on gender chauvinism
Lajos Brons (mail@lajosbrons.net)1
Department of Philosophy, Nihon University, and
Lakeland College, Japan Campus, Tokyo, Japan
abstract — Male chauvinism is the belief that men are morally superior to women. Female chauvinism
is the belief that women are morally superior to men. Both depend on the assumption of essential or
natural gender diferences between men and women with regards to thinking styles, most easily
summarized as male principle-based thinking and female empathic thinking. There is no evidence for
such a gender diference, however, but there is evidence that diferences in experience and
circumstances can lead to relevant diferences. People who care (often women) become more caring,
for example. By implication, gender chauvinism is based on false premises, and therefore, its
superiority claims are false as well. Moreover, because both male and female chauvinism imply that it is
socially preferable if women focus on caring tasks and occupation before taking on other jobs, both
promote the same social inequality, and consequently, female chauvinism is anti-feminist.
1.
Male chauvinism is the belief that men are superior to women. Female chauvinism is just the
reverse. Either variety of gender chauvinism can be unpacked in a number of ways, but I want
to focus here (at least initially) on two chauvinisms that are each other’s mirror image and
that start with the following two premises:
[MP] Male thinking is more focused on and guided by abstract principles, and is therefore
more rational, contractual, and impersonal.
[FE] Female thinking is more focused on and guided by empathy, and is therefore more
emotional, caring, and personal.
The two chauvinisms share these two premises but difer in their third premise and,
therefore, in their conclusions. Male chauvinism continues as follows:
[PS] Thinking that is focused on and guided by abstract principles (and that is more rational,
contractual, and impersonal) is superior to thinking that is focused on and guided by
empathy (and that is more emotional, caring, and personal).
[MS] Therefore, men are superior to women.
1 Version of 03/19/2016.
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And female chauvinism as follows:2
[ES] Thinking that is focused on and guided by empathy (and that is more emotional, caring,
and personal) is superior to thinking that is focused on and guided by abstract
principles (and that is more rational, contractual, and impersonal).
[FS] Therefore, women are superior to men.
This paper analyzes these arguments with the aim of pointing out a number of serious
laws. These arguments deserve this attention because more or less sophisticated versions of
either argument appear frequently in non-academic discussions about gender roles and
gender equality, but also play a role in the background of more academic debates on these and
related issues. It is hard to miss the female chauvinism in Caroll Gilligan’s In a Diferent Voice
(1982) or Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking (1989), for example. This female chauvinism is a
special case of what Iddo Landau (1997) has called the “good-women-bad-men” bias, which is
as common in (academic and popular) feminist thought, as male chauvinism elsewhere. 3
2.
The irst problem for the arguments as presented above is that they are invalid. The conclusions
do not follow from the premises because [MS] and [FS] are about superiority of people, while
premises [PS] and [ES] are about superiority of thinking styles. This problem can easily be
ixed, however, by means of a bridging premise like the following:
[B] If group x thinks in a way that is superior to the way of thinking of group y, then group
x is superior to group y.
If [B] is added as a premise, then conclusions [MS] and [FS] do follow, and thus the arguments
are valid, which raises the question whether they are sound – that is, whether their premises
are true.
The truth of a premise depends on two things, the meaning of that premise, and the way
the world is. In their current form, [PS], [ES], and [B] are all meaningless, however, because
being superior is not a two-place predicate as these premises suggest, but a three-place
predicate involving the superior, the inferior, and something like a context. It is meaningless
to say that x is superior to y without specifying in what sense one is supposed to be superior
to the other.
The kind or context of superiority in the conclusions is usually moral superiority, which
means something like “being more capable of making moral, political, and/or other socially
2 Of the two variants of gender chauvinism, male chauvinism is, of course, the better known. To my
knowledge, the irst inluential use of the notion of female chauvinism as understood in this paper
was that by Betty Friedan in her It Changed My Life (1976).
3 Either variant of gender chauvinism is an example of what I called “crude othering” elsewhere. (See
Brons 2015.)
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important decisions”. Superiority in [PS] and [ES] is not moral superiority in the same sense,
however, as ways of thinking are not themselves capable of making decisions. The most
plausible candidate kind/context of superiority in [PS] and [ES] is something like usefulness in
the sense of “most likely to produce desirable results”. A way of thinking is superior to
another if – in a given context – it is most likely to produce desirable results (in that context).
For example, logical thinking is superior when one wants to solve a logic problem, and
empathic thinking is superior when one wants to understand (what’s wrong with) a crying
child. Here the context of superiority is that of moral, political, and/or other socially
important decision-making, and therefore, “superior” in [PS] and [ES] and the irst occurrence
of “superior” in [B] mean “more likely to produce desirable results with regards to moral,
political and/or other socially important decision-making”, and “superior” in [MS] and [FS]
and the second occurrence of “superior” in [B] mean “more capable of making moral,
political, and/or other socially important decisions”. For clarity, [B'] substitutes these longer
descriptions for the two occurrences of “superior” in [B]:
[B'] If group x thinks in a way that is more likely to produce desirable results with regards
to moral, political and/or other socially important decision-making than the way of
thinking of group y, then group x is more capable of making moral, political, and/or
other socially important decisions than group y.
And similarly, [PS] and [MS] become:
[PS'] Thinking that is focused on and guided by abstract principles (and that is more rational,
contractual, and impersonal) is more likely to produce desirable results with regards to
moral, political and/or other socially important decision-making than thinking that is
focused on and guided by empathy (and that is more emotional, caring, and personal).
[MS'] Therefore, men are more capable of making moral, political, and/or other socially
important decisions than women.
Obviously, other interpretations of superiority are possible, but if the kind/context of
superiority of ways of thinking deviates too much from the kind/context of superiority of
groups, then [B] becomes very implausible. And given the present aim of analyzing the above
gender chauvinist arguments, these arguments must be interpreted and reconstructed in
their strongest, most plausible forms. [B'] is the most plausible reconstruction of the bridging
premise that I could think of.
Let us assume that [B'] is true. Attention then shifts to premises [PS'] and [ES']. In summary
form, [PS'] (given above) claims that principle-based thinking is better in social decision-
making than empathic thinking, while [ES'] claims it is the other way around. Assessing the
truth of these claims appears to be an empirical matter, although I don’t see any obvious way
to test them. Neither claim strikes me as particularly credible, however. If [PS'] were true,
then we should put intelligent psychopaths in charge. (Perhaps, we have already done that. If
so, then the results suggest that [PS'] is false.) If, on the other hand, [ES'] were true, then we
should put bonobos in charge. What seems much more plausible than either [PS'] or [ES'] is
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that social decision-making requires both principle-based thinking and empathic thinking –
that is, something like the following:
[CS] A well-balanced combination of principle-based thinking and empathic thinking is
more likely to produce desirable results with regards to moral, political and/or other
socially important decision-making than either kind of thinking on its own.
Wherein “principle-based thinking” summarizes the longer phrase “thinking that is focused
on and guided by abstract principles (and that is more rational, contractual, and impersonal)”
used before, and similarly “empathic thinking” summarizes “thinking that is focused on and
guided by empathy (and that is more emotional, caring, and personal)”.
Of course, [CS] is a useless premise in either variety of gender chauvinism presented above,
but it suggests two further varieties. These gender chauvinisms replace [MP] and [FE] with
[CS] and a claim that one gender is suiciently capable of (balancing) both kinds of thinking
while the other is lacking in one of the two. For example:
[FC] Female thinking is a well-balanced combination of principle-based thinking and
empathic thinking, but male thinking (which may or may not be more principle-based)
is lacking in empathic thinking (and therefore, less well-balanced).
From [FC], [SC], and [B] the same conclusion [FS] follows: women are morally superior to men.
(I don’t think a similar argument has ever been made for male superiority, however.)
Although there are diferences between gender chauvinism based on [FC] and those based
on [MP] and [FE], these diferent premises are also importantly similar: they assume an
essential diference between male and female styles of thinking. Ultimately, all variants of
gender chauvinism depend on that assumption. Before we turn our attention to male and
female styles of thinking, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of these chauvinisms,
however.
3.
If the conclusion of gender chauvinism is true, then men are more suitable for certain kinds of
social tasks and occupations, and women for others. If the conclusion of male chauvinism is
true, then men should be in charge of governments and businesses; if the conclusion of female
chauvinism is true, then women should be in charge. Or so it seems, at least.
It is important to note that in all variants (that is, both those based on [MP] and [FE] and
those based on [FC]) women are assumed to be more empathic, caring, and emotional; and
men are assumed to be more rational and impersonal. All variants of gender chauvinism take
– more or less – these gender diferences for granted; they merely difer in which qualities
they value higher and/or consider more important (for social decision-making).
Social tasks and occupations can – at least in theory – be ranked by the extent to which
they depend on an empathic or caring attitude of the person performing that task. Being the
primary care-giver of a child ranks very high on that list. (Usually a mother is the primary
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care-giver. Fathers as primary care-givers are relatively rare.) So does being a nurse, or being a
childcare worker; and so do a number of other occupations that have traditionally been
considered to be appropriate for women. If it is assumed that the number of high-ranking
care-requiring tasks and occupations is not much lower than the number of available women
– and I don’t think that this is an implausible assumption – then it would be socially
preferable that women are mothers, nurses, and so forth irst, and only occupy themselves
with politics and business (for example) after all care-requiring tasks have been taken care of.
Or shorter: if women are better care-givers than men, then women should focus on the tasks
that require most care-giving. Of course, it may very well be the case that politics and
business also require (or would be improved by) an empathic or caring attitude, but if such
attitudes are in short supply, then they should be used where they are needed most irst, and
that is not in politics and business, but in hospitals, daycare facilities, and at home.
To be clear, I’m not arguing that women should be mothers and nurses and stay out of
business and politics. What I am arguing, however, is that this follows from gender chauvinism,
regardless of whether that is male or female chauvinism. It is the assumption of diferences
between men and women with regards to empathy and care (combined with the plausible
assumptions that some tasks require more care than others and that care is in short supply)
that leads to this conclusion. By implication, it is not just male feminism that holds back
gender equality, but female chauvinism as well. Female chauvinism is anti-feminist.
This conclusion shouldn’t come as a surprise. In an unequal social system, any real or
supposed diference between the privileged and oppressed groups is more likely to be used to
help justify that inequality than counter it (not in the least because the privileged have more
means to use it to their advantage). The implications of this should be clear. If the assumed
gender diferences are real, then women should return to their caring roles. If the assumed
gender diferences are false, then they are an example of male ideology (in the Marxian sense
of “ideology”) corrupting feminism from within. (In that case, this would be one of the most
“beautiful” examples of cultural hegemony at work.)
Furthermore, female chauvinism is ofensive – not because it claims that women are
superior, because that is a meaningless claim (see above), but for the exact same reasons that
male chauvinism (or racism) is ofensive: it tells some group of people that they are less
suitable for certain tasks or occupations on the basis of nothing but their group membership.
Male chauvinism is ofensive because it tells women that they are less suitable for politics and
business and should stick to childcare and cooking dinner for their husbands. Female
chauvinism is ofensive because it implies the reverse – that is, that men are less suitable as
primary care-givers. As a male primary care-giver in a household that has mostly reversed the
traditional gender roles, I am deeply ofended by the suggestion that the content of my pants
makes me somehow less suitable for that role (and thus that we are doing something wrong as
a family).
However, if the assumed gender diferences underlying gender chauvinism turn out to be
true, then all of the above is moot. It makes no sense to be ofended by facts, or to claim that
facts are “anti-feminist”. So it all boils down to facts, to the facts of gender diference,
particularly.
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4.
The supposed gender diferences are twofold: (1) male thinking is more focused on and guided
by abstract principles (and is therefore more rational, contractual, and impersonal) than
female thinking, and (2) female thinking is more focused on and guided by empathy (and is
therefore more emotional, caring, and personal) than male thinking. This is what is claimed
by premises [MP] and [FE], but also by [FC]. The latter claims that women are better at
balancing the two styles of thought, but that still implies the same relative diference in focus.
Although this has not yet been made explicit in the above, gender chauvinism does not
claim that either men or women are superior due to diferences in education or culturally
determined diferences in circumstances. Rather, the arguments for chauvinism depend on
the assumption that these are natural, essential, and/or inherent diferences. If men would be
superior (in the relevant sense) because they receive a diferent education from women, that
would be a better argument for changing education than for male chauvinism. But if men are
superior (in the relevant sense) because of natural (etc.) gender diferences, then that could
support a male chauvinist conclusion.
There is little reason to believe in such essential or natural diferences, however. Naomi
Weisstein (1971; 1993), John Dupré (1993, chapter 3), and others have convincingly argued
against essentialist understandings of gender. And Janet Shiblet Hyde’s (2005) review of meta-
analyses of gender diferences shows that there is little evidence for gender diferences (aside
from physical strength) at all. There is no evidence that male thinking is more principle-based
or abstract than female thinking, and certainly no evidence that there would be a natural or
essential gender diference in this respect.
Nevertheless, while many may be willing to admit that women are as rational (and
irrational) as men, the assumption of diferences with regards to empathy and care appear to
be more persistent. Maternal care is the stock example “proving” that women care more or
deeper than men. But again, even if there is such a diference – and let us assume there is for
argument’s sake – then this only supports gender chauvinism (and probably only female
chauvinism) if it is a natural or essential diference, and not just a consequence of culturally
enforced diference in roles or circumstances. Evidence suggests that this is not the case.
Starting with pregnancy, but continuing after the birth of a child, there are important
hormonal changes and structural changes in the mother’s brain, but recent research has
shown that similar changes take place in men. Care-giving results in hormonal changes and
structural changes of the brain of fathers similar to those of mothers, and provided that the
mother and father are suiciently close, hormonal changes start in fathers already during
pregnancy. (For a review of hormonal changes in fathers, see Storey & Ziegler 2016; for a
review of structural brain changes in fathers, see Kim et al. 2014.) Some of the most
interesting results come from a study by Eyal Abraham and colleagues (2014), who show that
hormonal and brain changes in men depend on the intensity of care. What these results
suggest is (a) that women are not inherently more caring or empathic than men, and (b) that
for women there are two ways to acquire the hormonal changes and structural brain changes
to become more caring, pregnancy and being a primary care-giver, while for men there is only
one, being a primary care-giver. And importantly, there is no signiicant diference in the
results: male primary care-givers are as caring as female primary care-givers. (But primary
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care mothers are more caring than non-primary care fathers, and that remains the standard
in most – if not all – societies, thus continuously reinforcing the image of the caring mother.)
In other words, gender chauvinism has things backwards. It is not the case that a more
caring attitude makes women better care-givers. Rather, being forced to give more care
makes women more caring. (And forcing men to give more care would make men more caring
in exactly the same way.)
Therefore, [MP], [FE], and [FC] are false. The supposed natural or essential gender
diferences are a myth. It is important to realize that this is a self-sustaining myth. It is this
myth that forces women to give more care than men, thus making them more caring than
men, thus apparently conirming the myth.
5.
If natural or essential gender diferences with regards to rationality, empathy, and so forth
are a myth – and a damaging myth, moreover, given the inequality it promotes – then an
obvious question would be how we can get rid of this myth, or make it less inluential at least.
This is not the main topic of this short paper, however, so I will only make a brief comment
about this.
Given the evidence, the whole idea of inherently male or female styles of thinking makes
no sense. There is no male thinking. There is no female thinking. There is just thinking.
Thinking can become more principle-based and/or more empathic depending on the
circumstances of the thinker (and on the context), but that has nothing inherently to do with
gender. (In practice it has a lot to do with gender, however, as forcing men and women in
diferent roles shapes their brains in accordance with those roles.)
Stereotypes of male and female thinking only reinforce gender chauvinism and inequality,
and must, therefore, be countered. Unfortunately, such stereotypes are extremely
widespread, and not just outside the academy, but in various academic disciplines as well. A
famous example is Geert Hofstede’s (1984) ranking of masculine and feminine cultures, which
is based on a distinction that largely follows stereotypes of women as more caring and
cooperative and men as less caring and more competitive. The cultural dimension is real
enough, but the choice of labels is unfortunate.
In this paper I have argued that gender chauvinism – either male chauvinism or female
chauvinism – is based on an argument that is fatally lawed because it depends on a false
assumption of essential/natural gender diference with regards to thinking styles, rationality,
and empathy (or caringness). Moreover, gender chauvinism is not just false, it is ofensive and
anti-feminist because both male chauvinism and female chauvinism promote a kind of gender
inequality that is disadvantageous to women. For that reason, anyone who favors equality of
rights and opportunities for men and women (and everyone in between) should ight any
kind of gender chauvinism. Unfortunately, this is an uphill battle, as the stereotypes that
reinforce the assumption of gender diference are extremely widespread and inluential.
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National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 111.27: 9792-7.
Brons, Lajos L. (2015), “Othering, an analysis” Transcience: a Journal of Global Studies 6.1: 69-90.
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