buddhahood, wherein not even ‘‘mind-only’’ is taken to exist. The perfected nature is understood to entail a pure, unmediated awareness of thusness, which is equated with the attainment of buddhahood.21 While the MSA/Bh’s presentation of the three-nature theory cer- tainly brings together various terminologies and conceptual cate- gories, I think a case may be made that the text does offer a consistent interpretation of the three natures. Again, the point I have attempted 19 The link between the dependent nature and the store consciousness is also made at MSA/Bh 19.51. 20 An indirect link between these two is also made at MSABh ad 13.19. 21 See MSA/Bh 9.4, 9.22, 9.56, 9.57, 9.81, 11.31, 11.41, 19.79, 20–21.60–61, and the discussion in D’Amato ((2000), Chapter 7: Buddhatva). 206 M. D’AMATO to emphasize here is that in the context of the MSA/Bh, the three- nature theory is properly understood not as an ontological model simpliciter, but rather as a soteriologico-ontological model, a model presenting stages of gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood – an attainment which may be interpreted in terms of a non-conceptually-constructing awareness (nirvikalpa-j~  nana) of thus- ness (tathata).  REFERENCES Bagchi, Sitansusekhar, ed. (1970). Mahay  ana-S  utr  nk  ala _ ara  of Asanga._ Darbhanga, Bihar: Mithila Institute. Boquist, A˚ke. (1993). Trisvabhava:  A Study of the Development of the Three-nature- theory in Yogac  Buddhism. Lund, Sweden: University of Lund.  ara D’Amato, Mario. (2000). The Mahay  ana-H   inayana Distinction in the Mahay  anas  utr  : kara:  alam  A Terminological Analysis. Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. Davidson, Ronald M. (1985). 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