8 Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Türkiye
CAPITAL AND CAPITALISTS IN TURKEY
Gülen sect: Reached for the state,
got capital instead
Ayşe Çavdar
A religious sect now defies the strongest political the establishment of Anti-Communist League
party in Turkey. There must be a reason for this of Turkey (TKMD). During the Cold War era,
Anti-Communist League (KMD) was one of
alarming self-confidence. Is it rooted in history; that the prominent projects designed for Turkey.
is, does the sect have a long heritage? Not really -it is KMD became active in 1950 in Zonguldak and
a movement that started to take shape in the 1970s. opened its irst oicial branch in Istanbul in
What about economic clout? Well, sort of; but in a 1956. However, the association was not to be
long-lived, and was closed down after the 1960
country where each transaction must be approved by military coup. In 1963, it was reestablished
the state, economic force can translate into business under the name TKMD and came to be asso-
investment only as far as the state allows it. ciated with CIA-supported counterinsurgency
operations. After the association was eventually
closed down, some members of TKMD played
a role in the establishment of Nationalist Action
As such, it is hard to talk about huge business Party (MHP) and Society for Dissemination of
power in this respect. International connecti- Science (İlim Yayma Cemiyeti).
ons? he Gülen sect is being investigated by the Various biographies of Gülen suggest that
FBI, branded as “suspicious” by Germany and in this period, despite being a co-founder of
its schools are banned in Russia, Uzbekistan, TKMD he also attended meetings at People’s
Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan; it is now Houses (Halkevleri), probably to compensate
trying to gain clout in religious conlicts in de- for the negative historical image associated with
veloping countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and the former.
Somalia. his kind of international inluence In following years, Gülen worked as preacher
is not enough to challenge a ruling political (vaiz) at mosques in hrace and the Aegean Re-
party which has secured 50% of votes. Although gion, in particular, Edirne, Kırklareli and İzmir.
Prime Minister Erdoğan suggests otherwise,
Gülen’s followers cannot be likened to the As-
Ayşe Çavdar
sassins of Hassan-i Sabbah, that is, an army of Stately aspirations inside the state
She received her BA believers willing to die for their faith. Well, what
from Ankara University, is really at stake then? How have they come to Subsequently Gülen rose to notoriety because
Faculty of Communications,
secure so much political power? of two political lawsuits. In the irst lawsuit, he
Department of Journalism,
MA from Boğaziçi University, was placed under custody in the aftermath of
Department of History. She the March 12 military coup on May 5, 1971 for
worked as a reporter and
editor for various newspapers
A familiar starting point: Fighting violating the Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal
and magazines. She taught communism and evolution Code, which could be summarized as “conspi-
courses at Kadir Has Uni- ring to establish a religion-based state.” After
versity. She currently writes
for Bir+Bir and Express
he name of the association where Gülen chose seven months of imprisonment, he was inally
magazines. She is pursuing to step into politics is rather telling, considering released in 1974. Meanwhile, he continued to
a PhD degree at Viadrina the conditions of the epoch. After completing give sermons in Edremit, Manisa and Bornova.
University, in Frankfurt, in
the Department of Cultural his military service in 1963 in İskenderun, Gü- Gülen can be said to have shot to fame after
Anthropology. len returned to Erzurum and participated in imprisonment and acquittal. In 1975 and 1976,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Türkiye 9
Gülen travelled across Anatolia, preaching
against communism and Darwinism. He started
to publish the periodical Sızıntı in 1979, which
took up similar themes.
Gülen got into trouble with the state once
again during the 1980 military coup. A search
warrant was issued against him, obliging him
to hide. he Prime Minister Turgut Özal at the
time had the warrant cancelled a few years later.
Mehmet Keçeciler, who then was their go-
between, recalls that period in a long biographi-
cal interview, published by Hayy Kitap:
“Fethullah Gülen vanished into thin air just
© Kaynak / analizmerkezi.com
before the military coup. Following the 1983
elections, we came to power. I was the head of
ANAP’s [Motherland Party] party organization
back then. here was a search warrant for Fet-
hullah Hodja. he late Burdur Governor İsmail
Günindi was an old friend of mine from when
we were working as state employees…. One day
Gülen started his political
Günindi came to the ANAP Headquarters to key igure in the Islamist movement in Turkey,
career in Accociation For
say thank you. Alaattin Kaya and Mevlüt Saygın his words and political activities are not repre- Fighting Communism, which
were also in my oice. Kaya was the publisher sentative of Nursi’s line. Although he once had was know for its counter-
guerrilla operations and was
of Zaman newspaper, and Saygun the manager ties to the Okuyucular branch of the Nur sect, he
crucial to Nationalist Action
of Fethullah Hodja’s education institutions. I went his own way after the sect was divided into Party's (MHP) foundation.
introduced my visitors to one other. İsmail said two: Whereas the Yeni Asır circle voted no to the
‘Fethullah Gülen Hodja is in hiding for no good 1982 Constitution, the Şuracılar branch voted
reason. he prosecutor of Burdur only wants to yes. Gülen’s new line was harshly criticized by
take his statement; then they will let him go. he the followers of Said Nursi, although there was
sect is causing unnecessary trouble by urging signiicant competition and strife amongst the
Fethullah Gülen to lee.’ Naturally, Kaya and latter. he criticism was mainly aimed at Gülen’s
Saygun were all ears. İsmail said all this, and close ties with the state and private business.
then left. A few days later, Kaya and Saygun paid
me a visit; Kaya said that they had talked to the
Hodja about the issue. He had said ‘I will turn The Gülen movement was fully aware of class-based and
myself in, if Turgut Özal gives his word; I will
cultural divides and made good use of these. The Gülen
give a statement’. hey said that they wanted to
meet with the Prime Minister. I expressed their
sect did not aspire to social harmony; they translated
wish to Mr. Özal. I was a bit worried though. To existing class and culture divides into intra-sect dynamics,
make sure, I called İsmail (governor of Burdur) and offered upward class mobility as a source of promise
and said, ‘Talk with the prosecutor and double and motivation.
check. It would be very unpleasant if Fethullah
Hodja turns himself in, only to be arrested. Our
prestige is at stake here.’ İsmail then contacted he opus of Said Nursi is still read and discussed
the prosecutor and called me back: ‘No worries. in student houses, schools and conversation
hey won’t arrest him; they will just take his groups controlled by the Gülen sect. Diferent
statement and let him go.… ’ Once I made sure branches of the Nur sect, although in discord
that he would not be arrested, we paid a visit to about almost every issue, do agree that Gülen
Mr. Özal together with Kaya and Saygun. Özal is far from being an heir of Said Nursi’s political
said to them, ‘I conirm what Mehmet has told and religious thought.
you.’ A few days later, Fethullah Hodja did turn Gülen resigned from the civil service in
himself in in İzmir, gave a statement and was 1981, as there was a search warrant against him.
let go.” He continued to write articles for magazines
From this anecdote, we can see that Gülen and gave unoicial sermons. hen in 1989, he
already enjoyed protection and privileges from became a voluntary preacher at Valide Sultan
the highest oicials of the state back then. Mosque in Üsküdar. His irst books comprise
However, it is not so easy to grasp the reasons the sermons delivered in this mosque. By the
behind this inluence. hat is because, although 1990s, Gülen was already a frequently cited po-
Gülen seems to act like the heir of Said Nursi, a litical igure. Everyone talked about his schools,
10 Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Türkiye
students, prep schools called “dershane”, com- could not fully capitalize on, has turned out to
panies, and even attempts to place his followers be a critical advantage for the Gülen sect and
in the army and police. In 1994, he established for National Vision. Both movements can thus
and became the honorary president of Foun- develop a religious teaching steering away from
dation of Journalists and Writers (Gazeteciler moralistic principles and practices, which could
ve Yazarlar Vakfı), which became the lagship otherwise lead one to question certain political
of the Gülen sect. he foundation became a and economical activities: hey ofer Anatolian
prominent political player by organizing the religious groups—historically excluded from the
Abant Meetings in the aftermath of the military economic sphere and distribution networks—
memorandum of February 28, 1997. he ob- an opportunity to thrive under current capitalist
jective of these meetings was to help Turkish conditions. In a world where conventional,
political elites reach consensus, even if a basic deep-rooted sects preach humility and mode-
one, on key issues. Indeed, the AKP project was ration, and try to preserve their autonomy by
based on such a basic consensus. he burea- keeping the state at bay, this lack of historical
ucratic clout of the Gülen sect would thus be roots allows the Gülen sect and National Visi-
coupled with the political popularity of Tayyip on to uphold ambition and organization “for
Erdoğan and his entourage. Liberal intellectuals the sake of God”—the so-called “service”—to
contributed to this alliance a legitimizing dis- engage in conspicuous consumption on order
course with democratic references. Rocked by to praise the force of faith, and to utilize the
political turmoil, unsolved political murders, weapons of the enemy in the ight for survival.
and cases of corruption in the 1990s, Turkey In other words, it allows them to disregard the
discrepancy between the instrument and mes-
sage. In this respect, the competition between
Sect members could easily repay soaring foreign currency the Gülen sect and AKP—itself a transformed
debts despite exchange rate hikes, thanks to internal representative of the National Vision—is far
solidarity. They helped each other when purchasing a car from surprising.
Another dynamic powering the rapid ascent
or house, or when setting up a business. Besides, a vast
of the Gülen sect in the 1990s is related to the
network of businessmen also provided that key ingredient the built-in inequalities of the socio-economic
of well-oiled market mechanisms, that is, trust. Since they system. he Gülen movement was fully aware
had trust in each other, they could sign long-term business of class-based and cultural divides and made
contracts. In local chambers of commerce and industry, good use of these. he Gülen sect did not aspire
to social harmony; they translated existing class
these business networks eventually led to political clout.
and culture divides into intra-sect dynamics,
and ofered upward class mobility as a source
of promise and motivation. If you studied hard,
was in a pretty desperate position. It was almost you could be accepted to a higher echelon.
inevitable for AKP—rivaled only by Cem Uzan’s Otherwise you risked losing the advantages
Youth Party (Genç Parti)—to become the rising associated with your sect membership or rema-
star of center right. ining stuck with no socio-economic mobility. As
such, the organization resembled the manage-
ment of a large corporation, where awards and
Gülen sect on the rise punishments are distributed to according to
performance and social capital.
he main dynamics underlying the stellar rise And inally, the third dynamic was shaped
of the Gülen sect are to be found in the transfor- in the area left vacant by the state. hey helped
mations of religion, politics and state. Let’s start each other when purchasing a car or house, or
with the irst one: when setting up a business. Additionally, a vast
Unlike the Süleymancılar sect, which rose to network of businessmen also provided that key
prominence in similar fashion, and the National ingredient of well-oiled market mechanisms,
Vision (Millî Görüş), which irst appeared as a that is, trust. Since they had trust in each other,
political project before turning into a sect, the they could sign long-term business contracts.
Gülen sect does not have a historically rooted In local chambers of commerce and industry,
tradition. Although Gülen traces his philosophi- these business networks eventually led to po-
cal roots back to Said Nursi and certain Islamists litical clout. he same was true for schools and
even claim his sect to be a modern branch of the student houses. After a person joined the sect as
Kadiri denomination, Gülen has long abando- a very young university student, they no longer
ned these political and philosophical referen- had to worry about choosing their job, their spo-
ces. his lack of roots, which the Süleymancılar use or even the name of their child. he sect also
Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Türkiye 11
became the social guarantor of business capital, for this disadvantage through political and bu-
which the state could not provide. As the state reaucratic advantages ofered by AKP. As such,
became less and less reliable, sects become the rivalry between TUSKON and MÜSİAD not
more and more so. However, this has also chan- only has a rather small stake, but also seems
ged in recent years. Having lost its lexibility, the very risky. TUSKON has made signiicant he-
Gülen sect—and others, too—started closing adway by exporting 2.5 times MÜSİAD’s export
themselves to the outside world, and sharing volume; however, this seems set to change due
their beliefs and “acquisitions” only inside their to the ongoing conlict between AKP and sect.
own circle. As such, sects stopped expanding by
ofering reassurance to more and more people,
and instead started to give a bigger share of the ISO 500 MÜSİAD TUSKON
rewards to current members. hus, the social Number of
companies 500 31 45
and economic relations established by the sect
turned into a sphere of privilege. Ex-factory sales 210.6 7.6 12.4
(TL billion)
Share in total 100 3.6 5.9
(%)
Transformation of capital as the Exports (USD 46.224 1.004 2.522
million)
scene of competition
Share in total 100 2.1 5.5
(%)
he so-called Gülenist capital has come about
Profit (TL
by liberating itself of conventional Islam and its 15.555 671 986
million)
deep-rooted traditions. Although initially or- Share in total 100 4.3 6.3
ganized in the business organization MÜSİAD, (%)
Gülen-related businessmen soon diferentiated Number of 516.305 19.981 33.469
employees
themselves from other MÜSİAD members by
Share in total
business methods. In 2005, they set up TUS- 1000 3.8 6.5
(%)
KON, which became a rival alternate that gran-
ted signiicant favors to its members. From 2007 he irst signs of tension between Gülen and
onwards, MÜSİAD members started asking AKP surfaced in 2007. he reason for conlict
AKP oicials why the sect received preferential was same with that of their alliance in 2002. Er-
treatment. To understand this competition, doğan and his entourage enjoyed huge political
one must examine what funds were allocated popularity; however, they lacked support in the
to which companies by the development and bureaucracy, which found itself in a straitjacket
investment agencies set up under AKP rule, as after the February 28th memorandum. Accor-
well as the political connections of concerned ding to their initial agreement, the Gülen sect
companies. Nevertheless, it must also be noted would support AKP with members who gradua-
that AKP’s animosity towards the sect has beco- ted from its schools and then took oice across
me more visible as MÜSİAD increased its clout. the world; which could also be seen as a privi-
On the other hand, the feeble percentage lege granted to the sect by AKP. And it worked.
of MÜSİAD and TUSKON members among Prime Minister Erdoğan’s proud claim “We have
Turkey’s largest corporations suggests that this eliminated bureaucratic red tape” actually poin-
competition takes place on a rather limited base ted to a change of guard in the bureaucracy. he
and that this capital accumulation process has bureaucracy was now put to the service of the
yet to ind its own feet, independent of political party. According to this equation, the party was
support. equivalent to the general public, as it enjoyed
According to 2010 data provided by the 50% electoral support.
Istanbul Chamber of Industry, the number of It is not hard to guess that the alliance bet-
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members among the ween Erdoğan’s team and the Gülen sect ran
500 largest members of the chamber does not into problems from the very beginning. Nevert-
even reach one hundred. he total share in heless, the problem irst surfaced with the Mavi
employment of these two rival associations is Marmara crisis. his ship, which allegedly trans-
around 10%. heir joint share in total proits is ported aid to Gaza under the control of the NGO
also around the same percentage. Considering called İHH, was supported by Erdoğan, whereas
that only 8 MÜSİAD members made it to the list Gülen indicated that Israel’s permission should
in 1990, there obviously has been considerable be sought beforehand. With the subsequent
progress. Judging by the table below, one could killing of nine Turkish citizens on the ship by the
argue that Islamic capital does not have much Israeli army, this became a turning point in the
weight among the top 500 members of Istanbul relations between Gülen and AKP.
Chamber of Industry, and that it compensates he second crisis, which triggered conside-
12 Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Türkiye
© Kaynak / Tuskon
rable public uproar, was soon covered up as it support of Gülenists in the judiciary and police
risked damaging both parties. he scandal was to end the army’s control over the political are-
related to claims of corruption in the agency na. his was done by means of lawsuits dubbed
regulating university and civil service entrance Ergenekon and Balyoz. It must have been beco-
exams, the ÖSYM, and thus concerned millions me clear to Erdoğan that the Gülenist seeds he
of people. he government and sect made their himself had planted in the bureaucracy would
utmost to limit the scandal surrounding this key cause him serious headaches in any conlict of
institution. In 2010, the civil service entrance interest.
exam KPSS was cancelled after claims that the Finally, hell broke loose one year later, with
questions were leaked to Gülenist test prep the eruption of the dershane (university test
centers (dershane). AKP seemed to conirm preparation centers) scandal. he government
these claims as it tried—in vein—to bring the wanted to close down the centers and increase
ÖSYM under direct government control. Simi- the number of private schools (kolej) instead.
lar accusations were made about other exams However, the centers were the main channel
Compared to MÜSİAD, which organized by the agency; however, due to the of socialization for the Gülen sect. Even more
is relatively narrow in scale
extremely sensitive nature of the issue, the scan- importantly, the sect exploded with anger to see
and geographical reach,
TUSKON has a wider imperial dal was soon covered up, and the rivalry betwe- AKP, to which it had lent so much support in the
vision. TUSKON companies en the two sides inside the bureaucracy did not bureaucracy, take a clear measure to eradicate
are competing worldwide with
fully surface. its social base. Although the government inally
global companies.
he third key moment in the tension betwe- passed legislation to postpone the closure of the
en the sect and AKP concerned Hakan Fidan, test prep centers by two years, the looming crisis
the head of the Turkish intelligence service could not be avoided.
MİT. he crisis broke out on February 7, 2012 What happened after the police crackdown
when the special prosecutor in charge of the on government corruption on December 17 are
KCK lawsuit, Sadrettin Sarıkaya, invited Fidan to the scenes of a duel between the two modern
give a statement about the case. Prime Minister streams of Turkish Islamism: the Gülen sect and
Erdoğan clearly stated that Fidan would not do the AKP. In one corner we have the Fethullah
so. Immediately, a legislative change was pas- Gülen sect and their business concerns, which
sed to grant Fidan and his team legal immunity. boast great support in the bureaucracy, judici-
In fact, this was the beginning of the nightmare ary and police; in the other, AKP with its huge
for AKP, which had previously capitalized on the clout in the legislative and executive branches.
What is positive about all this is that the scandal
has revealed the banality of Turkish Islamism,
The sect also became the social guarantor of business
as it turns around such worldly issues as cor-
capital, which the state could not provide. As the state ruption and nepotism. As such, Gülen and AKP
became less and less reliable, sects become more and have jointly put an end to an epoch when the
more so. However, this has also changed in recent years. historical power of Islam as a religion could be
Having lost its flexibility, the Gülen sect –and others, translated into political legitimacy by Islamists.
too– started closing themselves to the outside world, and
sharing their beliefs and historical “acquisitions” only
inside their own circle.
