Equity Analysis of Boston MPO: An Analysis of Representation and Voting Structure
Equity Analysis of Boston MPO: An Analysis of Representation and Voting Structure
Equity Analysis of Boston MPO: An Analysis of Representation and Voting Structure
Equity Analysis of Boston MPO
An Analysis of Representation and Voting Structure
Marcos Luna, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Dept of Geography, Salem State University
12/22/2011
This report presents an analysis of the equity implications of representation and voting power at the Boston
Metropolitan Planning Organization’s (MPO) sub‐region and municipal level using Census 2010 demographic data. The
results show that representation and voting power in the Boston MPO is inequitably distributed in terms of population
and race.
Equity Analysis of Boston MPO Voting Structure
Summary
This report presents an analysis of the equity implications of representation and voting power at the Boston
Metropolitan Planning Organization’s (MPO) sub‐region and municipal level using Census 2010 demographic data. The
results show that representation and voting power in the Boston MPO is inequitably distributed in terms of population
and race.
Background
The Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) was established as a required part of the transportation planning
process under federal law. The MPO is responsible for planning and programming financial resources for a multi‐modal
transportation system for the Boston region. The Boston Region MPO was established in 1973 and includes 101 cities
and towns in eastern Massachusetts, predominantly within a radius of approximately 20 miles from the city of Boston. It
encompasses approximately 1,405 square miles. The MPO region is further subdivided into eight sub‐regions (see Figure
1).
In July 2011, the Boston MPO approved a Memorandum of Understanding for a new voting structure that would allocate
14 municipal seats on the Boston Region MPO as follows:
City of Boston with two seats;
Eight elected municipalities, one seat for each of the eight MPO sub‐regions;
Two elected cities filling at‐large seats;
Two elected towns filling at‐large seats.
The 2011 MOU states: “The Boston Region MPO will consider geographic and demographic equity a goal when
approving all certification documents. This means that after other factors, such as need, are used in evaluating and
selecting projects, a final view toward geographic and demographic balance and fairness over the span of the document
will be applied” (Section 3 A). However, the newly approved MPO seat and voting structure create a situation of
inequitable representation at both the sub‐region level and at the municipal level as a result of significant differences in
population size and racial/ethnic composition of sub‐regions and municipalities. Under this voting structure, smaller
communities enjoy relatively more voting power than larger communities. In addition, voting power is correlated with
race; communities with a larger proportion of White residents enjoy more voting power than communities with a
smaller proportion of White residents.
Municipal Seat Analysis of Boston Regional MPO
Under the 2011 MOU, each municipal seat enjoys a 7% voting share, assuming that each seat represents one vote in the
MPO. Boston enjoys a 14% share because of its two reserved seats (see Table 1). This voting share allocation is
inequitable when compared to population distributions. The Inner Core Communities (ICC) sub‐region in particular is
radically underrepresented. Although the ICC holds nearly 32% of the Boston Region MPO’s total population, its voting
share is only 7%. This disparity can be represented as voting power, a ratio of voting share percentage to population
percentage.
2
Figure 1 Boston MPO Sub‐regions
Voting power is calculated by dividing the voting share of a seat by the population percentage represented by that seat.
It is a measure of the relationship between voting share and population share. A truly equitable situation is one in which
voting share equals population share. In a voting power measure, a value of 100% indicates a balance between
population percentage and voting share percentage. Values below 100% indicate a situation of underrepresentation
(i.e. voting share percentage less than population percentage), while values above 100% indicate overrepresentation.
When measured as voting power, the ICC’s underrepresentation is clearly evident. Boston is also under‐represented. At
the sub‐region level, there is an inverse relationship between population size and voting power. In other words, as a
sub‐region’s population decreases, its relative voting power increases (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).
3
Table 1. Boston MPO 2010 Sub‐region populations and relative voting power under 2011 MOU. Population numbers
based on 2010 Census population totals for Massachusetts County Subdivisions.
MPO 2010 Pop % Votes Voting Share Voting Diff Voting Power Percent
Subregion Population (%) (Vot%/Pop%) White1
Boston2 617,594 19.3% 2 20% 1% 103% 47.0%
ICC 1,009,847 31.6% 1 10% ‐22% 32% 69.8%
MAGIC 167,755 5.3% 1 10% 5% 190% 85.9%
MWGMC 231,967 7.3% 1 10% 3% 138% 82.0%
NSPC 203,921 6.4% 1 10% 4% 157% 89.1%
NSTF 280,858 8.8% 1 10% 1% 114% 92.4%
SSC 258,305 8.1% 1 10% 2% 124% 92.7%
SWAP 143,424 4.5% 1 10% 6% 223% 90.9%
TRIC 280,633 8.8% 1 10% 1% 114% 82.6%
Region 3,194,304 100.0% 10 100%
Figure 2 ‐ MPO sub‐regional population and race compared to voting power
Percent Population vs. Voting Power by Subregion Percent White vs. Voting Power by Subregion
250% 250%
200% 200%
Voting Power
Voting Power
150% 150%
100% 100%
50% 50%
0% 0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percent of Regional Population by Sub‐region Percent White by Sub‐region
At‐Large MPO Municipal Seats
An analysis of the equity of MPO municipal seat allocation is complicated by the at‐large municipal seats. While sub‐
region municipal seats can be reasonably expected to represent the sub‐region to which they belong, it is not clear how
at‐large municipal seats should be treated. Do at‐large municipal seats represent only themselves? Do they represent
the sub‐regions to which they belong? Or do they represent all cities and towns within the MPO region? The answer to
this question affects how their voting power is calculated and thus the equity implications of the MPO municipal seat
allocation. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that municipalities occupying the at‐large seats represent only
their own residents.
1
Percent White is defined as the percentage of the population identified as non‐Hispanic White.
2
Boston is considered part of the Inner Core Communities, but its two permanent seats mean that it is always represented, in
contrast to the other Inner Core Communities. Boston is therefore considered separately.
4
Figure 3 Population Percentage compared to Voting Power by Sub‐region
Assuming At‐Large Municipal Seats Represent only themselves
If we assume that each of the four at‐large municipal seats represent only themselves, voting power values become
quite large because the populations of any at‐large municipality will be very small relative to the populations of sub‐
regions. If each at‐large municipal seat represents only its own resident population, voting power values for the at‐large
seats can range from a low of 215% to a high of over 6,600% (see Table 2). There is a strong inverse correlation between
voting power and population size. As the population size represented by a municipal seat decreases, its voting power
increases. This inverse correlation between voting power and population is high and statistically significant (see Table
3). This statistically significant correlation holds true across all possible combinations of at‐large city and town
population sizes.
5
Table 2. MPO seat populations and relative voting power under 2011 MOU, including ranges of values for at‐large
seats under scenario in which at‐large municipalities represent only themselves. Population numbers based on 2010
Census population totals for Massachusetts County Subdivisions.
MPO MPO Voting Power Percent
MPO Seat 2010 Population MPO Pop % Vot Diff
Vote Voting % (Vot%/Pop%) White
Boston 617,594 19.5% 2 14% ‐5% 73% 47.0%
ICC 1,009,847 31.9% 1 7% ‐25% 22% 67.0%
MAGIC 167,755 5.3% 1 7% 2% 135% 83.7%
MWGMC 231,967 7.3% 1 7% 0% 97% 77.5%
NSPC 203,921 6.4% 1 7% 1% 111% 88.1%
NSTF 280,858 8.9% 1 7% ‐2% 80% 89.7%
SSC 258,305 8.2% 1 7% ‐1% 87% 91.7%
SWAP 143,424 4.5% 1 7% 3% 157% 89.9%
TRIC 280,633 8.9% 1 7% ‐2% 80% 79.8%
At‐large City1 28,789 ‐ 105,162 0.9 ‐ 3.3% 1 7% 4 ‐ 6% 215 ‐ 784% 25 ‐ 94%
At‐large City2 26,983 – 92,271 0.9 – 2.9% 1 7% 4 ‐ 6% 245 ‐ 837% 48 ‐ 91%
At‐large Town1 3,504 – 68,318 0.1 – 2.2% 1 7% 5 ‐ 7% 331 – 6,623% 39 ‐ 96%
At‐large Town2 3,410 – 58,732 0.1 – 1.9% 1 7% 5 ‐ 7% 385 – 6,645% 65 ‐ 96%
Region 3,161,712 14 100%
The impact of this scenario on racial equity is more variable. If the at‐large seats are occupied by cities and towns with
the highest White population percentages (i.e. greater than 91%), there is a strong positive correlation between percent
White and voting power and this correlation is statistically significant (see Table 3). In this scenario, increases in voting
power are strongly explained by increases in the percent of the population that is White. This scenario would thus
indicate a strong racial disparity. If, on the other hand, the at‐large seats are occupied by the cities and towns with the
lowest White population percentages (i.e. less than 66%), the correlation between percent White and voting power
becomes negative, although this correlation is weaker and not statistically significant. Under this latter scenario, race is
not a statistically significant predictor of voting power.
Table 3. Correlations for at‐large scenario where at‐large seats represent their own municipal populations.
MPO Pop % MPO Pop % Pct White using Pct White using Pct White using
using Highest using Lowest Highest White Lowest White Median White
Pop At‐Large Pop At‐Large At‐Large Seats At‐Large Seats At‐Large Seats
Seats Seats
Voting Power ‐1.0** ‐1.0** 0.824** ‐0.385 0.418
**Correlation is statistically significant at p < .01; Spearman's rank correlation coefficient
This variation in outcomes indicates that the relationship between voting power and race is sensitive to the outcome of
elections for at‐large municipal seats. Under at least one scenario, there would be a racial disparity in MPO voting
power. The question is: How likely is it that these seats will be occupied by cities and towns with a combination of
voting power and racial composition such that a racial disparity becomes evident? This question is not easily answered
because there are literally thousands of possible combinations for the at‐large seats. One way to evaluate the likely
possibilities is to use the median values of percentage White for both towns and cities. Under this median value
6
scenario, the at‐large cities have White proportions of between 75% and 76% (Salem and Medford), and at‐large towns
have White proportions of between 90% and 91% (Rockland and Dover). Using median percentage White values and
their respective voting powers of these communities yields a positive correlation between voting power and percentage
White, but this correlation falls just short of statistical significance (see Table 3).
Figure 4 Figure 5
Highest Pop At‐Large Seats Lowest Pop At‐Large Seats
450% 7000%
400% 6000%
350%
5000%
Voting Power
Voting Power
300%
250% 4000%
200% 3000%
150%
2000%
100%
50% 1000%
0% 0%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
MPO Population Percentage MPO Population Percentage
Figure 6 Figure 7
Highest White At‐Large Seats Lowest White At‐Large Seats
5000% 800%
700%
4000%
600%
Voting Power
Voting Power
3000% 500%
400%
2000% 300%
200%
1000%
100%
0% 0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage White Percentage White
Figure 8
Median White At‐Large Seats
4500%
4000%
3500%
Voting Power
3000%
2500%
2000%
1500%
1000%
500%
0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage White
Because median values represent the 50th percentiles, we may infer that race is not a statistically significant predictor of
voting power for at least half of the possible combinations of at‐large municipal seats. However, this assumes that all
possible combinations of at‐large municipal seats have an equal probability of occurring, which may not be the case in
7
reality. A more accurate analysis would take into account the historical record of at‐large municipal elections in order to
provide more realistic probabilities.
Elections were held for eight of the municipal seats on Wednesday, October 26, 2011, at the MAPC´s Fall Council
Meeting in Cambridge. The seats up for election were those for the North Shore Task Force subregion, the North
Suburban subregion, the SouthWest Advisory Planning Committee subregion, the Three Rivers Interlocal Council
subregion, two at‐large towns, and two at‐large cities. Table 4 shows the MPO seats and demographics, including the
elected at‐large municipalities.
Table 4. Boston MPO seats and demographics, including municipalities elected to MPO at‐large city and town seats in
October 2011.
MPO MPO Voting Power Percent
MPO Seat 2010 Population MPO Pop % Vot Diff
Vote Voting % (Vot%/Pop%) White
Boston 617,594 19.5% 2 14% ‐5% 73% 47.0%
ICC 1,009,847 31.9% 1 7% ‐25% 22% 67.0%
MAGIC 167,755 5.3% 1 7% 2% 135% 83.7%
MWGMC 231,967 7.3% 1 7% 0% 97% 77.5%
NSPC 203,921 6.4% 1 7% 1% 111% 88.1%
NSTF 280,858 8.9% 1 7% ‐2% 80% 89.7%
SSC 258,305 8.2% 1 7% ‐1% 87% 91.7%
SWAP 143,424 4.5% 1 7% 3% 157% 89.9%
TRIC 280,633 8.9% 1 7% ‐2% 80% 79.8%
EverettC 41,667 1.3% 1 7% 5.7% 531% 54%
NewtonC 85,146 2.7% 1 7% 4.3% 260% 80%
ArlingtonT 42,844 1.4% 1 7% 5.6% 517% 84%
LexingtonT 31,394 1.0% 1 7% 6% 705% 74%
Region 3,161,712 14 100%
Analysis of the current MPO seating arrangement shows a strong inverse correlation between voting power and
population size. As the population size represented by a seat decreases, its voting power increases. This inverse
correlation between voting power and population is high and statistically significant (see Table 5). The relationship
between voting power and race in this case is not statistically significant. The at‐large seats are currently occupied by
cities and towns with racial compositions near the average for the region.
Table 5. Correlations between voting power, MPO population percentage, and percent White for MPO seats, including
current at‐large seat arrangement.
MPO Pop % Percent White
Voting Power ‐1.0** ‐0.11
** Correlation significant at p < .01.
The structure for at‐large seat representation shows a clear inequity in the distribution of voting power when compared
to population distribution. Racial inequity with regard to voting power is not always present, but it is always possible
under this seat structure.
8
Municipal Analysis of MPO Voting Structure
The system by which Boston MPO municipalities elect representatives is inequitable, both in terms of population
distribution and race. Under the 2011 MOU, all municipalities in the Boston MPO region vote for all open municipal
seats on the MPO. The Boston MPO region consists of 101 municipalities. Each of the 101 communities may cast votes
for 12 out of the 14 municipal representatives on the MPO. Every municipality votes for:
Eight municipalities, one municipality from each of the eight sub‐regional seats;
Two towns for the at‐large town seats; and
Two cities for the at‐large city seats.
Each municipality can thus cast up to 12 votes to fill 12 out of 14 of the available municipal seats on the MPO.
Under this structure, each municipality therefore enjoys slightly less than a 1% voting share (see Appendix A). This
voting share allocation is inequitable when compared to population distributions among the municipalities. Although
Boston maintains two permanent seats on the MPO, it is still radically underrepresented. Boston holds nearly 20% of
the MPO’s population, but its voting share is only .99%. In fact, three quarters of the Inner Core Communities are
among the underrepresented municipalities (i.e. voting percentage less than population percentage), although the ICC
represent less than one fifth of all municipalities in the MPO. In addition, while only one quarter of all municipalities in
the Boston MPO are underrepresented (i.e. voting power less than 100%), the ICC make up more than 57% of all the
underrepresented communities. As with the sub‐regions, this disparity in voting power among municipalities can be
understood as an inverse relationship between population size and voting power. As a municipality’s population
decreases, its relative voting power increases (see Figures 9 and 11). There is a strong inverse correlation between
population size and voting and it is statistically significant (see Table 7). Voting power amongst the 101 municipalities
ranges from a low of 5% (Boston) to a high of 918% (Nahant) (see Table 6).
Table 6. Top five and lowest five municipalities by voting power in the Boston MPO. Full list in Appendix A.
Municipalities with highest Voting Power Municipalities with Voting Power
voting power (Vote % / Population %) lowest voting power (Vote % / Population %)
Nahant 918% Boston 5%
Essex 893% Cambridge 30%
Sherborn 760% Quincy 34%
Carlisle 645% Lynn 35%
Wenham 642% Newton 37%
9
Figure 9 Figure 10
Percent Pop vs. Voting Power by Municipality Percent White vs. Voting Power by Municipality
1000% 1000%
900% 900%
800% 800%
700% 700%
Voting Power
Voting Power
600% 600%
500%
500%
400%
400%
300%
300%
200%
200%
100%
100%
0%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 0%
Percent of Regional Population 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percent White
Table 7. Correlations between voting power, population and race for all 101 MPO municipalities.
MPO Pop % Percent White
Voting Power ‐1.0** 0.635**
** Correlation significant at p < .01.
Voting power is inequitably distributed by race and ethnicity, as well as population among the municipalities. Voting
power for a municipality increases as the proportion of non‐Hispanic White residents in the municipality increases (see
Figures 10 and 12). The positive correlation between voting power and percentage White is strong and statistically
significant (see Table 7). Population and race are strong and statistically significant predictors of voting power for
municipalities across the Boston MPO region. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the inverted pattern of voting power
distribution when compared to population and race. Voting power is concentrated in the outer municipalities (west and
north), which are smaller and Whiter, while the region’s population and racial minorities are concentrated in, and
immediately around, Boston and the Inner Core Communities. This pattern illustrates the demographically and racially
inequitable distribution of voting power within the Boston MPO region under the 2011 Boston MPO MOU.
10
Figure 11
Figure 12
11
Conclusion
An analysis of the equity implications of representation and voting power at the Boston Metropolitan Planning
Organization’s (MPO) shows that representation and voting power in the Boston MPO is inequitably distributed in terms
of population and race. The representation and voting structure approved by the Boston Metropolitan Planning
Organization in July 2011 perpetuates a situation of inequitable representation by allocating seats and votes in such a
way that smaller, Whiter communities in the outer suburbs are overrepresented, while larger, more racially and
ethnically diverse communities are underrepresented. The racial disparity is somewhat complicated by the variable
possibilities for the at‐large seats, but is nevertheless always possible. From a municipal standpoint, voting power in the
Boston MPO region, defined as the ratio of vote share to MPO population share, is inequitably distributed when
compared to population distribution and race/ethnicity.
12
Appendix A. Boston MPO municipalities 2010 populations and statistics. Population numbers based on 2010 Census
population totals for Massachusetts County Subdivisions.
MPO Municipality 2010 Pop % Votes Vote % Voting Voting Non‐ Percent
Subregion Population Diff Power Hispanic Non‐
(Vot%/Pop%) White Hispanic
White
ICC Arlington 42,844 1.36% 12 0.99% ‐0.36% 73% 35,804 83.6%
ICC Belmont 24,729 0.78% 12 0.99% 0.21% 127% 20,118 81.4%
ICC Boston 617,594 19.53% 12 0.99% ‐18.54% 5% 290,312 47.0%
ICC Brookline 58,732 1.86% 12 0.99% ‐0.87% 53% 43,040 73.3%
ICC Cambridge 105,162 3.33% 12 0.99% ‐2.34% 30% 65,259 62.1%
ICC Chelsea 35,177 1.11% 12 0.99% ‐0.12% 89% 8,882 25.2%
ICC Everett 41,667 1.32% 12 0.99% ‐0.33% 75% 22,316 53.6%
ICC Lynn 90,329 2.86% 12 0.99% ‐1.87% 35% 42,969 47.6%
ICC Malden 59,450 1.88% 12 0.99% ‐0.89% 53% 31,211 52.5%
ICC Medford 56,173 1.78% 12 0.99% ‐0.79% 56% 42,789 76.2%
ICC Melrose 26,983 0.85% 12 0.99% 0.14% 116% 24,161 89.5%
ICC Milton 27,003 0.85% 12 0.99% 0.14% 116% 20,489 75.9%
ICC Newton 85,146 2.69% 12 0.99% ‐1.70% 37% 67,801 79.6%
ICC Quincy 92,271 2.92% 12 0.99% ‐1.93% 34% 60,448 65.5%
ICC Revere 51,755 1.64% 12 0.99% ‐0.65% 60% 32,299 62.4%
ICC Saugus 26,628 0.84% 12 0.99% 0.15% 118% 23,860 89.6%
ICC Somerville 75,754 2.40% 12 0.99% ‐1.41% 41% 52,359 69.1%
ICC Waltham 60,632 1.92% 12 0.99% ‐0.93% 52% 41,678 68.7%
ICC Watertown 31,915 1.01% 12 0.99% ‐0.02% 98% 26,065 81.7%
ICC Winthrop 17,497 0.55% 12 0.99% 0.44% 179% 15,486 88.5%
MAGIC Acton 21,924 0.69% 12 0.99% 0.30% 143% 16,555 75.5%
MAGIC Bedford 13,320 0.42% 12 0.99% 0.57% 235% 11,184 84.0%
MAGIC Bolton 4,897 0.15% 12 0.99% 0.84% 639% 4,577 93.5%
MAGIC Boxborough 4,996 0.16% 12 0.99% 0.83% 627% 3,940 78.9%
MAGIC Carlisle 4,852 0.15% 12 0.99% 0.84% 645% 4,257 87.7%
MAGIC Concord 17,668 0.56% 12 0.99% 0.43% 177% 15,402 87.2%
MAGIC Hudson 19,063 0.60% 12 0.99% 0.39% 164% 16,945 88.9%
MAGIC Lexington 31,394 0.99% 12 0.99% 0.00% 100% 23,138 73.7%
MAGIC Lincoln 6,362 0.20% 12 0.99% 0.79% 492% 5,266 82.8%
MAGIC Littleton 8,924 0.28% 12 0.99% 0.71% 351% 8,239 92.3%
MAGIC Maynard 10,106 0.32% 12 0.99% 0.67% 310% 9,110 90.1%
MAGIC Stow 6,590 0.21% 12 0.99% 0.78% 475% 6,079 92.2%
MAGIC Sudbury 17,659 0.56% 12 0.99% 0.43% 177% 15,779 89.4%
MWGMC Ashland 16,593 0.52% 12 0.99% 0.47% 189% 13,530 81.5%
MWGMC Framingham 68,318 2.16% 12 0.99% ‐1.17% 46% 44,625 65.3%
MWGMC Holliston 13,547 0.43% 12 0.99% 0.56% 231% 12,645 93.3%
MWGMC Marlborough 38,499 1.22% 12 0.99% ‐0.23% 81% 28,953 75.2%
MWGMC Natick 33,006 1.04% 12 0.99% ‐0.05% 95% 28,189 85.4%
MWGMC Southborough 9,767 0.31% 12 0.99% 0.68% 321% 8,405 86.1%
MWGMC Wayland 12,994 0.41% 12 0.99% 0.58% 241% 11,082 85.3%
MWGMC Wellesley 27,982 0.89% 12 0.99% 0.11% 112% 23,061 82.4%
MWGMC Weston 11,261 0.36% 12 0.99% 0.63% 278% 9,393 83.4%
NSTF Beverly 39,502 1.25% 12 0.99% ‐0.26% 79% 36,105 91.4%
NSTF Danvers 26,493 0.84% 12 0.99% 0.15% 118% 24,839 93.8%
NSTF Essex 3,504 0.11% 12 0.99% 0.88% 893% 3,369 96.1%
NSTF Gloucester 28,789 0.91% 12 0.99% 0.08% 109% 27,100 94.1%
NSTF Hamilton 7,764 0.25% 12 0.99% 0.74% 403% 7,088 91.3%
NSTF Ipswich 13,175 0.42% 12 0.99% 0.57% 238% 12,471 94.7%
NSTF Manchester‐ 5,136 0.16% 12 0.99% 0.83% 610% 4,952 96.4%
by‐the‐Sea
NSTF Marblehead 19,808 0.63% 12 0.99% 0.36% 158% 18,818 95.0%
NSTF Middleton 8,987 0.28% 12 0.99% 0.71% 348% 7,845 87.3%
NSTF Nahant 3,410 0.11% 12 0.99% 0.88% 918% 3,257 95.5%
NSTF Peabody 51,251 1.62% 12 0.99% ‐0.63% 61% 44,934 87.7%
NSTF Rockport 6,952 0.22% 12 0.99% 0.77% 450% 6,666 95.9%
13
MPO Municipality 2010 Pop % Votes Vote % Voting Voting Non‐ Percent
Subregion Population Diff Power Hispanic Non‐
(Vot%/Pop%) White Hispanic
White
NSTF Salem 41,340 1.31% 12 0.99% ‐0.32% 76% 31,377 75.9%
NSTF Swampscott 13,787 0.44% 12 0.99% 0.55% 227% 12,824 93.0%
NSTF Topsfield 6,085 0.19% 12 0.99% 0.80% 514% 5,802 95.3%
NSTF Wenham 4,875 0.15% 12 0.99% 0.84% 642% 4,607 94.5%
NSPC Burlington 24,498 0.77% 12 0.99% 0.22% 128% 19,392 79.2%
NSPC Lynnfield 11,596 0.37% 12 0.99% 0.62% 270% 10,838 93.5%
NSPC North 14,892 0.47% 12 0.99% 0.52% 210% 13,991 93.9%
Reading
NSPC Reading 24,747 0.78% 12 0.99% 0.21% 126% 22,877 92.4%
NSPC Stoneham 21,437 0.68% 12 0.99% 0.31% 146% 19,404 90.5%
NSPC Wakefield 24,932 0.79% 12 0.99% 0.20% 126% 23,181 93.0%
NSPC Wilmington 22,325 0.71% 12 0.99% 0.28% 140% 20,600 92.3%
NSPC Winchester 21,374 0.68% 12 0.99% 0.31% 146% 18,309 85.7%
NSPC Woburn 38,120 1.21% 12 0.99% ‐0.22% 82% 31,130 81.7%
SSC Braintree 35,744 1.13% 12 0.99% ‐0.14% 88% 30,471 85.2%
SSC Cohasset 7,542 0.24% 12 0.99% 0.75% 415% 7,254 96.2%
SSC Duxbury 15,059 0.48% 12 0.99% 0.51% 208% 14,499 96.3%
SSC Hanover 13,879 0.44% 12 0.99% 0.55% 226% 13,300 95.8%
SSC Hingham 22,157 0.70% 12 0.99% 0.29% 141% 21,135 95.4%
SSC Holbrook 10,791 0.34% 12 0.99% 0.65% 290% 8,721 80.8%
SSC Hull 10,293 0.33% 12 0.99% 0.66% 304% 9,702 94.3%
SSC Marshfield 25,132 0.79% 12 0.99% 0.20% 125% 24,127 96.0%
SSC Norwell 10,506 0.33% 12 0.99% 0.66% 298% 10,011 95.3%
SSC Pembroke 17,837 0.56% 12 0.99% 0.43% 176% 17,138 96.1%
SSC Rockland 17,489 0.55% 12 0.99% 0.44% 179% 15,879 90.8%
SSC Scituate 18,133 0.57% 12 0.99% 0.42% 173% 17,277 95.3%
SSC Weymouth 53,743 1.70% 12 0.99% ‐0.71% 58% 47,364 88.1%
SWAP Bellingham 16,332 0.52% 12 0.99% 0.47% 192% 14,985 91.8%
SWAP Dover 5,589 0.18% 12 0.99% 0.81% 560% 5,099 91.2%
SWAP Franklin 31,635 1.00% 12 0.99% ‐0.01% 99% 28,926 91.4%
SWAP Hopkinton 14,925 0.47% 12 0.99% 0.52% 210% 13,687 91.7%
SWAP Medway 12,752 0.40% 12 0.99% 0.59% 245% 11,924 93.5%
SWAP Milford 27,999 0.89% 12 0.99% 0.10% 112% 23,104 82.5%
SWAP Millis 7,891 0.25% 12 0.99% 0.74% 397% 7,315 92.7%
SWAP Norfolk 11,227 0.36% 12 0.99% 0.64% 279% 9,493 84.6%
SWAP Sherborn 4,119 0.13% 12 0.99% 0.86% 760% 3,845 93.3%
SWAP Wrentham 10,955 0.35% 12 0.99% 0.64% 286% 10,541 96.2%
TRIC Canton 21,561 0.68% 12 0.99% 0.31% 145% 17,951 83.3%
TRIC Dedham 24,729 0.78% 12 0.99% 0.21% 127% 21,047 85.1%
TRIC Foxborough 16,865 0.53% 12 0.99% 0.46% 186% 15,465 91.7%
TRIC Medfield 12,024 0.38% 12 0.99% 0.61% 260% 11,293 93.9%
TRIC Needham 28,886 0.91% 12 0.99% 0.08% 108% 25,730 89.1%
TRIC Norwood 28,602 0.90% 12 0.99% 0.09% 109% 23,642 82.7%
TRIC Randolph 32,112 1.02% 12 0.99% ‐0.03% 97% 12,553 39.1%
TRIC Sharon 17,612 0.56% 12 0.99% 0.43% 178% 14,271 81.0%
TRIC Stoughton 26,962 0.85% 12 0.99% 0.14% 116% 21,140 78.4%
TRIC Walpole 24,070 0.76% 12 0.99% 0.23% 130% 21,848 90.8%
TRIC Westwood 14,618 0.46% 12 0.99% 0.53% 214% 13,381 91.5%
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