Also Published in this series Marxism and Ecology Marxism and Anthropology Maurice Bloch Marxism and Philosophy Alex Callinicds Marxism and Law Hugh Collins Marxism and International Relations Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert A. Cruickshank Marxism and Morality Steven Lukes Marxism and Politics Ralph Miliband REINER GRUNDMANN Marxism and Ideology Fcrruccio Rossi-Landi Marxism and Literature Raymond Williams C L A R E N D O N P R E S S· O X F O R D 1991 Contents List of Abbreviations of Marx's Works x Introduction 1 1 . Establishing Phenomena, Claims, and Explanations 12 1 . 1 . Phenomena 13 1 .2. Ecological claims and approaches 14 1 .3 . Causes of ecological problems 27 1 .3 . 1 . Technology 28 1 .3.2. Unintended consequences 30 1 .3.3. Industrial accidents 33 1 .3.4. Economic growth 36 1 .3.5. Market, externalities, and the tragedy of the commons 37 1 .3.6. Prisoners' dilemma 43 lA. Summary 46 2. Ecology, the Social Sciences, and Marxism 47 2. 1 . How can we relate Marx to ecological problems? 57 2. 1 . 1 . Marx's anthropocentrism 58 2.1 .2. Population growth 64 2.1 .3. Future generations 65 2.1A. Unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of the commons' 71 2.2. Marx's motivation for his critique 72 2.3. Three Marxist approaches 75 2.3. 1 . First approach: capitalist production as a cause of ecological problems 75 Excursus on law 82 2.3.2. Second approach: alienation 88 2.3.3. Third approach: man-nature metabolism 90 2.4. The concept of nature 91 2.5. Philosophical anthropology 98 2.5 . 1 . Man as both a natural and social being 98 viii Contents Contents ix 2.5.2. Human needs 101 5.2. 1 . The critical dimension of the concept oflabour 238 2.5 .3. Human nature essential to Marx 102 5.2.2. Labourand enjoyment 239 5.2.3. The realm of necessity 241 3. Technology 107 5.3. Habermas: Marx between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel 247 3 . 1 . Marx as a student of technology 109 5.3. 1 . Labourand interaction 249 3 . 1 . 1 . Technology as part ol the human condition 1 10 5.4. Messianic Marxism 253 3 . 1 .2. Evolurion and technological evolution 1 14 5.4. 1 . Ernst Bloch: Marxism of technology 253 3 . 1 .3. Marx's machine definition 122 5.4.2. Walter Benjamin: the resurrection of 3 . 1 .4. The machinery question 127 past generations 257 3 . 1 .5. Science and technology 128 5.5. Conscious control and central planning 262 3 . 1 .6. What is wrong with machinery? 139 5 .5 . 1 . Marx, Vico, and social complexity 262 3 . 1 . 7. Progress? 141 5.5.2. Central planning? 266 3.2. Evolutionary approaches to technology in 5.5.3. Social complexity and personal differences 272 economic theory 144 5.6. Technology and the limits ol the philosophy of the 3.2. 1 . The behavioural theory ol thefirm 144 subject 277 3.3. Technology as a social system? 147 3.3 . 1 . Criticisms: system and environment 154 Conclusion 282 3.4. Marx: a technological determinist? 157 Bibliography 296 3.5. Technological alienation 162 3.5. 1. Technological alienation in the Manuscripts Index 319 1861-3 162 3.5.2. How Marx changed his view: Manuscripts 1861-3 v. Capital 166 3.6. Alienation and the division of labour 171 4. Historical Materialism 180 4. 1 . The spectre of functionalism 183 4.2. Capitalism and machinery as autopoietic systems? 192 4.3. Evolution and Darwinian systems 203 4.3 . 1 . A machino-capitalist hypercycle 209 4.3.2. Structural coupling 212 4.3.3. Summary 217 4.4. An empirical illustration: the transition from feudalism to capitalism 217 4.5. Evolution of technology and social institutions under ecological constraints 222 5. Communism 232 5 . 1 . Two faces of communism 232 5.2. Labour 238  Introduction List of Abbreviations of Marx's Works Some fifteen years ago, Hans Magnus Enzensberger rightly Quotations from Marx's own writings are given by title of work. remarked that the time when ecology confined itself within the Quotations from other authors are given by year of publication limits of biology was over. During the last decades the term has and page. undergone a change in meaning. When Haeckel coined it in the CW Marx, Engels: Collected Works 1 870s, it denoted that branch of biology which deals with the ILondon: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975- ) relations of living organisms to their surroundings. According Grundrisse Grundrisse der Kritik derpolitischen to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is now also used in a 6konomie IBerlin: Dictz, 1953; Eng!. broader meaning 'with reference to ecological issues such as translation Harmondsworth: Penguin, industrial pollution considered in a political context'. Today it 1973) is the centre of bitter controversies within a discourse which Manuscripts 1861-3 Zur Kriti1< der Politischen 6konomie: draws on such different branches of sciences as biochemistry, Manusl<ript 1861-63, in MEGAn biology, oceanography, mineralogy, meteorology, genetics, physi­ MEGAn Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, partn ology, medicine, demography, statistics, thermodynamics, cyber­ IBerlin: Dietz, 1976- ) netics, game theory, and so on IEnzensberger 1974: 4). It oscillates MEW Marx, Engels: Wer1<e, 42 vols. IBerlin: between the claim to become a new super-science and its [partly) Dietz); supplementary volume i 1 1974) pseudo-scientific manifestations. Ecology is also a social and Paris Manuscripts Economic and Philosophic Manu­ political movement which struggles for environmental protec­ scripts 1 1 844), in CW iii tion Ithe career of 'green parties' is a clear expression of this); 1859 Preface Preface to A Contribution to the and it is the name for a general attitude towards nature. It affects Critique of Political Economy 1 1859), politics, industrial production, city planning, law making, in CW xxix education-there is virtually no part of modern life which has SW Selected Wor1<s, 3 vols. IMoscow: not been submitted to ecological reasoning or criticism. Through­ Progress, 1975) out this book I shall use 'ecology' in this broader sense. 1 TSV Theories of Surplus Value, 3 vols. It seems to be commonly accepted that Marxism has little to ILondon: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972) say about ecological problems, that its implicit positions are far from illuminating them, and, what is more, that the Marxist position enables, causes, or legitimizes harm to the environ­ ment. At best Marxism is seen to be caught in the dilemma of rejecting the 'idiocy of rural life' andat the same time embracing the 'naturalization of man' and the 'resurrection of nature', The present work is a thorough reconsideration of any such I Ecology is also used in systems theory to denote the relations between systems and their environment. This meaning will be neglected here. 2 Introduction Introduction 3 assumption. It tries to avoid simplistic answers. Instead, it tries more wealth, the natural environment became more and more to find out which sort of problems can be analysed by Marx's debased, which in tum was detrimental to human well-being. theory and which of its approaches are still convincing-a task With this observation, it took little to conclude that productivism which necessitates the reconstruction of his thought. In effect, was responsible for this unpleasant state of affairs [see, for this presupposes that I think there is something which can be example, Jonas 1984, preface). Since human beings prosper at exploited and reconstructed. the expense of nature, so goes the claim of many environment­ Among the many ideas which have shaped the debate about alists, they do not take into account that this debased nature ecological problems in recent years, the issues connected to the will not allow mankind to prosper or survive in a not-so-distant notion of (mastery over nature' or 'domination of nature' have future. been of great importance. A unifying element among ecologists The Marxist opposition to this argument was a defence of is the belief that the Promethean project of mankind and modem productivism and a rejection of capitalism. In other words: the attitudes towards nature are the ultimate causes of ecological technological dynamism of the modem epoch was welcomed, problems. From this assumption they proceed to a rejection of and only its capitalist form was made responsible for ecologieal the modem attitude towards nature and tend to embrace an disasters. But there are also writers, whether Marxist or not, ecocentric outlook. In their view mankind's attempts to master who claim that Marxism is of little help in investigating ecolo­ nature have resulted above all in a destruction of the natural gical problems. Anthony Giddens, for example, writes that '[i]n environment. However, this is a faulty understanding of what Marx, nature appears above all as the medium of the realization domination means. Once we realize that domination only makes of human social development. The universal history of man is sense with respect to aims and interests, it becomes clear that a traeed through the progressive elaboration of the produetive concern for the natural environment is not only compatible forces, maximised in capitalism . . . But Marx's concern with with a Promethean view but follows ineVitably from it. King transforming the exploitative human social relations expressed Midas had the power to tum everything he touched into gold. in class systems does not extend to the exploitation of nature' However, such a power can hardly be included in a proper [Giddens 1 98 1 : 59). Giddens concludes that this 'Promethean definition of domination. Rather than enhancing the interests attitude' is indefensible in the twentieth century since 'the of the power-holder, it undermines them. Powers which tum expansion of the productive forces can no longer be treated into an existential threat for the power-holder do not contribute unproblematically as conducive to social progress' [ibid. 60). But to domination. The use of the concept of domination of nature, Giddens confuses expansion of productive forces 'as such' with therefore, can be understood only as a synonym for conscious productive forces which are detrimental to the natural environ­ control over nature. A eybemetic feedbaek loop rather than a ment. This may be a mere verbal quarrel. However, it seems reckless exploiter would be the appropriate image. Anthropo­ that, in his terminology, the expansion of productive forees centrism and mastery over nature, far from causing ecological leads inevitably to an 'exploitation of nature'. While I think that problems, are the starting-points from which to address them. nothing is wrong with 'exploiting nature', there is certainly To understand the meaning of the ecological discourse, it something wrong with nature transformations which lead to might be helpful to look back to world-views of the last century. worse life-conditions of human beings. In other words, I think A common world-view of the nineteenth century was that the that the 'Promethean' attitude is not only defensible, but also growth of scientific knowledge, technological development, and superior to Giddens's suggestion that Marx should have extended economic activity, in a word, 'industrialism', was an inherently his coneern to exploitation of nature. positive thing because it served human purposes. The twentieth It is true that Marx welcomed the growth of productive forces century Saw the results of this unbounded productivism; it and, what is more, praised even capitalism for developing the became manifest that although mankind succeeded in gaining produetive forces in a hitherto unknown way. Thus, at first 4 Introduction Introduction 5 sight, industrialism for him was part of the historical tendency from man's transformation of nature, and, second, to go back to of the productive forces to develop-an indispensable condition a state in which the well-being of people could not be secured on for the advent of a communist society. This outline has been the material level. Marx's position was a plea to expand human summarized by Andre Gorz in the following way: power and control over one's life-conditions to such a degree that the release of all human powers would lead only to beneficial Until recently most Marxists still thought of forces of production-in consequences. particular science and technology-as ideologically neutral, and they considered the development of these forces of production to be inherently A critique of Marx can only start at this point. If there is any positive. They usually held the view that as it matured capitalism was basic flaw in his treatment of productive forces and the domina­ producing a material base on which socialism could be constructed tion of nature it is in the insufficiently clear distinction between and it was thought that the more the forces of production developed the growth of productive forces and increaSing mastery over under capitalism the easier it would be to build socialism. Such nature. Marx, at times, seems to assume that the former does productive forces as technol.ogy, science, human skills and knowledge imply the latter. Against this I argue that there may be productive and abundant dead labour (fixed capital) were considered to be assets forces which do not lead to an increasing mastery over nature that would gteatly facilitate the transition to socialism. (Gorz 1973: but, rather, to an increasing uncertainty, risk, and uncontrol­ 159) lability as well as to unnecessary oppression in the production But Gorz does not share this view; on the contrary he thinks process. However, we may also find in Marx an impliCit distinc­ that modern science and technology are 'ideological' in the tion between these two meanings if we look at his awareness of sense that they are shaped in decisive ways by capitalist interests. the shortcomings of a purely economic approach. This awareness Indeed, there are several authors who deny that there can exist leads him to a radical opposition to the Political Economists something like 'innocent' productive forces. As we shall see, who thought that capitalist market economies would maximize this question is a crucial one for Marx's own analysis. This economic efficiency and thus human welfare and happiness. discussion will lead to the result that we must be aware of a His attack on Political Economy thus embraces both elements: double meaning of the term 'growth of productive forces': it it offers arguments against the effiCiency claim as well as can mean ( I ) increasing mastery over nature and (2) production arguments against the maximization of human welfare and of wealth (material goods) with ever-diminishing effort or in happiness, for capitalism is an irrational form of enhancing increasing abundance. The first meaning is that mankind gains effiCiency (crises! ) and it decreases happiness. It only creates the an ever-greater mastery over nature, in the sense that individuals material preconditions for a real human society. If this reasoning is develop into universal human beings, that they expand their true, Marx does not equate increases in economic efficiency control over the world around them, that they are able to shape a with an increase of human mastery over nature. world according to their needs and pleasures. Let us call this the But some critics of industrialism go one step further: they 'broad meaning' of historical materialism (which, for the sake of make the basic claim that the development of productive forces brevity, I also refer to as the 'philosophical' meaning). The per se is incompatible with the prospering of nature. From this second meaning is primarily economic; a growth in this sense proposition they conclude that industrialism should be limited can be measured with economic criteria of efficiency. Let us call (or even abolished) in the interest of nature and mankind. this the 'narrow (economic) meaning'. Although Marx rarely addressed ecological problems, this Both mcanings in Marx are linked together. The dignity of much is clear: he sharply opposed such pessimism. Instead of human beings requires freedom from hunger as much as it does assuming the basic incompatibility of modern technology with freedom from a hostile nature which acts upon them as an alien the prospering of mankind he assumed-at least in Capital­ force. For Marx two altcrnatives are thus excluded: first, to only the basic incompatibility of modern technology under accept modern civilization in which detrimental effects stem capitalist relations with the prospering of mankind. As my 6 Introduction Introduction 7 analysis will show, this judgement by Marx does not stand up to also 'business as usual' and its reification of social relations. the empirical evidence. The twentieth century has seen a rapid Crises, alienation, and fetishism affect all members of capitalist development of productive forces which has been partly enhanced society, that is, capitalists, too, are caught in a situation 'unworthy by public enterprises or by socialist enterprises Ii.e. enterprises of their human nature'. Post-war prosperity and interventionist in socialist countries). In both cases the damaging effects did not techniques of the Welfare State in the economy have led many disappear las we might expect on the basis of Marx's prediction). to believe that the basis for a socialist critique of capitalism has On the contrary, it seems that socialist countries present an vanished. Yet many Marxists and Marxologists feel that the even worse ecological record than capitalist countries. range of Marx's theory is not exhausted by the fact that capitalism Does this invalidate Marx's analysis? Are we to abandon his has brought about considerable economic growth. The decisive framework since the empirical facts have lonce more) belied his reason why Marx's theoretical range is wider is because he predictions? My answer is no. One reason is that he analysed the stresses the need for humans to have control over their fate. implications of machine technology labove all in the recently This is to say that, even granted that capitalist economy works published Manuscripts 1861-3) and was aware that the techno­ smoothly Iwhich may still be doubted on good grounds), there logical structure of capitalism-not only the capitalist use of may be other respects in which human control has not been it-may be detrimcntal for 'the good society'. Another reason is established. Only if such a control is improbable, implausible, that Marx's prediction, based on the concepts of the critique of or even undesirable would we have reasons to oppose the Political Economy, may have been falSified, but not necessarily underlying logic of his critique of capitalism. othcr parts of his theory. If I say that Marx's framework is still If we turn away, then, from Marx's political economy, and illuminating this does not mean that it gives uS a point of enter his philosophical discourse, we encounter, first, the abstract reference which is sufficient for the understanding of ecological relation between man and nature, as a transhistorical condition, problems. In investigating more deeply the philosophical argu­ and then the specific historical forms which this relation assumes. ment, this work is also distinguished from some attempts at Technologies serve as criteria to distinguish such historic for­ 'reconstructing' a 'green' Marx, a procedure which usually rests mations. Marx is equally concerned about people's ability to on a compilation of apparently 'green' statements by Marx Id. understand and control the world around them. As a writer of Schmied-Kowarzik 1984). One of them is the famous passage the nineteenth century he was rather optimistic as regards the from the Paris Manuscripts where Marx spoke of a 'humanization possibilities of science and technology in this process. But ' of nature and naturalizing of man', which is usually interpreted again, although his expectations have not been fulfilled, one as the young Marx's desire to bring about harmony between who is interested in human emancipation should not prematurely man and nature. In my view, such ad hoc 'reconstructions' of an dismiss his theoretical outline. On the contrary, if science and 'ecological Marx' do not reveal interesting insights. For we all technology have not been instruments for mankind to shape a know that Marx was no eeologist, even if he could have been world which is intelligible and controllable, we still live in one. conditions which have to be superseded in order to achieve But still, the philosophical Marx may reveal fundamental and human emancipation, a task in which Marx's theory may be of illuminating inSights. Marx's theory, after all, aims at human help. Whether or not this will yield valid or feasible solutions, it emancipation. If we forget this, Marx was not much different will articulate the ecological problems of industrial societies from an economist who measures human wealth in terms of from his philosophical framework. This framework is a unique prices and per capita income. Marx's life work consisted mainly combination of various modern philosophies, such as Bacon's, in showing that capitalist economy is a state of affairs in which Kant's, Hegel's, Feuerbach's, and others. In sharp contrast to this, individuals are systematically unable to control the outcomes the discourse of fundamentalist environmentalism proposes to of their actions. Such a critique highlights economic crises, but industrial societies that they adopt 'a simpler life' in order to 8 Introduction Introduction 9 safeguard the survival of this planet. If the ecological challenge ecological problems. It also provides some minimal conceptual is a challenge to basic assumptions of modern thinking, let us standard on which later chapters will rely. For example, I shall see; then, to what use one version of the modern view of nature, provide a definition of what an ecological problem is and why namely the theory of Karl Marx, can be put. this is a preferable definition to what is often heard. It is I will therefore start with the hypothesis that two of Marx's distinguished from loose talk like 'destruction of nature', 'eco­ expectations have been disproved: the expectation that science logical crisis', or 'ecological collapse'. and technology would create an intelligible and controllable Chapter 2 tries to relate Marx's thought to the findings of world as well as the expectation that only capitalist relations Chapter 1 in a direct way (s. 2. 1 ) and then reconstructs some stand in the way of such a goal (but equally wrong are those possible approaches from within his body of thought (ss. 2.2 and environmentalists who foolishly believe that the basic fault has 2.3). It will turn out that the concepts of nature and human to be seen in the attempt to harness nature to human purposes nature, as developed by Marx, provide an excellent starting­ or to develop productive forces). I argue that some productive point for the discussion (ss. 2.4 and 2.5). Marx's philosophical forces may run counter to the aim of extending human control anthropology provides the conceptual framework within which over nature. This study therefore investigates the conditions an illuminating analysis of the ecological problematic can be under which modem technology is developed and applied (ch. 3). If undertaken. For it turns out that Marx conceives of a transhis­ the growth of the productive forces does not lead automatically torical situation of mankind in which it has always to transform to an increase in mastery over nature, we also have to reconsider nature in order to survive. This is a process which takes place basic assumptions of historical materialism (ch. 4). A reformu­ within soCieties and by means of technology. Both, societies and lation of basic assumptions of historical materialism will inev­ technology, are in constant development. Marx conceptualizes itably affect our understading of what communism is, or should this in a theoretical model which is commonly called historical be (ch. 5). materialism. This model contains an interest both in the evolu­ Alfred Schmidt in his pioneering study has already remarked tion of societies and also in the evolution of technologies. that we have to collect many scattered remarks from a wide Chapter 3, therefore, focuses on the topic of technology and range of Marx's theory, sinee Marx never treated the concept of technological evolution. It confronts Marx's findings with those nature in a separate discussion. These scattered remarks, put of post-Darwinian evolutionary theory, discusses the similarities together, open up a complex discourse, since its elements are and differences between science and technology, considers a interwoven in many ways. There are many possible connections systems theoretical analysis of technology, and addresses the with other elements of his theory or with the theories of others. question whether Marx was a technological determinist. Finally, This could take us to philosophy, natural sciences, history, some attention is dedicated to Marx's analysis of modern machine epistemology, political economy, sociology, and further afield, technology. Most interestingly, Marx conceived of the possibility where there is considerable danger in being distracted from the that this technology may constitute a condition of alienation. centrally important discussion. For this reason, I have largely However, there is a decisive difference between such suggestions excluded questions of epistemology, political economy, and (above all spelled out in the Grundrisse and the Manuscripts history from this study, giving preference to an approach which 1861-3) and his final pronouncements in Capital (see s. 3.5). locates Marx in a philosophical tradition and connects his This chapter thus provides some new findings as regards exeget· thoughts to contemporary social theory and interpretations of ical matters. But not only the analysis of machine technology his work. has to be mentioned here. The division of labour is a topic on The framework of this book is as follows. Chapter 1 surveys which much has been written without doing much justice to the most common approaches to ecological problems which Marx. Section 3.6 will therefore clarify what Marx thought on attempt an understanding of both phenomena and causes of this topic. 10 Introduction Introduction 11 Chapter 4 links technological evolution with the evolution of alienation. Marx coins the term travail attractif for such a social forms. My starting-point here is the 1859 Preface which I realization of labour in communist society. My aim here is also try to reconstruct in different terms from those of the base­ to destroy the myth that the later Marx became more pessimistic superstructure model. I try to conceive of technology and society as regards the possibilities of the realm of freedom. In my as developing together in a process of coevolution. Again, I try opinion he always held the view that nature-imposed activities to use models provided by post· Darwinian evolutionary theory cannot count as free activity, although they could in principle be and by systems theory. The reader will also notice that I give done in non-alienated ways. Freedom, for Marx, can be gained another interpretation to the formula of 'fettering of the pro­ only in human objectifieations, in second nature. The more first ductive forces' which here is not interpreted along the lines of nature is transformed into seeond nature, the more its laws are an orthodox reading which focuses on property relations. Instead, understood and the more mankind is able to free itself from its I take it in the broader sense that the development of the strains. Communism is the culmination of such a process. This human race as such must not be thwarted (s. 4.5). It is argued is to say that only a society which is able to control its own that ecological problems can be illuminated using a historical workings on the natural environment is worth the name com­ materialist framework, if the dimension of Marx's philosophical munist. anthropology is not neglected. If one interprets Marxism in Chapter 5 also draws some attention to the question whether terms of a narrow (economic) conception of the development of Marx was against or in favour of markets and central planning productive forces, it loses all of its critical impetus. For it is not and whether he overlooked the problems which stem from the institution of private property which fetters the development scarcity, personal differences, and social complexity. Here it is of the productive forces in this (economic) sense; and it is not argued that Marx faced a dilemma when addressing the problem the institution of state planning which unfettered the develop­ of markets and plan-a dilemma which he was not able to solve. ment of the productive forces in this sense. He was also ambiguous on the problem of scarcity; sometimes But likewise, the presence of ecological problems cannot he thinks that abundance is unlikely to occur under communism. simply be explained in a monocausal way, for instance that As regards social complexity, it seems that Marx took the private property inevitably leads to ecological problems or that simple epistemological standpoint that human creations are state planning leads to them (or helps to avoid them). This is to understandable by humans, that humans as creators and observers say that the present historical level of nature transformation of their creations are able to discern them in an uncontested (which takes place with certain technologies) makes ecological truthful way. This would be even easier if humans transformed problems likely (from hidden to manifest, from chronic to first nature into second nature, thereby replacing nature more catastrophical). It is far from clear that forms of property have a and more with culture. However, it escaped his attention that causal influence on this state of affairs. this process led to an increasing social complexity and made the Chapter 5 embarks on a discussion of the concept of commun­ conditions for social transparence vanish. ism, both as originally formulated by Marx and as seen by other authors. Central for the discussion is the notion of labour which contains an emancipatory dimension. I argue that the distinction between a realm of necessity and a realm of freedom is important for Marx and parallels a distinction made earlier (s. 2.4) between first and second nature. According to Marx, true freedom is only possible within second nature. Where the untransformed first nature presses man to work, this is not free activity, although it can in principle be done with pleasure and in the absence of  Phenomena 13 ledge into commonsense language. This indicates that ecological problems are socially constructed. 1 Establishing Phenomena, Claims, and 1.1. Phenomena Explanations It is worth noting that the 'early' reports on environmental problems were stressing the interconnection of several factors which would lead to an ecological crisis or collapse, the most You want to live 'according to nature'? . To live-is important of them being exhaustion of resources, population that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is living not valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, growth, and pollution. At least in respect of the problem of wanting to be different? (Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good resources and population, recent studies, such as the Commission and Evil) of the United Nations on Environment and Development, are Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, elec­ more optimistic.2 The 1987 report of the commission lists the tric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of following phenomena: human industrYi natural material transformed into organs 1 . pollution (air, water); of the human will over nature. They are organs of the 2. depletion of groundwater; human brain, created by the human hand; the power of 3 . proliferation of toxic chemicals; knowledge, objectified. (Karl Marx, Gnmdrisse) 4. proliferation of hazardous waste; 5. erosioni Since the first studies concerning ecological problems appeared, l 6. desertification; the topic has been an ever-present issue in many contemporary 7. acidification; debates. These studies were alarmist in tone. They led to a 8. new chemicals (see United Nations 1987: 10) debate which altered the political dis.course in one important respect: the natural environment became an issue for political In a quite illuminating but little-discussed book, Passmore activity, for political parties and for governments. It became an listed the following problems: issue for social and political sciences, for economics, moral 9. pollution; philosophy, and law. Other parts of society increasingly realized 10. depletion of natural resources; that environmental questions were crucial; but just how crucial 1 1 . extinction of species; turned out to be a topic for many debates. These debates are still 12. ·destruction of wilderness; going on and partly taking place in the mass media. Their very 13. population growth (cf. Passmore 1974: 43). logic seems to lead to a permanent switch of attention. The urge Since ( 1 ), (3), (4), ( 7), and (8) are contained in the more general (9), for novelty periodically discovers new ecological problems, I shall take Passmore's list as the basis for further discussion. from the ozone hole to. the greenhouse effect, from noxious Since ( 1 1 ) and ( 1 2) are contained in ( 1 0), we have baSically chemicals in food chains to smog in big cities. However, the fact pollution, depletion of (renewable and non-renewable) resources, that it is the mass media that disperse this news should be no reason for neglecting the underlying problems. Very.often mass 2. 'The commission believes that widespread poverty is no longer inevitable' (United Nations 1987: 8). 'Global agriculture has the potential to grow enough media reports are simply translating available scientific know- food for all, but food is often not available where it is needed' (ibid. 12). 'Hunger often arises from lack of purchasing power rather than lack of available fooq' ! Carson 1962; Meadows el ai. 1972. Sec the criticisms of Heilbronner 1973, {ibid. 13). Note that the depletion of natural resources does not figure as a Myrdal 1973, and Galtung 1973 with respect to the latter. separate theme in the report. 14 Phenomena Phenomena 15 and population growth as ecological problems. Erosion and ecological problems, the dominating attitude of man towards desertification fall out of the list. They are natural processes nature should be replaced by another. The roots of our, presum­ anyway and interesting in our context only in so far as they are ably false, instrumentalist view of nature are usually dated back caused by human intervention. In this case we might classify to the Enlightenment (mechanistic world-view; separation of them under (10), distinguishing between renewable resources body and soul, of subject and object) or even to Judeo-Christian (agriculture) and non-renewable resources. Side-effects of chem­ religion. This latter claim was made by Lynn White Jr. when he ical substances (such as pharmaceutics) would have to be included said that the biblical creation story was responsible for the under pollution. Population growth can be an ecological problem growth of technology and the consequent destruction of large in two senses. First it can be seen as leading to ecological elements of nature (el. White 1973; Norton 1987: 143): 'And problems such as pollution or depletion of resources, because an God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness; then increasing population might require more intense exploitation let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of resources or more technological development with pollution of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth . . .' (Gen. 1 : as a side-effect. Second, it can be seen as an ecological problem 26-9). per se, that is, the increasing number in a specific place may be There are two lines in the ecological discourse regarding the detrimental to human well-being. Taken in the first sense it is strategy to overcome this false attitude towards nature. According a cause of, taken in the second sense it is an instance of, an to the first, mankind should retreat to a lower state of nature ecological problem. transformation and adopt a simpler way of life in order to The issue has a practical and a theoretical dimension. The restrict its interventions in natural processes;3 the other holds practical dimension is that almost every country has been that such a way back is not open to us. As Amery put it, 'there is affected by ecological problems in a more or less significant no way back to the ritual dance around the divine bear' (Amery. way; it has become one of the central political questions in the 1976: 197, my translation). When some authors ('New Age') course of a few years. In many countries social movements have speak of a social and cultural revolution which would be neces­ come into being which have already made an impact on political, sary to bring harmony to man's relationship to nature, this can legal, scientific, and economic matters. be understood in both ways. But no matter how we judge the many different projects and Utopias in this discourse, they all share the basic claim that the dominating attitude of mankind 1.2. Ecological claims and approaches lies at the root of the problem. The basic thrust of this present work is to oppose such a claim Turning to the theoretical implications, I shall first devote some directly. In my view 'domination of nature' is not responsible attention to looking at explanations of, and claims about, for ecological problems; quite the contrary: the very presence of ecological problems. It is important to be precise here, since the ecological problems proves the absence of such a domination. In way of defining and explaining the problem to a great extent other words, it is still a reasonable approach with which we can determines the solution. make sense of the problem and stipulate solutions. Now, this I start with the most basic and most radical thesis which is seems to be such a bold contention that it might be discarded by put forward by environmentalists and shared by many others. many from the very beginning. Let me therefore proceed in This is the claim that ecological problems are the consequence more detail. of a specific attitude towards nature which has prevailed in the Confronted with the dramatic events of the twentieth century, Western world for some centuries. This attitude towards nature the temptation has been strong for many thinkers to regard the is called 'domination of nature' and considered to be false and ,1 This view sometimes has an authoritarian flavour, especially in the version . undesirable. It follows as a corollary that, in order to overcome of Gruh1 11975) and Harich 11975). 16 Phenomena Phenomena 17 heritage of Westem civilization and Enlightenment very critically stand society on the basis of specific natural laws and to deduce and even reject its 'project of rationality'. As, for e;xample, social norms and principles of social organization from ecological Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialektik der Aufkldrung prinCiples (el. Oechsle 1988: 9). Haeckel, the founding father of wrote: ecology as a scientific discipline, already claimed in the nine­ teenth century that man should lead his life in accordance with The conservatives' conclusion, that horror and civilization are bound natural laws. It is intriguing to see that this naturalistic world­ together, is well established . . . Only under the sign of the hangman did culture develop . . . under the sign of the hangman are labour and view is a common denominator of all political tendencies in the enjoyment. To contradict this would mean to make a mockery at ecological discourse. We find it in conservative authors like science and logic. One cannot abolish the horror and retain civilization Gruhl (1975: 33, 345); in communist-Stalinist authors like . . . But different conclusions can also be drawn from this: one has to Harich (1975: 161); in anarchist writers like Bookchin scorn logic, if it is against mankind. (Adorno and Horkheimer 198 1 : (1977: IS), and in eco-socialist writers like Lalonde (1978: 53 ) . 245, my translation) All of them claim the authority of nature and her laws to be the In my view this position mistakenly identifies certain specific foundation stone of a new society which will solve ecological problems. Gruhl and Harich are alike in that they stress the iron results of Western rationality with rationality as such. From this fallacy follows the rejection of Western-type rationality and necessity with which nature operates; from this they derive the search for other world-views which promise to do better. similar tough political measures. Bookchin argues that spontan­ eity in life converges with spontaneity in nature (1977: 10), and Furthermore, this fallacy might suggest that another approach (mystical, religious, irrational) would avoid the problems in Lalonde stresses the fact that nature is and society should be question; such a suggestion, however, could be quite dangerous self-organizing. This short overview shows that nature is an for modern industrial societies. Utopian projects have to ac­ authority which many think to be uncontested; however, as knowledge the highly complex character of modern technology closer analysis shows, each version of nature is a construction of if they want to bring about feasible changes. Marcuse, posing its author. Therefore, what the 'nature of nature' is, is a matter himself this problem, thought that there could be two types of rather of debate than certainty. mastery over nature, a repressive one and a liberating one (see This already makes clear that any discourse on nature and Marcuse 1964: 185). To this position Habermas quite rightly ecological problems is not without presuppositions; and these objected that presuppositions lie within the cultural background of the parti­ cipants of the discourse; they are a product of history. A definition modern science can be interpreted as a historically unique project only of 'nature' or of ecological problems, therefore, always relates to if at least one alternative project is thinkable. And, in addition, an an anthropocentriC element. Since the reference point for evalu­ alternative New Science would have to include the definition of a New ation is human, non-anthropocentric approaches of nature pre­ Technology. This is. a sobering consideration because technology, if servation, so I suggest, are defective. Oechsle rightly refuses based at all on a project, can only be traced back to a 'project' of the ecological naturalism. However, she does not defend anthropo­ human species as a whole, and not to one that could be historically surpassed. (Habermas 1971b: 87) centrism in a straightforward way, as-in my opinion-she should have done. In my view, man's special position within Analysing contemporary ccological thought, Oechsle found that a nature is characterized by his domination of nature. In order to common world-view prevalent in it is naturalism. Naturalism, separate the question of whether mankind has a special status according to her, proceeds in the following way. It first juxtaposes within nature from the question of whether mankind should nature and society and then tries to bring them together in such dominate nature, Oechsle (approvingly) cites Mumford, who a way that society adapts its laws to the laws of nature. As she claimed that within occidental civilization there have been put it, naturalism here means the attempt to explain and under- examples of a 'democratic' technology. This argument gives her 18 Phenomena Phenomena 19 the possibility of defending a sort of anthropocentrism without guish themselves from animals: i t i s the use o f tools or techno­ embracing the notion of domination of nature. However, a logy. But something further follows from this. Because human distinction between a democratic and an authoritarian technology beings are organizing their life in the described way, they have makes sense only with respect to man, not with respect to no 'natural enemies' as almost every other species has though, nature. Every technology, even the softest, forms a part of man's certainly, they sometimes have specific parts of nature in op­ domination of nature. Oechsle comes close to acknowledging position to them, nature which exerts its resistance upon them. this when she writes that even the most 'dialogical' approaches As John Stuart Mill observed, the powers of nature 'are often towards nature (as, for example, proposed by Prigogine) cannot towards man in the position of enemies, from which he must but lead to a more perfect domination of nature. Ludwig Trepl wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use' expressed this in the following way: 'An ecological technology (Mill 1904: 1 5 ). means total grip. For this reason ecology does not stand outside This stresses again my objection to the ecological world-view the logic of progress, but the latter culminates in it' (TrepI 1983 : which challenges the anthropocentric world-view. Nature, as 1 1, my translation). Oechsle agrees with authors like Amery, such, is not always beneficial for human beings. It is completely Bahro, and Meyer-Abich (inter alia) that we have to research the mistaken to identify nature with 'good' and technology or , origins of destroying nature. These are seen in the specific human culture with 'bad .5 Moralizing helps rarely, less so with occidental human self-understanding and world-view. As Amery respect to nature. As Passmore observed quite rightly, 'these put it: natural processes may in fact be quite harmful, so that, let us say, oysters from granite regions ought to be condemned for If one does not expose the roots of these historical and ideal attitudes, human consumption. The "natural" is not necessarily harmless, the necessary remedies will always meet political and social resistance; and only if one realizes how deeply rooted these attitudes are in our let alone beneficial to man' (Passmore 1974: 47). In exactly the collective underground, can the necessary} i.c. radical and most painful, same vein, Adorno, reflecting on the landscape of the Swiss process of a planetary revolution be initiated. (Amery 1976: 10, my Alps, remarked: translation) Both} the scars of civilization and the untouched zone beyond the But at the same time Oechsle defends the anthropocentric timber line, are contrary to the idea that nature is a cheering, warming world-view to a certain degree. Man is Natur und Ubernatur, is thing, dedieated only to man; it reveals what the cosmos looks like. part of nature and at the same time 'above' or even 'outside' The usual imago of nature is limited, narrowly bourgeois, sensitive only to the tiny zone in which historically familiar life flourishes; the nature. Human beings have no fixed place where they have to bridle path is cultural philosophy. (Adorno 1968: 327, my translation) live; virtually every place on this planet can be inhabited by them. By this they distinguish themselves from most other Passmore, in reply to Barry Commoner's Third law of ecology­ animals (and, of course, plants) who survive only within a nature knows best', pointed out: limited geographical, biological, climatic zone. How are human It is true enough . . . that every human intervention in an ecosystem is beings able to survive in an 'insecure environment'? The answer likely to disturb the workings of that system in a way that is detrimental is: by constructing a second 'nature' around them.4 This artifi­ to some number of it. So much is true of every change, man-induced or cial, man-made nature is the embodiment of their need to fight nature-induced. But it by no means follows, as his 'law' might seem to against nature; it is the solution of the apparent paradux that suggest, that every such change, or even most such changes, will be they are in and against nature. The solution of the paradox detrimental to human beings. Unlike the watches to which he compares entails a wholly new dimension by which human beings dis tin- S As Kluge has shown in a detailed study, much of the ecological rhetoric 4 In comp,lrison, an animal species in an unfavourable enVironment will consists of the juxtaposition of life and death-where nature stands for the undergo an evolutionary process in order to survive. former, industrialism for the latter (see Kluge 1985). 20 Phenomena Phenomena 21 them, ecological systems were hot designed for man's USc. When men would be communicative instead of dominating. 'Harmony', picked seeds off plants and sowed them on cleared ground, they acted in 'conviviality', and 'co-operation' would be the underlYing prin­ a way that was detrimental to the organic life which was accustomed to ciples (el. Bloch 1986; Illich 1973). This claim having already feed on the fallen seeds. But only the mOst unreconstructed primitivist been criticized above, let us turn to the next one: would suggest that the actions of our agricultural forefathers were destructive of human interests. A nature left entirely alone as 'knowing Ecological problems are basically the result of man's (C2) best' would support only the dreariest and most monotonous of lives. destruction of nature. IPassmore 1974: 185) This definition releases us from the difficulty of alternative The anthropocentric approach has the main virtue of offering rnodes of conceiving and treating nature. (C2) does not necessarily a reference point from which to evaluate ecological problems, refuse the domination of nature; it only opposes some extremely The reference point, as we shall see, can bc defined in different negative features ( 'destruction'). However, this claim is equally ways Icurrently living human individuals, society, mankind, misleading since it suggests the (false) belief that nature could future generations) but, no matter how we defirle it, it establishes a be destroyed (by human action or otherwise). This definition clear criterion of how to judge existing ecological phenomena. leads us immediately to metaphysical arguments and tel the Any 'eco-centric' approach, on the other hand, is bound to be idealism-materialism opposition. Interestingly enough, many of inconsistent, unless it adopts a mystical standpoint. It is incon­ the participants of the ecological debate are 'materialists' (virtu­ sistent because it pretends to define ecological problems purely ally all natural scientists) and therefore should not believe in the from the standpoint of nature. It starts with assumptions about possibility of nature's self-destruction, and, in fact, most of nature and natural laws to which all human action should them would not subscribe to such a position, although many adapt.6 But it is evident that the definition of n�ture and an ecologists make use of this defioition. Scientists, quite explicitly, ecological balance is a human act, a human definition which refer to the 'second law of thermodynamics' (entropy law) to sets an ecological balance in relation to man's needs, pleasures, express their preoccupation in this respect (see Georgescu­ and desires.7 Consider now the following clairns:" Roegen 1971, 1980). But there remains another sense in which IC2) is understood. Ecological problems are the result of man's domination I C I ) In this version the destruction of nature is not taken in the sense of nature. of physics but in an evaluative sense. 'Destruction of nature' Following from this, another model of man's relation to nature here refers to the disruption of the environment human beings would eliminate ecological problems. The alternative model live in. This version is usually implied in the following claim: Ecological problems result ftom man's short-Sighted IC3) (, Note that the refusal of anthropoccntrism is followed by a conspicuous position which anthropomorphizes nature, Le. it projects human standards and exploitation of nature. inventions into the working of nature. But why should nature work in a A 'short-sighted' exploitation of nature can have two different 'balanced' manner? Or why should nature always be beautiful? Is it not man who introduces laws of beauty into nature? Cf. Dante: 'And therefore we need theanings: la) nature'S intrinsic values are violated; Ib) negative not praise man for his physical beauty which he gets by birth since it was not he repercussions from exploited nature to man are not taken into who made it. Instead, we should praise the maker, that is, human nature which account. As I shall explain below, only Ib) carl be used in a produces so much beauty in its material when it is not restricted by it' (Convivio, III, iv. 8), and Marx in the Paris Manuscripts, 'man forms objects in rneaningful way. accordance with the laws of beauty' (eW iii. 277). The ecological discourse, however, does not usually speak of 7 From a systems theoretical viewpoint, this claim can be pUt in the follow­ ecological problems, but of ecological crisis. The notion of crisis ing way: 'society is a communicatively closed system and cannot communicate with the environment. It finds no one there to answer. And even if this were the derives from medicine and has been widely applied, above all to case it would then be included within society' (Luhmann 1984a: 549, my trans.). economy. It denotes the turning-point of a pathological state K Cf. for the following also Buhl 1981. Ifor example fever in medicine, depreciation of capital in 22 Phenomena Phenomena 23 economy). The notion of crisis thus introduces a dramatic Passmore proposed the following, very broad definition: A prob­ dimension into the ecological discourse: it suggcsts that nature lem is 'ecological' if it arises as a practical consequence of man's is undergoing an ;abnormal' development which has to culminate dealings with nature (see Passmore 1974: 43). Since this definition in a crisis which then gives way to a new, 'normal' state. But avoids the problems of (C] ) to (CS), and has the virtue of relating each crisis can also lead to the opposite result: in this case the clearly to human action, I shall adopt it as the basis for further 'infected' system (organism) will not recover but die. discussion-with one additional qualification: 'practical con­ From this last alternative we get the following prediction: sequences' means that man's dcalings with nature retroact Current ecological crises lead necessarily to ecological (C4) upon society in a way which is detrimental to human well­ catastrophes (and eventually to the final collapse). being. This definition takes into consideration the fact that nature by itself can also induce ecological problems. This is the It goes without saying that much of the dramatic dimension of case with floods, eruption of volcanos, fall of meteorites, etc. the ecological discourse rests on this element. To subscribe to The important point here is that we are obviously interested in this.�laim a clear analysis of the present situation and a reliable ecological problems which are produced by society and the prognosis of the immediate future of the planet earth would be solutions of which lie within the scope of social action. required. The following two cxamples may illustrate this. The Man's dealings with nature are generally characterized by the first example is the problem of CO emissions into the atmo­ 2 following properties. First, man is part of nature, he is living in sphere. One position holds that this process will lead to the nature; biology defines him as the most highly developed mam­ 'greenhouse effect', that the planet's atmosphere will be heated mal. Nature, however, is the realm of competition for survival. up with consequences like change in global weather or the Thus human beings have to secure their position in nature as do melting of polar ice and the consequent flooding of many big other animals. But human beings distinguish themselves from maritime cities. The counter-position holds that increasing other animals in their own particular way of maintaining life. emissions of dust will cause a counter-tendency which prevents lf we characterize human beings as living in and dominating the heating up and thus prevents the greenhouse effect (d. nature, this does not present two statements which are incom­ Miller and Miller 1989). patible with cach other. When we say that a problem is ecological The second example is the question of scarcity of natural when it arises as a consequence of man's dealings with nature, resources. Again, scientists have expressed considerable disag­ many might agree. But I think it useful to push the point a bit reement; a judgement in this case depends on the answer to the further. It does not mean that the very fact of dealing with question of how fast technological progress will be (in order to nature ( manipulation, domination, harnessing, or seduction) is find substitutes for scarce resources). Thus I think that many of the crucial point, the 'cause', so to speak, of ecological problems. the 'alarmist' statements are the expression of one tendency Ecological problems arise only Out of specific ways of dealing within a variety of competing claimsY For this reason I shall with nature. To repeat my claim from above: both man's existence abandon the catastrophic prediction, but also the following in nature and his attempt to dominate nature are compatible; claim: human beings live in, and dominate, nature. Ecological problems are only temporary and not very (CS) Out of a misunderstanding of this relation, both ecologists severe; they will SOOn vanish. and their declared enemies conclude the mutually exclusive which is the symmetrical counter-argument to (C4). character of the two predicates. Both positions are wrong in that they identify the problem of dominating nature as the heart of ') In saying this I do not deny the existence of ecological catastrophes (in the the matter. Consider the following argument which takes the eco­ sense of Perrows's 'normal accidents', below). What I deny is the logical status of these catastrophes in the above definition. There, they have the status of an centric approach to extremes, thereby demonstrating its absurdity. instance for a 'final crisis'. Recall (C4) from above. There we saw that a 'pathological' state 24 Phenomena Phenomena 25 was distinguished from a 'normal' state of nature. But it is conceive of the 'selfish' character in a narrow, economic, short­ difficult to know what is 'normal' for nature. Ecologists will term way, all criteria can be reduced to this category lO My probably argue that the 'normal' state of nature is a balanced suspicion is that the ecological discourse shaped its arguments state of nature. Since I cannot see how this definition can work in a counter-position to economics, and also took over a basic without reference to human interests and definitions, I claim flaw of that theory: the identification of short-term rationality that nature is always in 'balance with itself'. Take the example (as expressed in economic behaviour) with rationality as such. of a river in which, as a result of pollution (detergents), no fish Out of this identification it is only logical to refuse an anthropo­ survive. But instead of fish other animals and plants (e.g. algae) centric approach as a guiding line in solving ecological problems. are flourishing. The ecologist, confronted with such an argument, Human beings are seen as inherently short-sighted; it follows would probably say that if the river cannot return to the former that their needs must not count as criteria for ecological polities. ('normal') state with its own powers, its ecosystem would have Doing away with this confusion, the anthropocentric standpoint to be called 'unbalanced'. But in so arguing, she would only makes perfectly possible a concern about the 'flourishing of reveal her preference for higher living organisms. Usually lower nature'; it is by no means bound to be an accomplice to the animals such as insects and bacteria are outside the concern of tendencies which cause ecological problems. Yet, what is more, ecological reasoning. Albert Schweitzer tried to be consistent I claim that this standpOint is the only one which can consistently and defended the right of living for the tsetse fly and the speak in terms like 'flourishing nature' and the only one which tubercle. This position, radical in ethical and religious respects, lays its standard of critique open, thus facilitating analyses and makes a consistent course of human action impossible. Consider solutions for these problems. the case of the AIDS virus! As Norton aptly observed, environmentalists often make two Let us take the argument a step further and consider the typical confusions. The first is the belief that one must choose example of a river which is drying out. In this ease again we have between attributing intrinsic and instrumental value to an 'nature': sand, rocks, plants, insects, reptiles, mammals. The object, that no object can be valued for its intrinsic value and .ecologist would now probably reply that nature's diversity and simultaneously for its usefulness. The second is the belief that complexity has been destroyed. And here, ironically, we have one must either attribute intrinsic value to an object or else the resurrection (if only implicit) of the anthropocentric view, leave it without any protection from the vagaries of human namely that it is man who has an interest in conserving natural consumptive demands. Such beliefs sometimes lead to the complexity. Now an adherent to the ecocentric view could confusion that protection of nature on anthropocentric·assump­ argue that nature 'for itself' should be complex. But unless one tions is a contradiction in terms. As regards the first belief, adopts a mystical or religiOUS standpOint, there is always a Norton rightly contends that 'one can assign instrumental human interest behind the attitude that nature should be left value to an object without automatically denying that it has out there 'for itself'. The reasons behind such a human interest value beyond that usefulness . . . Attributing intrinsic value to are either of an aesthetic or a purely selfish character or spring an object limits the ways in which that object can be used but from man's general care about his environment. Take the ex­ need not prohibit all use of it' (Norton 1987: 219). As regards the ample of pollution. Mary Douglas provided the following insight second belief, Norton shows that it is wrong as well. A simple into the problem. She claims that 'uncleanness is matter out of thought can make this clear: 'One need not attribute intrinsic place' (Douglas 1966: 40). What makes a place wrong is depehdent It) Consider the case of a domestic animal which falls ill and would die on the cultural value system of a given society. With respect to without medical care. Its 'natural' destiny would be to die. But, if the owner of Western societies we may say that it might be wrong aesthetically, the animal so wants, he tries to get it cured. This attempt need not be attributing intrinSic value to the animal because he may try to cure it on purely selfish that it is detrimental for health, or that it detroys Wildlife, grounds, I.e. simply because he would feel bad if the animal died without his plants, and animals (d. also Passmore 1974: 45-6). If we do not effort to prevent it from dying. 26 Phenomena Phenomena 27 value to a neighbour's property in order to have a good reason not live in, but only to be entered as oeeasion requires, when to destroy it. Nor need one attribute intrinsic value to nature in anything is wanted for the work of the Interpreter . . . ' libid. order to have good reason not to use it destructively' INorton 255, original emphasis). 13 1987: 219). Interestingly, from this instrumental view of nature we can derive a rationale for the protection of species which is again anthropocentric. One might believe that humans who 1.3. Causes of ecological problems protect rather than destroy other living things are less likely to be violent in their dealings with other humans. One should, In section 1.2 I have sketched some essential human features in therefore, value wild birds, for example, 'as providing occasions their relation to nature. From this we can infer the abstract for the uplifting of human attitudes and values' libid. 221). possibility of ecological problems, for it is always possible that One cannot escape the cultural value system of contemporary man acts upon nature in a way which causes changes in nature Western societies when criticizing it. This is to say that ecological detrimental to his own life. fundamentalists are bound to participate in rational debates, to In what follows I present several approaches which have been presuppose rationality standards, etc. As Krohn put it: 'The applied to investigate ecological problems or which can be used critique of science must take the form of science, in order to be for this purpose. We may divide them into economic and soci­ effective' IKrohn 1983: 128, my translation). I I The results of an ological ways of looking at the problem. The latter will be 'ecologically inspired' research Ifor example, the emerging dis­ presented in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, the former in sections cipline of ecosystems research) may thus, again ironically, con­ 1.3.4-1.3.7. Generally we may distinguish between two com­ tribute to a better domination of nature. As van den Daele 11987) pletely different mechanisms which are at work, which 'cause' has shown, ecology does not mean the transition to a non­ ecological problems, so to speak. The first conceives ecological technological or to a purely contemplative concept of nature, problems as a result of purely intentional behaviour, whereas but to a better technological concept. The Baconian vision of the second conceives them as essentially by-products of human domination of nature is thus not abandoned but perfected Id. action, as unintended in character. The first mechanism can be van den Daele 1987: 414). expressed in the economists' approach of 'externalities' which Since the mechanism of man's dealings with nature does not are the result of the strategy of an entrepreneur to externalize provide any barrier for a more perfect domination of nature, his costs as far as possible. The second mechanism has been such a barrier-if one wants to have one-must be established studied above all by philosophers and has been taken up by by humans. The ecologists do establish such a barrier in re­ social scientists.14 moralizing nature and science, thus challenging the famous In determining what counts as 'intended' and 'unintended' claim of Bacon who once formulated that it is an error to believe the time horizon which is presupposed is crucial. Not by chance that 'the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted or do the economists disregard long-term consequences of economic forbidden' IBacon 1986: 20)Y In his view nature is 'a granary behaviour; they are transformed into 'social costs'. Likewise, and storehouse of matters, not meant to be pleasant to stay or although the producers and consumers of certain potentially damaging products may be aware of the inherent danger, they j I Thus a m�mber of the German Green Party, Maren-Griesebach, wrote: nevertheless decide to produce and use Iconsume) them. But 'Ecology as baSIS for action, for politiCS. Since it is a scientific basis and can be at the same time they make their calculations about future proven with certainty . . . no one can avoid it' ( 1 98 1 : 32, my trans.). 11 Cf. also Kant in the preface to the 2nd edition of Kritik delreinen Vernunft: 'Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information U Marx shared this position, as we shall sec in ch. 2. from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his 14 To be sure, the two are ideal types which may not exist in this pure form. A master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to firm which externalizes may not be aware of causing a specific type of ecological reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose' (Kant 1952a: 6). damage. 28 Phenomena Phenomena 29 developments. Some think that the consequences of their be­ Bhopal. While I tum my attention to ( 1 ) throughout the remainder haviour will not react upon them, or will occur only in a distant of this section, I shall consider (2) in section 1 .3.3. future; others think that they will not be alive to witness the The report of the United Nations commission attributes a catastrophic results (apres moi 1e diiluge); still others think that prominent place to technology. It says: 'Emerging technologies no catastrophes will take place in the future because of the offer the promise of higher productivity, increased efficiency, beneficial technical innovations which reduce or abolish the and decreased pollution, but many bring risks of new toxic dangerous potential of these products, or likewise reduce or chemicals and wastes and of major accidents of a type and scale abolish already manifest pathological symptoms. beyond present coping mechanisms' (United Nations 1987: 16). The unintended character of human action stresses the limits Commoner expressed a similar view: 'In modern industrial to human design. It is thus more pessimistic regarding the societies, the most important link between society and the possibilities for abolishing ecological problems. Even if it were ecosystem on which it depends is technology. There is consider­ the case that entrepreneurs were not externalizing costs, but able evidence that many of the new technologies which now were ecologically aware, even if it were the case that no dangerous dominate production in an advanced country such as the United products are produced deliberately, there may be damages to the States are in conflict with the ecosystem. They therefore degrade environment (if only in the long run). The two mechanisms are the environment' (Commoner 1 9 7 1 : 1 78-9). intertwined if we consider long time-spans and take human A simple consideration makes clear that technology stands at experience into account. Here the actors know that their actions the heart of the matter. Mankind in its early stages, with may have detrimental effects on the environment, but they primitive technology, could not affect its environment in the 'take the risk', the more so the more the consequences of that same way as mankind can today: the axe and fire could not, even action will show up only in a distant future. Ecological problems lmder conditions of most careless use, cause dangers which were are thus no 'information problems' in the first place. Even if in the least comparable to present dangers which arise out of the people are well informed about the inherent dangers of some use of nuclear or chemical technology. The difference, then, lies products/actions etc. they are not likely to stop. This mixed mainly in the greater scope and greater complexity of modem form of unintended/intended mechanism is thus present in technology in comparison to old technology. Greater scope sections 1 .3.3 - 1 .3.7. I start out with a discussion of technology means that a Single malfunctioning of modem technology may which seems to be the decisive precondition for modem ecolo­ affect regions and people far away from the event; it may affect gical problems-but which should not be confused with a cause a larger number of people and for a longer time span. Greater of them. complexity means that modern technology is a composite of many parts which are embedded to a large degree in an institu­ 1 .3. 1 . Technology tional framework; social institutions and technology permeate each other. Both are complex in their nature, thus 'increasing Above, I said that ecological problems arise from man's dealings complexity, This leads to an ever-decreasing degree of transpar­ with nature. In modern societies these dealings take place on an ency (see s. 5.5.), industrial level, and are carried out by technological means. This makes it very difficult to determine more precisely We may generally distinguish two possible types of ecological 'causes' for ecological problems. It follows that the solution of problems: ( 1 ) ecological problems arising out of the 'normal' ecological problems is equally difficult to achieve, If a chemical working of technol(jgy; (2) ecological problems arising out of factory puts hazardous waste on a field, wc can identify the accidents or catastrophes. Instances of ( 1 ) are, among many cause and its solution immediately. As Luhmann ( 1989c) pointed others, acid rain or toxic substances in food chains. Instances of out, in such cases an adapted police law would suffice. But in (2) are accidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Seveso, or most cases things are not so easy. As Passmore has put it, 'the 30 Phenomena Phenomena 31 solution of an eeological problem will normally depend on the Modern technology thus exhibits a feature of social life in gen­ . . . solution of a sub-set of problems-scientific, technological, eral: human actions and intentions are crossed, mixed, and anni­ economic, moral, political, administrative-each with its own hilated by unintended consequences. Merton distinguishes be­ style of solution' (Passmore 1974: 46). tween unintended consequences and unanticipated consequences Thus interdisciplinary research is required to render possible and makes clear that 'undesired effects are not always undesirable a scientific understanding of ecological problems. There has effects' (Merton 1937: 895). From this it follows that undesired been a considerable boom in the last few years in ecologieal unanticipated consequences can be equated with unintended literature which does consider itself 'interdisciplinary'. Even consequences (in the sense I use the term). Note that Merton in the term 'super-seience' has been coined for ecology, but a big his later 'Manifest and Latent Functions' defines three types of part of it must be characterized as dilettante. IS This is because unintended consequences (see Merton 1968: l OS): functional, the subject-matter is so complex that no existing single discipline dysfunctional, and irrelevant consequences. Ecological problems of science (let alone a single person) can make competent resulting from unintended consequences are thus clearly dys­ analyses.I6 The emerging 'ecosystems research' and the institu­ functional in character; but, as we must ask, dysfunctional in tionalizing of 'technological assessment' (see McBrierty 1988; regard to what? Dysfunctional consequences may appear for Smits and Leyten 1988; Tuiniga 1988) are steps in the direction parts of the economic system (for example: rise in prices for raw of a truer interdisciplinary dimension. materials), the health system (increase in diseases), the political system (overburdening with legitimation). Additionally, the 1 .3.2. Unintended consequences political system cannot regulate the problems by law in a simple Suppose now that scientific research has yielded results and we way, but may instead trigger off a vicious circle by its very are able to understand the working of a particular ecological intervention. While I shall come back to this point in Chapter 2, problem. What comes next is (at least in many cases) the let me briefly summarize Merton's view. He first limits a development of a new technology, a technology which reduces correct anticipation of consequences of action to an existing or eradicates the undesired outcome of the old technologyP state of knowledge. Especially in situations which demand Paradoxically, here we may enter a vicious circle, because the immediate action of some sort, the probability is high that we production or operation of the new technology may also produce do not act on the basis of scientific knowledge but on opinion ecological problems. As Passmore said: 'Any technological in­ and estimate. As Merton himself put it: novation . . . involves an element of ecological risk; it is impossible to calculate all its consequences in every possible Moreover, even when immediate action is not exacted, there is the circumstance' (Passmore 1974: 49) .'8 economic problem of distributing our fundamental resources, time and IS energy. Time and energy are scarce means and economic behavior is As Enzensberger observed, 'today everyone counts as expert in ecological concerned with the rational allocation of these means among alternative matters' (Enzcnsberger 1973: 2, my trans.). 16 To be sure, many biologists have tried to develop solutions for the social, wants, only one of which is the anticipation of consequences of action. political, economic, or legal sphere, but they did not seem to be very appealing to In our present economic order, it is manifestly uneconomic behavior to their addressees. concern ourselves with attempts to obtain knowledge for predicting 17 I do not consider here such simple cases as the 'adapted police law' or any the outcomes of action to such an extent that we have practically no other 'simple new law' which is able to abolish any existing ecological problem in one blow. time or energy for other pursuits. (Merton 1937: 900) IN Cf. also Perrow: 'It is particularly important to evaluate technological fixes in the systems that we cannot or will not do without. Fixes, including safety The second factor is error. This means that actors often assume devices, sometimes create new accidents, and quite often merely allow those in that 'actions which have in the past led to the desired outcome charge to run the system faster, or in worse weather, or with bigger explosives. Some technical fixes are excuses for poor organisation or an attempt to compen­ will continue to do so' (ibid. 901). The third factor is what has sate for poor system design' (Perrow 1984: 1 1 ). been called 'imperious immediacy of interest' and refers to 32 Phenomena Phenomena 33 instances 'where the actor's paramount concern with the fore­ damage results in the decline of ecological awareness thus seen immediate consequences excludes the consideration of allowing a new Ivicious) cycle. further or other consequences of the same act' IMerton 1937: As we have seen, the feature of unintended consequences 901). Merton further explains that the action may be rational 'in makes social planning difficult. 19 This is basically due to the the sense that it is an action which may be expected to lead to the fact that we cannot predict the character of these consequences: attainment of the specific goal; irrational, in the sense that it they may be inherently beneficial or harmful Ito all of mankind may defeat the pursuit or attainment of other values which are or to parts of it; in respect of short-term or long-term considera­ not, at the moment, paramount but which nonetheless form an tions). Broadly speaking, we can summarize Merton's typology integral part of the individual's scale of values' libid. 902). This, into two classes: unintended consequences as resulting from however, is not only a question of conflicting values, but of imperfect knowledge I'error' being part of it) or as resulting short-term and long-term rationalities. Ecological problems seen from the actor's paramount concern with immediate results. In in this way would suggest an identification of the paramount section 1.3.3 the knowledge aspect plays a crucial role but is also interest with the immediate economic benefits; other values mixed with the second aspect, whereas in sections 1.3.6 and Ifor example, environment) are suppressed and become a long­ 1.3.8 the 'imperious immediacy of interest' will be centrally term Concern. A similar but distinct factor concerns the basic important. values involved in the course of human action: 'activities oriented toward certain values release processes which so react as to 1.S.S. Industrial accidents change the very scale of values which precipitated them' libid. I now come to the second possibility labove): industrial accidents. 903). Instances of this are self-defeating processes like the rise of Up to now we have arrived at the possibility that some industries, the Protestant ethic which in the end brought about wealth and during their 'normal' working, pollute, that is, produce toxic or abundance. Vicwing ecological and economic values in this otherwise dangerous waste. Now I shall consider the possibility perspective, one may say that the result of the dominating that some industries lirrespective of whether working 'cleanly' economic value in Western societies has been to contribute to or not) are likely to produce accidents which set free toxic or the emergence of its 'antagonist': the Ifundamentalist) defenders otherwise dangerous substances. of ecological values who express their paramount concern with Charles Perrow has studied high-risk technologies and their immediate ecological goals, no matter what the result for the institutional setting, combining the study of organizations with economy. the study of technology. His analysis thus contains two elements: The fourth and last factor Merton mentions is the intriguing technology Isee s. 1.3.1) and unintended consequences Isee fact that successful social prediction and planning are often s. 1.3.2). As Perrow pointed out, some characteristics of high­ hampercd by public predictions of future social developments risk technologies 'suggest that no matter how effective conven­ 'precisely because the prediction has become a new element in tional safety devices are, there is a form of accident that is the concrete situation, thus tending to change the initial course inevitable' IPerrow 1984: 3). This alarming conclusion is derived of developments' libid. 903-4). Applying this last model again from the specific features of modern technology: '!M!ost high­ to ecological problems, we may for once receive a more optimistic risk systems have some special characteristics, beyond their picture: we might expect that the apocalyptic tone of the first toxic or explosive or genetic dangers, that make accidents in world reports on environment have already changed the course them inevitable, even "normal". This has to do with the way of development, leading to a decline in pollution and a slower !<) As Passmore said: 'this is not a very encouraging line of reasoning . . . !blut depletion of resources. But if we consider Merton's third factor, it is at least realistic, firmly based on human history . . . that the unintended where a basic value becomes self-defeating, then we may get a consequences of mcn's actions arc more important, for the most part, than the much more pessimistic picture: then, the reduction in ecological consequences they intend' (Passmore 1974: 83-4). 34 Phenomena Phenomena 35 failures can . interact and the way the system is tied together' wrong). As Perrow himself put it: 'The legendary Murphy was (Perrow 1984: 4). This sort of system is characterized by 'inter­ wrong. His law, that if anything can go wrong it will, is disproved active complexity' and 'tight coupling'. Perrow employs two vari­ by almost all post-accident investigations of large disasters. ables in his analysis: linear/complex systems and loose/tight These investigations repeatedly point out that "it was lucky it , coupling. Linear processes and loose coupling are less prone to sys­ wasn't worse" (ibid. I l l ). Not all systems, however, display tem accidents. But note that even 'the most linear of all systems the characteristics outlined above. Systems which are not very will have at least one source of complex interactions, the environ­ complex, and are not coupled tightly, can still have accidents, as ment, since it impinges upon many parts or units in the system' all systems can. 'But they arc more likely to stem from major (ibid. 75). 'Loosely coupled systems, whether for good or ill, can failures whose dynamics are obvious, rather than the trivial incorporate shocks and failures and pressures for change without ones that are hidden from understanding' (ibid. 10). It is worth destabilisation. Tightly coupled systems will respond more noting that on the basis of Perrow's analysis the process of quickly to these perturbations, but the response may be disast­ specialization alone does not lead to a loss of control over rous. Both types of systems have their virtues and their vices' technology Or to detrimental effects of technology on the natural (ibid. 92). If the above two variables taken together inevitably environment or on human well-being. But such is exactly Tiezzi's produce an accident, this would be the case for a normal or claim: 'It is said that technologies must to a large degree be systems accident in Perrow's definition. As he makes clear, 'we scientific since one of the fundamental parameters in the pro­ have such accidents because we have built an industrial society ductive system today is complexity. But this leads to an increase that has some parts, like industrial plants or military adventures, in specialization and consequently to a loss of control and of that have highly interactive and tightly coupled units. Unfortu­ knowledge of (complex) reality, no matter whether on the part nately, some of these have high potential for catastrophic acci­ of the people or on the part of specialists. The more specialization dents' (ibid. 8). we have, the less we are able to foresee the effects of technology A well-known and widespread view blames the operators for upon Hature' (Tiezzi 1984: 35, my translation). This is a some­ causing accidents. Perrow, however, shows that 'the operator is what exaggerated view since the problem is not whether tech­ confronted by unexpected and usually mysterious interactions nologies can (or should) be controlled by everybody. In this among failures'. Saying 'that he or she should have zigged respect every specialization erects a barrier to such 'egalitarian' instead of zagged is possible only after the fact. Before the claims. The problem is rather that complex technologies may accident no one could know what was going on and what should not even be controllable by specialists (ef. also Shrader-Frechette have been done' (ibid. 9). It is complexity and tight coup­ 1984: 1 14). ling which has to be seen as cause for a 'normal accident'. In conclUSion, wc might say, then, that there exists something These two features make it possible that small and trivial which is likely to produce catastrophic accidents: the high-risk beginnings often cause great events. 'Where chemical reactions, systems. Perrow investigated the follOWing technologies: nuclear high temperature and pressure, or air, vapor, or water turbulence energy, petrochemical plants, shipping, air traffic, genetic engin­ is involved, we cannot see what is going on or even, at times, eering, space missions, dams, mining, and weapon systems. The understand the prinCiples. In many transformation systems we result is that the most catastrophic potential resides in nuclear know what works, but sometimes do not know why. These weapons and nuclear power; hence they should be abandoned. systems are particularly vulnerable to small failures that "prop­ Marine transport and DNA recombination have only little less agate" unexpectedly, because of complexity and tight coupling' catastrophic potential, hence they should be restricted. The last (ibid. 10). category is chemical, mining, airways, space, and darns which, Perrow's approach must not be confused with the so-called according to Perrow, should be tolerated and improved (see 'Murphy's Law' (i.e. that everything that can go wrong will go Perrow 1984: ch. 9). Perrow summarizes the implications of his  f 36 Phenomena Phenomena 37 analysis in the following way: 'On the whole, we have complex since the Second World War, insisting on the point that 'the systems because we don't know how to produce the output post-war technological transformation of the United States through linear systems. If these complex systems also have economy has produced not only the much-heralded 126 per cent catastrophic potential then we had better consider alternative rise in GNP, but also, at a rate about ten times faster than the ways of getting the product, or abandoning the product entirely' growth of GNP, the rising levels of environmental pollution' (Perrow 1984: 89). (ibid. 146). Summarizing sections 1 .3 . 1 to 1 .3.3 we may state that modern Beckerman, in a straightforward way, defended economic industry's potential for causing ecological problcms is consider­ growth in the following terms: 'For even if there were no growth, able. To forestall another point of this chapter it must be said and even if national product were declining, there would still be that few of the outlined characteristics of high-risk systems can a danger, in the absence of appropriate poliCies, that pollution be deduced from the institution of private property. would be excessive and that insufficient resources would be devoted to the preservation of the environment' (Beckerman 1 .3.4. Economic growth 1974: lOS). This is so because pollution reflects a failure of the · A further candidate for causing ecological problems is industrial market rather than being a result of economic growth (d. ibid.). growth. The explanation is straightforward. Low levels of indus­ Thus, if people 'think that growth must be stopped or slowed trial production produce low levels of output hence low degrees down on account of excessive pollution' (ibid. 1 8 ), they are of waste and possible pollutants. High levels of industrial pro­ completely mistaken. Pollution has nothing to do with growth duction produce high levels of output hence high levels of waste but is a question of misallocation of resources (d. ibid. 35, 104). and possible pollutants 20 Regarding the input side, we Can In the following discussion I concentrate on approaches which establish a similar link: low levels of industrial growth require all in one way or another have to do with economic rationality, low amounts of natural resources, high levels of production market behaviour, or 'Western' rationality as such. I start with require high amounts of resources (regarding both energy supply the sort of economic behaviour which is characterized by bur­ and raw materials). It is commonly agreed that the period since densome costs to the public ('externalities') and consider then a the Second World War has been a period of exceptionally rapid game-theoretic formaliza lion. The difficult question then arises economic growth which has caused a considerable amount of as to whether this economic behaviour is typical for market hitherto unknown ecological problems. But even if we had economies (such as capitalism) Or if it is a more general pattern declining or low levels of industrial production, ccological prob­ which would also apply to post-capitalist societies. Since we lems would be likely to survive, given thc characteristics of find empirical evidence for the latter assumption, we must try modern technology. As Barry Commoner put it: ' ''Economic to exp lain it. growth" is a popular whipping boy in certain ecological circles. As indicated earlier, there are good theoretical grounds why 1 .3.5. Market, externalities, and the tragedy of the commOns economIc growth Can lead to pollution . . . However, this theoretical relationship does not mean that any increase in Pigou, over fifty years ago, drew attention to the following economic activity automatically means more pollution. What feature of economic behaviour: 'ISlmoke in large towns inflicts happens to the environment depends on how the growth is a heavy uncharged loss on the community, in injury to buildings achieved' (Commoner 1 9 7 1 : 141). He emphasizes the impact of and vegetables, expenses for washing clothes and cleaning rooms, new technologies which have been used in the US economy expenses for the provision of extra artificial light, and in many other ways' (Pigou 1932: 184). This leads to the tendency of - Sorne fundamenta 1· '0 lSt ecologists, such as the German Carl Amery, thus private capital to externalize costs. As Passmore points out, the , demanded that production should stop where possible (ef. Amery 1978: 167). owner of a factory calculates 'that he will only have to meet 38 Phenomena Phenomena 39 such costs as directly arise from his particular enterprise, such tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and costs as raw materials, labour, machinery, depreciation, taxation, beast well below the carrying eapacity of the land. Finally, however, insurance. He does not expect to meet the cost of replacing Mrs comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal Jones' curtains, even if it is the smoke from his factory that of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of causes them to rot' (Passmore 1974: 65). the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. (Hardin 1980: 104) Neo-classical economics would argue that the market principle This is so because as a rational being the herdsman seeks to leads to beneficial outcomes in this respect provided that a maximize his gain. Since he is to get the full amount of increment system of property rights is established which includes natural if he adds one animal to his herd and he is only to share a part of resources like air or water. 21 Saleable rights would provide the the negative effects of overgrazing he concludes that the best mechanism for this system. Against this, some authors have thing he can do is add another animal to his herd. Hardin argued that the introduction of market principles into economy comments: 'But this is the conclusion reached by each and was a decisive factor for the depletion of resources. Before the every rational herdsman sharing commons. Therein is the tragedy. advent of the market, traditional mcchanisms occupied its Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase place. Often these were based on tribal or kinship relations and his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the were nature-conserving IVictor 1980: 205). As Victor, draWing destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own on Polanyi 1 1 944), maintains, the market principle in fact intro­ best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the duced a damaging tendency. Under market conditions the earth commons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all' libid. is no longer the property of the people who live on it, but an 104). exchangeable good. Under market conditions a company lor any Note that in one case the market is praised for preventing other) may buy a piece of land and extract resources in order ecological problems whereas in the other it is accused of causing to use them up by producing a specific good or simply to sell ecological problems. How can one explain these opposing judge­ them. When the job is done, the company moves away and ments of collective ownership? An answer to this would certainly leaves the place. It leavcs it to Isometimes) anonymous future focus on the important role which cultural values play in cases inhabitants. The difference between a society in which the where common property exists. If there are cultural patterns inhabitants of a certain area are the common owners of the which prevent the common owners from overfishing, over­ earth, taking the best care of it, and a society in which land has grazing, etc. there need not arise a tragedy of the commons. become a commodity, then, is that the former seems to be more Only in cases where such patterns do not lor no longer) exist can apt to avoid ecological problems than the latter. It is assumed the neo-classical argument come in. This has been rightly that people who own a certain thing commonly Iland in our identified as a strategic point for bringing in a sort of 'environ­ case) will take the best care of it. This could also be interpreted mentalist ethics'. Thus Hardin writes: as an example of a successful assurance game Is. 1 .3.6). But here neo-classical economists would argue that it is quite the contrary. IT)he logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private They have it that the trouble begins with common property:" property in real estate , ., Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman . . . but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an for this knowledge be constantly refreshed. (ibid. 105, 104) arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because The logic of the commons is understood mostly only 'in special 21 Beckerman ( 1 974) concedes that the market principle fails to prevent cases which are not sufficiently generalized . . . the oceans of the pollution since nobody has property rights in natural resources like air or water. 22 Actually, Hardin is a biologist but the logic of his argument is comparable world continue to suffer from the philosophy of the commons. to what neo-classical economists would hold. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth 40 Phenomena Phenomena 4 1 of the "freedom of seas". Professing to believe in the "inexhaust­ My answer here cannot be exhaustive but 1 think the follOWing ible reSources of the oceans", they bring species after species of factors explain a lot. In addition to what has been said above fish and whales closer to extinction' (Hardin 1980: 105). with respect to common property, I would add the following. It And Victor claims: 'These examples from history indicate is not true that only private enterprises (profit maximizers) that the expansion of the market system created the tragedy of cause ecological problems. The same holds true for state enter­ the commons by weakening the traditional forms of social prises and private consumers in capitalism, and for enterprises relations which had hitherto prevailed. It is the reconstruction and consumers in socialist countries. One reason, therefore, has of social structures such as these, combined with the propagation been explained by Max Weber: it is the expansion of the 'ration­ of an environmental ethic, that environmentalists argue is an ality principle' in the modern epoch. In capitalist enterprises essential ingredient in an effective environmental policy' (Victor economic calculation is carried out mainly by means of money, 1980: 206) . which is, according to Weber, the most rational way of orientating However, if such an environmental ethics is not in sight, the economic activities (ef. Weber 1978: 86). As Weber also makes problem must be posed in different terms. Rousseau addressed a clear, a planned economy which is based on the principle of need similar set of questions in his Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite satisfaction and on calculations in kind 'would have to determine parmi les hommes, using a model of a natural state which "value-indicators" of some kind for the individual capital goods roughly corresponds to our above example of the commons (ef. which could take over the role of the "prices" used in book Boudon and Bourricaud 1989: 313). His solution is to invest a calculation in modem business accounting' (ibid. 103). No matter superior power to regulate affairs in order to achieve optimal how this difficulty is resolved, whether by production quotas solutions. An optimal solution is one which would be preferable or in value, socialist countries also try to enhance economic to all but cannot be brought about by rational individual action effiCiency. alone. However, this solution also has its limits. The limits are But are socialist countries not in a better position in so far as that public power is often as short-sighted as individual actors. they can anticipate ecological costs, if not ecological problems? Since ecological problems are complex and interwoven with My answer is that state planning is not sufficient to avoid one another, the future outcome of an adopted course of action ecological problems. Six reasons oppose such a hope: in this field is insecure. This has serious implications for socialist societies. As has 1 . As already pointed out above, (at least) high-risk systems been argued, countries with state ownership of the means of produce ecological problems. Hence, no matter what basic production and planning are less likely to produce ecological property relations in a certain society obtain (private ownership problems for two reasons. First, so the argument gocs, socialist or state ownership), 'normal' or 'systems' accidents are likely to enterprises do not introduce prematurely certain (dangerous) occur. Because of their scope and dangerous potential, these technologies which are introduccd prematurely in capitalism complex technologies can create ecological problems for a great in order to gain extra profits. Second, because of central planning number of people over a long period of time. (and the absence of the profit principle) individual socialist 2. A second factor which makes central planning problematiC enterprises cannot externalize their costs to the environment. as a solution to ecological problems is the feature of unintended While it may be true that dangerous technologies are introduced consequences (see s. 1 .3.2) which, if true, is a general threat to in capitalism prematurely (in order to make short-term profits), 'planning the future'. it is not necessarily true that socialism does better in this 3. Collective ownership (for example of means of production) respect. In fact, the actual record of socialist countries elucidates may lead to the 'tragedy of the commons'. Also in this case we and confirms this point." What can account for this? have the spectre of externalities (social costs) which we have 2.-1 See some recent reports in Rosenbladt 1986 and generally Ziegler 1987. already defined as one of the causcs of ecological problems. 42 Phenomena Phenomena 43 Given certain conditions (see s. l .3.6), the logic of public goods environmental laws; but even in this case we would have ( I ) to can be applied here. (3) as candIdates for ecological problems. The outcome of this 4. As has been pointed out, the price system in countries like discussion, then, is, contrary to the intuitions of many, that the Soviet Union does not allow for taking into account the pnvate property is a less probable factor in causing ecological scarcity of resources. This is so because the dominating ideology problems and that a socialist society is in no structurally better forbids establishing prices which are not thc result of labour posmon to avoId ecologIcal problems. As Zieglerrightly observed time (dogma of the labour theory of value, d. Kupilik 1982: 169- 'environmental disruption has plagued industrial nations irre : 70).14 Moreover, the specific mechanisms of 'success indicators' spective of economic or political structures' (Ziegler 1987: 3). This (ibid. 1 7 1 ) and departmentalism (Ziegler 1987: 35) lead to a IS so because there are no mechanisms built into socialism which reward system which does not provide incentives for con­ would avoid these problems. Of course there are ecological cern for the environment. On thc contrary, 'environmental problems 111 capitalist societies which are connected only to protection is clearly identified, both by the central leadership short-term profit considerations but these do not explain the and by virtually all bureaucratic organizations, as low priority' broader phenomena or their existence in socialist countries. (ibid. 1 6 1 ) . 5. Although the Soviet Union is a country with one of the most 1 .3.6. Prisoners' dilemma ambitious environmental legislations, existing law is not enforced (see Goldman 1972, as cited in Kupilik 1982). As Ziegler put it, No matter whether the market combines the private producers 'the irony of Soviet enactments, which are superficially quite and consumers in a society or whetherforms of common property impressive, is their ineffectiveness in application. In form, eXIst, we may try to apply the logic of public goods to ecological Soviet law is a paradigm of environmentalism; in application, it problems. Game theory has formalized this approach in models often becomes a paradox of neglect' (Ziegler 1987: 8 1 ). Firms like 'isolation game' or 'prisoners' dilemma' (PD) (d. Luce and which are found guilty of polluting are punished only with Raiffa 1957). They were introduced into the social sciences by (relatively) small fines. This leads in effect to the result that Olson's ( 1 965) influential book. Sen presented the prisoners' firms take into account the cost of the fines in their budget dilemma in the following way: (Kupilik 1982: 1 7 1 ). Two prisoners are known to be guilty of a very serious crime but there 6. A further reason why effective concems about environmental ' is not enough evidence to convict them. There is, however, sufficient protection are blocked is the widespread belief that the Soviet evidence to convict them of a minor crime. The District Attorney-it Union is so huge that it can afford the negligence. Soviet official is an American Story-separates the two and tells each that they wil'l culture and Soviet popular culture frequently make a fetish out be givcn the option to confess if they wish to. If .both of them confess of the sheer size of the Soviet Union. This is an attitude 'similar they will be convicted of the major crime on each other's evidence bu� to the frontier mentality of the American pioneers who, in the in view of the good behaviour shown in squealing, the District Atto�ey nineteenth century, slaughtered millions of bison and passenger will ask for a penalty of 1 0 years each rather than the full penalty of pigeons in the mistaken belief that their numbers were inex­ 20 years. If neither confesses, each will be convicted only of the minor haustible' (Ziegler 1987: 25). crime and get 2, years. If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who does confess will go free and the other will go to prison for Whereas ( 1 ), (2), and (3) apply to socialist societies in general, 20 years. (Sen 1982: 62) (4), (5), and (6) are historically specific traits of Soviet society. The probable outcome is that ' each prisoner feels that no matter We may imagine a non-Soviet type of socialism which is not what the other does it is always better for him to confess. So committed to the labour theory of value and which enforces its both of them do confess guided by rational self-interest, and 24 See also Kramer 1973; Kelley et 01. 1976; Ziegler 1987: 167. each goes to prison for ten years' (ibid. 63). 44 Phenomena Phenomena 45 We can take this 'game' as a two-person game and apply its logic to an n-person game. In an n-person game the following modi­ All others fication occurs, as LiFeldman observed: 'Unlike the Prisoners' Do not co-operate co-operate Dilemma, where all parties must cooperate to achieve the solution, a free rider case [which is represented in the n-person dirty water clean water game] allows for some defectors' (LiFeldman 1986: 25). Important Do not co-operate (00 cost to me) (no cost to me) 2 1 is 'some' here, for if a considerable number of players defect, we Me would be in the logic of a two-person game again, where one part opposes the other: co-operation stands against non-co-operation. co·operate dirty water (cost to me) clean water (cost to me) Rawls also referred to a free-rider case when he wrote: 4 3 Where the public is large and includes many individuals, there is a temp­ tation for each person to try to avoid doing his share. This is because whatever one man does, his action will not significantly affect the FIG. 1.1 amount produced. He regards the collective action of others as already given one way or the other. If the public good is produced, his enjoyment However, there may be an optimal outcome, if we consider of it is not decreased by his not making a contribution. If it is not somewhat different preference patterns. As Sen put it, 'In the produced his action would not have changed the situation anyway. special case when everyone else [co-operates], the individual (Rawls 1972: 267) now prefers [to co-operate] himself ' (ibid. 137). In this 'assurance In order to apply the logic of public goods to ecological problems, game' the isolation paradox can be resolved. Now an individual's two conditions must be fulfilled. The first is that ecological dominant strategy is no longer non-co-operation. Provided that problems be manifest, the second that their removal create a there is perfect information for the players, then they will all 'public good'. The first condition is not always met because many choose co-operating 'in the safe expectation that others will too, ecological problems are invisible and accumulate unknown; for since it will be in everyone's interest to do so' (Shaw 1984: 26). a long time they do not show up as a problem. Only if an In cases where the game is repeated and the number of the ecological problem is obvious (if, for example, pollution is players is small, the preference ranking in Fig. 1 . 1 would be taking place before everyone's eyes) and its stopping would modified: 2 and 3 are changing places. Apart from enforcing generate a public good, could collective action lead to the rules, then, there exists the possibility that 'selective incentives' production of that public good. Consider the case of some towns induce actors to co-operate. These are offers which one can which pollute a river or a sea. Here we have an n-person game hardly refuse. Examples include cases where an incentive exists which can be represented as follows. Since each actor has to to do x and the threat of punishment when not doing x. Hillel decide his actions vis-a-vis all other actors, we may speak of Steiner ( 1 974: 36 fl.) coined the term 'throffer' for such combina­ 'me' as the actor in isolation from the 'others'. tions. The expected outcome, then, is suboptimal as my preference But not all ecological problems do dissolve so easily. One will always be not to co-operate, since whatever the others do, reason for this is that not all ecological problems arise out of that will put me in the best pOSition; not co-operating gives me a their public goods character. I shall return in chapter 2 to this free ride if all others produce the public good and I am not worse problem, discussing some problems connected to regulatory off in case they do not; then I have not paid any costs (but the policy. water stays dirty). Note that even a contractual solution needs enforcement, for 'even if a contract is arrived at, it will be in the interest of cach to break it' (Sen 1984: 136). 46 Phenomena 1.4. Summary Summarizing the causes for ecological problems, I should make 2 Ecology, the Social Sciences, and clear that there can be no monocausal explanation. All of the Marxism factors may be causing an ecological problem under certain conditions. These 'certain conditions' are partly contained in the other factors such that the combination of two or more factors is sufficient to cause an ecological problem. The only Prometheus, der den Mcnschen den Blitz ausgeliefert abcr exceptions are high-risk systems which represent a sufficient sic nicht gelehrt hatte, ihn gegen die Gotter zu gebrau�hen, factor on their own. Take technology, for example. It is damaging wurde wegen seiner Tat, beziehungsweise wegen seiner only if (in the case of pollution) 'ecological costs' can be external­ Unterlassung, im Auftrag der Gotter, von Hephaistos dem ized and no agreement with other concerned parties is reached. Schmied an den Kaukasus befestigt. IHeiner Miiller, Zement) It is damaging (in the case of resources) only if market prices make it profitable to exploit these resources and if no laws Environmental reports in the 1960s and early 1970s disturbed restrict the exploitation; the 'tragedy of commons' is only the world public with their alarming tone. They presented scen­ damaging if neither cultural values nor superior powers prevent arios which predicted ecological collapse within a few decades. the damage. According to these studies, main ecological problems were To conclude, the salient points of this chapter are the following. population growth, depletion of resources, and pollution. Since ( I ) I have distinguished the anthropocentric from the ecocentric then, ecological topics have proved to be a forceful challenge to approach showing the former's superiority. (2) In so doing, it is the Marxist left. One only needs to recall the debate which was possible to derive the criteria for evaluation (they are dependent sparked off by the first report of the 'Club of Rome' published in on man's interests, needs, pleasures, and desires). (3) I have 1972. Consider, for example, the comment of a shrewd writer defined what counts as an 'ecological problem' and that it like Enzensberger who in a typical way expressed a widespread results (as an abstract possibility) from man's dealings with leftist standpoint: nature. (4) I have then looked at the causes for the actual The ecological movement has only come into being since the districts emergence of ecological problems, using approaches from game which the bourgeoisie inhabit and their living conditions have been theory and social and economic theory. The result is that e�posed to those environmental burdens that industrialization brings . with it. technological and institutional complexity constitute a severe What fills their prophets with terror is not so much ecological barrier for conscious human design, hence for a world without declmc, whIch has been present since time immemorial, as its univer� salization. IEnzensberger 1974: 10) ecological problems. (5) Private property cannot count as a prime cause of ecological problems; neither can any other single However, this defence of the class-struggle orientation did not factor (except high-risk systems). (6) The market and systems of make Enzensberger blind to the importance of ecological prob­ common property may be equally beneficial or detrimental to lems as such. As he put it: the environment, depending . on the concrete historical and IAJn ideological critique is only useful when it remains conscious of its cultural conditions. own limitations: it is in no position to handle the object of its researches Pror:neth�us, who delivered the lightning flash to men but did not teach them to use � t agall1st the gods, was, in consequence of his act-or rather in consequence of hIS default-fastened to the Caucasus on behalf of the gods by Hcphaistos the blacksmith. 48 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 49 by itself. As such it remains merely the interpretation of an interpretation everyone must face up to the issue of how human beings as a species of real conditions, and is therefore unable to reach the heart of the have exploited nature. It has been widely accepted in the past that it is problem. Its characteristic gesture of lunmasking' can turn into a sm�g inadmissible, at least morally, for a human being to be treated as an ritual if attention remains fixed on the mask instead of on what 15 object, but now nature too can claim the right not to be treated any revealed beneath it. The fact that we name the interests which lie longer as an object. IBobbio 1987: 1 76) behind current demographic theories will not conjure the needs of a I leave aside for a moment the aspect of whether nature has or rapidly growing population out of existence. An examin�tion of the advertising campaigns of the enterprises involved does not Increase �hc should have rights. What I am interested in here is above all the energy reserves of the earth by a single ton. And the amount of foreIgn conclusion which Bobbio draws. He asks the following rhetorical matter in the air is not in any way reduced if we draw attentIOn to the questions: 'But is it still possible today to ignore the potentially earlier history of pollution in the working�class quarters of Victori�n catastrophic consequences of the unconditional submission of England. A critique of ideology which is tempted to go beyond ItS nature to the reign of the human species? Is it possible to persist effective limits itself becomes an ideology. IEnzensbcrger 1974: 19) in being blind to the fact that a humanistic ethic whose basic precept could be formulated in terms of "treat all human beings The two statements by Enzensberger typically express a sort of as persons, i.e. as an end in themselves, but nature as an object, leftist schizophrenia. On the one hand the evils of modern i.e. as a means" taken to extremes, could eventually cause societies, such as ecological problems, are linked closely to the nature to wreak vengeance on humanity? ' libid.). existence of capitalism and its class structure; on the other hand Both Giddens and Bobbio see the evil in the 'expansion of the existence of these problems as such is recognized, that is, productive forces' or in the 'domination of nature'. But in my the challenge to every type of modem society based on industrial view Giddens confuses expansion of productive forces 'as such' technology is perceived. with productive forces which are detrimental to the natural Among contemporary Marxists lor authors who are close to environment. Similarly, Bobbio sees in the very fact of domination the Marxist body of thought or influenced by it in the wider the possible cause of things going wrong. As I said, this may be a sense) there seem to be two broad spontaneous reactions to the mere verbal quarrel. However, Bobbio's application of the Kantian ecological challenge. II shall consider first these more general categorical imperative to nature would leave modern industrial attitudes and then turn to a specific variant.) The first IS the societies without any concrete guidance for action. If, for the orthodox reaction which claims that ecological problems are sake of the argument, we accept Bobbio's suggestion, we should the result of the workings of the profit principle and of the proceed in the same way as in the social realm, that is, we have institutions of private property. The second reaction claims that to reckon that a liberal society which follows Kant'S demand Marxism has concentrated too much on the exploitation of man has to institutionalize further rules and regulations to enable a and the domination over man, thereby neglecting the aspect of legal system to be effective. Likewise, we would need criteria for exploiting and dominating nature. I shall start my discussion action in the realm of transforming nature. It is my contention with the second type of reaction. that criteria which are based on anthropocentric premisses are I haVe already quoted Anthony Giddens (see Introduction) performing this task best. who charged Marx with a 'Promethean attitude' which he Let me now turn to the second type of response which I thinks to be indefensible in the twentieth century. Noberto mentioned in the beginning, Marxist orthodoxy. This response Bobbio, in a similar way, writes that: has it that with the emergence of ecological problems capitalism (a)fter two thousand years the Promethean myth of humanity as having has once more shown its incapacity to provide material wealth dominion over nature has reached a crisis: nature is rebelling agamst Its and security. The cause of ecological problems is clearly seen in subjugation just as the slave of other ages lof all ages). The central the fact of capitalist relations of production. As Ernest Mandel theme of Marxism was the exploitation of man by man. But now put it: 'The evil is private property and competition, that is, the 50 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 51 market economy and capitalism. All catastrophes, including crisis. This theoretical schema (and its 'green' interpretation) the irrational and inhuman roads that technology is led down, explains quite well the fact that many leftists changed their derive from this social base and from it alone' (Mandel 1975: 16). former class-struggle orientation to a green orientation, in the In a similar vein, albeit more carefully, Cohen writes that 'what­ hope that capitalism would collapse. What changed was the ever the size of the problem would otherwise be, it is certain reasoning behind that hope. The 'old' left view saw it collapsing that capitalism aggravates it' (Cohen 1978: 322). for economic reasons, the 'green left' for ecological reaSOns. In this Now these formulae seem to imply that the reverse is true as sense the orthodox Marxist orientation and the green funda­ well: that the abolition of private property will lead to a society mentalist position have quite a few affinities. without (or with fewer) ecological problems. However, many Orthodox Marxism was little prepared for the ecological orthodox Marxists have felt the inadequacy of such a claim. challenge. Everything it had to offer was either out of step with Therefore, they turned the challenge of ecology into a challenge reality or was to be taken over by a 'green logic'. However, the for capitalism: ecological problems are here interpreted as yet opposition which was created thereby is a false opposition. another mechanism causing capitalist crises and, eventually, Orthodox Marxists are plainly wrong in belieVing that capitalism the breakdown of capitalism. If we recall for a moment some of is the main Cause of ecological problems and the green Marxists the classic themes of orthodox Marxism, we would certainly or leftists (in the above sense) are wrong in believing that include the following: capitalism will fall because it suffers ecological crises. Yet, what is more, the latter have taken over a piece from the baggage of • the labour theory of value; ecological fundamentalism, that is, the ecocentric world-view. • the theory of capital accumulation; I now briefly address a more specific Marxist argument. This • the theory of class; is expressed by authors like Walker ( 1 979) and Benton ( 1 989) • the theory of revolution. who think that historical materialism has to be revised because Along the lines of these different theoretical elements, not only in its traditional form it did not sufficiently consider the problem orthodox Marxists, but many leftists as well, have been seduced of scarcity of resources. However, this point stresses only one of to restate an ecological critique of capitalism which tends to the two main ecological problems, almost completely neglecting replace the so-called historical subject (working class) with the other: pollution. But apart from this reduction of the prob­ nature. Nature is then seen as producing all values and all lematic the proposal seems of little help in the project of a green wealth, it is seen as exploited, and it has to be liberated. This reconstruction of historical materialism. The charge against approach seemed to offer the leftist a theoretical tool which Marx that he saw nature as something 'socially constructed' would no longer commit him to a response typical of the does not convince. True, there are natural limits to everything, orthodox Marxist'S. The natural response from a (Marxist)leftist including society. But the point is, rather, that societies have to ecological problems was to deny the central claim of the found ways to overcome these limits and are also trying to greens that ecological problems were global in character and a do so in the light of present ecological problems (see too the product of industrial societies, whether socialist or capitalist. argument based on the second law of thermodynamics: entropy; The left response tried to point out that ecological problems see Georgescu-Roegen 1 9 7 1 ). However, it is characteristic for were above all produced by the profit mechanism of capitalism, societies to behave in a 'negentropic' way, as pointed out, for or that they were a class question, or that they were simply example, by Luhmann ( 1989c). Two questions arise in this invented by the ruling classes to prevent the workers from context: first, to what extent are societies capable of doing so perceiving their 'real' class interests . . . and so on. and, second, is this right or wrong? Benton seems to address only Now, on the basis of this new image, every instance of an the second question, assuming that it is wrong. On the basis of ecological crisis could be seen as leading to capitalism's final this evaluation he infers the claim that Marx 'overestimated' 52 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 53 the transformative possibilities of modern technology. But this problems do not necessarily follow from such an attitude; seems to confuse the factual question whether such transform­ and, what is even more, that only the anthropocentric world­ ative potentials exist with the evaluative question whether we view allows us to develop criteria on which we can base our like them to be set free. As regards the factual question, I believe alteration of the present state of affairs (d. Norton 1987: 1 2 and that Marx's view of technological dynamism corresponds more see below). closely to reality than Benton'S. Imagine only electronic and Lukes ( 1 985) has argued that whenever Marx engages in biochemical technologies. The evaluative question again has arguments of a moral or normative sort, his discourse is one two sides: we may imagine beneficial and detrimental effects of concemed with emancipation, not with Recht. I broadly agree such an unleashing of technology. My suspicion is that Benton with this general statement. However, I do not see that this arrives at his conclusion only by impliCitly assuming that an theoretical decision (no matter if conSCiously taken by Marx) unleashing of technology leads to undesirable effects. In other was a fatal error. True enough, the Marxist tradition, following words: he confuses the undesirable with the unfeasible. Marx, ran into all kinds of difficulties by condemning any If this sketch of Marxist reactions is correct, it becomes discourse of Recht as abstract, formalistiC, and bourgeois. But understandable why orthodox Marxism has almost completely this tradition of dogmatic Marxism was never committed to the vanished and why leftists, in so far as they were relying on other part of the distinction, for it did not take seriously the standard Marxist assumptions, got confused. Orthodox Marxism discourse of emancipation. has vanished from the scene, leftism has turned green, I and No matter what its own self-description is, in my view, Marxists have become ecologists. However, there seems to be Marx's theory employs two levels of analysis, first, a level an unchanged world-view standing beyond the switch in ori­ which we can call descriptive, explanatory, or historical; and entation, in so far as radical leftists have turned into ecological second, a level of criticism. Both levels are bound together in the fundamentalists. Both reject the capitalist system, be it for following poetic statement: '(T]hese petrified relations must be economic reasons (exploitation, crises) or ecological reasons. forced to dance by singing their own tune to them!' (eW iii. 1 78). But this switch is not reflected properly by their adherents. The It was not by accident that Marx used the term 'critique' in the fact that orthodox Marxism failed in tackling the ecological title of many of his major writings, above all his life-long project problematic does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that of the 'Critique of Political Economy'. Raymond Geuss makes a Marx's thought is equally impotent in this respect. Such a similar distinction, a distinction between 'scientific' and 'critical' conclusion could only be drawn if it could be shown that Marx's theories. As he put the difference: basic premiss, i.e. the Promethean model, was fatally flawed. My contention is that this is not the case and that the potential A critical theory is structurally different from a scientific theory in that of Marxism therefore has not been exhausted. The big point for it is (reflective' and not 'objectifying', that is, it is not just a theory debate can be defined around the terms 'domination of nature' about some objects different from itself, it is also a theory about social theories, how they arise, how they can be applied, and the conditions and 'anthropocentric world-view'. under which they are acceptable. (Geuss 1981: 79) To explain this in greater detail, I distinguish between an eco­ centric and an anthropocentric world-view. 1'he former believes What is, then, for Marx the standard of critique? How does he that ecological problems are basically the result of our modern evaluate what social theories had to offer at his time? To attitude towards nature-an attitude which tries to manipulate this question there have been among Marxist scholars, broadly nature as if it were an object. The latter has it that nothing is speaking, two responses. The first is a natUralistic answer wrong with such an instrumental view of nature; that ecological which says that capitalist societies will lead to their own destruction and supersession as a result of the working of the I Among other things. It has also turned feminist, ethniC, and so on. laws of motion of capitalism itself. The proletariat is the social 54 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 55 class which fulfils the historical role as grave-digger for capitalism powers, the second are powers which grow out of social relations and as a foundation stone for the new, communist society. In and oppress the 'Promethean' project of man. Interestingly, both this version, critique is a process which exists, on a quasi­ powers are, according to Marx, themselves creations of men; ontological level, out there in reality. It is the task of the they are, therefore, liable to be dissolved and replaced by a communist to become its 'mouthpiece'. This is the interpretation rational order. The method behind this type of reasoning of Marxism to which above all Althusser and his followers have strongly resembles Kant's, who defined Enlightenment as the given great publicity; it is Marxism as a science. 'exit of mankind out of its minoritylimmaturity which was The second response commits itself to some nonnatlve . cntena. . . brought about by its own fault'. We can trace this line of thought Marx engages in such an enterprise when he compares capitalism through the whole work of Marx. In his early writings he with earlier modes of production and states that people in discusses this theme under the label of 'alienation', in Capital earlier epochs were freer and happier. Here Marx obviously he discusses it under the label of 'fetishism'. Right in the first employs a notion of the good life which is linked to his philo­ chapter of Capital, we find a section entitled 'The fetish character sophical anthropology. The theory of human nature which we of commodities and its secret'. Here Marx explicitly uses the encounter in Marx is a theory which states several basic traits of analogy between religious visions and religious powers on the human beings: that they are natural and social, where social one hand and capitalist mystification on the other. It was from embraces the meaning both of 'co-operative' and of 'civilized'. It Feuerbach that he took over the motto that all criticism has to also includes that they are creative and possess a projective start with the criticism of religion. Marx summarizes the analogy consciousness. They transform nature in co-operation with between religious and bourgeois illusions in the following way: others, and they appropriate culture in the same way. This 'As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his brain, so stress on creative activities is of the greatest importance if one is in capitalist production, he is governed by the products of his to understand Marx's critical approach properly. own hand' I Capital i. 582). What matters for Marx is human self-development, man's However, this is a state of affairs which is, according to Marx, 'working-out of all his creative powers' I Grundrisse). This is the unworthy of human nature. It must, therefore, be abolished and objective trend which Marx discerns in the history of mankind, replaced by social relations which are the conscious product of and it is at the same time a normative claim about the good life, human enterprise. Note that I am going beyond the point where as seen by Marx. Therefore, I interpret Marx's statement that Marx stopped his analysis. For him, the institutions of class the productive forces develop throughout history and that they society represented in the first place the instances for the frustra­ must be unfettered if social relations impinge upon them, in the tion of human self-creativity. However, I believe that even wide sense which I explained a moment ago as a process of supposing that class oppression had vanished, modern societies unfolding human self-realization. Orthodox Marxism has always would still not be able to control their fate, humans would still interpreted this statement from the 1859 Preface in a narrow suffer from the workings of 'alien powers' which they them­ economic sense. Accordingly, capitalism was criticized for not selves brought into existence and for which ecological problems developing enough economic efficiency. Whereas the weakness of give a good illustration. Therefore, I propose to adopt a double this interpretation becomes obvious, not least by experiences concept of alienation, one which focuses not only on the in post-war Europe, the broader interpretation still has something social relations like capital, abstract labour, and commodity important to say about the development of modern societies character of goods but also on their material aspects, like pro­ and about its evaluation as well. ductive forces, use-values, and concrete labour. This approach According to Marx, the creative drive of humans can be takes seriously Marx's discovery that the double character of thwarted from many directions. Marx distinguishes between commodities Ibeing the unity of use-value and exchange-value) 'heavenly' and 'earthly' powers. The first are magical or religious corresponds to the double character of labour I which is the unity 56 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 57 of concrete, transformative, and abstract, surplus-producing, my view, the economists' approach to ecological problems is far labour). too narrow. In continuation of my argument in Chapter 1, I The ecological debate only recently became a topic for social propose to enlarge the instrumentalist view of nature Iby adding theory. There have been many works which were directed, sCientific, aesthetic, and ethical elements to it) and subsequently instead, against some dominant paradigms in economic and to arrive at a position from which it is possible to evaluate social theory, like those of Mishan 1 1967), Meadows et a1. ecological problems and possible solutions from a human stand­ 1 1 972), Schumacher 1 1974), Gorz 1 1977, 1980, 1983). There have point, taking human needs and interests Is. 2.5) as a starting­ been 'ecological' analyses from economists like Georgescu­ point, rather than narrow, short-sighted economic preferences. Roegen 1 1971 ), Daly 1 1 980); works from moral philosophers like In so doing, I take sides With the ecologists' concern about our Feinberg 1 1980), Passmore 1 1 974), Regan 1 1 982), Jonas 1 1 984); natural environment. It seems commonly accepted that the works from philosophers of technology like Mumford 1 1977), economists' denial of any intrinsic value in nature and the Rapp 1 1978)-but no outstanding contribution from sociology. environmentalists' affirmation of precisely this value are the only There are exceptions in works on a meta-theoretical level, possible lextreme) ways to conceive of the problem. From this, it inspired by the sociology of knowledge, like Kitschelt 1 1984), is concluded that we face a dilemma which we cannot avoid. van den Daele 1 1 987), or Oechsle 1 1988). There are also works The only thing we could and must do is to make a choice from organizational sociology, most notably Perrow 1 1984). The between these opposing claims: either we choose 'nature', and works of Buh1 1 1 98 1 ) and Luhmann 1 1 989c) also have an organ­ 'life', or we choose 'wealth', and 'efficiency'. When I claim that izations and systems theoretical background. This seems to be we have a third possibility, I try to espouse the environmentalists' due to the fact that sociology, having its object of inquiry in concern about the natural environment without committing society and not in nature or in the relation between nature and myself to the metaphysical notion that nature has an intrinsic society, must be blind to ecological questions. value for itself. In this chapter, I want to show how Marx's This situation was reflected in Chapter 1 where, apart from theory concords with such an approach, thus proving its value considering Merton's and Perrow's analysis, ! focused mainly on for investigating ecological problems. Especially important is approaches which developed in philosophy and economics. Now Marx's distinction between 'wealth' and 'value'. it has often been noted that the economists' and the environ­ The present chapter proceeds as follows. I first try to relate the mentalists' views are inevitably at odds with each other. The findings of Chapter 1 to Marx's theory in a direct way Is. 2. 1 ) and first attribute no intrinsic value to nature as such and think in then reconstruct some of Marx's arguments from within his short-term economic outcomes, as affected by actors' preferences. body of thought as laid out in section 2.3. In section 2.4 I will The latter, by contrast, pursue a 'deontological' argument and discuss the concept of nature in Marx, and in section 2.5 Marx's think that nature has an intrinsic value which should be respected philosophical anthropology. and preserved. Hence their concern about nature is profound and the time horizon is rather wide, stretching also to future generations. The actors' preferences of the economists are criti­ 2.1. How can we relate Marx to ecological problems? cized as a distorted version of 'real human needs'. In this chapter, I try to propound a position which avoids the pitfalls of Recall the discussion of section 1 . 2 where I considered several both approaches. Odd though it may seem, I take sides with the claims with respect to ecological problems. How is it possible to economists in denying that any intrisic value in nature exists. relate elements of Marx's theory to them? As will be demon­ This instrumentalist view of nature, however, does not squeeze strated in this section, Marx shared an anthropocentric approach out ecological concerns-on the contrary, it does so only if the and had something to say on population growth, future genera­ economists' interpretation of 'value' is accepted. However, in tions, and unintended consequences of human action. 58 Ecology, the Social SCiences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 59 could rise up and become God-like. Such heresy was not to be 2. 1 . 1 . Marx's anthropocentrism embraced until the advent of technological breakthroughs based I think it is plain that Marx had an anthropocentric world-view on scientific discoveries. Even before Pico, Dante saw in human and did not set up moral barriers to the investigation of nature. nature the potential for a transformation of the world, albeit He was clearly a follower of Enlightenment thinkers like Bacon primarily in an aesthetic sense. When Dante says that we have and Descartes. However, both have become the main scapegoats to praise human nature which produces so much beauty2 this in ecological literature. Both are accused of having helped to refers to aesthetic standards, but, nevertheless, the reference establish a world-view which is in favour of dominating nature. point is clearly human. What the human essence is can be But the modern approach towards nature does not amount to a deciphered from art. This tradition, which includes writers like 'violation' of nature. As Bodei has made clear, it was the ancient Vico, Rousseau, Schiller, Humboldt, and Herder, was also to be view of nature which saw in the use of mechanics a violation of inherited by Marx. While there is little evidence that Marx was nature: familiar with the work of Pico, he was a great admirer of Dante and took up Italian Renaissance thought via Giambattista In the ancient world the machine was often conceptualized as an Vico.3 However, as we shall see, Marx extends the argument of alteration 'against nature' within the balance between man and naturc. the artistic realization of human essence to technology and Apart from this, the notion mechane originally means 'cunning', industry. loutwitting', 'trick'. Only much later does it denote the machine in If nature is harnessed, it is not by violating her laws, but by general . . . Thus the machine is considered by Aristotle and by a part of the tradition as a sort of knowledge and a technique against nature obeying them. Marx takes this point from Bacon and distinguishes tpara physinJ, since it violates the laws of nature. Conversely, medicine, between two general forms of mankind's relationship with for examplc, is according to nature (kata physinj, as far as it promotes it. nature. The first is the form where nature was merely 'appropri­ (Bodei 1983: 1 7- 1 8, my translation; cf. Spaemann 1980: 191) ated', i.e. in societies of hunters and gatherers. In the second form, nature is not only appropriated, but also transformed. In A corollary of the ancient view of nature was the fear that nature the Grundrisse, he imagines a state in which agricultural com­ might take her revenge if manl<ind tried to harness her: 'How­ munities appropriate 'ready objects prepared by nature itself for ever, the outwitted nature which has been caught by surprise consumption . . . without any instruments whatever' I Grundrisse by sophisticated human beings is able to take her revenge and 4921. A state of nature may be imagined in which the free gifts punish those who dared to challenge her, who tried to break her of nature Iwerel abundant' I Grundrisse 6 1 2) and hence there was eternal laws' (Bodei 1983: 1 7, my translation). We find this no need to develop technologies. However, Marx calls this thought even in a famous passage of Engels's Dialectic of appropriation of nature production and not consumption, since Nature, and in more drastic forms from a religious strand of the hunters and gatherers also have to develop certain capacities ecological movement: here, nuclear power is simply the work of and abilities. But this is not the normal state, not even a normal the devil. original state, as he assures us in the same text Isee Grundrisse Modernity sees nature as an object of utility which fulfils 492). In Capital, Marx states more explicitly that man can human needs and desires. In paving the way for a modern ptoduce nothing without technology Isee Capital i. 352; in the outlook, apart from Dante, Pico della Mirandola's De hominis Paris Manuscripts he had already spoken of industry as the open dignitate is of crucial importance. Pico criticized the ancient book of man's essential powers, the perceptibly existing human view sharply. According to him, God did not attribute a fixed point to human beings in the 'hierarchy of Being'. Instead, he 2 Cf. ch. 1 u. 6. attributed to humans the power to change their place on this " For the influence of Dante on Feuerbach, see Wartofsky 1977: 1 19; on scale, so that they could sink down and become animals, or they Hegel, see Dobbins and Fuss 1982. 60 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 61 psychology, CW iii. 302) and the dcvelopmcnt of productive Marx in one passage of the Grundrisse seems to reject the very forces as largely dependcnt on geographical factors: idea of the domination of nature, since it would imply the breaking of a free will: 'Basically the appropriation of animals, Where nature is too lavish, she 'keeps him in hand, like a child in land etc. carulot take place in a master-servant relation, although leading reins', She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop the animal provides service. The presupposition of the master­ himself. It is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the servant relation is the appropriation of an alien will' (Gnmdrisse temperate zone, that is the mother-country of capitaL It is . . . the differen­ 500, my emphasis) 4 But the condition of breaking an alien will tiation of the soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the is a limiting case which is not of very much interest: it does not seasons, which form the physical basis for the social division of labour, and which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to the matter if domination is achieved by breaking or by respecting (or multiplication of his wants, his capabilities} his means and modes of by transforming, influencing, manipulating, etc.) an alien will; labour. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of it is only important that the outcome of domination serves the society, of economizing, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale interests of the dominator. The question of whether nature by the work of man's hand, that first plays the decisive part in the possesses a will (or a soul) of its own, therefore, is primarily a history of industry. ( Capital i. 481, amended translation) question of religious interest. If we speak of taming wild animals such questions may arise. However, they do not arise if we This presupposes that the producers have some ends which speak of 'taming' a river, or, to take another example, of mastering transcend the 'normal' end of providing food and shelter. In this an instrument. Imagine a musician who plays her instrument means-ends relationship, human beings try to get something with virtuosity. We can her playing 'masterly', she masters her from nature which is not immediately there, or to manipulate instrument. It is in this sense that we have to understand the and control natural processes to a certain degree. This higher domination of nature. It does not mean that one behaves in a form of Stoffwechsel presupposes the use of speCific technologies. reckless way towards it, in the Same way as we do not suggest To denote this specific trait of humans, that is, that of being that a masterly player dominates his instrument (say a violin) natural beings which are able to 'steer' some parts of the rest of when he works upon it with a hammer. nature, Marx used the term 'domination of nature'. True, the As we saw in Chapter 1, contemporary debates on ecology notion of domination is value-laden, as is the notion of exploit­ seem to conceive society's relation to nature either as one of ation. However, both offer us a possible description of man's harmony or as one of conflict. Often the former is seen as the relationship to nature; in the first case, where natural gifts are desideratum, whereas the latter is seen as the current dreadful abundant, man can be conceived of as exploiting (in the sense of state of affairs. For Marx such an opposition makes no sense at 'usufructing') nature; in the second case, where nature is actively all. In the German Ideology he emphasizes that mankind is transformed, it is harnessed or dominated. always in unity and in struggle with nature: I said above that the concept of 'domination' is always linked to a concept of the agents' interests. King Midas, by turning (The) unity of man with nature has always existed in industry and has everything he touched into gold, can hardly be said to have existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or 'dominated' his citizens, or even his own private life. His power greater development of industry, and so has the Istruggle' of man with was self-defeating since he was no longer able to feed himself. nature, right up to the development of his productive forces on a corresponding basis. (CW v. 40) As the poet put it, Therefore, thou gaudy gold, 4 From this it follows that another version of this model {which is usually Hard food for Midas, I will none of thee endorsed by environmentalists) is as problematic: the notion of co-operation (Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, III. iii) with nature-one cannot co-operate with a stone or a -cat. 62 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 63 Nature, in Marx, is not anthropomorphous. Nature has no end Manuscripts: 'Man lives on nature-Ithis] means that nature is in itself, it is man who imposes his ends on it.5 In order to do so, his body with which he must remain in continuous interchange however, he has to respect the laws of nature. Domination does if he is not to die' (CW iii. 276). Any careless use of resources, not imply violation: as Bacon put it in the Novum organon, any pollution of earth, water, and air which exceeds a certain 'nature to be commanded must be obeyed . . . man, being the degree may turn out to be detrimental to the well-being of servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so human beings. The disruption of man's environment makes mueh and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought survival for the human species difficult, if not impossible. Marx of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything considers the following possibilities for such a disturbance: nor can he do anything' (Bacon 1986: 47). This is to say that man Capitalist production, by collecting the production in great centres, imposes his ends on nature, but he cannot harness or manipulate and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of town population, on nature in an arbitrary way; he eannot make flour out of green the one hand concentrates the historical motive power of societYi on wheat. 'All that man can do is to put together or to put asunder the other hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter IStoffwechsel J natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within' (ibid. between man and the soil, i.e, prevents the return to the soil of its 47). An ecologist might argue that there exists a natutal cycle or elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; it natural potential for a flower (in our ease) to become a fruit and therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the that men are bound to respect these cycles 6 But nothing in soil. (Capital i. 474) nature forbids us (to take another example) to not eat the ripe apple, to leave it on the tree and let it rot. On the other hand, if Marx is aware of the fact that man and soil are essential for a the apple is picked too early, this is not detrimental to nature, successful Stoffwechsel; they are the two basic elements of but to human nature: an unripe apple causes stomach-ache. every labour process in every society: Natural cycles have no teleological structure, i.e. no immanent If we look at the labour process in the abstract, one can say that purpose, no stage which is naturally the highest. It is rather just basically only two factors come into play: man and nature (labour and by chance (as a product of 'blind evolution') that apples in a ripe the material substratum of labour) . . . Conceived in this way, the soil state are beneficial to men. But even if we accept the teleological and labour are the original factors of production. Products determined argument for a moment, its absurdity can be shown when we fodabour, I.e. produced work material, means of production, means for extend its scope and look at other cases. Take the case of rats, subsistence, are only derived factors. (MEGA II. iii. ! . 87) ' insects, or bacteria which reproduce quickly and are contrary to With regard to the material aspect, i.e. the production of use�value, the man's well-being: here man intervenes if he has the required production process of capital is a labour process. As such, it exhibits all technology to do so. Man's ends are thus intimately related to the characteristics which this process assumes under the social forms his 'human nature', a concept which is, as we shall see, crucial of production in their diversity. In other words, these characteristics to Marx's analysis. But Marx's rejection of a teleological struc­ are determined by the nature of labour as labour. (MEGA II. iii. 1 . 82) turc to nature does not make him blind with respect to ecological There are two main sources of all wealth, the soil, and labour problems. An ecological concern is contained in his general power. If man wants to prosper, these two also have to prosper. position which views nature as man's inorganic body. This body But capitalist production hampers this condition, it 'develops must flourish if man is to flourish. As Marx writes in the Paris technology . . . only by sapping the original sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer' ( Capital i. 475) . .5 Recall Hegel's famous phrase that the cork tree does not grow in order to deliver taps for wine bottles; or Voltaire'S that the melon was not designed to be eaten by a family. 7 All quotations from the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe have been translated (, On the question whether nature operates in cycles, cf. Reiche 1984; Maurer 1973. by myself. 64 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 65 compulsory solutions which are feasible as well. But not even 2.1.2. Population growth the results of demographical research seem to suggest that the Sometimes a Malthusian theme recurs in the ecological discourse, planet will suffer in the near future from overpopulation. After it is the contention that an increasing number of inhabitants of all, this is a relative concept which depends on technologies and the earth will be left without the means of subsistence andlor that possibilities of providing the means for life. Up till now, mankind this will lead to an ever-greater degree of pollution. The first part of has succeeded in providing these means for an increasing num­ the contention is classical Malthusian whereas the second part ber, that many people still die from starvation is primarily a could be called 'Neo-Malthusian', it was expressed in the first result of the present mode of distribution of food. Consider now reports of the Club of Rome, for example (el. Meadows et aJ. 1972). the Neo-Malthusian argument. In so far as an increasing popula­ Marx, throughout his work, never stopped criticizing Malthus's tion leads to ecological problems like littering or pollution, the ideas. Consider the following passage from the Grundrisse: phenomenon can be analysed with the logic of public goods (s. 1 .3.6). To repeat: population growth is a relative notion. Malthus's theory . . . is significant in two respects: ( 1 ) because he gives Consider a stagnating world population but a simultaneous brutal expression to the brutal viewpoint of capital, [2) because he concentration of population in certain areas. In this case we asserted the fact of overpopulation in all forms of society. Proved it he would not speak of overpopulation of the globe, but of problems has not, for there is nothing more uncritical than his motley compila­ of a large community which has to find a solution for the tions from historians and travellers' descriptions. His conception is altogether false and childish [ I ) because he regards overpopulation as production of its public goods. being of the same kind in all the different historic phases of economic development; does not understand their specific difference, and hence 2. 1.3. Future generations stupidly reduces these very complicated and varying relations to a The reference to future generations is a comparatively new single relation, two equations, in which the natural reproduction of issue in political philosophy. Bacon, writing in the late sixteenth humanity appears on the one side, and the natural reproduction of century, was still of the old opinion that 'men must pursue edible plants (or means of subsistence) on the other, as two natural series, the former geometric and the latter arithmetic in progression. In things which are just in Ithe] present . . . and leave the future to this way he transforms the historically distinct relations into an the divine Providence' (The Advancement of Learning, cited in abstract numerical relation, which he has fished purely out of thin aiI, Passmore 1 974: 80). As Passmore pointed out, it was in Kant's and which rests neither on natural nor on historical laws. (Grundrisse philosophy that 605-6) the idea of a duty to posterity assumes, perhaps for the first time, a Marx disagreed with Malthus over the alleged different growth central place. But although he exhorted Izuratenl men to sacrifice themselves for a posterity which would enjoy the fruits of their toil . . . rates of natural and human population growth. But he could Kant had too little confidence in man to suggest that the future is have agreed that there might arise such limits, since he said that entirely his making. Providence, working through the laws of progress, we have ro deal with 'very complicated and varying relations'. is still for Kant the principal historical agent. [ibid.) True, there is a certain hesitation on the part of many Marxists (and on the side of liberals, too) in acknowledging population World-views of the twentieth century, and especially the ecolo­ growth as problematical since this seems to open the door for gically inspired ones, are often committed to the position that dictatorial measures of population control or for imperialist only enormous sacrifices could prevent mankind from perishing treatment of the 'irresponsibility' of third-world populations. in a nuclear disaster or in an ecological breakdown, thus making However, this anxiety seems to me unfounded. If it were true sacrifices for posterity inevitable. But if we ask for the arguments that population growth presents severe problems for the pros­ which would persuade us to make sacrifices for posterity, what pering of mankind one can imagine that there might be non- can we supply? 66 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 67 Passmore has dedicated some attention to this problem. It lems. If something eannot be expressed in terms of monetary seems that there are three possible types of argument. The first value then it is not likely to be taken into consideration for the is religious, the second perfectionist, the third utilitarian. Leaving calculation of utility or welfare. As Thomas Schelling noted, aside the first, I deal with the perfectionist and utilitarian 'economic theory evaluates actions by their consequenees and approaches. The perfectionist view was endorsed by Kant and by the way the consequences are valued by the people who Fichte who thought that man will always strive towards a better benefit or suffer' ISchelling 1983: 3). Usually, such evaluations world, towards the fulfilment of an ideal society. The utilitarian are carried out by means of a cost-benefit analysis. When applied approach is presented in the Bentham, and Sidgwick, version." to questions of species preservation, the cost-benefit approach assesses the value of an individual species and, if several species Bentham, and Sidgwick after him, were fully prepared to admit that we ought to take into account both the probability of the effects of our are involved, sums the relevant assessments. As Norton pointed actions and also their remotenesSi in general, we should place the out, on the basis of sueh an approach 'no initial presumption in greater emphasis on effects which are near at hand. Although the favour of species preservation is built into the analysis' INorton hereafter as such has the same moral importance as the now, this is not 1987: 30). Beckerman exemplifies such an approach. He asks: true when account is taken of its uncertainty. [Passmore 1974: 84) 'How should society choose between consumption today and consumption tomorrow? ' (Beckerman 1974: 27). The answer is: Thus the utilitarian view [at least in this version) is not strong 'If a sacrifice of consumption today of £100 for purposes of enough to ensure a concern for posterity, mainly because we are investing in the environment can only yield an extra £90-worth not able to calculate the probabilities of eventually detrimental of future welfare from the environment then it should not be actions to future generations. As Passmore concludes: 'So even undertaken' libid. 29). But this rules out the possibility that if we accept the principle of impartiality and the utilitarian there might be environmental values which are appreciated 'as framework in which it is embedded, even if we accept the view such', even if on balance there would in fact be such a trade-off that we ought not so to act as certainly to harm posterity, this as described. The problem with Beckerman's account is not, as does not appear to be a principle strong enough to justify the he sees it, that the different preferences might be difficult to kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to measure, but simply that he neglects the fact that people might make' (ibid.). not want the extinction of an animal species even if its actual Beckerman, a straightforward defender of economic growth financial value were negligible. His view, therefore, presents in and economic rationality, expresses the myopie view of many a nutshell what is wrong with the economists' approach: their eeonomists whieh has come under attack from the environ­ framework does not ine1ude human needs which cannot be mentalists when he says: rendered in economic terms ('preferences' which lead to a market [IJf it can be said that there is a conflict between growth and the price). To repeat the lucid statement of Norton, who eaptured environment, it is equally true that there is a conflict between growth the point very well: and food consumption or clothing consumpt.ioll, or any other ingredient of current standards of living. In other words, one does not choose The usefulness of a species may wait upon changes in human tastes and between consumption tomorrow and environment todaYi the choice is preferences, changes in income levels, developments of knowledge and between consumption tomorrow and consumption today, irrespective technologies for using species, and changes in public policies. But if the of how consumption today or tomorrow is distributed between the species is extinguished before it is examined for usefulness or before environment and other uses of output. [Beckerman 1974: 29) such changes can take place, the resulting losses will never be known. [Norton 1987: 37) This quote makes suffiCiently clear how economists, on the basis of their utilitarian approach, coneeive of ecological prob- The topic of future generations is an extremely difficult and S Passmore erroneously calls Rawls a utilitarian, see Passmore 1974: 86-7. complex subject which I cannot address in detail here. Therefore, I 68 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 69 limited the argument to questions of species preservation and average working day. (By the way, this is how irreversible the possiblc role of economic mechanisms in that process. Joan destruction of natural resources in this century has been legit­ Robinson in her Economic Philosophy put her own scepticism imated.) However, I think that Rawls's suggestion is misleading, about a concern for fmure generations in this way: because it overlooks the fact that the interests of the immediate and all future generations may not coincide, as a simple example This problem cannot be resolved by any kind of calculation based on can show: there may be a technical solution to storing nuclear 'discounting the future', for the individuals concerned in the loss arc waste for the next generation (or even the next two or three different . . . The benefit from their sacrifices will come later and they generations) but this way of storing may become dangerous may not survive to see it. The choice must be taken somehow or other, for the tenth or hundredth generation. Furthermore, Rawls's but the principles of Welfare Economics do not help to settle it. (Robinson 1962: 1 15 ) reasoning does not give criteria to judge the problem of preser­ vation of species. But what about a theory of justice which i s designed to tackle But how does Marx relate to these approaches? At first sight, exactly such problems? Consider,for example, the approach of none of the outlined approaches contains Marx's position. Marx Rawls, who is not concerned with maximization of welfare, did not think that any hitherto existing society had, or should utility, or happiness, but wants to define the conditions for a have, made sacrifices for posterity. He thought that capitalism just society. The question of future generations can also be ana­ anticipated the future in the dreadful way that it wastes human lysed by this approach. Rawls argues that the principle of impar­ resources: tiality between present and future generations is too demanding; It is, in fact} only at the greatest waste of individual development that there is no reasonable argument for demanding from the present the development of general men is secured in those epochs of history generation that it share the available resources with the whole which prelude to a socialist constitution of mankind. (MEGA JI. iii. ! . of posterity. But it is quite reasonable to hand on to our immediate 327, English in original) posterity a better situation than we have ourselves inherited. Communist society on the contrary, so he thought, would leave Rawls writes: the planet to future generations in a better state simply as a Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and result of its pure modus operandi. This is not only a matter of civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been prediction and of 'historical laws'; Marx himself expounds it as established} but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable a duty to unborn generations when he speaks about the duty of amount of real capital accumulation. (Rawls 1972: 285) the world's inhabitants to hand it down to future generations.in a better condition:9 The language of economics ('capital accumulation') is a bit technical here but what is meant is simple: each generation has From the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private to hand on to the following one technology, investments in ownership of the globe by single individuals will appcar quite as absurd science and education, agriculture, etc. Note, however, that the as private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole society, a nation} or even all simultaneously existing societies together, arc not extraction of, say, minerals from the earth is an irreversible act, the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, both as regards the 'loss' of the mineral (in its natural form) and and, like bani patres familias, they must hand it down to succeeding also as regards an eventually aesthetic damage (as would be the generations in an improved condition. (Capita) iii. 776) case in the dcstruction of a mountain or a village). In this case all that the present gencration can do is hand on a compensation for Hence the passage from Capital iii does contain a statement this loss; this compensation may take the form of improved about facts (and historical prophecy) and an ethical principle. technology which in turn leads to an increase in productivity 9 It is thus no ethical argument regarding nature, but an ethical argument which finally leads to higher incomes and/or to a decrease of the regarding human beings {unborn generations}, 70 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 71 It is difficult to speculate exactly about what his position amounted to, but a probable answer, taking Passmore's scheme 2.1.4. Unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of the for granted, is that he was committed to both a utilitarian commons' and perfectionist view. Since Marx says 'future generations', a As regards unintended consequences, Marx was one of the first Rawlsian interpretation seems to be excluded. However, we social scientists who systematically treated this mechanism. must keep in mind that Marx did not treat this question in a He employed this kind of analysis himself when he demonstrated systematic manner, so he probably did not care too much about both on the political and economic level how individual ration­ the formulation. ality can bring about collectively undesirable outcomes. As But Marx also clearly endorsed a perfectionist view. Together Elster put it: with Fichte and Kant, he shared the belief that mankind would always strive towards greater self-realization, towards the ideal The general idea that unintended consequences arise when agents society. With the industrialists of his time he shared the belief entertain beliefs about each other that exemplify the fallacy of com­ that the world is imperfect but can be improved. The good position is an extremely powerful onc. In my opinion, it "is Marx's central contribution to the methodology of social sciencc. IElster 1985: society for Marx is a society which enables the release of all 481 human powers, most notably their communal and creative powers Id. s. 2.5). Since these cannot be defined in advance and Economists are usually interested in positive feedback loops once and for all, Marx avoids a static definition of what human which give rise to their beloved 'invisible hand mechanisms'. needs are or what the communist society would exactly look But Marx immediately sees the two possibilities contained in like; but this much seems clear: communism should be that this mechanism: social form which liberates the human content. This is an open The real point is not that each individual!s pursuit of his private process which finds in a perfectionist view its natural expression. interest promotes the totality of private interests, the general interest. In contrast to Fichte and Kant, Marx offered an account which­ One could just as well deduce from this abstract phrase that each so he thought-would explain why mankind moves toward that individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interest, so ideal society. This account is contained in his historical materi­ that instead of a general affirmation, this war of all against all produces a
ism to which I shall turn in Chapter 4. On the basis of his a general negation. (Grundrisse 1561 ' materialist conception of history, Marx avoided the ethical tone of Kant and Fichte who could only conceive of a duty, a duty to As Elster rightly observed, strive for a better future. for Marx} counterfinality-the negative externalities of the capitalist Marx's imperative in the above passage where he conceives of mode of production-was a more interesting phenomenon. He believed a duty of existing generations to leave the planet in an improved that capitalism systematically tends to aggravate spontaneously arising situation is rather an exception to his general line of thought. crises, since each entrepreneur reacts to them by behaviour that, even if True, in his early writings Marx accepted the categorical imper­ individually rational, is disastrous in the aggregate. The main instance ative to 'overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, of this mechanism Marx found in the process that according to him tends to generate a fall in the rate of profit. (Elster 1985: 25-6) enslaved, forsaken, despicable being' lew iii. 182) but this general principle does not stretch to future generations, once a Marx employs the same structure of argument with respect to communist society has been established; it would be sufficient the phenomenon that behind the backs of capitalists a process is to leave the planet in the same condition and to take care that at work which, through increasing productivity, reduces socially mankind will not regress to a state in which man again becomes necessary labour which turns out to lower effective demand. a forsaken and despicable being. Marx also uses this argument in summarizing the whole capit­ alist business cycle, i.e. on a meta-level. Here the specific 72 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 73 capitalist means of increasing productivity lead to economic oppression and they may also take the form of alienation which crises. This is one major reason why Marx condemned capitalism: Marx thought was the prevailing form in the capitalist system. he condemned it as a socially antagonistic form of wealth Alienation, for Marx, presupposes a 'true human' essence which production. Certainly, capitalism develops the productive forces will come into being once the conditions of alienation are (this is, according to Marx, its historical legitimation), but it removed; thus communism is the realization of the true human does so by wasting social wealth. Tremendous amounts of value essence, of true human society. If we take this line of thought as are depreciated in periods of economic crisis, and labourers and a guiding thread, we have a far richer approach for our subject soil are exploited and degraded during capitalism's 'business as than a simple 'capital-criticism' would offer us. Marx criticized usual'. the social form of capitalism because it alienated men: the Another example of the presence of this mechanism in Marx's products of their work appear to them as if they were alien work is the 'tragedy of the commons' which I referred to in powers. In the German Ideology he writes thus: section 1 .3. Marx comes close to recognizing this mechanism This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves when, in a letter to Engels, he praises the German agriculturalist produce into a material power above us, growing out of our control, Fraas for proving thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one that climate and flora changed in historic times . . . He maintains that of the chief factors in historical development up till now. The social as a result of cultivation-in proportion to its degree-the 'dampness' power . . . which arises through the co-operation of different individuals so very much beloved by the peasants is lost (hence plants, too, as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, emigrate from South to North) and eventually the formation of steppes since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, begins. The first effect of cultivation is useful but is eventually devasta­ not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside ting on account of deforestation etc. . . The sum total is that them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cultivation-when it progresses naturally and is not consciously cou­ are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a trolled (as a bourgeois, of course, he docs not arrive at this)-Ieaves peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the deserts behind itl Persia, Mesopotamia, etc. Greece. (Letter to Engels, action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these. (German 2S Mar. 1868) Ideology 47-8) Now this is clearly a different explanation from the one which As Fetscher summarized Marx's concern: blames market mechanisms (or capitalism) for ecological prob­ Domination of man over Isocial nature' should do away with the quasi­ lems. natural forces generated by the capitalist system of production. Thus the (free association of producers' is at the same time the prolongation and the accomplishment of human history as the humanization of 2.2. Marx's motivation for his critique nature and of the appropriation of truly humanized nature by man. (Fetscher 1973: 460) Fortunately, Marx's approach is far richer in scope than is reflected in the all too well-known standard interpretation But it is not only capitalism which brings about alienation; which blames only capitalist relations for all evil. Taking Marx there are other social forms which display this feature; and it in a broader sense seems to me supported by at least two facts. seems doubtful to many that alienation can ever be overcome. Firstly, Marx's critique of capitalism was no end in itself, but was This is in part due to the character of our complex world of to serve the establishment of a 'true, human society' (see ch. 5). technology and social institutions. If this is so, might not Marx criticized capitalism mainly because of its 'enslaving Marx's own approaches give us illuminating insights into this effects' on human beings. Enslaving effects can express them­ field? If so, much of my task would be fulfilled, namely showing selves in many ways; they may take the form of overt or covert how useful Marx can be in analysing ecological problems. Marx 74 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 75 treats technology as a constituent part of mankind in prominent lems in socialist countries, the orthodox Marxists have done a places throughout his work (see ch. 3). He thus offers an analytical disservice to Marx's thought, convincing many of their opinion tool for investigating ecological problems.lO The other tool that his theory has little to offer in respect to contemporary consists in his social theory which investigates the features of problems. social institutions. As we shall see, Marx focused on this subject as well in the most prominent places throughout his work and, 2.3. Three Marxist approaches what is more, he combined both aspects in a theoretical frame­ work which has been called 'historical materialism' (see ch. 4). In section 2.1 I tried to relate some of Marx's statements to Now it would be beside the point to blame a writer for having contemporary debates on ecological problems. In what follows, written on problems which were pressing at his time. But, I shall present three approaches which are to be found in Marx's unfortunately, it seems that sometimes contemporary Marxists writings, all of which could be related to ecological problems. are unable to acknowledge the changed reality in a profound The first approach blames capitalist production (s. 2.3 . 1 ), and way (of course, even the most orthodox Marxist will pay lip­ the second alienation, for ecological problems (s. 2.3.2). The service to the fact that reality has changed . . . ) and to build their third approach is more general in that it investigates natural and theory on these changed 'real' preconditions. Moreover, they social factors without focusing immediately on the capitalist have blinded us to an approach which is able to deal with form (s. 2.3.3). I shall claim that this is the most promising contemporary problems (such as ecology) in an illuminating approach and I use it as the basis for my own argument. way. Thus I plead for a reinterpretation of Marx in this respect which acknowledges frankly Marx's own predominant approach 2.3. 1 . First approach : capitalist production as a cause of (i.e. blaming capitalism's social form) but does not accept it as ecological problems the main tool in analysing contemporary ecological problems. In order to do so, we have to exploit some resources in Marx's In its concentration upon capitalist profit-maximizers, Marx's thought which have not yet been acknowledged to the extent approach is fairly close to the 'externalities approach' (see s. 1.3.6) they deserve. Moreover, as my analysis will show, Marx himself with one difference: Marx's main focus is on capitalists as in his preparatory writings for Capital analysed machine tech­ externalizers. As we have seen in Chapter 1, however, the scope nology in a way which focused on its inherent characteristics, of the phenomenon is much wider: state enterprises and private regardless of the capitalist context in which it was placed. consumers, too, externalize their costs, following general stand­ Orthodox Marxism has blinded us to such theoretical possibilities ards of rationality. The potential of public enterprises for causing by stressing the paramount role of capitalist exploitation and ecological problems is as great as that of private enterprises, if class rule as causing all major problems in the modern world. they employ high-risk technology. The same holds true for state Such a narrow and, confronted with the facts, unrealistic inter­ enterprises in socialist countries. Let us determine, then, the pretation of Marx's thought may have the advantage of being in potential of private consumers for damaging the natural envir­ line with the argument in Capital. But in neglecting other most onment. Imagine the following possibilities: littering, private interesting parts of his theory, and overlooking ecological prob- cars, and burning. In the case of littering, most civilized countries 10 employ public services to remove refuse. The responsibility lies It is not surprising that he did not consider inherently dangerous technology or high-risk systems. For one rcason, he wrote over 100 years ago and could not thus with the state (public organs) which has to provide a witness the problems of modern tCGhnological systems. For another reason, he solution to the problem (burning waste etc.). Individual citizens seemed to have been quite confident regarding the possibilities of overcoming pay a fee for obtaining this service. Marx saw the possibility of technical problems which have detrimental effects on human beings. Instead, he insisted that it was the capitalist use of technology which makes life private pollution but tried to tie it to the capitalist economy, unpleasant and risky. that is, he saw it as being caused by irrational social principles: 76 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 77 Excretions of consumption arc of the greatest importance for agriculture. committed environmentalists. Even opponents of the anthropo­ So far as their utilisation is concerned, there is an enormous waste of centric view partly recognize this embeddedness. Paul Taylor, them in the capitalist economy. In London, for instance, they find no for example, writes: better use for the excretion of four and a half million human beings than to contaminate the Thames with it at heavy expense. (Capital iii. We arc part of a civilization that can only exist by controlling nature !OI, my emphasisl and using its resources. Even those who go out to a natural area to enjoy the 'wilderness experience' are recipients of the benefits of advanced Marx assumes that a rational society would find a solution for technology. IWhat marvels of modern chemistry went into the creation using excrement as a fertilizer for agriculture. Up to now, of plastics and synthetic fabrics in their backpacks, tents, sleeping bags, however, there is no solution available in this respect. Human and food containers!) None of us can evade the responsibility that excrement is simply not appropriate for fertilizing agricultural comes with our high standard of living; we all take advantage of the land. amenities of civilized life in pursuing our individual values and interests. A widespread view of environmentalists is that private con­ ITaylor 1986: 1 9 1 1 sumers ought not to buy potentially damaging goods, such as batteries, plastics, cars, etc., in order to abolish this kind of I n the case of private cars, at least some countries have intro­ refuse and to allocate the productive capacitics of society to dnced technical standards which limit the quantity of toxic gas other, less damaging, production. This argument forgets the in car exhaust. In countries where no such legislation exists, the structural aspect of the problem: it forgets the 'embeddedness' potential for private pollution is considerable. Take now the of virtually every consumer in a network of social obligations, problem of private burning. Especially in winter time the big technological and economic constraints and possibilities, which cities of many countries are covered by an unbreathable air. by and large rcproduces the present structure of consumer A change in this situation is not very likely since every individual goods. To be surc, the market mechanism would allow for the consumer seems to prefer breathing bad air to freezing. Even replacement of presumably dangerous materials with less dan­ given the existence of a new, clean, heating technology, this gerous material, if the new material could be produced at attitude of the 'rational consumer' will not change unless special competitive prices. But this depends on technological possibil­ incentives are created which 'force' people to change their ities which are economically profitable. The environmentalist, heating systems. But in many towns, heating is provided by confronted with such an argument, would probably confess his public services Icentral heating plants), hence shifting the re­ readiness to pay much more for a certain good, if this would sponsibility again from the individual to the social level. protect the environment. This solution, however, again raises To sum up, then, two things can be said. Firstly, the situation the spectre of the prisoners' dilemma. We can regard it as a of private consumers is sometimes characterized by the fact that solution only under two premisses: I I I that the real income their environmental responsibilities are taken over by public allows for such chOices; 121 that the vast majority of people administration. Secondly, the impact of private consumers on would become what Pizzorno has called 'identifiers'. I I But note, the environment is of much less importance Iwith the possible this 'solution' only reformulates our problem: for people to exception of private cars) than the impact of the other mechan­ adhere to a 'logic of identity' rather than to a 'logic of utility', ismsJisted in section 1.3. This is so because the scope of private they would have to accept some sort of 'green' ideology and pollution is much more restricted, because the technology at enter a 'circle of recognition' which is constituted by other hand is much less powerful. It seems plain that Marx under­ estimated the externalizing potential of public enterprises land, 1 1 Starting from Hirschmann'S notions 'exit, voice and loyalty', Pizzorno to a lesser extent, of private consumers). Marxists after him introduces a fourth notion: identification. This is supposed to explain behaviour which otherwise could not be explained. See Hirschmann 1970 and Pizzorno have been mistaken in underestimating the externalizing 1986. potential of socialist enterprises. 78 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 79 In the early On the Jewish Question Marx connects the conversely for their preservation and restoration appears infinitesimal. degradation of nature to the dominion of money: [Capital ii. 248) Money is the jealous God of Israel in face of which no other god may However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the absence of the profit exist. Money is the universal self-established value of all things. It has prinCiple, and the absence of market competition, does not therefore robbed the whole world-both the world of men and nature­ ensure a careful use of natural resources. Marx often seemed to of its specific value . . . The view of nature attained under the dominion of private property and money is a real contempt for and practical take into account this possibility incidentally, without elabora­ debasement of nature. (CW iii. 1 72) ting on it. Rather, it came to him via the reading of Fraas. As Fetscher has observed, Marx was deeply inspired by Fraas, As we saw above, Marx blames capitalist production for the inter­ whose book Klima und Pflanzenwelt in der Zeit: Ein Beitrag zur ruption of the man-nature metabolism: 'on the other hand, Icapit­ Geschichte beider he 'discovered' in 1868 and about which he alist agriculture] disturbs the circulation of matter IStoffwechsel] commented to Engels enthusiastically, as we have seen above between man and the soil i.e. prevents the return to the soil of (Fetscher 1985a: 124). He appreciated the work of Liebig in the its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; follOWing way: 'To have developed from the point of view of it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility natural science, the negative, i.e. destructive side of modern of the soil' ( Capital i. 474). In the following passages Marx agriculture, is one of Liebig's immortal merits' (Capital i. 475). demonstrates how he applies the working of the principles of Therefore, both the problems of fertility and forestry illustrate capitalism to its own life-conditions, the soil and the labourer. the mechanism of unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of Here his explanation is clearly one which rests on the 'unintended the commons', rather than capitalist methods. Consider, first, consequences mechanism', although Marx himself tries to limit the forestry example. Marx's claim is that forests have been it to the capitalist epoch. destroyed throughout history, under no matter which form of [A[II progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only property. This is to say that not only the market mechanism or of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing capitalist methods of production lead to destruction of forests the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the but also collective forms of growing timber. Consider, now, the lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its develop­ fertility example. Here Marx juxtaposes a short-term rationality ment au the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for ('increasing the fertility for a given time') to a long-term irra­ example, the more rapid is the process of destruction. Capitalist tionality ('ruining the lasting resources of that fertility') where production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together the latter is explained by the former. This interpretation is of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original further supported by Marx's general assertion that 'the develop­ sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer. (Capital i. 474-5, my ment of culture and industry in general' (Letter of 25 Mar. emphasis) 1 868) has led to such an energetic destruction of forests. In Capital ii Marx dedicates some attention to the problem of But let us turn again to the general destruction of soil and timber-growing: labour as a result of the capitalist mode of production. Marx identifies large-scale industry and agriculture as main causes of The long production-time (which comprises a relatively small period of ecological problems: working time), and the great length of the periods of turnover entailed, make forestry an industry of little attraction to private, and therefore Large-scale industry and large-scale mechanised agriculture work to­ capitalist, enterprise, the latter being essentially private even if the gether. If originally distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste associated capitalist takes the place of the individual capitalist. The and destroys principally labour power, hence the natural force of development of culture and of industry in general has ever evinced human beings, whereas the latter more directly exhausts the natural itself in such energetic destruction of forests that everything done by it validity of the soil, they join hands in the further course of development 80 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 81 in that the industrial system in the country-side also enervates the Regarding the chemical industry Marx is completely optimistic. labourers, and industry and commerce, for their part, supply agriculture According to him, it utilizes not only its own waste, for which with the means of exhausting the soil. (Capital iii. 813, amended it finds new uses, but also that of many other industries translation) (Capital iii. 102). The general result of Marx's analysis with With regard to the destruction of labour Marx points to the faet regard to 'undermining the fountains of wealth' is formulated that individual rational behaviour of capitalists leads to disastrous in the following pointed manner: 'Capitalist production . . . is outcomes on the aggregate level: very economical with the materialized labour incorporated in commodities. Yet, more than any other mode of pro­ 'ApIeS moi Ie deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of every duction, it squanders human lives, or living labour, and not only capitalist nation. Hence capital is reckless of the health or length of life blood and flesh, but also nerve and brain' (Capital iii. 88). In the of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society. To the outcry as Manuscripts 1861-3 he phrases it this way: 'The capitalistic to the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the production is . . . most economical of realized labour, labour torture of over-work, it answers: ought these to trouble us since they increase our profits? ( Capital i. 257) realized in commodities. It is a greater spendthrift than any other mode of production of man, of living labour, spend­ In illustrating what the consequences of capitalist production thrift not only of flesh and blood and muscles, but of brains and amount to for the worker, he claims that the introduction of nerves' (MEGA II. iii. 1 . 326-7, original in English, emphasis machinery worsens the working conditions for the workers: added). At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the As we saw above, Marx distinguished between two sources of uttermost, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and wealth: soil and labour. That Marx's main interest was in the confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual waste of human beings is not due solely to his humanist stand­ activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, point and his political outlook. Undoubtedly it reflects the since the machine does not free the worker from work, but deprives the historical situation of his time where the far !'nore pressing work of all interest. ( Capital i. 398) problem was the direct waste of human beings in the production Three things spring immediately to mind: ( I ) Marx partly blames process. Nowadays, human beings are endangered perhaps less capitalist relations, partly modem industry for the undesirable within the industrial production process than outside it. Marx results; (2) he concentrates far more on the waste of labour than was preoccupied with the life-conditions of the working class on the waste of the natural environment; 13) the waste of the resulting from overwork and bad working conditions. There natural environment in Marx's view is largely limited to the was a remedy at hand which in fact improved the working waste of soil as a result of capitalist agriculture. Since I discuss conditions and the lives of the working class and which Marx ( I ) extensively in Chapter 3, only the last two points will be supported: the labour legislation which led to the shortening of further commented on here. Marx is fairly optimistic regarding the working day which introduced, inter alia, standards of job the possibilities of recycling. In Capital iii he stresses the fact security. What if we apply this by analogy to the destruction of that capital has an interest in consuming the elements of the natural environment? Imagine two clear-cut eases. The first production in an economic way: is a production process in which human beings are wasted, but which, ecologically, does little damage. The second is a produc­ The general requirements for the re-employment of these excretions are: large quantities of such waste, such as are available only in large­ tion process in which labourers enjoy safe and decent working scale production; improved machinery whereby materials, formerly conditions, a short working time, but which harms the natural useless in their prevailing form, are put into a state fit for new productionj environment. If we take these two cases as ideal cases and scientific progress, particularly of chemistry, which reveals the useful suppose-for the sake of the argument-that the first obtained properties of such wastc. ( Capital iii. 1 0 1 ) during Marx's time, whereas the second obtains today, we 82 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 83 might benefit from an explicit application of Marx's approach to In Chapter I I discussed several versions of the argument that the natural environment. nature prescribes how society should live I 'nature knows best'l. Interestingly, Marx polemicizes against such a view which was Excursus on law already being put forward by the true socialists: Before proceeding any further, we must ask: how exactly does The true socialist proceeds from the thought that the dichotomy of life Marx conceive of the exhaustion of labour power? In the opening and happiness must cease. To prove this thesis he summons the aid of paragraph of section 5, chapter x, of Capital i, he writes: nature presupposing that this dichotomy does not exist in nature and from this he deduces that since man, too, is a natural body and has the Wbat is a working-day? What is the length of time duringwhich capital properties which bodies generally possess, this dichotomy ought not to may consume the labour power whose daily value it buys? How far may exist for him either. ICW v. 473) the working day be extended beyond the working-time necessary for the reproduction of labour power itself? It has been seen that to these We can think of nature as having either instrumental or intrinsic questions capital replies: the working-day contains the full 24 hours, value. As Passmore put it: 'On the first view, wilderness and with the deduction of the few hours of repose without which labour­ species ought to be preserved only if, and in so far as, they are power absolutely refuses its services again. (Capital i. 252) useful to man. On the second view, they ought to be preserved Capital does not respect the time necessary for human education, even if their continued existence were demonstrably harmful to intellectual development, fulfilment of social functions, social human interests' I Passmore 1974: 1011. He rightly says that intercourse, the free play of physical and psychical life powers. 'usefulness need not be narrowly interpreted: wilderness and It does not even respect the holy Sabbath Ie!. ibid.l· Following its species, it might be argued, are valuable not only as economic blind instincts, capital overruns not only the moral, but also the resources, actual and potential, but as providing opportunities physical, limits of the working day: all the worker's 'disposable for the pursuit of science, for recreation and retreat, as sources of time is by nature and law labour time' libid., my emphasis). If moral and aesthetic delight' libid. 102; cf. Norton 1987: 1 2 f.1. 1t we apply this argument to man's dealing with nature, we would thus seems a promising project to develop arguments against get the following argument: nature belongs to man 'by nature the destruction of the natural environment on the basis of its and law' in its entirety; man overruns the 'moral and physical instrumental rather than its intrinsic values; the more so, since limits' of nature; man often does not permit nature to recover. Marx's position connects the aspect of domination of nature to In fact, Marx himself says that 'a greedy farmer snatches increased human interests. produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility' libid. 253, Marx, draWing an analogy between exhausted working power my emphasis). and exhausted soil, used an instrumentalist argument in the As we have seen, Marx invokes moral and physical limits example of the greedy farmer. Yet another observation can be when speaking about the working day and its limits. Does it made about this example. He did not say that the exhaustion of make sense to do the same with respect to nature? As regards soil was due only to capitalist methods, but that it was due also the moral dimension, I think that Marx would have refused. He to the greedy behaviour of the farmer. Of course, as we have seen time and again ridiculed all forms of nature worship and senti­ above I Capital i. 474-5; Capital iii. 8 13), Marx thinks that mentalism. This becomes clear when we look at his appraisal of capitalist methods accomplish the destruction of soil in the capitalism, in so far as it 'creates the bourgeois society, and the most systematic and 'efficient' way. But his reference to the universal appropriation of nature' IGrundrisse 409). 1 2 'greediness' of the farmer suggests that it is a fundamental · 12 problem that must be faced by every social form. In similar In a polemic against the 'true socialists' and the nature-cult of Mr D.mmer, Marx makes fun of a view which sees essentially harmony in nature, see CWv. fashion, Marx analyses the labour process in its material content 471 -3; CW x. 244-5. I'as such') before he dedicates his attention to the specific social 84 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 85 forms labove all, the capitalist one; d. MEGA I!. iii. l . 82, as merttal law does not in principle alter anything with respect to quoted above). the behaviour of rational actors; the problem would be restated With such an approach one does not say that capitalism in the form that it might be rational for the actors to break the exhausts nature just like it exhausts labour power, but that the law. But let us simply assume that negative incentives Ithreat of labour process Isometimes) exhausts nature just like the capitalist sanctions) are at work which prevent actors from doing so. For exhausts labour power. In both cases the exploiter has to face the purpose of exposition we may take Dworkin's 1 1978: 1 7 1 ) negative consequences if he is too ruthless. During Marx's time distinction between three approaches of modem law: rights­ capitalists resolved the problem of a perishing labour force by based theories, duty-based theories, 14 and goal-based theories. importing new labour until labour legislation put an end to this. The first and second are mainly concerned with individual In the case of man's exploitation of nature we can distinguish interests; the third concerns the community as a whole Id. also two cases, recalling the distinction between the 'prisoners ' Waldron 1984: 12-14). In elaboraring the first approach, there dilemma' and the 'assurance game' in Chapter l . The point of have been contemporary efforts to extend the concept of rights the PD is the following: If the assurance mechanism does not to animals, 15 to material objects in nature, 16 to artistic creations, work, optimal outcomes are only obtained by superior force, and to foetusesP that is, when all actors are 'forced' to contribute to the public It seems pretty clear that Marx would have scorned rights­ good either in a direct way (penal law) or in an indirect way based theories. From what we know, he was already opposed Iselective incentives). Before considering this possibility, let us even to the rather limited concept of rights in his own time Isee look briefly at the possibilities for co-operation. As has been his On the Jewish Question; see also Campbell 1983 and Lukes pointed out, the number of actors must be limited and the 1985 for an evaluation). However, in the case of labour legislation game must be repeated. Taking a limited number of actors for he was in favour of using law as an instrument against capital's granted, the repetition of the game does not necessarily give an assault on workers, which might presuppose the attribution of incentive to contribute to the public good: if an actor is better off rights to them. With respect to a duty-based theory, Marx, at by polluting and can off-load the costs on to 'the public', then he least in his early Hegel critique, inspired by Kant's categorical will not co-operate. In this case, the future is likely to become imperative Iwhich is taken as a basis in many contemporary the 'junkyard of the present' IMiiJIhalde der Gegenwart) as duty-based theories), formulated his own categorical imperative: Preuss 1 1 9 8 1 ) aptly remarked. If, however, the future 'retroacts' 'The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the even now, and if it can be anticipated in some way, actors may highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to have an incentive to co-operate. But note that it is only in the overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, case of this feedback loop, where detrimental consequences forsaken, despicable being . . . ' leW iii. 1 82; d. ibid. 187). As we become felt, that a further discounting of the future is likely to shall see in the next section on Marx's philosophical anthropo­ be avoided. 13 logy, Marx did in fact endorse some ethical values which he Basing the argument on such considerations, then, it seems thought to be universally human and which an ideal form of that there is no mechanism which automatically secures an society should put into practice. The problem for him was optimal outcome. Let us therefore discuss an alternative: law thus not to attribute rights but to establish the conditions coerces actors to co-operate. Can law provide the key to the under which man's species power could be released. In Lukes's solution of ecological problems? The existence of an environ- 1 4 Hart (1968: 9) claimed that the duty-based approaches often turn out to be 13 As C. Perrow pointed OUt to me, it is essentially human to act within short Utilitarian, i.e. goal-based. time-spans and to consider only short-term consequences of that action. But the 15 Regan and Singer 1976; the first attempt was formulated in 1892 by Salt (d. present time with its immense and fast information and communication Passmore 1974: 1 15). 6 systems may contribute to a change of this state of affairs. 1 Stone 1974. J7 Feinberg 1980. 86 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 87 formulation: Marx opposed the morals of Recht, but endorsed the intended results. This is because law can rarely anticipate the morals of emancipa tion. the development of science and technology, which would be But what about the third possibility of a 'goal-based theory'? necessary for it to intervene successfully. Moreover, legal inter­ This approach, which dates back to Bentham, is essentially ventions may produce unintended consequences which also based on utilitarian premisses. Since we know how much Marx harm nature. As Teubner and Willke have pointed out, traditional ridiculed Bentham ('Genie in der biirgerlichen Dummheit') and law was apt to regulate simple, bipolar conflicts (sce Teubner his 'utility-principle' ('freedom, equality, property and Bentham! ') and Willke 1984). These conflicts presupposed a world of simple it seems unlikely that he would have allowed his own theory to connections. In a stratified society, this condition did in fact be characterized in goal-based terms. And yet, there is something obtain (at least to a much greater degree than under modem there which comes very close to a utilitarian approach. I made conditions). Following Luhmann, Teubner and Willke assume the distinction above between nature's instrumental and intrinsic that the structural principle of modem societies is no longer values of nature. Marx adhered to the instrumental view of stratification or class, but functional differentiation. Modem nature. But what label other than utilitarian (if only in the societies have a high degree of internal complexity which changes broadest sense of its meaning) could be given to this approach? 1 8 the conditions for social development and the possibilities of Let me return ro the question of law. In the previous paragraphs I social regulation in decisive ways (see Teubner and Willke have dealt with a possible Marxist position regarding law's 1984: 9). Law is confronted with a functionally differentiated, capacity to deal with ecological problems. The result was not complex society; society has no top nor does it have a centre. It very clear. It seems that Marx could have endorsed all three follows that it cannot intervene in the traditional way; it cannot approaches. ConSider, again, his advocacy of labour legislation. 'plan' society. This is not pOSSible, because the social subsystems At face value his argument is purely goal-based (the working class have gained an autonomy and degree of differentiation which is the universal class which leads mankind into communism). make it impossible for law to bring about only intended COnse­ But since Marx thinks that letting people work to death is quences. There is the ever-present danger that interventions in simply inhuman, he also endorsed a duty-based theory. And one subsystem may have detrimental effects on other subsystems. since defending workers' interests seems to presuppose the Hence the slogan 'more law!' may backfire. But neither does the attribution of rights, he nolens volens has to embrace also rights opposite possibility seem feasible, because the mere autonomy of workers. In what follows I shall concentrate upon the feasibility of subsystems produces ecological risks and damage. 19 Recently, of the goal-based approach. Teubner has listed four reasons which inhibit regulatory politics. For this purpose, I should like to distinguish between law as a These are ( 1 ) Change of goals. Original goals of conditional medium for regulation and law as a guarantee to secure some programmes are changed into a judicial question of 'who loses? minimal standards. Marx, when analysing labour legislation, who wins?' (2) Statics of legal positions. The means-ends relation­ strongly supported the legal fixation of the limits of the working ship of condi tional programmes is transformed into thinking in day. This is an instance where law operates as a guarantee, as a legal terms. The question now is: Who can .trump with rights? purely defensive mechanism which protects some interests (3) Change of reality construction. The reality construction of from being overridden. This should be quite uncontroversial regulatory programmes, based on certain causal connections, is among Marxists and liberals (though not among libertarians). transformed into a legal reality construction based on a two- However, law as a means for regulation poses some intriguing questions. Recent research suggests that the complexity of l\.l In ch. I, we encountered Merton's statement that there arc three main types of unintended consequences: functional, dysfunctional, and irrelevant. many problems makes it extremely difficult for law to achieve Teubner's 'regulatory trilemma' has it that law as a social system may ( I ) Cause 11< See Lukes 1985 for some similarities between Marx's and utilitarian dysfunctional effects in other social systems, \2) remain irrelevant, and (3) cause approaches. detrimental effects for itself (see Teubner 1985: 3 1 1). 88 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 89 party perspective of plaintiff and defendant. (4) Dogmatism. Finally, we have seen earlier thatl in fact, the labourer looks at the Instruments of regulation are transformed into elements of social nature of his labour, at its combination with the labour of others sheer normative orders and dogmatics (see Teubner 1988c). for a common purpose, as he would at an alien powerj the condition of Given these difficulties of regulatory policies based on law, realizing this combination is alien property, whose dissipation would the (neo-)liberal comes up with a comparatively simple solution: be totally indifferent to him if he were not compelled to economise he assumes that the market leads to beneficial results for nature with it. The situation is quite different in factories owned by the as wel! as for society. Marx flirted with such a solution in his labourers themselves, as in Rochdale, for instance. (Capital iii. 85, my emphasis) analysis of the waste of resources and a possible recycling (see above), and many still regard it as a mechanism which is With the idea of being 'compelled', Marx has in mind the genetal!Y valid 20 One could even say that the waste of resources institution of piece-work (Stiicklohn) as the following passage is not the most urgent problem for modern societies, and this makes clear: might indeed be due to the working of the market. But Marx was well aware that the working of the market offers no beneficial The capitalist's fanatical insistence on economy in means of production solution in some eases like agriculture and human labour power. is therefore quite understandable. That nothing is lost or wasted and Recalling the discussion in Chapter 1, we can conclude that the means of production are consumed only in the manner required by every naive reliance on the market is completely fallacious. 2 l production itself, depends partly on the skill and intelligence of the Summarizing the discussion of goal-based theories in law, we labourers and partly on the discipline emorced by the capitalist for the combined labour. This discipline will become superfluous under a can say that this approach is linked to the problem of 'steering social system in which the labourers work for their own account, as it society' (with all its inherent difficulties). Since a successfully has already become practically superfluous in piece-work. leapita1 iii. planned society was Marx's final aim, I shall return to this 83) question in Chapter 5 . Note that communist society and capitalist piece-work arc 2.3.2. Second approach : alienation supposed, here, to be similar in their results: both tend to In section 2.3.1 I concentrated on detrimental effects stemming economize on resources. In both cases, the worker has no from capitalist production, especially from its profit principle. interest in wasting resources. The prinCiple of piece-work is said I dismissed that prinCiple as too narrow to be able to account fot to bring about this result because the worker gets paid for the ecological problems. Next, I evaluated the question of private fruits of his labour according to their quantity and quality. Thus consumers as 'externalizers', that is, as responsible for ecological it lies in the worker's interest to produce a maximum output in problems, and arrived at a similar result. Another prominent a certain time period. Capitalists' supervision can therefore be feature of capitalism which Marx holds responsible for many minimized. But here Marx seems to overlook a crucial fact. pathological phenomena of modern society is alienation. Might Since the worker gets paid for the final product, he has no it not be that under conditions of alienation a careless use of incentive to use resources sparingly. If he squanders resources technology and resources takes place which leads to ecological this need not have negative consequences for his wage. His wage problems? Marx does not elaborate upon this line of thought in a could, however, be related to his use of resources in the following systematic way. However, in Capital iii, in the chapter entitled two ways: either the worker has to pay for wasted raw material, 'Economy in the Use of Constant Capital', he states: semi-products, or damage to the machine (as can easily be done in the case of house work), .or supervision and control are ::1.0 See Hayek ( 1973-9) as the most prominent defender of this position. 21 Note that the dogmatic Marxist and the neo-liberal views are symmetrical, maintained. A communist society, therefore, is not free from but equally mistaken: the one blames the market as one cause 6f ecological this problem either (see s. 1 .3.5). The possibility of alienation problems, the other praises the market for being the most efficient remedy. arises as soon as we admit that Singular interests are not identical 90 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Soeial Sciences, Marxism 9 1 to general interests, 22 a possibility which Marx excluded. I return Technology is the mediating instance without which man to this problem in Chapter 5. could not secure his interchange with nature. Marx's approach is essentially based on Hegel: 2.3.3. Third approach: man-nature metabolism As soon as he has to produce, man possesses the resolve to use a part of In section 2.3.1, I introduced industry and technology as decisive the available natural objects directly as means of labour, and, as Hegel factors with respect to ecological problems. 'Production' thus correctly said it, subsumes them under his activity without further seems to be the central category for the analysis of our problem. process of mediation. I Grundrisse 734; d. ibid. 706)24 We are confirmed in this view by a statement from a radical There are several questions then which need examination before ecologist who said: 'For the sake of nature, no production would we can address Marx's position in its full scope. The first is the be the best production' (Amery 1 9 78 : 167, my translation). This question of nature, to which I turn in the next section (s. 2.4); position, however, leads to absurdity. Human beings would no the second is the question of human nature (s. 2.5). Finally, the longer exist if they stopped producing their life-conditions within question of technology will be addressed in Chapter 3 . After this nature 23 Marx's approach is far from such absurdity. He recog­ discussion, we will be in a better position to examine Marx's nizes that human beings are part of nature, the most developed thought with respect to ecological problems; I shall then take up species of animals. They are thus dependent on nature, and have again the threads of nature, technology, and society and discuss to organize their 'interchange' (Stoffwechsel) with nature in them as they are brought together in Marx's historical material­ order to survive. Furthermore, they employ tools, instruments, ism (ch. 4). knowledge, and skills during their interaction with nature. Let us call this 'technology' for short. He locates technology in the middle between man and nature: it is the necessary condition 2.4. The concept of natllre for man's Stoffwechsel with nature; man transforms nature only by using means, tools, technology. According to Marx, 'techno­ In this section I claim that Marx's concept of nature belongs to logy discloses man's mode of dealing with nature' ( Capital i. a discourse which dates back to Pico, Bacon, Descartes, and 352). The embeddedness of human beings within nature is which includes such thinkers as Hegel and Nietzsche.25 It is expressed by Marx through an analogy to organism. He says: this modern view of nature which has structured philosophical 'But just as man requires lungs to breathe with, so he requires reasoning and which has recently come under attack. As we something that is work of man's hand, in order to consume 24 Cf. Hegel: 'Man ought to be proud of his tools since reason is expressed in physical forces productively' (Capital i. 365). them. The tOol is the medius terminus which mediates human activity with outer nature. This is the spirit of rcason, in that man preserves himself in turning not himself but something else against nature which is then rubbed off' Man -----�) Technology ------;.) Nature (Hegel 1983a: 159, my trans.). 25 From Bacon ('nature is a storehouse of matter'), Hegel ('nature has no t immanent purpose'I, Marx ('nature ceases to be recognized as a power for itself') there is a direct line to Nietzsche ('will to power'). For an exposition of this FI G. 2 1. discourse and its historical emergence, sec Leiss 1972. Cf. also Dostoevsky: 'Men will unite to take from life all it can give, but only for joy and happiness in the present world. Man will be lifted up with a spirit of divine Titanic pride and man-god will appear. From hour to hour extending his conquest of nature 22 A further cause of ecological problems can be called 'technological alienation' infinitely by his will and his science, man will feel such lofty joy from hour to and will be discussed in ch. 3. hour in doing it that it will make up for all his old dreams of the joys of heaven' 2.> And yet, even on this level, the argument has been put forward that, if (Dostoevsky 1952: 345). But Marx is also different from these writers who mankind inevitably damages nature in securing its means for life, it would be propound that man should make an impact on the world: for Marx this goal is better that it perish (see Birch 1982: 48-9). related to the goal of controlling all natural and social processes. 92 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 93 shall see, Marx did not merely follow Bacon or Hegel, but therefore, is the culmination of a process of increasing mastery developed a quite unique position, however much the 'modern' over nature. concept of nature is at its basis, Therefore, in discussing Marx's Alfred Schmidt 1 1 97 1 : 29) maintains that Marx employed a approach, the whole modern concept of nature is involved 26 double concept ofnature, On the one hand nature was for Marx the A position such as the fundamentalist ecological one which totality of all existing 'reality' IGes4mtwirldichkeit), comprising refutes the Marxian position is thus challenging the whole human beings and 'external' nature, i,e, the universe, On the modern discourse of nature, One can regard Marx's position as a other hand, nature is only there for human beings if they enter test Case for the feasibility of the modern discourse on nature, into a practical relationship with it; they are in relation with This is all the more interesting since Marx, in my view, has nature only when transforming it. Marx puts it in the extreme given the concept 'domination of nature' the most compelling formula: 'But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself-nature formulation, Two things need mentioning here which I take up fixed in isolation from man-is nothing for man' ICW iii. 345), again later: This passage from the Paris Manuscripts indicates that there 1 , The concept of domination makes sense for Marx only with is no discrepancy between an 'ecologist' yOl1ng Marx and an respect to interests and needs, Recall the example of King Midas 'economist' later Marx. who had the power to turn everything hc touched into gold, But, on the other hand, Marx is aware that man can produce Now this is clearly a self-defeating power which we would nothing without the help of nature ICWiii. 273), In the Critique hardly include in a reasonable concept of domination, Likewise, of the Gotha Programme he stresses that labour alone does not a society which does not take into account the repercussions of create wealth, Here he insists that nature too produces use­ its transformation of nature can hardly be said to dominate values which are the material precondition for all production, nature at aIL In this version the usual meaning of 'domination of However, the Grundrisse view that only labour can create value nature' is reversed, In the usual meaning, ecological crises are I Gnzndrisse 366) is not revoked, Against the physiocrats, Marx seen as a result of this very domination of nature, But here they holds that it is important to analyse the social forms in which are seen as the absence of it, value is produced; value-in contrast to wealth-is not imme­ 2, Marx links the concept of domination of nature to his cOm­ diately given or transhistorical, it is the economic form which munist project: for him communism is a state of affairs in which material wealth takes under specific conditions Imost typically human beings are capable Ifor the first time) of full self-realization, under capitalism), In other words, the above quote from the All naturally evolved natural and social conditions are the Grundrisse neither expresses nor implies that Marx disregarded products of their common conscious control. Communism, nature in the sense that he undervalued natural preconditions 26 for human production, Quite the contrary is true, However, Cf. Heidegger 1 96 1 : 'That period we call modern . . . is defined by the fact that man becomes the center and measure of all beings. Man is the subjectum, there is a certain disregard for nature, albeit in a completely that which lies at the bottom of all beings, that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification and representation' (cited in Habermas 1987a: 133). different sense, This apparent paradox can be solved by looking It is also Heidegger who challenges the modem concept of nature as a 'storehouse of at Hegel's distinction between first and second nature, As he put matter and energy' (see Heideggcr 1978: 296-9). Modern science, like modern it in the Philosophy of Right, para, 4: technology, entraps and frames nature. The alternative is to hope that another form of pOiesis will 'bring forth and reveal': art. Heidcgger's vision lies in 'this The basis of right is, in general, mind; its precise place and point of other possibility: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everyvvhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, origin is the wilL The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom "7 Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflcction upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the onc hand, akin to the essence of technology, and on the other, 27 Compare Marx, Capital iii. 820, where he refers to the 'realm of freedom'; fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art' jHeidegger 1978: 316-17). see also ch. 5. 94 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 95 made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second becomes nature2 . Marx saw the natural sciences as haVing made nature. (Hegel 1952, my emphasis)28 great progress in this respect whereas the social realm was still awaiting its revolution. 'Revolution' here is to be taken literally, Marx takes this outline as a model for a society in which human for Marx thought that a social revolution was necessary to beings are no longer dominated by alien powers 29 However, establish nature2 properly. After the social revolution, therefore, Marx disagreed with Hegel on the point of whether existing no soeial science will be needed anymore (seess. 5.5 and 5.6). To society, law, and state were manifestations of 'reason'. Marx repeat: Hegel maintained that the existing forms of nature2 objected to this Hegelian view for two reasons. Firstly, he (law, state, society) were the manifestation of reason; Marx, on maintained that under given circumstances human beings still the contrary, maintained that, since nature2 acts upon man in a experience their own creations as alien powers. In this sense 'natural' way, in a way which is not understood ('blind wirkende history is still to be characterized as pre-history ( 1 859 Preface). Naturgesetze'), it cannot be the manifestation of man's reason, It follows that second nature is still first nature in the sense that but only a distorted version of it. it imposes its blind forces on man in a natural way ('blind This leads me to Marx's second objection to Hegel. Marx wirkende Naturgesetze'). It is intriguing to extricate this line of substituted the notion of 'reason' for the notion of man as a 'real thought from Marx. As Marx indicated in a footnote in Capital i, human being' who has needs, desires, and consciousness. He he agreed with Vico that man can understand the world which is derived this line of thought from Feuerbach's critique of Hegel, his own product much better than the world of nature (which is, as the Paris Manuscripts show (see s. 2.5). But what is most according to Vico, the product of God).'o important here is the implication of this theoretical shift for man's relationship with nature. When I said above that Marx Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are adopts from Hegel his disregard of nature" this is not to say that the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? his position is condemned as blind to ecological problems. The And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, introduction of the Feuerbachian 'real sensuous being', ' as a human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made human living organism, reveals the distinction here. Marx the former, but not the latter' (Capital i. 352) conceives of human beings primarily as 'real bodily entities' Let us call the nature before man's transformation 'nature,', and (which, of course, also have a brain and 'reason') which relate to the transformed nature 'nature,'. The latter comprises all prod­ the rest of nature as their extended body. Marx in his early Paris ucts of the human will, all objectifications. We can conceive Manuscripts praises Hegel for having conceived of man as of culture, history, and society as second nature. Now, Marx producing himself through labour. As he put it, 'the outstanding thought that the more man transforms nature, the more he achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie and of its final outcome understands its principles and laws. In this process nature, . . . is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as 211 In the German original: 'Der Boden des Rechts ist uberhaupt das Geistige alienation and as transcendence of this alienation, thus grasping und seine niihere Stelle und Ausgangspunkt der Wille, welcher frei ist, sodaB die the essence of labour and comprehending objective man-true, Freiheit seine Substanz und Bestimmung ausmacht und das Rechtssystem das Reich der verwirklichten Freiheit, die Welt des Geistcs aus ihm selbst hervor* because real man-as the outcome of man's own labour' (CW gebracht ais eine zweite Natur'ist.' iii. 332-3, amended translation). This 'greatness' of Hegel, 29 Fetscher is right when he emphasizes that Marx's point 'is that men should however, did not blind Marx to the fact that this Hegelian being be able to consciously control their own form of association (division and combination of labour etc.) instead of being dominated by autonomous struc­ was still an essentially spiritual being, a limitation which Marx tural forces. What the free association of producers has to achieve is the exposed. But whether we see labour as 'spiritual' or 'practical', completion of the process of humanization that started with the first conscious it is not the only source of wealth. In 1875, attacking the transformation of nature by men' {Fetscher 1973: 459). .�o As we shall see in ch. 5, Vieo's argument needs to be reconsidered. Programme of the German Social Democratic Party which 96 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 9 7 declared exactly that 'labour is the SOurce of all wealth and of all modern reality and tries to develop an ecological critique on the civilization', Marx wrote: basis of scientific findings.32 Still, one might insist that Marx, in privileging second nature, Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source pays too little attention to first nature. Jon Elster called his of use values land it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as concept of nature 'extreme and exaggerated' ( 1985: 56), and labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature 'exaggerated and pointless' (ibid. 57). I agree with him when he human labour power. The above phrase is to be found in all childrcn'� claims that Marx's concept of nature does not hold true for 'the primers and is correct in so far as it is implied that labour is performed millions of solar systems outside the reach of man' (ibid.). But I with the appurtenant subjects and instruments. But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions think Elster himself underestimates the degree to which nature that alone give them meaning. 15W iii. 17) has been transformed by man. Two important points must be made. The first is that we usually underestimate this. Many In Capital i Marx affirms the same: 'We see, then, that labour is landscapes, apart from their geomorphological and topographical not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced elements, also contain a cultural element in that they have been by labour' (Capital i. 50). created by man-they arc 'landscaped'. The most important To conclude, then, Marx's perspective was that only com­ factor in this process has been the development of agriculture. munist society would merge nature, and nature2, humanizing With agriculture, natural landscapes develop into 'cultivated' nature ;md naturalizing man (to paraphrase a passage from the ones. Biitzing ( 1 984) has shown how this process transformed Paris Manuscripts). Thus he writes in the Grundrisse: 'Univer­ the Alps. As Passmore put it: 'IT]he landscapes we now so sally developed individuals . . . are no product of nature, but of greatly admire-the landscapes of Tuscany or of England or of history' (Grundrisse 162). In this transformation process two Kyushu-are largely the creation of human enterprise, of human main factors participate: man and nature. Both have physical struggles' ( Passmore 1974: 1 79).33 The second point is that this properties and limits which must be respected if the transforma­ is not only a question of degree, of 'how much' nature has been tion process is to be continued. So far, the ecologists' attack on transformed, rather, it is a cognitive point. And here may arise Marx is in vain. But they might now argue that Marxism does serious problems for Marx. Elster seems not to be aware of the not take into consideration these parts of nature which are not crucial importance of this matter for Marx's whole project; it is needed for material production. As I shall show, this claim is not not sufficient to call his view extreme and pointless. If Marx is true either. It would be true if consistent ecological politics wrong in his exaggerated view, that whole project fails, because required a deontological 'respect for nature' as a starting-point, this view is one of the corner-stones of a true, human society: if the attribution of intrinsic value to nature were the sine qua from this view derives Marx's optimism, together with the non for ecological .concerns. As we have seen, Marx did not attribute an intrinsic, but an instrumental, value to nature. :{� Inter.estit.1g1y, much of t�e current. ecological criticism was suggested by efltlcal sCl�ntlsts. Th� em�rgmg ecologlcal movement took it up but gave it a However, it is possible to derive an ecological awareness from (partly) antl-modern duecHon. One important reason for this seems to be that such a premiss if we understand the instrumental value as many environmentalists do not trust the present systems to be able to resolve these problems. On the contrary, they seem to believe that further research and including other elements (such as aesthetic and recreational).3l further development of technologies would rather worSen the situation than And, what is more, this premiss is more likely to help construct im�rove it. Howev�r, ecologi�al policy-making also needs �oncrete technologies criteria for an ecological position which starts from premisses of whIch are economIcally feaSIble. Ecosystems research is of the utmost impor­ tance here . .B See also Marx on Feuerbach: 'jTJhc nature that preceded human history is ,1J It may also include a cultural and moral element, as the case of cruelty to not by any �eans the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today animals makes clear. But, as I have argued in ch. I, this moral standard is derived no longer eXIstS <lllywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of from human needs and purposes. recent origin)' (eW v. 40). 98 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 99 belief that a rational society Ihuman society, communist society) other living beings, can only exist within a natural environment. presupposes the human understanding of the processes at work Marx expressed this view in his early Paris Manuscripts with lin nature and society). Significantly, Elster himself associates the metaphor of nature being man's 'inorganic body'; in Capital this Marxian viewpoint to Marx's theory of the good society Isee he used the language of 'metabolism', or 'intcrchange with Elster 1985: 57), without paying more attention to its cognitive nature' las the German Stoffwechsel is rendered in English). But implications. The more human beings have transformed nature, this Stoffwechsel takes place in community with others. Thus into nature2-so goes Marx's claim-the more they are able to human beings are also social beings. As Marx states in the understand the world, the more they are able to avoid 'enslaving introduction to the Grundrisse: effects' which stem from natural or social processes. His concern was to abolish man's lunfounded) beliefs in natural or mystical The human being is in the most literal sense, a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself powers. Taken in this sense, even solar systems lat least those only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual within the reach of telescopes) have been 'transformed' by outside society-a rarc exception which may well occur when a civilised man without his putting a hand on them; their movements are person in whom the social forces arc already dynamically present, is understood. It was no accident that the phrase 'Copernican cast by accident into the wilderness-is as much an absurdity as is the revolution' was coined for the new conception of man's position development of language without individuals living together and talking in the cosmos. Similarly, it could be argued that we now know to each other. (Grundrisse 84) what oxygen is, that is, we know its 'secrets'. In this sense it is transformed, since it represents something other to man than it Marx stresses this double relation of man to his fellow-men and did before. to nature throughout his work. We shall see in Chapters 3 and 4 that Marx continues this argument and repeats the distinction on the level of society. Here he differentiates between relations 2.5. Philosophical anthropology of production and productive forces where the former correspond to the relation between 'man and fellow-men', the latter to the As Schmidt 1 1 9 7 1 ) has shown, Marx, analysing the man-nature relation 'man to nature'. As a result of both their natural lbrain) relation, followed a methodological approach which was sub­ and social character (common goals, tradition of know-how, stantially the same throughout his writings. Its first element skiIls) human beings are able to harness nature, to make it work is, as we have seen, the double characterization of man as for them. As Marx remarks in the Grundrisse: both natural and social being, a definition in which we can detect Feuerbach's influence Iman is both 'Natur·Mensch' and Nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of 'Menschen-Mensch'). 34 utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as the tuse to subjugate 2. 5.1. Man as both a natural and social being it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or a means of production. (Grundrisse 410, amended translation) The 'natural' and social dimension are intertwined. When Marx uses the metaphor of nature as man's inorganic body, and refers And in Capital i: to this relation as Stoffwechsel, the natural dimension is obvious: An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the man as part of nature acts upon nature, just as any other natural labourer interposes between himself and the subject of his labour, and element may have an impact on another. In this respect, man is which serves as the conductor of his activity. He makes use of the a biological being with physical needs; a being who, like all mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances in order to make other substances subservient to his aims. (Capital i. .,4 See Feuerbach 1959, 1960, 1973. 174-5) 100 Ecology, thc Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism !O1 In a footnote to this passage Marx refers to Hegel, whom he cites 2.5.2. Human needs approvingly: A decisive feature of man is that he produces and develops his Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act productive capacities. But where does this drive come from? and re�act on each other in accordance with their own nature, in this Marx's answer is simple: from human needs. We can derive two way, without any interference in the process, carries out reason's sorts of human needs according to my distinction between natural intentions. ICitcd in Capital i; German original in Hcgel l970a: 365)35 and social characteristics of human beings. As Elster put it: The main feature of men is thus not so much that they are tool­ The concept of human needs is fundamental in Marx's theory of human making but that they are 'intelligent' in that they can anticipate nature. The good society, for Marx, is one in which people are rich in outcomes of their action upon nature. Human beings are able to needs and rich in need satisfaction. Conversely, capitalism is defective project outcomes of natural processes and outcomes of their both because people have few needs and because the needs they do have own work. To illustrate this, Marx eompared human activity are not satisfied. IElster 1985: 68) with that of a spider and a bee: The concept of needs is important also in another sense. We saw A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee that the notion of domination (in general, and in respect to puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But nature) is meaningful only if linked to a notion of interests (for what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that matters of simplicity, I take needs and interests synonymously). the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in Now, how can we establish this link? Elster, drawing on Heller reality. ICapital i. 1 74) 1 9 76, constructed the following typology of needs in Marx. It includes This projective consciousness is the decisive difference between human beings and animals. Human beings can decide how to 1 . Physieal needs which are needs for physical or biological build their houses. They do not have a 'natural' place in the eco­ necessities; system but they are able to adapt to many environments. Again, as 2. Necessary needs which correspond to the conventional distinct from animals, men do not change their species character and accepted standards of living of a particular group of in this process of adaptation, but, on the contrary, they exercise people at a particular time and place; it. Human beings have been described as 'Miinge!wesen' (Gehlen), 3. Luxury needs which are needs which exceed (2); beings of shortcomings and deficiencies. 'But', as Fetscher rightly 4. Social needs which are needs which (a) are social in origin, comments, 'man's biological disadvantage is at the same time (b) are social in content, or (c) can be satisfied only com­ the basis for his superiority over animals' (Fetscher 1973: 444). munally (see Elster 1985: 69). Hence Marx's definition fits well with the definition in section 1 .2 where the relation between man and nature was defined as: ObViously, each point in this typology can be related to the man being ( 1 ) in and (2) against (dominating) nature. ecological problematic in one way or another. To be more specific, I shall qualify the relations in the following way. ( 1 ) Physical needs: it is immediately clear that a debased envir­ ,15 In his Naturphilosophie Hegel makes a more elaborate statement: 'The practical relation to nature is determined by the desire which is egoistic. This onment may not permit of need satisfaction. This is the case for desire aims at using nature to our benefit, to rub it off, to cancel it out, in short: inhabitants of an extremely polluted area who can no longer to annihilate it . . . The need and the cunning of man has invented many ways of have these needs (like food) satisfied in that area. (2) Necessary using and mastering nature . . He takes the means from nature and uses them against her. The cunning of his rcason makes sure that he thereby pits natural needs: standard goods of consumption (like water), which have powers against other natural powers. The former arc then attacked and man such a low price (if any) that it can be neglected when calculating confirms and preserves himself behind them' {Hegel 197Gb: 13 £., my trans.). standard of living, may increase in their prices because it becomes 102 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 103 more and more costly to keep water, for example, clean. As a Geras shows that the sixth thesis can by no means be taken as result, the historical and moral elements which enter this support for the 'anti-humanist' interpretation of Marx (see Geras category will change. 13) Luxury goods: it is a cultural and 1983a: 27-87). With regard to the substantial level, I would like political question to define the distinguishing line between 12) and to add the following. When Marx speaks of human nature, and 13). Some orthodox Marxists and some committed 'workerists' in the sixth thesis apparently denies such human essence, this have contended that the perception of environmental problems, should be explained in the following way. What the human as it occurred in the early 1970s, was an expression of the essence is can only be grasped from its emanations, from its privileged status of the middle and upper classes. Workers, on objectifications. This combines the Hegelian idea Ithat the real the contrary Iso went the claim), have always faced these prob­ is the rational) with the 'positivist' idea that only real, observable lems at their workplaces and tried to improve their situation. In entities form the object of scientific investigation. Marx, most some extreme versions of this 'workerism', it is claimed that explicitly in the German Ideology, conceives of human charac­ workers should not bother about these problems but instead teristics such as creativity and communality as empirically pursue their 'real' class interests. 14) Social needs: Elster gave an given facts which can be observed and analysed. Modern industry example of a social need which can be satisfied only communally: is a product of this 'inner essence', a thought which had already the need for education. Education can be seen as a public good appeared in the Paris Manuscripts. There might be many other which is usually provided by the state. By analogy, we can apply human traits which have manifested or which will manifest the logic of collective goods to many ecological problems. Clean themselves; what Marx is interested in is the significance of air and clean water may serve as examples here. All environ­ these traits. How does he define what is significant and what is mental problems are social in origin in that they are produced not? According to him, it is the (self-)production of the conditions socially; to overcome them is both a social concern and a social of human life which leads him to attribute to the development need. of the productive forces, and the relations of production, a prominent place. Certainly, Marx is equally aware of the im­ 2.5.8. Human nature essential to Marx portance of language or power but he attributes only a secondary To define human beings as communal and creative36 justifies role to them. This is because he takes pains to avoid what coining the term theory of human nature. Man as a 'tool­ we may call 'Don Quixotism', that is, the attempt to bring making animal' can be seen as part of the creative dimension. As about something for which the preconditions are missing. Such Norman Geras, in a most detailed and convincing study, has attempts sometimes look funny, sometimes dreadful, and Marx shown, throughout his writings Marx adhered to something we scorned many of his contemporaries for this reason Imost notably could describe as 'human nature'. The evidence that Marx held a the Utopian SOcialists). Consider how Marx relates class struggle specific view of human nature seems clear and abundant. And (power) to the development of the productive forces. According yet, one interpretation of Marx, namely that of Althusser and to him, class struggle can only play the role of a midwife, a his followers, has denied precisely this. What is taken as evidence metaphor which Marx used several times. The analogy is obvious: that there was no 'humanistic' element in Marx is the sixth as in biology, in social life, the objective preconditions must be thesis on Feuerbach, the second and third sentences of which given in order that a midwife can take up her job. This takes me read as follows: 'But the essence of man is no abstraction to another set of arguments. inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble Up to now we have listed a number of statements on human of the social relations' lew v. 4). As regards the exegetical level, nature which are explanatory in character. Additionally, Marx M, For obvious reasons, I take 'creative' here to mean both constructive and employs the concept in a normative sense. He not only holds destructive. In any case, what counts as constructive or destructive is observer� that there exists something like a human nature, but, moreover, dependent. he qualifies this. The substantial part of his concept of human 104 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 105 nature is contained in his notion of labour as free, creative be no clear answer to this. On the one hand, it seems as if Marx activity. In the Paris Manuscripts he distinguishes men from would align readily with the communitarian critique of liberalism animals by defining their species character: since he saw individuals as socially constituted and aiming at a Free conscious activity is man's species character , . . The animal is specific conception of the good. However, I want to draw some immediately identical with its life-activity . . . Man makes his life­ attention to the fact that Marx, despite all his criticism of activity itself the object of his will and consciousness . . . Conscious liberalism, is no defender of Neo-Aristotelianism, since he does life�activity directly distinguishes man from animal lifc-activity . . not envisage an institutionalization of the good life in a good Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwell­ society which is based on virtues. Therefore, the Greek model of ings . . . But man in the working up of the objective world . . . duplicates polis was not an option for communist society as perceived by himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually but also actively, him. The 'good life' for him is something dynamic which cannot in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world he has be expressed in citizens' basic virtues. This is so because his idea created. lew iii. 275-7) of human self-realization is a process which has baSically no But human beings are not only creative, but also communal, end. The ideal society, therefore, marks no endpOint in history even in eases where they are not directly co-operating, in actions but is a society which is forever superseding itself. like composing, writing, thinking. 'The individual is the social Self-realization, then, does not allow for an end-state called being. His manifestations of life-even if they may not appear 'communism'. For these reasons Marx tries to avoid giving in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried concrete models of communist society. And when he does, he out in association with others-are therefore an expression and tries to keep open all the possibilities of human self-realization. confirmation of social life' lew iii. 299). This 'expressivist' However, the model of self-realization contains a tautology and notion of labour ITaylor 1 9 75) is present in all stages of Marx's a paradox ."9 The tautology is that human essence Iwith its theoretical development. Just as German Idealism saw the potentiality for self-realization) is what it is Ifor example: limit­ formation of spirit as self-consciousness, Marx as a materialist less). The paradox is that human essence is what it is not since 'praxis-philosopher' sees the formation of human species as self­ it is everything Ibecause limitless). But if it is everything, it is creation: externalization, objectification, and appropriation are void, it is nothing. It is a contradiction in terms to define the three aspects of this circle.37 In this context, we have the something without drawing the border around the defined object. human labour on one side and the objectified, dead labour on the Likewise, absolute freedom is a contradiction in terms. One can other. The latter is the crystallized result of man's interchange be free only with regard to something or from something. The with nature. 'Dead labour', therefore, is many things: technology, process of self-realization is a historical process which up till buildings, but also culture, institutions; it is man's second now has gone through certain stages, and has opened up new nature. possibilities. I now address some questions which arise from Marx's philo­ Marx seems to have been aware of all this. He modifies his sophical anthropology. One can relate this theoretical outline to pOSition after the completion of the Paris Manuscripts. In the the contemporary debate on liberalism and its communitarian Theses on Feuerbach and the German Ideology he affirms that criticis" and ask: Where does Marx stand? Obviously, there can what for him is important is not an abstract 'human essence' but ,17 Habermas 1987a: 7S If. There are a number of scholars who interpret Marx concrete, real, existing individuals and their realized essence, as as transposing Hegel's model to his anthropocentric approach, replacing 'Spirit' we find it in existing culture, i.e. industry, science, art, literature, with 'mankind'. Cf. Kolakowski 1978, Habermas 1987a, Thcunissen 1978, Benhabib 1986. They all point Out that Marx also inherits the fundamental ,l<) See Luhmann 1988d for the distinction and its application to social difficulties of that theoretical model. thought and social reality. In a similar way, Ricoeur (l986: 309-10) distinguishes ;J8 Cf. the discussion on Rawls's ( 1972) book, especially the contributions by between ideology and Utopia; ideology justifies existing relations whereas Sandel { 1 9821 and MacIntyre {19841. Utopia contains fictional power. 106 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism etc. He thus ( 1 ) analyses concrete objectifications of human essence and (2) measures them by an abstract human potentiality. The first operation is based on tautology, the second on paradox. This shows that the model of self-realization as a basis for 3 Technology criticism does not vanish. It may be appropriate to describe Marx's move as a move which de-paradoxified the abstract philosophical thesis of self-realization. He introduces a distinction between historical analysis and critical evaluation-a move which allows him to overcome the void and sterile 'man is It is not the articles made, but how they arc made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different everything' and its tautological or paradoxical implications. economic epochs. (Karl Marx, Capital) The distinction separates the analysis of concrete objectifications of human essence (e.g. as realized in productive forces) from the evaluation of these. Historical analysis and critical judgement So far I have discussed the concept of nature and human nature are thus two distinct operations. To be sure, Marx uses criteria in Marx and some implications for the ecological problematic. which derive from self-realization when criticizing existing Now I turn to the topic of technology. Apart from the importance productIve forces and social institutions. However, they are this subject has for my discussion of Marx, it additionally 'reintroduced' only after the crucial distinction is made and provides the opportunity to investigate a subject which has been only after the historical analysis is carried out. The motive of his largely neglected by political and social theory as well as by criticism is the concern for human dignity. philosophy. For a better understanding of the following I briefly recall the For the sake of conceptual clarity, the following remarks structure of the argument. According to the Stoffwechse1 model are in order. The English notion 'technology' is equivalent to man transforms nature by means of labour and technology. In the German 'Technik' which derives from Greek 'techne' and Chapter 3 following (and in ch. 4) I therefore focus on the means intentional, goal-directed change of things. The Inter­ analysis of technology and society, postponing the notion of n ational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences gives a useful labour and its implications to Chapter 5. definition: lIn] its broad meaning it connotes the practical arts. These arts range from hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture, animal husbandry, and mining through manufacturing, construction, transportation, provision of food, power, heat, light, etc.t to means of communication, medicine and military technology. Technologies are bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using, and doing useful things. (Merrill 1968: 576) In order to identify these 'useful things' more preCisely, Merrill adds that the concept of technology 'centers on processes that are primarily biological and physical rather than on psychological or social processes' (ibid. 577). Note that with this narrow definition not just any means-ends relationship counts as tech­ nology; rather, it stresses means-ends relationships which take place on a 'material' level. It is easy to see how the narrow 108 Technology Technology 109 definition of technology corresponds to Marx's concept, which Marx himself sometimes suggested such a parallel but did not also stresses the material aspect.l subsequently develop it. That he could not adhere to such a In section 3 . 1 I shall discuss Marx's approach to modern position will be made clear as well: if there was something in industry '> Here, I am especially interested in his definition of the human condition (technology) which escaped successful machinery and his evolutionary view of technology. Several social control, his project of liberating society from 'alien powers' contemporary attempts at conceiving tcchnology in an evolu­ would have failed. tionary way will be discussed in section 3.2. Closely connected to this problem is the problem of distinguishing between science 3.1. Marx as a student of technology and technology. I then discuss two theoretical possibilities which are contained in Marx's general position. The first is As Rosenberg ( 1982a) emphasized, Marx was a careful student technological determinism, which I address in section 3.3; the of technology. He argues that second is technological alienation, which I address in section 3.5. Closely connected to the question of technological deter­ quite independently of whether Marx was right or wrong in his charac� minism and to an evolutionary view of technology is the question terization of the future course of technological change and its social whether technology can be conceived as having an 'inner logic' and economic ramifications/ his formulation of the problem still deserves or 'autonomy'. I shall address this problem in sections 3.2 and to be a starting-pointior any serious investigation of technology and its ramifications. (Rosenberg 1982a: 34)5 3.4, discussing some contemporary approaches. Section 3.5 will discuss the concept of division of labour in Marx. According to Rosenberg, Marx 'devoted much time and effort to It has been claimed by several authors that Marx employs a explicating the distinctive characteristics of technologies, and theoretical model which conceives the results of human action to attempting to unravel and examine the innerlogic of individual as becoming independent from their producers (a process called technologies' (Rosenberg 1982a: 34). Furthermore, 'he insisted objectification) but eventually reappropriated. In cases where that technologies constitute an interesting subject, not only to this reappropriation is not possible but where the objectifications technologists but to students of society and social pathology as are retroacting upon the producers in a detrimental way, we well, and he was very explicit in the introduction of technological have a state of alienation.3 If such a 'lack of control' can be variables into his arguments' (ibid.). discerned in the working of technology, if modern technology But why was Marx so obsessed by the feature of technology to operates behind the backs of the individuals, then we would the extent that he focused on it in all his major theoretical have an exact parallel on the technological level to what Marx works? I think that any answer has to consider at least two analysed regarding economics 4 Moreover, as can be shown, elements. First, Marx sees technology as part of the human condition, as the means by which man exercises and regulates I For two usages of a wide notion of technology, see Weber 1978: 32f. and his Stoffwechsel with nature. Second, Marx was aware of the Heidegger, who stresses that techne is not only the name 'for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts and for the fine arts' !Heidcggcr 1978: importance of the productive forces for the development of a 294). mode of production, for the evolution of relations of production, 2. The German Groile Industrie has been translated as 'modern industry' as himself in his work, the constructor losing himself in his construction, is now well as 'large-scale industrY'. l shall use the former since the text which was at the metaphysical temptation of man. Man shrinks back from transferring my disposal adopted this translation. The decisive differences between the himself without remainder into self-produced objectivity, into a constructed epoch of Gro/3e InduslJie and other epochs (such as manufacture) arc the important thing. being, and yet works unceasingly at the continuation of the process of scientific­ . technical self-objectification' (Schclsky 1961, as quoted lU Habermas 1976b: 3 See Plemenatz 1975 and Elster 1985 for a distinction between spiritual and . 126). social alienation. 4 Schelsky spoke of a 'new self-estrangement of man which came into the ;'i The history of technology is indeed a very young discipline. See Hughes world with the new scientific civilization. The danger that the creator is losing 1979 for an overview of emerging themes in this discipline. 1 1 0 Technology Technology 111 and, specifically, he was interested in the role of machines and Marx assumed an 'inner logic' of technology, simultaneously machinery for the emergence of capitalism; likewise, he was rejected any technological determinism in his thought. This interested in the technological basis of communist society. In section will focus on the problem. what follows, I shall turn to each of the two topics. When Marx explicates the concept of Stoffwechsel, he remarks: 3. 1 . 1 . Technology as part of the human condition Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the It was Marx's firm conviction that modern industry reveals mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions man's active relationship with nature. To be sure, there has that flow from them. (Capital i. 352) been an original state in which 'the free gifts ·of nature [were] But just as man requires lungs to breathe with, so he requires something abundant' (Grundrisse 6 1 2) and hence there was no need to that is work of man's hand, in order to consume physical forces develop technologies. This state is, according to Marx, a pre­ productively. (Capital i. 365) historical one. But as soon as human beings develop technolog;es they begin to have a history. Thus we are able to reconstruct In historical development all three factors involved in this main characteristics of earlier societies by examining the different Stoffwechsel process are changing: human beings, technology, ways in which production took place. As Marx states: and nature. Marx aims at an identification of a 'driving force', a mechanism which sets the change in motion. My claim is that Relics of bygone instruments of labourpossess the same importance for Marx approaches this problem in two different ways. One way is the investigation of extinct economical forms of society as do fossil to examine history and to draw conclusions. This is essentially bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the an explanatory task. The other way is to evaluate the develop­ articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of ment of the three factors; this is essentially a normative enter­ labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to prise. In order to distinguish these two aspects, I use the terms which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the 'historical' and 'critical'. social conditions under which that labour is carried on. (Capital Taking the historical approach to the problem we can conclude i. 175-6) that Marx conceived in prinCiple all three factors as 'driving force': In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx bases his judgement on the works of Babbage and Ure who analysed technology and, par­ I. nature: geographical determinism;" ticularly, machinery. The definition which he adopts is the 2. technology: autonomous development, inner logic, evolu­ following: tion; 3. human beings: their needs, developing technolOgies, trans­ The machine is a uniting of the instruments of labour, and by no means forming nature ? a combination of different operations for the worker himself . . . Simple tools; accumulation of tools; composite tools; setting in motion of a Thus the circle can be started from all three points " composite tool by a single hand engine, by mani setting in motion of (, We find an instance of geographical determinism in a passage (crossed these instruments by natural forces; machines; system of machines out by Marx) from the German Ideology: 'These conditions [geological, oro· hydrographical, climatic] determine not only the original, spontaneous organisa­ having one motor; system of machines having an automatic motor­ tion of men, especially racial differences, but also the entire further develop­ this is the progress of machinery. ICW vi. 186-7) ment, or lack of development, of men up to the present time' (CWv. 3 1 ). See also Manuscripts 1861-3 where he states that geographical and climatic factors In this definition an interesting evolutionary logic is suggested. determine the differences in the natural tools ('in den naturlich vorgefundenen Are these evolutionary stages of technology to be explained Arbeitsinstrumenten'J which in turn divide the branches of existence of different tribes [d. MEGA lI. iii. J . 266-7). from within their own development or are they determined by 7 Boserup ( 1 9 8 1 ) argues that population and technology stimulate each other outside factors? Rosenberg 1 1 982a: 34), while suggesting that through history. Since the ratio man-land is a decreasing one, human beings 1 1 2 Technology Technology U3 Turning to the critical dimension, Marx's theoretical human­ owners of private property. Never, in any earlier period, have the ism immediately springs to mind. Because the good society productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse of for Marx is a society in which no alien powers exercise any individuals as individuals, because their intercourse itself was still a 'enslaving effects' on the individuals, but, quite the contrary, r�stricted one. lew v. 86-7) in which individuals are fully developed and autonomous, an The only instance which legitimately enjoys autonomy is the autonomy of ( 1 ) or (2) could cause difficulties for his theory. In fully developed individual. True, Marx always acknowledges his view, a society cannot be called free as long as enslaving the eternal condition of mankind to produce and reproduce effects are exercised, no matter whether they come from nature itself within natural limits ('realm of necessity'). Exactly because or technology. If technologies are detrimental to human well­ such limits do exist, so he concludes, the realm of necessity will being, they must not enjoy autonomy in his theoretical frame­ never vanish completely (cf. Capital iii. 820). But he thinks that work With respect to nature Marx in the German Ideology alienation, also in the field of necessity (i.e. transformation of clearly states that a society which lives in an untransformed nature), can be superseded." Here I want to stress that the nature can only be called narrow-minded or ignorant (borniert): German Ideology can be read in exactly the same way. Marx 'Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature and man also conceives of the reappropriation of the productive forces as appears in such a way that the restricted attitude of men to synonymous with the development of individual capacities. nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and Since the productive forces have developed to a totality, their restricted attitude to one another determines men's re­ stricted relation to nature, exactly because nature has not yet this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to been historically modified' (CW v. 44; emphasized part missing the productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these from the English edition, d. MEW iii. 3 1 ). With respect to forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual technology Marx makes clear that labour must reappropriate capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. lew v. 87) the objectified productive forces 'not only to achieve self-activity, but . . . to safeguard their very existence': The discussion in this chapter, and in the following section 3 . 1 .2, concentrates on Marx's discussion of technological evolu­ [TJhe productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite inde­ pendent of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals; tion, which seems a challenging enterprise, for it seems that a the rcason for this is that the individuals, whose forces they arc, exist tension in his theory arises exactly here: a tension between his split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the other hand, historical and critical analysis. As I shall show, this tension these forces are only real forces in the intercourse and association of takes the form of an opposition between a technological evolution these individuals. Thus . , . we have a totality of productive forces, and his humanist claims. As Rottleuthner, in another context, which have, as it were, taken on a material form and arc for the puts it: individuals themselves no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property, and hence of the individuals only in so far as they are The concepts of organism and development arc linked by their ambi­ valent and therefore broad political applicability. Development can develop more productive technologies in order to maintain (or improve) their . easily be linked with dynamism and progress, with directions and goals situation. Note that Marx also sees the possibility that population growth can be a productive force, sec Grundrisse 400, 528-9, 749. of development, which recall the ideals of perfectibility of the 18th il The determining role of nature may be limited to an original state where century. But 'development' was also linked . . with the aspect of production and society start 'from scratch' (see last footnote). For industrially objectivity, a context which was remotc from the deliberatc, goal� developed societies we could thus neglect the point. Ironically, however, it comes in again through the back door, when 'careless' use of technology and natural resOurces has led to a debasement of the natural environment, which in \I This foreshadows my discussion in ch. 5 where I give an interpretation turn affects human well· being and requires measures (often new technologies) of the famous passage from Capital iii which diverges from the standard to improve the situation. interpretation. 1 14 Technology Technology 115 directed action of men. The forces or regularities of development act A hundred years later this question has still not received the inevitably. History cannot be made. (Rottleuthner 1988: 1 10- 1 1 ) attention it deserves. As Rosenberg rightly observes, this passage from Capital, 'amazingly fresh over a century later, reads like a In the present chapter, I limit the analysis to the question prolegomenon to a history of technology that still remains to be whether technology evolves; in the next chapter, I embark on written' IRosenberg 1982a: 40). the question whether technology is autonomous. The reference to Darwin comes out even more clearly in the Manuscripts 1 861-3. Marx explicitly refers to On the Origin of 3.1 .2. Evolution and technological evolution Species where Darwin distinguishes between the lower and The major source in studying this subject is the recently published higher forms of organization of living beings. The criterion for manuscript 2m Kritik der Politischen 6konomie: Manuskript drawing this distinction is the differentiation of organs. Since 1 861-63 lManuscripts 1861-3 for short)1D where Marx presents, Marx gives a summary of the passage in German, let me reproduce over hundreds of pages, major contributions on technology. the English original here. Darwin writes: Already a superficial glance into the table of contents shows the I presume that lowness in this case means that the several parts of the importance which Marx attributed to this subject. In part II, organization have been but little specialised for particular functions; volume iii. I , we find under the heading 'Der relative Mehrwert' and as long as the same part has to perform diversified work, we can excerpts and discussions on co-operation, division of labour, perhaps see why it should remain variable, that is, why natural selection and machinery. In volume iii. 6, Marx returns to the same should have preserved or rejected each little deviation of form less questions. Just to show how closely Marx did study matters of carefully than when the part has to serve for one special purpose alone. technology, I shall draw to a great extent on passages from this In the same way that a knife which has to cut all sorts of things may be work lapart from more common sources) which has only recently of almost any shape; whilst a tool for some particular object had better been published lin German). be of some particular shape. Natural selection, it should never be Marx conceives the development of the productive forces, and forgotten, can act on each part of each being, solely through and for the advantage of each being. (Darwin 1 9 7 1 : 1 4 1 j I l of relations of production, in an evolutionary perspective. He refuses a viewpoint which would treat the individual inventor Marx is inspired directly by Darwin and uses an analogy between as the focus of attention. Indeed, in the beginning of the chapter biology and technology. l 2 He transposes this distinction to on 'Machinery and Modern Industry' in the first volume of technology in thc broad sense lincluding division of labour, Capital, Marx writes: tools, machinery, etc.). A critical history of technology would show how little any of the The differentiation, specialization and Simplification of tools in manu­ inventions of the 18th century are the work of a single individual. facture, which is based on the division of labour-their exclusive Hitherto there is no such book. Darwin has interested us in the history adaptation to very simple operations-is one of the technological, of Natures technologYI Le. in the formations of the organs of the plants material preconditions for the development of machinery as an element and animals! which organs serve as instruments of production for !I It should be mentioned that Darwin rejected the common equation of sustaining life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of evolution with progrcss (Gould 1973: 36). organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve !2 It is most interesting that Darwin intuitively conceived of the develop­ equal attention? ( Capital i. 352 n.) ment of tools and of organs in the same evolutionary way. The Marx/Darwin relation has been a controversial topic. This seems to be due to Marx's ambi­ valent attitude towards Darwin, sec Groh 1981, Avincri 1968, Gerratana 1973, 10 In fact, parts of these manuscripts had been published 1905-10 under the Ball 1979. Marx fiercely rejects the formula 'struggle for life' which is a basic title Theorien iiber den Mehrwert, ed. Karl Kautsky, and 1954-61 by the theme of Malthus. In a letter to Kugelmann, Marx stresses that this formula is a Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU. These mere Phrase which is as void (and false) as Malthus's law of (over-Jpopulation. editions consisted mainly of notebooks v-xv and XX-XXIII; the new edition of See Marx to Kugelmann, 27 June 1870. In a letter to Lassalle, he praises Darwin the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe contains all the notebooks. for haVing destroyed teleology in the natural sciences (see letter of 16 Jan. 1861). 1 1 6 Technology Technology 117 which revolutionizes the mode and relations of production. (MEGA II. are similar in that they do nothing by themselves: technology iii. 6. 1914) needs to be designed and produced, a deck of cards needs to be shuffled. Marx was convinced that the historical development of techno­ There are two main objections to an evolutionary approach logy which is man's organic nature (see s. 3 . 1 . 1 ) cannot be within social theory. The first contends that the natural and the explained by individual behaviour (inventions). Rather, it needs social world are different in that the social world is characterized to be explained by an approach which conceives the development by intentional human action. The second rejects the use of of technology from an observer's standpoint, i.e. as evolution. 13 biological models in the social sciences in a more principled As Weick put it: way. I comment on both objections in turn. What occurs is simply that an obseIVer watches events happen, imposes 1 . It is true that evolution in the biological and evolution in on these happenings some preconception about order, and this pre­ the socio-cultural (including technological) sphere are distinct. conception then allows the observer to watch the changing instances, The most important difference is that the latter does not depend compare them, and see whether there is a progression toward orderliness on the selection of mutations, since the possibility of new in those portions being observed. If there is, evolution has occurred. combinations is given in each generation (d. Luhmann 1984a: (Weick 1979: 1 19) 589). This leads to an enormous acceleration of evolution. As Enzo In the above passage Marx alludes to the mechanism of 'adapta­ Tiezzi wrote in his instructive Tempi storiei, tempi biologici: tion' which makes us ask: does it make sense to suggest sim­ With biological time we measure biological evolution. Its unit of ilarities between the adaptation of a biological species to an measure lies in the order of millions of years: thousands of millions of environment and a technology which adapts to 'very simple years separate us from the origin of the earth, hundreds of millions of operations'? Are we not led astray by Marx's application of years from the appearance of algae, bacteria, trilobites, Arthropoda, Darwin's criteria to technology? Darwin suggests that evolution fish; three million years from the appearance of human beings. However, is a process of natural selection which operates by means of with biological time we also have to measure the future and it is here variation. The 'goal' of evolution, however, is not variation (nor that the rupture of biological balances induces variations on a planetary is it selection or inheritance). These are only the means to level in time-spans so short as to accelerate the geological clock. secure the survival of the species and to reach an increase in Transformations which in former times occurred in millions of years reproductive capacity of the species. 14 This is not to say that the can now occur . . . in some decades and the subsequent variations for human and social balances correspond to an acceleration of millions of suggested similarities are devoid of heuristic value. Weick pointed years of history. (Tiezzi 1984: 62, my translation) out that 'a surprisingly rich introduction to theories of evolution can be obtained with a simple deck of playing cards. If the deck Biological and socio-cultural evolution are thus taking place at is shuffled repeatedly, it is clear that there is continual change as different speeds and different rhythms which may lead to ecolo­ the cards become rearranged, but does the deck evolve? It all gical problems. It may occur that the fast evolution of society depends. Some people are willing to accept any rearrangement does not permit for an adaptation of some biological species of parts as evolution, whereas others would say that some order (either of the K- or r- type). To the extent that social evolution must occur out of chaos before it can be said that evolution is depends on these species, it in turn will be endangered. occurring' (Weick 1979: 1 1 9). Technology and the deck of cards Unlike Elster, and others, I do not see the decisive difference U I A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inven­ between biological and sodal evolution as resting on the iatter tions of the 18th century are the work of a single individual' (Capital i. 352 n.). being characterized by intentional human action. The decisive 14 According to Gould, we may distinguish between two main strategies for difference is that the social realm evolves at a much faster enhancing reproductive capacity: r- and [(-strategies. The former are directly maximizing reproduction, the latter are adapting ('fine-tuning') to the environ­ rate than the biological realm. Also, Terence Ball juxtaposes ment. See Gould 1973: 94. natural and social evolution: 'The opening chapter of his Origin 1 1 8 Technology Technology 1 19 notwithstanding, Darwin fails to see that conscious human selec­ 19th century uses this scheme of thought. So did Hegel, and, of course, tion is, when weighted on the scales of human history, vastly Marx. ILuhmann 1984c: 6 1 ) more significant a factor in evolution than IS natural selectIOn through chance and accident. Because of human attempts to There are various thinkers who have tried to adapt an evolution­ transform nature, "natural history" is fast becoming "human ary model to the social sciences, among them Donald Campbell. history". Human purpose and praxis are replacing chance and He tried to summarize the main mechanisms of evolution in the accident as the motive force of evolution' (Ball 1979: 473). But following way: Ball is doubly mistaken. First he neglects the fact thador Marx For an evolutionary process to take place there need to be variations (as capitalist societies cannot be called human sOCieties smce they by mutation, trial, etc.), stable aspects of the environment differentially still belong to what he called 'natural history' (see 1859 Preface). 's selecting among such variations and a retention-propagation system Second, following directly from the first point, he does not rigidly holding on to the selected variations. The variation and the interpret the decisive difference between natural and social retention aspects are inherently at odds. Every new mutation represents a evolution as in the first place a difference m relative speeds failure of reproduction of a prior selected form. Too high a mutation of evolution, but a difference marked by intentional actIOn rate jeopardizes the preservation of already achieved adaptations. There arise in evolutionary systems, therefore, mechanisms for curbing the which, according to him, replace chance and accident. To repeat: variation rate. The more elaborate the achieved adaptation, the more at least for Marx such a state of affairs could be estabhshed only likely are mutations to be deleterious, and therefore the stronger the in communism (the truly human society), and not in pre­ inhibitions on mutation. For this reason we may expect to find great communist societies. strength in the preservation and propagation systems, which will lead Ball concludes that the 'Marx-Darwin-myth' was completely to a perpetuation of once-adaptive traits long after environmental unfounded. However, there is something which does not fit into shifts have removed their adaptedness. I Campbell 1965: 306-7) Ball's account and which makes understandable a claim hke Several authors have transposed this model to socio-cultural Feuer's, namely that Marxism rests on Darwinian evolution evolution. As Luhmann pointed out, 'Despite all these differences (cited in Ball 1979: 479-80): Marx, while clearly seemg the between organic and socio-cultural evolution . . . the latter is differences between natural and social evolution and 1musmg also evolution in the strict sense, that is, an unplanned arrange­ himself about Darwin's identification of nature with the free­ ment of a highly improbable complexity' (Luhmann 1984a: 590, market categories of capitalism, nevertheless tries to develop my translation). Note that Luhmann defines evolution (both in his own theory of social evolution. In this respect Engels's the biological and in the socio-cultural sense) as leading to an speech at Marx'S graveside (where he called him the Darwm of increase in complexity (see also Ballmer and von Weizsacker the social world) was not without justificatIOn. As Luhmann 1974). This complexity is the result of selections of individual rightly pointed out: ('improbable') variations (mutations) and thus an improbable Darwin's theory of evolution represents a radical break with all earlier event. Evolutionary theory, then, would have the task of ex­ traditions of thinking about development and perfection, of history and plaining how it came about that (both in the natural and social order. It is no longer an intelligent cause, no longer God's design, hut world) highly improbable constellations were selected and sta­ simply a difference that makes the difference. All 'grand theory' of the bilized.16 Habermas also tried out possible uses which can be 15 Karl Karsch ( 1 967) rightly emphasized that the crucial point for Marx was ! (> See also Gould's stress on the importan t role played by increasing com­ the overcoming of the naturwUchsige traits of society. This word can.no� be plexity: 'Either plants or animals. Our basic conception of life's diversity is translated adequately into English with only one ",,:ord. �arx uses it 1� a based upon this division. Yet it represents little more than a prejudice spawned pejorative sense here; it means that people are confrontmg SOCIety as ,som,ethmg by our status as large, terrestrial animals' (Gould 1973: 1 13). Gould then adopts they do not understand or can do nothing about. I shall translate It wlth the the five-kingdom typology of Whittaker 'because it tells a sensible story about English word 'natural'. organic diversity. It arranges life in three levels of increasing complexi ty . 120 Technology Technology 121 made of evolutionary models in the social sciences. Although it Gregory Bateson once remarked that it is a feature of the is very tentative, his article is worth mentioning here. He asks human brain to think with the help of what he called 'abductions'. what sense it makes to transfer such categories as 'variation' This is to say that our perception is guided by specific experiences and 'increase in complexity' to society. As to the latter he and concepts. If we encounter something new, we try to explain rightly comments that 'increase in complexity' is no sufficient It with common or known I'old') categories, models, or theories. criterion for establishing an evolutionary hierarchy if we do not know the inner logic of the organisms IHabermas 1976a: 190). This lateral extension of abstract components of description is called Habermas sees the increasing 'learning potential' of societies abduction . . . Every abduction may be seen as a double or multiple more as the driving force of development. However, as Gould descnptIOn of some object or event or sequence . . . In each case, it is has convincingly pointed out, we can derive these criteria by assumed that certain formal characteristics of one component will be mirrored in the other. IBateson 1979: ch. 5) looking at how organisms succeed in handling the balance between size and shape Isee Gould 1973). By analogy, if we As to the second point, it has been noted by several authors that dissect society in social subsystems, we can formulate the Marx deliberately tried to develop his theory with analogy to the criterion that each subsystem must be able to secure its own natural sciences. Alfred Schmidt has already pointed out that in maintenance, given its level of complexity and its operating Marx we find 'peculiarly biological metaphors' in describing codes. The 'goal', so to speak, of its operations thus lies, similarly man's relationship to nature ISchmidt 1 9 7 1 : 80). Schmidt cites to natural processes, in securing the continuation of its own Moleschott and Liebig who both employed the term Stoffwechsel operations. 1 7 whIch Marx acquired from them. Moleschott wrote that the 2. One might wish to reject the use of biological analogies in soul of the world consists in a circulation of matter (ef. Schmidt a more rigorous way. Indeed, it is common in the social sciences 1 97 1 : 86-7). The German philosopher Schelling also used this to be highly sceptical of models of theories which are imported notion to develop parts of his natural philosophy. Indeed, the from biology. IS Biological analogies and metaphors are to be title of one of his writings is 'Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese found also in Marx.'9 I shall thus make a general remark about der hiiheren Physik zur Erklarung des allgemeinen Organismus' analogies as such and about biological analogies in Marx and my (Schelling 1927) 20 The curious thing with Moleschott and own study. Liebig is that they coin the term Stoffwechsel with analogy to IE]volutionary transition from any level to the next occurs more than oncei the SOCIal concepts: Moleschott makes reference to commerce advantages of increased complexity arc so great that many independent lines Liebig to politics. We have thus to take into account that at leas� converge upon the few possible solutions. The members of each kingdom are some categories in the natural sciences were coined by explicit united by common structure, not by common descent' (Gould 1973: 1 1 7). or ImpliCIt reference to social phenomena. This reciprocal process 17 At the time Habermas wrote his article, Luhmann had not yet taken his has also been noted by Schmidt: 'autopoietic turn'. But Habermas already objected to 'hopeless circles of self­ referential definitions' in Luhmann's and Dunn's efforts in establishing criteria analogous to the survival criterion in biology. Since classical times, and right up to Machiavelli and even Pareto HI Needless to say, I share this scepticism regarding sociobiology and social alteratio?s in the configuration of society have been understood as par� Darwinism. For a critique, see Gould 1973 and Hofstadter 1944. 19 See the afterword to the 2nd edn. of Das Kapital, where Marx cites with ?f a cychcal movement proceeding according to natural laws. We find, Just as early, attempts to interpret the changes and mutual interactions approval a Russian reviewer of his book who pointed out that it was Marx's method to examine the evolution of social and economic forms, 'in a word, of natural objects by means of social categories. ISchmidt 1971 : 92) economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution" in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of As we just have seen, Darwin can also be added to this list· he economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A also tried to make plausible the use of a concept (differentiation) more thorough analysis . . . shows that social organisms differ among them­ 20 It is worth noting that Sc helling'sphilosophy has also been interpreted as a selves as fundamentally as plants or animals' (Capital i. 28). Marx comments . forerunner of the new paradIgms of self-organization self-reproduction and , that this generous review portrays nothing other than his dialectical method. autopoicsis-see Heuser-KeEler 1986: 52. ' 122 Technology Technology 123 by means of an analogy, in this case to the technical world (see In a letter to Engels he explains several attempts to define a his knife example). Furthermore, Darwin also transposed a machine: mechanism from the social world to the natural world, namely Malthus's 'struggle for existence' (see Rottleuthner 1988: 109)­ You may or you may not know) for of itself the thing1s quite immaterial, a procedure which amused Marx. 2 1 Wolf Lepenies has shown that there is considerable controversy as to what distinguishes a machine from a tool " if we take a look at the machine in its that the concept of division of labour went back and forth elementary form, there can be no doubt that the industrial revolution between sociology and biology: 'Spencer spoke of reciprocity originates, not from motive power, but from that part of machinery ( Wechselwirkung) as he showed that biology borrowed the called the WORKING MACHINE by the English, i.e. not from, say, the usc concept of division of labour from sociology in order to return it of water or steam in the place of the foot to move the spinning wheel, in an enriched form. Reciptocity signifies the transfer of a concept but from the transformation of the actual spinning process itself, and from one scientific discipline to another and then back into the the elimination of that part of human labour that was not mere original discipline' ( Lepenies 1976: 1 72, cited in Rottleuthner EXERTION OF POWER (as in treadling a wheel), but was concerned with 1988: 1 0 1 ) . processing, working directly on the material to be processed, (Letter to To come to my own use of such analogies: as will become Engels, 28 Jan. 1863) clear in the following discussion, evolutionary concepts in Marx aims to identify a technological element which is able to social theory indeed borrow much from biology (see Weick produce social change. The point for Marx is not to have a good 1979). There are several authors who believe that central notions definition for its own sake but to have a definition which is able of evolutionary theory can be put to use in the explanation of to capture the advent of the industrial revolution. It is precisely social phenomena and social change. In Chapter 4, I shall test here that the definitions of the Englishmen and the Germans the potential of such an approach in comparison to the standard fail. Marx emphasizes his speCial interest when he admits that Marxist approach (as expressed in the 1859 Preface). 'Itlo those who are merely mathematicians, these questions are of no great moment, but they assume great importance when it S. l.S. Marx's machine definition comes to establishing a connection between human social relations and the development of these material modes of Now look at Marx's definition of what a machine is. He rejects production' (letter to Engels of 28 jan. 1863, my emphasis). several definitions, among them the following: According to Marx, then, the important difference is the existence of a mechanism, which can be found in the models of the clock The explanation that a machine is a complicated tool and a tool a simple and the mill. According to him, 'Itlhe clock was the first auto­ machine explains nothing. The explanation that we have a machine where the tool is not moved by human power and that we have a tool matic device to be used for practical purposes, and from it the where the human being is the prime mover . . . mistakes a dog's cart . . . whole theory of the production of regular motion evolved' for a machine and the mechanical spinning wheel . . . for a tool. It (ibid.). Marx is aware that machines (which conform to this contains nothing which cOl1ld explain historical change. (MEGA II. iii . definition) have been employed for a long time. But with their 6. 1951, my emphasis) use on a broader level a specific dynamics occurs which leads to the industrial revolution: The industrial revolution began as 21 See the letter to Engels of 1 8 June 1 862: 'It is remarkable how Darwin soon as mechanical means were employed in fields where, from recognises among beasts and plants his English society with its division of time immemorial, the final result had called for human labour labour, competition, opening up of new markets, inventions and the Malthusian and not therefore-as in the case of the above-mentioned tools­ "struggle for existence", His [nature I is Hobbes' bellum omnium contra omnes and one is reminded of Hegel's Phenomenology, where civil society is described where the actual material to be processed had never, within as a IIspiritual animal kingdom ", while in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as living memory, been directly connected with the human hand; civil society,' where, by the nature of things and from the outset, man has not 1 2.4 Technology Technology 12.5 functioned purely as POWER ' Iletter to Engels of 2.8 Jan. 1863). Machinery rests upon simple co-operation and division of He thus rejects both the definition of the English technologists labour, but changes them at the same time: 25 who 'call a tool a simple machine and a machine a complicated tool' and the definition of the 'German jackasses, who are great As soon as machinery is employed in a capitalist way . . . it presupposes simple co-operation. This appears in this context . . . as a much more on little matters like this' and call a plough a machine because important moment than it was when manufacture rested on the it is not moved by human power 22 Instead, he agrees with division of labour . . . which repeats itself inside the mechanical atelier, Babbage who defines the maehine in the following way: albeit on a lower scale; and, as we shall see later, the mechanical atelier When each process has been reduced to the use of some simple tool, the overthrows the main principles of manufacture, based on the division union of all these tools, actuated by one moving power, constitutes a of labour. Finally, the use of machinery increases the division of labour machine. In contriving tools and simplifying processes, the operative within society, the multiplication of special trades and autonomous branches. Their basic principle is to be found in the replacement of workmen are, perhaps, most successful; but it requires for other habits skilled labour by simple labour. (MEGA II. iii. 1. 294, my emphasis) to combine into one machine these scattered arts. (Babbage 1971: 1 74)23 Marx distinguishes historically two stages of transition to ma­ Marx comments: 'What we stress here is not only the reduction chine work. The first is the development of machines which "de chaque operation particuliere a l'emploi d'un instrument have their origin in primitive tools and which eventually led to simple" [of each process to the use of some simple tool], but the production of machines by means of machines. what is involved in it, i.e. creation of these "instruments simples" There are two classical examples of machinery which emerge in this on the basis of the division ol labour' IMEGA II . iii. 6. 19 14). It is way: on the one hand spinning and weaving machines which develop not important what the motor is. It may be the human hand and out of the oldest tools . . . On the other hand construction of machinery foot, animal powers, elementary powers, or an automaton Imech­ by means of machinery . . . Historically, the revolution in industry anical powers) Id. MEGA II. iii. 6. 1914). The only important thing starts with the first. It is in the very nature of things that only after the is that virtuosity and skill get transposed from the worker to the production of commodities by machinery has reached a certain size mechanism: 'However, those operations which formerly needed does the need become felt to produce machinery by machinery. the virtuoso who played on the instrument are now produced by (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1915) the transformation of the most simple movements Icaused by In the case of the spinning machine, the worker was reduced to human beings, like turning a handle, treading a wheel) into the merely driving the wheel. The mass of the product was no refined movements of the machine' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7).24 longer in direct proportion to the physical expense of power. 22 In a letter to Engels he admits-to being 'in considerable doubt about the The decisive feature of machinery is that a mechanism performs section in my book that deals with machinery. I have never been quite able to operations which earlier were performed by a virtuoso who sec in what way SELF-ACTORS changed spinning, or rather, since steam power was already in use before then, how it was that the spinner, despite steam power; played an instrument: had to intervene with his motive power' {letter of 24 Jan. 1863). And, in the letter of 28 Jan. of the same year: 'For me, mechanics presents much the s.amc From the moment that direct human participation in production problem as language. I understand the matheinatical laws, but the simplest consisted only in supplying simple power, the principle of work done technical reality that calls for ocular knowledge is more difficult for me than by machinery was given. Thc mechanism had become available whereby most complicated combinations.' For this reason, Marx was attending a practical the human factor could be replaced later by water, steam, etc. (MEGA course for working men in the Institute of Geology (cf. CW xli. 446, 449). II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7) 2J Cf. also The Poverty 0/ Philosophy, CW vi. 186, as cited above. 24 See also the following passage from the Gnmdrisse: 'lIlt is the machinery which possesses skill and strength, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in The second stage is characterized by the employment of the steam the mechanical laws acting through it . . . The workers' activity, reduced to a engine: 'After this first big industrial revolution, the use of the mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of machinery and not the opposite' (Gntndrisse 693). 2;; See s. 3.6 for a discussion of his concept' of 'division of labour'. 126 Technology Technology 127 steam engine as providing the motive power was the second' completely obedient to the despotism of capital. Furthermore, IMEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7). The historical turning-point, however, is capitalist use of machinery lengthens the working day instead expressed in the first stage Itransfer of skill), for the simple of shortening it: 'Once the working day has been forcibly pro­ reason that mankind always had living automata I =animals) longed, it takes ages las in England) for the workers to reduce it which served as a power source. The important difference has to back to its previous level' IMEGA II. iii. 1 . 303). be seen in the instrument. The plough contained no element which could lead to the industrial revolution: all movements of 3. 1 . 4. The machinery question men and animals were essentially those of free will, the move­ The machinery question in early nineteenth�century Britain was the ment was irregular; man had to direct the animals. The mechan­ question of the sources of tcchnical progress and the impact of the ical act was hidden behind the movement of man and animal: introduction of the new technology of the period on the total economy they themselves were not forced into a strict geometry. The and society. The question was central to everyday relations between mill, however, can be regarded as the forerunner of machinery; master and workman but it was also of major theoretical and ideological it is the first 'Arbeitswerkzeug' Isee MEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 19). 'This interest. The very technology at the basis of economy and society was a aspect of machinery has also been developed from the mill, i.e. platform of challenge and struggle. IBerg 1982: 9). that work which was previously separated from grinding in the BaSically, there were two attitudes towards machinery: one strict sense is now done by the same motive power and therefore which welcomed it and saw it as an instance of progress; is mechanically combined with the work of grinding' IMEGA II. another which condemned it, stressing its dehumanizing effects. iii. 6. 1 920-1 ). It is most important to keep in mind the differentia The follOWing quote from John Stuart Mill may serve as an specijica of the machine as defined by Marx. It is the transfer of example of the first attitude: 'The more visible fruits of scientific technical skill from the worker to the instrument. Recall, also, progress . . . the mechanical improvements, the steam engine, Marx's definition from the Grundrisse where he said that the the railroads, carry the feeling of admiration for the modern, and machine is the virtuoso which possesses a soul of its own Isee disrespect for ancient times, even down to the wholly uneducated Grundrisse 529, 693). In Capital, Marx shifts the attention classes' IMill 1 865: 148; see also Marx 1964: ch. 4). The counter­ from the technological to the social level Isee s. 3.5.). position was expressed by writers like Thomas Carlyle or Charles But let us return to the consequences of Marx's machine Dickens. Carlyle's cultural critique comes out clearly when he definition. The effects on the character of the labour performed compares 'the living artisan' with the inanimate one: 'The huge under these conditions are summarized as follows: demon of Mechanism smokes and thunders, panting at his great On the one hand, we have the changed form of labour, its apparent ease task, in all sections of English land; changing his shape like a which transfers all muscular effort to machinery-but also all virtuosity. very Proteus; and, infallibly, at every change of shape, oversetting The lengthening of the working day therefore does not immediately whole multitudes of workmen, as if with the waving of his reach physical limits. On the other hand, the opposition of the worker shadow from afar, hurling them asunder, this way and that, in breaks down since his virtuosity . . . is broken. This impedes the ability their crowded march and curse of work or traffic' ICarlyle 1980: of the worker to resist and it allows capital to replace skilled workers xxiii. 24). with unskilled workers who more readily submit to control. lMEGA II. Marx was caught between these attitudes. He saw both the iii. I. 303) progressive character of machinery and also its debasing effects.26 He tried to combine both positions, pointing to a higher form of This new reality, which is in the first instance a technological one, has tremendous social consequences, and negative ones for 26 The latter are sharply expressed in the early Paris Manuscripts, but also in the workers. Marx says that a new class of workers, i.e. women Capital. The difference is that Capital conceives the debaSing effects as due only and children, is entering the production process, a class which is to the capitalist use of machinery. 128 Technology Technology 129 industrial society where the negative features would have van­ more generally, how the relation between the two has to be ished. Carlyle depicted machinery as a 'huge, dead, immeasurable conceptualized. In a recent debate, Fores denied the scientific steam engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference' (Carlyle 1885';'8, character of technology (modern or otherwise). He maintains that cited in Berg 1982: 12). Marx, in Capital, describes a 'mechanical there is nothing identifiable which could be called technology; monster whose body fills whole factories, and whose demon it is only Technik which is worth talking about. According to power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions of himJ 'it makes no more sense to ask an engineer to be J'scientific" his giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious than to ask a lawyer to "be seamanly" or a sailor to "act like , whirl of his countless working organs' (Capital i. 381-2). good cook" (Fores 1988: 7 1 ). In his view, engineering science is This expresses an anxiety felt by many contemporaries of a 'myth'. However, this view is contrary to a long tradition of Marx and still felt by many people today 27 When Dickens conceptualizing modern technology which I cannot represent complained that in modern society everything was quantified, adequately here for reasons of time and space. Suffice it to say mechanized, calculated as 'so many hundred hands in this mill; that, from Ure, Babbage, and Marx onwards, technology's main so many hundreds horse steampower',28 Marx would stress the characteristic was seen in the growing application of scientific potential for liberating mankind on the basis of this scientific findings. This does not mean that technology has to await some method. In Capital he praises modern industry in the following 'ordered' scientific results, or that technology is 'applied science'; way: rather it means that modern technology as such incorporates skills, knowledge, and experience, and thereby some-at least Modern Industry rent the veil that concealed from men their own social process of production and that turned the various, spontaneously minimal-scientific knowledge .'o However, Fores is right to divided branches of production into so many riddles} not only to insist on the distinction between science and technology. In outsiders, but even to the initiated. The principle which is pursued, of order to pursue this issue further, I now explore Marx's thought resolving each process into its constituent movements, without any on this matter, confronting it with some contemporary analyses. regard to their possible execution by the hand of man, created the new Marx conceives the relationship between science and techno­ modern science of technology_ The varied, apparently unconnected, logy under capitalism in the following way: and petrified forms of the industrial process now resolved themselves into so many conscious and systematic applications of natural science In machinery, the appropriation of living labour by capital achieves a to the attainment of given useful effects. ICapital i. 456-7) direct reality in this respect as well: it is, firstly, the analysis and application of mechanical and chemical laws, ariSing directly out of From this quote at least we may conjecture that Marx ultimately science, which enables the machine to perform the same labour as that gave more emphasi&to the progressive aspect of machinery than previously performed by the worker. IGrundrisse 703-4) to the 'spiritual' consequences 29 This has to do with the eman­ In the follOWing statement in the Manuscripts 1861-3 he exag­ cipatory role he attributed to science, as we shall now see. gerates the influence of science upon technology to some extent 3.1 .5. Science and technology .10 Scheler ( 1 980), in an illuminating study, has claimed that it is logic, It is a commonplace that the main facet of modern technology is mathematics, and the practice of observing and measuring that form the driving the growing influence of science. Little agreement exists on forc;e for technical development (basic to both science and technology is the whether science or technology has a prius over the other, or, Mach£gedani<e, the will to power). Scheler thinks that Technik does not in the first place consist in constructing 'economically efficient' machines, but, follow­ ing its own logic, 'The basic value which guides the new technologies aims at 27 Charles Babbage also expressed such an anxiety-see Berg 1982: 1 1-12. constructing . . . all possible machines. First, this is carried out in thought and as 2H Dickens 1969, as cited in Berg 1982: 13. a plan' (Scheler 1980: 125, my trans.). Only after that are two further selections 29 To be sure, this is also the way in which mainstream Marxism presented made: one by the engineer, the other by the entrepreneur lcf. ibid. 127); see also its answer to the question of 'technical progress'. Rapp 1978: 70. I come back to 'Scheler in s. 3.3. 130 Technology Technology 131 when he says that every scientific discovery serves as a base for a logy i s itself a body of knowledge about certain classes of events new technological invention: and activities. It is not merely the application of knowledge Every discovery becomes a basis for further invention or for new and brought from another sphere . . . It is . . . not a fundamental kind better methods of production. Only the capitalist mode of production of knowledge, but rather a form of knowledge that has generated puts science at the service of the immediate process of production! a certain rate of economic progress for thousands of years' while, on the other hand, the development of production provides the IRosenberg 1982b: 143). means for the theoretical subjugation of nature . . . Capital does not Thus technology may develop on its own, without the guiding create science but exploits it, adapts it to the production process. Hand function of science. Marx was also aware of this when stressing in hand with this goes the separation of science (science applied to the 'eigendynamics' of technology: production) from immediate labour. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2060) Invention then becomes a bUSiness} and the application of science to Marx's very concept of the machine would not work without direct production itself becomes a prospect which determines and the role of science. As he propounded at length in Capital, it was solicits it. But this is not the road along which machinery, by and large, only with the emergence of machinery that science could be arose, and even less the road on which it progresses in detail. The road applied to the production process in an unprecedented way. is rather dissection IAnalyseJ-through the division of labour, which Rosenberg observed: 'By breaking down the productive process gradually transforms the workers' operations into morc and more into objectively identifiable component parts, it creates a struc­ mechanical ones, so that at a certain point a mechanism can step into ture of activities which is really amenable for rigorous analysis' their places. IGrundr;sse 704, my emphasis)3 l IRosenberg 1976b: 133). Marx himself put it this way: It is doubtful if Marx would have agreed with attributing the The principle, carried out in the factory system, of analysing the following characteristics to a communist society: process of production into its constituent parts, and of solving the ITJhe normal situation in the past and to a considerable degree also in problems thus proposed by the application of mechanics, of chemistry, the present, is that technological knowledge has preceded scientific and of the whole range of the natural sciences, becomes the determin­ knowledge . . . Thus, it is to be expected that feasible technological ing principle everywhere. (Capital i. 434) knowledge is likely to be attained before the deeper level of scientific understanding. At least this is so if sufficiently powerful economic This is a quite recent phenomenon. To be sure, science and incentives are at work. IRosenberg 1982b: 144) capital have existed for centuries without giving rise to the above-described process of analYSing the production process and Perrow, analysing high-risk systems, points out that poorly applying scientific knowledge to it. 'It is only at a very recent designed or poorly understood technological systems are likely point in history, Marx argues, that the marriage of science and to lead to accidents: industry occurs. Moreover, this marriage does not coincide with Transformation processes exist in recombinant DNA teclmology, chem­ the historical emergence of capitalism' IRosenberg 1976a: 130). ical plants, nuclear power production, nuclear weapons, and some In modern industry, technology is for the first time not designed aspects of space missions. Most of these are quite new, but it is in accordance with the physical endowments of the workers 'but in accordance with a completely different logic, a logic .�J See Hegel: 'In a case where factory work has been made so perfect and which explicitly incorporates principles of science and engin­ simple, a machine can work instead of a human being and this is the normal transition which now takes place inside the factories' (Hegel 1983b: 127, my eering' libid. 132). trans.). Avineri comments: 'We thus have herel in one of the most speculative But the mere growth of science is not a sufficient condition for documents of German idealist philosophy, one of the most acute insights into the growth of productivity. Neither is it justified to think of the working of modern, industrial society: from a priori philosophical anthro­ pologYI Hegel moves on to incorporate the results of political economy into a technology as application of scientific knowledge. As Rosenberg philosophical system-an attempt almost identical in its systematic structure put it, 'this perspective obscures a very elemental point: techno- with Marx's program forty years later' (Avineri 1972: 94). 132 Technology Technology 133 significant that chemical processing is not. While experience has passage from the German Ideology (fishing and hunting); but in helped reduce accidents, accidents continue to plague transformation the same text, Marx also says that the highly developed productive processes that are fifty years old . These are processes that can be forces of capitalism will be appropriated by the producers, described but not really understood. They were often discovered through which is the very precondition for the full development of the trial and errOI, and what passes for understanding is really only a individuals (d. CWv 86-7 as cited in s. 3 . 1 . 1 ) . It is important to . description of something that works. IPerrow 1984: 85) note that Marx's basic idea remains the same in this respect, Marx, on the other hand, doubtless assumed an ever more what varies is only the stress he gives to different factors. For explanatory and projective force of science when he wrote: example, in the 'Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper' ( 1 856), he invokes new-fangled men who would masterthe new­ But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real fangled machinery; in the Grundrisse he envisages a fully auto­ wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of mated production process with man as mere guardian (see the labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during passage cited below); in Capital he stresses that there will be labour time, whose 'powerful effectiveness' , . . depends rather on the varied work also under communism, which makes necessary an general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the all-round development of individuals. But the basic idea of the application of this science to production . . . Agriculture, e.g., becomes merely the application of the science of material metabolism, its rural model reappears: it is the explicit claim that any fixation of regulation for the greatest advantage of the entire body of society. persons to one exclusive task has to be avoided; the all-round IGnmdrisse 704-5) development of human capacities and needs is Marx's goal. Regarding the possibilities for the realization of that goal, Marx's Equally optimistic was his trust in technological possibilities: argument is quite optimistic; according to him, it is based on 'Mirabeau's "Impossible I Ne me dites jamais ce hete de mot!" is real relations which exist in modern industry. Therefore, fully particularly applicable to modern technology' (Capital i. 448). developed individuality is both the aim of communism and He speaks of an ever-increasing productivity of labour together necessitated by capitalist technology. The rural idyll is replaced 'with the uninterrupted advance of science and technology' by a model where indiViduals, as it were, switch from one (Capital i. 567). At this point in his theory, Marx seems to activity to another, but they do this on the basis of a scientific enlarge his theoretical scheme according to which man trans­ and artistic education (which will also generate new needs in forms nature with the help of technology. Now the role of them). This model is no Utopia but, according to Marx, inevitable, science becomes crucial. since modern technology requires it. A functional requirement Here an intriguing question arises: how can we reconcile of modern societies, therefore, leads to the birth of communist Marx's statement that technology develops relatively autonom­ man, which is quite an extraordinary claim. ously, i.e. independently of science, on the one hand, with his To turn to the scientific dimension, it should be said that statement, on the other hand, that science will to an ever Marx analyses technology mainly in its historical development, greater extent determine the course of technology? including its rapid growth under capitalism. He describes this Marx's theory offers two possibilities for such a synthesis. process as an evolutionary process. But it is one thing to state First, we can again apply the distinction between a historical with hindsight a blind evolutionary process, another to state it and a critical approach, which in Marx's case is represented in for the future. And here, I suppose, not only could Marx not the difference between an analysis which is 'backward-looking' allow for such a possibility, no humanist position could. This is and one which is 'forward-looking'. The second possibility is why Marx distinguished sharply between pre-history and history contained in his claim that human labour will be able to reappro­ proper (d. 1859 Preface): the first is governed by blind evolution priate all sorts of objectifications, including modem technology. It whereas the second is controlled and planned by human purposes. is true that a rural idyll is the reference point in the famous And this is the place where science becomes most important for 134 Technology Technology 135 Marx. Science provides the means for a planned technology, for electrical industries indicate that there is also a reverse tendency a planned Stoffwechsel between man and nature; and, what is to observe: parts or components of technical systems are designed more, science for Marx was not only a desideratum, but a real, so as to fulfil more than one function (d. Perrow 1984). unfolding I'before our eyes') force. Under the regime of science, To return to the problem of science and technology in Marx. the gap between explanation and evaluation, between blind Above, I suggested that we can reconcile the autonomous devel­ evolution and conscious human control, between pre-history opment of technology and the increasing influence of science in and history could be bridged .'2 For Marx it is an empirical fact Marx's model with the distinction between historical and critical that modern industry Icapitalism) already leads mankind to the analysis. But apart from the exegetical task, we are still left with threshold of history proper. Look at his bold outline in the the crucial question: how do we distinguish science from tech­ Grundrisse where he sketches some breathtaking scenarios for nology and what does their relation look like? a technologically advanced, communist society: Rosenberg holds that science and technology are essentially two different things which have things in common, but are, in Labour nO longer appears so much to be included within the production the first place, distinct from each other. The difference lies in process; rather the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself . . . No longer does the worker the specific character of knowledge which is employed. In the insert a modified natural thing INaturgegenstandj as middle link case of science we have rules, laws, and procedures which can be between the object and himself; rather he inserts the process of nature/ written down and discussed by the academic profession. In the transformed into an industrial process} as a means between himself and case of technology, the knowledge which is sometimes employed inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the production cannot be explained; technical solutions are found which demand process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is scientific explanation. From this it follows that technology neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor thc time cannot simply be conceived as applied science. According to during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general Rosenberg, the main bulk of inventions and technical-practical productive power, his understanding of nature, and his mastery over it solutions were found long before a scientific explanation could by virtue of his presence as a social body-it is, in a word, the develop� account for them. 'It is still far from unusual for engineers in ment of the social individual which appe.rs as thc great faundatian­ many industries to develop a successful solution to a problem stone of production and of wealth. (Grundrisse 705 J for which there is no scientific explanation and for the engineering Marx's optimism with regard to the transparence of technological solution to generate the subsequent scientific research that processes must be subjected to critical examination. It seems eventually provides the explanation' (Rosenberg 1982b: 144; that it does not concord with the reality of modern technology, see also Marx: science depends on the development of trade and Perrow emphasized four dimensions of technological systems: industry, d. CW v. 40).33 linear/complex and loose/tight coupled. The point is that Marx Price, in a similar vein, says that 'the naive picture of techno­ excludes the complex dimension from his analysis when stressing logy as applied science simply will not fit all the facts. Inventions that the production process gets 'dissected' into its component do not hang like fruits on a scientific tree' (Price 1982: 169). parts.· This suggests that every instrument in the production process serves only one purpose: the production process takes ,B Heidegger made the same point when he wrote: 'It is said that modern place step by step. However, examples from the chemical and technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science. Meanwhile we have .'S2 This general outline seems still to apply to present-day problems of come to understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as well: modern industrial accidents. As Perrow has pointed out, it is due to the poor scientific phYSiCS, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon understanding of existing technological systems that their working is some­ progress in the bUilding of apparatus' (Heideggcr 1978: 295-6). One strand in the times dangerous. This view can be contrasted with the standard explanation sociology of science takes up exactly this point in stressing the hermeneutic which assumes perfect functioning of technology and simply blames the oper­ character of the natural sciences, see Bloor 1976; Barnes 1977; Mulkay 1979; ators in case of an accident. Knorr-Cetina 1985. For a criticism, see Archer 1987.  r , r 136 Technology Technology 137 Instead, so he argues, 'most technological advances derive im­ science and technology will be able to use each other's ambient mediately from those that precede them . . . old technology r knowledge. It seems too that this will generally be the ambient breeds new in just the same way as the scientific process' (Price 1982: 1 70). Such a characterization would presuppose that tech­ t knowledge that is on the average about one generation of students old-perhaps ten years' (ibid.) ."5 nology, like science, could be conceived as a social system (for further discussion see s. 3.3). Price bypasses this difficulty in assuming that old technology breeds new, just as old knowledge Il How hard it is for science and technology to communicate has been convincingly stated by Price in the following way: In any case, what communication difficulty there is seems due to the r breeds new,34 and in endorsing an actor model in explaining the transfer of knowledge from science to technology. He sees the fact that though the scientists want to write and the technologists want to read, the scientists arc writing for their colleagues in science, or relationship between the two as an 'interaction' (which takes sometimes for their imaginary archive; they are simply not writing the I place between persons) since we know of many cases in which sort of material that the technologists want to read. This frustrates the science has passed into technology and technology has made technologists and makes them believe that somewhere in this pile of possible new science (ef. ibid. 1 7 1 ). But the prius is science since material, if only they could find it, there is the very valuable material he notes a time-lag between scientific and technological advance. they are looking for to make new products. (ibid. 173)3(> Price takes an image from Toynbee in order to illustrate the f t relation between the two. The image is of two dancers, dancing In summary, then, there seem to exist few if any channels of to the same music: it is 'impossible to tell who is leading, and I communication between science and technology.3? Rosenberg is aware of this, stressing the distinct character and development i who following' (ibid. 1 70). But, 'IrJather than supposing that an outsideforce affects both of the two. To stick to the picture, the dancers are still dancing together, but to different kinds of music. He emphasizes the I dancers, it seems more reasonable to think that their action · central role which technology has always played in the history upon each other keeps them in step' (i bid. 1 7 1 ). Since the influence is reciprocal, we must assume a complete interaction of mankind, thus clearly referring to Marx's concept of Stoff­ (ibid.). However, there is a time-lag between scientific and wechsel (ef. Rosenberg 1982a: 41). He concludes that technology as such can proceed without the guidance or assistance of technological advance which 'would seem to indicate that the dancers hold each other at arm's length instead of dancing cheek I science. 'Indeed, if the human race had been confined to tech­ to cheek. To use the more precise language of the physicist, the relation between science and technology seems to be a weak 1 i nologies that were understood in a scientific sense, it would have passed from the scene long ago' ( Rosenberg 1982b: 143).38 rather than a strong interaction' (ibid. ). ! Technology sets the agenda for scientific research, provides the To explain the interaction, Price employs an actor model and K empirical data without which the latter cannot start. Rosenberg stresses the important role of socialization of the respective actors (i.e. scientists and engineers): 'ITJhe medium of transmis­ 1 straightforwardly reverses the common view that science is prior to technology: it is technology which 'influences scientific sion is the person and the method is the fact of the formal or , 35 Note that this explanation does not depend on an actor model; the same I informal education' (ibid.). By this mechanism, Price explains could be said for a systems approach: each system uses information from its environment, i.c. from other systems too. the time-lag between the two disciplines: it is simply that both 36 Marx provides an example from hydraulics in the 18th century: 'Hydraulics I scientists and technologists, during their education, are subjected and hydrotechnology have been enriched by the many discoveries of the 1 8th to some training in the ambient state of the respective other century with beneficial consequences for the miller's art which, however, followed theoretical progress only slowly (especially in Germany) . . . The theory discipline. 'It follows then that men on the research fronts of of water wheels was difficult, therefore it was denigrated as an empty theory, the builders of the mills hardly considered it' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1924). 34 Cf. also: 'One can, I suppose, create technology to order, just by wishing it. 37 See Stichweh 1987: 473, for another example. I I But ordinarily one is severely constrained by the old technology's having or not .38 Cf. also his statement that science and technology represent two different having the capacity to breed a particular desired thing' (:price 1982: 170). forms of knowledge. See Rosenberg 1982a: 143, as cited above. I I J 138 Technology Technology 139 activity in numerous and pervasive ways' IRosenberg 1982b: 142). industry Isee s.3.3 for other interrelations). To be sure, technology In tills conception, technology provides empirical data for science is not 'applied science', but it is true that some scientific just as nature does. To be sure, both science and technology have findings get embodied in technical apparatus. to do with man's Stoffwechsel with nature; whereas technology is practical-empirical transformation of physical objects, I shall 3.1.6. Wha t is wrong with machinery! define science as one form of social communication about this process.39 Science uses the empirical data provided by nature Machinery represents a form of constant capital and therefore a and technology as information on which it builds its own social relation but it also represents an embodiment of human system Isee s. 3.3. for further elaboration). control over nature, that is, it is also a material means to provide How can we relate Marx's findings about modern industry to society with the possibility of transforming nature. The well­ this distinction? Marx emphasizes the important role of science known part of Marx's theory, and the one which became histor­ in the modern capitalist production process. Machinery is for ically relevant, has it that technology as such is a neutral means him the bodily expression of the abstract principles of science. by the help of which mankind progresses towards communism. This is not to say, however, that machinery is the mere applica­ The specific social form of technology in capitalism li.e. as fixed tion of scientific knowledge nor to say that science comes before capital) is the barrier to a full liberation of technology'S potential. technology. What Marx stresses is the fact that in modern It is the peel which has to be stripped off by proletarian revolution. industry scientific know ledge could be applied for the first time This model is defective for all the reasons we know today and in a systematic way and on a large level, and that modern Marx would no longer deserve any attention if he had no more to industry gave rise to the expansion and importance of scientific offer. In effect, he has more to offer, and this leads us to some research. Yet, what is more, Marx's stress on the important role very interesting ambiguities in his theoretical framework. played by science is crucial for his communist perspective. In this section I briefly point out that the distinction between Recall the distinction of naturej and nature2 from Chapter 2. It technology as social form and technology as material artefact is only under the condition of transforming naturej into nature2 was known by Marx and that he, in the years when he was and understanding this transformation that mankind liberates preparing Das Kapital for publication, was not clear how to treat itself from alien powers. We must thus regard Marx's position as it. In the writings from these years we witness how he analyses a position which privileges the scientific over the technological machine technology not only in terms of social form but also in dimension, for only a second nature which is understood provides terms of material artefact. He discovers that: the basis for communist society. It is quite obvious that techno­ 1 . machinery not ony dispossesses the worker of the surplus­ logies which are just technical installations and happen to work value produced by him but also deprives him of his skill cannot provide the technological basis for communist society. and virtuosity. They cannot provide this baSiS, especially under modern con­ This is a worrying discovery for an author who also holds the ditions where technologies may affect large parts of the globe following two important views: and its populations in a detrimental way over a long period of time. 2. an ideal of human self-realization which calls for the full In summary, then, we might say that science and technology development of man's species powers; and are different fields of human activity which are quite distinct as 3 . an evolutionary view of historical and technological devel­ regards their basic characteristics. But they also influence each opment, with the important claim that every existing form other, constituting a relationship which is vital for modern emerges out of a pre-existing form by way of differentiation. .1',' Also Marx in the Gnmdrisse distinguishes a material and a mental dimen­ If we take these two views together with the discovery that sion of the Stoffwechsel, see Grundrisse 1 6 1 . machine technology is deskilling and dehumanizing, Marx is  140 Technology Technology 141 left with the uncomfortable result that machinery as such is societies can direct technological development. If they could do alienating. The project of communism must then rely upon the so, they would come closer to the ideal of communist society, contingent occurrence of a new, liberating technology. Since namely being able to control their fate consciously. The political this standpoint was clearly unacceptable to Marx, he took focus thus switches from the objective of proletarian revolution another way out of the dilemma. He put all guilt on the capitalist to the problems of 'intersystemic planning' Isee s.4.2 for further social form and not on the material substratum of machinery. development and literature) . . Therefore, I la) only capitalist machinery is alienating and depriving 3. 1 . 7. Progress? workers. One could distinguish several criteria for measuring progress. This solution does not come as a surprise from an author who, There are economic criteria, regarding productivity or per capita writing in the nineteenth century, saw all evils of society rooted income. Productivity is usually defined as the relation between in capitalism. The political aim was the overthrow of the costs and benefits, between investments and pay-offs. Higher bourgeoiSie, an event which should pave the way to a socicty productivity thus means to achieve the same output with less without domination, exploitation, and alienation. Experience investment, or, which is the same, to achieve more output with of both 'real socialism' and global ecological problems tells us that the same amount of investment.4o Another criterion would be Marx's solution to the dilemma is defective. The re-evaluation one which is purely immanent to technology and which judges of this question can lead to quite dramatic consequences, not technological features like reliability, speed, longevity, energy only for true Marxist believers but also for anyone whose input, etc. Still another criterion would be spiritual in that it interest is linked to human emancipation. Roughly speaking, asks if people are freer or happier in comparison to former states the consequences would amount to the following: in history. The latter two criteria seem to cause difficulties. For how can 4. Given that technology has the traits described by Marx, we distinguish different levels or stages of evolution in the alienation has to be considered part of the modern human technological or ethical realm? And, more penetratingly, is condition. Emancipation depends on the incidental emer­ progress involved in this development? With Weick we could gence of new, liberating technologies; say again: all depends on which criteria we want to use. There 5. Given that technology not only cripples and deprives the are no absolute standards regarding technical criteria: they are all workers but also degrades the natural environment, ecolo­ dependent on a social-cultural-economic context. A technology gical problems do not follow from the capitalist use but which comes later in time need not be 'superior' to a previous from the inner logic of technology as such. technology Isee Rammert 1988). Contemporary theorists either drop premiss 12) and claim that Let us, therefore, look for a moment at spiritual criteria in mankind has to survive and forget about Enlightenment ideals, judging progress. In a very stimulating book on Goethe'S Faust, or they proclaim 15) and conclude that industrial production Binswanger 11985) pointed out that along with modern economic has to be abolished where possible. However, these solutions growth, mankind witnessed two major losses: beauty and Itech­ have as littlc foundation as Marx's own. Therefore, let us nical and economic) security.4l If we now contrast the purely explore the possibility of consistently holding together views 1 1 ), 12), 13), avoiding conclusions I l a), 14), and 15). This solution 40 Marx is not precise when he writes that 'the growth of the productive would be easy if one could point to real existing technologies forces of labour means merely that less direct labour is required in order to make a larger product' {Grundrisse 831, see also MEGA II. iii. 6. 2 1 44, as cited below}, which promote human self-realization and do not disrupt the since it is sufficient that the same product is produced with less labour. environment. Since this is hardly the usual case, in general the 4 1 Binswanger distinguishes the latter again into 'risk' and 'worry' (Sorge), see solution depends upon the possibility that modern complex Binswanger 1985: 65-70. 142 Technology Technology 143 economic and technical criteria with the spiritual criteria, we committed to any notion of progress whereas Marxist social can conclude that the overall development need not establish an theory definitely is. However, Marx did present his normative unequivocal progress. Marx's criteria, in fact, were not only assumptions. In the Manuscripts 1861 �3, Marx takes sides economic and te.chnical, but also spirituaL42 For Marx, real with Ricardo against Sismondi, defending the former's appraisal wealth is not only, or primarily, expressed in value or material of 'production for the sake of production': goods, but in total individuals. Neither does Marx neglect the Ricardo conceives, rightly for his time, of the capitalist mode of physical aspect of material production. Again, unlike the eco­ production as the most advantageous for the production of wealth. He nomists, he does take into account qualitative criteria (as when wants production for the sake of production and this is right. Were one he praises the ancient world for caring most about the quality of to claim} as sentimental opponents of Ricardo havc done} that production the products), he does stress the need to transform nature with as such is not the purpose, one forgets that production for the sake of respect to the well-being of individuals. Both points make clear production means nothing morc than development of human productive that the charge against standard economics of neglecting the capacities} i.e. development of the wealth of human nature as an end in natural environment cannot be made against Marx. itself. (MEGA II. iii. 3. 768) It is common in interpretation to neglect the latter element in Marx praises Ricardo's scientific honesty; nevertheless, Marx Marx. Thus, the following critique by Luhmann is misconceived. distinguishes himself also in this respeet from Ricardo. Consider He 'charges Marx (and Durkheim) with employing an 'evolu­ the following quote from the same page of the MEGA: tionist' position, since they used the notion of 'division of labour': 'This theoretical approach [division of labour] makes a Ricardo's disregard was not only scientifically honest but a scientific conception of historical progress (including Marx and Durkheim) imperative for his viewpoint. For this reason he is completely indifferent inevitable' (Luhmann 1984b: 320, my translation). Ironically, to the question of whether the development of the productive forces Luhmann's charge backfires: with the same legitimation we kills landed property or workers. If this progress depreciates capital of could charge him with being committed to a strong notion of the industrial bourgeoisie} he also welcomes it . . . Who cares} says Ricardo: The productivity of human labour has been doubled. (MEGA progress because he employs the concepts of 'functional differ­ 4 II. iii. 3. 768) 3 entiation' and 'increase in complexity'. Similarly, one could charge him with claiming that the more complexity we have in But Marx does not say 'who cares?' when workers are crushed in society, the more progress exists. As Luhmann himself says, the factories. Rather, his analyses were 'fired by outrage and evolutionary processes are developments which display some indignation and the burning desire for a better world' (Lukes succession of order to an observer. This means that it is the 1985: 3). Neither does Marx content himself with an increase in observer's criteria of order which are crucial here. The evaluation material wealth since this wealth assumes antagonistic forms of this process is equally observer-dependent. If, for example, an vis-a-vis the producers. Material wealth here leads to a domina­ observer labels an evolutionary process as 'progress', he has to tion of things over persons, since the creation of use-values in show the criteria for doing so. Darwinian theory is not usually capitalism is achieved at the expense of the individuals. Special­ ization and dehumanization are the main means of achieving it 42 Cohen, for example, stresses only the economic criteria when he writes: (cf. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2164-51. 'The United States can produce, much more abundantly per head, everything the medievals could produce, and more besides, with the exception of certain products perhaps wholly beyond its reach, such as, say, stained glass of the kind found all Notre Dame Cathedral . . . The concept of need is not easy to handle, but it would be hard to maintain that the unavailability of JUSt that kind of stained glass generates an overwhelming frustration' (Cohen 1978: 60). But these are issues at stake when we discuss the ,question of progress-in this case, 4 " But d. Marx's judgement of Malthus on the preceeding page, MEGA I I . iii. a loss of beauty. 3. 767. 144 Technology Technology 145 development and selection of technologies. This 'evolutionary' 3.2. Evolutionary approaches to technology in economic theory approach to technology has been a very influential one in the recent debate among economists, economic historians, and also A recent strand in cconomic theory, cspecially Neo-Schum­ among sociologists. peterian economics, conceives technology in an evolutionary The approach contains, however, several points which proved way. In the following section, I shall therefore discuss an evolu­ to be problematic for scholars working on the basis of it. They tionary approach to technology and, only after that, several focused mainly on the question whether technology has 'inner objections to it. The criticisms can be divided into three main logic' or 'trajectory'. This set of questions is closely related to strands. The first criticism sees the danger of technological the methodological question of Darwinian evolutionary theory. determinism when endorsing an evolutionary approach to tech­ Dosi, building upon the evolutionary approach of Nelson et nology. The second criticism doubts whether the analogy to al., made the explicit analogy to Darwinian theory. Although he Darwinism is legitimate or even feasible. The third criticism does not develop a full analogy to Darwinian theory, we can doubts whether the distinction between systcm and environ­ conclude that Dosi equates speCific technologies with 'species', ment can be made and asks how the system itself has to be and the environment with economy and society (see Dosi 1984: conceptualized. The remainder of this section, and sections 3.3 20). Now, Dosi holds that the environment does not only select and 3.4, deal with these problems. among mutations, but is also selecting the direction of mutations. (Tlhe economic and social environment affects technological develop­ 3.2. 1 . The behavioural theory of the firm ment in two ways, first selecting the 'direction of mutation' (i.e. selecting the technological paradigm) and then selecting among muta­ Criticizing neo-c1assical economics, Nelson et al. claimed that tions, in a more Darwinian fashion (i.e. the ex-post selection among existing technologies were not chosen because they were indic­ Schumpeterian trials and errors). libid.) ated by markct signals or followed from the rational decision of a firm in order to maximize its profits. On the contrary, so they But what exactly does the environment constitute? Dosi stresses argued, the technology of a firm is the outcome of a routine; three factors: the economy, politics, and institutions. Since firms do not choose technologies, but have them. In their there are many possible technologies which could be chosen, words: it is 'hardly possible to compare and rank them ex ante' (ibid. 18). This is witnessed by the 'role often played in the establishment Our principal break with neoclassical tradition lies in our 'behavioral' of a particular technological trajectory by public ("political") treatment of the question: why is the firm at any time using the forces' libid.). As examples, Dosi mentions the military and technique it is using? A neoclassical answer would be that the firm has space programmes in the US and the synthetic chemistry in chosen its technique on the basis of profitability calculations comparing the elements of a large choice set (production function). A behavioralist's Germany which emerged in the post-Bismarck period out of answer, and the one employed in our model, is of a very different form. that country's drive towards self-sufficiency 44 'Bridging insti­ The production technique used by a firm at any time is regarded as a tutions' between 'pure' science and applied R & D are also of complex pattern of routinized behavior, of which the input-output great importance here. But these three environmental factors do coefficients arc a quantifiable aspect. The firm is not seen, at any time, 'choosing' its technique from a large choice set, but rather as 'having' 44 Cf. Dosi 1984: 18. Comparing the role of poliCies with respect to auto­ its technique. (Nelson et a!. 1976: 94) motive and aircraft technology, another author states: 'In one important respect the development of commercial aircraft and aircraft engines was different from The point Nelson et 01. are making here is that they reject the the development of automotive technology. In the case of the automobile the government played no significant role. But government support for the develop­ idea that technologies are simply chosen because of their profit­ ment of military aircraft and aircraft engines generated technology applicable to ability. Rather, firms are developing rules and meta-rules for the commercial aircraft' (Klein 1977: 109).  146 Technology Technology 147 not shape a technological trajectory: technology is still under­ compare different technological trajectories? In this case, the determined. As Dosi observes, 'competition does not only occur answer seems not very clear at all; not even evolutionary theory between the "new" technology and the "old" ones which it tends has a ready-made solution to it:" As we shall see, Marx distin­ to substitute, but also among alternative "new" technological guishes in a more general manner between different I'epochal') approaches' IDosi 1984: 1 9 ). As I shall propose later, the envir­ technologies I'technological trajectories'). According to him, onmental factors economy, politics, and science can be viewed there are three big historical forms: ( 1 ) artisan, 12) manufacture, . as systems themselves. Technology in this conception is seen as and 13) machines. Each one stands for a specific historical epoch, an emergent phenomenon which arises out of the interacting of it is the material base for every social organization Id. Capital i. these three systems. Dosi comes close to a similar statement 352 n.). For Marx, the transition from I I ) to (2) and from (2) to 13) when he writes that the 'emergence of radically new techno­ was paralleled by an increase in productivity, and, to a certain logical paradigms . . . stems from the complex interplay . . . degree, by 'progress'. His notion of progress, however, is neither between advances in science, institutional factors and economic purely economic nor purely technological; it also contains an mechanisms' libid. 292). These remarks, however, indicate that ethical eomponent.47 technology cannot be shown to have a real autonomy, to be a real unity which evolves. Rather, it has to be conceptualized as having an apparent autonomy but essentially dependent on social factors. 3.3. Technology as a social system? Dosi uses not only the analogy to biology in explaining technological trajectories but also an analogy to the philosophy of science, especially to Kuhn's concept of 'paradigms'. This was At this point it may be useful to state again my own position already hinted at with Nelson et a1. 's approach when they alluded with respect to technology. In my view, technology is a social­ to Kuhn's aper9u 'You can't beat something with nothing', material entity which can be conceived in an evolutionary which means that a new scientific paradigm must be able to manner. However, it should not be conceptualized as a social replace the old one: it is not sufficient to prove the flaws of an system. Consider, first, two important distinctions which we established paradigm, if there is no conception which could take encountered above. One is the distinction between science its place. Dosi applies this line of thought to technology itself. and technology, the other is the distinction between system and environment. I shall claim that science:" but not tech­ In broad analogy with the Kuhnian definition of a 'scientific paradigm', nology, can be conceived as a social system. The difference we shall define a 'technological paradigm' as a 'model l and a 'pattern' of can be described as follows: the first is a homogeneous, well­ solution of selected technological problems, based on selected principlcs defined field in which actions or communications are the basic derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies . . . units and in which meaning is transmitted; the second is a We will define a technological trajectory as the pattern of 'normal' problem-solving activity li.e. of 'progress') on the grounds of a techno­ logical paradigm. libid. 14-15) progress in the short run or on the micro-level; from an observer's viewpoint, and/or from the historian's viewpoint, this need not be true. Moreover, it is not Dosi offers us a criterion of progress which is immanent to said that this 'progress' is a linear, directional process. It could also be a development on a circular, or any other, line. ct. Rimbaud ( 1 970: 12): 'Science, technology itself: problem-solving activities arise within a given the new nobility! Progress. The world walks on! Why doesn't it turn around?' technological paradigm and around 'focusing devices'. If they {my tr�ns.). , succeed, this could be an instance of 'progress 45 But what if we 46 See again Darwin's refusal to equate evolution with progress, Gould 1973: 36. 45 However, the difference between progress and problem-solving activities 47 Cf. Marx's judgement of Ricardo, above. Sec ch. 4 for further discussion. should be kept in mind. If problem-solving activities succeed, there may be 41> And not only science, as we shall see later. J 48 Technology Technology 149 heterogeneous field which has to do primarily with the physical words of Price, science produces papers, technology machines, reordering of the world 49 drugs, products of any sort (see Price 1982: 1 70). Renate Mayntz emphasized the difference between social Consider now the distinction between system and environ­ systems and socio-technical systems. According to her, techno­ ment. Technology stands in a close relationship not only to logical systems cannot be analysed as functional subsystems of science, but also to economy and politics Sl Technology should society because the components of technological systems are be seen as part of the material world which has already been trans­ not (only) social.so Instead, goes her claim, in analysing socio­ formed by social labour into tools, instruments, machines s2 technical systems, one should leave the ground of the theory of Technology contains a material and a social element, matter social differentiation and conceive technological systems (such and mind. In Marx's formulation: 'Nature builds no machines, as large infrastructural technologies) as socio-technical systems no locomotives, railways, electrie telegraphs, self-acting mules (Mayntz 1988: 236). This approach rightly proposes that techno­ etc. These are products of human industry; natural material logy cannot be conceived as a social system. However, the transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of conclusion which is drawn does not accommodate the abstract human participation in nature. They are organs of the human level on which my discussion is here located. Mayntz aims at a brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, theoretical framework which illuminates empirical studies of objectified' (Grundrisse 706). specific technological infrastructure systems; my analysis tries Scheler stressed that in modern societies science and economy to investigate relations between technological and social factors are both autonomous social spheres: capitalist economy is per se. driven towards limitless 'process of acquisition versus gaining Several authors have emphasized the similarities between and keeping of property' (Scheler 1980: 129; my translation). like­ science and technology. One similarity is that both employ a wise, science is expanding in a similar unlimited way: 'Modern method of decomposing (analysing) and recombining (see Price science neither administrates a given and stable asset of truth nor 1982). While this is obViously true, there is also a big difference. researches only to solve specifically defined tasks, but it is Consider the cases of a scientist and an engineer. The engineer primarily a will to "methods" from which . . . emerges in a limit­ will apply the scientific knowledge which he has learnt (his less way and unlimited process ever new substantive knowledge 'ambient knowledge' in the language of Price); but when it . . . almost automatically' (ibid., my translation). comes to the point where he has to solve a practical problem, he For my subject, a third social subsystem is relevant. This is does not proceed in an essentially scientific way. It is not that politics. There have been some doubts whether politics deserves intuition plays a greater role here than in science; rather, it is a special treatment within the social sciences. John Stuart Mill the fact that engineers can rest content with solutions they find argued that there can be no such special science, since '[tlhose without asking for the exact scientific explanation. Both sci­ phenomena . . . with which the influences of the ethological entific and technological activities are problem-solving, decom­ state of the people are mixed up at every step (so that the posing and recombining, but the engineer is concerned with a connexion of effects and causes cannot be even rudely marked practical, workable solution whereas the scientist is looking for out without taking those influences into conSideration) could explanations on the level of his academic discipline. In the not with any advantage . . . be treated independently of political 49 To avoid a possible misunderstanding: in denying the status of a social 51 See Scheler 1980 for a model of a triple selection made by the scientist, the system to technology, one docs not deny the decisive role of technology in engineer, and the entrepreneur to which I want to add the political clement. The modern societies. scientist wants to construct all possible machines, the engineer all workable 50 Or, in Habermas's earlier definition: '[Wle shall understand "technology" machines, the entrepreneur all profitable machines, and the politician all to mean Scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes. It refers to machines which enhance power and legitimation. the system in which research and technology arc coupled with feedback from 52 Marx presupposes Nawrstoff which is transformed with the help of tech­ the economy and administration' (Habermas 1971b: 57). nology which is already transformed Naturstoff, see MEW iii. 45.  150 Technology Technology 151 ethology' (Mill 1 9 74: 906). This argument that polities cannot As w e shall see in a moment, the most convincing solution to be studied separately since it is mixed up with the national the problem of distinguishing system and environment is to character at every step is not very convincing, because the attribute everything which is not part of the system to the argument is not particular to politics-the same can apply to environment. Thus each of these systems conceives all other economics, too, for example: there are undoubtedly certain systems and the environment (such as technology and natural nationalities who can be said to have a greater business spirit resources) as its environment. Note that economy, politics, or than others. In contrast to Mill, Max Weber holds that modern science have to take into consideration the characteristics of politics in fact forms a separate field of human action which can existing technology. This may influence the systemic behaviour be studied accordingly. In 'Politik als Beruf', Weber, similarly to in many ways. Consider: politics is eonfronted with dangerous Scheler, starts from an analogy to the economy as studied by technologies as a problem of legitimation; economy is keen on Karl Marx. Both emphasize the analogy, but also that the respec­ certain most profitable technologies; scientific research is de­ tive fields are following unique laws of their own.53 Above, we pendent on technological apparatus and research funds. saw how Scheler defined the specific function of science in Usually the production of technology itself is conceived of as modern societies. Now, how does Weber define politics? Accord­ an economic activity, that is, firms are concerned with the ing to him, 'engage in polities' means nothing else than 'seek to construction of new technologies. Economic activity is seen as influence the distribution of power within and between political including technological activities, or, to put it the other way structures' (Weber 1948: 83). How is this political realm defined? round, technology is a speeial case of economic activity. 54 Weber describes it in similar terms to the functioning of a Although this is a rather crude and narrow version of the social capitalist enterprise: dimension of technology, it may serve the purpose. of illustrating a 'technological trajectory'. A reason for such a 'technological [T]he modern state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come together under a single head. No single official trajectory' is the role of fixed capital. As Hughes put it, personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings} stores, tools, The durability of artifacts and of knowledge in a system suggests and war machines he controls. In the contemporary 'state' -and this is the notion of trajectory, a physical metaphor similar to momentum. essential for the concept state-the 'separation' of the administrative Modern capital-intensive systems possess a multitude of durable phys' staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from the ical artifacts. Laying off workers in labour�intensive systems reduces material means of administrative organization is completed. libido momentum, but capital-intensive systems cannot lay off capital and 82) interest payments on machinery and processes. Durable physical arti­ facts project into the future the socially constructed characteristics Although sketched very roughly, these systemic distinctions acquired in the past when they were designed. IHughes 1987: 77) are the ground on which later versions of social theory could find a point of departure for their functional and systemic Consider now the enlarged view: here we have scientific, eco­ approaches. In what follows, I shall take Luhmann'S theory as a nomic, and political factors shaping technology. Additionally, a major reference point when discussing the differentiation of new technology must be a technology which fulfils certain society into subsystems, and the interrelations between them. standards of engineering. A new technology thus has to be in In his theory, polities is that funetional subsystem of modern accordance with politics, science, economics, and engineering. society in which collectively binding deeisions are taken (see Apart from the fact that technology is durable, the development Luhmann 1988d: 29-30). of new technologies takes time; we therefore have a certain inertia of technological development. It is unlikely that all the -",{ "".'eber says: 'The direction of capitalist enterprises, despite far-reaching 54 As Max Adler ( 1 964: 32, my trans.) PUt it: 'Economy and technology are by analogies, follows quite . , dlfferent laws than those of political administration' no means two distinguished factors which could act upon each other. They are I (Weber 1948: 821. but two sides of one process, and this is the social life- and working-process .  p 152 Technology Technology 153 time technologically revolutionary 'shocks' occur. Quite on the development from tools to the machine. (See CW vi. 186-7; contrary, it is likely that a process of diffusion and saturation quoted above, p. 1 10). But at the same time Marx is aware that occurs,55 the history of technology has not yet got the attention it deserves. Piore and Sabel try to explain both technological trajectories In Capital, he suggests a historical investigation into technology and historical turning-points. Their 'possible worlds approach,56 which would proceed by analogy to Darwin's investigation of may be seen as akin to the 'social construction of technology' natural history (see Capital i. 352). However, an evolutionary approach when they stress that there is no 'absolute best tech­ view of technology, especially if based on Darwin's method, nology': 'Thus although the winning design had to meet some will leave no room for any teleological explanations S? Now minimum performance standard, the sweep of its success was what about the 'inner logic' of specific technologies? I think that not a proof of unrivaled technical superiority, nor of the existence such an 'inner logic' and an evolutionary view of technology of a narrow track of progress : other variants could have served as may be compatible. With respect to biological evolution one can well. Power in the market, not efficiency lin the sense of a say that although it is a non-teleologieal process, it can never­ uniquely appropriate application of technology) decided the theless be interpreted as if it were a teleological process (ef. contest' (Piore and Sabel 1984: 40). Once a breakthrough has been Habermas 1976a: 1 8 7; one could call it 'teleonomic'j. If we made, many competitors choose to follow a proven approach apply this argument to technology, we might say the same: 'rather than risk failing to find one more suited to their needs' although the development of technology is a non-teleological (ibid.). From this the authors conclude that 'in the world of process, we can look at it with hindsight and try to find the possible worlds, relatively short periods of technological diver­ mechanisms which stabilized such improbable constellations. sification punctuate longer periods of uniformity. The technical Looking at the history of technology, we as observers impose knowledge that is accumulated during the interludes of diversity some preconceptions about order, 'and this preconception then creates the possibility of divergent breakthroughs: branching allows the observer to watch the changing instances, compare points. At these technological diVides, the different political them, and see whether there is a progression toward orderliness circumstances in diffcrent regional or national economies move in those portions being observed. If there is, evolution has technology down correspondingly different paths' (ibid. 39). occurred' (Weick 1979: 1 19). Thus they suggest the metaphor of a branching tree instead of 2. It seems clear that Marx is aware of both economy and classical Political Economy's 'narrOw track' when considering science as interacting factors. However, he overestimated the the history of technology. SCience-technology interaction, in comparison to political influ­ If we now confront Marx with the results of this section, two ences upon technology. The latter seem to have only an indirect things require comment. influence, via laws which are the result of class conflicts. 58 With I . At first sight it seems that Marx was a follower of classical respect to communist society, he stressed the important role of Political Economy's 'narrow track' rather than a proponent of science and economy, too. The necessity of scientific under­ the possible worlds theory, as when he presents the development standing has already been indicated; the importance of economic up to the machine as a logical development, one which follows criteria is expressed clearly in Capital iii: an inner logic. This is c1earl y expressed in the passage from the Poverty of Philosophy where he sketches the various stages of IAlfter thc abolition of the capitalist mode of production, but still retaining social production, the determination of value continues to prevail in the' sense that the regulation of labour-time and the distribution 55 Economists call this 'absorbing Markov processes', I shall return in ch. 4 to the problem of 'stasis', of social labour among the various production groups, ultimately the 56 This approach has been developed by Stalnaker and Lewis (and before :;7Marx is aware of this, see the already cited letterto Lassallc, 1 6 Jan. 1861. them, o� co�rse} by Leibniz). For a good discussion of the theory with respect to $ 1> He stressed that the law which shortened the working day enhanced the economlC hIstory, sec Elster 1978. See also the critical remarks by Lukes ( 1 980). development of technology. See Capital L 1 54 Technology Technology ISS book-keeping encompassing all this, become more essential than ever. defined criteria for accepting or rejecting any given mutation." (Capital iii. 85 1 ; see also Capital ii. 137_8)59 IElster). In societal evolution involving technological develop­ ment, even the selection process is far from deterministic: Here science is in a close relationship with cconomy, but at the same time has a certain autonomy. The economy tries to Intentions and expectations play a role' Ivan den Belt and Rip utilize, and evcn direct, scientific knowledge; but sciencc is not 1987: 140- 1 ) . In other words: actors try to change the actions of others and thereby change their environments. 'Thus the merely demand-induced. Science must have developed before, and independently from, captialism I Capital i. 434, 567; see also assumption of a selection environment that is truly independent Rosenberg 1976b: 135-6). of a particular technological trajectory is hard to justify' (ibid.). Against this argument three points cau be made:62 3.3. 1 . Criticisms: system and environment First, if we take into account unintended consequences of human action, we cannot assume strategic action to be always In contrast to the above-mentioned model of a 'technological successful Isee Douglas 1986). In this case we again get blind trajectory', several authors have developed a different approach. events, which can be studied from an observer's standpoint with Pinch and Bijker 1 1987) speak of a 'multidirectional development the help of evolutionary models. of technology'; Calion 1 1987) assumes an 'actor-network' which Second, there are inherently technical factors which determine contains animate and non-animate components; Law 1 1 98 7), in a special course of development in some cases. We can illustrate a similar vein, coins the notion of 'heterogeneous engineering'; this point again with an example from biology. As Gould has van den Belt and Rip 1 1 987) assume a 'nexus' between techno­ pointed out, 'Galileo argued that the bone of a large animal must logical trajectory and the selection environment Iwhich they thicken disproportionally to provide the same relative strength see embodied in patent law in an exemplary way). All these as the slender bone of a small creature . . . This simple principle concepts try to avoid what the authors think to be an inherent of differential scaling with increasing size may well be the most difficulty of evolutionary theory: the distinction between system important determinant of organic shape. J. B. S. Haldane once and environment 60 As Calion rightly states: 'The systems wrote that "comparative anatomy is largely the story of the concept presupposes that a distinction can be made between the struggle to increase surface in proportion to volume". Yet its system itself and its environment' ICallon 1987: 100).61 But generality extends beyond life, for the geometry of space contains 'how do we define the limits of a system and explain concretely ships, buildings, and machines, as well as animals' IGould 1973: the influence of the environment?' libid.). The main difference 1 73-5). Gould then presents medieval churches as a testing from Darwinian systems is seen in the fact that in the case of ground for the effects of size and shape. There are inherent technology the selecting criteria are not just given, but socially barriers for the size of a church, because shaped. Van den Belt and Rip make this point following Elster 1 1984: 6): 'In biological evolution, although mutations are random, the area of outer walls and windows would increase as length cubed. In the selection process is deterministic; that is there are "well other words, the area of the windows would increase far more slowly than the volume that requires illumination . . . Large organisms, like 59 Recall Weber 1978: 103 as cited in s. 1.3. 60 62 From this basic assumption follow the different attempts to resolve the As I pointed out in s. 3 . 1 .2, there is an important difference between problem: whether 'nexus', 'actor-network', or 'heterogeneous engineering', all biological evolution on the one hand and social and technological evolution on try to dissolve the boundaries between system and environment. the other. This difference lies in the different speed of development and the 61 The theoretical problems which the authors pose themselves thus arise higher capacity of the social field to recombine its elements in innumerable from a misconception of technology: only if one tries to define technology as a ways. Evolution of biological species is a relatively slow process which leads to social system does the difficulty of distinguishing system and environment specialization of natural characteristics. Evolution of social forms and of tech­ arise. Yet another consequence follows from some of their approaches: those nologies is a relatively fast process of differentiation and recombination of who think that technology cannot be regarded as a social system seem to reject elements. The last aspect thus deserves our special attention (see Luhmann systems theory tout court (Mayntz is an exception in this respect). 1984a: 569; Tiezzi 1984; and see ch. 5). 156 Technology Technology 157 large churches, have very few options open to them. Above a certain Third, all the approaches discussed above have one basic flaw size, large terrestrial animals look basically alike-they have thick legs in common: it is their anthropomorphic model of social action and relatively short, stout bodies. Large medieval churches are relatively and evolution. Only by placing human action I'individuals') long and have abundant outpunchings, The 'invention' of internal in the centre of analysis do they arrive at their conclusions. organs allowed animals to retain the highly succcssful shape of a MacKenzie most clearly expresses this Imistaken) view when simple exterior enclosing a large internal volumcj the invention of intcrnal lighting and structural steel has permitted modern architects he writes: '[Alctars create and maintain systems, and if they fail to design large buildings of essentially cubic form. The limits are to do so, the systems in question cease to exist' IMacKenzie expanded, but the laws still operate. (Gould 1973: 175-7)63 1987: 197). And Hughes, on whom MacKenzie builds his argu­ ment, takes the same view in stressing the actor-dependent This may be an illuminating illustration when discussing the characteristics of technological systems: 'Because they are in­ question of technological autonomy or technological trajectories. vented and developed by system builders and their associates, A small car probably cannot be a large car writ small; neither the components of technological systems are socially constructed can the opposite obtain. In ignoring this, the Ford motor company artifacts' IHughes 1987: 52). For this reason, 'the convention of had to suffer an unpleasant experience: designating social factors as the environment, or context, of a The troubles that the Ford Motor Car Company had in the 1930s technological system should be avoided' libid.). But what if we producing a compact car suggest that some of their problems resulted reverse the two? Could we not imagine technology as part of the from the fact that they presumed small cars are made the same way as environment of social systems? I think this is the solution to the large cars: take a big car and shrink it. Since Ford knew how to make problem which, however, the authors under discussion here large cars, they thought there was no problem. (Weick 1979: 6) cannot allow for. Instead of treating technology as the environ­ But even if technology develops in accordance with the laws of ment of social systems, the heroic actions of individual 'system size and shape, it eventually arrives at a halting point. To builders' must fulfil the theoretical blank in the analysis of advance technology, new technological solutions must be avail­ technology. able. On such a reading, one can derive a dynamic model of Before going into greater detail on the question of evolution technical change in which periods of simple extension alternate and systems theory Ich. 41, I shall keep attention for the remainder with periods of technical revolution. The first phase is charac­ of this chapter on Marx's own analysis. Next I shall discuss terized by extending existing technical principles Isuch as: Marx's alleged technological determinism Is. 3.41, the question bigger, smaller, faster, slower, lighter, heavier, more silent, of technological alienation Is. 3.5), and the division of labour more powerful, etc., see Rammert 1988). The second phase is Is. 3.6). characterized by a technical invention which helps to overcome a restriction, an obstacle to further development. There are several 3.4. Marx: a teehnological determinist? theoretical formulations of this problem, such as Hughes's 'reverse salients', or Rosenberg's 'bottlenecks'. Furthermore, there seems to exist an equivalent on the economic level in the Discussing the question of technological determinism in Marx, law of diminishing returns I Grenznutzen) or in absorbing Markov we should first of all devote some attention to the problem of processes: in these cases a point of saturation is reached, beyond determinism in Marx per se. which no further investment is optimal. Marx is often interpreted as an economic determinist. This interpretation holds that Marx's 'iron laws of history' rest on the 6,� As a schoolboy, I was always struck by the example that there are limits in paramount role of economic motives for social development. length for a rope which is hanging freely. At a certain length it will ineVitably From the German Ideology where he sets up his research pro­ break, because it cannot bear its own weight. gramme of investigating the 'life-process of the real individuals'  r 158 Technology Technology 159 (CW v. 35) to his later Critique of Political Economy he is ones. But this normative dimension has to retreat when describ­ obsessed with the important role economic factors play in social ing or explaining soeial reality. Marx was aware of this, as he life. A very clear expression of this view is the all-too-famous made clear in the foreword to Capital i : 'base-superstructure' metaphor. Aceording to this model, it is I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But clear that the economie base is far more important than the here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifica­ political, juridical, or cultural superstructure: tions of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations In the social production of their life, men entcr into definite relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which raise himself above them.65 rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond Marx's soeial determinism is most clearly expressed in Capital. definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of In respect of teehnology, his position is the following: machinery material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in generaL It is not the consciousness of men that determines their ean, be employed in completely different ways. Capitalism em­ being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their ploys it to the detriment of the producers; communism will consciousness. ICW xxix. 263, emphasis added) employ it to the benefit of the producers. Thus it is good per se, but bad under capitalist use. This offers him the theoretical Nevertheless,64 Marx was also a soeial determinist, for he possibility of achieving a social form which produces in a non­ believed that social institutions played a big part in explaining alienated way. Note that on the basis of a technological deter­ historical change. Thus, he did not coneentrate on individual minism sueh a perspective might be difficult. It would be behaviour nor on economic relations 'as such'. Rather, his difficult if the structure of technology were to impinge on a full approach consisted in a speeifie conception of the social sphere development of human needs and capaeities. The following which has its own dynamics. In this sense, Marx was a follower passage from Capital iii can be read as confirmation for both the of Hegel; there was nothing strange in Marx suggesting that economic and social determinism: social institutions develop aceording to their own logic and their own goals: they are forms of objective spirit. It has been, The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped and, perhaps, still is, fashionable to deride such an approach and out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, to assimilate it to another Hegelian concept, namely the march as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element . . . It is always the direct relationship of of the Weltgeist through history. But if a rigorous attempt the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers­ to explain decisive historical developments in terms of individ­ a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the devel­ uals' aetions fails (and I think it does), then some kind of 'social opment of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity­ determinism' will be needed, as developed by sociological which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social theories, be they structural, systems, or funetional approaches. structure, and with it . . . the corresponding specific form of the state. In Chapter 2, I have analysed Marx's philosophieal anthropology; (Capital iii. 791 ) we may label his intentions there as 'ethical individualistic' 64 I need not conceal that in my view this metaphor is not very illuminating; 65 Many advocates of methodological individualism seem to confuse ethical on the contrary, it often obfuscates illuminating insights {see also Lukes 1983 and methodological indiVidualism, to use a distinction of Lukes ( 1973). Or, as for a critique). But it should also be said that Marx thereby formulated a problem Teubner put it, they confuse moral-political options with theory constructions which served as a starting point for sociological research. See only Weber 1930 (Teubner 1989b). Many theorists seem to incur the fallacy of embracing an and Mannheim 1936. individualistic approach because they consider themselves humanists.  160 Technology Technology 161 As I shall claim, Marx's ccntral notions sometimes do not tions. We should thus take into consideration the possibility of pcrmit of precise differentiation between legal, political, and functional equivalents Isee Luhmann 1970). Marx, on some economic factors. The concepts 'relations of production' and occasions, seems to forget his evolutionary approach because he 'productive forces' overlap; they cannot be defined independently cannot withstand the temptation to cstablish a rigid connection of one another. In Chapter 4, I shall return to this issue, this time between technology and social form. seen from the viewpoint of Cohen's claim that the productive Turning to the historical dimension, we must note that Marx forces have primacy over the relations of production, which is a does not favour the technological argument. He says that both technological determinist interpretation. forces of production and relations of production are caught in an Turning now to Marx's technological determinism, we should evolutionary development. There are examples of the Importance first have a clear definition of technological determinism. If we of technological factors6l as well as examples of the importance define it in the strongest possible sense, it means that technology of social and political factors.68 determines other social spheres Ilogical determinism) and that MacKenzie 1 1984) is also dealing with the question whether it is the driving force for social change lhistorical determinism).66 Marx can be called a technological determinist. Commenting On the first I 'logical') level, we can distinguish between a strong on the 1 859 Preface 'as the definitive statement of historical and a weak notion. The strong notion would probably claim that materialism', he writes: to one specific technology, one social form which is determined by this technology exactly corresponds. The weak notion would Anything approaching a careful reading of it quickly reveals two things. probably claim that to a specific technology a variety of social First, to make it into a statement that machines make hi� tory, the 'forces of production' would have to be interpreted as cqUlval�n� to forms may correspond, which consequcntly are thus not deter­ teclUlology. Second, to make it into a strong technological determml�m mined by technology; rather, they are 'allowed by' or 'compatible in the sense outlined above, the development of the forces of produCtlon with' that technology. Marx sometimes invokes the weak, would have to be taken as autonomous, or at least independent of the sometimes the strong notion. The weak version is present when relations of production. (MacKenzie 1984: 476) he says that artisan technology was the technology of slavery and feudalism; the strong version is present when he says that In my view, the first point causes no problems, since technology capitalism is only capitalism when it is machine-based. However, can be conceived as containing skills, knowledge, and expen­ the technological basis of capitalism Itogether with the co­ ence 69 More intriguing is the second question. G. A. Cohen has operative character of the labour process) will also serve com­ tried to make the second point in the strongest possible way, munist society, which again would suggest the weak version of claiming that 'Ia) The productive forces tend to develop through­ the argument. It seems that an evolutionary approach requires out history (the Development thesis). Ib) The nature of the the weak version, because all elements of a new social form production relations of a society is explained by the level of must be already present at the prior stage and are always common development of its productive forces Ithe Primacy Thesis proper)' to both social forms. I think that the strong notion cannot be ICohen 1978: 134). Furthermore, Cohen's intention is 'to use la) as supported in a consistent way. The evolutionary approach advises 67 As when he holds that capitalism and communism cannot be based on us to subscribe to the weak notion. The weak notion does not artisan technology. allow for any combination, it only rules out specific combina- . (;8 As when he holds that only with the abolition of the gUlld laws and the consequent establishment of a l�bour market, only with the disc�ver� of new 66 MacKenzie thus refers to both meanings when he writes: 'To be a tech­ continents and the import of precIOUS metals (CWVl. 185) could capItalIsm . grow nological determinist is obviously to believe that in some sense technical up. change causes social change, indeed that it is the most important cause of social . change. But to give full weight to the first term in expressions such as "prime 69 Habermas overemphasizes these non-material elements af prodUCtlVC forces. He defines Produ1<tivi<rafte as consisting of ( 1 ) labour power; (2) kn� w­ mover" and " independent variable", it would also have to be believed that ledge which can be translated into productive techniques; (3) knowledge which technical change is itself uncaused' (MacKenzie 1984: 474). organizes, mobilizes, and qualifies labour power. See Habermas 1976(/: 152-3.  162 Technology Technology 163 part ol the argument for Ib)' ICohen 1978: 153). In other words, if in ethnology, but also in philosophy ISchelling, Hegel, Kant), technology can be shown to be the unmoved prime mover, sociology IComte), physics, and psychoanalysis. It denotes the MacKenzie's conditions would be fulfilled. I postpone the dis­ phenomenon of objects produced by people being invested with cussion of this point to Chapter 4, but nevertheless will make a apparent power lef. Seidel 1972). Objects do not have that power judgement at this point: Marx did not employ technological inherently, but the attribution of power to them by their produ­ determinism in a consistent way/o rather, he was tempted cers generates their own power which is a real phenomenon. several times to use it as an additional argument for his theory. The fetish character of commodities arises because their social character is established only after the production, that is, after 3.5. Technological alienation the use-values have experienced exchange and proved their exchange-value. According to Marx, if all labour were perfortned My suspicion in section 3 . 1 . 1 was that Marx runs into a theoret­ as social labour from the outset, there could be no fetishism. He ical difficulty when Simultaneously endorsing an evolutionary refers above all to commodity, money, and capital fetishism; approach towards technology and a normative humanist stand­ the first two he explains at the beginning of volume i of Capital; point. Above, the two elemcnts were made compatible by an he retums to the third at several places throughout Capital, interpretation which sees technological evolution as paralleled culminating in the 'Trinitarian formula' Ivolumc iii). by an increase in human capacities. The total individuals were In a passage in the Gnzndrisse, Marx links the concept of the result of an objective unfolding historical process, of 'blind' alienation quite tightly to the concept of fetishism. There he evolution. But what if this diagnosis is not plausible? The compares the function of money with the function of 'lists of tension between the two elements tums into a contradiction if current prices'. Hc says: 'Money . . . serves as such only because the historical and the critical level cannot be reconciled. If there of its social lsymbolic) property; and it can have a social property was to be no technology which permitted the realization of only because individuals have alienated their own social relation­ Marx's humanist programme, he would have remained pessim­ ship hom themselves so that it takes the form of a thing' istic. In fact, as we shall see, underlying his theory was optimism. I Grundrisse 160). Lists of current prices provide information about the activities of all others on the world market and are 3. 5.1. Technological alienation in the Manuscripts 186 1-3 'the best proof of the way in which their own exchange and their own production confront individuals as an objective relation The aforementioned problem gives me a strong reason for locating which is independent of them' IGrundrisse 1 6 1 ) . The three technological alienation in Marx's discourse of the Manuscripts concepts reification, fetishism, and alienation can be seen here 1 861-3. It is the character of the machine itself land not its as forming the structure of a situation 'unworthy of human employment by capital) which expropriates his abilities from nature': 1 1 ) a social relation takes the shape of a thing; 12) this the worker, which transfers his skill to the machine. thing is invested with a power of its own; 13) this power reacts Before going into greater detail, I first discuss briefly the upon the individuals as an independent force. 1 1 ) stands for notions of alienation, reification, and fetishism. 7 j The concept reification, 12) for fetishism, 13) for alienation. Marx here compares of fetishism derives from the Portugoese 'feitico' ILatin factitius) money and lists of prices with the result that 12) docs apply to and means 'artificial', 'false', and 'magic'. It was first employed money but not to the lists of prices. From this Marx seems to 70 See Heilbronner 1967 for a statement that Marx was an explicit techno­ conclude that the 'Aufhebung' of alienation is easier in the l09ica1 determinist . latter case. He writes: 'In the case of the world market, the J �he term 'Verdinglichung' was first used in a systematic way by Lukacs, who, m his early formulation, suggested an identity of 'Vcrdinglichung' and connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also 'Entfremdung'. See his later self-criticism in the 1967 preface to Geschichte und the independence of this connection from the individual, have Klassenbewufltsein. See also Petrovic 1983 and Gems 1983b for definitions. developed to such a high level that the formation of the world  164 Technology Technology 165 market already at the same time eontains the conditions for ' the 'machino-centric' description of capitalist reality of produc­ going beyond it' ( Gnzndrisse 1 6 1 ) 72 tion ?3 Marx, however, does not care to show how an Aufhebung Consider, now, an application of this triad to technology. of this contradiction is possible, how a new, socialist 'machine' Obviously, ( I ) is not relevant here, since man's relationship to can be imagined. Following the 'materialist' advice of Marx, this nature is nearly always mediated by things. The relation to new 'machine' would still have to emerge under the old con­ nature is no social relation which then assumes the form of a ditions, i.e. in capitalism. Yet, he himself does not show this and thing, nay, it is already in the first place a 'dinghaft' relation, it is he gives us no touchstone at all to indicate that it should occur. lU Its very nature characterized by the use of things. However, We can only presume that he aims at a similar thing when he (2) and (3) are relevant, as we can see in every treatment of the writes: matter by Marx. Capitalist production is generally characterized by the fact that the According to Ricoeur, Marx in his l)aris Manuscripts employed means of production oppose the hving labourer in an independent way, a Hegelian model when he analysed 'the inversion of human as if they were personified. The worker does not employ the means of labour into an alien, foreign, seemingly transcendent entity. production, but vice versa. By this reversal the workers become capital Therefore, the transformation by which the subjective essence and the commodity owner who employs them becomes capitalist. of labour . . . is abolished and lost in a power that seems to rule (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2014) human existence becomes the paradigm for all similar processes. Something human is inverted into something which seems to According to this outline, a post-capitalist society would be a be exterior, external, superior, more powerful, and sometimes society in which the workers employ the means of production ('im supernatural' (Ricoeur 1986: 35). Accusativ anwenden', as Marx says-instead of vice versa, as in capitalism). The creation of a new social form I= abolishing of Ricoeur rightly insists that-in contrast to the dogmatic capital) is accompanied by a new technological form (=abolishing Marxists-there is no fundamental economic alienation from of enslaving work). Marx aims at overcoming these 'contradict­ which all other forms of alienation are derived; rather, these ory forms' of social production: 'As soon as this contradictory other alienations are analogical to the Feuerbachian construction form falls away it follows that they possess this means of (see ibid. 36). Consider, for example, Marx's description of production socially, not as private individuals' (MEGA II. iii. 6. money-fetishism: 2144). Tbeir power lof gold and silver) appears as a kind of fate and the Since technology in capitalism assumes the form of fixed consciousness of men, especially in social orders declining be�ause of a capital, two things exert domination over the worker: capital deeper development of exchange-value relations, rebels against the pov:cr which a physical matteI, a thing, acquires with respect to men, 7.� Hcidegger's position can be interpreted as a straightforward �ositio� of agamst the domination of the accursed metal Ivelfluchtes Metallj technological alienation. The 'essence' of modern tec�nology, accordmg to �lm, which appears as sheer insanity. (eW xxix. 487) can be understood neither in terms of instrumentahty {means-ends re1atlon­ shipL nor in terms of human activity_ The essence of modern technology is If Marx's enterprise is characterized by a strong anthropocentric rather that it is concealing instead of revealing. '[MJodern technology, docs not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in and critical approach, this must ineVitably be in opposition to modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordernl, which puts to nature the . 72 Cf. Keynes's drastic statement which may serve here to make the distinc­ unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as tIOn between two different uses of money clearer. Writing about a future society, such' (Heideggcr 1978: 296). Nature becomes an object of ordering, a 'standing he says: 'We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true reserve'. Even man is involved in this process, although he is never 'transformed value. The love of money as a possession-as distinguished from the love of into mere standing reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part money �s a. means to the enjoyments and realities of life-will be recognised for in ordering as a way of revealing" (ibid. 300). This is not the place to deal what It lSI a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal semi­ with the exact structure of Hcidegger's argument; suffice it to say that, for pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the spe�ialists him, '\mlodern technology, as a revealing which orders, is thus no mere human in mental disease' (Keynes 1972: 329). dOing' libid.). 166 Technology Technology 167 and technology. Capital and machinery in their evolution and in single motive power, whatever the form of that power may be' their functioning are acting in pairs, reinforcing each other, I Capital i. 355). conditioning each other. The one is not possible without the Marx also repeats that the skill of the worker is transferred to other. It takes only a small step for Marx to assume that the machinery: 'Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in Aufhebung of the capital-labour relation would also lead to an handling it passes over to the machine' I Capital i. 396). But Aufhebung of deskilling machinery. But Marx does not devote the 'slight difference' turns out to be a radical cut between a any discussion to this special problem. He only states in a very machinery 'as such' and the really existing one lof capitalism). general way that workers in post-capitalist society will possess He cites Ure for the two different aspects of the automatic the means of production socially, not as private individuals Icf. factory I'automatische Fabrik' as Marx calls the 'atelier' now). MEGA II. iii. 6. 2 1 44). The first is ' "[C)ooperation of many orders of workpeople . . . in In the Manuscripts 1861-3, Marx is a technological determinist tending with assiduous skill, a system of productive machines, when backward-looking and a social determinist when forward­ continuously impelled by a central power" Ithe prime mover)' looking. In Capital, Marx tries to get out of these theoretical I Capital i. 394-5). The second is 'a vast automaton, composed of difficulties and gives the following solution: his argument builds various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uninter­ exactly on the 'social character of labour'. He claims that in rupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them capitalist modern industry the character of labour is immediately being subordinate to a self-regulated moving force' I Capital i . social and co-operative; all that needs to be done is the expropri­ 395). ation of capital. The advantage of this solution readily springs to Now look at Marx's comment: 'The first description is applic­ mind: it is consistent with his evolutionary approach I'new able to every possible employment of machinery on a large productive forces do not drop from the sky', Grundrisse 278 j, scale, the second is characteristic of its use by capital, and and at the same time fits his normative criteria. Only in this therefore of the modern factory system' I Capital i. 396). But this way could he bring together the historical and critical strands of distinction is completely artifiCial, having no real basis in the his project. We may thus say that although his approach in text of Ure. Marx has nowhere shown what 'every possible Capital is far more 'social determinism', he nevertheless allows employment of machinery on a large scale' could mean. Addi­ for a technological argument, too. This occurs when he claims tionally, the first passage of Ure in support of a 'neutral' use of that the social institutions have to adapt to the 'technical machinery is self-defeating. Here it is clearly expressed that the necessity' I Capital i. 365) of the labour process. workers only oversee I iiberwachen) a system of productive machinery. No virtuosity is inherent in the workers, as Marx 3.5.2. How Marx changed his view: Manuscripts 1861-3 v. himself asserts on the next page. He says: 'Hence, in the place of Capital the hierarchy of specialised workmen that characterises manu­ facture, there steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to The degree to which Marx maintained this definition of the ma­ equalise and reduce to one and the same level every kind of work chine and its corollaries in his final version of Capital is most in­ that has to be done by the minders of the machines' I Capital i. teresting. One could show in great detail how he used the material 396). Marx could not rest content with such a perspective. from the Manuscripts 1861-3 for the formulation of chapter 1 3 Communism would have to abolish the reduction of workers 1 1 5 in the English version) of Capital. But a t first sight there into mere 'appendages' to machinery. Marx, however, is a materi­ seems to be a slight difference in the definition of the machine. alist. He could neither be content in proclaiming such a goal In Capital, he defines it as follows: 'The machine . . . supersedes for communist society nor advocate a return to the medieval the workman, who handles a single tool, by a mechanism 'masterpiece' Isee his polemic against Proudhon, CW vi. 190). operating with a number of similar tools, and set in motion by a He must show a real possibility for abolishing enslavement  168 Technology Technology 169 in the production process which stems from technological transfer of skil1. It is no exaggeration to say that he actually factors. substitutes the one for the othcr. The two, however, are of a It may be that Marx became aware, after the Manuscripts different theoretical status. The first is historical (and thus 1 861 -3, that he was trapped in the pitfalls of his own theory, for contingent), the seconq analytical. Thc only analytical instance he had to provide a new technological 'elementary form' for (in Capital) is the (spurious) 'Ure-distinction', the others are post-capitalist society which must be already visible under historica1.?6 Now Marx seems to overemphasize the difference presentconditions. Since he could not provide this, he constructed between the use of machinery by capital and the character of it in a somewhat obscure way from Ure's text. Marx has two machinery as such. The expropriation of skill is no longer possible ways with which to defend his materialist programme: central, as it was in the Manuscripts 1861-3. To make it plain: if 1 . he can claim that machines can be used in other than capitalists would refrain from using women and children in the capitalist ways; production process, from lengthening the working day past its 2. he can claim that under communism another technology natural limits, etc. their use of machinery would nevertheless will be used in the process of material production. be capitalist (and not 'neutral' application of machinery 'as such'). Another instance of Marx's adherence to strategy ( I ) is His strategy combines both points. He follows ( I ) in that he takes great pains to show how the liberating potential of ma­ the fact that machinery is used by capital as a tool for warfare chinery is not (and cannot be) set free under capitalism.74 He against the workers. As Berg pointed out, 'Ure's automatic develops (2) above all with respect to the character of the labour factory was the image of war' (Berg 1982: 201 ) . Indeed, Marx process (see s. 3.6). himself was to use this paralle1. He writes: The introduced distinction, however, has important conse­ But machinery not only acts as a competitor who gets the better of the quences for Marx's further analysis in Capital; we can say that it workman, and is constantly on the point of making him superfluous. It changes the character of his discourse completely. It becomes is also a power inimical to him, and as such capital proclaims it from the guiding thread for the remainder of the fifteenth chapter. the roof tops and as such makes use of it. It is the most powerful weapon We find a dozen passages like the following: 'Here as every­ for repressing strikes, those periodical revolts of the working-class against the autocracy of capital . . . It would be possible to write quite a where else, we must distinguish between increased productive­ history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sale pnrpose of ness due to the development of the social process of production, supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working­ and that due to the capitalist exploitation of that process' class. leapita! i. 4 1 0- 1 1 ) 77 ( Capital i. 398). Marx's strategy in chapter IS is simple: he attributes all negative features of machinery (essentially those 76 Needless to say, the Manuscripts 1861-3 abound with analytical ex­ amples: 'This is the big difference: whether the existing means of production which oppose his theory of human nature) to the capitalist use; confront the workers as capital and can be appropriated by them only in so far as , the positive features he attributes to 'Maschinerie an sich 75 they increase the surplus-value and surplus-product for their employers, that is, whether these means of production employ them or whether they, as subjects, Marx provides examples like intensification of work, child employ the means of production in the accusative, in order to produce wealth for and woman labour, lengthening of the working day, etc. to prove themselves' (MEGA II. iii. 3 . 1 195). the capitalist use. He stresses these features more than the 77 See also the following passage from the Manuscripts 1861-3: 'All the more, here we have alienation in which the objective conditions of work (i.e. past labour) assume, vis-a-vis living labour, a direct opposition in that past 74 The main point is the increased productivity which allows the producing labour, including the general social forces of labour, natural forces, and science, of more output with a given portion of labour power. This means that the appear directly as weapons, partly to make workers redundant . . . partly to break working day can be reduced drastically; and free time, we know with Marx, is their special qualifications and the claims which arise from them, partly to important and left for the development of the indiVidual, cf. MEGA II. iii. 1 . 275; subjugate them to the factory despotism and military discipline of capital. In MEGA II. iii. 6. 1909-10, 2088-9. this form, therefore, the social conditions of work . . . appear not only as claims 75 His evolutionary scheme thus anticipates a 'mutation' only of the relations, to the worker but as directly hostile and overwhelming powers which are and the mode of, production, not of technology, employed in the interest of capital' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2057-8). 1 70 Technology Technology 171 This warfare, according to him, is no technological feature; imagined. The spinners' (now called minders') union not only survived rather, it is a social feature of class struggle, where capitalists but gained extensive control over the use of the new technology. (Piore use machinery as a weapon to become independent of special and Sabel 1984: 45) workers' skills. To repeat: this is the approach Marx adopts in However, the above quote from the Manuscripts 1861-3 also Capital. In the Manuscripts 1861 -3, however, he additionally reveals that Marx discerned alienation on the technological defines the conflict as one between the 'iron man' and the man level alone. This comes out when he uses the term Frontstein 'of flesh and blood': (keystone, comer-stone), which brings to mind architecture. Also here, past labour-as automaton and the machinery moved by The picture is of an arch which is completed by a keystone. This it-appears as independent of labour and self-acting, instead of being keystone prevents the construction from collapsing and provides subjected to it, is subjecting. It is the iron man which opposes the man its stability. The worker gets expropriated of his skills and of his of flesh and blood. This subjugation of his labour under capital . . . product; it is capital which accumulates both and represents which is given with capitalist production appears here as a technological itself as the living subject: dead labour which is able to move on fact. The corner*stone is in place. Dead labour is endowed with movc* its own; living labour which serves only as an appendage to it. ment and living labour is only one of its conscious organs. (MEGA 11. iii. 6. 2057-8, my emphasis) The increase in productivity which stems from the division of labour . . . is not only a productive force of capital instead of the worker. The This passage echoes again a formulation of Ure, who wrote in social form of these combined activities is the existence of capital 1835: 'Thus the Iron Man, as the operatives fitly call it, sprang against the worker. This combination confronts the worker as an out of the hands of our modern Prometheus at the bidding of overpowering force to which he succumbs since his labour has been Minerva-a creation destined to restore order among the indus­ reduced to a wholly one-sided function which counts for nothing in trious classes, and to confirm to Great Britain the empire of art' separation from the whole mechanism. The worker himself has become a (Ure 1967: 367, cited in Berg 1982: 201). mere detail. iMEGA II. iii. I . 254) Though Ure says that '[tlhe news of this Herculean prodigy 'In machinery . . . the domination of past labour over living spread dismay through the union, and even long before it left its labour gains not only social . . . but also technological truth' cradle, so to speak, it strangled the Hydra of misrule' (ibid.), this (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2059). This passage contains in a nutshell both does not to stand up to closer scrutiny. As Lazonick ( 1979) has technological determinism and an analysis of technology in shown, the shop-floor organization continued even after the terms of fetishism-a position which Marx in Capital is going introduction of the self-acting mule. This is affirmed by the to blur. following account of Piore and Sable: In 1830 . . . the Manchester engineering firm of Sharp, Roberts & 3.6. Alienation and the division of labour Company introduced the self-acting mule, and promised its customers that the new equipment would allow the substitution of unskilled The concept of 'division of labour' has had a long career from machine operators for skilled cotton spinners-thus putting an end to ancient Greek philosophy to the Political Economy of Marx's the spinners' union in the mills. Ure, a political economist and industrial time. It is essentially a concept which lacks precision since consultant} popularized this claim as a statement of facti Marx lwho called Ure the Pindar of the factory) accepted this account and, as we every author and every epoch uses it in a different way. Authors saw} made it a starting point for his reflections on the decisive role of who, like Marx, try to use the concept to cover many phenomena special-purpose machinery in modem industry. Yet the cotton spinner}s are thus easily confused in their argument. role in production-part supervisor} part recruiter of labor-was far In fact, the concept 'division of labour' is a rather complex more complex} and management's grip on the shop-floor activity far subject in Marx too; it is used in different ways, which some­ more limited} than the machine maker, the consultant, and the theorist times leaves the reader confused. Marx himself was aware of  1 72 Technology Technology 1 73 this danger whcn he criticized Proudhon for using the concept as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, con­ 'division of labour' in such a vague way. Marx's point was that sequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the concept covers too many different things which do not have the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudcs' I Capital much in common and thus can hardly be understood by the i. 458). Here Marx explains in a functional fashion that human term 'divide' Id. C W vi. 180). abilities have to adapt to productive necessities. This argu­ But why, thcn, am I interestcd at all in the concept and ment, however, presupposes a gap between the development of especially its connection with technology? Both technology and productive forces and individual abilities. Thus, Marx tacitly the division of labour are essential for Marx's discussion of the assumes that mankind's collective objectifications Isuch as 'good society', i.e. for his communist perspective. Both techno­ technology) evolve in a different manncr, at a different speed, or logy and division of labour in communist society must be of a at a different rhythm from individual capacities. Since both are kind that exerts minimal 'enslaving effects' on individuals. But tied together by functional requirements, they co-evolve. This both are, on the other hand, main 'agents' in the dcvelopment leads Marx to the enigmatic statement that mankind sets itself of the preconditions for a communist society. They develop only tasks which it is able to fulfil 1 1 859 Preface). possibilities of transport and communication Iworld market), It seems plain that Marx would allow for a certain social reduce the socially necessary labour, lcad to an increase in division of labour, as far as it is the product of the associatcd productivity: in short, they contribute to thc crcation of real individuals.'8 Heller summarized Marx's intention very well: wealth. But they do not bring about this rcal wealth completely, 'Marx attacks those theoreticians who tie the specialisation all they do under capitalist relations is produce material wealth which arises from centralisation to capitalist relations of pro­ I'sachlicher Reichtum'), and this only in antagonistic forms duction, "as if the division of labour were not likewise possible Iclass domination, poverty, economic crises, etc.). Marx's concept if its conditions belonged to the associated workers, and were of division of labour has-like his concept of technology­ regarded by the latter as their own activity, which they are by a historical and critical dimension Ifor a comprehensive dis­ their very nature'" IHeller 1976: 108, Marx quotation from cussion, see Grundmann 1988). Theories of Surplus Value, cf. MEGA II. iii. 4. 1405). Heller As Fetscher notcd, Marx in his maturc works 'no longer contends that the bourgeois economists want to achieve by this pretends that the division of labour will altogether disappear. identification a justification for the capitalist mode of production. Certainly there will be different social functions and people to As Marx put it, they seek 'a technological justification for the fill them.' And, Fetscher continues, 'the very nature of modern specific social form, i.e. capitalist form, in which the relationship industrial production and the rapid change of its technology will of labour to thc conditions of labour is turned upside down, so demand many more many-sided individuals' IFetschcr 1973: that it is not the worker who makes use of the conditions of 46 1). Marx thought that the development of modern industry labour, but the conditions of labour which make use of the and the development of human needs and capacities would go worker' Icited in Heller 1976: 108; d. MEGA II. iii. 4. 1409).'9 together. This connection is established in the following way: Marx was ambiguous in evaluating the division of labour in 'IP]rivate property can be abolished only on condition of an all­ modern industry. He regards it in both positive and negative round development of individuals, precisely because the existing terms. It is positive, since it contributes to the increasc in pro­ form of intercourse and their existing productive forces are all­ ductivity and thus contributes to the matcrial preconditionS for embracing and only individuals that are developing in an all­ 7H Selucky in his (otherWise illuminating) treatment of the division of labour round fashion can appropriate them i.e. can turn them into free is thus mistaken when he says: 'Be that as it may, Marx and Engels wanted to abolish the division of labour' {Se1ucky 1979: 10). manifestations of their lives' I C W v. 439, see also CWv. 86 ff.). 79 Cf. also Habermas's claim that technology in late capitalism takes the In Capital i, Marx Similarly points out that 'modern industry form of ideology, since 'Sachzwangc' are blamed imitead of obsolete power through its catastrophcs imposes the necessity of recognizing, relations. See Habermas 1971b: 59. 1 74 Technology Technology 1 75 communist society. It is negative since it contributes to enslaving a natural division of labour which is based on personal endow­ effects, that is, individuals get subsumed under a life-long task ments and geographical and climatic factors (MEGA u. iii. 1 . which hinders their development into 'total' individuals."O Now, 266-7) and an occupational, professional division of labour it would be naive to think that communism could do away with which found its most adequate expression in the system of the division of labour because the necessary levels of material manufacture. Modern industry destroys this division of labour wealth would then exist. The reproduction of wealth requires and leads to a form of co-operation.83 Marx's political perspective a certain social organization of labour, which may be called is to regulate this co-operation socially84 and to allow for an all­ 'division of labour'. From this it follows that communist society round education and training of the whole working population also must develop a social form of division of labour, but one ( Capital i. 458). He refuses to return to the idea of the craftsman, which exercises no enslaving effects."' Unfortunately, Marx as Ricoeur pointed out: dedicated little attention to the topic of division of labour in society. It seems that he would see an inverse relationship For Marx, we must push the industrial system to its last consequences between the division of labour inside the factory and the division in order to achieve a solution at the level of the illness. The nostalgia of of labour in society: the less division of labour inside the factory, romantics for an earlier labour situation is thus misplaced. The craft worker who made a complete work still did not control the market; the the more division: of labour in society ."2 My conjecture is thathe value of the work was determined by someone else. (Ricoeur 1986: 53) does see the trend towards a functionally differentiated society, which, however, will be reversed at a certain stage of historical Marx strongly opposed a life-long subordination of individuals development. As Elster rightly pointed out, 'like Weber and to specialized tasks in all of his works; in other words, he Durkheim, Marx . . . saw the progress of history up to the present opposed a fusion of occupational and technical division of as one of constant differentiation. Unlike them, he did not see labour. The division of labour within society is, however, a this as an irreversible process, but predicted that there would broader concept than the division of tasks: the occupational occur a final stage of integration, or loss of differentiation' division of labour is only one part of the social division of labour. (Elster 1985: 1 13). Marx's ambiguity in evaluating the division of labour is resolved If Marx's main interest was to reduce the fragmentary effects by means of a change in opinion on these matters. In the of the division of labour, a prerequisite thereto was the exploration preparatory writings to Capital, he depicts the difference between of the possibility. From the Grundrisse onwards, Marx assumes manufacture and modern industry in the way that the period of manufacture leaves the virtuosity and skill with the worker, !lO In Capital L 343 Marx cites Urquardt with approval: 'To subdivide a man is whereas in modern industry the worker gets deprived of his to execute him, if he deserves the sentence, to assassinate him if he does not . . . The subdivision of labour is the assassination of a people,' virtuosity and skill. Whereas the division of labour in manufac­ 81 Both in the early German Ideology and in the Critique of the Gotha ture was a real division of labour, a division between different Programme of 1875 Marx explicitly assumes separate 'social functions' to sorts of labour (MEGA II. iii. ! . 269-701,"5 in modern industry ' - exist in a communist society. See GW v. 47; SWiiL 19, 26; see also Crundrisse 158. 11 2 Actually, the place where this quote occurs deals with manufacture .but 8:� According to Marx the concept of co-operation is the universal form of I think it fits the stage of machinery as well: 'The division of labour in the which the division of labour is only a special case: see MEGA II. iii. ! . 229-31 . IN workshop implies concentration of the means of production in the hands of one Cf. Capit.al i. 400: 'The factory code . . . is but the capitalist caricature of capitalistj the division of labour in society implies their dispersion among many that social regulation of the labour-process which becomes requisite in coopera­ independent producers of commodities . . . [Iln a society with capitalist produc­ tion on a great scale, and the employment in common, of instruments of labour tion, anarchy in the ' social division of labour and despotism in that of the and especially of machinery.' workshop are mutual conditions the one of the other' (Capit.al i. 336-7). 85 It is concentration instead of dispersion of the elements of the production Capitalist society is only able to organize its tasks with the help of despotism process which is characteristic of manufacture. Marx therefore calls manufac­ and anarchy which to Marx must have appeared a very undesirable state of ture the mode of production specifically corresponding to the division of labour affairs. (see MEGA II. iii. 6. 2701.  1 76 Technology Technology 177 there exists a division of machines, under which living labour is division of labour in manufacture] increases the social produc­ subjected IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2016). tive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the capitalist Simple co-operation and division of labour get totally trans­ instead of that of the labourer, but it does this by crippling the formed once machinery becomes the main way of producing: individual labourers' I Capital i. 344). Now we come to the mechanical atelier which is based on a system of In manufacture, as well as in simple co-operation, the collective machinery. To be sure, here we also have a division of labour . . . It has working organism is a form of existence of capital . . . manufacture its material basis in the different, specific machines . In this proper not only subjects the previously independent workman to the mechanical atelier the body of the whole mechanism consists of the discipline and command of capital, but, in addition, creates a hierarchiC differentiated machines themselves . . . Here it is not a specifically gradation of the workmen themselves. While simple co-operation developed labour power which uses particular instruments like a leaves the mode of working by the individual for the most unchanged, virtuoso does, but it is the self-acting instrument which needs specific­ manufacture thoroughly revolutionizes it, and seizes labour-power by ally and constantly attached servants. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2020) its very roots. It converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity, by In the system of manufacture, the tasks are distributed according forcing his detail dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities and instincts; just as in the States of La Plata they butcher a to a hierarchy of skills and powers. SpeCific physical and mental whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow. ICapital i. 340, my abilities of individuals are seized upon and developed in their emphasis) one-sidedness in order to produce a common, general mechanism Id. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2020). By contrast, in modern industry86 Modern industry, on the other hand, is conceived positively: it there no longer exists a hierarchy of abilities. What we have is a is more productive than manufacture, since it is not dependent general nivellement of services with the consequence that the on a certain number of skilled craftsmen and their skills. Instead, workers can work at different machines with little prior training an objective productive organism, a 'skeleton', takes their place. time Id. Capital i. 396). The 'subjective principle' of adapting the instruments to personal Under manufacture, the construction of new instruments had abilities falls away. The production process gets analysed in its to be done with respect to human abilities and characteristics constituent parts. IMEGA II. iii. 1 . 274). Modern industry, on the contrary, is In manufacture, it is the workmen who, with their manual implements, characterized by the principle that machines get constructed must, either singly or in groups, carry on each particular detail process. under the sole influence of scientific analysis and natural laws. If, on the one hand, the workman becomes adapted to the process, on Marx echoes here a central theme from the work of Andrew Ure the other, the process was previously made suitable to the workman. who stressed that machinery is preferable for factory-owners This subjective principle of the division of labour no longer exists in because it is not dependent on the skills of craft workers. production by machinery. Here, the process as a whole is examined Another point is that Marx repeats Ure's judgement that modern objectively, in itself, that is to say, without regard to the question of its industry has eliminated the division of labour Isee Berg 1982: execution by human hands, it is analysed into its constituent phases; 197-8). and the problem, how to execute each detail process, and bind them all into a whole, is solved by the aid of machines, chemistry. ICapital i. Consider, now, the discussion in Capital. Marx repeats the 359 )" ' general line of argument, but changes his evaluation completely: now he sharply criticizes the division of labour under the The reversal of judgement thus seems to rely on a more positive system of manufacture, drawing on Ferguson and Smith: 'IThe view of the possibilities for human self-development offered by machinery. To illustrate the different character of the means of H6 In the Manuscripts 1 861-3, Marx often uses the term 'mechanical atelier' production, Marx uses the metaphor of 'dwarf-instruments' to denote the new technological character of the post"manufacture age. In Capital he calls it automatic factory, or, more generally, 'modern industry'. H7 Cf. also Capital i. 456-7, 434, 567. 1 78 Technology Technology 1 79 I Capital i. 361 I, as being characteristic of manufacture, whereas the most perverted form of capitalist technology li.e. negative in 'cyclopic machines', or even 'cyclopic monsters' I Capital i. 360, comparison to manufacture). Marx reverses his judgement in 3641, are characteristic of modern industry. This indicates that, Capital. He now conceives manufacture, as we have seen, as the although monsters may be more horrible than dwarfs, neither technological regime whieh expropriates the workers from their is immediately preferable: dwarfs and monsters are both weird skills, cripples their individualities, etc. Likewise, he conceives figures for humans. modern industry as a turning-point, as a mode of production in Even more important is Marx's juxtaposition of the social which the character of labour is already unmittelbar geselI­ character of labour in these two technological epochs. In manu­ schaftlich, 'co-operative'. The virtuosity, knowledge, and skills facture the worker is expropriated of his skill which becomes in are embodied in the Cesamtarbeiter, albeit belonging to capital. turn embodied in the Cesamtarbeiter: On the basis of this construction it is sufficient to expropriate capital in order to return the lost capacities to the Cesamtarbeiter. Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the dctail labourers, is concentrated in the An additional point is of interest here. Marx said that the co­ capital that employs them . , . In manufacture, in order to make the operative character of the labour process is a 'technical necessity' collective labourer, and through him capital} rich in social productive Isee Capital i. 365). This suggests that he clings to a sort of power, each labourer must be made poor in individual productive 'technological primacy'. First develop technologies, then soeial powers. I Capital i. 341) institutions. This standpoint makes it easy to present the trend towards communism as 'inevitable', or 'lawlike'. We are wrong if we think that maehinery also displays this Technological determinism was a very appealing concept for feature since '[m]achinery . . . operates only by means of associated Marx because it offered him the chance to prove the inevitability labour, or labour in common. Hence the co-operative character of communism. Every time he analyses the role of technology in of the labour process is, in the latter one, a technieal neeessity history, he is tempted to endorse a determinist view, no matter dictated by the instrument of labour itself' I Capital i. 364_5 ) 88 whether we take the The Poverty of Philosophy, the Manuscripts This is the complete reversal of the argument in the Manuscripts 1 861-3, or Capital. However, in the Manuscripts, Marx is left 1 861-3 89 The deeisi ve difference between the Manuscripts and with the most discomforting theoretical problems when analysing Capital is the faet that according to the Manuscripts the worker the central role of machinery and its dehumanizing effects. under the system of manufacture is in full possession of his Therefore, he makes little reference to the technologieal base knowledge and skill, that it is he, the h uman being, who of communism, which, after all, seems the most interesting commands the instrument; modern industry, on the contrary, is question, given his evolutionary approach to teehnology and $$ The English translation does not render the following interesting connota­ social institutions. In Capital, he solves this problem by stressing tion: the German original says machinery 'funktioniert nur in der Hand un­ mittelbar vergcsellschafteter oder gemeinsamer Arbeit' (Das Kapital i. 407). the co-operative character of the labour process as the decisive Now, this is the same formula that Marx employs when describing a decisive feature of modern industry, thus suggesting a 'genetic link' with feature of communist society, namely that labour would be social from the communist society. This solution has the great advantage of outset ('unmittclbar vergesellschaftet'J, whereas in capitalism the social charac� ter of production proves itself only post !estum, after the exchange of private presenting capitalism's technological base and organization of products. It is no accident that Marx assimilates the character of work under labour as being similar to those of communism. Using a distinc­ modern industry to a feature of communist society. tion of Agnes Heller, we may say that Marx did not rely on the 89 To avoid misunderstanding: in the Manuscripts 1 861-3 Marx also empha­ sizes the point that machine production leads to higher productivity, and that 'subjective will' to bring about a higher form of society; he was the labour process becomes sociaL Large'scale production seems irreconcilable not content until he could find some 'natural laws' providing with single ownership of the means of production (cf. MEGA II. iiL 6. 2144). The the possibility for transition. fact that the workers are still fragmented, and developed only in narrow specialities, he considers to be an inheritance of manufacture, which is, how­ ever, enhanced by capitalist use of machinery (see Capital i. 398).  Historical Materialism J81 of functional analyses in the social sciences. In section 4 . J I argue that social enquiry cannot do without functional analysis, that it is sound, and that it is, in some respects (depending on the 4 Historical Materialism questions one is asking), superior to causal-intentional explana­ tion. In section 4.2 I try to apply findings of the emergent paradigm of autopoiesis to the problem of coevolution of society and technology. Section 4.3 tries to apply some findings of neo­ All earlier modes of production were essentially conserva­ Darwinian theory to the same problem. Section 4.4 summarizes tive. IKarl Marx, Capital) -f Marx's presentation of how feudalism as a social form, based on a speCific technology, was overcome by capitalism which was My discussion so far has shown that Marx's main critical based on another technology. Section 4.5 confronts the basic concern was to investigate the conditions for realizing the 'good claims of Marx's historical materialism with the ecological life'. To this end, he was interested in the liberating potential of problematic, showing that its conclusion (the stripping away of technologies and social forms. Regarding technology, Chapter 3 private property relations) may be of little help when facing explained that Marx was able to conceive of the problems which ecological problems, but that the potential of Marx's historical stem from man's dealings with nature. From this he did not maferialism is far greater than is expressed in the standard conclude that it is the fault of technology as such or of a specific, model. dominating attitude towards nature. I think he was right to Marx's interest in technology stems from his materialist reject such a conclusion. Regarding social forms, he assumed approach to studying society. As he stated in Capital: 'Tech­ that the negative aspects of technology only stem from its nology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process capitalist employment: in so doing I think he was wrong. He did of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays not conceive of the possibility that specific forms of technology bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the could cause ecological problems for every social form, not only mental conceptions that flow from them' (Capital i. 352). In this for capitalism. This chapter will focus on the following questions. statement, a relationship between three elements is expressed: Starting from the premisses of historical materialism, its 'standard ( 1 ) the transformation of nature; (2) forms of social relations; model', as laid out in the J 859 Preface and elsewhere, I try to and (3) mental conceptions '> These three elements have been reconstruct the basic underlying thought. As several discussions evident in Marx's work since the early German Ideology. In the have shown, a reconstruction is needed since the original model canonical i 859 Preface, Marx states the following relationship is inadequate.l The underlying thought which should be kept is between these elements: that society and technology can be analysed in evolutionary terms. Coevolution of social and technological forms is a process In the social production of their life, men cntcr into definite relations in which the individual has little explanatory power. My recon­ that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of struction thus tries to retain these Marxian analytical premisses, production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their matehal productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production while simultaneously trying to overcome some of the basic constitutes the econotnic structure of society, the real basis, on which flaws of the standard model. When one speaks of coevolution, functional links between 2 J:.5 Douglass North put it: JMafx's over�ll an�lysis, set i? the contex� of . economic history, explores human interrelatiOnShIps as a vehIcle for study�n? evolving units are required. This necessitates a brief consideration the increasing mastery of humans over nature. The growth of the productlve forces of human beings was an ongoing process in the subordination of nature to ! See the, debate on G. A. Cohen'S book ( 1 978), especially the contributions by mario As humans learned how to produce and use intermediate goods, it became Elster 1 1980, 1982), Lukes 1 1983), joshua Cohen 1 1 982), Levine and Wtight necessary to define the relationship amongst human beings with respect to the 1 1 980). production and use of these tools' (North 1986: 58). 182 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 183 to which correspond an answer to this question can we reassess the question of rises a legal and political superstructure, and mode of production of whether mankmd WIll be able consciously to control its own definite forms of social consciousness. The al life process political and intel lectu material life conditions the social, mines their fate. cious ness of men that deter in general. It is not the cons mine s their that deter being, but, on the contrary, their social being the mate rial devel opme nt, 4.1 The spectre of functionalism consciousness. At a certain stage of their ing relations in confl ict with the exist productive forces of society come ssion for the same thing­ Before embarking in closer detail on the proposed reformulation of production} or-what is but a legal expre they have been at work with the property relations within which of the premIsses of historical materialism, I briefly discuss an the productive forces, these hitherto. From forms of development of Important methodological question. The systems approach which begin s an epoc h of social revolution. relations tum into theirfetters. Then I propose and the evolutionary approach which I shall examine I CW xxix. 263) later have a common reference point in functionalism. And . model only. functIOnalism also plays an important role in Marxism. As van Let me concentrate on two aspeets of this 1 . Marx conceives of the following thre e levels in bourgeois den Berghe put it, society: functionalism and the dialectic share an evolutionary notion of social • relations of production and productive forces, corresponding change. For both Hegel and Marx the dialectic process is an asccnsional . to each other (economic base l, over which emerges a spIral towards progress. The functionalist concept of differentiation • political and legal superstru cture which, in turn, corresponds postulates �n �volutionary growth in structural complexity and func­ . tional speCIfiCIty analogous to biological evolution. Admittedly, these to two evolutlOnary Views are different, and each presents serious diffi­ forms of social consciousness. • . cultle�. We are �ll aware of the pitfalls of organicism, the teleological as standing in a 2. Marx conceives of these three levels , uctive forces deter­ I:�npl�catl��s of progress , and the untenability of assuming that cvolu� relation of determination to each other: prod tlon is umlmear �r has an endpoint , , , Nevertheless, the convergence rmine political and mine relations of production, these dete of the two th�ones o� so�c form of evolutionism suggests that the a certain social con­ legal forms, which in turn give rise to c?nce�t of soclal evolutlOn 1m the minimal sense of change in discernible . various elements in sciousness. I shall propose to disconnect the d,rectIOns) may be Ineseapable. Ivan den Berghe 1963: 703) an autonomous role. the above model and to assign to them all Jon Elster argued that it is almost impossible to find functional politicS, and culture This means that technology, economy, law, explanatIOns m the social sciences. According to him it is own, without com­ are developing according to a logic of their essentially a method which yields good results in biology, but In other words, the pletely losing touch with each other.3 obscures the Issues at hand in the social sciences (Elster 1980: tion of the model proposal is a systems theoretical reformula 125-6).4 ThIs IS so for the following reason: a functional explana­ e all aim at a precise contained in the Prefa ce which would abov tIOn explams an event E as occurring because of its beneficial i.e. technology, are understanding of how productive forces, consequences for something else (X). Or, in his words: stands at the heart of socially shaped. If it is technology which t chances there are of the matter it is important to know wha An institution or a behavioral pattern X is explained by its function Y h are less harmful to for group Z if and only if: bringing into existence technologies whic gs. Only if we have the natural environment and to human bein L Y is an effeet of X; 2. Y is benefieial for Z; ctive forces with technology, an " The reader will notice that I equate produ true for capita list societies. It seems that size and 4 T�e target ?f Elster's criticism was G. A. Cohen's defence of historical equation which is basically . alent role in pre-capitalist societies. With maten�hsm whlch employed a functional explanation. In order to avoid too density of population played an equiv lism, it is clearly techn ology {see Grund risse 400, 529). exegetlcal an argument, I shall leave aside this debate here. capita 184 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 1 85 3. Y is unintended by thc actors producing X; explanations in order to avoid obscure or pre-scientific results. 4. Y-or at least the causal relation between X and Y-is unrecognized Elster would be prepared to accept a functional analysis if the by the actors in Zi mechanisms at work could be shown. Otherwise, for him, it 5. Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. IElster would have the status of a metaphysical notion, it would be 1983b: 571 obscuring matters rather than illuminating them. Now Elster claims that having described the beneficial From the structure of Elster's five conditions and his comments consequences and the occurrence of Y, we do not have an one can conclude that he regards functional explanation as a explanation at all, unless we can show the existence of a feedback variety of causal explanation, since he ties cause and effect in a mechanism which secures that Y will indeed occur. Elster very tight manner.6 The only difference between a functional affirms that no one has any quarrel with functional explanation and a proper causal analysis would thus be the direction in where the mechanism is actually shown to be at work. However, which the causal chain is running ? But this premiss need not 'the hard question is whether one can ever be justified in be accepted blindly. Another proponent of functional analysis setting forward a functional explanation even in the absence of a clearly accepted the criticisms made by authors like Nagel and specific mechanism. In biology this question is to be answered Hempel with respect to the 'strong functionalist' paradigm. In in the affirmative, because the general mechanism of natural 1962, Niklas Luhmann stated that 'it is not immediately possible selection creates a presumption that beneficial consequences to explain Causes by their effects' ILuhmann 1970: 10, my explain their own causes' IElster 1980: 126). According to Elster, translation). The function of an action, seen as effect, cannot be social scientists unfortunately and typically do not satisfy all taken to explain the factual occurrence of that action. Functional five conditions of the above list; and, typically, what is missing analysis thus needs some additional arguments which qualify is the last condition. these effects and functions. 'The functional argument is not to Mary Douglas 1 1986) accepted Elster's demand, insisting at conclude a specific need from an existing "service" [Leistung[ the same time that social sciences cannot do without functional and thus to justify the existence of this service' libid. 15, my explanations. In fact, she defends much of Durkheim's and translation). So far, Elster and Luhmann could agree. But where Merton's programme, rejecting any naive I'arm-waving') func­ Elster is sceptical that such 'microfoundations' can be found lif tionalism. C. A. Cohen took another line of defence when he not on the basis of methodological individualism and causal claimed that there are always mechanisms at work, even when explanation), Luhmann is sceptical that a causal model will be we are not able to show them Isee Cohen 1980: 133-4). This possible at all, assuming that an uncertainty relation obtains epistemological point, however, offers us little resistance against between cause and effect. According to him, it is not possible to bad functionalist arguments of the type 'whenever an event y determine cause and effect simultaneously, for variables in has beneficial consequences it will occur'. I thus take sides with social research typically cannot be separated. For Luhmann, the Douglas and Cohen in insisting on the importance of functional interesting question is thus not: Does A always cause BI But: are analysis for the social sciences,s but also accept Elster'S demand (, Von Foerster ( 1984) coined the term 'trivial machines' to denote the determin­ that in order to have a proper explanation, we need to provide istic connection between input and output, where input is understood as some sort of mechanism. Elster concludes that social scientists sufficient condition for a certain output. One can easily see how this applies to a should be committed exclusively to causal and intentional deterministic cause-effect relationship. 7 Cohen explicitly holds that functional explanations or 'consequence explana" tions' (as he later calls them) are a variety of causal explanations-see Cohen ;:; And, especially, his insistence that game theory cannot replace t�e central (1980: 130). Luhmann holds exactly the opposite POSitiOll, as Berger and Offc assumptions of historical materialism. See also Berger and Offc: 'Loglcally, the rightly observed: 'Luhmann surpriSingly, but plausibly, suggests that we reverse game starts only after the actors have been constituted, and their order of the relationship of "functionality" and "causality", In his view, functional preferences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot themselves be relations are no longer a special subcase of causal relations, but causal relations a considered as part of the game' (Berger and Offe 1982: 525). subcase of functional ones' (Berger and Oifc 1982: 522). 186 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 1 8 7 A, C, 0, E functionally equivalent to produce B? This approach the construction of thc problem Id. Luhmann 1984a: 86) 1O opens up a space for alternative possibilities and a gain in However, Luhmann is not as vulnerable as Cohcn, since he does knowledge. Luhmann consequently characterizes the 'causal not accept the underlying claim regarding scientific research. sciences' as metaphysics, since they try to fix action to invariant According to him, mainstream science is fascinated by a parallel relations between determinant causes and determined effects between the structure of theoretical statemcnts IAussagestruktur) Id. Luhmann 1970: 26). It seems that Luhmann's functional and the structure of the object I Gegenstandsstruktur). l l In fact, analysis does not claim the same explanatory power as, for Luhmann'S decisive turn has been the adaptation of a constructiv­ cxample, Cohen's functionalist explanation lor any causal ex­ ist epistemology. Cohen, on the other hand, shares the premisses planation in gcneral); it is no accident that Luhmann avoids of mainstream science, which makes his position in the debate talking about 'explanations'. His concern is with functional with Elster more vulnerable. equivalents which would give us more illuminating insights One purpose of Elster's Making Sense of Marx was to show than strict causal connections Isee also Berger and Offe that whenever Marx engages in functional analYSiS, he goes 1982). '. astray, and whenever he engages in causal analysis, especially In his Soziale Systeme, Luhmann seems to come close to based on the premisscs of methodological indiVidualism, he Cohen's insistence that functional analysis may be a useful tool arrives at good and valid results. It is beyond the scope of the even in the case where micro-mechanisms cannot be shown to present study to prove the exact oppositc. However, I shall draw be at work, when he writes that the increase in knowledge some attention to this point. Marx alludes several times to the provided by the functional method is based on a comparison of model of natural scienccs with which he tricd to bolster his causal connections which is possible even in cases where we analysis in Capital where we find many references to chemistry, have little knowledge of the causalities involved .' The functional biology, astronomy, physics, and mathematics. His ultimate method is a comparative method which serves as a means for aim was to discover and explain the law of motion of capitalist broadening the viewpoint in order to see other possibilities. It society. He understood this law in close analogy to Newton's tries to find relations between relations, it relates something to discovery of the movements of the plancts. Once the movements · 9 an aspect of a problem in order to compare it to other soIutlOns. and regularities are understood, we can determine the state of Larmore 1 1 982) and others have objected to this view in that the the universe at any point in time, in the past and in the future. relation between these functional equivalents is not clear and We are able to predict eclipses of the sun and the moon or the that arbitrary equivalents could be listed. However, as Luhmann 10 As Luhmann points out, functional analysis does not attempt to justify or asserts, this is not the case. It is decisive that the additional legitimize its object of study, it is a technique of discovering pro�lems which points are limited by the nature and aspects of the problem one have already been solved in reality with the help of system theoreucal assump­ is interested in. Therefore, not everything, but few points can be tions (see Luhmann 1978: 6j. II For a criticism of the 'natural science model' sec also Charles Taylor, added. The real virtue and achievement of this approach lics in according to whom this rests on 'the view that the natural sciences can proVide us with paradigms for the methods and procedures of the social science. We H 'Growth in knowledge as it were cuts across causalities. It resides in their think we understand the activity of exploring nature. Here, too, we arc certainly comparison. One can achieve it even if causalities are understood at first over�complacent. But we tell ourselves a tolerably clear story of what goes on in hypothetically or without being adequately researched' (Luhmann 1984a: 84, natural science, and the very success of our research seems to indicate that we my trans.). . . . have here the norm for science in general. The prestige of this norm then stops <,) 'The functional method is ultimately a comparative onc. And itS mtroduc­ further enquiry' (Taylor 1985: 91-2). Without embarking on an exposition of the tion into reality serves to open up what exists there to other possibilities. question whether there are different sorts of scientific knowledge, we can Ultimately it ascertains relations among relations. It relates something to a propose two general solutions to the problem stated by Taylor: either we look perspective on a problem in order to be able to relate this to oth�rsolutions of the for explanations sui generis in the social realm, or we stick to a 'monist' view, problem. Accordingly, "functional explanation" can be nothmg less than the rejecting, however, the realist epistemology which underpins the natural science ascertainment (in general) and exclusion (in particular) of functional equivalences' model. In the latter case, both natural and social sciences construct their own libid. 85, my trans.}. object of knowledge.  r F' t j 188 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 189 r! return of comets. Marx was convinced that he had found the whole process, which always reproduces its own conditions, take on equivalent for the social world. His supreme task was to show the form of periodicity. (Capital i. 593) that capitalism will lead to its own supersession which is brought In thc first sentence he vindicates the model of classical mech­ about by the laws of motion of capitalism itself. Only if we are anics and tries to apply it for his social scientific analysis. In the aware of this line of thought are we able to understand Marx's second sentence he moves partly away from it in claiming that obsession with cyclical economic crises, the law of the falling effects turn into causes, that there are varying accidents in the rate of profit, the general law of capitalist accumulation, etc. But whole process which give rise to new emerging orders (Eigen­ today these models have less fascination. One important reason zlZstimde, to use a contemporary term). for this is that the natural sciences themselves are moving away lt is interesting to introduce Weber's analysis of religion here. from purely causal models. Authors like Prigogine, Hahn, Weber used the notion of 'elective affinity' (Wahlverwandtschaftl Elgen, von Foerster, and many others doubt the validity of to analyse specific social and cultural developments, such as the causal explanatIOn when analysing complex systems. To predict rise of Protestantism and capitalism. The term stems from the future behaviour of such systems, the usual causal principle chemistry and was taken up by Goethe who wrote a novel with that the same causes lead to the same effects must be made in a that title.13 But it was also known in philosophy where Kant stronger way. The causal principle must be that similar causes employed the term 'affinity'. The 'art of divorce' was his way of must lead to similar effects (d. Krohn and Klippers 1989: 78 1 separating the rational from the empirical. In the final paragraph smce the startmg conditions of systems are never equal but of Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant suggested the 'moral always have minimal variations. As soon as we have minimal sciences' proceed according to the methods of mechanics or deviations �f one system from the other, little causes can lead to chemistry: big effects l 2 But il this is true, the strong version of causality loses Its plauslb,hty. The fascination of the traditional paradigm This example [i.e. mechanics] may suggest to us to enter on the same was based on the belief that behind all eomplexities one will path in treating of the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us find regularity and simplicity. This was plausible in a world in hope of a like good result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement of reason. By analysing these into their elementary concep­ which classical mechanics served as a model for the whole of tions, and in default of mathematics adopting a process similar to that nature. The more this model is losing its paradigmatic eharaeter, of chemistry) the separation of the empirical from the rational elements the less the strong assumptions can convince. The universe is that may be found in them, by repeated experiments on common sense, no watch, the planet is no machine, living beings are no automata we may exhibit both pure, and learn with certainty what each part can (d. ibid. 791. accomplish of itself, so as to prevent on the one hand the errors of a still It may be worth noting that Marx, although relying heavily on cnlde untrained judgement, and on the other hand . . . the extravagances of } claSSIcal mechamcs and especially astronomy, nevertheless lends genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher s stone} without hImself to a more cautious reading. See, for example, the following any methodological study or knowledge of nature} visionary treasures passage from Capital: are promised and true are thrown away. (Kant 1952b: 361, my emphasis) As the heavenly bodies, once thrown into a certain definite motion Weber became familiar with Kant's philosophy via Kuno Fischer always repeat this, so is it with SOci�ll production as soon as it is onc� (see Howe 1978: 377). A logical or analytical affinity was a thrown into this movement of alternate expansion and contraction. 'property of the concepts that they have certain features in Effects, in their turn, become causes, and the varying accidents of the common with other concepts', as the Encyc10piidische Worter­ 12 buch der l<Iitischen Philosophie noted in 1 797 (see Howe 1978: Krohn and Kuppcrs quote the example of E. N. Lorenz who in his studies on 3761. The classical definition was that of Bergman: weather found out that insignificant variations in the date set-up led to com­ , pletely dlffcre nt developments. This was due to an exponential amplification of 1 3 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wablverwandtschaften ( 1 809); see , , the small vanatlons. Howe 1978: 3 7 1 . 190 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 191 Suppose A to be a substance for which other heterogenous substances, Certainly, there have been attempts to define the Marxist a, b, C, &c./ have an attraction; suppose further A combined with c to term of 'determination' exactly in this sensc of 'correspondence', saturation [this unit I shall call Ac), should, upon the addition of b, tend , or 'correlation . 1 8 Cohen too suggests something similar when to unite with it to the exclusion of c, A is then said to attract b more he says that an existing productive force is only compatible with strongly than c, or to have a stronger elective attraction for it; lastly, let a small range of social relations, 1 9 which means that a strict the union of Ab, upon the addition of a, be broken, let b be rejected, and determination does not obtain. Weber's methodological pro­ a chosen in its place, it will follow that a exceeds b in attractive power, gramme is thus a comparatively modest one, in the sense that and we shall have a series a, b, c in respect of efficacy. What I here call attraction, others denominate affinity. (Bergman 1970, cited in Howe it does not establish causal or lawful connections: 'When we 1978: 374-5)14 construct a "stage of culture", then this thought construct, analysed into judgements, means only that the individual appear­ In the climate of the beginning of the twentieth century, with ances that we thereby assemble conceptually are " adequate" to the influence of vulgar Marxists' economic determinism, Weber one another, possess a certain measure of "inner affinity" iinnere tried to escape such a narrow way of thinking using the metaphor Verwandtschaft] . . with one another, but never that they . of elective affinities. The vulgar Marxists' interpretation of follow from one another with any kind of lawfulness' (Weber social life and social evolution was based ( I ) on the base­ 1 930, as cited in Howe 1978: 378). superstructure model which was (2) taken in a causal way (3) Recall, now, Marx's analysis of capitalism and machinery. We with the superstructure explained in purely economic terms. can view it from the Cohen, Luhmann, or Weber standpOint. Engels protested against this interpretation15 but his intervention According to Cohen, we would get a functional relation between hardly settled the debate. Ever since then, orthodox Marxists productive forces and social relations. According to Luhmann, have had enormous difficulties in handling the relations in the there may be functional equivalents to actual solutions and we base-superstructure mode!. 16 Against this poor model, and the should avoid the mistake of regarding the actual as the 'necessary' confusion which it caused, Weber suggested another analytical and inescapable solution. Piore and Sable, for example, claim model, as, for example, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of that handicraft production (combined with computer technology) Capitalism: , may well be a 'functional 20 alternative to industrial mass In view of the tremendous confusion of interdependent influences production (Piore and Sable 1984). According to Weber, there between the material basis, the forms of social and political organization, must obtain 'elective affinities' between the elements which and the ideas current in the time of the Reformation, we can only form a unit. The question of whether machinery is compatible proceed by investigating whether and at what points certain correlations with communist society may serve as an example here. As we [Wahlverwandtschaftenl between forms of religious belief and practical ethics can be worked out. IWeber 1930: 9 1 ) " forms of social and political organization, and the intellectual and spiritual contents of the cultural epochs of the Reformation, one can proceed only by first of all inquiring as to whether and in what points definite elective affinities 14 'From chemistry and Bergman would come the basic paradigm of elective between certain forms of its religious faith and its work ethic are discernible' affinity; from literature and Goethe, its application to the portrayal of social relationships; from philosophy and Kant, the art of divorce of the empirical from [Howe 1978: 3681. See also Schluchter 198 1 : 142. I f! the rational and the affinity of all things in their possibility' (Howe 1978: 382). See Raymond Williams's suggestion that a determination sets only limits IS See his letters to Joseph Bloch, 2 1-22 Sept. 1890, and to Conrad Schmidt, and does not determine {bestimmenj in the strong sense (Williams 1977: 83-9). 27 Oct. 1890, both in MEW xxxvii; to Franz Mehring, 14 July 1893, and to W. But the problem is not just a semantic one of how to translate the German Borgius, 25 Jan. 1894, both in MEW xxxix. 'bestimmen', since Engels already had trouble explaining what 'bestimmend in 16 Thousands of scholars since then have been looking for the 'last instance' letzter Instanz' meant (see above). or 'relative autonomy'. [<) The undcrdetermination of the relations by the forces of production is 17 Unfortunately, Parsons translated Wahlverwandtschafl as correlation deVeloped in Cohen 1978: 163-5. instead of elective affinity. Howe's translation reads as follows: 'in view of the 20 1 put 'functional' in quotation marks because the authors themselves do immense confusion of reciprocal influences between the material bases, the not use the term. 192 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 193 have seen in Chapter 3, Marx was ambiguous about this problem. other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers' I Capital i. In the Manuscripts 1861-3, he regarded machinery as inherently 668). The capitalist mode of production 'produces not merely deskilling, leading to the enslaving and crippling of human the material products, but reproduces continually the production beings. In Capital, he revised this position, stressing the co­ relations in which the former are produced, and thereby also the operative character of mass production and blaming only the corresponding distribution relations' I Capital iii. 879). social form, that is, capitalism which employs machinery. From In both cases the 'crutches' of pre-capitalist modes of production the viewpoint of present-day Western societies we might add could be thrown away. We are thus in both cases dealing with the effects of machinery on the natural environment. In the self-referential operations: production of capital by means of following sections I shall thus try to establish some possible capital, production of machinery by means of machinery. It relations between capitalism and machinery, postponing the seems tempting to apply autopoietic systems theory to these question of communism to Chapter 5. two processes since Marx himself conceives the material and the social as self-referential processes 23 4.2 Capitalism and machinery as autopoietic systems? " Autopoietic theory has been developed in biology IMaturana 1982; Varela 1979, 1981; Maturana and Varela 1980) and in The starting-point for my elaboration here is the curious way in social theory Ifor example, Luhmann 1984a; Hej1 1982; Willke which Marx links capitalism and machinery. He wants to stress 1983, 1986, 1987; Teubner 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989a, 1989b).24 that capital has found in machinery its adequate mode of pro­ , This 'emerging paradigm 25 takes as its point of departure the duction IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2142-41, which is to say that before the concepts of 'self-reference', basic circularity, and operative closure use of machinery the mode of production could not be called of social systems. However, as has been emphasized by several capitalist: authors ITeubner 1987, 1989a; Roth 1987; Buhl 1987; Zolo Modern Industry had therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its 1 99 1 ), one has to be careful not to mix up the concepts of self­ characteristic instrument of production, and to construct machines by referentiality, self-reproduction, and autopoiesis. machines. It was not till it did this, that it built up for itself a fitting Autopoietic theory defines system and environment in a technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. ICapital i. 363)22 different way from 'General Systems Theory'; it combines systems theoretical elements with evolutionary theory and With respect to the social form, he says that only from that point constructivist epistemology. In some versions, like Luhmann'S, on, where capital exists in its 'pure' form Ii.e. essentially as it tries to overcome basic theoretical difficulties of older socio­ capital-labour relation), does it stand on its own feet and is logical approaches, like Parsons's structural functionalism or therefore capitalist in the real sense of the word. General Systems Theory. The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the How is an autopoietic system defined? Stichweh, following labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own feet, it not 23 Sztompka ( 1 974: 177) has claimed that 'Marx may be pronounced the forefather of the modern systems approach in social sciences'. In an illuminat­ only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually ing article, Amburgery and McQuarie try to interpret Marx's categories in a extending scale. ICapital i. 668, amended translation) systems theoretic way. In contrast to Cohen, who stresses the primacy of the productive forces, Amburgery and McQuarie emphasize the 'reciprocal linkages This is a process which 'transforms, on the one hand, the social between the various subsystems of this model' (Amburgery and McQuarie 1977: means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the 100). 24 For a critique which is not completely hostile to the concept of autOpoiesis 21 This section owes much to discussions I had with Gunther Teubner. as such, but doubts the validity of using it in broad analogy to biology as a new 12 Grundrisse 699; d. also MEGA II. iii. 6. 2059. It would be interesting to ask 'super-paradigm', see Buhl 1987. if this is also true the other way round. In other words, can we assume that 25 Some authors call it a 'revolutionary paradigm', d. Krohn, Kiippcrs, and machinery has found in capital its adequate social expression? Paslack 1987. 194 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 195 Luhmann, gives four criteria which must be fulfilled to call a munications. Technology could even be conceived of as a self­ social system autopoietic: referential and self-reproductive process: whenever engineers 1 . operational closure: operations of the system relate only to are constructing a new technology, they are likely to take operations of the same system; machines and textbooks of colleagues as models Isee Rammert 2. definition of its own elements: the systemic process defines 1988). However, technology cannot be conceived as exclusively what will function as its elements; based on meaning, as other social systems can. It would be 3. production of its own elements: an autopoietic system is a absurd to see the essential elements in a thus conceived techno­ network of processes which produce elements for this logical social system as consisting of communicative events. system; What gives technology its specific role in social life is, on the 4. self-definition of the system-boundary Isee Stichweh 1987: contrary, that some of its basic elements are material in character. 448-9). In addition to the above definition of a social system, Luhmann calls a social system an autopoietic system in so far as it is Someone might propose to apply criteria 1 1 )-13) to technology and say that technology is operationally closed and has clearly a recursively closed system} which can neither derive its operations defined elements. He would probably describe technology as a from its environment nor pass them on to that environment. It cannot system of instrumental artefacts which produces instrumental communicate with the environment but it can and must necessarily artefacts.26 Taking this assumption for granted for the sake of communicate about the environment . . . This is a very clear} very unequivocal state of affairs} which does not pose any fundamental the argument, we could therefore say that technology is opera­ difficulties in the concept of unity or in the demarcation of the system tionally closed. Turning to the elements of the system, we from the environment . . . [Tbe system) does not, for example, consist of might say that it does not matter which substances the elements physical events nor of isolated individual behaviouL ILuhmann 1988a: of an autopoietic system consist of Ithey may be books, 18-19, emphasis added) factory buildings, banks, or persons), because 'elements' of the system are not things or persons, but operations. However, as According to Luhmann's position, 'An autopoietic system . . . will become clear in a moment, such a proposition fails for two constitutes the elements of which it consists through the reasons: I I ) technology cannot be conceived as a social sub­ elements of which it consists' libid. 14). Elements of a system of society; 12) the material aspect of technology has social system are events or communications. Events 'have no not to be neglected: technology is not only a 'meaning-based duration in which they can change, but disappear immediately system'. According to Luhmann, a social system 'consists of on their emergence . . . Since the social system . . . consists of meaningful communications-only of communications, and of nothing but communications, it belongs to this type of system all communications. It forms its elementary units from the that consists of events' ILuhmann 1988b: 341-2). From this synthesis of information, communication, comprehension . . .' account it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive technology ILuhmann 1988a: 18). To be sure, technology could be conceived as a social system-it would only be possible if technology is as a specialized social communication which can be defined defined in a broad way Isee ch. 3).17 Take first the aspect of apart from political, religiOUS, economic, and scientific com- 27 From Luhmann's quote it also becomes clear that Marx's thought and 26 autopoietic theory are located on two different 'ontological' levels: the former It would be production of technology by means of technology (to allude to Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means 0/ Commodities). Taken in the assumes that societies are able to have direct contact with their environment, above sense, technology would be a special case of commodity. A commodity is the latter denies exactly this and insists on the purely communicative dimen­ the unity of exchange-value and use-value. There seems to be no problem in sion of society. For Marx, the possibility that society has a direct contact with regarding value production as a self-referential process. But what about use­ nature was at the very heart of his theory. As we saw, he regarded the conscious values and, speCifically, technology? Marx himself gave us a few hints to transformation of nature as the precondition for history. For autopoietic theory, conceive technology in terms of basic circularity; sec e.g. Capital L 363; on the other hand, an environment 'out there' docs not exist; what exists is only Grundrisse 699. As I shall argue, this line of argument cannot be maintained. system-internal constructions of reality. I return to this problem below. 196 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 197 events. Since technology produces durable artefacts, it hardly presupposes energy capable of being bound. In the formation of systems, falls under the category of an 'event'. Consider, next, the aspect then, there is never any kind of recreation of the world in each of communication. Technology may be conceived of in com­ individual case. This materiality continuum which has in each case to municative terms as well. This is the case when, for example, be presupposed takes no heed of the system boundaries of the differen­ engineers discuss the design of a new machine, or when politicians tiating systemj it is both inside and outside the system. It nevertheless limits the possibilities of system formation, since only such systems confer on the problem of dangerous technologies. But the 'essence' are possible that are compatible with the materiality continuum. The of technology can hardly be grasped with the notion of commu­ emergence of social systems based on meaning processing presupposes nication alone. Technology typically produces 'a machine, a the existence of a multiplicity of such materiality continua and is thus drug, or a process of Some kind' (Price 1982: 1 70). rather improbable. (Luhmann 1988b: 338) Luhmann additionally brings to bear a further criterion: every functional subsystem of society has its own 'binary code' which Social systems rest on this material continuum but operate on organizes its operations. For example, he defines money as the the basis of social meaning. In so doing, they are constructing code of the economy, power as the code of the political system, their own social reality. So far the use of the notion of material truth as the code of the scientific system, etc. The point of continuum is in accordance with Luhmann's use. However, I Luhmann's argument is that the autonomy of the various social think we can make use of it in another respect as well. It fulfils systems consists in their coding: it is the economy which the function of keeping together the different social systems decides what counts as payment and what does not; it is the 'from below'. It makes plausible the claim that politics, economy, political system which decides what counts as power and what and science not only are occasionally or punctually in contact does not; it is the scientific discipline which decides what but are coupled on the basis of this material continuum. This counts as scientific knowledge (truth) and what does not. It provides the 'material basis' for the linkage of the social systems. follows as a corollary that politics cannot solve problems of The potential financial reward of a technological invention science, the economy cannot solve problems of the political links technology immediately to the economic system, perhaps system, science cannot solve problems of the economy, etc. without giving much importance to science. Science is part of In this sense a technological system is neither a social nor an the environment of the economy, that is, inventions depart autopoietic system. It is the realm in which mankind organizes from an available given standard of scientific knowledge. If for its Stoffwechsel with nature.'8 This is a process which proceeds political reaSons research is directed towards certain goals, it is partly by means of communication, partly by means of material the political system which gives rise to that research. The transformation of the environment. From my definition and the financing involves the economic system too. The political system discussion in section 3.3 it follows that the material dimension may also enhance technological development in a direct way by is crucial for the concept of technology. Luhmann's theory also subsidizing innovative firms. draws attention to this material element as the 'eternal presup­ At this point a basic objection could be made. As I discussed position' for social systems: Marx's model of Stoffwechsel, it was clear that society (by virtue of its ArbeitsprozefJ) had the possibility of transforming All systems form in a presupposed materiality continuum, which the environment in a physical way. It is precisely this possibility Maturana calls medium. For example, they presuppose a structure of that is denied by Luhmann. It is impossible for society to derive matter rooted in atoms, just as the formation of atoms obviously operations from its environment and to pass operations on to that environment. How can we, then, reconcile the proposed 2" Technology should thus be defined as '.allopoietic' because of its hetero­ systems approach with Marx's analysis of technology? Are the geneous character (ef. Maturana 1982: 159). It is essentially instrumental, a pool of skills and knowledge which is linked to all other systems: science, economy, two theories mutually exclusive since they presuppose different and politics. ontologies? 198 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 199 I shall not doubt that the theories are ontologically disparate. can show that the social impact on technological development However, they are by no means incompatible. The solution is considerable. Before explaining this, I shall briefly address the draws on the notion of 'materiality continuum' which is presup­ self-referentiality of technology. posed by systemic operations and which is inside and outside In a particularly useful essay, Hughes addresses the problem social systems. of identifying a technological system when he says that '[t[ech­ In Marx, the labour process is a goal-orientated transformation nological systems solve problems or fulfil goals using whatever of nature which takes place with tools (or processes) and is means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do zweckrational, i.e. determined by means-ends relationships. mostly with re-ordering the physical world in ways considered From this goal-orientation it follows that technology stands in a useful or desirable' (Hughes 1987: 53). However, his approach close relationship to rational human action or to a systemic is not informed by autopoietic theory. Rather, so it seems, he rationality: the goals are in most cases clearly defined by tech­ remains with a model which conceives systems as open, input­ nical imperatives: produce product x!, solve problem Y!, adjust using, and output-producing. But then how do we distinguish a 2! whereas autopoietic systems do not have a final goal, end, or technological system from any other system? Or are all social 'telos'. The product and goal of their working are they themselves. systems varieties of one, ali-embracing technological system? When Marx analysed the valorization process (capitalist eco­ In this case we could conceive of the technological system as a nomy), he employed a method which imagines traits of 'basic subsystem of every social system: politics, law, economy, and circularity' and self-reference, even of autopoiesis.29 The capitalist art use technologies.3l Hughes is also aware of the difficulty economy is an auropoietic system par excellence (see also when endorsing the wide definition of technology. He thus tries Breuer 1987). But, as we have seen, it is not possible to extend to make the following qualification to the definition of techno­ this analogy to the process of use-value production as such, to logy: 'It is problem solving usually concerned with the re-order­ man's transformation of nature, in short, to technology. ing of the material world to make it more productive of goods These considerations suggest that the possibilities of influ­ and services' (ibid., my emphasis). However, the criterion encing technology are not so small. It seems that pessimistic of productivity is basically an economic one, that is, technology analyses which have it that technology has slipped out of itself cannot measure its own 'productivity'. Engineers who control of human action (Ellul 1964; see also Winner 1977) tell work in the field of machines and power transformation usually only half the truth: it is true, indeed, that technology is evolving use Leistungsgrad (performance) as an indicator for the efficiency according to its own Sachgesetzlichkeit ('technical imperatives'), of their products, but this physical criterion is quite different moves in the way of 'trajectories', and cannot be determined by from efficiency in the economic or social sense. This leads to the individual action. Furthermore, it is true that attempts to change paradoxical situation in which a distinction is applied to itself, for existing technologies in some desired direction must fit three example, Is it legal that law distinguishes between the legal and different logics or 'systemic codes'. This narrows down the illegal? (See, for example, Fletcher 1985; Luhmann 1988c.) In range of feasible possibilities. But it is not true that technology our case we could ask: is a new productive device productive or as such develops according to its own logic linner code), or even not? This is to say that technology stands in a relation of moves away from the human world. A pessimistic argument augmentation to itself. What counts as more productive is open would have to show that all technologies have merged together to debate. A higher energy-balance need not be more efficient in into one autonomous technological trajectory which cannot be the economic sense.32 This historical record of capitalism so far changed.3D But theoretical considerations and empirical evidence .11 See Weber 1978: 32, Ellul 1964. 29 See his definition of capital as essentially referring to itself, as automatisches t n . It may be noted that Hughes's solution resorts to actor models where an Subjck,' (Das Kapi'aI i. 169 1 . actor measures and defines progress. It sounds ironic, but to make his system JO See Adorno and Horkheimer 1981 as an illustration of such pessimism. approach work, he needs a systems builder, Le. a person who forges the  200 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 201 shows that economic criteria played a crucial role in this evalua­ he tried to evaluate the possibilities for a communist society tion. The successful entrepreneur has most importantly to ('forwards'-orientated).35 unite economic and engineering skills and knowledge." But Recent studies in the history and sociology of technology are today other factors are entering this evaluation. For example, strongly opposed to technological determinism (Pinch and Bijker effects on the natural environment which are recorded by scienti­ 1987; Hughes 1987; Law 1987; MacKenzie 1987) and arguefor a fic research, monitored by politics, and transformed into decisions strong social determinism. Pinch and Bijker try to apply the which are based on some social acceptability of technologies 'strong programme' (developed in the sociology of science) to ('technology assessment' and 'Sozial- und Umweltvertraglich­ technology. The label they adopt therefore is 'Social construc­ keit'). tion of technology' (SCOT). The starting-point for their approach Having rejected the notions of an 'autonomous' technology is the Kuhnian notion of scientific paradigm, especially as further and of technological system, I now ask: How shall we conceive developed by Mulkay and others. Whereas Kuhn restricted his of the coevolution of technology and society? Is technology at analysis to the natural sciences, several attempts have been any point in time SOCially determined and hence subjected to made to extend it to the social sciences. Pinch and Bijker now human design? Instead of determining life, is it not itself com­ try to apply it to technology, thus claiming that technology, just pletely determined by social arrangements? I deal with this like natural and social sciences, is a social construction which question in two steps. gets stabilized during a process of 'closure', that is, technologists 1 . As far as the question juxtaposes social and technological come to agree on a specific technology as the solution to a determinism, it is paralleled by a similar ambivalence in Marx. specific problem. There is nothing 'inheren tly' superior in a As I suggested above (see s. 3.4), Marx believed in both techno­ technology which becomes dominant over competing tech­ logical determinism and social determinism because of a twofold nologies; it is simply a matter of convention. From this it theoretical interest. Its first element is historical: to find out follows that a history of technology has to dispense with the which variable 'explains most'; the second element is critical: idea that dominant technologies are 'better' technologies in to estimate the technological and social possibilities and require­ comparison to others. The point is to treat successful and ments for a communist society. From this follows Marx's reduc­ unsuccessful technologies in the same way ('symmetry of ex­ tionism and his determinisim of one sort or another. There is planation') and to show how contingent factors led to a decision nothing wrong with reductionism and determinism if it is which selected this or that technology. In my view this approach is supported by certain theoretical assumptions and empirical a good starting-point for any sociological analysis of technology. evidence. My suspicion is, however, that Marx was led astray by However there are two comments I should like to make. The this approach. He wavered between a social and a technological first is th�t the notion of 'social shaping' is too vague. As I have determinism depending on his prevailing theoretical interest. In shown above, the 'social' must be further decomposed into a very rough way,"4 we can say that he was a technological social subsystems (politicS, economics, and science) in order to determinist when he tried to explain historical development trace the inner dynamics of technology. From this it follows ( 'backwards'-orientated), but became a social determinist when that it is not sufficient that 'technological closure' takes place; the technology which is successful in the 'middle run' has to be heterogeneous elements together and takes care that new technology will be compatible with economic and political factors as well. The more productive. second point is that Pinch and Bijker try to employ their argu­ 33 As Schumpeter put it, '[ilt is therefore quite wrong . . . to say, as so many ment as an argument .against an evolutionary view of technology. economists do, that capitalist enterprise was onc, and technological progress a second, distinct factor in the observed development of output; they were They assume that once they Gan show that a process of closure essentially one and the same thing' (Schumpetcr 1987: 1 10, see also 132). .�5 As we saw in 55. 3.5 and 3.6, the two approaches can be found in a nearly ,{4 For the necessary qualifications, see s. 3.4. ideal�typ�cal way in the Manuscripts 1861-3 and in Capital. 202 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 203 takes place in the technological field, this is evidence against an 1 1 984) maintain, there exist specific 'branching points' in the evolutionary view of technology. But this assumption is com­ development of technology which make 'human choice' possible. pletely mistaken; the contrary follows from their argument. To But apart from the strong notion of social construction of disprove an evolutionary view it is not sufficient to show that technology, we should consider another possibility which goes intentional human actions and choices are at work. As the beyond the question of 'determination'. In this view technology example of the deck of cards lef. Weick 1979) can show, an is conceived of as having some 'eigendynamics' lin the sense attribution of the label 'evolution' to any development of an that technical properties inhibit or enhance certain technological entity over time depends in the first place on the criteria of order developments), but is at the same time shaped by social factors. which an observer wants to apply Isee also s. 3 . 1 .2). Let me thus return again, this time in more detail, to evolutionary Thomas P. Hughes admits that technological systems 'are theory. both socially constructed and society shaping' IHughes 1987: 5 1 ). Viewing technology as system, he comes close to attributing an autonomous development to it. However, Hughes refuses to 4.3. Evolution and Darwinian systems subscribe to such a notion. He coins the term 'momentum' for the phenomena that technological systems consolidate and Since Marx's analysis explicitly attempts an evolutionary ex­ grow. As he explicitly points out, '[mJomentum . . . remains a planation of productive forces and mode of production, we more useful concept than autonomy. Momentum does not might look a little more closely at Darwinian systems. Eigen contradict the doctrine of social construction of technology, and and Schuster 1 1977, 1978a, 1978b) have emphaSized the follow­ it does not support the erroneous belief in technological deter­ ing properties of Darwinian systems which they regard as their minism. The metaphor encompasses both structural facts and 'necessary prerequisites': contingent events' libid. 80). I think this formulation makes the The essential requirement for a system to be self�selective is that it has point very well: what is needed is a theory which is capable of to stabilize certain structures at the expense of others . . . The criteria combining structural and contingent events. Hughes, however, for evaluation must involve some feedback property, which ensures does not offer much of such a theory. Unfortunately, he limits the identity of value and dynamic stability. An advantageous mutant, himself to historical illustration and very weak theoretical once produced as a consequence of some fluctuation, must be able to generalizations. On the one hand, he doubts the autonomy of amplify itself in the presence of a large excess of less advantageous technology libid. 79), on the other he concedes that '[IJarge competitors. IEigen and Schuster 1977: 547) systems with high momentum tend to exert a soft determinism The 'advantageous mutant' in our case is, of course, the machine. on other systems, groups, and individuals in society' libid. 54-5, But Marx's theory also contains an evolutionary scheme for the my emphasis). But how can technology exert a determining modes of production. The ' advantageous mutant' in this case is force if it is not autonomous? This question leads to the second capitalist commodity production. Generally speaking, the new step of my discussion. emerges as a result of recombinations of the already existing, as 2. As far as the question juxtaposes autonomous and hetero­ Loh emphasized: during development and change the new does nomous systems the following can be said. It seems that it is not not simply supplement the already existing but is constituted possible to impress a specific shape on existing technology at from the pre-existing by means of development of the form ILoh any time in any direction. Such attempts are likely to fail in one 1975: 261 ). Purely incremental change need not lead to evolu­ of three senses: these attempts may be dysfunctional, irrelevant, tionary change of forms. According to Schumpeter's striking or detrimental to the acting system it elf.'" As Piore and Sabel phrase, you may 'add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby' ISchumpeter 1934: 54). 36 Cf. Teubner's 'regulatory trilemma'; Teubner 1985. We can conceive the evolution of technology Imachinery) and 204 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 205 mode of production Icommodity production) in isolation from tion. Before the advent of capitalism, all these elements lalso the each other and in coevolution with each other. The first would model machine mill) had existed in niches. As we shall see, Marx apply to machines which emerged long before eapitalism. It is is never suffiCiently clear on whether technology is a 'self­ the case of specialization and differentiation that Marx refers to. replicative unit' or a 'functional linkage' -'8 They were the precondition for the rise of machinery. The two Eigen and Schuster list several properties of the so-called model machines which the sixteenth century inherited from hypercycle, of which the seventh is of special interest here: antiquity were the clock and the mill id. Marx's letter to Engels 'Selection of a hypercycle is a "once-for-ever" decision. In any of 28 Jan. 1863. Note that neither machine is hasedon a deskilling common Darwinian system mutants offering a selective advan­ of the handicraft worker.) Capital also existed before capitalism, tage can easily grow up and become established. Their growth above all in the form of money-capital. The interesting question, properties are independent of the population size . . . a hypercycle, then, is how the two came into touch with each other, triggering once established, can not easily be replaced by any newcomer, off hitherto unknown technological dynamism. since new species always emerge as one copy lor a few)' IEigen One of Marx's implicit theoretical tasks was to provide an and Schuster 1978a: 4 1 ). With these methodological tools, we explanation for the fact that out of a variety of technologies and may read the following passages from the Manuscripts 1 861-3 modes of production the capitalist mode and machinery, com­ and gain new insight into the problems with which Marx was bined together, became the successful ones and drove out all confronted in his enterprise. , In the following passage, Marx stresses the gradual development others lor pushed them into 'niches ).37 The mechanism of the self-organizing hypercycle is described by Eigen and Schuster in of modes of production and technology using an analogy to the following way: geology: Functional integration of an ensemble consisting of several self­ As, with the sequence of different geological formations, one should replicative units requires the introduction of catalytic links among all not believe in sudden and sharply distinguished periods, the same is partners. These linkages, superimposed on the individual replication true of the making of the different economic formations of society. In cycles of the subunits, must form a closed loop, in order to stabilize the the womb of artisan production the beginnings of manufacture developed 'ensemble via mutual control of all population variables. Independent and here we already find a partial usage of machinery. (MEGA II. iii. 6. competitors, which under certain spatial conditions and for limited 1972) time spans may coexist in 'niches', as well as catalytic chains or Note that Marx, while speaking of 'economic modes of produc­ branchcd networks are devoid of self-organizing propcrties, typical of tion', gives examples of technologies in order to distinguish them: hypercycles. Mere coexistence is not sufficient to yield coherent growth and evolution of all partners of an cnsemble. (Eigen and Schustcr artisan production, manufacture, and machines. Evolutionary 1978a: 40- 1 ) theory also stresses the gradual development, the emerging of one form out of another: 'Evolution is conservative and therefore Recall here Marx's description of capitalism where machines appears to be an almost continuous process, apart from occasional are built by machines, capital produced by capital, and, as a drastic changes. Selection is in fact based on instabilities brought precondition, labourers are separated from all means of produc- about by the appearance of advantageous mutants that cause 37 Ballmer and von Weizsacker criticized Eigen and Schuster's model of formerly stable distribution to break down. The descendants, the hypercycle for not allowing for 'niches': 'Eigen leaves isolation out of however, are usually so closely related to their immediate the picture. However, this is a factor of equal importance with mutation and ancestors that changes emerge very gradually' IEigen lind se�ecti?n' ( �alll11er and von Weizsacker 1974: 248, my trans.}. This neglect mIght mhlba. the very emergence of evolution: 'Eigen's theory builds up its own Schuster 1978b: 367). I think it is revealing to confront this decisive barrier against an evolution beyond the stage of hypercycles: the strategy of extirpation of the successful hypercycle against all others which is .,� See von Neumann 1966 for an exposition of how we may conceive of laid Out in Eigen's quasi-physical criterion of fitness' (ibid.). machines capable of self-replication. 206 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 207 statement with the following three passages from Marx: 'The adaptation to very simple operations-is one of the technological, general law, however, which is constant, is that the material material preconditions for the development of maci1inery as an element possibility of the later form is produced in the former, as regards which revolutionizes the mode and relations ofproduction. (MEGA II. both the technological conditions, and the corresponding eco­ iii. 6. 1914, my emphasis) nomic structure of the atelier' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973). Consider first the causal interpretation. According to this the Compare also the following illuminating passage from the division of labour leads to ('causes') differentiation and special­ Grundrisse: 'It must be kept in mind that the new forces of ization of the work instruments, which constitutes the material production and relations of production do not develop out of condition for the development of machinery. Machinery, in nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb of the self­ turn, is one of the elements which leads to a revolution of the positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing mode and the relations of production. If we leave aside the development of production and the inherited, traditional relations division of labour for a moment, we get the sequence shown in of property' (Grundrisse 278). Fig. 4. 1 . And in the Manuscripts 1 861-3: Here we have to remark above all that we are not dealing with a precise ) Sx T, technological divide but with a revolution in the employed means of production which transforms the mode of production and therefore the relations of production. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1915) 1 Tb ) Sy Once the revolution of the productive forces has been achieved (which reveals itself technologicallYl} a revolution in the relations of production also occurs. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973) F I G . 4.1 It may be said that these quotes strongly support a technological­ Technology T" leads to social revolution and eventually to determinist view of history, that is, the emergence of the social form Sx' Within this social form Sx a new technology Tz, machine caused the change in the relations of production: after arises which brings about social form Sy. Note that we have both the revolution in productive forces comes a revolution in the a technological and a social determinism here: T,,->Sx stands for relations of production. Butthere need not be a causal relation. the technological, Sx-> Tz, stands for the social determinism. Marx only says that with technological revolution a social There is a causal effect of technology on the social form before a revolution also occurs. Technical and social revolution could revolution and a causal effect of the social form on technology thus be parallel processes, without causal links. This interpreta­ after a revolution. The canonical source for a technological tion is further supported by Marx's affirmation that not only determinism is the 1859 Preface; support for social determinism is present technology but also the present mode of production found in the following passages from Capital i: must have forerunners in the previous evolutionary stage when he says that 'the later form is produced in the former, as regards At a given stage in its development, the narrow technical basis on both the technological conditions, and the corresponding eco­ which manufacture rested, came into conflict with requirements of nomic structure' (cf. above, quote from MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973). production that were created by manufacture itself. (Capital i. 347) This allows two possibilities of conceiving the 'social' and the Manufacture produced the machinery, by means of which Modern 'technical': a causal and a functional model of historical change. Industry abolished handicraft and manufacturing systems in those We may interpret the following passage in both ways: spheres of production that it first seized upon. The factory system was therefore raised, in the natural course of things, on an inadequate The differentiation} specialization, and simplification of tools in foundation. When the system attained to a certain degree of develop­ manufacture which is based on the division of labour-their exclusive ment, it had to root up this ready�made foundation, which in the  208 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 209 meantime had been elaborated on the old lines, and to build up for itself a basis that should correspond to its mcthods of production. (Capital i. 4.3.1 . A machino-capitalist hypercyc1e 361) Using the definition of Eigen and Schuster as heuristic device, I In both cases the 'requirements' or the 'methods of production' shall now try to define the 'self-replicative units', the 'catalytic are the driving force which cause a change in technology. This is links', and the 'closed loop'. In a first tentative approach, the a clear illustration that the growth of the productive forces has 'self-replicative units' might be listed as follows: to be explained in a social way. Consider now the second 1 . capital; possibility (see Fig. 4.2): 2. labour power; 3. machines; 4. raw materials. In Marx's view, as laid out in the 1859 Preface and elsewhere, s, productive forces, relations of production, and the superstructure stabilize each other. Elements ( 1 )-(4) from the above list all F I G . 4.2 existed before capitalism; the 'capitalist hypercycle', however, is structured by the recomposition of all elements.4o ( 1 )-(4) are In the language of Eigen and Schuster this is a case of 'functional commodities which can be bought on the market; they fuse integration'. Such a functional integration requircs 'catalytic together in the production process where ( 1 )-12) constitute a links' between the self-replicative units. These linkages must social relation, 12)-13) a technical relation, 12)-14) the elements form a closed loop in order to stabilize the ensemble (see Eigen of 1 1 ) lvalue) under the aspect of use-value.4l But if Marx links up and Schuster 1978a: 40- 1 ). Similarly, Marx wants to establish a machinery and capitalism in such a definite way, it is impossible kind of 'elective affinity' between machinery and capitalism. to speak of 'Maschinerie an sich', independent of Ibad) capitalist This elective affinity has the following traits. Capital as 'pro­ use: machinery is capitalistic, capitalism is machinery. Conse­ cessing value' does not know any limits. Likewise, machinery quently, the historical perspective must change: a post-capitalist does not depend on craft skills of workers nor on an increased society must also be a post-machinery society. From the Poverty working population in order to produce more commodities: the of Philosophy onwards, where he says 'The handmill gives you sale limits are physical (raw materials) and technical in character. the feudal lord',42 Marx has a curious theoretical scheme in As a result, a worker who is employed by capitalist machinery becomes dispossessed in two ways: in the technological realm, 40 In the Grundrisse Marx emphasizes that the separation of these elements he gets dispossessed of his skill, in the economic realm, of the was the outcome of a long historical process of dissolution of old forms of production. 'It is not the case that capital creates the objective conditions of product of his labour.39 Note that in the case of a functional labour' (Grundrisse, Berlin edn,: 406; my trans.). Capital is the product of an integration we have a coevolution of social forms and techno­ evolutionary process, as are the instruments of work. 'The merit of capital logies. When Cohen says that 'slavery rules out computer tech­ consists only in uniting hands and instruments !which it has already found) under its control' (ibid. 407; my trans.). nology, but also computer technology rules out slavery' (Cohen 41 Marx additionally emphasizes that ( 1 ) and (3) dominate 12l; since 'domin" 1 9 78 : 153), I shall leave open for the moment the question ation' has no place in Darwinian systems, I shall leave this aside here. whether capitalism with, say, craft technology as dominant 42 'Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing technology is equally impossible (see ch. 5). their mode of production, in changing their way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The handmill gives you society with the feudal 3 9 I leave aside here whether this expropriation i s 'just' o r 'unjust'-see the lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitaHst' (eW vi. 166). The contributions in Cohen et ai. 1980 and Geras 1986 for a good discussion and a example of the handmill may be historically untenable (see Elster 1985), but complete overview of the literature. here I want to emphasize that it was Marx's aim to find such correspondences.  • 210 Historical Materialism r Historical Materialism 2 1 1 mind. It consists of the law-like connection of ( I ) forces of produc­ assume that all good things go together-d. Elster 1985 and tion, (2) mode of production, and (3) relations of production. The Lukes 1985. most significant and famous expression of this is to be found in the On the level of (3) relations of production, we have slavery, 1859 Preface and is commonly called 'historical materialism'. feudalism, capitalism, and communism. (i) corresponds to anti­ My claim is that Marx attributes to each of these analytical quity, (ii) to capitalism, and (iii) to communism. Note that there units an elementary form:' as the folloWing scheme shows. I corresponds an ethical evolutionary scheme (Grundrisse 158 consider all cases in turn. In the case of ( I ) productive forces it and German Ideology ( eW v. 78-9)), where Marx says that is artisan-, manufacture-, and machine-production. In the case individuals were freer before the advent of capitalism. Habermas of (2) mode of production it is use-value and commodity produc­ seems to be more optimistic as regards the evolutionary potential tion ('The commodity is the elementary form of bourgeois of the 'ethical realm' when he says: wealth'). The crucial point around which Political Economy Whereas Marx localized the learning process important for evolution in revolved, and which only Marx solved (so he claimed), was his the dimension of objective thought-of technical and organizational discovery that in capitalism the product (i.e. the commodity) knowledgeJ of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of productive reflects the double character of labour which is embodied in it. forces-there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning In other words: the commodity unites use-value and exchange­ processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical value just as labour unites use-value-orientated concrete labour knowledge . . . learning processes that are deposited in more mature and exchange-value-orientated, surplus-producing abstract forms of social integration, in new productive relations, and that in labour. Marx explicitly credited himself with this discovery (see turn first make possible the introduction of new productive forces. (Habermas 1979: 97-9) his letter to Engels of 8 Jan. 1 868). In his evolutionary model we get the sequence Ii) use-value, The Middle Ages already partly produced commodities. Antiquity (ii) exchange-value (commodity), and again (iii) use-value produc­ and communism have a social character of production. The first tion. As in ancient Greece, the Middle Ages (i.e. its artisans) is regulated by blind rules, the second by a conscious plan (and were producing essentially use-value, not primarily exchange­ the application of science). In feudalism and, above all, in value. This is the crucial point for Marx. But he cannot simply capitalism, the market co-ordinates the many independent private return to the Middle Ages or to antiquity since he wants to producers.44 If we represent these three evolutionary strands establish a use-value-orientated production on the basis of graphically, we can detect an empty field (see Fig 4.3).45 capitalist productivity (but without domination of exchange­ A return to use-value production in communist society takes value). The high level of productivity is the valuable point in the place on a higher and broader level than the ancient one-on a case of capitalism. Marx's vision of communism seems to higher level because mankind has more developed needs, and more capacities to fulfil them, on a broader level because the development of productive forces is enjoyed not only by a polis 4,> Maybe we arc now living in a post-machinery age which is characterized but by the whole of mankind 46 by electronic and cybernetic systems. Accordingly, we should expect a social form which corresponds to it. Much has been said about 'post-industrial' 44 It has been claimed that there exist basically two forms of socialization: society and its characteristics. In my view, however, the central difference in markets and hierarchies (see Williamson 1975). Another position holds tht there contemporary modem societies is not their industrial or post�industrial character are three forms: market, organization, and solidarity (see Polanyi 1944). As we but the difference between stratified class societies and functionally differentiated shall see, it can be claimed that communism would, or should, be marketal, societies. In Marx's model a class division occurs also on the technological level hierarchical, or solidaric-or a mixture of them. since the great majority of the working class is an 'appendage' to the machine. 45 Lenin, in popularizing terms, defined communism as 'Soviet power plus If we apply his model to present Western societies, we would expect a new the electrification of the whole country' (see Lenin 1920: 515 and Ziegler 1987: technology which'is different in this respect. If machines were run by workers 24). who are not reduced to appendages, we could speak of a new, liberating 4(, I have remained strictly within the framework provided by Marx and technology. See Kern and Schumann 1986 for some empirical examples. therefore do not discuss the (questionable) heuristic value of an approach which  2 1 2 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 213 passage froni Max Scheler cited in section 3.3 lwith my adden­ Madee! Antiquity Feudalism Capitalism Communism dum regarding politicS) where the drive towards domination of production nature was conceived as the outcome of the follOWing inter­ actions: the scientist wants to construct all possible machines; Main ??? technology tools tools, manufacture manufacture, machine the engineer wants to construct all workable machines; the entrepreneur wants to construct all profitable machines; the . Form al use-value use·valueJ exchange-value use-value politician wants to construct all machines which enhance legit­ product exchange-value imation. If we transform this model from the level of interaction between individuals to the systemic level, we see the inter­ Purpose o! production production production for production for action of three different social systems: economy, politics, and production for needs for needs surplus needs science. Technology is an emergent entity, a complex; it springs from Formel social production, political regulation; independent social production the interplay of these social systems. Because of the durability socialization regulated by blind rules guilds and estates, producers. market regulated by of technical artefacts, technology is an enduring phenomenon. partly markets regulation conscious plan As part of second nature, it belongs to the environment of all societies; modern societies are additionally characterized by the F I G . 4.3 fact that their social subsystems 'include' technology. The 'interaction' between technology and social subsystems is not 4.3.2. Structural coupling symmetrical; it is not the case that all three subsystems pull and push technology with the same power, in the same direction, or The elements in the model outlined above of a machino-capitalist with the same success (see again s. 3.3). hypercycle are partiy material-physical, partly social. Only From this model, a 'technological trajectory', but no techno­ capital is a social relation, as Marx never tires of reminding us. logical determinism, can be derived. This is so for the following According to him, it would be completely fallacious to conceive reasons. Every system operates according to its own rules and capital exclUSively in a definite, palpable form such as money­ expectations about the operations of other systems. For example, capital, machinery, buildings, etc. As already indicated, techno­ the economy has to take into account that the legal context may logy cannot be conceived of as a social system. change in the near future, that new scientific inventions will It might be useful to approach the problem from another become available, or a technological solution. Politics may try viewpoint; this time the focus is on the interplay or 'structural to resist or enhance certain technologies, scientific work, or coupling' of social systems in their environment. 47 Recall the economic activities. Science observes that a specific discovery emphasizes the character of tools for distinguishing historical epochs; see would elicit massive financial rewards so concentrates on a WeIskopf 1974. specific research path. Each systemic operation takes time. 47 See Maturana: 'In the history of interactions of a composite unity in its Meanwhile, the Stoffwechsel takes place with technologies medium, both unity and medium operate in each interaction as independent systems that, by triggering in each other a structural change, select in each other which are available. Small improvements and changes occur a structural change. If the organization of a composite unity remains invariant during their daily application. This explains the existence of a while it undergoes structural changes . . . its adaptation is conserved . . . In other words, if a composite unity is structurally plastic its conservation of adaptation 'technological trajectory'. A technological revolution may occur results in its maintained structural coupling to the medium that selects its path either as a result of cumulative changes within a technological of structural change' (Maturana 1980: p. xxi). Luhmann's theory also offers the trajectory, or as a result of scientific discoveries which become possibility of a 'structural coupling' of different social systems. He discusses this in the chapter on 'Interpenetration' in his Soziale Systeme; see Luhmann applicable to transformation processes. However, technologIcal 1984a. determinism is excluded, since there are economic, political,  214 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 215 and scientific incentives at work, which lead to a change of Politics does not stand at the top of a (pyramidal) society nor technology. in the centre of a (concentrical) society: it is one social subsystem To summarize my criticism of the base-superstructure model: among others. This is to say that politics cannot be expected to 1 . The concept of relations of production lacks precision. It cure modem societies of the disease of ecological problems. encompasses economic, legal, and social meanings. In order to This would presuppose at least the following: make it more precise, it should be decomposed into its constituent • it would have to be able to provide a self-description for parts. society which is accepted by all; 2. The concept of superstructure is· misleading since it uses a • it would have to give an uncontested account of the reasons metaphor which suggests a picture of a building with more and of ecological problems; less important floors. It suggests that the base (ground floor) • it would have to put into practice the conclusions reached could exist without the superstructure (first floor). (d. Luhmann 1988d, 1989c). 3. Cohen's interpretation tries to avoid some of the difficulties by proposing a functional relationship between the elements. What politics does is to decide on public issues in a binding way. Thus we have a primary layer of productive forces which explain Where an ecological problem is the result of a logic of public the relatlOns of production which explain the superstructures. goods, politics seems to have some power to resolve it. Examples But superstructures stabilize relations of production which in are cases where ecological problems are manifest and where the tum stabilize productive forces. This functional analysis fails obviation of them is feasible by a combined policy of threats and on the grounds of its Own premiss, that is, to explain productive offers, for which Hillel Steiner coined the term 'throffer' (see forces in asocial terms 4S Steiner 1974 and Taylor 1982; see also ch. 1 above). These 4. My own position, in contrast, concurs with the approach decisions may also have effects on the economy or on science, that there are some functional links involved in Marx's model but not in a direct way. We know of many cases where such but it defines the units in a different way. The most important attempts have proved to be dysfunctional. But there are also dIfference IS to rob technology of its autonomous status; in my examples of sueeessful political interventions (see Rottleuthner VIew, only SOCIal systems enjoy such a position. Moreover, 1989; Scharpf 1989). If politiCS takes a specific decision, this will SOCIal systems can be defined independently from eaeh other be perceived by science and economy with their own specific which avoids problems of variable diseretion. Circularity i � logic (see von Foerster 1981, who defines cognition as computa­ Illvolved III their self-production (which is no defect of the tion of computation of . . . ). How can we, then, imagine the theory! ), but is not involved in the relation between them. Yet, emergence of a 'virtuous circle' here? the question remains: which productive forces will be suitable In an interesting study, Beck ( 1 988) reformulated the Marxian for communism? Will they take the form of machinery which categories of relations of production and productive forces. He per de!1nitionem degrades human beings and natural environ­ conceives of the late twentieth century's reality as characterized ment? According ro evolutionary theory, a new, 'liberating' by a conflict between productive forces and relations of definition technology Cannot be brought about by intentional action alone (De!1nitionsverhi:iltnisse) and suggested that a central issue in rather, its hypothetical emergence would be the result of th� the ecological problematic is the threshold values (Grenzwerte) interplay of the economic, political, and SCientific system. Let which are established for every substance which is considered me present a short scenario to illustrate this line of thought and toxic or otherwise dangerous. Such thresholds are defined by its illuminating and critical potential. scientists and technical experts-politicians are laymen in this process. It is often said that the definition of thresholds is rather 4H See Lukes 1983 for a similar critique of the separation of the superstructure a political than a 'rational' decision. However, as I try to explain, from the base. there are no uncontested standards of rationality. Each system has 216 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 217 its own. Thresholds often are just the establishing of a comfortable working hypothesis which serves certain industries and research 4.3.3. Summary departments and which has been adopted by politics. Politicians On a Weberian account, as briefly pointed out in section 4.2.3, here either play the part of active accomplices or-in a case where an elective affinity between capital, machinery, and science they really want to change something-are simply incompetent. obtains which explains the fusion of these elements in capitalist But imagine that critical scientists, engineers, parts of the society.49 On the basis of Eigen and Schuster's account, this public, and 'green politicians' succeed in keeping the thresholds process can be described as a hypercycle. Stripped to its essentials, considerably down. The result would be real 'political' thresholds manufacturing and machine technology, movable capital, pro­ being much lower than technological or scientific thresholds. pertyless workers, competition, and extension of intercourse The industries concerned might protest, but if the policy is would be the elements of the hypercycle. Capital is the self­ successful, investments will flow into less damaging technologies replicative unit, the others are 'catalytic links'. According to and substances, thereby reducing or eliminating the production autopoietic theory, capitalism is a social system which reproduces of dangerous substances. However, it should be noted that this itself (in Marx, the elements are values, in Luhmann, the ele­ process is recursive, since it is not realistic to expect feasible ments are payments); it reproduces the system by the production production processes which are completely free from dangerous of its elements and it produces its elements by its elements. substances. This would be possible only in an ecological Utopia, Taking these three approaches together, we can say that an ultimately depending on the power of scientific knowledge. In autonomy of technology exists in none of them. Additionally, the last instance, only a society which is in the possession of full one important conclusion is that a causal explanation is not knowledge could be expected to be a society without ecological attainable and that the success of functional analysis depends problems. very much on the precise formulation of the problem and the Returning to the problem of intersystemic communication, basic units of analysis. on the basis of this scenario the establishment of a threshold value would be a social communication which links up the economic, the political, and the scientific system. A communi­ 4.4. An empirical illustration: the transition from fendalism cation on threshold values is at the same time an economic, to capitalism political, and scientific communication. As Teubner has pointed out, structural coupling of different social subsystems is possible In this section, I trace some of Marx's analysis with respect to for three reasons. First, these subsystems are all based on meaning; the transition from feudalism to capitalism, thereby also showing second, they all use communications as basic elements for their that a causal analysis is not feasible. systems building. And third, every special communication in Marx never developed fully a historical account of the emerg­ one subsystem may at the same time be a general social com­ ence of capitalism. He was mainly interested in the logical munication (ei. Teubner 1989a: 107). Teubner gives the institu­ preconditions of capitalist production. Thus he restricted his tion of contract as an example where three types of social historical sketch at the end of Capital i. to demonstrating how actions coincide when a contract is made: economic, legal, and capital and labour power came into existence. However, there life-world communications (see ibid. 133 £.). In the case of a are some pages in the German Ideology (see CWv. 66-8 1 ) andin communication on threshold values, the political, the the Grundrisse which can be exploited for my purposes here scientific, and the economic system are involved, and the com­ (I shall rely mainly on the passage from the German Ideology). munication is at the same time a general social communication in which the political public takes part. 49 This is, of course, not Weber's precise theSiS, which, as is known, analyses the relation between religions and economic forms. 218 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 2 1 9 Marx gives the following picture of the dynamics of capitalist production: application of natural powers in industry, machinery, production under the regime of the guilds and other fcudal bonds. a huge division of labour, freedom of competition inside the The premiss is an ever-greater division of labour which separates nation, and the development of theoretical mechanics. We may town and country, commercc and industry, and Branches of interrupt Marx's outline at this point and ask ourselves: what industry. The result is the extension of communicationsSO sort of explanation, if any, is employed? which are particularly important for the development of the Marx gives an account of how a new form of production drives productive forces. 'As long as there exists no intercourse tran­ out another form: 'Hence the decline of the guilds as soon as scending the immediate neighborhood, every invention must they come into contact with manufacture' lew v. 70). This be made separately in each locality . . . In primitive history every seems to be an argument on the level of selection. Taking invention had to be made daily anew and in each locality Elster'S five points from above, and equating IY) with the advent independently' (eW v. 67). of manufacture, (X), with some needs of feudal society, IZ), we With the establishment of the world market and large-scale then have to ask how condition IS), i.e. the feedback loop by industry, 'the permanence of the acquired productive forces lis] which Y maintains X through Z, can be fulfilled. assured' lew v. 67), Marx assumes.51 However, the empirical At first sight, there seem to be many causal relations at work: starting-point for the evolution of capitalism is the manufacture needs giving a 'stimulus', discovery of America prOViding the of weaving. This first and most important branch of manufacture 'impetus', etc. On the other hand, Marx speaks of preconditions uses machinery. The rising demand for clothing gave weaving a for this development (freedom of competition, natural sciences, big stimulus. A new class of weaver came into existence in the machinery, wage-labour). But these preconditions are themselves towns. Because of its very nature weaving resisted the trammels products of historical processes. Whatever these are, we are not of the guilds; it was carried on mostly in villages and market able to identify a prime mover (or first cause) which sets into centres without guild organization. Merchant capital, and capital motion the whole process. Besides, the picture does not resemble of manufacture, created a mass of movable capital. At the same a chain reaction, but, rather, a network in which all elements time, peasants and vagabonds provided the army of the work­ influence all the others. It seems as if increasing demand ('human people. The discovery of America and of the sea-route to India needs') is the motive power behind the whole. But since demand led to a new impetus for manufacture; the import of gold and is only effective as economic demand, there must be a prior other precious metals gave an additional stimulus to the creation income which can then show up as demand. It thus seems as if of movable capital. Commerce and navigation led to the establish­ we are lost in vicious circles and infinite regresses: capitalism ment of the world market, albeit in a restricted form, because of still does not get off the ground. its splitting up into separate parts, each of which was exploited Let us therefore change the text for a moment. In Capital i, by a particular nation. Real competition between nations was Marx tells us that English feudal lords transformed their agri­ prevented. cultural land into pastures for sheep to graze which in turn was Marx distinguishes the above two forms of manufacture and caused by the flourishing of Flemish wool manufacture, followed commerce as two distinct historical periods. The third period, by a consequent rise in wool prices. In fact, the whole 'clearing then, is large-scale industry. It had to respond to the ever­ of estates' created a propertyless class of free labourers. But apart increasing demand for manufactured products. According to from the economic motivation (i.e. Dutch competition), there is Marx, several preconditions must be fulfilled for this mode of a political factor Ithe dissolution of feudalism) and a religious­ political factor Ithe dissolution of the property of the Church). so The German 'Vcrkchr' is usually translated as 'intercourse'. These are all historically contingent events. 51 Somewhat naIvely, we might add today, standing on the shoulders of On this baSis we still do not get a coherent explanation. Every Merton. As Douglas ( 1986) has pointed Ollt, multiple discoveries and institutional forgetting are complementary processes which also take place in modern times. string we catch dissolves into many threads; every line we 220 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 221 follow reveals itself as a circle.52 The most reasonable approach social relations, in this case within the capital-labour relation. I would thus be to take the preconditions of capitalism as historic­ thus concludc that it was part of Marx's impliCit research ally contingent and analyse only the self-enhancing processes programme to examine social relations and productive forces in which eventually created modern capitalism. 53 Since his theory their coevolution. A confirmation is the transition from manu­ tells him that the capital-labour relation is essential for under­ facture to modern industry. As already noted, Marx here assigns standing capitalism, Marx restricts historical analysis mainly to a degree of importance to social factors Isee Capital i. 347, 361, the point where the emergence of those two elements land their and MEGA II iii. 6. 1973). constitution as a social relation) takes place. But to come back to the functional analysis: what sort of And yet there seems to be a privileged element in Marx's relations of production were functional for the development of acCOunt. This is technology. He starts the historical sketch in the productive forces? As we have seen, in manufacture land the German Ideology with a glance at the division of labour. He even more in large-scale industry) the capital-labour relation states that the biggest division between manual and mental was the important, dynamic social relation. Relations of pro­ labour is the division between town and country. In the country­ duction which are functional for this relation must thus secure: side, outside the control of the guilds, evolves the system of I I ) private property in the forms of free labour and free capital; manufacture s4 Marx knows with Hegel and Adam Smith that 12) free-market competition; 13) an institution which secures manufacture with its division of labour isfar more efficient than both I I ) and 12), namely the modern state. 56 the earlier system of craftsmanship. 55 But the guilds prevented However, Marx does not stop with this account. Within the manufacture from growing up. Here we have an example for technical form of manufacture a new technology arises which Marx's claim that social institutions may 'fetter' productive will take the place of the old: this is large-scale industry based on forces. Historical evidence told him that the drive of the produc­ machinery. Manufacture already used machines in its production tive forces is stronger than the repression of social institutions. process. Eventually, manufacture also produces machines which The guilds were simply bypassed and had to bow later before the are able to produce machines. Onee this task is accomplished­ rise of manufacture. This is the 'technological bias' in Marx's manufacture has performed its 'historical service'-it becomes analysis. However, technology is always embedded in specific superfluous. The new productive forces of modern industry no longer depend on crafts of any sort. This is certainly a suggestive picture which has not lost any of its power. But perhaps Marx ;\2 Neo-Darwinian biology seems to have the same difficulty in explaining how the 'closure' of the hypercycle is brought about. 'The inevitable question was led astray by the implicit suggestion that machinery itself which follows is how the hypcrcycle is closed off; how it emerges is described was self-reproductive. In the language of Eigen and Schuster, it often in a not very precise way' (Ballmer and von Weizsacker 1974: 241, my would have evolved from a 'functional linkage' into a 'self­ trans.). 53 Marx would probably have insisted on a more law-like account. In the replicative unit'. But there are severe theoretical difficulties in Gnmdrisse, and Capital, he establishes some evolutionary stages of the develop­ supporting such an assumption, not to speak of its lack of ment of social forms which emerge from each other 'out of necessity', But it is plausibility. Even a fully automated industry, which employs nOt clear whether this applies also to technical forms, i.c. whether production based on artisanship had to give way to manufacture and only to manufacture. robots instead of human labour power, cannot be said to be only 54 When he describes the emergence of movable capital, of wage-labour, of competition, and of the establishment of a 'cash nexus' (X for short) he always presents it in the form of 'With the advent of manufacture, X also occurred'. 56 On this analysis the democratic form of the modern State is a contingent These are clearly concomitant processes which are not causcd by manufacture event. To be functional for the productive forces, it is sufficient to secure private although it may seem that manufacture was the 'subject' of this process. In the property and competition. To be sure, there are historical reasons which made GlUndrisse, he speaks of a process of dissolution which brought about the the democratic form of the state necessary, e.g. the anti-feudal, anti-authoritarian, elements or preconditions for capitalism (see GlUndrisse 496 ff.). pro-science, and, in some countries, pro· Enlightenment conjuncture. Sec also 55 See the famous pin-making example of Adam Smith as cited in Hegel's Barrington Moore's an.llysis ( 1966), which stresses the importance of class­ early fenaer Systementwiir{e, see Hegel 1975: 323. constellations for the final shape of specific political forms of capitalism. 222 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 223 produced by machines. This kind of technology is also linked to productive forces which causes considerable ecological damage. science, politics, and the economy." Hence, if we would rely on their 'autonomous' development, we would be left witnessing even more disasters. Late capitalism is still characterized by a productivity which 4.5. Evolution of technology and social institutions under the green fundamentalist Bahro called 'frightening' (at a time ecological constraints when he was still a critical Marxist, see Bahro 1977: 9, 5 1 ). If we judge the performance of capitalism on the basis of economic or In the following discussion, I want to come back to the question technical criteria (productivity), there is no reason to assume of historical progress and the criteria for measuring it. First of that a new social form would be required to 'unfetter' a develop­ all, I want to stress that under present conditions we are faced ment of the productive forces. Marxism, interpreted in such a 'with a new kind of " contradiction between the development of scheme of productive forces/relations of production, loses all of the forces of production and existing social productive relations" its critical impetus. However, in my opinion, there is still much which appears . . . in all industrial societies', as Schefold ( 1 977: justification for claiming exactly such a critical dimension for 247, my emphasis) so aptly put it. Marxism. In order to do so, another theoretical referencc point If we accept the terminology of the 1859 Preface, we can no will be needed. As I have pointed out, it is crucial for such an longer assume that modern socicties have to adapt their institu­ approach to incorporate non-economic criteria into our stand�rds tional arrangements to the productive forces but that they have of measuring progress. Since Marx did so, we have the possIbIhty to attempt to shape the productive forces in a way which makes of endorsing this dimension in judging how successful a mode of their detrimental effects upon the natural environment and production is in transforming nature. upon human beings decrease. The social institutions and the It is not the institution of private property which fetters the productive forces have to become reflexive if the original claIm development of the productive forces; and, on the other hand, it of development and progress is to be sustained. Traditional is not the institution of state planning which has led to an Marxist analyses assumed that the institutional change would unfettered development of the productive forces either in the be tantamount to the abolishing of private property relations. wide Idomination of nature) or in the narrow leconomic) sense. This solution is fatally flawed in the light of ecological problems. Ironically, the history of the last seventy years has shown that It But not even a sophisticated author like G. A. Cohen allows is still the capitalist arrangement whIch develops the productIve these considerations sufficient room in his interpretation of forces lat least in the narrow sense) best. And, even worse for thc historical materialism sR We would be ill advised if we performance of socialist planning, the socialist arrangement of adopted his outline for the discussion of ecological problems the productive forces did not prevent the emergence of severe since it offers only the perspective that class struggle nught fight ecological problems. If socialist countries had a slower develop­ out the contradiction between productive forces and relations of ment of productive forces, it was not because they adopted an production until new social relations have been established ecological policy which consumed part of the resources necessary which are propitious for the productive forces. But it seems that for the development of the productive forces. in the case of ecological problems it is the very nature of some Marx employed ethical and physical arguments when judging S7 historical forms of society. With respect to the first, he stated It is a common theme in science fiction to assume the contrary, Le. technology completely beyond the control of social relations. This p�rsistent unequivocally that people were happier in previous modes of metaphor takes its force from a deep �nthropological 'fear' of the �achme. �he production: . . machine is something between the hvmg and the dead; d. Bahr s stlmulatlng book 1 1 983). At first sight there is a certain ambiguity in the conditions und�r w�ich S!! I say 'sufficient' because there is a degree of awareness of the problem (see the capital relation originally appears lor which appear as histoncal below). preconditions of its becoming): on the one hand dissolution of lower 224 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 225 forms of living labour, on the other dissolution of happier relations of partially recycled, apart from extinct animal species. It goes the immediate producer. On the one hand dissolution of slavery and without saying that only the relatively expensive raw materials serfdom. On the other dissolution of that form in which the means of are recycled by capitalists.60 The cheap ones are wasted. It is production are owned by the immediate producer in that his labour is , completely rational for a capitalist las for a private consumer) to directed primarily either towards use-value (agnculture) or towards exchange-value ltown labour). Finally dissolution of the form of eom­ throw away what would require some labour time to restore its munity [Gemeinwesenl in which the worker as an organ of this natural use-value if he can readily buy the material at a comparatively community was simultaneously owner or possessor of his own means low price. If a capitalist has the alternative of buying one ton of a of production. IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2288)" metal or of extracting it from a salt which comes out as waste from his production process, he will decide on the basis of With respect to the second problem, he held quite an optimistic relative prices. Similarly, the private consumer throws away his view, as I argued in Chapter 2. Capitalism, he thought, displays TV set when costs of repair exceed a certain percentage of the the inherent tendency to recycle waste if it is cost-reducmg. On costs of a new TV set. the other hand, things which have no priee are likely to be At the same time, we observe another tendency in this process: wasted under capitalism-examples are air, water, and, most the tendency to replace expensive raw materials with cheaper importantly, human beings. It is their flesh, blood, and nerves raw materials. The result of this is that man to an ever-greater which capitalism wastes in an unprecedented way if it is not extent mediates his Stoffwechsel with nature by a process prevented by law. which transforms nature I'raw material') into artefacts. Ecologists Considering the present conditions of industrially developed doubt that this success in transforming nature is a rational one. countries, this account seems to be questionable; but I claim II one compares the efficiency of production as an economic that the premiss on which it is built is still valid. The premiss is process with its effiCiency as a technical process in so far as it the following: out of a given set of costs, capitalists try to reduce involves energy, we may find that there is a discrepancy Isee each factor, be it labour or raw material. This premiss is as valid Schefold 1977). Economic rationality may have to be replaced, today as it was a hundred years ago. The difference lies in the or supplemented, by an energy-conscious rationality. Cohen, at different structure of costs Irelative prices). In Marx's time, the very end of his book, dedicates some attention to this labour was a relatively cheap factor which has now become problem. He admits that 'if resources are to be used more much more expensive. Raw materials, on the other hand, have sparingly, recourse to them must to some extent be replaced by not become cheaper in general: some raw materials have become continued reliance on human labour power' ICohen 1978: 323). cheaper, some more expensive, some are free lor nearly free), as Is this a reason to be pessimistic about post-capitalist society, they were in Marx's time lair and water). Certainly, labour has since the promise of increased leisure cannot be fulfilled? Not at become protected by law. It therefore cannot be wasted in the all, replies Cohen. Such peSSimistic 'reflections depend on a same way as it could a hundred years ago. On this different crude concept of leisure . . . By "leisure" we have meant freedom empirical basis, we obtain results different from Marx's. Today from unwanted activity, not freedom from productive activity. we witness the depletion of natural resources which are only That the two have gone together under capitalism does not .59 Cf. the early formulation in the Holy Family: 'In the modern world ea�h , mean that they are fated to coincide in the future' libid. 323). As person is at the same time a member of slave S?Clet y �nd of the public commonwcallthl. PreCisely the slavery of civil soclety IS lil appearance the we shall see in the next chapter, this distinction is an illuminating . greatest freedom because it is in appearance the fully developed mdependence of one, but one with which Marx was already familiar.6l the individual who considers as his own freedom the uocurbed movement, no Victor 1 1 980) also maintains that Marx's framework entails longer bound by a common bond or by milO, of the estranged elem�nts of ?is life, . such as property, industry, religion, etc., whereas actually thIS IS hls fully 6{) I do not consider here public recycling of paper, glass, etc. developed slavery and inhumanity' (eW IV. 1 16). See also Rosdolsky 1968: 61 It thus does not run 'against a deep current of thought in Marx', as Cohen 488 ff. supposes (see Cohen 1978: 323). 226 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 227 the physical dimensions of economic processes. After criticizing productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? The full neo-classical economics for its blindness with respect to eco­ development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so­ logical problems, Victor holds that Marx's 'broadly conceived called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute analytical framework is not open to the same criticism . . . that working�out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition can be levelled at the neo-classical framework' IVictor 1980: other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality 207). Nco-classical economics have had only one major contribn­ of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the tion which recognized the problem; this was Kenneth Boulding's end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? article 'The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth'. As Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute Victor put it, Boulding 'pointed out that the economic activities movement of becoming? (Grundrisse 488) of consumption, production, and trade involve a rearrangement of matter and not a creation of new material' libid. 198). But Soeial division of labour in class societies is most likely to this approach is hardly new for someone familiar with Marx's initiate extraneous purposes. Marx, writing on a future com­ theory: munist society in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, asserts that 'in a higher stage of communist society . . . the enslaving This new approach to economic activities is particularly insightful for subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and analysing environmental issues. It may be surprising to discover, therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical therefore, that in fact it is not really a new approach at alL Economists as distinct in their orientation as Alfred Marshall and Karl Marx labour [will have] vanished . . .' ISW iii. 191. As we have already devoted substantial passages in their respective treatises to a description seen, Marx thought that people were happier and freer in earlier of economic activity in precisely these terms. (ibid.) modes of production. But pre-capitalist conditions where the worker owns his means of production typically exclude I I ) This leads me to the core of Marx's theory. I maintain that concentration of means of production; 12) co-operation; 131 divi­ Marx throughout his work endorsed an ethical theory on which sion of iabour within one production process; 14) social mastery his analysis and scientific edifice rest. This ethical theory can be and regulation of nature; and 151 free development of social summed up in the following way. productive forces Isee Capital i. 7141· Marx's main concern regarding mankind as a whole, and Marx thought that it is possible, probable, and even inevitable individual human beings, was to search out the possibilities for that mankind will reach a non-enslaving mode of production an abolition of all 'enslaving effects' which would fetter the in socialist society. Socialist society would syntheSize the moral development of individuals in a universal way. For example, he level of ancient societies with the achievements of modernity; writes in the Theories of Surplus Value that people under it would combine the concern for use-value production Iquality capitalist conditions are 'dominated by the pressure of an extra­ of products) of antique society with the general availability of neous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of commodities in modern capitalist society Iquantity).62 In the which is regarded as a soeial duty' ITSV iii. 257). In the Gruudrisse, Grundrisse, he says that only under modern conditions does an Marx defines 'real wealth' in terms of individual self-realization, a interest arise in what sort of property yields maximum wealth; process which includes an increasing domination of nature and in ancient Greece, the interest was in which sort of property is at the same time an ongoing process, that is, a process which yields the best citizen Isee Grundrisse 487). has no halting point. This passage synthesizes his philosophieal The historical condition for the fusion of 'happiness' with anthropology with perfectionism and his conception of eman­ cipation. 62. In the Manuscripts 1861-3 Marx examines ancient Greek thinkers like Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides, They were concerned with the [WJhen the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth quality of products {use-values!; therefore, it was assumed that each man should other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, depicate himself only to one art or work 228 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 229 'material wealth for the greatest number' would be a sufficient Marx, in turn, uses the same poem in the opposite sense, level of productive forces which frees man from wrestling with stressing above all the third and fourth verses which refer to the nature to a large degree. Capitalism was the mode of production expectation of a socialist revolution. This use of thc' poem is a which served this purpose. Thus Marx praised capitalism for the clear instance of Marx's view that history until the advent of development of the productive forces. But capitalism still does socialist society is a natural process in which a certain number of not bring about a full 'social mastery and regulation of nature'. souls have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the downfall of the People are still the pawns in a mechanism which they do not tyrant. Of course, one can characterize this position as simply understand. As Marx emphasizes, there is a paradoxical tendency describing I'value-free') a mechanism; but only the underlying at work:. evaluation Isacrifice, tyrant) provides meaning Ifor the social scientist) and motivation Ifor the oppressed masses). It is thus a In our days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, moral condemnation, because someone who is interested exclu­ gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we bebold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources sively in the level of productive forces has no reason to condemn of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. the social form which is beneficial to that development, if this The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same social form goes along with a development of the productive pace that mankind masters nature/ man seems to become enslaved to forces both on average and in the long run. If the setbacks are other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems only temporary or so small that they cannot reverse the general unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our direction of the development of the productive forces, there invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with would be no reason to object to such a development. But Marx is intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. not concerned about 'net gains' of the sum total of progress and (eW xiv. 655-6) regress. The point is that both notions have many dimensions This paradoxical tendency, this regress within progress, made which make it difficult to scale or quantify them. Marx condemn capitalism. It is a social form which makes Marx does not share the criticisms of modernity which would people suffer, which has an irrational performance leconomic like to abolish modern technology and modern conflicts. Against crises), and reifies social relations. This condemnation is a such backward-orientated positions, Marx says: 'On our part, moral condemnation, even if Marx refused to accept such a we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues label. He often endorses an ironic attitude, as when he cites to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well, Goethe's poem 'An Suleika'. Marx refcrs several times to this the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered poem. He attributes it to the propagators of capitalism and to by new-fangled men-and such are the working men. They are the capitalists themselves when he exposes the misery produced as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself' lew by capitalism. Confronted with the number ofdead workers in xiv. 656). Nietzsche'S Ubermensch comes to mind here, but mines, they would, according to Marx, respond with the poem . also Marx's dictum that people only set themselves tasks which which reads as follows: they are able to fulfil. The emergence of Marx's 'superman' is a process which can be determined technologically: since the Sollte diese Qual uns quiilcn, productive forces of capitalism are universal ones, the producers Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt, who reappropriate them are becoming universal individuals. Hat nicht Myriaden Seden If one accepts this interpretation of Marx's theory, one under­ Timurs Hcrrschaft aufgezehrt? ('Should this torment worry us stands better the question of ecological problems and their it increases our delight; relation to producti ve forces. If Marx's ultimate concern was the did not the souls of myriads abolition of enslaVing effects and the bringing about of a social eat up Timur's might?') form which organizes its transformation of nature in a rational 230 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 231 way, he would have had to take into account the possibility that mankind has not yet succeeded in mastering nature. We may man's very Stoffwechsel with nature entails the danger of 'en­ thus regard the solution of ecological problems as a test case for slaving effects'. Marx seems to overestimate the degree of a communism, that is, only that social form which succeeds in successful social mastery of nature under modern conditions. incorporating reflexivity into its modus operandi will be But, conversely, he is aware of severe ecological problems which worthy of being called 'communist'. arise under capitalist conditions. However, we may doubt Marx did not pay enough attention to the possibility that whether Marx's own position offers a perspective here. As he technological and scientific progress need not be paralleled by states in Capital, a higher synthesis of agriculture and industry, social progress. He partly followed the optimistic tradition of i.e. the unification of town and country, would avoid disturbances the Enlightenment (Bacon, Descartes) which ·assumed such a in the process of Stoffwechsel (see Capital i. 474). parallel (see Leiss 1972). But Marx was also deeply influenced by In his view, it is modern industry which frustrates such a (German) romanticism. This tradition informed his theory of higher synthesis: 'The more a country starts its development on the moral evolution of mankind (from a non-alienated primordial the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for state to personal dependence, to impersonal dependence, to example, the more rapid is this process of destruction' (Capital total freedom).64 Since Marx tooldor granted that history would i. 475). This is another instance where Marx seems aware of the inevitably lead to a final reconciliation in communist society, possibility that the very nature of a productive force might he could formulate the relation between productive forces and cause huge undesirable effects, that is, that it is not only the social institutions as a law-like relation which will lead to capitalist form which is responsible. But this would create communism. If we, basing ourselves on historical evidence, insurmountable difficulties for his theory. He thus adds imme­ challenge this assumption, we can nevertheless derive the criteria diately: 'Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology for the superiority of communism from Marx's own framework: . . . only by sapping the original sources of all wealth-the soil only a society which is able to calculate the results of its own and the labourer' ( Capital i. 475). With respect to the detrimental work and function fulfils the condition of being a communist effects of modern industry on human labour power, Marx tried to society. make his analysis consistent in the final version, i.e. in Capital, as we have seen in section 3.6. With respect to detrimental effects M See Grundrisse: 'Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous of modern industry on the natural environment, Marx's analysis at the outset) are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence remains ambiguous: it allows for both possibilities, blaming the founded on objective dependence is the second great form, in which a system of productive forces and social relations.63 general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all�round need and universal According to Marx, a social mastery of nature can be achieved capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, only in communism. As he states in Capital, a higher synthesis social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage' (Grundrisse IS8). of agriculture and industry would avoid 'disturbances' in the Stoffwechsel between man and nature. The miserable state of the natural environment, the separation of the globe into agri­ cultural and industrial zones, the dangers arising from the present methods of transforming nature indicate clearly that (,,-\ Recall Marx's statement on the 'greedy farmer (who! snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility' (Capital L 253). Also, here, it is not a specific social relation (for example, capitalism) which exhausts the soil but a behaviour which may occur under several social relations, under relations which exacerbate a greedy attitude towards nature.  Communism 233 7. reappropriation of man's objectifications; 8. total individuals; 9. conscious control. 5 Communism The dividing line lies somewhere between (5) and 17). The difference between the two notions can be connected to the principles of market and plan and to the presence or absence of alienation and fetishism. Whereas the strong notion requires So wird das Problem eines zentral vermittelten Bezugs zur the superseding of alienation, the weak notion would allow its J:'atur das dringendste; die Tage des blo[\en Ausbeuters, des persistence. I return to this difference in sections 5.5.2 and 5.6. Uberhsters, des blo[\en Wahmehmers von Chancen sind In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx himself gives a hint of such a auch teehnisch geziihlt. (Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hof/nung) distinction: here he says: 'Communism is the necessary form and the dynamiC principle of the immediate future, but com­ munism as such is not the goal of human development, the form 5.1. Two faces of communism of human society' I CW iii. 306). Maihofer ( 1968) points out this possible difference. It is possible that Marx here refers to 'crude One conclusion which I have reached so far is that a communist communism', a notion which he also used in the Paris Manu­ society must be a society which regulates its interchange with scripts. In his later writings he equates the release of all human nature in a rational way; this is to say that the existence of powers with communism. Nevertheless, there is still a tension severe ecological crises would inhibit one from calling such a within his concept of communism. Fot example, in his Critique society 'communist'. This proposition follows from Marx's of the Gotha Programme, Marx introduces a lower stage of insistence that human emancipation means not only material communism, which by later Marxists has been called socialism abundance and non-existence of wage-slavery but also spiritual (d. Lenin 1 9 1 7 : 472). With this distinction we have again a weak wealth (happiness) and conscious control of the individuals over and a strong notion of communism. But before discussing this their life-conditions. In what follows I shall focus on a possible possible tension, I shall first look at decisive traits of communism ambiguity in this notion of communism. The ambiguity is . the last proposition: all depends on how strong a 'as such', as described by Marx. contamed m In the Comments on James Mill 1 1 844) Marx defines 'human claim is made with respect to conscious control and how the society' as a society which makes possible the full release of realm of 'life-conditions' is defined. My suggestion is to distin­ human nature: gUIsh between two notions of communism. If we summarize some remarks of Marx with respect to communism in general, Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would bave in two ways affirmed himself and the other we could compIle the following list: person . I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, . . 1 . abolition of private property; my human nature, my communal nature. Our products would be so 2. abolition of classes, class exploitation, and class oppression·, many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature. lew iii. 3 . universalization of happiness; 227-8) 4. universalization of material wealth·, Marx contrasts production under capitalist relations with 'produc­ 5. expanding of disposable time; tion as human beings'; the latter is a synonym for communism. 6. return to use-value production; Human beings are characterized as creative and communal 'Thus the problem of a centrally mediated relation to nature becomes most beings. Capitalism thwarts the full development of the indivi­ urgent: t�� days of the mere exploiter, of the outwittcr, of the mere taker of duals, although-at least according to the 'official' position opportUl1ltics are numbered even in technological terms. f developed in Capital-it contributes to that development in so 234 Communism Communism 235 far as it enhances the variety ( Vielseitigkeit) of work and creates tive forces. However, productive forces are embodied in specific the social-co-operative character of work. A society which enabled technologies and forms of social co-operation. They are the the release of all human powers would be 'human society'. 'expression' or objectification of the creative individuals who Marx approaches the project of emancipation not from a given strive towards a world which leaves no place for superior powers. 'system of happiness' but rather from the features of human This humanist model lies at the heart of Marx's discussion of the nature. The first approach would be a static and doctrinal onc, relation between productive forces and relations of production. whereas the sccond starts from empirical facts and scientific It would be as mistaken to interpret the Preface in mere quanti­ observation, namely that human beings have developed their tative economic terms as it would be to interpret it in scientific­ productive powers, i.e. their domination over nature. Chapter 2 deterministic terms. It is true that capitalism fettered the deve­ briefly examined the paradoxical and tautological implications lopment of the productive forces in this respect, too (remember in this approach. However, Marx was able to resolvc them by that this was Lenin's central claim in his theory of imperialism), distinguishing between a historical and a critical dimension in and that Marx also criticized capitalism in this respect. I say his enterprise. The critical dimcnsion enables him to judge 'also' because this was neither his sole nor his most important historical forms of production, including the capitalist form. At criticism. In section 4.6, we saw that a spiritual element was times, for Marx the scientific and the normative view converge. always present in Marx's definition of 'progress'. We also saw In these cases he advances 'Marxism as a science'. For example, that a successful Stoffwechsel between society and narure has the abolition of capitalism is not only desirable for him but real, to be included and that the Marxian theory offers the tools for a 'process which unfolds beyond our eyes' (as he put it in the such an analysis. After all, this is the crucial point for the whole Communist Manifesto). debate between Marxists and environmentalists: if Marxism If a social form 'fetters' the project of mankind to increase has a narrow, quantitative, 'productivist' notion of what increase mastery over nature, it has to be and it will be replaced by a in the productive forces means, the environmentalists' challenge social form better adapted to that need. The mechanisms which to Marxism is completely in order. If, on the contrary, Marxism bring about this replacement arc equally historically observable has a wider notion of the term (and I think it has) then the real forces. In cases where Marx fuses both dimensions, he tries environmentalists' charge is misplaced. To sustain my argument .to get around the task of defining communism, since this was further, I draw attention to the following critical elements in troublesome. Consider, for example, his assertion in Capital i, Marx's thought. where he approVingly cites thc monk Ortes of Venice, who said: In the German Ideology, he draws a contrast between com­ 'Instead of proposing useless systems for people's happiness, I munism and all earlier modes of production. He writes, shall limit myself to investigating the causes of human misery' Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns (Das Kapital i. 675-6, my translation). But the exposing of the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for instances of human misery presupposes some notion of happi­ the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises [natur­ ness. 'Marxism as a critique', therefore, is indispensable in this 'WUchsigj as the creations of hitherto existing men, strips them of their enterprise. natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united The reader will note that I am using the word 'fetter' with a individuals . . . The reality which communism creates is precisely the different meaning from the usual one. The locus classicus for true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist inde­ the notion of fettering is the 1859 Preface, where it occupies a pendently of individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a central place to describe the relation between productive forces product of the preceding intercourse of individuals. (eW v. 81, my and relations of production in the course of history. The standard emphasis) interpretation of the 1859 Preface is mainly about economic Marx does not yet use the term 'mode of production'. However, criteria, about fetters to the optimal use or development of produc- as the context makes clear, he is not only talking about a 236 Communism Communism 237 communist (social) movement but about communism as a that personal dependence has given way to impersonal depend­ social form. Note that the word 'natural' in the quotation does ence, transforming labour power into a commodity. 1 not so much refer to 'nature', but is used in the sense of 'given', Communism, for Marx, is thus a stage of society in which the 'unchangeable', 'opaque'. Not only naturel, but also nature2 can unitedindividuals2 (freely associated men) act upon their material thus have 'naturally evolved' characteristics. The more mankind production and conceive their products as products of their succeeds in transforming naturel, the less this is conceived as a own; not as products of nature, and not as mystical products, i.e. mystical power; rather it is seen as something subjugated to the products of capital: power of the united individuals. This aspect of actively trans­ The life-process of society which is based on the process of material forming nature becomes of crucial importance here and distin­ production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as guishes Marx from Feucrbach's passive naturalism. For Marx, production by freely associated men, and is conciously regulated by nature as such cannot be cognitively captured. As he put it with thcm in accordance with a settled plan. (Capital i. 84, my emphasis) Vico, we can understand only what we have produced ourselves (see s. 5 . 5 . 1 ) . 'Natural character' and 'mystical veil' are interchangeable in the quote from the German Ideology (CW v. 8 1 , quoted above) In Capital, Marx again analyses 'natural premisses' and the and in the preceding quote from Capital-they fulfil the same possibility of treating them as the creations of 'hitherto existing function in his argument. When Marx says here that production men'. In so dOing, he employs the Stoffwechsel concept to must be 'regulated in accordance with a settled plan', this can analyse the relation of society to nature and conceives of human be interpreted as a more concrete formulation of the German development in the circle of externalization, objectification, Ideology's. 'subjugation of human creations-to the power of the and appropriation (ef. Habermas 1987a: 64 H., 76 H.). Under united individuals'. Communism will be the historical stage capitalism, the circle is interrupted, since the product of the under which men for the first time supersede the natural character producers does not return to them. Hence, to close this circle, of the Stoffwechsel. The preconditions for such a society are the private property needs to be abolished and labour has to be establishment of the world market and the existence of a uni­ constituted as social labour from the outset. Marx presents four versal class: the proletariat.3 models of non-capitalist production. The first is Robinson's In this section I touched upon three questions which need isolated production, the second is feudalism, the third is a patri­ further examination. The first is the question of transforming archal farmers' community, and the fourth is 'a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of I I employ here the evolutionary scheme from the Grundrisse where Marx production in common, in which the labour-power of all the depicts a development of mankind from personal dependence to impersonaJ dependence to freedom, sec Grundrisse 158. The full quote i$ given in s. 4.5, different individuals is consciously applied as the combined final note. labour-power of the community' ( Capital L 82-3). 2 The notion of 'individual' is a modern concept which emerges directly from Now, this 'community of free individuals' is obviously a the dissolution of relations of personal dependence, I.e. when labour power is transformed into a commodity. In other words, members of a patriarchal family synonym for communism. Feudalism and the patriarchal family are not 'individuals'-or they are individuals only as part of a collectivity. See are both based on personal dependence, with the diHerence that Luhmann 1989b. feudalism rests on an enforced division of labour whereas the .> Note that both preconditions refer to communicative aspectsj the cn;:ation of the world market consists in the extension of means of transport and patriarchal family rests on a 'spontaneously developed division communication; likeWise, the proletariat is a universal producing and suffering of labour' ( Capital i. 82). These rural-patriarchal communities class which represents the interests of humanity. In contrast to earlier producers, thus could almost be called communist, if they were not founded the industrial workers are producing co-operativc;ly, a fact which enhances communication. Comparing countries with different population den$ity, Marx on the 'immature development of man individually' which is draws attention to the fact that a country with less density may compensate for reflected in the 'ancient worship of Nature' ( Capital i. 83, 84). such a possible disadvantage with respect to productive power by means of Historically, these communities have been eroded to the extent communication. See Capital i. 333. 238 Communism Communism 239 nature and the cognitive possibilities which are required for a human society-a question which I discuss further in sections 5.2.2. Labour and enjoyment 5.3 and 5.5. 1 . The second is the question of how this 'conscious In my view Marx constantly employed an ideal of labour which control' will be organized. Does something like central state was a combination of work and enjoyment. We can find an planning follow from Marx's theory Is. 5.5.2)1 Closely linked to instance of this approach, for example, in the Paris Manuscripts this topic is the third question: how are the weak and the strong where he writes: 'In political economy labour occurs only in the notions of communism linked in Marx Iss. 5.5.2 and 5.6)? But form of activity as a source of livelihood . . . [P]olitical economy first I shall consider the notion of labour which, according to knows the worker only as a working animal-as a beast reduced Marx, forms the link between society and nature. to the strictest bodily needs' ICW iii. 241, 242). The alienated state of labour is constituted by 'the fact that labour is external 5.2. Labour to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies In this section I focus on how Marx conceives of the character of himself, does not feel content, but unhappy, does not develop productive activity in communist society. Is it true that he freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and equated labour las necessary, nature-transforming activity of ruins his mind' ICW iii. 274). In the German Ideology, writing the human race) with unwanted activity? Did he conceive of about the relation between individuals and the productive forces, communist society as a society in which labour has been trans­ he states: 'Labour, the only connection which still links them formed into completely free activity? Is Marx's ideal of labour with the productive forces and with their own existence, has something close to 'play'? In what follows I shall answer all lost all semblance of self-activity and only sustains their life by these questions in the negative. stunting it' ICW v. 87). The same general approach is to be found in the Grundrisse 5.2.1. The critical dimension of the concept oflabour where he introduces the distinction between labour and play. Marx opposes Fourier who advocates a transformation of labour Human beings are natural and social beings. Their life activity into play Isee Grundrisse 7 1 2). He maintains that such a trans­ ILebensiiu/!erung) is thus not mere transformation of nature, formation would be impossible, and, furthermore, even the but conscious and creative transformation of nature. In this most free work llike composing) is a most serious activity Isee transformation of nature they realize at the same time their Grundrisse 6 1 1 ).4 But Marx also opposes the view of Adam species essence, their human nature. Marx saw clearly that the Smith who regards all work as a 'curse' and views leisure as the present conditions of production Icapitalist relations) impinge ideal human situation. Against this position Marx puts forward upon the full realization of these human characteristics I d. CW his different anthropology, that is, that man, in his 'normal state v. 87-8). The abolition of these conditions would thus give rise of health, power, activity', has the need for a normal quantum of to the realization of all human powers. This 'expressivist' notion work and hence interruption of leisure. of labour ITaylor 1975) is present in all stages of Marx's theoretical development. What changes is the way he conceptualizes it. In In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour! was Jehova's curse on section 2.5.3 I devoted some attention to paradoxical and Adam. And this is labour for Smith, a curse. 'Tranquility' appears as the tautological implications of this expressivism. I argued that 4 Benjamin in his Passagen Well< endorsed Fourier's vision, arguing that once Marx resolves the problem by splitting it up. First he analyses human labour ceases to be exploited, nature also ceases to be exploited and historical manifestations of this human essence, and second, he hence work can become play: 'Once exploitation ceases, labour will strip off its evaluates them on the basis of a notion of human self-realization. character as nature exploiting. It will then take place according to the model of childlike play which in Fourier forms the basis of the travail passionne of the This second operation deserves our interest now. harmoninens' {Benjamin 1982: 456). I return to Benjamin in a moment. 2AO Communism Communism 241 adequate state} as identical with 'freedom' and 'happiness'. It seems production for having abolished the life-long attachment of one quite far from Smith IS mind that the individual, lin his normal state of individual to one profession or branch of activity; he praises the health, strength, activity, skill, facility, also needs a normal portion of tendency to develop more abilities, and, finally, the essentially work, and of the supersession of tranquility'. (Grundrisse 6 1 1 ) co-operative character of industrial production S On the other Although the Grundrisse would be seen to tum away from the hand, Marx is aware of the deskilling and other harmful conse­ early writings because of their deliberate 'realist' tone against quences of these tendencies under capitalist relations. Since Fourier, instead they rather confirm the position taken there, Marx, in Capital, takes great pains to show that potential namely that labour and enjoyment in principle can, and should, progress Iboth in the economic and spiritual sense of the term) is go together; in the Grundrisse, we find the formula of 'travail not set in motion as a result of capitalist social relations, it attractif' for this fusion. Marx stresses the need human beings would be foolish for him to endorse a concept of labour which have for work, which may be done in an enjoyable way I'travail was devoid of any emancipatory element lef. Honneth 1982). attractif') or in a fragmented, alienated, unhappy way las under capitalism). But Marx clearly opposes the extreme position that 5.2.3. The realm ofnecessity labour could be transformed into play. IThis Fourierian view employs the same anthropology as Adam Smith. Both regard Human beings, whether they want to or not, must participate in the Stoffwechsel with nature. With this argument, Marx seems human beings essentially as 'homo ludens' or at least having a to come close to Adam Smith's concept of labour. But does it strong 'leisure preference'.) really follow that he has to give up his concept of 'travail Let us now examine the concept of labour in Capital. Marx attractif '1 A widespread view holds that Marx, at least in Capital starts with a theme which by now is familiar to the reader: man iii, becomes more pessimistic and introduces the dichotomy of is part of nature, nature is man's inorganic body with which he labour and leisure, where the first is alienated, the second free, must keep in contact in order to survive. This Stoffwechsel is conscious activity. The two are interpreted as corresponding to therefore, in the first place, a necessity rather than a desire. So the realms of necessity and freedom and it is assumed that the far as 'labour is a creator of use-value . . . it is a necessary . early Marx dreamt of communism as the 'realm of freedom', COndItIOn, mdependent of all forms of society, for the existence whereas the later Marx came to acknowledge some undelightful of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, necessities. I think that such interpretations are completely WIthout whIch there can be no material exchanges between misconceived 6 Since the famous passage from Capital iii has man and Nature, and therefore no life' I Capital i. SO). Note that been the subject of many discussions, I shall devote some this approach is already present in the early writings and in the attention to it. Marx says: German Ideology: 'The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the material In fact, the realm of freedom begins only where labour which is on which his labour is realised, in which it is active, from which determined by necessity and mundane cpnsiderations ceases; thus in and by means of which it produces' ICW v. 273). the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material There can be do doubt that Marx in Capital, too, endorses a production. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his normative concept of labour. Admittedly, there are some passages wantst to maintain and reproduce lifet so must civilized mant and he m whIch he seems to praise modern factory work for itself. As must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity my discussion in Chapter 3 has shown, this appraisal has expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same timet the forces of nothing to do with praising stupid, monotonous, or repellent work. The extolling merely refers to the social, co-operative 5 I am not sure if Marx proposes here a 'downright silly' position, as Elster character of production which would serve as a foundation 1 1985: 8 1 ) suggests. stone of communist society. He praises the capitalist mode of (, See, also, my own treatment in Grundmann 1988. 242 Communism Communism 243 production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth field can only consist in socialised man, the associate producers, (the creations of man)' (CWv. 5 1 ). In the Grundrisse, he returns rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under to this problem, citing a view which sees in the establishment of their common control, instead of being ruled by it as a blind power; and impersonal relations an advantage: 'It has been said and may be achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions said that this is precisely the beauty and greatness of it [the most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonethe­ world market]: this spontaneous interconnection . . . which is less still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, independent of the knowing and Willing of the individuals, and which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as which presupposes their reciprocal independence and indiffer­ its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite. ence. And, certainly, this objective connection is preferable to (Capital iii. 820) the lack of any connection, or to a merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant From this it follows very clearly that communism will never be relations' ( Grundrisse 1 6 1-2). But at the same time he adds a a pure 'realm of freedom'-but the younger Marx did not entertain critical judgement: such a belief either. Marx, both in the 1840s and in the 1 860s and 1 8 70s, knew that mankind must transform nature in order to Equally certain is that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own safeguard its existence and he expounded this view several social interconnections before they have created them. But it is an times;' but something else follows from this too. insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spon­ Marx does not suggest that all that communism can bring taneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature lin antithesis to their knowing and willing). This bond is about is a significant reduction in labour time. We are led astray their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their if we would equate the reduetion of working time with a development. The alien and independent character in which it presently reduction of the realm of necessity, as many authors seem to do. exists vis-a.-vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged When Marx speaks about 'development of human energy which in the creation of the conditions of their social hfe, and that they have is an end in itself ' ( Capital iii. 820), this refers to his earlier not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it. (Grundrisse treatment of the problem of how human wealth can be conceived. 162) Take, for example, the following passage from the German I return in section 5.5 to the 'Vieo-argument' contained in this Ideology where Marx draws attention to the definition of passage. What is of interest here is that the world market is a spiritual wealth and praises the establishment of the world precondition for the development of human wealth. Communism market as an important element in this respect: 'From the above will not abolish the world-wide eonneetion between producers, it is clear that the real intellectual wealth of the individual but bring them under their conscious control. This is the pre­ depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only supposition for mankind's gaining real wealth: this will liberate the separate individuals from the various national and local barriers, bring them into practical connection In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, with the production (including intellectual production) of the what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, whole world and make it possible for them to acquire the pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, 7 Marx conceives of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom both in a those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The similar and in a different way from Aristotle. They are similar in stressing the absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposi­ natural necessity of labour as a life-maintaining process; they arc different in tion other than the previous historic development, which makes this that Marx does not locate labour in the realm of oi1<08, the private household, to which in Aristotle the nobler polileia, the public, corresponds. Marx introduces totality of development i.e. the development of all human powers as labour into the 'public sphere, attributing to it 'noble' characteristics and such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? locating an emancipatory dimension in it. Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces 244 Communism Communism 245 his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in Marx, surplus labour itself will become a need (see Grundrisse, the absolute movement of becoming? (Gll/ndrisse 4881 Berlin edn.: 23 1). Second, in a passage in the Manuscripts 1 861-3, Marx asserts I take this eloquent list of rhetorical questions as an extended that it is a 'law of motion' of human nature to develop new needs version of the short remark in Capital iii, where Marx speaks of once an existing set of needs has been satisfied. Capital is the development of human energy as an end in itself. From the propitious for this trend since it sets free labour in one branch above passage it is clear that the development of human powers and employs it in others. It develops human capacities in new depends I I ) on a given stage of transformation of nature; (2) on directions lef. MEGA II iii. 1 . 1 75). human capacities which have already been reached; (3) on new It is often heard that the passage from Capital iii would capacities which emerge and on human needs which set in conceive of a possibility of a leap from the realm of necessity motion the drivelor new goals. Or, in the language of Capital iii, into the realm of freedom. Engels, in his Anti-Diihring, coined 'the true realm of freedom . . . however, can blossom forth only the term 'humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into with this realm of necessity as its basis' I Capital iii. 820). But it the realm of freedom'. He argued that with the seizing of the follows equally, and this is the stress in Capital iii, that mankind means of production by society, man becomes 'master of his for this reason will always have to work. Only a stationary own social organisation' ( CW xxv. 270r. However, Engels's society would allow for the reduction of labour time to an treatment of the matter is based on social aspects alone, as insignificant length. However, Marx leaves no place for a 'station­ becomes even more clear in the following passage: 'Man's own ary state' of society which would have been for him a society social organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity restricting human freedom in an unacceptable way. The develop­ imposed by nature and history, now becomes the result of his ment of human powers demands the production and reproduction own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have of the conditions necessary for it. The shortening of the working hitherto govemed history pass under the control of man himself' day is the prerequisite for this 'development of human energy as (ibid.). But Marx, in the above passage, makes an argument an end in itself ', as Marx claims in Capital iii. In order further to about natural necessities. He says that human beings, in their defend my position that Marx was not content with a simple development, will expand their wants thus creating a counter­ reduction of working time in communist society, I give two tendency to a decreasing realm of necessity. There might be one possible readings of this sentence. First, it can be argued that the possibility for such a leap: if we imagine a 'stationary state' above claim refers principally to capitalist conditions where (John Stuart Mill) which is able to produce its wealth in an ever­ labour indeed has an alienated character. The shortening of the decreasing amount of time-if its population remains constant working day is a condition for the producers to be able to and no new needs are developing. This necessary transformation develop new creative powers and new needs. The working time, of nature could be done by means of an automated production the work-load, and the alienated character of labour under process. But such a stationary state is completely incompatible capitalism fetter such a development. Therefore, the working with Marx's definition of what human freedom means. It is an day has to be shortened. But if, in a communist society, labour integral part of his theory of human nature that humans develop, has lost its alrenated character, if humans develop their creative that they are creative and innovative, that they acquire new needs potential also in and through the process of production, shortening and knowledge and find new solutions to emerging problems. the working day may be of less importance. Imagine people who Consider the following passage from John Stuart Mill: already in capitalist society are among the happy few to perform I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth above all creative labour. Many of them would consider a . with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by limitation of working time as a restriction of their personal political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it needs and creativity. In a communist society, according to would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our  po 246 Communism Communism 247 present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held from any alteration in the circumstances of mankind, as when out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that there is such a plenty of any thing as satisfies all the desires of of struggling to get ani that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and men. In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social and every thing remains in common' (ibid. 267). And: '(I1f men life, are the most desirable lot of human kind. [Mill 1909: 748) were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, or if While Marx could have agreed with the undesirable traits of every one had the same affection and tender regard for every one industrial society, he certainly would not have agreed with the as for himself; justice and injustice would be equally unknown endorsement of the stationary state 8 For example, in Capital i, among mankind' (ibid.). he writes: Interestingly, Marx also uses part of this argument in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Needless to say, he did not Only by suppressing the capitalist form of production could the length include the aspect of mutual affection, but the aspect of material of the working-day be reduced to the necessary labour time. But, even abundance is clearly seen as the basis for the withering away of in that case, the latter would extend its limits. On the one hand, justice. This line of argument played a most important role in because the notion of 'means of subsistence' would considerably the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, where it was supposed expand, and the labourer would lay claim to an altogether different to explain why a country like Russia with so little material standard of life. On the other hand, because a part of what is now surplus·labour, would then count as necessary labour. [Capital i. 496) wealth could not do away with the state bureaucracy, for example. Trotsky used this argument, saying that state and money would The point is that Marx is talking about natural limits to the remain necessary as long as the material basis (i.e. more or less transfonnation of nature which stem from this peculiarly human abundance) did not allow their withering away (Trotsky 1 9 7 1 : condition. In other words: the social character of human beings 56 ff.). But one should not overestimate the passage from the re-establishes anew the natural limits at each stage of historical Critique of the Gotha Programme, for Marx was aware that development. The 'natural limits' are physically given and people were different, that even personal antagonisms might socially produced (see Hirsch 1977). Since these natural limits do survive capitalism (d. 1 859 Preface) and thus the conditions of exist, no matter whether physically given or SOCially produced, justice might not disappear in communism (see also s. 5.5.3.). there is no place for speculation about mankind's 'leap' into the realm of freedom, as the Marxist tradition has assumed. The standard Marxist interpretation holds that the realm of freedom 5.3. Habermas: Marx between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel will be based on material abundance; only with this will it be possible to overcome personal differences. The similarities of Habermas emphasizes the double influence of Kant and Hegel this reading to the following observation of Hume are obvious. on Marx's concept of nature. According to him, the fact that first In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume pointed out that the nature cannot be completely transformed into second nature conditions for justice derive from a specific situation in which thwarts the Hegelian component in Marx's model. Instead, mankind finds itself restricted by selfishness and limited gener­ argues Habermas, something like the Kantian Ding an sich osity of the human mind and scarcity of external objects (see re-emerges here. Hume 1964: 266-7). However, among people imbued with The materialist concept of synthesis [through soeial labour[ thus retains mutual affection, things are often rendered common property, as from Kant the fixed framework within which the subject forms a 'married people in particular lose their property and are un­ substance that it encounters. This framework is established once and acquainted with the mine and thine . . . The same effect arises for all through the equipment of transcendental consciousness or of the Il Some recent advocates of a stationary state include Ophuls ( 1977) and Daly human species as a species of tool-making animals. On the other hand, [ 1 9801· in distinction from Kant, Marx assumes empirically mediated rules of 248 Communism Communism 249 synthesis that arc objectified as productive forces and historically limits production or praxis to labour (see ibid. 42). Habermas transform the subjects' relation to theiT natural environment. (Habermas claIms that there is a discrepancy between Marx's social theory 1971a: 35) and h,S philosophical self-understanding. In his social theory he Habermas holds that Marx tried to overcome this theoretical was aware of both instrumental and communicative action dilemma by means of Fichte's philosophy. In so doing, Marx where the first consists of transforming nature, the second i � limits Fichte's absolute ego to mankind, which is a product of embedded In cultural traditions and is exercised via symbolically natural evolution and at each stage in its history is determined mediated Interaction. However, so goes Habermas's charge, by the productive forces available to it. This can be stated in Marx dId not translate this insight into his philosophical frame­ Fichte's terms where ego confronts its non-ego. As Habermas work. 'Taken by itself, scientific-technical progress does not yet puts it, 'this interpretation given by Fichte with stubborn logic lead to a reflexive comprehension of the traditional "natural" to Kant'S pure apperception sheds light on the identity of socially ; operation of the social life process in such a wa that self­ laboring subjects as it is conceived by materialism. As an identical conscious control could result' (ibid. 5 1 ) . ego they find themselves confronting an environment that obtains its identity in labor processes; this environment is not ego' 5.3. 1 . Labour and interaction (Habermas 1 9 7 1 a : 39). Habermas rightly emphasizes that Marx is congenial to Fichte's insistence (against Kant) that the unity Habermas's theoretical interest is thus in the first place to of consciousness is achieved only by an act of self-consciousness: proVIde some thoughts on the philosophical-epistemological it is a product of activity (see ibid. 40). Marx's stress on the level. He does not think that Marx's concept of labour can fulfil active element in man's relationship to nature here parallels his this task. Instead, he introduces a distinction between two types judgement of Feuerbach. Having appreciated Feuerbach's philo­ of actIOn: Instrumental, nature-transforming action (which is sophy in the early 1 840s, Marx in 1845 reassures himself of the characterized by means-ends relationships) on the one hand, importance of the active element, which was developed by and communicative action on the other, thereby taking up the idealism. As he wrote in the first thesis on Feuerbach: 'The chief d\StInCtIOll made by Aristotle (and further developed by Hannah defect of all previous materialism ( that of Feuerbach included) is Arendt) between praxis and poiesis. He characterizes the first that things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived type of action as typical of social systems, the second as typical only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as of the hfe world. Instrumental action therefore not only refers to sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in the transformation of nature, but also to the operation of social contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth systems. I doubt that this distinction can help us tackle the abstractly by idealism-which, of course, does not know real, ecological problematic. One reason for my scepticism is this: sensuous activity as such' (eW v. 2). According to Habermas, even granted that the institutional conditions for human eman­ Marx restates with Fichte Hegel's critique on Kant: cipation do exist, there might still be something which escapes Habermas's framework but which is contained in that of Marx Marx restricts Fichtc's absolute ego to the contingent human species. above all in his analysis of machinery in the Grundrisse and th� Its act of self-generation, the activity in which it constitutes itself, is Manuscripts 1 861-3. In other words, Habermas suggests that thus absolute only in relation to historical formations of the ego and we conld separate a conscions control of social life production the non-ego, to societal subjects and their material environment. from the process of material prodnction: 'Marx very precisely Production is conditioned on both sides by 'natural presuppositions I dlstmgmshes the self-conscious control of the social life process [nature and human labour!. (Haberrnas 1971a: 40) by the combmed producers from an automatic regulation of the But, Habermas continues, Marx's approach does not allow for a process of production that has become independent of these critical self-reflection of the productive subject, because Marx mdIvIduals. In the former case the workers relate to each other 250 Communism Communism 251 as combining with each other of their own accord. In the latter Now, if this trend cannot be reversed under communism, the they are merely combined' (Habermas 1971a: 5 1 ). 'true human society' will remain Utopia for ever. Habermas, But this 'automatic regulation of the process of production' although citing the same passage, does not pay attention to this may constrain the 'self-conscious control' for ever. Communism question. He remains blind to the problem which technology in the strong sense ('human society') would thus be impossible. poses to modem societies, since he thinks neither that technology Habermas himself is aware that the development of productive can be brought back into the life world of the individuals nor forces leads to an increasing embodiment of knowledge in that another type of technology can be imagined. He seems to machines (ibid. 55 ('auf die Ebene VOn Maschinen ab­ assume that in order to make the producers the beneficiaries of a gebildet wird', Habermas 1968: 76)) which has its limiting growth in productive forees, 1O the establishing of a society in value in the 'organisation of society itself as an automaton' which the ideal speech siruation is institutionalized would be (Habermas 1 9 7 1 a : 55). But if this is true, then Habermas's necessary and sufficient. My argument against this is that not distinction between instrumental and communicative action even such a society would have the means for controlling the becomes less important. For what can the 'self-reflection' (which unbounded 'animated monster'. As before, the producers would is embedded in the latter type of action) achieve? According be the combined and not the combining. When they are stepping to Habermas, it can achieve abolition of ideological delusion aside from the production process and engaging in discursive ( Verblendung) and class rule. But perhaps a still more urgent activities, they will eventually realize that their way of trans­ problem has been thcreby neglected: the existence of a productive forming nature must be changed; and is precisely here that automaton which remains even after the fall of bourgeois order Habermas's model does not show how the two can be brought as an 'animated monster'. Communism could only mean thc together, unless he can show how the communicative action establishment of a classless society which is, however, still a influences the instrumental one. society in which 'superior powers' are generated and reproduced There is a certain ambivalence in Habermas (with respect to systematically. Habermas does not seem to realize that Marx's technical progress) which comes out in his 'early' critique of 'ingenious combination of Kant and Fichte' (ibid.) is Marcuse. Here Habermas seems to immunize technical develop­ not doomed to fail because his model offers no place for ment against criticism: 'The idea of a New Science will not critical self-reflection, but that on Marx's own account we have stand up to logical scrutiny any more than that of a New to reckon with the possibility that first nature can be transformed Technology . . . For this function, as for scientific-technical into second nature (under industrial conditions) only by paying progress in general, there is no more "humane substitute'" the price of technological alienation. In other words, growth in (Habermas 1971b: 88). But here Habermas confuses technical productive forces leads to an increase in artefacts, vis-a-vis and scientific development, partly identifying science with which the producers are only 'combined', not combining. As technology. The reason for this is his immaterial definition of Marx noted in the Grundrisse: productive forces, as we saw in Chapter 4. To avoid a possible The combination of this labour appears just as subservient to and Icd by misunderstanding here, I should say that I agree that in industri­ an alien will and an alien intelligence-having its animating unity ally developed societies there can be no functional alternative to elsewhere- as its material unity appears subordinate to the objective science; but there can be other technologies (whilst it is difficult unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which, as animated monster, to imagine another science). This is the result of my analysis of objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in social systems in Chapter 3 and 4, where I argued that technology any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he is no social system. It follows that technology is open to social himself exists as an animated individual punctuation mark, as its living isolated accessory. (Grundrisse 470)9 to Habermas rightly sees that growth in productive forces and the conditions ') As 1 have shown in ch. 3, Marx's final analysis in Capital differs from this of the good life arc not identical, the former can 'at best serve' the latter, see outline. Habermas 1971b: 1 19. 252 Communism Communism 253 determination, its autonomy only an apparent one. The concrete a diagnosis and therapy are sufficient for the problem at stake. shape of existing technologies is the result of conflicts and Habermas's somewhat imprecise use of the notion of 'domina­ negotiations between social systems. tion' is obscuring rather than illuminating here. For what is Habermas presents a somewhat different approach in the meant by this notion? Obviously it is to denote the interests of article 'Technology and Science as Ideology' which was written social systems vis-a-vis the life world, or, as he later says, the three years earlier. Here he acknowledges that 'this thesis of the spill-over of systemic imperatives to the life world. However, autonomous character of technical development is not correct' these social systems operate according to different systems­ IHabermas 1971a: 59). He rightly sees that 'the pace and the codes; I find it difficult to fuse them together under the general direction of technical development today depend to a great heading Herrschaft. I would maintain that it is more illuminat­ extent on public investments' libid.). Moreover, he says that ing to investigate the different mechanisms of the subsystems technology is coupled with economy, science, and politics libid.). of society li.e. also their conflicts' ) in order to bring out both the But even on the basis of this approach he stops short of considering dangers of some modern technologies and the possibilities of the topic of changing existing technologies when he writes that solving them Ifor an attempt to do so, see Luhmann 1989c). 'through the unplanned sociocultural consequences of techno­ To summarize: Habermas's framework seems to imply too rigid logical progress, the human species has challenged itself to learn a distinction between different types of action, such that the not merely to affect its social destiny, but to control it' libid. 6 1 ) . communicative element is excluded from nature-transforming This is to say 'the social potential constituted b y technical activities. Ironically, he himself has to reintroduce the commu­ knowledge and ability lis brought] into a defined and controlled nicative element to enable social reflexivity. This reintroduction relation to our practical knowledge and will' libid.). He sees the is necessary for Habermas, since he is aware that a liberated main obstacle to this in 'social interests that arise naturally society has to become self-reflexive not only in its communicative Inaturwuchsig] out of the compulsion of the reproduction of sphere, but also in its technical-instrumental sphere. But is, social life without being reflected upon and confronted With the then, the separation between instrumental and communicative declared political self-understanding of social groups' libid. 60, action of great help for the understanding of ecological problems? amended translation I I ) . This is definitely not a mere restating of the orthodox Marxist position that it is only capitalist class rule which needs to be abolished; even a 'classless' industrial society 5.4. Messianic Marxism would probably Ito a certain extent) face these problems. But Habermas fails to show how the communicative type of action In this section, I set out to examine two writers who present an can change the course of technological development since here extraordinarily unorthodox Marxism: Ernst Bloch and Walter he thinks that it should be changed. Habermas himself poses the Benjamin. Both writers are most interesting in that they already question in the following way: 'IH]ow can the relation between focused on the problem of modern societies' relationship with technical progress and the social life-world, which today is still nature some forty years ago. I shall claim that they are able to organized in a natural way, be reflected upon and brought under arrive at a position which is peculiarly aware of ecological the control of rational discussion? ' libid. 53, amended trans­ problems on the basis of their metaphysical orientation. However, lation). Habermas's answer points to the liberating potential of as will become clear, they cannot be put on a par with defenders an undistorted political discussion. Such a discussion is pro­ of an ecocentric world-view. hibited by domination IHerrschaftl, by interests which are not subject to public justification Isee ibid. 6 1 ) . I doubt that such 5.4. 1 . Ernst Bloch: Marxism of technology I I I use the term 'natural' to render the German 'naturwuchsig', as is done It is a merit of Bloch's analysis that he addresses the problem of throughout this work. science and technology for communist society in a detailed 254 Communism Communism 255 way. In his book Das Prinzip Hoffnung, written during World hominis" . . . Bacon's great maxim: "Natura parendo vincitur", War II and published in the 1950s, he discusses the question of nature is conquered by obedience, remained active, but it was technology above all in the chapter 'Will and Nature, Tech­ crossed by the interest of an "exploitation" of nature, and thus nological Utopias'. He praises bourgeois technology for having by an interest which has nothing more to do with the natura achieved some degree of progress, especially in constructing naturans which Bacon still knows and singles out as the "causa what he calls 'de-organicist' teehnology (entorganisierte Technik). causarum", let alone being allied to it' libid. 657). This term is to denote the fact that modern technology cannot Against this Bloch holds that we have to construct new be understood any longer as a simple extension or replacement technologies which achieve a more intimate relationship with of the body (tool-arm; saw-teeth; eye-lens; etc.) but must be nature; a relationship which is totally different from the attitude conceived as something completely new: 'And the more tech­ of a conqueror who stands in the land of the enemy, pushing nology loses the final traces of its rootedness, or rather the more around the recalcitrant elements. Bloch accepts that it is man­ it gains new rootedness wherever it wants to, in the synthetic kind's project to gain fuller mastery over nature. However, he production of raw materials, in the radiation industry and does not agree that 'exploitation of nature' should be part of that whatever else in magnificent hubris: the more intimately and project. There are two terminological questions which arise centrally the mediation with the interpolated system of nature here. The first is the question whether nature can be exploited, must develop' (Bloch 1986: 67 1 ). This 'de-organicist' teehnology if it makes sense to speak of an 'exploitation of nature' in the makes possible a more intimate mediation with nature. strict sense.'3 When talking about exploitation, we usually have But at the same time, he charges bourgeois technology with individuals in mind who, according to some moral standards, being too abstract, with pressing forms on to natural contents can be said to exploit other individuals. Obviously, this does not without understanding them: 'Thus it becomes evident again apply to man's relationship to nature, unless one is prepared to and again that our technology up to now stands in nature like an adopt an approach which attributes rights to nature Isee the army of occupation in enemy territory, and it knows nothing of discussion in ch. 2). In a weaker sense, however, we all speak of the interior of the country, the fact of the matter is transcendent . exploitation of natural resources, a process which Bloch does to it' (ibid. 696).1 2 In this respect, bourgeois technology is not oppose as such. 'Marxism of technology, once it has been similar to capitalist economy: both produce accidents. Never­ well thought-out, is no philanthropy for maltreated metals, but theless, bourgeois technology is more reliable than its economy: rather the end of the naive application of the standpoint of 'Certainly bourgeois technology, by virtue of its elective affinity the exploiter and animal tamer to nature' libid. 695). The with natural mechanisms, is considerably more sound than the second, and more important, question seems to be that Bloch capitalist-abstract economic system, even non-Euclidean acts also uses the term in another sense: he wants to express the fact of boldness are not denied to it, they stand out remarkably, as we that people will not succeed in mastering nature if they 'exploit' have seen' (ibid. 695). Bloch aims at a more intimate transforma­ it, that is, if they are not able to transform it according to some tion of nature following Bacon: 'The control of nature INatur­ inherent laws or structures of the material elements. This beherrschung] serves in Bacon the establishment of a "regnum means that they will not succeed in transforming it if they do 12 not understand the laws and mechanisms involved. As I showed The metaphor of the conqueror was also used by Engels-see CW xxv. 461. Interestingly, Engels says the following with respect to the Italian Alps: at the beginning of Chapter 2, quoting Bodei, ancient thought 'when the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so conceived of technical solutions as solutions directed against carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by dOing so nature; it was only with modern writers that they were under­ they were cutting at the roots of the dairy industry in their region: they had still less inkling that they were depriving their mountain springs of water for the stood as in accordance with natural laws-see Bodei 1983. greater part of the year, and making it possiQlc for them to pour still more furious torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons' leW xxv. 461). \., Note that Bloch himself put 'exploitation' in quotation marks. 256 Communism Communism 257 Bloch's position is thus a position within modernity, accepting approach also implies an Uberlister·technology. Moreover, the central claims of Enlightenment philosophy. He shares the co-operative role of nature would also put man in the role of belief that mankind can prosper in transforming nature; he does exploiter or outwitter ( Uberlister): either humans appropriate not reject the development of science and technology; on the what nature freely produces, or they combine natural processes contrary, he holds that only more developed technologies will in a way beneficial to them: in the latter case, the 'cunning of contribute to mankind's prospering. These new technologies, reason' ( = uberlisten) is at work. Of course, I agree that there are however, need to be based on more profound insights into mystical and religious elements in Bloch's concept of nature; nature-something which seems inhibited by present capitalist but, nevertheless, I think that the interpretation which I gave relations. In so doing, he implicitly tries to defend the 1859 above is a legitimate one. To put it in another way, Bloch's Preface, although it is not clear whether he charges capitalism metaphysical beliefs may have made him sensitive to a problem with insufficient development or insufficient use of new pro­ which does not so much interest traditional Marxists. We could ductive forces.'4 But at the same time, Bloch is aware that not say, then, that Bloch's analysis was non-Marxist in its motivation every increase in productive forces contributes to social progress but Marxist in its method. It is admitted that there is a 'meta­ when he says that all rejoicing about great technical progress is physical surplus' which does not square with Marxian thought in vain if it forgets that technical progress can be accompanied (see also Hudson 1982). by social regress (see Bloch 1986: 696). 2. Schmidt's doubts about nature's 'latency' seem to be even My interpretation of Bloch is very charitable compared with less justified. Here it is Bloch, rather, who is in greater accord that of Alfred Schmidt, for example. Let me therefore briefly with the natural sciences. As we know from Darwinism, nature sum up Schmidt's criticisms. He charges Bloch ( I ) with over­ is an essentially unfinished and open process. Curiously, Schmidt estimating the possibility of unifying subject and object. Bloch thinks that higher beings than humans cannot emerge (d. aims at a 'mystical nature-subject' (Natursub;ekt) which has Schmidt 1 9 7 1 : 162). This seems to me an exaggerated anthro· not yetiS revealed itself; (2) with being obscure about the 'open­ pocentrism, onc which conceives mankind as the centre of the ness' ( Unabgeschlossenheit) and 'latency' of nature. I address universe. Evolution is a blind, and thus open, process, the stages the two points in turn. of which are not predetermined. 1 . Schmidt is right when he insists that mankind's purposes will always remain alien to nature-also in socialism (see 5.4.2. Walter Ben;amin: the resurrection ofpast generations Schmidt 1 9 7 1 : 167)-and that mankind has to outwit nature. In In Chapters 3 and 4, I presented and discussed some evolutionary this respect Bloch's terminology is indeed misleading (or self­ approaches to social history. It was argued that, on a materialist contradictory). Consider the following passage by Bloch: 'In conception, the new can only emerge as a recombination of the place of the technologist as a mere outwitter or exploiter there existing. Such a view certainly may be challenged from several stands in concrete terms the subject socially mediated with positions. One of them is a position which expects the new as itself, which increasingly mediates itself with the problem of the totally different from the present. Walter Benjamin, in his the natural subject' (Bloch 1986: 674). This may sound strange Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen, put forward such an argument. and confused, but one may interpret it that Bloch wants to stress Criticizing the notion of progress held by the German Social the possible role of nature as co-producer, a role which can be set Democratic party, he noted that this was problematic in that it forth only on the basis of a deeper understanding of nature. But conceived of progress ( I ) as progress of the human species, (2) as then, to repeat, he gets self-contradictory, since the Baconian unlimited (perfectibility), and (3) as inevitable (see Benjamin 14 See Elster 1985: 259 for a distinction. 1974: 700).'6 But basic to these three problematic notions is a \S This is the crucial notion for Bloch: the 'not-yet-character' of all that 16 Note that his charge does not fit an evolutionary approach, as presented in exists. chs. 3 and 4. 258 Communism Communism 259 concept of time as empty and homogeneous. 1 7 Against such a tion with the phlegmatic politics of the Social Democrats leads concept Benjamin contends that history is a construction which to an overreaction. He frankly endorses an extreme subjectiv­ is located in our time, not in empty and homogeneous time: ism: for him, there seem to be no historical laws Or mechan­ 'History is the subject of a construction whose site is not isms but only the one of the grasping of unique historical homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of opportunities. This 'tiger's leap' into the past corresponds to his , the now I retztzeitl IBenjamin 1973: 263, amended translation). claim of an increasing acceleration of history, as he noted in This fact allows us to cite past events, just as fashion cites past Thesis XVIII: clothes; the French Revolution cited ancient Rome and under­ lIn relation to the history of organic life on earth' writes a modern stood itself as a renewal of it. biologist, Ithe paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens constitute some­ The French revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It evoked thing like two seconds at the close of a twenty-four-hour day. On this ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion seale, the history of civilized mankind would fill one-fifth of the last has a flair for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long second of the last hour.' The present, which, as a model of Messianic ago; it's a tiger's leap into the past. This jump, however, takes place in time, comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridge­ an arena where the ruling class gives the commands, The same leap in ment, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind the open air of history is the dialectical one, which is how Marx has in the universe libid. 265) understood the revolution. libid.) Although Benjamin calls this approach the true approach of the Central to Benjamin's argument is the notion of 'blasting out' historical materialist, it is, rather, idealist. The 'totally different' is Iheraussprengen ) these past events from the continuum of history. not something which has not yet been there, but, rather, some­ This metaphor corresponds to a second one which refers to the thing which did indeed exist a long time ago. Proletarian revolu­ picture we have of these past events and which is available to us tion therefore consists in bringing back a lost state of history. only in moments of danger. Benjamin coins the term 'flashing' Revolution, for Benjamin, is redemption, revenge for the injustice lau/blitzen ) for it: 'The past can be seized only as an image to former generations. which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself is the and is never seen again' libid. 257). With these two basic depository of historical knowledge. In Marx it appears as the enslaved concepts, we can understand Benjamin's different conception of class, as the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of social change. There is no stream of progress in which the Social generations of the downtrodden. This conviction . . . has always been Democratic Party and the working class can swim, but there are objectionable to Social Democrats . . . Social Democracy thought fit to unique historical opportunities where a picture becomes available assign to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, to the historieal subject and this can be reactivated at other such in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength. This training moments. 'Historical materialism wishes to retain that image made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, of the past which unexpeetedly appears to the historical subject for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than at a moment of danger' libid., amended translation). This last that of liberated grandchildren. libid. 262) technique refers to the method of the materialist historian; Although Benjamin is not concerned with future generations, 19 for the fighting class the cognitive flashing is combined with he is able to work out a sensitive position in relation to nature. practil blasting out Iheraussprengen) . I " Benjamin's preoccupa- lY In Annex B to the Theses Benjamin makes clear that his approach is 17 Lukacs in his seminal Geschichte tlnd KlassenbewufJtsein ( 1 923) noted informed by fewish religion: 'We know that the Jews were prohibited from that modern capitalism transforms time into a pure quantitative category-see investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remem­ Lukacs 1971: 179-80. brance, however. This stripped the future of its magiC, to which all those III Note that both metaphors are metaphors from war; Benjamin wrote this succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does not imply, text in 1942. however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For 260 Communism Communism 261 However, this sensibility comes from his religious background. aware that labour can become play only on the basis of the most As he noted in EinbahnstrafJe, human beings have to revere developed productive forces: 'The unfolding and blossoming in nature, since they depend on nature and are not able to give it playing presupposes highly developed productive forces which anything. Thus, whenever they receive something from nature, are available to mankind only today. However, they are provided they ought to be grateful. only in the opposite sense of their potential: for the caSe of The earliest customs of peoples seem to send us a warning that in emergency' (ibid., my translation). Likewise, this 'liberated accepting what we receive so abundantly from nature we should guard labour' is to 'improve' nature by technical means. Benjamin against a gesture of avarice. For we are able to make Mother Earth no again cites with approval Fourier's Phalansteres: 'According to gift of our own. It is therefore fitting to show respect in taking, by Fourier, good social labour should bear the consequence that returp.inga part of all we receive before laying hands on our share . . . An four moons would illuminate the earthly night, that ice would Athenian custom forbade the picking up of crumbs at the table, since retreat from the poles, that sea water would no longer taste salty, they belonged to the heroes. If society has so degenerated through and that wild animals would enter the service of humanity. All necessity and greed that it can now receive the gifts of nature only this illustrates a type of labour which, far from exploiting rapaciously, that it snatches the fruit unripe from the trces in order to nature, would set free the creations which are slumbering in its sell it most profitably, and is compelled to empty each dish in its womb' (Benjamin 1974: 699, my transIation) 21 Perhaps it should determination to have enough, the earth will be impoverished and the be said that nowadays we may have the possibility of creating land yield bad harvests. (Benjamin 1986: 76) such animals with the help of genetic engineering (leaving open According to Benjamin, a society without exploitation might be the question whether this is 'liberated work'): but who would be able to give nature something back, even to 'improve' it: 'Once delighted? Similarly, the poles may be melting in the near this exploitation has stopped, labour too will lose its nature­ future, but with quite disastrous consequences. exploiting character . . . Such labour which is animated by play Furthermore, Benjamin hopes that mankind will make true does not aim at the production of values but at an improved cosmic experiences-which he thinks indispensable-with the nature' (Benjamin 1982: 456, my translation, my emphasis). help of technology. The ancient relationship towards the cosmos Now, one might say that Benjamin's approach is forceful and was mediated by the experience of ecstasy (Rausch), while we persuasive but has the disadvantage of being based solely on an moderns have technical possibilities at hand. These possibilities ethical dimension: gratitude towards nature.20 Of course, he are extrapolated from war technologies which, of course, have wants to abolish the social conditions which inhibit such an been used only for destructive purposes. The result was a 'river 'alien' relationship to nature, but one might ask if this can be a of blood' (see Benjamin 1986: 93). But at the same time Benjamin is realistic pcrspective for industrial societies. Let me thus turn to fascinated by these new technologies: 'High-frequency currents Benjamin's 'technical utopia'. Benjamin, unlike some 'green' coursed through the landscape, new constellations rose in the fundamentalists, does not reject technological development. sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered with propellers . . . ' When proposing Fourier's ideal of labour (i.e. play), Benjamin is (ibid.). 22 However, the fascination is immediately broken when Benjamin adds the following to his enumeration: ' . . . and every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter' (Benjamin 1973: 266). But see Adorno 1977: 619 for a view which mentions 21 Note the similarity to Bloch, who uses the notion of nature's co-produc­ Benjamin's concern for future generations. tivity, its 'latency', See also the Similarity to Bloch's technological Utopia: 'Just :w Interestingly, Bloch juxtaposes Schiller's and Goethe'S concepts of as the chain reactions on the sun bring us heat, light and life, so atomic energy . nature; according to Bloch, the fonner wants to dominate nature ('Beneficent is creates fertile land out of the desert, and spring out of ice. A few hundred pounds the fire's might, if man controls and guards it right'L the latter is grateful to of uranium and thorium would be enough to make the Sahara and Northern nature: 'Sublime spirit, you gave mel gave me all for which I asked / You did not Canada, Greenland and the Antartic into the riviera' (Bloch 1986: 664). turn in vain I your countenance to me within the fire' (Faust, part It ff. 3217-20, 22 Note the parallel to writers like Ernst Junger or the Italian futurists; sec as quoted in Bloch 1986: 670). Hinz 1985 for the latter. 262 Communism Communism 263 everywhere sacrificial shafts were dug in Mother Earth' IBenjamin nature Iwhich is, according to Vico, the product of God). Marx 1986: 93). The ruling class's yeaming for profit had changed the says: bride's bed into a river of blood Id. ibid.). This sexual metaphor can be seen to conceive of the possibilities of technology in the Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organisation, deserve equal attention? same way as Bloch: as in principle leading to a more intimate And would not such a history be easier to compile) since) as Vico says, relationship with nature. Again, like Bloch, these possibilities human history differs from natural history in this) that we have made are not put into practice as a result of capitalist relations. the former, but not the latter? (Capital i. 352) The mastery of nature, so the imperialists teach, is the purpose of all It is noteworthy that many commentators have not noticed the technology. But who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed the important implications which follow from this claim. Marx is mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education? Is not often charged with having overlooked the fact that nature will education above all the indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use this term} never be completely transformed. Alfred Schmidt also bases his of that relationship and not of children? And likewise technology is not criticism of Bloch on this line of argument: 'Despite its increasing the mastery of nature but of the relation between nature and man. mediation, nature never becomes something completely "made" (ibid.) by us . . . This point expresses the most fundamental mark of distinction between the idealist and the materialist dialectic: With this formulation, Benjamin arrives at an extraordinary even in a truly human world there is no full reconciliation of insight: he captures a central problem of modem societies in an Subject and Object. This is what frustrates Bloch's hope for a ingenious fashion. He concentrates on the results of relations of philosophy of identity' ISchmidt 1971: 158). But Schmidt neglects domination, stressing the need for reflexivity. We gain nothing, the more basic problem: leven granted that nature and society he says, if we insist on the right to dominate nature lassuming could be reconciled) what if human creations still cannot be we wish to use that term). Instead, he continues, we should be conceived as human creations and thus cannot be fully under­ able to control I 'dominate') this relation . This formulation is stood?'4 In other words, what if the social sphere loses its congenial to Marx's project in that it stresses both the need to privileged cognitive status? transform nature with the help of technologies and the need to After all, it is only natural for us to doubt such a privileged evaluate these transformations. Domination of nature thus status for the social sciences: did not the positivists charge the becomes a reflexive concept.23 humanities with indulging in unscientific enterprises and with pretending to have gained knowledge about non-natural things? 5.5. Conscious control and central planning The motivation for this attack came from their experience of self-proclaimed human sciences, such as Marxism and psycho­ 5.5. 1 . Marx, Vico, and social complexity analYSiS, on the background of a fundamental crisis of the exact sciences such as physics and mathematics. How strong this Marx derived part of his historical optimism from Vico and the positivist influence was land still is), we can see if we look at tradition which followed him Id. Berlin 1976: 94, 137). Indeed, commonsense opinions regarding this problem. It is a widespread if Vico's claim were true, there would be a powerful reason to view that the natural sciences are able to know more about nature share Marx's optimism. As Marx indicated in a footnote in than the social sciences about society. It would be interesting to Capital i, he agreed with Vico that man can understand the world which is his own product much better than the world of 24 Marx faces this problem when he discusses a possible 'deviatio? ' of technologies from human abilities. Howcver, he a�su�es a s�rong functlo,:al 2,� See also Luhmann ( 1 984a: 644-5), who defines social rationality as the . . mechanism to be at work here which links human ablhtlcs to eXlstmg productlve system's awareness of the reflexivity of its own operations on its environment. forccs. See CW v . 87-8 and Capital L 488. 264 Communism Communism 265 examine how different epochs (and different writers) have seen theory, for political science, for the techniques of inquiry, and­ this cognitive problem-a task which lies outside the framework perhaps most important-for public policy are enormous' (ibid. of this study. What I want to do here is to formulate some doubts 1 8). regarding Marx's privileging of 'the social' with respect to cogni­ Now this is obviously an argument which presents a strong tion. I do this by looking at some results of contemporary social challenge to the Vico-Marx position.2S For if these are pervasive research. traits of modern societies, Marx's hope for an abolition of Todd La Porte, in his seminal Organized Social Complexity, fetishism, for a full reappropriation of man's objectifications, for observes that a 'reconciliation', is doomed. It is not doomed because of an 'indissoluble' rest of nature, which cannot be transformed, but IOlne particularly striking aspect of modern political and social develop­ ment has been the capacity of men to construct social systems encom� for the opposite reason: even if mankind succeeds very well in passing more and more groups. OUI lives arc bounded by agencies, transfonning nature we have to take into account the paradoxical organizations, combines, coalitions, and associations: networks of result that it now suffers from social opacity. The process which hundreds of connected groups and persons . . . One consequence of these leads to such a result is the development of the productive increases in group connections . . . has been the tightening of organiza­ forces, which have grown not only in efficiency but also in size: tional dependencies affecting social dynamics and political movements. as Marx himself was aware, the relation between individual Another has been a rapid increase in the number of people and agencies (craft worker) and technology (his craft instrument on which he affecting the day-to-day experiences of individuals. Closely related to played like a virtuoso) was reversed with the advent of modern this increase has been onc in the number of surprises we encounter. industry. To run certain technologies, it is indispensable to have They are generally disturbing surprises, caused by the interruption or a whole network of social institutions. Immediately connected frustration of Ollr expectation by some hitherto unrecognized depen­ to this diagnosis is the question of planning, or of 'social steering'. I dency. (La Porte 1975: 3) lack not only space but also competence to discuss the different La Porte calls this a condition of social complexity-to be more judgements on the prospects of planning in complex societies. 26 precise, of organized social complexity. 'Systems that are I only want to bring out a theoretical dilemma (which seems to characterized by organized complexity . . . are those in which be also a historical one) which Marx did not confront. there is at least a moderate number of variables or parts related Recall his distinction between ancient societies and com­ to each other in organic or interdependent ways' (ibid. 5). The munism. In ancient societies people were dependent on nature most obvious empirical referents are 'social groups with conscious to a large degree. Their 'mastery' of nature is on a low level. To purposes, such as formal organizations or informal, but cohesive, this corresponds a mystical world-view: nature is essentially an groups and associations' (ibid. 6). It is important that these opaque thing for human beings, whereas social relations in systems are self-conscious in order that their interaction can ancient societies are transparent. Communist societies, on the count as organized. La Porte then provides a working definition other hand, have succeeded in transforming nature into second of organized social complexity: 'The degree of complexity of nature, resulting in a (nearly) transparent nature and a transparent organized social systems (0) is a function of the number of system components (Ci), the relative differentiation or variety 25 The challenge becomes even stronger if we assume that ecological problems of these components (Dj], and the degree of interdependence arise Out of an interplay between social and natural processes, both (at times) poorly understood-not to speak of their complex interaction. How little we among these components (h). Then, by definition, the greater know in this respect can be grasped from the discussion which followed the Ci, Dj, and Ik, the greater the complexity of the organized system publication of a number of 'world-models' (Club of Rome and others) which (0)' (ibid.). La Porte concludes: '[Ilf it is true that the texture of tried to connect several factors in an obviously unsatisfying way. 26 Sec the contributions of La Porte ( 1975), Mayntz { l986); Scharpf ( 1989); life and its social institutions has become increasingly complex Luhmann [ 1 98901; Teubner { 1 98901; Willke [19911; Krohn and Kuppers [ 1 990), and can be expected to continue so, the implications for social Biih1 1 1 9891. 266 Communism Communism 267 society. In between ancient and communist societies lie societies socialism exchange products with each other, these products which, to differing degrees, exhibit natural and social opacity; assume the form of commodities since they are use-value and but the gross course of history seems to follow a road on which exchange-value at one and the same time. Marx offers only a natural opacity decreases and social opacity increases-up to a verbal resistance to such a conclusion by insisting that the point (capitalism) where, according to Marx, the social realm is different units of production must be carried on by private most opaque, but the possibilities of breaking it up increase individuals in order for their products to assume the form of proportionally. However, this mechanism is a rather speculative commodities (which, rather than providing a solution, begs the one. Marx excludes the possibility that social opacity cannot be question). The whole problem therefore seems to come down to blasted away, but perhaps at most reduced. The growth of the question of market and plan. productive forces has led to a decrease in natural opacity but Before going into detail, a preliminary remark is in order. Up also to an increase in social opacity. Whereas Marx saw this to now, I have quoted several passages from Marx where he opacity as a result of false reality which could be transformed speaks of 'conscious control' or a 'settled plan' which would be into a true reality, some contemporary sociologists are more necessary for a communist society. I should like to stress that sceptical. They explain social opacity by social complexity these notions are philosophical and abstract notions. We cannot, which cannot be abolished. In other words, the 'inverted world' therefore, immediately derive from them an answer to the (Marx) presents an irreversible stage of social evolution. According question whether Marx was in favour of central planning (in the to their approach, the evil has to be located more deeply than sense of 'command economy') or not. And, what is more, he Marx locates it. If they are right, then Marx's assumption that might even have opposed central planning if it came into oppo­ with the abolition of capitalism fragmentation and alienation sition with the 'conscious control', that is, if the side-effects and would also vanish must be regarded as obsolete. irrationalities of central planning would have thwarted the full conscious self-control of mankind's fate. As I shall claim, Marx's theoretical framework requires both markets and plan. Marx 5.5.2. Centralplanning! needs markets for the transformation of concrete labour into In section 5 . 1 , I made the distinction between a weak and a abstract labour, and he needs the plan to establish the social strong notion of communism. The decisive difference has been character of labour from the outset. There is no way Out of this identified in the existence of alienation and fetishism. However, dilemma. according to Marx, alienation and fetishism have their social As Michael Harrington observed, 'Marx is a major source of roots in privately producing units, i.e. under market conditions. the contemporary confusion, not the least because he provides The dichotomy market/plan thus becomes most important solid authority for contradictory positions' (Harrington 1989: here. As we shall see, Marx was not very clear about the survival 57). According to him, Marx regarded the Ten-Hours Law as of markets in communism and the role of central planning. nothing less than a 'modest Magna Charta', 'as the triumph of Take, first, his assertion in Capital that 'only products of the political economy of the working class over the political different labour processes, carried on independentl'y for the economy of the middle class'. From this one can infer that in a accounts of different private individuals, confront one another 'socialist-tending society, markets would have an utterly different as commodities' (Capital i. 49, amended translation). This qualifi­ meaning than under capitalist laissez-faire'. But things are not cation enables Marx to claim that a socialist economy which so easy with Marx: 'Unfortunately, Das Kapital also provides has abolished exploitation, but continues to exchange products, solid reasons for arguing a contrary position: that socialism is also free of commodity fetishism, since its products are not must totally dispense with markets. Small wonder that matters commodities. But this claim overlooks the fact that if different got confused' (ibid. 58). units of production (for example, workers' co-operatives) under Marx criticized Proudhon and the Ricardian socialists Bray 268 Communism Communism 269 and Gray several times for their proposal to abolish money and Eight years later, in the first volume of Capital, Marx conceives replace it with certificates for labour time Isee CW xxix. 320 ff. ). of labour performed under conditions of modern industry as Marx's main point of criticism is that their solution would be nearly completely simple labour: 'Hence, in the place of hierarchy self-defeating, since it proposes that goods be produced, but not of specialised workmen that characterises manufacture, there exchanged, as commodities Isee Moore 1980: 73; see also Cohen steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalise and 1978: 127-8). Marx never proposed to 'count any two hours of reduce to one and the same level every kind of work that has to concrete labour as equivalent. This is the solution of Proudhon be done by the minders of the machines' I Capital i. 396; see also and Duhring, but not that of Marx' IMoore 1980: 73). Instead, MEGA II. iii. I . 209). Finally, in the Critique of the Gotha claims Moore, Marx was looking for a mechanism to translate Programme, Marx runs into a difficulty when he claims on the concrete labour into abstract labour, since he was constantly one hand that in the first stage of communism each should be aware of every society's need to perform this transformation. rewarded according to her labour contribution, but, on the other Marx maintains that 'complicated labour . . . lis] labour of hand, recognizes that labour is heterogeneous, that is, different greater intensity and greater specific gravity . . . Iwhich] resolves workers perform different amounts of labour in a given time itself into simple labour put together; it is Simple labour raised period Isee S W iii. 1 8- 19). to a higher power, so that for example one day of skilled labour To turn to the other horn of the dilemma. Marx never tires of may equal three days of simple labour' I CW xxix. 273). In a letter demanding that labour be directly part of the aggregate labour of to Kugelmann he writes, 'that this necessity of the distribution society, that it acquire this social character not only post festum, of social labour in definite proportions cannot possibly be done through the market, but from the outset. This insistence derives away with by a particular form of social production but can only from his insight that fetishism and alienation arise only in change the mode of appearance, is self-evident' ISW ii. 4 1 9). And conditions under which the producers are separated from each in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx other, where 'fragmentation has become the normal state of explains: affairs' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 218 1 ), where products assume the form To measure the exchange values .of commodities by the labour time of value-in a word: in market economies. From this insight they contain, the different kinds of labour have to be reduced to follows his proposal to abolish markets and to replace them uniform, homogeneous, simple labour, in short to labour of uniform with a central plan: quality, whose only difference, therefore/ is quantity. This reduction appears to be an abstraction, but it is an abstraction which is made If we conceive society as being not capitalistic but communistic, there every day in the social process of production. The conversion of all will be no money-capital at all in the first place, nor the disguises commodities into labour time is no greater an abstraction, and is no cloaking the transactions arising on account of it. The question then less real, than the resolution of all organic bodies into air. (CW xxix. comes down to the need of society to calculate beforehand how much 272) labour} means of production, and means of subSIstence it can invest . . . In capitalist society however where social reason always asserts itself But how, then, translate and measure more complicated labour? only post festum great disturbances may and must constantly occur. Here Marx rclies on the reality of bourgeois society which has (Capital ii. 318-19) already brought about the transformation of a great part of social Note that society is conceived here to calculate labour quanta. labour into simple labour: 'The greater part of the labour per­ However, Marx does not tell us how this should be done. He formed in bourgeois society is simple labour as statistical data only suggests that producers may now get paper certificates for show' ICW xxix. 273). But what, then, about the smaller part of their performed work: complicated labour? How is the reduction brought about? Marx's answer in this text is evasive when he says: 'The laws governing In case of socialised production the money�capital is eliminated. Society this reduction do not concern us here' ICW xxix. 273). distributes labour�power and means of production to the different 270 Communism Communism 271 branches of production, The producers may, for all it matters, receive Social theory has developed the following concepts to distinguish paper vouchers entitling them to withdraw from the social supplies of between three forms of socialization. Whereas Oliver Williamson consumer goods a quantity corresponding to their labour time. These ( 1 975) distinguishes only between two forms, markets and hier­ vouchers are not money. They do not circulate. (Capital ii. 362) archies, Luhmann ( 1 984a: 522) distinguishes between com­ There are several problems with that solution. The first is that petition, co-operation, and exchange; Elster ( 1985[, following labour has been reduced to simple, homogeneous labour in order Polanyi, distinguishes between market, planning, and reciprocity. that it can be compared. However, this does not match with These distinctions are different, but also overlapping?9 One Marx's position that the character of labour under communism could, for example, fuse them under the headings of market, will definitely be different from that under capitalism, a point to state, and solidarity. And it seems that all modern societies which I come in a moment. Another difficulty is that Marx employ all of the three mechanisms. A simple thought can thinks that these vouchers would not circulate. But who would illustrate this. Take first the plan: if it is not perfect (and who ensure this? Would it not be natural to assume that they get would assume it can be?), there will always emerge a market exchanged, that a market of labour vouchers would emerge?27 besides the plan-albeit a black market. Above we saw that it To summarize the argument so far. In order to abolish fetishism, would be natural to assume the circulation of labour vouchers. Marx needs to abolish labour markets; in order to calculate the Similarly, it would be absurd for a 'free' society simply to forbid ratios of concrete and abstract labour, he needs to retain markets. Likewise, if the market does not work perfectly (and markets.2s My claim is that Marx employs the term 'conscious who would assume it does?), state intervention will become control' to cover two different principles of organizing the necessary. Finally, solidarity seems always to operate in social economy: market and plan. Note that market and plan are not relations, at least on the micro-level (interactions, families) but as such incompatible; mixed economies or market socialism also on higher levels (agreements between firms, institutions, may be feasible social forms. In the Civil War in France, Marx in etc.). fact seems to combine markets and plan: If labour gets reduced to simple labour under capitalist condi­ tions, will it retain this character in communism? Obviously [Those) members of the ruling class who are intelligent enough to not, if we look at Marx's own writings. I have already quoted the perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system-and they passage from Capital where Marx stresses the need for varied are many-have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co­ operative production. If co*operative production is not to remain a work which becomes realized first under capitalist relations. sham and snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united co­ Certainly, one could say that varied work may be at the same operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common time simple work-but Marx in Capital also stresses the need planJ thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the for an all-round education which is a clear sign that labour constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of cannot be conceived as simple work. In my view, Marx did not Capitalist production-what else, gentlemen, would it be but Com­ change his basic position in respect of labour from the Grundrisse munism, 'possible' Communism? (CW xxii. 335; see also Moore who to Capital. But he has moved into a dilemma whose two aspects points out that the Communist Manifesto contains a model of market are the following: either he has a consistent position in favour of socialism which Marx was later to abandon: Moore 1980: 66-70): labour markets which transform complex into simple labour; 27 Note that Marx at this point takes up the proposal of the Ricardian but this solution entails the danger of fetishism and alienation. SOcialists, and of ProudJlon, to substitute money for such vouchers. The difference Or he has a consistent position in favour of planned labour is that production is now socialized-Marx is therefore consistent in criticizing allocation-in which case he has to assume that labour under their proposal and in proposing something similar here. (But note how un� comfortable he feels: he says meinetwegen they may receive paper vouchers . . . ) communism has the same character as under capitalism. 21'1 See Kosta, Meyer, and Weber ( 1 973: 99 ff.), who report on attempts in the 29 Further examples are Parsons and Shils 1951; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; CDR to measure complicated labour without markets. Kaufmann, Majone, and Ostrom 1986. 272 Communism Communism 273 5,5,3, Social complexity and personal differences would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected Our essential nature, lew iii. 227-8) In this section, I briefly point to an apparent difficulty with Marx's concept of communism which has to do with the possible As far as this argument rests on the assumption of limitless underestimation of ( I ) the importance of personal conflicts and material abundance it must be rejected on the grounds that (2) the importance of social functions, I address these two points Marx himself gave: there will never be a society with limitless in turn. material abundance, As far as the argument rests on the assump­ Marx repeatedly stated that individuals were different .'o tion that personal endowments and interests can be channelled However, he seemed to believe that only under conditions of via a division of labour to the benefit of all, it seems to presuppose class societies, especially capitalism, would personal differences an unrealistic notion of social harmony, As Elster pointed out, turn into conflicts, With the abolition of private property and 'Ie ]ven assuming people to be moved by altruism or a concern for classes, he argues, personal differences can be put to the benefit the common good, they might not have a common conception of all instead of turning into conflicts between individuals, In of what that good is' (Elster 1985: 458), Marx could agree with the German Ideology, Marx and Engels assert that 'with the such an account, arguing that this is characteristic of the first abolition of the basis, private property, with the communistic stage of communism, which is 'in every respect, economically, regulation of production (and implicit in this, the abolition of morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the alien attitude [Fremdheit] of men to their own product), the the old society from whose womb it emerges' (SW iii. 23), And in power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into the early Paris Manuscripts, Marx conceives of a 'crude com­ nothing, and men once more gain control of exchange and the munism' which may well correspond to the two stages in the way they behave to one another' ( C W v, 48), In the Communist Gotha Programme, Marx writes: Manifesto, we read: 'In place of the old bourgeois society, with This type of communism-since it negates the personality of man in its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, every sphere-is but the logical expression of private property, which is in which the free development of each is the condition for the this negation. General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in free development of all' ( CW vi, 506), In the Comments on which greed re-establishes and satisfies itself, only in another way, The James Mill, we read: thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and urge to Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only the person, 11 ) ln my production I would have objectified my individuality, cumulation of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual preconceived minimum, lew iii, 295)3 1 manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object 1 would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality Maihofer pointed out that for this reason law as a social function to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all would be indispensable for communist society,32 Now this doubt, 12) In your enjoyment or use of my product 1 would have the seems to contradict Marx's hope of a 'withering away of the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human state', Maihofer and others have claimed that Marx never enter­ need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, tained such a hope, What Marx actually said was that 'public and of having thus created an object corresponding to another man's power loses its political character' and that the proletariat will essential nature . . . I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. Our products 31 In both texts, according to Marx, all members of society are workers. As Elster pointed OtH, 'what Marx in his youth saw as a blind alley, he later came to 3() See 1859 Pre/ace, The Critique of the Gotha Programme. see as a necessary, if transitional stage' (Elster 1985: 452). 32 See Lukes 1985: 98 ff. for an eloquent exposition of further reasons. 274 Communism Communism 275 install an association which excludes the existence of classes from the real individual and collective interests, and at the same and the conflict between them ."3 But consider Marx's comments time as an illusory community' lew v. 46). I On the Tewish Question) on the 'perfect' state as embodiment Elster convincingly argued that all debates and procedures of of the universal: allocation of resources and of finding solutions to social problems are likely to assume a political character. This leads me to the The perfect political state is, by its nature, manIS species-life, as second question, that is, whether Marx also overlooked the need opposed to his material life. All the preconditions of this egoistic life for the maintenance of social functions such as law, economy, continue to exist in Civil society outside the sphere of the state} but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its true politics, etc. in communist society. development} man-not only in thought, in consciousness, but in We have already seen that Marx claimed that the state would reality, in life-leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life lose its political character in communism. This seems to entail in the political community, in which he considers himself a communal communism eradicating the political system altogether. In so being, and life in civil society, in which hE: acts as a private individual, far as Marx or Marxists adhere to such a position, it must be regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and regarded as basically unrealistic. As social research in this becomes the plaything of alien powers. ICW iii. 1 53-4, my emphasis) century has shown, there is a trend of 'autonomization of social spheres'. One could even conceive of these social autonomiza­ From this Marx concludes: tions as analogous to the autonomization of the economy which Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract Marx so brilliantly analysed. But if it is true that such an citayelll and as an individual human being has become a species-being autonomization has taken place, it is improbable that it can be in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular simply reversed. Writers like Habermas explicitly acknowledge situation, only when man has recognised and organised his 'forces that this social differentiation has to be interpreted as an 'evolu­ propres ' as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social tionary achievement', which is to say that every modem complex power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will society must work according to the laws of different social human emancipation have been accomplished. ICW iii. 168)34 subsystems in which money and power are the two main means of steering Isee Habermas 1 9 8 1 : ii. 499, SO l ). It is not only that the bourgeois has to be eradicated in order to Marx, on the one hand, seems open to such a position when he retain the life of the citoyen, it is rather the whole separation writes in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: 'What social which Marx aims to supersede lin the sense of 'aufheben'). This functions will remain in existence that are analogous to present follows clearly from Marx's treatment of the bourgeois state as state functions? This question can only be answered scientifically' an instance of alienation: 'Out of this very contradiction between ISW iii. 26). Equally open for the functional requirements of particular and the common interests, the common interest modern society lin this case of large-scale industry) was his assumes an independent form as the state, which is divorced position on education. As we saw, Marx claims that many-sided individuals will be needed by large-scale industry and that the ,�.� See Communist Manifesto and Poverty of Philosophy. According to Maihofer, the formula of Withering away of the state was Engels's invention. educational system brings them forth. In the passage on child However, and ironically, Engels himself envisages a Gemeinwesen which labour he even goes so far as to use the requirements of organizes the association of communist society. See Maihofer 1968: 14 ff.; see modern industry as an argument for the inevitability of child also Zolo 1974. .14 This is a theme which has been taken up again by the communitarian labour, which to my view is a somewhat sinister statement.35 In critique of liberalism. Communitarians want to fuse public and private, political .1S and moral dimensions. Interestingly, they seem to commit the same fallacy in He should have separated more clearly the capitalist need for child labour assimilating the 'self-rule' of society to that of an individual. However, to use and his reasons for favouring a combination of theoretical and practical education. Elster'S words here in criticizing Marx, 'this is a scale-error of monumental size The way it stands, it could be interpreted as if Marx would not resist the and importance', see Elster 1985: 458. squandering of children's lives in the factories.  276 Communism Communism 277 summary, Marx acknowledges the need of modern societies to This argument would explain the first ambiguity, i.e. the problem have functionally separated social spheres; sometimes he even of personal conflicts. With respect to the second problem we entertains a naive functionalist view, assuming that the require­ have to look even more closely at the philosophical tradition ments of large-scale industry will be fulfilled automatically. Marx inherited. This is the task of the last section. But on the other hand he clearly favours an abolition of social systems if and in so far as they are superior powers and are 5.6. Technology and the limits of the philosophy of the subject experienced as fate by the individuals. Here he favours a community model over a society model. But if the modern Marx follows Hegel in assuming that the subject will reappro­ world is characterized by such objectifications as social systems priate its own 'creations', its own objectifications. But this which are essential to the functioning of society (whether based assumption is dogmatic. Nothing guarantees or proves that on 'socialist' or 'capitalist' principles) it seems impossible to there will be a subject or a reappropriation. For example, Seyla bring them back completely into the realm of intersubjective Benhabib rightly points out that 'Hegel's critique is based upon action (Habermas's 'Lebenswelt' or the communitarians' 'com­ the normative image of a life form that has become "transparent" munity')-which was Marx's hope in the Tewish Question arid intelligible to the intellect, and in which individuals once (inter alia). This would only be possible on the condition that all again can recognize themselves as part of a "living" as opposed social functions could be performed by small local communities. to a "dead" totality' (Benhabib 1986: 3�). But there is an ambi­ However, as several authors have pointed out, any complex valence in Hegel's immanent critique of natural right theories society needs some large-scale institutions which are organized which Marx was to inherit: on a regional, national, and international level and display some [Oln the one hand, he criticizes the dogmatism of modern natural right degree of centralization. It seems obvious, therefore, that aliena­ theories in reifying present social relations; on the other hand, he tion is inevitable here (and it may already exist on lower levels, himself admits that there is no moment in the present upon which to ftom the intersubjective dimension upwards). anchor the view of a unified ethical life. The ideal of an ethical life is How could we explain this ambiguity in Marx? Lukes suggested not an immanent but a transcendent ideal, in the sense that it involves that there might be a contradiction between the individualistic looking back to the past. (ibid. 32) and the communitarian impulses in Marx's thought: Marx, like Hegel, conceives of human culture as a historical The notion of individuality, to which . . . Marx was so much attached . . . product of man's objectifications; the objects are the expression which reached the nineteenth century through Romanticism, Goethe of man's inner essence and are thus prone to a 'reappropriation'. supplying its artistic and Schleiermacher its metaphysical foundation This reappropriation beeomes necessary because the actual -this notion prescribes that 'each individual is called or destined to course of history has led to an alienation of man from his realise his own incomparable image' (Simmel). The notion of commu­ objects. As Benhabib puts it, nity, to which Marx was no less attached, which is no less rooted in the Western political tradition, pictures individuals as finding their fulfil­ Marx's early diagnosis of the antagonism inherent in bourgeois civil ment in reciprocity and solidarity rather than competition and self­ society clearly parallels the Hegelian one of Entzweiung. The principle assertion, and in mutual identification in common activities and the of essential unity is denied methodologically, but it is reasserted at the pursuit of common purposes. (Lukes 1985: 96)36 normative level as the immanent utopia which Marx claims is the implicit lought' towards which actuality must evolve . . . The reappro­ M> Or, as Habermas pointed out, drawing on Schiller: 'This self-formative priation of the powers and potentialities that humanity has alienated process is related not to the individual but to the collective life-context of the from itself is the dream. (ibid. 38, 39) people as a whole: "Totality of character must therefore be found in a people that is capable and worthy of exchanging the State of need for the state of Let me introduce a thought experiment here. If we cannot rely freedom'" {Schiller, Si:imtliche Werke, v. 579; quoted in Habermas 1987a: 45). on a complete Aufhebung of alienation, we might expect a 278 Communism Communism 279 reduction of alienation. This is to say that from the two models production were happier (d. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2288). But people in of communism only the weaker one is available. Recall the earlier modes of production certainly did not have full conscious strong model from the beginning of this chapter. It is based on control over their life-conditions: nature was an alien power, four elements: return to use-value production, reappropriation even if society was relatively transparent. Religious alienation of man's objectifications, total individuals, and conscious controL was the normal state of these societies. I mention this only to These elements are four inseparable 'moments' of the Pro­ show that (3) does not mean abolition of alienation. This is methean image of mankind. Total individuals are individuals necessary to distinguish the weaker from the stronger notion of who have reappropriated their objectifications and have brought communism. Marx (not only in his early writings) seemed to all their activities under their common conscious controL37 believe that with the abolition of private property all other This strong notion of communism clearly belongs to the notion points would follow more or less automatically; at least the Bildung of German Idealism (Humboldt, Herder) which Marx following passage from the Paris Manuscripts can be interpreted took up from Hegel's philosophy (but also from Feuerbach's in such a way: 'Communism is the positive transcendence of materialism). As we have seen, it is contained both in Hegel's private property, as human self-estrangement and therefore as model of transformation of first nature into second nature the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; which alone makes possible a rational character of the world communism therefore is the complete return of man to himself and in Feuerbach's critique of religion which Marx considered as a social (i.e. human) being-a return accomplishing consciously the starting-point of all critique. According to him, in the and embracing the entire wealth of previous development' (CW emerging modern epoch, science, technology, and bourgeoisie iii. 296; d. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2144). had to fight religious tutelage and free themselves from that Let me now restate the problematic of the present work in the grip.3S light of the above. Ecological problems are seen as the result of But, equally, the established modern epoch has to carryon the technologies operating in a highly differentiated society. The fight against every other form of 'fate' or 'alien powers'. It is thus human species has developed technologies in order to dominate up to the human species to acquire control over its own fate nstme; at a certain point in their development these technologies (social and natural processes) and to develop all of its species can no longer be controlled by individuals, but only by units of powers, as embodied in individuals. social co-operation. If we recall the evolutionary models from Contrast now the weaker notion of communism: Chapter 4, we might say that both technology and social forms 1 . abolition of private property; have assumed a shape which escapes the control of the indivi­ 2. abolition of classes, class exploitation, and class oppression; duals. Both craft technology and transparent social relations 3. universalization of happiness; (like families, guilds, towns) had dimensions which could be 4. universalization of material wealth; grasped by the individuals. Modern technologies are not at the 5. expanding of disposable time. disposal of individual craft workers; likewise, social life cannot be conceived as a family writ large.39 Both stages of development ( I ) and (2) are elements of standard Marxism. However, as my display a sharp qualitative leap which any social theory has to discussion has shown, forms of property and stratification are recognize.4o not the most important causes of ecological problems. I included (3) in this list since Marx thinks that people in former modes of 39 Teubnc: rightly notes that some socialist and corporatist theories wrongly eq�ate functional subsystems of societies with big corporations, capable of 37 The notion of conscious control plays a big role in the humanist tradition actIon (Teubner 1989a: 103). The same holds true with respect to SOme recent going back to Dante, see Girnus 1974; Klein 1974. communitarian criticisms of liberalism. .Hl Humboldt and Schleicrmacher were favouring scientific autonomy which 40 Adorno, in an article called 'Fortschritt', clearly sees that Hegel and Marx was guaranteed by the state in order to fight back religiOUS and ecclesiastical were aware of this autonomization of supra-individual entities. He also sees a domination. Cf. Habcrmas 1987b: 8 1 . 'mythical element' in this process: 'Innerworldly progress has its mythical  ----, - 280 Communism Communism 281 Marx pointed to both phenomena: individuals under conditions thought. Fetishism, which gives rise to 'false consciousness' of modern industry are reduced to 'living accessories' who does not mean that people are in principle unable to conceiv� experience the (technical) world rather as 'fate' than as a product reality. Rather, reality presents itself in the way in which it is of their conscious controL As he said, 'in comparison with represented by consciousness.42 It is up to social science to capitalist society, these old social organisms of production are 'dissipate the mist' and provide explanations which make the far more simple and transparent' (Capital i. 83). Surely, science world more intelligible. Contrary to Marx's hope, contemporary may reveal more and more secrets and solve more and more societies have become even mOre differentiated and complex. puzzles-this is also the route which Marx embarks on in order Social science is therefore needed mOre than ever before. to foster his historical optimism. However, his optimism goes as far as assuming that in principle there can, and will, be a state 42 This 'realist' epistemology comes out very clearly in Marx's letter to of affairs which would make social science superfluous. In other Kugelmann of 1 1 july 1868: 'Since the thought process itself grows out of conditions, is itself a natural process, thinking that really comprehends must words, Marx seems to presuppose that communism will create always be the same, and can vary only gradually, according to the maturity of social relations which are entirely transparent to their members. development, including the development of the organ by which the thinking is As Cohen put it: done' ISW ii. 419). Marx says that relations between human beings under socialism are {transparent' and 'intelligible', Economic agents whose actions arc integrated by a democratically formulated plan understand what they are doing . . . ISocial science) has no function in a world which has abolished the discrepancy between the surface of things and their true character . , . When social science is necessary, men do not understand themselves. A society in which men do not understand themselves is a defective SOciety. (Cohen 1978: 336-8) This interpretation is in line with my emphasis that what counted most for Marx in the final analysis was the construction of a rational world. Cohen gives a-to my view-excellent interpretation of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Marx says there: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.' Cohen rightly suggests interpreting this phrase not in the sense that Marx was (in contrast to Feuerbaeh) interested in practical questions. Rather, as Cohen suggests, we understand the meaning of the eleventh thesis best by adding 'to change it so that interpretation of it is no longer necessary' (Cohen 1978: 339, my emphasis)!l In other words: social reality must be such that it provides the conditions of intelligibility which initiate harmony between reality and element in that it takes place over the heads of the subjects and forms them according to its likeness. Hegel and Marx understood this well' (Adorno 1977: 631-2, my trans.). 4 1 See the Contribution £0 the Critique 0/ Hegel's Philosophy 0/ Law where Marx speaks about an 'inverted world'; see CW iii. 175.  Conclusion 283 1977). Theoretical assumptions of the general validity of the law of value thus seem to be basically unrealistic. Perhaps a para­ Conclusion doxical inference makes this claim even more plausible. Socialist societies which emerged in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba should have done away with the law of value-at least according to Marxist theory. Instead, these societies seemed to be plagued by the persistence of this law. Many SOCially undesirable features Every interpretation and every reconstruction has to start with were attributed to the persistence of exactly this law. As a a reduction. It has to limit the material which it regards as consequence, Marxists found themselves in the absurd situation relevant, it has to limit the questions it is interested in, and it of claiming that capitalism and socialism were characterized by has to decide which method of research to use and what style of the hidden working of the law of value. The law of value was presentation to follow. I started my research with the basic thus transformed from a historical into a universal law which intuition that the Marxian Wertgesetz, his theory of value could only give rise to confusion and endless debates within the which most scholars of Marxism hold to be essential, was of camp of Marxist economists (ef. Brus 1972: ch. 4 and the quoted no interest at all when investigating the relationship between literature). But the law of value was not of any practical help for Marxism and ecological problems. This reduction may seem economic planners in socialist societies. They did not (and quite bold and unconvincing. For was it not Marx himself who could not!) take seriously the implications of this MarXist devoted much attention to an 'unfolding of the laws of motion' dogma since it did not indicate clear lines of action. In determining 01 capitalism? Did not he himself try to decompose the surface the prices for the products of socialist economies, planners phenomena of capitalist society into its constitutive elements usually did not count embodied quantities of labour, but tried to which could be described by the theory of value alone? And did simulate market operations in order to arrive at equilibrium not Marx then, after this decomposition, try to reconstruct the prices (ef. Brus and Laski 1989). In practical terms this came manifold phenomena of capitalist society departing from the down to the question of whether socialism can be conceived as hidden structure lKernstrukt11l) of this very society, thereby a distinct economic system. To affirm this usually meanS to unfolding the logic of the law of value? consider things like state ownership in the means of production, True, all of these questions have to be answered in the planning, poliCies of full employment, etc. as distinctive of a affirmative. It is also true that Marx conceived of the law of socialist economic system. However, both recent his toncal value as the gen eralJaw of capitalist society. Only in this type of events in Eastern Europe and the competent judgement of society has the law of value found its most general expression. economic reformers in these countries indicate that this is In pre-capitalist societies, the law of value is restricted or rather an 'open-ended' question libid. 149). absent. I do not want to judge here if the law of value was The theoretical arguments which object to the theory of value effective in the way Marx thought it was during the late nine­ were discussed immediately after the publication of the three teenth century. Granted that it was, I think that two objections, volumes of Das Kapital. From the first criticisms of Bohm­ one empirical and one theoretical, are fatal for it. The empirical Bawerk till today there seems to be enough evidence to conclude objection is that with the emergence of the Welfare State the that the critics of Marx had the better arguments. This could not law of value no longer applies to society. Economic interventions, be admitted by any serious Marxist who saw in the existence of state enterprises, anti-cyclical interventions in the business cycle, this law, its analysis, and propaganda by Marx and Engels at the and to a certain degree planning have restricted the working of same time the essence of capitalism and its deadly critique. The the law of value in considerable ways. There has been a significant fierce defence of this central dogma of classical Marxism has its change from the 'invisible hand' to the 'visible hand' (Chandler explanation in the fact that it was considercd to be the corner- 284 Conclusion Conclusion 285 stone on which the whole theoretical and practical project first distinction separates culture from nature, the second separ­ rested. Therefore, if the critics of Marx on this point were right, ates technology from society, and the third separates the economy Marxism as a theory would have been refuted and Marxism as a from politics and both again from a religiOUS and those again revolutionary practice would have been defective. This was the from a scientific dimension. As the reader will notice, I introduce underlying assumption on both sides. several elements of post-Marxian sociology into a genuinely As I said, my basic intuition was totally different. That I think historical materialist framework. Among the former, the theories Marxism has something valuable to offer in the analysis of of evolution and of functional differentiation are the most ecological problems will surprise many of those who thought important. My combination of contemporary SOCiological ap­ exclusively in terms of his theory of value. My other intuition proaches with Marx's historical materialism seems to me made was that Marxism, on a non-orthodox reading, could contribute possible by a basic affinity between central elements of both. quite a lot to the understanding of ecological problems. This is Note also that Marx's view of nature has some affinities with an interesting point since the social sciences until the 1980s did the lately promoted paradigm of constructivism in the social not seem to have much to contribute on the issue. I must say sciences (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Glasersfeld 1 9 8 1 ; that I myself was surprised how much Marx's theory had to Watzlawick 1976). This view appears in Marx when h e stresses offer, once the strait-jacket of an orthodox interpretation was the fact that primordial nature has been transformed by historical stripped off. However, one also has to point to the limits of its existing cultures into a second nature, a nature which is culturally theoretical power. shaped. The nature of nature, therefore, is a social construction According to Marx, every product in bourgeois society as­ of every single existing historical culture. sumes the form of a commodity. A commodity embodies the The fact that man stands at the intersection between nature unity of use-value and exchange-value. Labour also has this and culture has further consequences. One of them is that man double character; it is the unity of concrete, use-value producing, is at the same time a natural and a social being, he is Natm­ and abstract, value-producing activity. Likewise, technology is Mensch and Menschen-Mensch ('Gemeinmensch, Communist') both a means and medium to transform nature (partly consti­ as Feuerbach put it. However, it is the human dimension which tuting, partly constituted by -social labour) and constant capital is relevant for the evaluation of the process of the appropriation at the same time. My working hypothesis therefore was to and transformation of nature. In ancient societies this task was explore the theoretical possibilities of abstracting from the fulfilled by religious or mystical world-views. In modern times, value aspect in all these cases and to focus primarily on the use­ where man has to reinvent himself/herself always anew,l the value aspect. This perspective opened up a whole range of new standards of evaluation are not eternally given but change from approaches and possibilities which otherwise would have been culture to culture, from generation to generation, from functional occluded. subsystem to functional subsystem (d. Beck 1988; Eder 1988; Marx's analysis of nature and human nature starts with quite Luhmann 1989b). general assumptions about transhistorical conditions in which As I tried to show, Marx's standard for evaluation draws on a mankind is situated. Marx coined the term Stoffwechsel to specific variant of modern thought. Most interesting are his denote man's dependence on and his active and conscious insights deriving from his philosophical anthropology, combining intervention into nature. This process could, in a very abstract results from the natural sciences with an ethical device: that way, be seen as a self-mediation of nature, a process in which human beings are to master the world and nature in such a way human beings, as parts of nature, appropriate and transform that they achieve adulthood (Miindigkeit). These two sides of nature. However, to 'unfold' this dialectic, it is necessary to I i!-s expressed by Baudelaire: 'Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive, the introduce other distinctions. These distinctions have to be contmgent, half of the art, the other half being the eternal and unchangeable' drawn all on the side of the s ocial, not on the side of nature. The (Baudelaire 1954: 892, my trans,; cf. also Foucault 1984; Luhmann 1989b). 286 Conclusion Conclusion 287 Marx's analysis are in tension with each other. Perhaps one be within the scope of single individuals, every time controllable could interpret them as corresponding to Enlightenment and by them? How does Marx relate the individual to the social? The Humanism, to use Foucault's distinction Isee Foucault 1984: answer is that he tries to avoid this problem altogether by 43 £.). The critical Marxian method is expressed in a sort of synthesizing Feuerbaeh's Gattungswesen with historical em­ categorical imperative which reads in the following way: 'The pirical development. This theoretical move is expressed in the criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the turn from the Paris Manuscripts to the German Ideology. Marx highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to thinks that human objectifications are the embodiment and overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, examples of human self-realization, to put it crudely: the Gat­ forsaken, despicable being. ,2 Human beings have to reduce or tungswesen in palpable form. This move was supposed to give abolish domination over each other and they have to aim at a him a firm stance against philosophical speculation. In fact, it conscious conttol of their actions. Marx conceived of this process opened the way to historical materialism. However, Marx never as being parallel to, or even the pure unfolding of, human self­ abandoned the expressivist conception of Gattungswesen which, realization. In putting it this way, he reconciled Enlightenment at later stages of theoretical development, returns. Every time with Humanist thought. Marx confronts this return, he remembers his commitment to However, further problems arise here. The reconciliation is Gattungswesen and advances solutions which abolish deep­ performed in a perfectionist and romantic framework which is seated oppositions in society, and which favout the individual. formulated clearly in his philosophy of history. Inherent in To be sure, Marx rarely addressed this problem in the terms I am history's course was a telos which had to be realized. For Marx, using here. For him, all deep-seated oppositions were crystallizing like Hegel, this telos was the reconciliation of the fragmented in class cleavages. Therefore it was sufficient to abolish class rule parts of modernity, the abolition of all deep-seated oppositions in order to liberate human potentials. But in addressing the which characterize modern bourgeois society. To be sure, Marx problem of technology, he faced the problem again and again. He diverges from Hegel in that he replaces the funetion which spirit became aware that a single change in property forms and the occupies in Hegel's system with the function of productive abolition of classes might not be sufficient to turn existing labour. Nevertheless, he inherits all the problems of Hegel's productive forces into authentic examples of human self­ philosophy of identity. For communism is seen as a state of development. However, as I tried to show, Marx concealed this affairs in which mankind is in harmony with its own creations, disquieting issue. in which it has solved the riddle of history and knows itself as its Now, one might argue: granted there is a critical potential in solution, as he put it in the Paris Manuscripts. This teleology Marxism with respect to ecological problems, but it has been has been submitted to sharp criticism, and rightly so. I mention achieved at too great a cost, that is, only by subscribing to the only the works of Kolakowski, Charles Taylor, and Habennas. philosophy of identity, which is untenable. The answer would lAs an aside, for Marx this communist future will not mark an be that we can separate in Marx the assumptions of Hegel's end of history, but an end to pre-history, for it is only now that identity philosophy from his critical method. In other words: people have eome to produce their life-conditions consciously we should use Kant'S critical method3 and not Hegel's identity that they can make history properly. ) philosophy as the major reference point. Thereby, I think, one Marx did not directly address the problem he was facing. This would get a sort of general4 standard for criticism which does problem was: how can the individual need for self-realization be not commit itself to the strong assumptions made in Marx's reconciled with the development of productive forces which theory of history Ici. Foucault 1984). This critical model would are, after all, a social entity? Does every productive force have to . ,� For some early studies on the relationship between Kant and Marx, sec Vorlander 1900; Bauer 1905; Adler 1975. For a recent attempt, see Kain 1988. 2 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 0/ Law, CW iii. 182. 4 Not universal, for it is based on purely modern conditions!  288 Conclusion Conclusion 289 also be different both from neo-Kantian positions such as action. Strategic-instrumental action, on the other hand, which Habermas's discourse ethics (which, as is known, relies on is outcome-orientated and applies to processes of transforming linguistic reasoning) and from Anglo-American liberalism such nature, does not contain any critical standards. But note: it is as Rawls's theory. That it has something of interest to offer, I only after haVing read Marx and the praxis-philosophers with shall try ro explain now, coming back to the question of ecology. these spectacles that Habermas can derive a reduced account of The process of transforming nature entails the danger that it the concept of labour which is bare of any emancipatory potential. does not work to the benefit of the producers. One reason for Now I return to the proposed combination of historical materi­ this may be that the whole process of transforming nature has alism and systems theory which I carried out in a framcwork of grown 'out of control', that people are, as before, ruled by a 'blind coevolution. It may be noted that 'social forms' here means fate'. It would follow that people have to achieve their power to something slightly different from in Marx's framework. Accord­ control their life and thereby achieve human dignity. But this ing to Marx'S definition there are three major social forms perspective can only be understood in a weak sense, not in the which history has so far developed: ancient, feudal, and capitalist. sense that there will be an end-state which has realized all of To every historical epoch ( social form) Marx attributes a specific = these ideals. Modern societies are characterized by a social and technology and specific forms of social co-operation (see Fig. 4.3). technological dynamism which makes an eventual 'halting Marx himself pulls these elements together in a model in which point', at which mankind and nature are in balance, quite different layers are in a relation of determination. At times Marx implausible. The proposed critical model is therefore not to be thinks that the development of the productive forces is the understood as containing the programme for a reconciled society; deepest layer in all societies and that this layer constantly it only contains a critical potential which can be applied in develops and causes the relations of production (the social different circumstances in order to improve the predicament of forms) to change accordingly. However, as I have shown, both mankind. empirical evidence and Marx's own considerations make clear This approach differs from Rawls's or Habermas's in the that the development of productive forces is also influenced by following way. Rawls is operating on a much more modest level. the specific relations of production. To get a clearer picture, The scope of his criticism lies exclUSively on the level of justice; I therefore proposed to replace this somewhat obscure termino­ problems of the above-mentioned kind fall outside his point of logy of relations of production and productive forces with a view. In this sense, Marx's preference for human freedom (over conceptual framework which was developed by post-Marxian justice and Recht) has something to it. I do not doubt that SOCiology, that is, the language of functional differentiation as Rawls's procedural techniques have much to offer regarding the we find it in Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Parsons, Luhmann, process of finding a just regulation of, say, scarcity of resources, and others. or distribution of wealth, but his theory gets these problems Replacing the too general 'social relations of production' with into its view only when they have already occurred. more accurate and sharper conceptual tools allows us to get Habermas, in a similar way to Rawls, excludes from his better insights into the complicated process of technological analysis the locus where ecological problems are produced. His and social coevolution. Economy, science, and politics are the reaction to the alleged weakness of the praxis-philosophical most important social spheres which contribute to the develop­ reading of Marx is an overreaction and blinds him to the potential ment of productive forces and are, in turn, themselves conditioned which really is implicit in this reading when properly understood. by a historical level of technology and its potentials. In using This leaves Habermas with the only critical tool for investigating additionally a systems theoretical model for the reformulation discursive activities which would establish the conditions for of historical materialism, I hope to clarify further the real an unconstrained consensus. For Habermas, the emancipatory possibilities and dangers of such a coevolutionary process. Pro­ potential lies completely within the communicative type of ductive forces are no autonomous force in history, they are  r ! 290 Conclusion Conclusion 291 socially shaped. It thus seems that a contemporary fear of a binding way S These decisions may also have effects on the technologically inevitable trajectory which leads to an increas­ economy or on science, but not in a direct way. We know of ing domination over people and to more or deeper ecological many cases where such attempts have proved to be dysfunctional problems is not sufficiently founded. But the opposite is not true for the solution of a problem. But there are also examples of either. Since modern societies do not possess a centre, the successful political interventions Isee Rottleuthner 1989; Scharpf planning of society and technology becomes difficult if not 1989; Biihl 1989). impossible. Furthermore, all social systems are operating on the My claim that politiCS is not able to abolish ecolOgical problems basis of their own logic or code-each code being different from need not be confused with a statement which would affirm that the others. The result is that each social system is a closed nothing can be done. As I have indicated, the process of techno­ universe for the others, and none of them has primacy over the logical development is crucial here. It would be naive to believe others. Autopoietic systems theory has not yet developed a that politics could bring about new, less harmful technologies convincing solution to the problem of how intersystemic com­ just by ordering them. Technologies which are economizing munication can be conceived-a theoretical requirement for resources, which are less polluting, and which are safer lin the the understanding of such a process. I have suggested some sense that they do not lead necessarily to industrial aCCidents) possible steps to handle the problem Iss. 3.3 and 4.3) which I do can only be the result of a social process in which scientific, not repeat here. political, and economic forces are the most important. The fact It is well known that communist parties in Eastern Europe that politics is only one force in this process indicates that it claimed to be the sole organizations equipped to discover the cannot plan it from the outside; but the corollary is that politiCS, objective laws of nature. A society that is consciously admini­ because it is part of that process, may be able to influence it from stered does not experience the same contradictions as capitalist inside. societies Id. Ziegler 1987: 35). However, functional differentiation It may be objected to my systems theoretical reformulation of has eroded the party's privileged position as it has generally historical materialism that this is a contradiction in terms since eroded any privileged position. The problems of regulatory Marx's ethical theory and the cool functional analyses of systems politics are thus not very different in East and West. Most theory are incommensurable. In a certain sense this objection industrially advanced societies face ·severe ecological problems repeats the long-standing schism between Marxism as humanism which are the result of their highly developed processes of v. Marxism as anti-humanism. In claiming that both sides are transforming nature. Part of these societies are social movements reconcilable I also have to show in what sense the debate within and political forces which expose these problems and make Marxism was misconceived. In fact, I think that it revolved them into political issues. Such issues became more and more around a false dichotomy. The argument which is supposed to important in the late 1980s. sustain my claim is that Marx's analysis of alienation and The emergence of ecological parties in the West has led to a fetishism has to be detached from the individual level and that considerable legitimation crisis of governments in power. As a there is an equivalent for 'alienation' in systems theory. This is result, many political parties all over the world have taken up to say that the abolition or reduction of alienation not only, and ecological issues. Politicians, therefore, try to decrease ecological not in the first place, means the change of certain psychic states problems where possible. However, they are restricted when of modern men, or enabling them as individuals to control doing so. Politics does not stand at the top of a Ipyramidal) society nor in the centre of a Iconcentric) society: it is one social .5 Where ecological problems are the result of a logic of public goods, politicS seems to have some power to resolve them. Examples are cases where ecological subsystem among others. This is to say that politics cannot be problems arc manifest and where it is possible to neutralize them by a combined expected to cure modern societies of the disease of ecological policy of (legal) threats and (economic) offers. See Steiner 1974; Taylor 1982; problems. What politics does is to decide on public issues in a Teubner 1987. 292 Conclusion Conclusion 293 social life, but, more importantly, means the enabling of social criticizc capitalism exactly in terms of individual alienation, systems to get control over their environment. This 'getting that is, to denounce every stcp in social differentiation as a control' is a shorthand to describe the complex feedback loop further instance of the scandalous performance of capitalism. from society, including human needs and interests, affecting This is the solution favoured by many contemporary thinkers, nature by means of technology, to nature which finally makes whether Marxists, ex-Marxists, greens, or communitarians. For itself felt to society. example, the influential model of 'small is beautiful' recommends At the turn of the twenty-first century one must acknowledge the re-dimensioning of social and technical reality. I do not that Marx's hope of reconciling the individual with society is in doubt that one can make such criticism with good reason and vain. The conditions of a society in which the free development also with the help of Marx's notion of alienation. But neither do of each is the condition for the free development of all, and in I think that it is congenial to Marx's general line of thought nor which complete transparence is achieved, do not obtain. In so does it correspond to present social reality and its possibilities. far as Marx's argument of a withering away of justice land the The historical drive towards functional differentiation has been state) was based on the assumption that communism would so strong that it could not be opposed by such simple models of overcome scarcity, it was refuted by the occurrence of ecological social life which all, in a way, take as their reference point the problems like scarcity of resources and pollution. Additionally, community and autarchy of the Greek polis. To advance such a the mechanism of positional goods (Hirsch 1977) thwarts the type of argument in a society which exists on a world scale and possibility of a justice-free society. In so far as Marx's argument which is highly mobile, pluralistic, loosening traditional bonds, was based on the assumption that communism would bring resembles the attitude of Don Quixote who 'long ago paid the about social transparence, this was refuted by an increase in penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was com­ functional differentiation. In other words, the basic separation patible with all economic forms of society' ( Capital i. 86 n.). of politics and economy was not only not reversed (as Marx Marx tried to find out real possibilities of social change on the expected), but completed and aggravated by additional differences. basis of an analysis of the obtaining historical conditions. The Precisely here lies the great virtue of systems theory for the direction of social change was indicated by his philosophical reconstruction of historical materialism. The big problem in anthropology and the philosophy of identity. The real possibility modern societies is not that individuals do not understand the for him was embodied in the working class which could bring working of certain technologies or of social systems. This does about a new organization of society. However, this specific happen and has well-known effects, but these should be minim­ version of historical materialism is less and less convincing. Yet ized. Far more serious is the problem that social systems are any project of human self-realization and of the overcoming of often unable to observe and control (to 'understand') the effects alienation has to be founded on a sound analysis of social reality, of their own working on themselves. I suggest using the concept if it is not to become a pious wish. of alienation on this level also. The basic meaning remains the Heidegger made the intriguing statement that in the modern same; what is changed is the point of reference. It switches from epoch man becomes the centre and measure of all beings I d. the individual to the social. What Luhmann calls 'Rationalitat' Habermas 1987a: 133) 6 This phrase can be taken at face value, 1 1 984a: 638 ff.) of social systems would in my reading be a state that is, as a statement about the modern condition. But it can of affairs in which no alienation thus understood exists. also be understood in a critical way, that is, that man should be In making Marx's humanism compatible with systems theory measure and middle of all beings. In Heidegger, both meanings one has to pay a price. In my view, the price should be to drop the are intertwined. He continues his statement: 'Man is the sub: reference point of a subject which gets alienated and to replace it iectum, that which lies at the bottom of all beings, that is, in with the notion of social systems. To be sure, there is (at least) (, 'Das Zcitalter, das wir die Ncuzcit ncnncn, bestimmt sich dadurch, daB der another possibility of reconciling the two. It is possible to Mensch Mag und Mittc des Scicnclen wird' (Heidegger 1961: Ii. 61).  294 Conclusion modern terms, at the bottom Conclusion 295 of all objectification and re­ presentation. , 7 The term former was blind to certain problems which have to do with 'objectification' ( Vergegens lichung) points to the forme tiind_ motivational forces of social change whereas the latter draws r, the term 'representation' 'imagination', Vorstellbarkeit (or : upon a Utopian dimension. As Ricoeur ( 1 986) aptly pamted out, ) to the critical dimension. Ma is different. For him, the loss rx Utopia has an important function for society . It IS a �ort of store of individual power over soc . relations Was a fact of reality ial of historically transmitted Images and fantaSIes whIch helps us ; for him it was all about rein the mdlvldual WIth ItS los vesting to imagine other possible worlds. Ricoeur thus re-evaluates the t power. The model was a conceIved as community On society notion of Utopia (which is often used in a pejoratIve sense a world scale in which there plenty of resources and goo were among social scientists and philosophers) in asslgmng to It an ds and hence no need for jus Likewise, the distinction bet tice. essentially positive role. He even goes so far as to affirm that a ween politics and economy, between Cltoyen and bourge and society without Utopia is a dead socicty. In the present context ois, would be overcome. The dual would reappropriate all indivi­ it is important to note that critical social theory has to achieve extemalized forces as forces In so far as critics of modern propres. something more than just proclaiming Utopian Ideas. It has to society base their panacea on outline, they are likely to im this give a thorough analysis of the historical condItIOns whIch are itate Don Quixote. They tak from Marx a model of society e over under discussion and then to test some of the tools from Utopia's (de-differentiation) without rec Sidering its analytical and on­ store. If this dialectic is forgotten, the process of cntlclsm historical foundations. But preconditions on which Ma if the degenerates into an end in itself. The fact that modern socIety IS rx based this critical model longer valid, the critical mo are no not constructed according to human sIze and logIC does not del itself loses its powcr. Soc theory, especially the theory ial mean that we have to forget about such ideals. The questIOn to of functional differentiation evidenced the changing featur has which this book has tricd to contribute, therefore, IS: how can es of modern society. Sophisti critical writers like Jiirgen Ha �ated we strive towards them on thc basis of a sound analysIs, WIthout bermas and others have ack ledged this fact. The critica now­ simply invoking a 'paradise lost'? l outline, therefore, has to another form than the Marxi take an. 8 Marx and Engels thought tha t they had developed sociali from an Utopian notion into sm a science. They did not forese their model of social scienc e that e was to become one among others and that its practical many message would lose its plausi Moreover, as 'Marxism as a bility. science' ran into all kinds of culties, it took little to pro diffi­ claim the counter-reaction MarX-Engels slogan. Marxism to the was now faulted for having gon too far in the direction of scie e nce. What was needed was Utopian e1ement.9 I distinguis the hed between Marxism as a scie and Marxism as a critique (sce nce ch. 2) and I maintained that the . 7 'Der Mensch ist das aHem Seienden, d.h. bchung und Vorstellbarl<eit neuzeitlich alIer Vergegenstiin zugrundeliegendc, das subj d. Habermas 198 5: 160, emp cctum' (quoted in hasis added). 8 For an example of criticiZing Habermas for s�stems theory nd functio gOing too far in the direction � nalism, see McCarthy 1985 of wmg authors thmk that Hab , comprom , In effect, many left­ ermas IS ising with 9 Cf. Ernst Bloc the devil. h's notion of a cold and a Hudson 1982. See also Wal warm stream within Marxism lerstein 1986j Ricoeur 198 J 6.  a Bibliography 297 Das Kapital ( 1 867), vols. i-iii, in MEW xxiii-xxv. Bibliography Capital, vols. i-iii (London: Lawrence & Wishart). Briefe liber das Kapital (Berlin: Dietz, 1954). Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. 1 . Works of Marx L. Feuer ILondon: Fontana, 19691. 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Teubner (ed.), State, Berlin, L 262 Darwin, C. 1 14-15, 1 16-18, 121-2, Law, Economy as A utopoietic Systems (Milau: Giuffre). Bijker, W. 154,201 147 n. Binswanger, H. C. 141 Descartes, R. 58, 91,231  320 Index Index 321 Dickens, C. 127, 128 n. Foerster, H. von 185, 188, 2 1 5 high-risk systems 33-6, 84, 131-2, eroancipatory dimension 10, lOS, Dobbins, �. 59 n. Fores, M. 129 135 238, 241, 242, 243,261, 288-9 Dosi, G. 145 Foucault, M. 285 n., 286-7 Hinz, M. 261 n. as 'play' and 'curse' 239, 260-1 Dostoevsky/ P.M. 91 n. Fourier, C. 239, 240,260-1 Hirsch, F. 246, 292 simple and complicated 268, 271 Douglas, M. 24, 155, 184, 2 1 8 ll. Fraas, C. 72, 79 Hirschmann, A. O. 76 as 'travail attractif' 240, 241 Durkhdm, E. 142, 1 74, 184, 289 functionalism 183-8 Hobbes, T. 122 11. Lalonde, B. 1 7 Dworkin, R. 85 functional v. causal Hofstadter, R. 120 n. La Porte, T . R . 264 explanation 184-8, 219 Honneth, A. 241 Larmore, C. 186 ecological catastrophes 22, 28-9,33 Fuss, P. 59 n. Horkheimer, M. 16, 198 n. Laski, K. 283 ecological crisis 9, 2l, 51 future generations 57, 65-70, 259 Howe, R. H . 189 n., 191 law: ecological problems 9, 1 2, 13, 14, 17, Hudson, W. 257, 294 as instrument in regulating 20, 21-3, 27-8,36-41, 46-50, Galtung, J. 1 2 Hughes, T. P. 109 ll., 151, 156, 157, ecological problems 82�8 72-5, 222-3, 229, 230, 284,287, Gehlen, A . !0O 199,201, 202 as social function 1 74, 273-6 290 Georgescu·Roegcn, N. 21, 5 1, 56 human nature 9, 54,85, 100, 102 Law, J. 201 depletion of Datural resources 13, Geras, N. 102-3, 162 n.,208 n. alien powers v. conscious Lazonick, W. 170 14, 22, 78-9, 88,224 Gemltana, V. 1 1 5 n. control 54-5, 72 Leiss, W. 91 n.,231 destruction of wilderness 1 3 Gcuss, R. 53 alienation 55, 108 Lenin, V.l. 2 1 1 n., 233,235 extinction of species 13, 67 Giddens, A. 3, 48-9 self-realization 58-9, 70,73, 104, Lepcnics, W. 122 grecnhousc cffcct 12,22 Girnus, W. 278 n. 139, 1 72, 174, 177, 226, 233, 287 Levinc, A. 180 pollution 13, 14, 22, 36-7, 38,46 Glasersfeld, E. von 285 true human esscnce 73, 103, Liebig, J. 79, 121 Eder, K. 285 God 15, 5S, 1 1 8 104-6 Lifcldman, H. 44 Eigen, M. 188, 203-5, 208, 2 1 7 Goethe, J . W . von 141, 189, 22S, Humboldt, W. von 59, 278 lifcworld 249, 251-3, 276 Ellul, j . 198-9 260 n. Hume, D. 246-7 Loh, W. 203 ElSter, J. 71, 97, 101, 102, 108 n., 1 1 7, Goldman, M. 42 Luce, D. 43 152 11. , 154-5, 1 74, 180, 183-7, Gorz, A. 4,56 lllieh, L 21 Luckmann, T. 285 209 n., 214, 219, 241 n., 256 n., Gould, S. J. l l5 n., 1 1 6 n., 119 n., Luhmann, N. 29, 51, 56,87, 105 n., 271, 273, 274n. 120, 147 n., 155 Jonas, H. 3,56 1 17, 1 1 9, 142, ISO, 1 6 1, 1 74, Engels, F. 58, 72, 1 18, 122 n., 123, Groh, D. 1 1 5 n. Junger, E. 261 n. 1 85-7, 191, 193, 194-7, 199, 190,204,245,254 n., 272, 274 n., Gruhl, H. 15, 1 7 212 n., 215, 2 1 7, 237 n., 262 n., 294 Grundmann, R. 172,241 n. Kain, P. J. 287 ri. 265 n., 271, 285, 289 Enzcnsbergcr, H. M. 1, 30, 47-8 Kant, L 7,26, 55,66, 70, 85, 163, 189, Lukacs, G. 162 n., 258 n. evolution: Habermas,J. 16, 104 n., 1 19, 120, 247, 287 Lukes, S. 53,85, 86, 152n., 158 n., coevolution 9, 10, 197, 200, 204, 148n., 153, 161 n., 173 n., 2 1 1, Kaufmann, F. X. 271 n. 159 n., 180, 214 n., 273 n., 276 209-10,221 236, 247-53, 275,276,278 n., Kelley, D. 42 hypercyclc 205-6, 209, 212-13, 286, 288, 293�4 Kern, H. 210 McCarthy, T. 294 220n. Haeckcl, E. 1, 1 7 Keynes, J. M. 164 n. machine 122-8, 130 riatural 1 17, 1 19, 155 Haken, H. I S 8 Kitschelt, H. 56 capitalist use of 125-7, 139-40, of productive forces and relations Hardin, G. 38-9 Klein, B. H. 145 n. 160, 1 68-9, 192, 209 of production 1 14, 173,203-12, Harich, W. 15, 1 7 Klein, M. 278 n. definition of 122, 124, 166 221, 279, 289 Harrington, M . 267 Kluge, T. 19 machinery 1 10, 1 15, 125-8, 130, social 1 1 7, 1 19, 155 Hart, H. L. A. 85 n. Knorr-Cetina, K. 135 n. 133, 139, I l l , 1 76-7, 191, 209, social Darwinism 120 n. Hayek, F. A. von 88 n. Kolakowski, L. 104 n., 286 214 SOCiobiology 120 n. Hegel, G. W. F. 7,59 n., 62, 85, 91-5, Korsch, K. 1 1 8 n. Marx's problems with 123, 139- externalities 27, 37, 41, 75 100, 1 3 1 11., 158, 163, 220,247, Kosta, 1- 270 n. 40, 165, 179 277-8, 279 n., 286-7 Kramer, J. M. 42 MacIntyre, A. 104 n. Hcidegger, M. 92, 108 n., 135 n., Krohn, W. 26, 188,265 n. MacKenzie, D. 157, 160 n., 1 6 1 , 201 Feinberg, J. 56,85 n. 165 n., 293 Kuhn, T. S. 146 McQuarie, D. 193 n. Fctscher, ]. 73, 79,94 n., 100, 172 Heilbronner, R. L. 12, 162 n. Kupilik, M. 42 Maihofer, W. 233, 273, 274 n. Fcucrbach,1. 7, 59 n., 95, 97 n., 98, Hejl, P. M. 193 Kuppers, G. 188,265 11. Malthus, T. R. 64, 1 15 n., 143 n. 102, 1 64,236,248,278,285 Hellcr, A. 101, 1 73, 1 79 Mandel, E. 49 theses on 102,280 Hempel, C. G. 185 labour 95, 96, 238-53, 286 Mannheim, K. 158 n. Fichte, J. G. 66, 70, 248 Herder, J. G. 59, 278 division of 1 15, 1 22, 124-5, 133, Marcuse, H. 16,251 Fletcher, G. P. 199 Heuser-KeHler, M. L. 1 2 1 n. 171-9,218, 227 Marcn-Griesebach, M. 26 322 Index Index 323 market 1 1 , 37-40, 88 Parsons, T. 190 n., 193, 271 n.,289 Schelling, F. W. j. 121, 163 Taylor, C. 104, 187 n., 286 and plan 266-71 Passmore, J. 13, 19, 20,23, 24, 29,30, Schelling, T. C. 67 Taylor, M. 215, 291 n. Marx, 1. 127 33,37-8, 56, 65, 83, 85 n., 97 Schclsky, H. 108 n. Taylor, P. 77 materiality continuum 196-7 Perrow, C. 30,33,34,35, 56, 84, Schiller, F. 59, 260 n., 276 n. tcchnology 9, 18, 28,29, 46, 74, Maturana, H. R. 193, 196 n., 212 n. 1 31-2, 135 Schluchter, W. 191 n. 90-1, 107, 128-39, 149, Maurer, R. 62 Petrovic, G. 162 n. Schmidt, A. 8,93, 98, 121, 256-7, 263 254 Mayntz, R. 148, 154 n., 265 n. Pico della Mirandola 58, 59, 9 1 Schmicd-Kowarzik, W. 6 chemical 28-9, 35 Meadows, D. 12,56,64 Pigou, A . 37 Schumacher, E. 56 as complex 213 Merrill, R. 107 Pinch, T. 154,201 Schumann, M. 210 n. complexity of 134; see also high­ Mertoll, R.K. 31, 56; 87 n., 184 Piore, M. 152, 1 70, 1 9 1 , 202 Schumpeter, J. A. 200 n., 203 risk systems Meyer-Abich, K. 1 8 Pizzorno, A. 76 Schuster, P. 203-5,208, 2 1 7 'eigendynamics' of 131, 152, 202, Mill, j . S. 19, 127, 150, 245-6 Plemenatz, J. 108 n. Schweitzer, A . 24 279 Mishan, E. f. 56 Polanyi, K. 38, 2 1 1 n., 271 science 9, 26, 1 28-39, 251, 263-5, evolution of 133, 139, 145, 153, Moleschott, 1. 121 population growth 13-14,57, 64-5 280 166, 198, 200-1 Moore, B., Jun. 221 n. Preuss, U. K. 84 Marxism as science 102 nuclear 28-9, 35 Moore, S. 268, 270 Price, D. j. de Solla 135-7, 148-9, Marx's belief in 128-30, 1-'3 2-4, social construction of 201-2 Mulkay, M. 1,,5 n. 196 138, 187-9 as system 147-57, 193-203, 251 Mumford, L. 17, 56 Prigogine, L 18, 1 88 natural 79,95, 121, 128-39, 188 technological alienation 9, 108, Myrdal, G. 1 2 prisoners' dilemma 38,43-5,84 social 95, 120, 280 140, 162-6, 1 71, 250 productive forces 3,4, 49, 103, 106, Seidel, C. 163 technological asscssment 30, 200 Nagel, E. 185 1 12-13, 173 Sc1ucky, R. 173 technological determinism I l l, nature: clash with relations of Sen, A. K. 43-4 159-62, 1 7 1, 1 79, 200- 1, 206, concept of 93,256-7,260 production 182, 222,234 Shakcspeare, W. 60 207, 213 destruction of 9, 15, 2 1 growth of 3,4, 49, 60,220, 228, Shaw, W. 45 technological progress 1 13, 141-3, domination of 2,4, 13, 14, 1 7, 10, 229,250 Shrader-Frechette, K. 35 199-200 21, 23,49,52, 60-3, 92,99, 223, Proudhon, P. j. 1 72, 267 Sidgwick, H. 66 tcchnological trajectory 145-7, 243-4, 262,265 Singer, P. 85 n. 152, 213 exploitation of 3 , 2 1 , 49, 255,260 Raiffa, H. 43 Sismondi, j. C. 1. 143 teleology 62, 115 n., 153, 183 first and second 10, 94, 96, 138, Rammcrt, W. 141, 156, 195 Smith, A. 1 76, 220, 239, 240 Teubner, G. 87, 159 n., 193, 202 n., 236, 247,250 Rapp, F. 56, 129 n. society: 2 1 6, 265 n., 279 n., 291 n. instrumental value 25, 56-7,83, rationality 16,25,37,55, 252, 280, ancient 58-9, 2 1 1 , 236,265-6 thermodynamics, sccond law of 21, 86, 96 292 modern 87, 140,262,272,275, 279 51 intrinsic value 25,56-7,83,96 Rawls, j. 44,66,68, 104 n., 288 truchuman, see communist Thcunissen, M. 104 n. laws of 21, 58-9, 64, 95, 1 79,255; Regan, T. 56,85 n. society threshold values 215-16 see also naturalism Reiche, J. 62 Spacmann, R. 58 Tiezzi, E. 35, 1 1 7, 155 n. man's dealings with 23, 26, 28, 90 Ricardo, D. 143, 147 n. Sraffa, P. 194 n. Trepl, 1. 18 naturalism 17-20 Ricoeur, P. 105 n., 164, 1 75, 294-5 Steiner, H. 45, 215, 291 n. Trotsky, L. 247 teleological character 62 Rimbaud, A. 147 n. Stiehwch, R. 137 n., 193, 194 unintended consequences of human transforming of 3, 9, 90, 94, 96, 97, Rip, A. 154-5 Stone, C. 85 n. action 27, 30-3, 57, 71-2, 78, 98,99, 1 1 1, 132, 138, 225, 229, Robinson, ,. 68 systems: 87 236-7, 244, 246, 250, 255, 265, Rosdolsky, R. 224 n. aUopoietic 196 n. United Nations Commission on 289, 290 Rosenberg, N. 109, 1 10, 1 15, 130-2, autonomous 202 Environment and Nelson, R. 144-6 135, 137, 154, 156 autopoictic 193-7 Development 13,29 Neumann, J. von 205 n. Rosenbladt, S. 40 closed 195, 290 Ure, A. 1 10, 129, 167-9, 176 Newton, !' 187 Roth, G. 193 eodcs of 196, 198, 290 Nietzsche, F. 1 2, 9 1 , 229 Rottlcuthner, H. 122, 215,291 intcrfcrcnccof 146-7, 215-16 Varela, F. 193 North, D. C. 1 8 1 n. Rousseau, I.-I. 40, 59 intcrpenetration of 212 n. Vico, G. 59, 94, 236, 262-3, 265 Norton, B. 15, 25,26,53,67,83 intersystemic communication 290 Victor, P. A. 38, 40, 225, 226 Sable, C. 152, 1 70, 191, 202 social 87, 193, 249, 251, 290 Voltairc, 62 Oechsle, M. 16, 17,56 Sandel, M. 104 n. technologic.al, see technology, 'IS Vorlandcr, K. 287 Offe, C. 184 n., 185 n., 186 Seharpf, F.W. 21S,26Sn.,291 system Olson, M., jun. 43 Schefold, B. 222,225 theory 10, 193 Waldron, j. 85 Ophuls, W. 246 n. Scheler, M. 129 n., 149, 150, 213 Sztompka, P. 193n. Walker, K. j. 5 1 324 Index Wallerstein, I. 294 WeIskopf, E. 212 n. Wartofsky, M. W. 59 n. Whitc, L., /un. 15 Watzlawick, P. 285 Williams, R. 191 n. Weber, M. 41, 108 n., 150, 154 n., Williamson, O. E. 2 1 1 n., 271 158 n., 1 74, 1 89, 190, 191, 199, Willke, H. 87, 193,265n. 2 1 7, 289 Winner, 1. 198 Weick, K. E. 1 16, 122, 141, 1 53, 156, Wright, E. O. 180 202 Weizsacker, E. von 1 1 9 n" 204 n., Ziegler, C. 40,42, 43, 2 1 1 n.,290 220 n. Zolo, D. 193,274 n.