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Ab Aeterno
…
10 pages
1 file
AI-generated Abstract
The dialogue with Professor Alexander Dugin examines his perspectives on the Eurasian Movement, Western hegemony, and Russian political dynamics, particularly under Vladimir Putin's leadership. Dugin critiques President Medvedev's actions regarding Gaddafi and draws parallels with ongoing conflicts in Libya and Syria, advocating for stronger Russian support for allies. He expresses a complex relationship with Putin, acknowledging past support while calling for a return to patriotic reforms and anti-Western strategies to regain the popular support of the Russian people.
In the face of Islamist terrorism, Russia undertook a military operation in Syria to protect its interests as a Muslim country and a multifaith state. Its achievements have embarrassed NATO, while reinforcing Russia’s position as a Eurasian power to be reckoned with. Since the Ukrainian crisis unfolded, the theme of the Cold War has been at the forefront in analyses of the situation in Russia. We shall return to this “Russian misunderstanding,” which prevents us from understanding what is really happening in this huge country. We will see how the changes that have been occurring inside Russian Islam are altering the Russians’ vision of themselves and of their place in a globalized world. We will analyze the relationship between a domestic patriotism and an outward-facing “conservative” messianism. It is only by going back through Russia’s long history that we will be able to appreciate the depth of the abyss into which globalization has thrown this country. It used to be an empire and it used to be socialist; it is now a nation-state, and it is liberal.
Routledge Handbook of Russian Security, 2019
The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin's (b. 1962) challenge to the Western liberal order. Even though Dugin's project is in many ways a theoretical epitome of Russia's contemporary attempt to profile itself as a regional great power with a political and cultural identity distinct from the liberal West, Dugin can also be read in a wider context as one of the currently most prominent representatives of the culturally and intellectually oriented international New Right. The chapter introduces Dugin's role on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent "fourth political theory" as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to liberalism as well as the two other main twentieth-century ideologies, communism and fascism. Dugin's fourth ideology, essentially meant as an alternative to a unipolar post-Cold War global hegemony of victorious liberalism, draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt's pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin's eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism.
It’s important to remind ourselves that beyond ideological conflicts between socialism and capitalism, people share aspirations for peace and concerns for the future. "The demonization of Russia is, I believe, one of the most dangerous things that is happening in our world today.” The anti-Russia perception — the assumption that Russia is “evil” — is most unfortunate. Peace depends on breaking the “clash of epistemologies. ” In the highly militarized, dangerous world we share, it is important to humanize rather than demonize one another. We need to find ways to nurture cooperation, and achieve goodwill and fraternity with Russia. Sadly, contemporary international relations have become a game of brinkmanship. We are witnessing a major geopolitical shift. It appears that neither Russia nor the United States seem to be afraid of nuclear weapons. We are at a crossroad of history where rule-based, multilateral cooperation is at stake.
As last Sunday's farcical elections highlight the Western apathy and shyness in front of the rising forces of Russian totalitarianism, we are rather left with the impression that England and America may have even wished the victory of United Russia, the party supported by the Kremlin dictator. The reasons are not limited within the bilateral context, West vs. Russia, that the Anglo-Saxon powers want to preserve in order to avoid a more complicated, triangular relationship USA – European Union – Russia. The reasons of the Western indifference for the diffusion and implementation of Democracy, freedom and Human Rights in Russia pertain also to Islam. This has little to do with the Muslims included with Russia's borders and their eventual manipulation by the Western powers (in what would be the closest parallel to Afghanistan's Taliban). It mostly hinges on the fact that sizeable parts of the Islamic World occupy territories that are either Oil and Gas rich or critical for Oil and Gas transportation. And these territories are adjacent to Russia, at its southern flank…… Apparently provocative Western attitudes towards Russia The Western world has proved to be a politically inconsistent, ideologically disparate, and morally perverse complex of conflicting economic interests. They all emanate from two diametrically opposed circles of behind-the-scenes power that coexisted for many long centuries, plunging Europe first and the entire world at a later stage into ceaseless wars. The Western world's expansion spread problems rather than solved issues. Since the collapse of the East European Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, 16 – 18 years have passed, and they are a very long period for intentions and interests to be manifested clearly. If many believed in 1990 that there was a genuine Western interest in the oppressed peoples of the European East, Central Asia and Siberia, as well as in the satellite countries, namely Angola, Vietnam, Mongolia, ‘Ethiopia' and Cuba, few are left with this impression today. Already in the days of Gorbachev, a genuine interest was expressed by the last Soviet leader for a Russian participation in what he called as ‘the Common European House'. However, since the middle 90s the term was methodically buried, as the Western attitude towards Russia was rather reminiscent of robbery; Bulgaria should join NATO, Estonia should join the EU, Ukraine should separate completely, and the Russian natural resources should be sold as cheapest as possible. The West never demonstrated a really serious interest to reach out to the Russian democrats, to extend a real concern for the various non Russian oppressed nations, and to integrate Russia in a decent way in the NATO, the WEU, and the EU. As a matter of fact, Russia has been treated far worse than Turkey in this regard. The Western attitude vis-à-vis Russia has been as biased as in the case of Turkey's Kurds. It is definitely mendacious and hypocritical to show an interest in the use of Kurdish in Turkey's Primary and Secondary Education without also demonstrating an equivalent interest in the use of Breton, Alsatian, Langue d' Oc, Corsican, Basque (Euskara), and Catalan in France. First published in AfroArticles, American Chronicle, and Buzzle on 4th December 2007
Russia consists of the world attention in many respect say it social, institutional, economic, Political,geopolitical,hegemonic,military,climatic and so on. Russian elite has always transgressed approach to national identity building of Russia .Gender inequality in Russia has always been the gross problem since massive loss of life in Second world war . On June 22, 1941, Hitler’s Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union to initiate what would become the most brutal and costly war between two countries in history. The surprise attack on the woefully unprepared Red Army led to devastating losses for the Soviet Union in the early phase of the war: within the first six months, the Red Army had lost nearly 5 million men – the size of the Soviet Union’s entire prewar army – and had lost territory equal to the size of the United States between the East Coast and Springfield, Illinois (Glantz 2005). Almost after fall of Soviet Union Russia lost his credential in the world and unilateral world has gone to the US directional framework, after allit’s hard to deny Russian hegemony until it has maintained its military capacity. Although Russian position has one more advantage with its territorial adjustment which always raise the discourse of Eurasian politics and only because of this Russia’s geopolitical nature rules the whole diplomatic strategy all over the world either say BRICS or any other, as I don’t see Russia’s any relevance in BRICS more than to maintain geopolitical equilibrium, through which to have the hold over even on economic forum and also of strategic public diplomacy approach which helps to sustain its domestic politics. Russian political strength in the world context even Within Russian intellectual elite has this conflict been conceptualized and resulted in confrontation of different ideological trends. One of them, the Westernizing one, considers rights of the individual to be its corner stone. The former tradition embraces universal rights, the latter cultural relativism and national particularism. The first tendency pushes Russia towards the West while the second one results in Russia pursuing a policy of self-isolation. To put it short, Russia has always vacillated between self-isolation and openness to the outer world. A key element of all Russian history, which suffuses the nation's political culture, is the idea of a strong state authority, to which our “native-soil patriots” so love to appeal. This does not mean, however, that the seeds of liberal freedoms were eradicated from the national political culture; they were always there and remain so today. Rather, they are emerging from their suppression (Chugrov, 2000, 149 - 150).
2019
How the concept of the "Russian World" was transformed from the niche interest of a few intellectuals to the cornerstone of the Kremlin's revanchist agenda.
The Eurasianist ideology is coming back on the Russian political and intellectual scene but also among the Turkic and Muslim elites in the Russian Federation and in Kazakhstan. The political, economic, social and identity difficulties of the transition invite Russians and other post-Soviet citizens to think about their relations with Europe and about the relevance of taking the West as a model. In this context of destabilization, Eurasianism proposes a geopolitical solution for the post-Soviet space. It presupposes the existence of a third continent between East and West, called "Eurasia," and supports the idea of an organic unity of cultures born in this zone of symbiosis between Russian, Turkic, Muslim and even Chinese worlds 1 . Neo-Eurasianism is the main ideology born among the different Russian conservative movements in the 1990s. Its theories are very little known, but the idea of an entity called Eurasia, regrouping the center of the old continent in which Russia would be "at home," is more and more rife. It attracted many intellectuals and politicians in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Eurasianism was a way to explain the "disaster."
Anthropology of East Europe Review, 2009
Christophe Barbier, 2017
Abstract My research will focus on Russia’s relations versus the Western world from the past to the present day. Russia's vision and perception of the West since the end of the Cold War have changed the world substantially, and as a result, the idealism for the West and Russia to be strong allies have rather distanced themselves both diplomatically and politically on the international stage. For viewers to understand the implication of this research analysis, I will examine Russia’s brutal past, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the post-WWII Soviet era, the unending Cold War’s with renewing tensions today and the fall of Communism which precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. These historical events are thematically linked as early as the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 in which Russians defeated the Mongols by creating a surprising attack hidden from view. This ideological mechanism of Maskirovka in Russian (Маскировка), meaning ‘masking’ is a deceptive psychological apparatus used in Russian’s technical warfare during previous wars to deceive its enemies from within in a mastery art of wars. This psychological framework of deception is still present today in a series of recent international events about the attempt at reacquiring the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as a sovereign state within the former Soviet Union Republics now known today as Russia. The invasion of Crimea, followed by the annexation of Ukraine in 2014 and the military intervention in Syria in 2015 not only reinserted Russia as a superpower, but also demonstrated these geopolitical moves were carried out to counter-attack NATO aggressive policy of containment toward the Baltic States and along the Russian national borders. Russia also views the West with the propagation of pro-liberalism, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international law, and the global war on Islamic terrorism carrying some significant caveats. The West places Russia on a pedestal of being an antagonist player, nonconformist and rebellious in contradiction with the West’s foreign policy which dictates liberal values and liberties. All of these historical events corroborate with consistency and conformity with the current cold war tensions and frustrations between Russia and the West in a battle of disinformation, cyber warfare attacks and impartial truths. This Russian doctrine also magnifies why Russia does not correlate to the West in a same diplomatic and political manner as the West does. As a result, it creates more geopolitical differences and political divisions. In this Master’s research paper, I will analyze the underlying causes of diplomatic tensions such as the historical, ideological, geopolitical, and political nuances that Russia’s past battles, wars, attacks, and foreign invaders from the West hemisphere have led Russia to be both fearful and defensive toward the Western world. Russia’s tumultuous and dramatic past has cast an overshadowing net over unconstructive ties with the West and deteriorating relations that continue to exacerbate any diplomatic relations from leading to successful outcomes. That has prevented both hemispheres from reaching encouraging and promising mutual footings in world affairs. Is there a way to mollify the renewed tensions between the West and Russia? Yes, and I will demonstrate that both the West and Russia can mend their differences and reset their partnerships. However, the latter is also true that increasing strains during the investigation will bring forth to the readers tangible evidence that Russia and the West will continue for years to come to be suspicious and skeptical of one and another. East-West’s problematic political discourses compounded by distrustful and complicated bilateral relations within the crossfire NATO and the European Union could potentially destabilize peace and security and as a result, reshape the world itself between the East and the West.

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