The Fall of Two Capitals: The Mongol Conquests of Abbasid Baghdad (1258) and Song Hangzhou (1276)

Writing Sample HUA The Fall of Two Capitals: The Mongol Conquests of Abbasid Baghdad (1258) and Song Hangzhou (1276) Kaiqi Hua UC Merced Abstract: In the thirteenth century, the Mongols swept through Eurasia by capturing numerous cities, including two of the largest and richest capital cities in Asia: Abbasid Baghdad in 1258, and Southern Song Hangzhou (also known as Lin’an) in 1276. Baghdad had lost its political centrality in the fragmented Islamic world, but maintained its status as a religious center under the Abbasid Caliph; Hangzhou, the “temporary residence” of Song emperors for a century and a half after the loss of the original Song capital to invasion, remained both politically and culturally preeminent among Song cities. The Caliph in Baghdad surrendered to the Mongols after a short siege, and the city was then destroyed and its population (including the Caliph) massacred. The Song regent, the grandmother of the six-year-old Song emperor, surrendered Hangzhou to the Mongols without resistance, and no sack or massacre of the city occurred. Were the different fates of Baghdad and Hangzhou due only to the choice of whether or not to resist the Mongol attack? Why was the Mongol advance into the Islamic world permanently halted by the Mamluks in 1260, whereas the Mongols were able to defeat the last Song resistance forces and complete the conquest of China in 1279? This paper analyzes the deeper reasons behind these different outcomes. Keywords: Mongol, Baghdad, Hangzhou 1 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Have you seen in all the length and breadth of the earth A city such as Baghdad? Indeed it is paradise on earth.1 Umara ibn Aqil, ninth century Arab poet The Noble and Magnificent city of Quinsai (Hangzhou), a name that signifies “the celestial city”, and which it merits from its pre-eminence to all others in the world, in point of grandeur and beauty, as well as from its abundant delights, which might lead an inhabitant to imagine himself in paradise.2 Marco Polo (1254-1324) Introduction The campaigns against the Southern Song and the Abbasid Caliphate were the last unified military ventures of the Mongolian empire. The Mongols’ mandate to bring the known world under their dominion was never to be realized.3 Of the two capitals, Baghdad laid in ruin but the other remained its urban spectacle. Baghdad suffered complete destruction, especially the west bank of the Tigris. Only a few buildings along the east bank remained, such as Nestorian churches and the Mustansiriyah College. In contrast, Hangzhou’s landscape was not largely changed, until in 1285 the Song imperial palace was burned down by the Tangut Lama and head of the Yuan Bureau of Buddhist Affairs, Yang Lianzhenjia 楊 璉真珈 (?-?). The campaign against Hangzhou was among the most carefully devised and least violent conquests in Mongol history.4 Both Baghdad and Hangzhou were besieged in January, a difficult time for adequate food supplies. But fortunately the siege of Hangzhou did not last for many years as the one in Xiangyang. Two rich metropolises were both over one million in population before the Mongols arrived. After the Mongols' takeover, Baghdadis were almost annihilated, but while Hangzhou’s population declined as well, it was with limited mortality. Furthermore, a huge epidemic followed the sack of Baghdad, sweeping across Persia and Mesopotamia to Syria, and killing more people who survived under the Mongols’ iron hoofs. Both of the paradise-like cities had their heyday in the medieval world, but Baghdad never revived its past prosperity and influence in the Islamic world. Its fine canal irrigation 1 Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, The topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages: Texts and Studies, trans. Jacob Lassner (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), 47. 2 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2008), 209-10. 3 Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 5 Part One: The Song Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907-1279 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 413. 4 Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6 Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 942. 2 / 31 Writing Sample HUA system was destroyed, farmlands salinized, and agriculture declined. After the Mamluks defeated the Mongols and killed the military leader, General Ket Buqa, in Ayn Julut in 1260, the center of the Islamic world moved to Cairo, Egypt. Hangzhou declined to become a provincial city rather than the imperial capital. It did keep its regional influence in economy and culture, and it was revived in the early Ming dynasty after the retreat of the Mongols; however, Hangzhou was not a capital again and lost its empirewide political significance. Though we have vivid accounts of urban life by contemporary travelers such as Marco Polo and Ibn Battutah, the city’s natural beauty faded after the fall of the Song dynasty. Composition of the Mongol Forces: Hulagu vs. Bayan Neither let any bastion remain in the world nor leave a pile of dust standing. ash d al- n5 After meeting at the khuriltai of 1251, the Great Khan khaghan Mongke 蒙哥 (1209-1259) sent out his brothers Khubilai 忽必烈 (1215-1294) to East and South Asia, and Hulagu 旭烈兀 (1217-1265) to Central and West Asia, along with highly qualified soldiers and commanders, to achieve the incomplete mission of Genghis Khan (1162-1227) of conquering the world.6 Selected from Mongke’s personal guard, Uriyangkhadai 兀良合台 (1201-1272) was the commander of Khubilai’s army heading to Southwest China and Southeast Asia. Ethnically and culturally, many commanders of Khubilai were Northern and Southern Chinese deserters. They were very aware of the need to preserve the Song empire’s wealth and culture, as well as its fertile lands and plenty of laborers, in order to secure tax revenues and manpower. As the paper will discuss later, ong Wenbing’s 董文炳 (1217-1278) proposal to save all books of the imperial library is a good example. ash d al- n, Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jami’u’t-Tawarikh - Compendium of Chronicles, trans. W M Thackston (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998), 479. 6 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 478. “Qubilai to the east realms of Cathay, Machin, Qarajang, Tangqut, Tibet, Jurcha, Solanqa and Kauli [Korea], and the part of India that was adjacent to Cathay and Machin. To Hulagu were assigned the western lands of Iran, Syria, Egypt, Anatolia, and Armenia.” Also see Song Lian 宋濂, Yuanshi (Chronicle of the Yuan Dynasty, 1369) 元史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), juan 3 “Record of Xianzong” 憲宗紀. 5 3 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Accompanying Hulagu’s troops to destroy fortresses between the Quhistan and Khurasan (Korasan) regions was a large army led by many sophisticated generals, such as Mongke’s personal steward Ket Buqa (Ked Bukha) 怯的不花 (?-1260) and the Nestorian Christian and Chinese general Guo Kan 郭侃 (1217-1277). The army included a thousand engineers and infantry from Northern China. 7 Hulagu’s forces allied with Mongols, Armenians and Turks from the Golden Horde and the Chaghadai Khanate. Hulagu set the military base in Tabriz, far north of Baghdad. He converged multiple Mongol forces from the Golden Horde, Anatolia and Georgia, and moved around between Tabriz and Hamadan preparing for war. In November 1257, the numerous armies left Hamadan and flooded to Baghdad. According to old Mongol tradition, he summoned two astrologers for divination, Husamuddin (Husam alDin) and Khwaja Nasiruddin Tusi (Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi). Husamuddin predicted that the conquest would fail and lead to six disasters, but Tusi claimed the auspicious vision that “Hulagu Khan will take the Caliph’s place”. 8 Because Tusi was a Shi’i Muslim and he was not conversant with the Sunni Caliphate, Hulagu favored Tusi and kept him as personal advisor although he had initially recruited Tusi for just a short time from Alamut, the fortress of the Assassins. Thus Hulagu began his march to Baghdad in three divisions. Jochi’s grandsons led troops from the Golden Horde to meet Hulagu in the north, Ket Buqa’s army as the right wing marched to reach the shore of the gulf, and Hulagu led the middle wing with nobles and forces from Persia directly headed to Baghdad through Kirmanshahan and Hulwan. He also sent an envoy to the Caliph with the message: “If the Caliph is in submission, let him come out. Otherwise, this means war. Let the Vizier, Sulaymanshah, and the Dawatdar (i.e. the vice inkpot holder, or the lesser marshal) come first to hear our words.”9 From December 18, 1257 to January 16, 1258, the right wing crossed Tigris River and arrived at Nahr Isa near al-Dujayl, north of Baghdad. The Mongols fought against the Abbasid army at the gate to Mansur’s kiosk above Midrafa, and separated the leagues ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 486. Ket Buqa left in 1252 and Hulagu left in 1253. ibid., 492-3. 9 ibid., 495. 7 8 4 / 31 Writing Sample HUA from Baghdad.10 There was a lake in this vicinity of Baghdad. The Mongols opened the dikes and flooded the entire plain behind the backs of the Baghdadi army. 11 The army was defeated and few soldiers survived. The routes from independent Muslim areas of Syria and Egypt had been cut off; therefore, no aid could reach Baghdad. From January 22 through 29, “the Mongol army swarmed in like ants and locusts from all directions, forming a circle around the ramparts of Baghdad and setting up a wall.”12 A unit consisting of one thousand “crews” of Chinese artillerymen helped breach the walls.13 They set up catapults opposite the Ajami Tower (i.e. The Persian Tower) in the southeast corner of the city and breached it. 14 Ironically, in the 1270s during the siege warfare in China, Khubilai adopted Persian engineers from Ilkhanate to build catapults and mangonels against the Chinese. The Vizier and the catholicos (i.e., the Nestorian Christian patriarch) were sent by the Caliph to Hulagu for his earlier request. But Hulagu turned them back and required the Dawatdar and Sulaymanshah to come with the Vizier together. A fierce battle lasted six days and nights.15 Hulagu wrote the decree saying “The lives of cadis (judges), scholars, shaykhs (clergymen), Alids (descendants of Ali, the Shi’is), and Nestorian priests, and persons who do not combat against us are safe from us,” and the messages were fastened to arrows and shot into Baghdad from all directions.16 On February 3, the Mongol army flooded through the Suq Sultan Gate and the east wall of Baghdad was taken.17 Hulagu ordered his soldiers to build floating bridges from boats upstream and downstream of Tigris, and to patrol to prevent people from escaping from Baghdad.18 It seems this idea was brought from the legendary Chinese general Guo Kan, according to his biography in official Chinese Chronicle: There was a big river among two cities (i.e. West and East Baghdad). Kan built a floating bridge in order to prevent escape. When the city was conquered, the Caliph sultan got on a boat. When 10 ibid., 495. ibid., 495. 12 ibid., 495-6. 13 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 403. 14 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 496. 15 ibid., 496. 16 ibid., 496. 17 ibid., 496.Russian and Chinese version, Feb. 4, 18 ibid., 496. 11 5 / 31 Writing Sample HUA he saw the blockade of floating bridges, he had himself bound and came to our camp to surrender.19 Whether or not the Caliph had tried to escape by boat, he was truly desperate when he met the Dawatdar who attempted by boat but failed. He said, “I will surrender.”20 Around February 5 to 6, the Caliph’s eldest and middle sons, along with the Vizier, came out of the city to see Hulagu but were denied. Hulagu said: “The Caliph can do what he wants. If he wants, let him come out; if not, let him not come out. But the Mongol troops will remain on the walls where they are until they come out.” 21 On February 8, the awatdar’s family and his followers, the astrologer Sulaymanshah and seven hundred of his relatives came out of the city. They were all slaughtered.22 When the Caliph Mustasim (1213-1258) finally realized the end of the Abbasid dynasty. He asked the Vizier, “What to be done?” The Vizier Alqami quoted a line from poetry: They think the matter is simple, but it is a sword whose edges have been sharpened for meeting.23 Like Hulagu’s international troops, Khubilai’s armies, navies and cavalries were multiethnic groups of Mongols, northern Chinese, Uighurs, Persians, Koreans, and Jurchens. 24 The Song commander of Xiangyang city, Lu Wenhuan 呂文煥 (?-1286) did not want to give away the city at first. But he changed his mind when he was shocked by both the massacre in the nearby twin city Fancheng after it fell to the Mongols, and the great damage in Xiangyang that caused by huge rocks hurled from catapults and mangonels, which were built by two gifted Persian Muslim engineers, Isma’il and Ala al-Din, sent by the Ilkhan Abaqa.25 Khubilai pardoned Lu Wenhuan and the inhabitants of Xiangyang, and later Lu became a Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 149 “Biography of Guo Kan” 郭侃傳. ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 496. 21 ibid., 497. 22 The Dawatdar and Sulaymanshah came out the city on Feb. 7, but Hulagu told them to go back to the city and bring their family and follows out. He said he would pardon them and take them to conquer Egypt and Syria together. However, when they came out on Feb. 8, nothing was waiting for them but death. 23 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 497. 24 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 403, 431. Also in the 1250s under Mongke, “The armies that invaded the Song between 1253 and 1259 contained, besides Mongolian and Turkic contingents, Chinese, Tanguts, Koreans, Uighurs, and Alans, the last a north Caucasian people impressed into service following the census of 1254.” 25 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 203, 454-5. Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 433; also the cannons from Persia called huihui pao 回回炮. 19 20 6 / 31 Writing Sample HUA loyal general of the Mongols for assisting in the warfare towards the Song. Becasue of Lu’s reputation, his social network in the Song military system and the fear created by terrible stories of Xiangyang and Fancheng, one city after another along the middle and lower reaches of Yangzi River surrendered without any resistance, including Huangzhou, Qizhou, Jiangzhou, Anqing and Chizhou. The Mongols welcomed defectors and appointed many excellent generals of the Song such as Fan Wenhu 範文虎 (?-1302) to new positions in military.26 In the summer of 1273, following the advice of one of his most trusted Chinese generals, Shi Tianze 史 澤 (1202-1275), Khubilai appointed Bayan 伯顏 (1236-1294) as the chief commander of the Mongol forces in charge of all military affairs in China. Bayan’s fame had accumulated before the Xiangyang battle. His family had served Hulagu’s army and helped most of his campaigns in Middle East. He was sent to Khubilai as Hulagu’s envoy from Persia in 1265. He impressed Khubilai with his abilities and later was kept in the Yuan court.27 Bayan’s tactic after conquering Xiangyang and Fancheng was directly heading to Hangzhou in spite of several small towns around middle Yangzi River basin, in order to conquer the Song capital and finish the war in a short time. General Guo Kan, the Chinese commander of Baghdad battle, proposed the similar plan before the conquest of Xiangyang: The Song is based in the Southeast, located in the Wu and Yue areas, and the most significant cities are Jingzhou and Xiangyang. The current strategy is to take Xiangyang first. If Xiangyang is conquered, cities such as Yangzhou and Luzhou are tiny areas that do not deserve much attention. But (we should) immediately drive to Lin’an (Hangzhou); (if Hangzhou is taken) then Jianghuai – lower Yangzi delta and Bashu – Sichuan will surrender without any fight.28 According to their strategy, Hangzhou was easily taken in 1276. Bayan ordered the Chinese general Dong Wenbing to dissolve the Song administration, dismiss military forces, seal the imperial storehouse, and collect musical instruments and books. Dong submitted all seals of the Song emperors to Bayan. The Like Lu and Fan’s surrenders, also due to their disappointment to the Song court’s weak supply provides, mistakable policies and corrupted leadership especially Chancellor Jia Sidao 27 For Bayan’s biography, see Igor achewiltz, In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yuan Period (1200-1300) (Harrassowitz Verlag. Wiesbaden, 1993) 587-607. Bayan’s father died during Hulagu’s siege of the Assassins. 28 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 149 “Biography of Guo Kan”. 26 7 / 31 Writing Sample HUA local society was in order and even most Hangzhou inhabitants did not realize the state had changed. In contrast to what the Mongols did to the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, according to ong’s suggestion and the Chinese tradition of official chronicle editing, the Mongols collected all books from imperial library and transported them to the Yuan capital in Beijing.29 However, most leaders of Hulagu's troops were neither Iraqi nor Persian. Many of them were not Muslims. Since the Caliphate had no political significance, Hulagu only had two goals: to demolish this religious icon and to seize the Caliph’s wealth and women. He and his followers ignored the cultural heritage of the city and treated Baghdad not as a commercial or secular city but a storehouse of treasures and the residence of a magnate. Unlike the siege of Hangzhou, the Mongol troops' goal was the control of materials more than the iconic meaning of taking the city. Ruling Legitimacy: Hulagu vs. Khubilai My enemy has succeeded: I have fallen into a snare like a clever little bird. ash d al- n 30 Khubilai’s personal preference of Chinese culture and his position as the emperor of China, who has mandate of heaven, forced him to absorb the Song culture of South China rather than destroying it. The bloody stories about the fall of Kaifeng, Xi Xia and Baghdad, as well as the position of the Great Khan with questionable legitimacy, made him restrict violence, although some massacres took place during the conquest of Song dynasty such as in Fancheng and in Changzhou. Before Khubilai’s enthronement, domestic conflict divided the royal family of Toluid between Khubilai and Mongke. In the 1250s, no one dared to question Mongke’s authority as the Great Khan - the Khan of Khans - except the Chaghadai Khan. However, Khubilai gained power in his appanage of North China and made Mongke worry about his throne. In 1257, the Great Khan ordered an investigation of 29 30 ibid., juan 156. ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 498. 8 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Khubilai’s activities including an accused corruption case in Shaanxi province. In 1258, heeding suggestions from many Chinese advisors such as Liu Bingzhong 劉秉忠 (1216-1274), Khubilai went back to Karakorum in early 1258 to reaffirm his loyalty and submissiveness to Mongke’s authority. Mongke immediately forgave his negligence and restored his troops for the campaign against the Song. Hulagu, by adopting the title il-khan and continuing tributes to advertise his subordination to the Great Khan, earned enough trust from Mongke. Also because he was far west out of the political core in Mongolia’s homeland, he was not in the scope of domestic political conflict. He was allowed to conduct the Baghdad campaign in February 1258.31 Therefore at the same time in early 1258, Hulagu was leading troops to storm the Caliph’s palace arbitrarily, while Khubilai had to visit Mongke’s palace to beg for his indulgence.32 Khubilai, soon after the death of Mongke Khan in 1259, proclaimed himself the Great Khan in Kaiping (Shangdu/Xanadu) supported by the il-khan Abaqa (Abakha) 阿 哈 (1234-1282) son of Hulagu. Khubilai initiated the civil war against his younger brother Arigh Boke 阿裡不哥 (1219-1266), who was elected as the Great Khan in Karakorum with backing by the Golden Horde of Russia and Chaghadai Khanate of Central Asia. Later in 1267, after successfully defeating Arigh Boke and suppressing the Li Tan rebellion in Shandong province, Khubilai cleared all obstacles in his domain of North China and readied to end Song rule in the South. He published the Imperial Order of Conquering the South of Yangzi River Xia Jiangnan Xi 下江南檄, by citing mismanagement of the Song empire itself and indicating his willing to reunify all of China. He criticized: (The Song Empire) has not realized that it already lost its people’s belief, It has not noticed that the Mandate of Heaven is going to be transferred.33 Although Khubilai already declared war against the Song in 1274, he was not willing to have a bloody consequence. Compared to well-known stories of past slaughters, such as the Jurchen Jin in Kaifeng 31 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 408-9. It is hard to say Khubilai was willing to make this trip, or it was just his political show for Mongke. 33 Tao Zongyi, Nan Cun Chuo Gen Lu 南村輟耕錄 j.1,檄 32 9 / 31 Writing Sample HUA (1127), the Mongols in Xi Xia (1227) and in Kaifeng of Jin (1234), and Hulagu in Baghdad (1258), he did not wish to repeat the same notorious actions in Hangzhou. According to his taxation and administrative experience in North China, he needed elites, laborers, technologies and resources to run his giant empire rather than just kill them and seize their wealth. The Song had the world’s largest population, and it was richer than any other realms invaded by the Mongols before. Hangzhou, like Baghdad, was a metropolis with over one million inhabitants, extended vicinities, a developed economy, spectacular cultures, a flourishing irrigation system, a heavenly landscape, and international connections of maritime transportation. Khubilai did not want to finish the conquest by leaving a ruin. Another reason is that he wanted to limit the Mongol forces’ casualties, because the humid and hot climate of the south, and potential diseases in forests and jungles, might cause a big problem for his soldiers. Furthermore, the extensive waterways in South China could trouble the fast chariots and cavalries, and they required a navy of excellent sailors and large number of ships as good as the Song’s. Having considered these issues, Khubilai dispatched the Uighur Confucian minister Lian Xixian's 廉希 憲 (1231-1280) brother Lian Xixian2 廉希賢 (1247-1275), and Yan Zhongfan 嚴忠範 (?-1275) as emissaries to Hangzhou in 1275. Bayan warned them the risk of this mission, since the former Yuan envoy Hao Jing 郝經 (1223-1275) was detained during his visit to the Song in 1260 and was under hostage for fifteen years. When Lian and Yan reached the Pass of Sole Pine Dusong Guan, north of Hangzhou, the Song defense forces did not get information about their visit and suspected the five hundred Mongol soldiers who escorted the emissaries were actually invading Hangzhou. They soon killed Yan and imprisoned Lian Xixian2 to death. 34 When the Song court realized the misunderstanding, it expressed regret to Bayan but again killed all other envoys he sent, such as Qin Zhong 秦中, Zhang Yu 張羽 and Wang Zhang 王章. Both Khubilai and Bayan were outraged by this violence so they cancelled all negotiation offers. They met in Kaiping in July 1275 and discussed the circumstance in the south. Khubilai was busy at suppressing the invasion from his major antagonist Khaidu 海都 (1230-1301) the 34 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan4, 127. 10 / 31 Writing Sample HUA grandson of Ogedai in the northwest.35 So he mostly accepted all the tactics Bayan drafted.36 On July 20, Bayan was appointed as the Right Chancellor and Aju 阿朮 (1227?-1287) as the Left Chancellor in the Yuan court. eligion is another issue drove historians’ attention. Khubilai was never converted to a certain religion, but he and his wife Chabi 察必 (1227-1281) preferred Buddhism. The Song Empire did not have a state religion, and the state policy was the flourishing and integration of all religions except for a few illegal local cults. Khubilai was generous on religious policy, and religion did not play an important role during his conquest of the Song. However, Hulagu’s wife and commander Ket Buqa were Nestorian Christians. Hulagu’s own belief is unknown.37 Nestorians were spared during the Baghdad massacre and they were allowed to keep all their properties. Hulagu gave the palace of the Dawatdar to the Nestorian patriarch as a gift.38 Hulagu’s troops included many Armenians and other Christians from Transcaucasus. Hulagu’s great advisor Tusi was a Shi’i of Ismailis, who was hostile to the Caliphate. Even the Vizier Alqami was Shi’i, as were many Baghdad residents in the West bank. Thus some scholars have argued that the sack of Baghdad was a conspiracy of Christians and Shi’i Muslims. Some even argued that Hulagu’s expedition in Middle East was for his personal pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Generally speaking, after the devastation of Baghdad in the thirteenth century, Sunni Muslims in the Islamic World were appalled. It did partly help the growth of Christian and Shi’i Islam in the relevant region. On February 10, 1258, the Caliph Mustasim, his three sons and followers came out of Baghdad. Under Hulagu’s command, the Caliph sent word into the city to ask people throw down their weapons and come out.39 The Mongols killed all disarmed people who came out of the city. The Caliph and his relatives were 35 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 442. Liu Minzhong, Pingsonglu, juan 2 卷中. 37 Might be none of or one of these: Buddhism, Christian, Animism, Shamanism, or Tengriism. 38 Xu, Liangli, Yi er han guo shi yan jiu. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2009), 172 Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol a lo ds enghis han, ublai han, H leg , Tamerlane. (New York: Sterling Pub. Co., 1990), 110. “The Christian community and its churches had also been spared and the Nestorian Patriarch, Makikha, was given one of the Caliph’s old palaces as his residence.” Also see the Qasida verse 6 Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 45. 39 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 497. 36 11 / 31 Writing Sample HUA imprisoned in tents at Ket Buqa’s camp. The pillage and massacre began on February 13 and lasted for a blood-filled week until Hulagu departed from Baghdad on February 20. The popular sources say that the sack of Baghdad lasted forty days. The death toll was between 200,000 to 800,000. 40 On February 15, Hulagu abducted Mustasim from the Caliphate palace and forced him to submit the enormous treasures of the 508-year-old Abbasid dynasty. He also snatched six hundred out of seven hundred women from the Caliph’s harem. Hulagu returned to his camp and kept all the treasure around him in mountainous piles. Most of the sacred places like the Caliph’s mosque, the Musa-Jawad shrine, and the tombs in Rusafa were burned.41 The libraries and the House of Wisdom were destroyed. The Tigris River was stained to black due to ink from the books thrown in by the Mongols. On February 20, Hulagu ordered an end the massacre, thanks to the representatives of Baghdad residents Sharafuddin Maragha’i, Shihabuddin Zanjani and Malik ilrast’s petition for amnesty.42 Because of the foul air shrouding Baghdad, Hulagu left the city and camped at Waqaf-u-Jalabiyya.43 Mustasim desperately realized his death threat and was mocked by the Vizier. The Vizier Alqami was sent back to Baghdad to hold a new official post in the Ilkhanate, still as a Vizier.44 At sunset of the day, the Caliph and his eldest son, as well as five attendants, were wrapped into blankets and kicked to death by horses, according to the Mongol tradition of executing noble men bloodlessly.45 On January 20, 1276, Bayan prohibited his army from entering into Hangzhou, and highlighted that those who violated this command would be punished by law.46 He met the Song Right Chancellor Wen Tianxiang’s 文 祥 (1236-1283) group for negotiation at Mingyin Temple in the town of Linping, northeast of Hangzhou near the Gaoting Hill where Bayan camped. Wen Tianxiang, who denounced the 40 G. Le Strange, Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate: from Contemporary Arabic and Persian Sources, (London: Curzon Press, 1972), 882. 41 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 498. 42 ibid., 498. 43 ibid., 498. 44 ibid., 500. Alqami died on June 6, and his son Sharafuddin succeeded his position. 45 ibid., 499. The Caliph’s middle son was killed on February 22 in same way. His youngest son was sent to Tusi and later married a Mongolian woman. 46 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 9, "Record of Shizu" 世祖紀. February 5 he issued a same order again, see Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 942. 12 / 31 Writing Sample HUA former Right Chancellor Chen Yizhong’s 陳宜中 (?-?) flattering attitude on asking the Mongols for peace, was appointed as the Right Chancellor and chief commander of the bureau of Military Affairs by Grand Empress Dowager (GED) Xie Daoqing 謝道清 (1210-1283). Under the extremely urgent circumstance, Wen recommended himself to replace Chen Yizhong to go to Bayan’s camp for a face-to-face negotiation. This was the Song imperial family’s last chance at survival. GED Xie approved his brave request and dispatched him with the Left Chancellor Wu Jian 吳堅(1213-1276) and other few officials carrying the declaration of surrender out of the city. Wen Tianxiang was in indignation full of passion and confidence. He and Bayan debated in the Temple, but more likely it was Bayan’s idea to give the Song officials a last chance to display their resolute loyalty. Wen stated his interpretation about justice and righteousness, and did not fear the Mongols.47 He told Bayan: The Song had legitimacy through its practice of rites and music. Does the northern state want to possess our land, to destroy our state?48 Bayan answered, Your shrines must not be moved, and people must not be killed. Wen further pleaded, It is very good if two states build friendship. Otherwise, if martial disaster took place between the South (i.e. the Song) and the North (i.e. the Yuan), it is no benefit to you! I am the Chancellor of the Song dynasty holding the Jinshi degree. I owe nothing to my emperor but a debt of gratitude. Either sword, saw, caldron, or wok, I have no fear.49 Wen was struggling to persuade Bayan to withdraw his troops back to Pingjiang (Suzhou) and Jiankang (Nanjing), as well as end the war. Bayan had no interest dealing with stubborn Wen and his idealistic suggestion, but he respected his rectitude and loyalty to the Song. Bayan was also impressed by Wen's knowledge. So Wen was detained in the Temple and urged to accept an official post to serve the Mongols. 47 Wang Yingling, Si Ming Wen Xian Ji 四明文獻集 juan 5. Rites and Music: The Confucian ideology about what the legitimate ruler should act. 49 Wen Tianxiang, Wen Shan Ji 文山集 juan 13 . Zhinan lu 指南錄. 48 13 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Bayan sent other representatives back to Hangzhou after they submitted the imperial seal, a symbol of the Song state equivalent to the royal crown. 50 Wen did not realize that the Song had already failed its survival.51 Here, the symbolic meaning of the seal was more important than possession of the capital city, because it legitimized Khubilai's status as the sole ruler of China with the mandate of heaven. On January 23, Bayan advanced his troops to besiege the city, based on the Song's surrender. From January 26, Bayan’s forces gradually entered into Hangzhou. Later, all civil and military officials came out of the city for census. On February 7, Bayan reported the good news to Khubilai, and the Great Khan soon responded by a gracious edict. He required Bayan to treat the Song imperial family well, not to bother city residents, waive partial taxes, take a census of the population and buildings, relieve poverty, collect books and treasures, and not to destroy any cultural sites.52 On February 24, Khubilai sent a note to ask Bayan back to the Yuan capital Dadu (Beijing) with the Song imperial family and court officials. After arranging Alahan and Dong Wenbing for administrative affairs in Hangzhou, Bayan left Hangzhou on March 12. Among the long march team were the child emperor Gongdi 恭帝 (1271-1323?) and his mother, Empress Dowager Quan 全 后 (?-1309). Sixty-six-year-old GED Xie was ill in bed and she was allowed to stay in the palace until she recovered. Khubilai treated the Song imperial clan well in Beijing and Kaiping.53 Xie entered a nunnery and died in 1283. Quan became a Buddhist nun and died in 1309. Emperor Gongdi was later exiled to Tibet and became a prestigious Buddhist Lama. In 1323, he was forced to commit suicide by the Yuan emperor of the time. During the siege of Hangzhou in January, two half-brothers of Emperor Gongdi were secretly escorted by General Zhang Shijie 張世傑 (?-1279) to the south. With 50 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 9. Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain: the crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 108. 51 Liu Xun, Shui Yun Cun Gao 水雲村稿 j.8 52 Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 9. "Record of Shizu" 世祖紀. It’s the official chronicle of the Yuan and official biography of Khubilai, so whether or not the edict was true and had been acted in Hangzhou is still questionable. 53 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 945. 14 / 31 Writing Sample HUA support from remaining Song loyalists and a limited navy, they resisted stiffly for three more years along China's Southeast coast after the fall of Hangzhou in 1276. Furthermore, the Song’s surrender was honest in which Khubilai and Bayan were not angered about the secret escaping of two princes ordered by GED Xie in 1276. By that time, Khubilai was 61 and Bayan 40. They showed mercy and sympathy to the child monarch Gongdi and two widow empresses Xie and Quan, who were all not in the prime of their lives. Unlike Hulagu’s trap, after Hangzhou surrendered, Bayan did not kill a single one of them. As for Baghdad, in 1258, Hulagu was 41 and the Caliph Mustasim was 45. It was a competition for personal dignity and material possessions between two figures of similar age. The Caliph’s arrogant attitude and enormous personal treasures stirred Hulagu’s aggressive desire and increased the Mongols' hostility. Therefore, Hulagu's forces were ruthless and regardless of Baghdad's religious and cultural importance. Court Politics: Abbasid vs. Song We woke up in the morning in a palace like paradise, but we went to bed without a palace with which we could not dispense yesterday. ash d al- n 54 Mongke led his forces to Gansu and Sichuan provinces in Western China and died in the battlefield in 1259, when Khubilai was busy with the warfare in the middle Yangzi region near Ezhou. So Khubilai had to depart to Karakorum again for the khuriltai election. The Song Chancellor Jia Sidao’s 賈似道 (12131275) troops of only 150 soldiers took advantage of this chance by defeating the remaining Mongol army. Later he decorated it as a great victory and reported it to the Emperor Lizong 理宗 (1205–1264). Jia's report misled officials and the Song court in Hangzhou to believe that the Mongol force was not as strong as they heard before so that their worry declined and they convinced themselves that they were indestructible. When Ezhou was not taken and Khubilai’s major troops left in 1259, the Song troops did not take any action to re-seize lost territory but were waiting for a cease-fire agreement with Khubilai 54 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 499. 15 / 31 Writing Sample HUA according to Jia’s order from the court. Unlike the Song’s inefficiency, the Mamluks of Egypt caught the opportunity when Hulagu had to retreat his main troops back to Karakorum and defeated Ket Buqa in Ain Jalut in 1260. The Mamluks permanently stopped the Mongol’s expansion into Africa and saved the remaining part of the Islamic world after the fall of Baghdad. However, the Song Empire lost the chance to end Khubilai’s expedition and save the South China. Comparing the court policies and less effective statecrafts of these two states before the Mongol storm, the inactive Caliph could not attract loyalists and manage an effective military force. The Song court led by the unsophisticated female regency was not able to restrain loyalist, end factionalism, punish corruption, and guide collaboration between civil officials and military leaders. Therefore, the Caliphate lost its daulat, which in Persian means: the stability of the empire, the foundation of kinship, or the royal fortune; and the Song yielded its Tianming, which in Chinese means: Mandate of Heaven. Two years before Hulagu’s conquest of Baghdad, in late summer 1256, a huge flood from the Tigris River swept over Baghdad and inundated the lower part of the urban inhabited section for five days. It also destroyed half the districts of Iraq and has been called the “Mustasimid flood.” 55 A similar natural disaster happened in Hangzhou, also two years before the Mongol conquest, in late summer 1274, when the Mountain of Heavenly Visage Tianmu shan experienced several landslides. The disaster later caused floods that destroyed towns and populations in the outskirts of Western Hangzhou.56 The mountain was commonly believed to be the origin of Dragon Range longmai to the capital and the imperial palace at the Phoenix Hill according to geomantic fengshui theory, which brought the auspicious Kingly ambiance Wangqi to the Song emperorship. The residents were shocked by this bad omen and the death of emperor Duzong 度宗 (1240-1274) weeks before. It had been exactly forty years since the fall of the Jurchen Jin dynasty of North China in 1234. In 1273, after the final success of the tough five-year siege of Xiangyang, the most important border city of the Song Empire, Khubilai declared war against the Song in 1274. He 55 56 ibid., 487. Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 27. Ruan Yuan, Xu zizhi tongjian, juan 180 16 / 31 Writing Sample HUA addressed the Song’s actions against his peace treaty proposal in the past by killing innocent people, continuing dispatch troops and detaining the Mongol envoy Hao Jing for almost fourteen years.57 In August 12nd 1274, the three–year-old Zhao Xian 趙㬎 became the sixteenth emperor of Song as Gongdi. His grandmother, GED Xie Daoqing, took charge of state affairs from behind the curtain.58 In October 1275, court astronomers reported another unusual omen that Saturn and Venus would cross paths, linking to a solar eclipse that occurred in June.59 These signs from heaven again irritated the Song empire from top to bottom, and reminded people to question the troubled Song leadership for almost fifty years since Lizong’s reign from 1224. ue to the bloody Zhachuan Incident 霅川之變 conspired by then- Chancellor Shi Miyuan 史彌遠 (1164-1233), the prince Zhao Hong 趙竑 (?-1225) was abolished and Zhao Yun 趙昀, an imperial descendant but commoner youth, was raised as Emperor Lizong. But since Lizong did not have a son, his nephew Zhao Ji 趙禥 succeeded his throne, reigning from 1264 to 1274 as Duzong. GED Xie was involved in court politics since early time during Lizong’s reign as his empress although she did not have any children with Lizong. In 1274 she eventually gained power and stepped on the stage as the regent of the child emperor Gongdi. Thus during the last two years before the Mongol takeover, the Song’s ruling legitimacy was already weakened due to seemingly impure lineage, a female regency, and a child monarch. The situation of having an immature emperor and a female regency also recalled a similar scenario about three hundred years prior when the general of imperial guard (i.e. chief of palace troops), Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 (927976), dethroned seven–year-old child emperor Gongdi2 Chai Zongxun 57 宗訓 (953-973) of Later Zhou Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 8, 157; Tao Zongyi, Nan Cun Chuo Gen Lu, juan 20. Wang Feng, Wu Xi Ji 梧溪集 juan 1. 58 Jennifer, Jay. A Change in Dynasties: Loyalism in Thirteenth-Century China (Bellingham: Western Washington University Press, 1991), 29. 59 Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 86. It could be understood as the eclipse of the Mandate of heaven. In 960, a prophet saw two suns fighting, and later general Zhao Kuangyin declare he is the emperor of the Song Dynasty. 17 / 31 Writing Sample dynasty (951-960) and his mother Empress Dowager Fu 符 HUA 后 (?-993), who was Chai’s regent for half a year, and Zhao declared emperorship as Taizu of the Song dynasty.60 uring the last years of Song sovereignty, the court was polarized by Chancellor Jia’s reform to curb profiteering eunuchs, imperial relatives and bureaucrats, and his purge by bringing his own allies into prominent positions and dismissing dissidents. 61 The Song court had already missed two peaceful offerings from Khubilai in 1260 and 1261 that would have acknowledged Mongol overlordship in return of the Song’s imperial status at Hangzhou. The Mongols renewed warfare in Sichuan in 1265 after a pause due to Mongke’s death in 1259. In the central Yangzi River basin, the most significant city, Xiangyang, resisted under Mongols’ siege from the fall of 1268 to March, 1273. In February 1275, GED Xie dispatched Chancellor Jia to lead an army and navy with 130,000 men and 2,500 ships to Wuhu, a riverside city on the Yangzi about 280 km northwest of Hangzhou. This was the Song court’s last big martial gamble to stop the Mongol forces crossing the Yangzi River and moving south towards Hangzhou. Under the pressure of student demonstrations at the imperial university in Hangzhou, Jia had to lead the troops since he was the chief commander of the Bureau of Military Affairs and the Chancellor of court, but he was unwilling to face the ruthless Mongols. When he met Bayan in mid-March in Dingjia Zhou on the Yangzi riverbank, he did not actively organize his army. Jia released many Mongol prisoners of war and even presented mandarin oranges and lychee to Bayan in order to appease him. Some of Jia’s generals fled, such as Xia Gui 夏貴 (1197-1279). Bayan rejected Jia’s generous offer and set up the giant catapults. Bayan also invited Jia to visit his camp for negotiation but Jia was afraid to be detained there. The Song troops were dispersed and Jia fled to Yangzhou on a boat. 62 When Jia returned to Hangzhou, he was denounced in the court and dismissed from office by GED Xie. Khubilai in his Xia Jiang Nan Xi (1267) criticized the Song founder’s mistreat to the dethroned last child emperor of Later Zhou dynasty that “bullying widdow and child” 欺人寡婦 兒. Please note that Chai Zongxun was also titled as Gongdi 恭帝, same as the Song Gongdi Zhao Xian, so here marked as Gongdi2 61 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 431. 62 Hu Zhaoxi 胡昭曦, Song Meng (Yuan) guan xi shi 宋蒙(元)關係史 (Chengdu: Sichuan da xue chu ban she, 1992), 373. Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 451 "Biography of Jiang Cai" 薑才傳. 60 18 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Bayan chased Jia all the way down to Yangzhou, and captured thirty-seven generals, five thousand soldiers and one thousand ships. One contemporary criticized: “when the troops collapsed in Wuhu, our state affairs did not run well anymore.” 63 Bayan left a few of his underlings to besiege Yangzhou and moved major forces to Hangzhou directly. He received Khubilai’s edict by Lian Xixian that required him to restrict his army from plundering innocent Song subjects in their upcoming conquest.64 On March 2, 1275, the Mongols took Jiankang, one of the most important cities in Lower Yangzi Delta, without any fire. Hundreds of Song officials from Jiankang and other cities surrendered in order.65 When Khubilai heard this good news, he concluded: My soldiers are already south of the Yangzi River; the Song court must fear them deeply. If I send envoys for a peace offer and ask for tribute now, they would accept it without any doubt.66 After Jiankang’s fall, GE Xie issued a nation-wide Edict of Sorrow Ai Tong Zhao 哀痛詔 in the name of Emperor Gongdi, calling all Song loyalists to “succor the emperor” Qinwang 勤王. The result was disastrous: only three officials in the entire empire responded to her call. They were Zhang Shijie 張世傑 in Jiangsu, a military officer under Lu Wenhuan’s brother Lu Wende 呂文德 (?-1270), who died during the siege of Xiangyang, Li Fu 李芾 (?-1276) in Hunan and Wen Tianxiang in Jiangxi. Wen Tianxiang cried and was preparing to go to Hangzhou when he received the second edict, which said, “ espect the latest edict, immediately recruit righteous warriors to succor the emperor, and come to Xingzai (Hangzhou)”.67 GED Xie also wrote an edict to the surrendered commanders, including Lu Wenhuan and Fan Wenhu, requiring them to ask the Mongols to stop fighting. This attempt was in vain as well. 63 Lu Xinyuan, Song Shi Yi 宋史翼, juan 15 "Biography of Fang Dacong" 方大琮傳. Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 89. 65 Lu Xinyuan, Song Shi Yi, juan 31 "Biography of Cheng Zhu" 程洙傳. 66 Tao Zongyi, Nan Cun Chuo Gen Lu, juan 1, "The Pass of Sole Pine" 獨松關. 67 Wen Tianxiang, Wen Shan Ji, juan 17. Tuo Tuo 脫脫, Songshi (Chronicle of the Song Dynasty, 1343) 宋史, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977, juan 418 "Biography of Wen Tianxiang" 文 祥傳. Hu Zhaoxi, Song Meng (Yuan) guan xi shi, 375. 64 19 / 31 Writing Sample HUA On another side of Asia, the five-hundred-year-old Caliphate faced a similar hard plight. The Baghdad Sunni Caliphate had already lost its political centrality and only maintained religious influence. Its military dominance vanished around 950, and the territory now only covered the Baghdad city. But the Caliph was both the head of the city-state and the top spiritual leader of all Muslims except the Shi’a and few heretic sects such as Ismailis. For example, once a new ruler was enthroned in a Muslim state-emirate, the Caliph would send a representative with gifts and certificate. The ruler was to practice rituals for respecting the envoy such as kissing his hand, kissing his donkey’s foot, wearing a gifted robe, treating him well, and giving him a tour around the capital. Before Mustasim’s reign in 1242, there had been thirty-five Caliphs since 750, the founding year of the Abbasid dynasty. The Caliph’s palace of Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris River was called the Round City and built by the Caliph Mansur in 762. The Caliph’s power faded quickly after a golden age in the eighth century. From 833 to 946, the Caliph was the puppet of his Turkish bodyguard. Under the Turkish tyranny the Caliphs moved the capital and residence to Samarra for fifty-eight years until 865.68 Caused by two sieges of Amin and Musta’in, parts of Western Baghdad including the Round City and three Northern quarters of East Baghdad were all in ruin.69 The Caliph Mu’tadid set the new palace in East Baghdad in 892. Thus the core of Baghdad moved to the east of the Tigris. The Round City was abandoned and Caliphs lived in the new palace called Daral-Khilafah, the Abode of the Caliphate. In 946, the Buyid dynasty of Persian Shi’is conquered Baghdad but still maintained the Caliph’s titular authority. The Buyid princes built their palace in East Baghdad as well. In 1055, the Turkish Seljuk dynasty ended the Buyid supremacy in Baghdad. Even before the Seljuk period, the Caliphate had already sunk into political insignificance. The Caliphs had “much more spare time and considerable revenues employed their energies in palace building”.70 By the last Great Seljuk Sultan Sanjar’s death in 1157, the politically insignificant Abbasid Caliph was able to have his own troops and no more under anyone’s shade for one hundred years until Hulagu arrived at the Baghdad wall in 1258. East Baghdad, the new city formed around 1095, had the Caliph’s palaces in one third of the city, 68 Strange, Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate, 858. ibid., 860. 70 ibid., 870. 69 20 / 31 Writing Sample HUA which were surrounded by markets, streets and the extended suburbs.71 Along the west bank of the Tigris there were communities of Shi’i Muslims, Pilgrim routes to Mecca, an intensive irrigation system and countryside. In September 1257, Hulagu sent a message to the Caliph from Hamadan. He threatened the Caliph by saying, Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us. If you do not wish to come, send all three, the vizer, Sulaymanshah, and the Dawatdar, that they may convey our message word for word. If our command is obeyed, …… you may retain your lands, army and subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle. …… When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad, …… I shall not leave one person alive in your realm, and I shall put your city and country to the torch. If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s heads, heed my advice.72 The Caliph Mustasim responded firmly, Does the prince (Hulagu) not know that from the east to the west, from king to beggar, from old to young, all who are God-fearing and God-worshipping are servants of this court and soldiers in my army?73 He suggested that Hulagu to go back to Khurasan, otherwise the Caliph’s army would not only defend the Baghdad city but also retain the lost lands of Persia. Hulagu’s envoys were also poorly treated by the Caliph's people in Baghdad, similar to how Khubilai’s emissaries to Hangzhou fared. Hulagu was outraged, so he aroused his army to Baghdad “as numerous as ants and locusts”.74 At this point, the Caliph Mustasim was isolated from his court and officials in Baghdad. On the one hand, the Shi’i Vizier Alqami advised him the solution against Hulagu’s invasion was not to organize armies for the Caliph but to corrupt the Mongols by spending “a thousand loads of precious items, a 71 ibid., 879. ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 488. Also see Jayvani, Mongke’s edict before Hulagu’s expedition, seems the Caliph’s rejection of the Mongol’s nice offer is retrospective writing, the Mongol punished him only because he did not agree the Mongol’s requirement to be subordinated. Was the Mongol’s offer truly that nice or still a trap? 73 Rash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 489. 74 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 489. 72 21 / 31 Writing Sample HUA thousand choice camels, and a thousand Arabian horses with accouterments”.75 Although in the Song court, a similar proposal had been made to pay tribute to the Mongols in return for peace, the items of tribute were mostly metal currencies, silks, and other artifacts, rather than military equipment. Not simply because there were hardly any horses and camels in the Song domain, but because the Song did not want the Mongols to obtain their lethal equipment or learn the technologies even if the Song dynasty was the most talented empire in the medieval world that invented most damaging weapons like gun powder, cannon and fire rocket as well as advanced equipments like large vessels. Therefore, Alqami’s misguiding advice could be suspected as to betray the Caliph for benefiting the Mongols. One story gave the reason of his discontent to the Caliph. It said that Alqami was a zealous Shi’i and had been Mustasim’s Vizier for almost thirteen years. Ahmed, the Caliph’s eldest son, had once pillaged the Shi’ah community Carkh in Baghdad. He took some Seyids (descendants of Ali, the Shi’is) and publically denounced them in the city. Alqami wrote a letter to the governor of Hille, Seyid Tadj-ud-din Mohammed, saying he decided to take revenge before the Caliph killed all Shi’is.76 The story also mentioned that Alqami had sent several letters to Hulagu privately to indicate the vulnerability of Baghdad city and the weakness of the Caliphate, and to welcome Hulagu’s invasion. On the other hand, there was enmity between the awatdar Mujahiduddin Aybak (Mujahid al-Din Aybak) and the Vizier Alqami, worse than the Song court factionalism and political purge by Chancellor Jia and later Chancellor Chen Yizhong. The Caliph was indecisive and vacillating. He approved the Vizier’s suggestion but later stopped the transportation of treasures and weapons to Hulagu. The Vizier Alqami perceived that the Caliphate’s royal fortune daulat was going to the end, so he “writhed like a snake and tried in every way possible to think up a strategy” to survive. The Dawatdar Aybak was also one of the chief commanders of Baghdad military. He and other amirs including Sulaymanshah called for a war against the Mongols in Baghdad, and the Caliph now strongly supported them. But they still cursed the Caliph and thought he was “an enemy of soldiers.”77 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 490. Duo Sang, Duo Sang Meng Gu Shi 多桑蒙古史, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), 74. It is the Chinese translation of Constantin D' Ohsson's Histoire Des Mongols. Also see Vassaf j.1 77 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 490. 75 76 22 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Actually most of the Caliphate’s army organized by his father in Baghdad was already dismissed by Mustasim. Because the Vizier told him that the army cost a lot of money, the Caliph simply believed Alqami and sold the army.78 Being aware of the lack of militia, the Caliph asked Alqami to recruit men from Turks and Persians. However, the Vizier deliberately postponed this task. He took almost five months and then reported to the Caliph that the mercenary was ready. But stingy Mustasim changed his mind and did not pay promised gold to the army. 79 The Dawatdar whispered to Mustasim about the alleged treachery of the Vizier, but the Caliph did not pay attention. Mustasim even sent a new letter to Hulagu to frighten him by listing all the cases of past failed invasions at Baghdad: “It is not politic for the padishah (Hulagu) to think of attacking the Abbasid dynasty. You should worry about the evil eye of adverse fortune.”80 He also ignored reports from Husamuddin Akka, the governor of Dartang, which were the military intelligence of Hulagu’s war preparation. Without the Caliph's help, Akka had to surrender to Hulagu. Later, Akka, his family and court were all executed by Ket Buqa when Hulagu learned of Akka’s contact with the Caliph. In November 1275, Bayan’s group conquered Changzhou and slaughtered most urban residents due to their stiff resistance. The Song was astonishingly afraid. In December the Song envoy Liu Yue 嶽 (?-?) visited Bayan and submitted the letters from GED Xie. He said in tears, Today our Grand Empress Dowager is old, the young emperor is weak, and even more we are still in mourning of our former emperor. In history a courteous state has never invaded a state in sorrow. So we hope the great Chancellor (Bayan) calms his anger, in order to avoid bothering the palace and shaking graves. We won’t dare not to submit tribute yearly and shall pursue a peaceful relationship with you. All the mistakes were attributed to the evil Chancellor Jia Sidao. His discredited actions harmed our state.81 But Bayan answered without any sympathy, 78 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 487. Mustasim liked frivolous pleasure like arts and performance, he was not interested in military affairs. He was an indecisive and simple-hearted person. Also see Vassaf, j.1. 79 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 491. 80 ibid., 491. 81 Liu Minzhong, Ping Song Lu, juan 2. 23 / 31 Writing Sample HUA When our holy son of heaven (Khubilai) was enthroned, he sent envoys and letters to make a peace treaty with you. But your state is a clown and it detained our envoy (Hao Jing) for sixteen years; that is why now we ask you to pay your debt. Last time again, you killed our envoy Lian Xixian2. Whose mistake was it? If you wish our troops not to advance, you should surrender like how King Qian (of the Wuyue Kingdom) and King Li (of the Southern Tang dynasty) did (to the Song founder). Your Song state was established by robbing a child (emperor), and now it will be lost in the hand of a child emperor. This is fate, and you need not say any more.82 On December 23, 1275, GED Xie proposed a regular tribute system for the Mongols in return for the withdrawal of Bayan’s troops. On January 11, 1276, she offered a more attractive plan, including yearly tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk.83 But there were no good results. Bayan’s goal was the Song’s unconditional surrender and the submission of all resources and population. On January 18, 1276, after taking the Guangde Commandery and the Pass of Sole Pine in the northwest, as well as Huzhou prefecture in the north and Jiaxing prefecture in the northeast, three divisions of the Mongol forces led by Alahan, Bayan and Dong Wenbing converged on Gaoting Hill, about fifteen kilometers north of the Hangzhou city wall. When the Song court realized how close Bayan’s forces were to Hangzhou, they were in deep panic.84 However, there were still a four-hundred-thousand-soldier army and thirty-to-forty thousand guerrilla partisans for "succoring the emperor" from all over the empire. Wen Tianxiang arrived at Hangzhou in November 1275, and with Zhang Shijie together urged GED Xie to fight. They believed even if they lost Hangzhou, the Song court could retreat through China’s southeast coast towards the south to Fujian and Guangzhou, which were still under Song control.85 But the Right Chancellor Chen Yizhong pressured GED Xie not to move the troops into Hangzhou but to capitulate. Xie was in ill health, accepted Chen’s request, and sent a message to Bayan begging for granting the Song a title as the Yuan dynasty’s subordinated state. Chen Yizhong, a active alumnus of the imperial university and the former henchman of Jia Sidao’s partisan, denounced Jia in the court after his fiasco, was promoted as the Right Chancellor and chief of 82 ibid. Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 171. Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times, 90. 84 Tuo Tuo, Songshi, juan 47 “Record of Duke Yingguo (i.e. Emperor Gongdi)” 瀛國 85 Song Ji San Chao Zheng Yao 宋 三朝政要 juan 5. 83 24 / 31 紀 Writing Sample HUA the Bureau of Military Affairs. Although he was loyal to the emperor and was not treacherous with the Mongols, he had similar characteristics to the Baghdad Vizier Alqami. He was stubborn and cowardly according to Yuanshi, but was always zealous to abuse his power. For example, after Song troops were routed in Jiaoshan (Zhenjiang) in July 1275, the chief commander of the Palace Guard Han Zhen 韓震 (?1275) advised the court to move capital and spoke for Jia Sidao. He was alleged to be an ally of Jia, and his proposal of capital relocation would make the court the hostage of its generals.86 Chen invited Han to his residence for a talk. But when Han arrived, Chen bludgeoned him to death. 87 Chen’s savage assassination was rare for a civil official in the Song dynasty in which even the court usually did not give death sentences to officials. Chen evaded any guilty accusation, resigned from his office, and moved back to his hometown in Wenzhou. Students of the Imperial University such as Liu Jiugao 劉九皋 (?-?) appealed to the emperor to criticize Chen’s ten faults: The Chancellor is supposed to supervise the troops in battlefield but he was afraid and hesitated. He never acted by edicts and decrees…… He employed Zhang Shijie’s army on the river but Liu Shiyong’s 劉師勇 (?-1278) navy on land. His misleading caused our rout. He harmed our empire more than Jia Sidao.88 With GE Xie’s endorsement, Chen came back to the capital and pretended as though nothing happened. He kept his office as the Right Chancellor and premier court advisor. But many officials were already disappointed about the court leadership and heard the Mongols’ hoofbeats approaching Hangzhou.89 In early January of 1276, most officials fled from Hangzhou, and the capital was in curfew. Court officials fled at day and night.90 There were a mere six civil officials in the court audience.91 The once clamorous court was now quiet and empty. 92 On January 17, one day before the Mongols’ 86 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 934. Zhou Mi, Gui Xin Za Zhi 癸辛雜識, 前集 施行韓震. Song Lian, Yuanshi, juan 8. Richard, L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 72-5. 88 Tuo Tuo, Songshi, juan 177. 89 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, 937. 90 Liu Yiqing, Qian Tang Yi Shi 錢塘遺事, juan 7 朝臣宵遁. 91 Tuo Tuo, Songshi, juan 47 “Record of Duke Yingguo” 瀛國 紀. Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 107. 92 Liu Yiqing, Qian Tang Yi Shi, juan 7 . 87 25 / 31 Writing Sample HUA convergence at Gaoting Hill, Chen Yizhong suggested that GED Xie move the capital but was denied.93 GED Xie was so angered about all the disappeared officials that she posted a critical edict in the court rebukes: Our Great Song has over three hundred years of history, and it always treated statesmen very well. Currently our new emperor and I are in much trouble, and among court officials from high to low rank, no one appeals for saving our Empire. If you had read all books of saints and gentlemen, how could you do that! If you do such things [i.e. flee], how do you face people in life? How do you face former emperors in the afterlife?94 When Bayan detected the large numbers of officials escaping, he immediately dispatched Alahan, Dong Wenbing, and Fan Wenhu to block the south wall along the Qiantang River to prevent inhabitants from leaving and prohibit others from entering the city.95 As mentioned above, a similar order was made by Hulagu to build a floating bridge and arrange a patrol boat on the Tigris to prevent inhabitants from escaping from Baghdad. Meanwhile Bayan sent three hundred soldiers into the Song palace to take all the imperial documents. They required all Hangzhou residents to post a sign on each house door says “We welcome surrender”. 96 This was a peaceful request and completely different from Hulagu’s message fastened to arrows and shot into Baghdad. On January 18, when the Mongols were moving to secure the Hangzhou Bay and cut off escape routes, Chen Yizhong again urged GED Xie to evacuate the capital. He pointed out the proposal of relocating the capital multiple times at this time shifted flashily from nearly ten days ago when he rejected the similar pleas from Zhang Shijie and Wen Tianxiang.97 It was because Chen Yizhong was terrified since Bayan invited him for a face-to-face talk. 98 Also, his hometown was Wenzhou, a coastal city southeast of Hangzhou, and Chen was familiar with the escape routes and the Southeast region. This time, the hesitating GED Xie approved his proposal. The royal family and attendants packed up quickly. Xie was Tuo Tuo, Songshi, juan 418 “Biography of Chen Yizhong” 陳宜中傳 Another translation, see Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, 934-5. 95 Liu Minzhong, Ping Song Lu, juan 2. 96 Tao Zongyi, Nan Cun Chuo Gen Lu. juan 1 浙江潮. 97 Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 107-8. 98 Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 108. 93 94 26 / 31 Writing Sample HUA fully dressed and ready to leave at night. However, Chen did not arrive as he promised in the daytime. He already escaped Hangzhou secretly right after he left the palace.99 GED Xie was so angered that she threw her hatpin and earrings and returned back to her boudoir.100 Chen’s betrayal worsened her health and extinguished her hopes. She despaired and refused to meet anyone that night. The declaration of surrender had already been drafted and was ready to be sent to Bayan’s camp. 101 The declaration begged the Mongols for mercy on the imperial clan and millions of people living in Hangzhou.102 Conclusion By comparing these two states, the differences between the Abbasid Caliphate and the Song Dynasty are as follows. The former was a religious and cultural authority with scattered, partial influence among all independent states in Middle East. The latter was a politically, culturally, and economically centralized state with tight control over all its domains. But putting the two cities in contrast, one sees many similarities. Due to internal or external reasons, the two cities each had abandoned an old formed walled city and advanced to an irregular shaped metropolis, in order to meet population increases and economic booms. The perfectly designed Round City had not been the permanent palace of Caliphs since very early period of Abbasid dynasty, and the symmetrical square palace within the former capital Kaifeng of the Song dynasty was occupied by the nomadic Jurchens in 1127. Both Baghdad and Hangzhou were hubs of transportation grids, and each had a big river nearby and a flourishing canal system such as the Grand Canal of China. Furthermore, the Caliph’s palace was near the Tigris iver and the Song palace was close by the Qiantang River. But the Song palace was located on a hill inside the city, more like a garden than a castle like the Caliphate’s. Baghdad was spread to east and west in two parts, with the commercial and residential areas decentralized. In contrast, Hangzhou’s commercial core was close to the palace along the 99 Chen escaped to his hometown, but later joined Zhang Shijie in Fuzhou with two escorted princes. Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 108. 101 Zhou Mi, Gui Xin Za Zhi. 別集下 德祐表詔. 102 For full contents of the declaration, see Richard L. Davis, Wind Against the Mountain, 109. “Yet the Mandate of Heaven, having shifted, Your Servant chooses to change with it.” 100 27 / 31 Writing Sample HUA imperial thoroughfare, and the Song Hangzhou city had no extension in the south bank of the Qiantang River. This topographical difference made invasion easier to prevent in Hangzhou than in Baghdad, since Hangzhou's south city wall was farther north up the bank of the Qiantang River and the palace completely embedded in the city, with supplies of food and products nearby. Baghdad may have had a hard time during the siege warfare, due to the distances among agricultural supply areas, the palace, and the Tigris River. If the invaders controlled the Tigris, their navy could use it to isolate the two portions of the city and attack the palace from behind. In addition, the more intensive network of canals in Baghdad helped agriculture and the water supply for urban residents. But it could be a disaster if dams were blocked or broken. Actually, the Mongols did devastate the irrigation system to flood Baghdad before the siege, and the “Mustasim flood” in 1256 deteriorated the canals in suburban areas. Overall, the once-great city of Baghdad had shrunk into a collection of separate and squabbling suburbs, further beyond the Caliph’s control. Drainage systems had fallen into disrepair so that even these suburbs were frequently flooded.103 uring the “Mustasimid flood”, the Baghdadi society was in unrest. The awatdar Aybak once attempted to gather gangs, ruffians and his own henchmen, in order to depose the Caliph and put the city into disorder. In the Song empire, however, even in the very toughest times against the Mongols, Chancellor Jia Sidao and powerful figures of the Song court did not conspire to depose the ill emperor Duzong or his child monarch Gongdi.104 Shi Miyuan or Aybak’s plots did not happen in the last decade of the Song dynasty, and most members of the court and military showed great loyalty to Song supervision despite the faded legitimacy due to the weakened emperorship and female regency. The Caliph Mustasim crumbled the Aybak conspiracy but still the inhabitants of Baghdad considered it as a sign of the end of Mustasim’s reign.105 It seems that the Caliph had already lost his charisma upon the Baghdad inhabitants, and all Hulagu needed to do was to remove the last brick supporting the base of the Caliphate. 103 Hook, The Mongol Warlords, 102. Jia Sidao’s sister was a consort of Emperor Lizong. 105 ash d al- n, Jami’u’t-Tawarikh, 487-488. 104 28 / 31 Writing Sample HUA Bibliography Baghdad Primary Sources: al- n, ash d, and W M Thackston. Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jami’u’t-Tawarikh - Compendium of Chronicles. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998. Juvayn , Al al- n A Malik, and John Andrew Boyle. The History of the World-Conqueror. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. Notes of Primary Sources about the Sack of Baghdad, from “A Qasida on the Destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols” by Joseph e Somogyi (G.R. Hawting, Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 2005): Three primary sources in Arabic literature: “One is by Ibn at-Tiqtaqa, who in 701/1301-2 wrote his famous Al-kitab al-Fakhri fil-adab assultaniyya wad-duwal al-islamiyya, at the end of which he describes the Mongol siege. The second is by Ibn al-Furat, who lived one century later (died in 807/1404-5), and records the same event in his hitherto unedited Ta’ ikh ad-duwal wal-muluk. The third is by adh-Dhahabi (died in 748/1348), who in his hitherto unedited and voluminous Ta’ ikh al-islam devotes a separate chapter to the fall of Baghdad, which not only gives a detailed account of the event, but also includes a qasida lamenting the decline of the glorious city.” from Hawting, Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 41-2. Three primary sources in Persian language: “(1) The Tabaqat an-Nasiri, written shortly after 656/1258, is a contemporary authority on the times of Hulagu; (2) the Jami‘ at-tawarikh, ashidaddin’s well-known work, finished in 710/1310-11, provides a fairly clear account of the siege operations; (3) the history of Wassaf (Vassaf), the historiographer of Ghazan, the Ilkhan of Persia, written in 700/1300-1, contains only the data related also by ashidaddin.” from Hawting, Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 41-2. Secondary Sources: Allsen, Thomas T. Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ------. Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ------. Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. ------. 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