All the More Reason to Exercise Caution while Discussing Genesis. G.C.
Berkouwer on Scripture and Science
Gijsbert van den Brink, Faculty of Theology, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV
Amsterdam NL; g.vanden.brink@vu.nl
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter Abraham Flipse sketched the main contours of the
development of neo-Calvinist and Roman Catholic views of science in the late
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. One of the things his analysis
brought to light was the special role played by leading neo-Calvinist theologians
during and after the interbellum. Flipse showed how these theologians opted for
a conservative line by integrating two aspects of neo-Calvinism that until then
had largely remained separate: the ideal of developing a “Christian science” on
the one hand and a literal-historical reading of the Bible, especially the first
chapters of Genesis, on the other. Young earth creationism as it had emerged in
the USA several decades before came to their help as the perfect bridge to
connect these two strands in their thinking. 1 As a result, neo-Calvinist attempts to
come to terms with contemporary science came to a standstill, and neo-Calvinist
academics who were involved in the natural sciences had a hard time. The road
towards taking seriously the methods and results of mainstream science was
blocked, for when these results deviated from a so-called literal understanding of
the Bible – as was in particular the case with regard to the questions of origin –
biblical exegesis overruled the search for the most adequate scientific theory.
How did this situation change? Following up on Flipse’s observations, in this
contribution we will have a closer look at the next stage of neo-Calvinist thinking
on the relations between science and religion: the late fifties and sixties of the
twentieth century. During this period significant alterations took place in the way
in which the natural sciences were conceived of in relation to biblical
interpretation and theological doctrine, and even more drastic shifts were
prepared. In particular, we will zoom in on the role played by systematic
theologian Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer (1903-1996) in this regard.
There are three reasons for this focus. First, it is generally agreed upon that
Berkouwer was a highly influential theologian in neo-Calvinist circles, whose
national and international stature and radiance almost equalled that of his
famous predecessors at the Free University, Abraham Kuyper and Herman
Bavinck. In fact, Berkouwer may have been the last Dutch neo-Calvinist
theologian who largely determined the course of an entire church with his
publications – later theologians found themselves in a much more fragmented
landscape, at best speaking to particular factions of their church. Second,
Berkouwer was a very accurate trend watcher of developments that took place in
contemporary Roman Catholic theology, and deeply involved in inter-confessional
1 Abraham C. Flipse, “Neo-Calvinism, neo-Thomism and the Natural Sciences,
1880-1960”, this volume; cf. idem, “The Origins of Creationism in the
Netherlands: The Evolution Debate Among Twentieth-Century Dutch neo-
Calvinists”, Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture 81 (2012), 104-
147.
1
dialogue with Roman Catholicism.2 This makes a case study of his thinking
especially fit for inclusion in this volume. What connections or differences did he
observe between Protestant and Roman Catholic approaches of the natural
sciences at the time? Third, Berkouwer was very circumspect about making
unequivocal statements with regard to ‘hot issues’, such as how to assess
evolutionary theory in relation to theological doctrine. Still, we will see that he did
not just evade the sensitive debates, as is sometimes suggested. So what can we
tell about his views, and how did he influence subsequent generations of neo-
Calvinist thinkers and scientists on this score? The fact that Berkouwer played a
pivotal role in the transition of neo-Calvinism in the Netherlands from
fundamentalism towards open-mindedness makes him an intriguing and
rewarding figure to study.
First, we will provisionally explore the typical way in which Berkouwer discussed
the sensitive theme of faith and science – and in particular the topic of creation
and evolution – by examining a popular newspaper review he published in the
mid-1950s (§2). Second, we will examine how he elaborated his approach of
these issues in his Studies in Dogmatics, first of all in his theological anthropology
(1957) and subsequently in his volumes on Holy Scripture (1966/1967) (§3). Next,
we will zoom in on the parallels that Berkouwer drew with the way in which the
same problems were dealt with in contemporary Roman Catholic theology (§4).
We will end up with some conclusions (§5).
2. Creation and Evolution (1956)
In 1956 Jan Lever, who was a full professor of zoology at the newly erected
biology department (1950) of the Free University of Amsterdam, published a
landmark book that was to become a watershed in the Dutch Calvinist reception
of evolutionary theory: Creatie en evolutie.3 Following up on comments he had
made in his inaugural lecture (1952), in this book Lever explained to his neo-
Calvinist readership why in his view evolutionary theory should be accepted. He
also attempted to reconcile such acceptance with an adequate interpretation of
the first chapters of the book of Genesis, rejecting so-called literal readings of it
as being informed by outdated science. His own views on the questions of origin
came close to what was later to be called ‘theistic evolutionism’, but what Lever
himself somewhat confusingly referred to as ‘creationism’: God created the world
2 Cf. G.C. Berkouwer, The Conflict with Rome (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1958; Dutch original 1949); idem, Recent Developments in Roman Catholic
Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958); idem, The Second Vatican Council and
the New Catholicism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965); and at least three other
titles that appeared in Dutch only. In 1963, Berkouwer had attended the Second
Vatican Council as an ‘observer’ at the personal invitation of pope John XXIII. For
a large scale analysis of Berkouwer’s assessment of Roman Catholic theology,
see Eduardo Echeverria, Berkouwer and Catholicism. Disputed Questions (Leiden:
Brill, 2013).
3 J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie (Wageningen: Zomer & Keuning, 1956). The book
was well-sold: a second edition appeared in 1958, as did an English translation:
Creation and Evolution (Grand Rapids: Grand Rapids International Publications,
1958).
2
and ever since guides the process of evolution in accordance with his
predetermined plan; the only way to find out how this process actually works, is
by doing science.4
In Trouw, the daily newspaper that served the Reformed “pillar” in the
Netherlands at the time, Berkouwer published one of the first reviews of Lever’s
book. Its tone was entirely positive – which as it turned out was very much
appreciated by Lever (and presumably came to some extent as a relief to him;
Berkouwer was a highly influential figure at that time already). 5 Berkouwer first of
all connects Lever’s book to earlier publications on the same topic by Bavinck
and Kuyper, but also by more recent Reformed theologians such as N.H.
Ridderbos. In this way, Berkouwer showed his readers that Lever’s ideas did not
come out of the blue. In fact, he even suggests that some of the questions Lever
addressed had lingered in contemporary neo-Calvinism for quite some time
without being answered, so that Lever’s book came as a natural sequel to earlier
debates. Berkouwer then praises the “honesty” with which Lever revisited these
questions in his book and shows respect for his scholarship. Lever rightly saw
that the Word of God enlightens the Christian scientist, but does not make his
scientific research superfluous. 6
Next, Berkouwer proceeds in a rather remarkable way. Instead of assessing
Lever’s theological proposals and solutions to the creation-evolution conundrum
from his perspective as a systematic theologian, he places himself in the position
of Lever’s prospected more conservative critical readers, pre-empting the
objections such readers might be willing to raise. No, Lever did not pose limits to
the Word of God, he just addressed the question of how to interpret the book of
Genesis in an appropriate way. In this connection, Berkouwer notes that Lever
rejected a reading according to which Genesis offers us “scientifically exact
knowledge”; instead, such “fundamentalism” favored the state of the art in the
natural sciences of some centuries ago over against modern science, using
biblical texts to canonize this obsolete state of affairs. Berkouwer does not make
explicit whether or not he agrees with Lever here, but the reader strongly gets
the impression that he does since he continues to extol Lever’s virtues, writing
that his book is “stamped by the seriousness and honesty of a Christian who
wants to be a man of science with a good conscience”.
What follows is a passage so characteristic of Berkouwer’s cautious way of
proceeding at this stage that it is worth quoting in full:
I can imagine that someone asks: but what is his [Lever’s] solution with
regard to creation or evolution? It is definitely not my purpose to answer
4 Cf. Rob P.W. Visser, “Dutch Calvinists and Darwinism, 1900-1960”, in: Jitse M.
van der Meer and Scott Mandelbrote (eds.), Nature and Scripture in the
Abrahamic Religions: 1700-Present, Vol.2 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 310.
5 Cf. an interview that Kruyswijk had with Lever in 2005, as mentioned in Hittjo
Kruyswijk, Baas in eigen Boek? Evolutietheorie en Schriftgezag bij de
Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (1881-1981) (Hilversum: Verloren, 2011),
226 (Lever passed away in 2010).
6 G.C. Berkouwer, “Creatie en evolutie”, Trouw (15 december 1956), 5; all quotes
in this section are from this review article.
3
this question in a couple of compact sentences. That is not even possible,
since one needs to read the entire book in order to understand the
questions and answers.7
Thus, Berkouwer does not even tell his readers – let alone evaluate – what Lever
actually proposes in his book. As a matter of fact, he would not begin to assess
Lever’s “solution” to the questions raised by evolutionary theory even when
space limits did not prevent him from doing so. In this review article, Berkouwer
goes on to emphasize the continuity between Lever’s views and some insights
put forward by Abraham Kuyper8, in order to then admit that “of course also
questions arise from this book”. Berkouwer indicates these questions in fairly
general terms as “questions with regard to the goal of revelation, the scientific
level and the all-decisive level of faith”. The most concrete reference here is to
questions “on the religious meaning of the paradise narrative according to Acts
15 and Romans 5, which strongly suggests that it is essential that only two
humans inhabited the garden of Eden”. 9 Berkouwer does not explain how Lever
interprets these critical passages, however. Instead, he ends his review by
stipulating that these and other questions that might be raised by Lever’s book
should be asked in the same spirit of seriousness in which the book was written –
thus warding off any possible dismissive responses.
I have highlighted this review by Berkouwer, since the way in which he proceeds
in this tiny piece is typical for his more general approach. Throughout his vast
oeuvre10 Berkouwer steered clear of addressing the questions of (human) origin in
any straightforward way. This may have been due to his wish to prevent new
ecclesial divisions from taking place – Berkouwer’s Reformed church had gone
through a tragic split over the interpretation of Genesis 2-3 as recently as in
1926, one year before Berkouwer was ordained and became one of its ministers.
This split was occasioned by the decisions of the synod of Assen, especially by its
claim that the serpent in paradise (Genesis 3) had spoken in an empirically
observable way and by its prohibition to advocate any exegesis which obscures
this clear meaning of Scripture.11 Berkouwer may have been wary of rekindling
the unhappy debates that preceded this decision, perhaps fearing once again dire
7 Berkouwer, “Creatie en evolutie”, 5.
8 Drawing on Lever, Berkouwer especially refers to Kuyper’s famous rectorial
address on evolution: Evolutie (Amsterdam: Höveker & Wormser, 1899); ET:
Abraham Kuyper, “Evolution”, Calvin Theological Journal 31 (1996), 11-50. Cf.
Gijsbert van den Brink, “Evolution as a Bone of Contention between Church and
Academy. How Abraham Kuyper Can Help Us Bridge the Gap”, Kuyper Center
Review 5 (2015), 92-103.
9 Berkouwer, “Creatie en evolutie”, 5; the antecedent of ‘which’ is grammatically
unclear in the Dutch original; it seems that this most crucial sentence of the
review is an anacoluthon.
10 Cf. Dirk van Keulen, Bibliografie/Bibliography G.C. Berkouwer (Kampen: Kok,
2000).
11 For the broader context of the split, see e.g. J. Veenhof, “A History of Theology
and Spirituality of the Dutch Reformed Churches (Gereformeerde Kerken), 1892-
1992”, Calvin Theological Journal 28 (1993), 266-297.
4
consequences. Alternatively, the reason for his silence on the ‘real’ issues may
have been that he just was not sure how to deal with them in an adequate way. In
any case, as we will see in the next section he was very much aware of the fact
that the issues were critical from a theological point of view, since they might
affect some of the basic tenets of Reformed theology.
3. Theological Anthropology (1957) and the Doctrine of Scripture (1967)
If we examine the topics of Berkouwer’s impressive eighteen volume “Studies in
Dogmatics” (1949-1972), some customary themes are conspicuous for their
absence. For example, though Berkouwer devoted separate volumes to specific
attributes and decrees of God (in particular God’s providence and election), we
do not have a study on the doctrine of God as such. Neither did Berkouwer
include a volume on the prolegomena (in which he could have explained his
theological method), whereas a volume on the doctrine of creation is missing as
well.12 It is precisely in such volumes that an in-depth engagement with the
relationship of God and creation and the theological relevance (or irrelevance) of
scientific inquiry could be expected.
Another volume in which Berkouwer might have entered the debate in a
straightforward way is the one on anthropology. Indeed, in his Man: The Image of
God Berkouwer acknowledges that “both the Church and theology have been
interested in the origin of man”.13 He admits that Bavinck had even addressed at
length “the problems of the ‘ancestry’ of man, and Darwinism and evolution”. 14
This was in a different setting, however, since Bavinck did so in his doctrine of
creation. In writing a theological anthropology, Berkouwer is much more
interested in the traditional debate on the origin of the human soul – is each
individual soul directly created by God (creatianism) or do souls come into being
through procreation (traducianism)? This dilemma may now strike us as fairly
obsolete, for Berkouwer it was apparently more pressing than the questions
raised by the sciences of human origin. Or was it just a safer question? In any
case: “We do not plan to take up the problems regarding the creation of man and
of the human race, since these problems would involve us in a discussion of the
meaning of creation and of the unity of the human race, and also of the fall of
man”.15 One wonders what would be wrong with that, but Berkouwer apparently
12 Interestingly, volumes on prolegomena and the doctrine of creation were part
of Berkouwer’s original overall plan for the Studies in Dogmatics. See Dirk van
Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek. Schriftbeschouwing en Schriftgebruik in het
dogmatisch werk van A. Kuyper, H. Bavinck en G.C. Berkouwer (Kampen: Kok,
2003), 359-365; Van Keulen concludes that, though various suggestions circulate
in the secondary literature, we can only speculate about the reasons why
Berkouwer deviated from his original plan (363).
13 G.C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962),
279; the Dutch original is from 1957, which means that this book would have
offered him a perfect opportunity to pursue some of the questions he had alluded
to in his review of Lever’s Creatie en Evolutie.
14 Berkouwer, Man, 279; cf. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics II (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), §36.
15 Berkouwer, Man, 279.
5
felt that it would lead him too far away from his actual goals. Therefore, he
restricts himself to pointing out a parallel discussion on human origins in
contemporary Roman Catholic theology (to which we will return in section 4).
Ten years later, however, in the penultimate volumes of his Studies in
Dogmatics, Berkouwer becomes a bit more explicit. These volumes are devoted
to the doctrine of Scripture. Here, finally, Berkouwer had to give some account of
his theological method, and especially of the role of the Bible in his thinking. 16 He
will all the more have felt the need to do so since in the preceding volumes, on
eschatology, he had occasionally employed the Bible in an unusual way, applying
figurative methods of interpretation at places where this had not been customary
in his circles thus far.17 It is in the volumes on Holy Scripture that Berkouwer
further accounts for this hermeneutics, and in the process also discusses the way
in which scientific claims can be allowed to influence our readings of the Bible. In
particular, he does so in an extensive chapter on one of the properties that
Protestant theology had traditionally ascribed to the Bible, namely clarity or
perspicuity. This chapter is placed in between chapters on Scripture’s reliability
and sufficiency – two other properties ascribed to the Bible in orthodox Protestant
theology.18 The chapter on Scripture’s clarity is much larger than those on its
reliability and sufficiency, though, which can explained by the fact that the
appeal to Scripture’s clarity (or “clear sense”) had played a pivotal role in the
decisions of the 1926 synod of Assen.
Berkouwer starts this chapter by asking the obvious question whether the
doctrine of the clarity of Scripture “leaves any room for the need of
interpretation”.19 If Scripture is clear in and of its own, why do we need
interpreters and interpretations in order to understand it? Isn’t Holy Scripture “its
16 Two volumes appeared in Dutch: De Heilige Schrift 1 (Kampen: Kok, 1966) and
De Heilige Schrift II (Kampen: Kok, 1967), the first one clearing the ground for a
discussion of more fundamental issues in the second one. An English edition was
provided by Jack B. Rogers in one volume: G.C. Berkouwer, Holy Scripture (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). Rogers’ translation left out approximately one-third of
the original material, especially “interactions with people holding other
viewpoints” (Holy Scripture, 7).
17 Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 364; cf. idem, ‘Promise and Expectation. The
Use of Scripture in the Eschatology of G.C. Berkouwer’, in: A. van Egmond & D.
van Keulen (eds.), Christian Hope in Context, Vol.1 (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2001),
esp. 220.
18 The locus on Scripture in Heinrich Heppe’s compendium of orthodox Reformed
theology, Reformed Dogmatics. Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, rev. and
ed. by Ernst Bizer (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1978), has sections on the
authority of the Bible (22-28), its perfection or sufficiency (28-31), its necessity
(31-32) and its clarity (32-36). All these properties (and more, 21-22) were taken
by Protestant theologians from the doctrine of God and applied to Scripture as
the Word of God. For a more recent discussion of their meaning and functions see
Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2003), 295-370.
19 G.C. Berkouwer, Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 267; in this
section, page numbers in the body of the text will refer to this volume.
6
own interpreter” (267)? Berkouwer then points out that the Reformers never took
this maxim as implying that biblical exegesis is superfluous, noting that such
Reformers as Luther and Calvin were intensely occupied with scriptural
interpretation themselves (268). Obviously, the clarity of Scripture does not mean
that the Bible is immediately accessible to us like a newspaper report (270). What
it does mean can only be retrieved by examining the historical circumstances in
which the doctrine arose, namely as part of the Reformation’s controversy with
Rome (271). The Reformers were not opposed to ecclesiastical interpretations of
Scripture, but held that Scripture as the Word of God was a light on everyone’s
path.20 It is from this perspective that we can appreciate the confession of the
clarity of Scripture: when reading the Bible, its message of salvation really comes
through. Thus, it is from the context of the biblical message of salvation that the
confession emerges. Only at a later stage post-Reformation theologians came to
apply it to the very words of Scripture. Though the message of salvation is of
course conveyed to us in words and language, the Reformers never isolated
these words from the message.
Berkouwer’s exposition gets a more personal flavour when he laments the fact
that the confession of Scripture’s clarity “does not automatically lead to a total
uniformity of perception, disposing of any problems”, calling this one of its “most
moving and difficult aspects” (286).21 We cannot escape “from the anxiety of
divergences” in interpretation, however, by retreating to some “preconceived
technique”. Rather, we have to hear the call “to receptive attention, research,
respect, and expectation, to faith and prayer” (287). It is in this context that
Berkouwer raises the sensitive issue of the critical ‘scientific’ study of Scripture –
a topic that had concerned him from the very beginning of his career. 22 Many
people think that this study will only sharpen the “fatal division of minds”
concerning the meaning of Scripture, and they sometimes retreat to “the
arbitrariness of private understanding” (287). Berkouwer, however, ponders the
more optimistic possibility that “the fascinating process of continued biblical
research” may bring to light “converging lines in the understanding of Scripture”
(287).23 In fact, if we really believe in the clarity of Scripture we should eagerly
long for such convergence, and expect it. In the next section, we will see that
20 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 272; I have added the italics from the Dutch
original (Heilige Schrift 2, 255).
21 Berkouwer’s strong engagement with doctrine of the clarity of Scripture also
transpires from the fact that he had a gifted South African student of him write
his doctoral thesis on it: H.W. Rossouw, Klaarheid en interpretasie. Enkele
probleemhistoriese gesigspunte in verband met die leer van die duidelikheid van
die Heilige Skrif (Amsterdam: Jacob van Campen, 1963).
22 Cf. G.C. Berkouwer, Het probleem der Schriftkritiek [The problem of historical
criticism] (Kampen: Kok, 1938); I use ‘scientific’ within scare quotes to indicate
that the Dutch original in Berkouwer’s oeuvre (wetenschappelijk) does not just
refer to the natural sciences but to historical scholarship as well.
23 The Dutch original has “boeiend” for “fascinating” (Heilige Schrift 2, 286),
which is perhaps better translated by the slightly more distanced term
“interesting”.
7
Berkouwer indeed observed a number of important converging lines in his times,
namely between Protestant and Roman Catholic theology.
Although Berkouwer closely connected the notion of the clarity of Scripture to its
message or ‘scope’ – a notion that gradually became centre-stage in his doctrine
of Scripture24 – this did not mean that the verba or literal words of Scripture
became unimportant to him. On the contrary: “Without giving the words of
Scripture full attention, it is wholly impossible to confess the perspicuity of
Scripture” (290). Attention to the exact words of Scripture, however, does “not in
the least warrant a simplistic exegesis” (290). Using the generally acknowledged
difficulties in the interpretation of the Book of Revelation as an example,
Berkouwer argues that the appeal to the clarity of Scripture cannot be naively
used as an excuse for ignoring “[t]he peculiar imagery and figures of speech of
apocalypticism” (290). Rather, like other parts of Scripture apocalyptic texts can
only be understood if we take into account “the specific literary form in which the
words appear and the great variety of ways in which Scripture speaks to us”
(291). Now why is this generally accepted with regard to apocalypticism and
eschatology (the last things) while it is much more disputed to deny that the
literary style of texts on protology (the first things) can simply be identified with
historiography? That is, Berkouwer surmises, because in the case of protology
alongside the question of its literary style consideration of the findings of science
has come into play (292-293). Berkouwer does not shy away from the tough and
complex issues that arise here, however, but intentionally addresses them from
the specific angle of the claritas Scripturae:
In our time these questions have become more and more relevant,
particularly with respect to the problems of ‘origin’ in the first three
chapters of Genesis. It is not within the scope of this study to elaborate on
the question of the creation and man’s fall from God’s hand in guilt and
alienation. But I do wish to discuss in some detail the very important
aspect of the clarity and self-evidence of Scripture concerning creation and
the fall.25
Berkouwer starts his reflections with the more general question whether “certain
results of science, be it natural science or historical research, can provide the
‘occasion’ for understanding various aspects of Scripture in a different way than
before” (133). He argues that as soon as one adopts an organic understanding of
the inspiration of Scripture, which takes its human form with full seriousness, this
question can only be answered affirmatively. Bavinck therefore already spoke of
the “excellent service” which geology can offer us when interpreting the creation
story, of the Copernican view that “has pressed theology to give another and a
better interpretation of the sun’s ‘standing still’ in Joshua 10”, and of the precious
contributions of Assyriology and Egyptology to scriptural exegesis in general. 26
Berkouwer observes, however, that almost nobody is still worried about the
changed exegesis of Joshua 10 in the wake of the Galileo-trial, but that the
24 Cf. Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 513-514, 526-531.
25 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 292 (I have slightly adapted Roger’s translation).
26 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 496.
8
problems with regard to Genesis 1-3 are much more fundamental since they are
inextricably linked up with our understanding of Scripture as a whole in its
witness on creation, fall and redemption.27 Moreover, allowing certain results of
science to influence our exegesis cannot mean that we retroject these results in
Scripture, as if they had been present there all the time. For given the nature of
Scripture we should of course not expect it to anticipate on later scientific
research (300). 28 Therefore, Berkouwer unambiguously rejects all “concordism”,
meaning by this all attempts to harmonize Scripture with the newest findings of
the natural sciences. In particular, he criticizes the so called day-age view of
Genesis 1 in this connection as “an untenable construction”. 29
Still, the results of scientific research can legitimately influence our use of
Scripture in another way, namely by correcting an approach which, after all, may
not have been in agreement with the meaning and goal of Scripture. In this way,
one does not allow science to dominate or dictate one’s understanding of
Scripture (and by consequence one’s faith), but science can still contribute to a
better understanding of its unique message. 30 With respect to the first chapters of
Genesis, for example, scientific research has opened our eyes to the role of
human activity, reflection and composition in the creation stories that emerged in
Israel and that cannot be isolated from Israel’s belief in God. This is not to turn
the stories into subjective human projections, but to acknowledge the way in
which God apparently worked when revealing himself and inspiring the biblical
writers. Rather than assuming that God provided some unique information to
them about “how it all begun”, we have to see the creation stories (esp. Genesis
1) as Israel’s faith-driven polemical response to the mythical theogonies and
cosmogonies which dominated its ancient near eastern Umwelt. “For God’s
revelation does not exclude human thought and historical confrontation, but
adopts them” (293). Once we see this, the notion of the clarity of Scripture starts
to shift: the ‘clear sense’ of Scripture no longer coincides with what we intuitively
think to be the meaning upon reading the text, but can only be established when
we take into account these historical conditions. 31
What then is the meaning of Genesis 1-3? Berkouwer is not ambivalent here, but
answers this crucial question in a crystal clear way. The Genesis story does not
convey human fictions or projections, timeless general ideas or psychological
truths, but
27 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 303; this is a part of a long section in the Dutch
original (296-320) which has not been included in the English translation,
apparently because Berkouwer engages extensively here with arguments that
played a role around and after the decisions of the 1926 synod of Assen.
28 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 300.
29 On this day-age view as a variety of old earth creationism, see e.g. Gerald
Rau, Mapping the Origins Debate. Six Models of the Beginning of Everything
(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2012), 48-50 and passim.
30 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 301.
31 Berkouwer clearly believed that the biblical texts had a meaning and that in
principle it is possible to grasp it; not being a postmodern thinker, his was not the
view that the text has a plurality of meanings depending on the situatedness (or
wishes) of its readers.
9
(…) a reality of the creation of heaven and earth (…), of the gap that arose
between God and humanity, a gap of guilt and alienation that became
deeper and deeper, and of the divine initiative towards salvation and light
in this utter darkness.32
The sequence is absolutely key here to Berkouwer: the relationship between
creation and sin in this story is “really irreversible”, as Genesis 1 precedes
Genesis 3.33 Thus, we don’t have to do with myth, since the stories are relating a
real act of creation and the equally real fact of human guilt and alienation, in a
way that excludes any confusion of creation and fall which would leave us
humans excused. Thus, the stories are not naïve, but reflective and highly radical
at that: they reject a tragic view of life in which God or fate are considered to be
the origin of evil, and instead they judge us humans – though not without the
promise of God’s salvation. In this way, Berkouwer continued to uphold the basic
structure of classical Reformed theology in his reading of Genesis 1-3. This
profound revelation of human guilt over against divine generosity, however, is
rendered in these chapters in human imagery. In fact, Berkouwer ponders, we
could have considered the possibility of this interpretation already by closely
examining the stories themselves, in their peculiar contours and typically human
characteristics. Science came in as the coincidental occasion that pressed us to
do this more seriously than before.34 After all, the traditional exegesis had its
problems all along, and therefore “(…) there is all the more reason to exercise
caution while discussion Genesis. One must above all be on guard for the false
dilemma of reality or fiction when choosing between the traditional exegesis or a
different one” (294-295).
To conclude, the direction in which Berkouwer looked for solving the
tensions between science and faith with respect to the questions of human origin
was not at all unclear. He rejected (both young earth and old earth) creationist
readings of the first chapters of Genesis on the one hand, and phenomenological
interpretations of these chapters (as if they merely offered some wise lessons on
the human condition) on the other. The Genesis-story belongs to the prologue of
the book and its author had a keen interest in what happened “in the
32 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 313 (my translation).
33 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 316; this is fully in line with Berkouwer’s
treatment of the problem of evil in his The Providence of God (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1952), Ch. VIII.
34 Kruyswijk, Baas in eigen Boek?, 245-246, criticizes Berkouwer for only allowing
science the role of an “outside” occasion to re-examine traditional
interpretations: “we hear nothing on the legitimacy of science as such, apart from
this function” (246); this criticism is unfair, given the fact that Berkouwer’s topic
is the interpretation of Scripture (not the raison d’être of science), and it is hard
to see how contemporary science could determine the meaning of age-old
biblical texts. As Berkouwer argued, in the context of biblical interpretation
science can indeed only function as an occasion to reconsider traditional
understandings that previously had often gone unchallenged.
10
beginning”.35 The chapters describe the reality of God’s good creation and the
human fall in vivid contemporary imagery.36
But can such a view be sustained in the light of contemporary scientific
evidence on human evolution? And if so, how should we envisage what exactly
happened at the dawn of human history? Here we reach territory which
Berkouwer did not enter – and perhaps wisely so, since any way forward he would
have explored would most probably have led to controversy and to a parting of
the ways in his Reformed community.37 Berkouwer may very well have sensed
how far he could go without losing support. Van Deursen’s (otherwise critical)
portrayal of Berkouwer is pertinent here: “Berkouwer succeeded in winning the
majority of the gereformeerde church people for himself (…). He did what
Bavinck had never dared to do: publishing altered, new insights to the world
outside, and he was rewarded for it. He gained the support of the people because
they continued to trust him”.38 By letting his students think for themselves he
enabled them to gradually move on where he had stopped – though they
sometimes went far beyond the boundaries he had delineated (e.g. by
abandoning the “irreversible” order of creation and fall). Meanwhile, in
contemporary research on the interface of science and religion attempts have
been made to re-contextualize the notion of a primordial human fall from God’s
intentions within an evolutionary worldview.39
4. The Catholic Connection
When investigating Berkouwer’s relationship to Roman Catholicism it seems
natural to consult his various treatises on contemporary Roman Catholic
thought.40 In these publications, however, Berkouwer’s method is mostly
descriptive, and his personal views remain even more implicit than is famously
the case in his dogmatic work.41 Moreover, since in these treatises Berkouwer
mostly focuses on the traditional doctrinal differences between Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism rather than on shared contemporary challenges,
35 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 315.
36 In today’s jargon, it seems that Berkouwer’s vision could be described as a
variety of ‘theistic evolutionism’. He would probably have been quite sympathetic
to e.g. Denis Alexander’s elaboration of this view in his Creation or Evolution: Do
We Have to Choose? ( Oxford: Monarch Books, 2008; 2nd ed. 2014), 177-388.
37 That Berkouwer was well aware of the fact that his work in this area was
unfinished, is clear from his comment that these issues “should of course be
discussed more extensively in a ‘locus de creatione’”; Heilige Schrift 2, 322.
38 Arie Theodorus van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University
in Amsterdam, 1880-2005 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 254. In this
connection, a rhetorical analysis of Berkouwer’s writing style might be revealing.
39 Cf. e.g. Gijsbert van den Brink, “Should We Drop the Fall? On Taking Evil
Seriously”, in: Eddy van der Borght & Paul van Geest (eds.), Strangers and
Pilgrims on Earth. Essays in Honour of Abraham van de Beek (Leiden: Brill, 2011),
761-778.
40 See footnote 2.
41 Cf. Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 463-464; Echeverria, Berkouwer and
Catholicism, 3-4.
11
the issue of Scripture and science is not on the forefront. Interestingly, however,
in all three pieces that we analyzed above Berkouwer draws a parallel to
contemporary Roman Catholic discussions on the questions of origin. Therefore,
in this section I will focus on the relevant parts of these pieces.
Already in his one page review of Lever’s Creatie en Evolutie Berkouwer
refers to “certain pronouncements” of the Roman Catholic Biblical Commission in
1909. These statements delineated what had to be accepted as the established
result of the exegesis of the Genesis story.42 Berkouwer points out that these
pronouncements had engendered a lot of discussion, and though “we”
Protestants don’t have Biblical commissions, we as well do have our questions on
this theme and want to deal with these in a responsible way (like Lever had
done). The reference to contemporary Roman Catholicism seems mainly intended
to make clear that “we Protestants” are not the only ones who have some work to
do in this area.
In Man: The Image of God Berkouwer refers to Lever’s book only once,
pointing out that the questions with which Lever was concerned, especially the
question of the unity of the human race in Adam, have become more urgent in
recent times as a result of “developments in the biological sciences”. 43 Though
the questions are common to Protestants and Catholics, Berkouwer observes with
some surprise that thus far they have been “most actual” in Roman Catholic
theology. In this connection he not only refers once more to the statement of
1909, but also to the papal encyclical Humani Generis of 1950. Here, the
question of human origins was taken up in connection with the theory of
evolution, and Berkouwer correctly renders the solution which Humani Generis
stipulated: the church allows a treatment of evolution that, as far as humans are
concerned, is restricted to the human body. 44 While the human body may be
regarded as having evolved from other living beings, it should be upheld that the
human soul is directly created by God. Berkouwer notes that in this way the
results of modern science are cautiously accommodated, but within clearly
defined limits. These limits are determined by the doctrine of original sin; it is
because of this doctrine that the human soul has to be seen as created by a
42 Cf. Heinrich Denzinger, Peter Hünermann (eds.) Enchiridion symbolorum
definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum / Compendium of Creeds,
Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals, Latin-English, 43rd
Edition (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 705-707 (nos. 3512-3519). The
declaration stipulates that, though metaphorical or anthropomorphical elements
may be involved in its text (707), Genesis 1-3 should in any case be regarded as
historical, since these chapters affect the fundamentals of the Christian religion.
43 Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, 280; Berkouwer does not specify the
nature of these developments.
44 Berkouwer, Man, 281; this is one of the few times that the word ‘evolution’
occurs in Berkouwer’s oeuvre (interestingly, the Dutch original has “the so-called
theory of evolution”). M.P. van der Marel, Registers op de dogmatische studiën
van Dr G.C. Berkouwer (Kampen: Kok, 1988), 37, notes one place in the eighteen
Studies in Dogmatics where Berkouwer uses “evolution”, another one where he
has “evolutionism”, and two places where he writes “evolutionary theory”
(evolutieleer).
12
special act of God and that polygenism (the idea that not all contemporary
humans descend from Adam and Eve since there were more people around in
primordial times) has to be rejected.
After having mentioned the internal Roman Catholic debates on the
interpretation of Humani Generis, Berkouwer makes clear that as a Protestant he
has two problems with its stipulations. First, he is surprised by the fact that
making such a sharp distinction between soul and body as Humani Generis does
“is not at all experienced as dualistic”.45 Berkouwer himself opines that the
background of this distinction is an unwarranted dichotomy between soul and
body. Second, Berkouwer laments the fact that Scriptural arguments do not play
a decisive role in Humani Generis, but doctrinal considerations (especially “the
infallible dogma of original sin”) that largely function in isolation from biblical
exegesis. This goes back to “a very different view of the relation between dogma
and Scripture”, and as a result of this “far-reaching methodological difference in
approach” it is hard to imagine that Protestants could adopt Humani Generis’ line
of reasoning on this issue.46 Turning to Protestant thought, however, Berkouwer
warns that here as well “dogmatic presuppositions – though they be within
another view of the relation between dogma and Scripture – may influence and
dominate the portrayal of man”.47 Unfortunately he does not explain this
intriguing remark, since at this points he shifts his focus to the actual theme of
his chapter: a discussion of various speculative theories on the origin of human
souls. In any case, the way in which Humani Generis had dealt with evolutionary
theory did not particularly entice Berkouwer to follow suit. 48
Finally, in his dogmatic study on Holy Scripture Berkouwer starts on a much
more positive note when he examines contemporary Roman Catholic theology. In
a passage that has been skipped in the English version of the book, Berkouwer
observes that both in Roman Catholic and in Protestant theology the transition
had been made from a so-called mechanical towards a more organic
understanding of the inspiration of Scripture, that is: an understanding that takes
seriously the involvement of concrete human beings in the formation of the
Bible.49 At the same time, the Bible had received a more central place in recent
Roman Catholic theology, and Berkouwer suggests that this change in both the
place of the Bible and the understanding of its inspiration had led to a number of
remarkable theological convergences between recent Roman Catholic and
Protestant theology. In particular, he points to the doctrines of grace and
45 I have re-translated the Dutch here (“… blijkbaar allerminst als dualistisch
wordt aangevoeld”); the English edition more ambiguously renders this as “felt to
be not at all dualistic” (282).
46 Berkouwer, Man, 283.
47 Berkouwer, Man, 283.
48 In his Recent Developments in Roman Catholic Thought (1958; Dutch original
1957) Berkouwer devotes an entire chapter to Humani Generis (44-54), but does
not address the way in which it discusses the question of human origin in relation
to evolutionary theory.
49 Cf. Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 155; and more broadly Berkouwer, Second
Vatican Council , Ch.3.
13
justification, and even to certain motives in the doctrine of the eucharist. 50
Although it is unclear how these developments will work out, especially since
substantial divergences continue to play a role as well, over against sceptics
Berkouwer hails the convergences as a clear sign of what the perspicuity of
Scripture implies: if we really believe in the clarity of Scripture, such convergence
is exactly what may be expected.51
The transition to an organic understanding of the inspiration of Scripture,
however, also led to the question to what extent scientific developments might
legitimately be used in biblical exegesis.52 Berkouwer is highly interested in the
Roman Catholic response to this question, since Roman Catholicism had a
longstanding tradition of protecting the true understanding of Scripture by
infallible church dogma. Today, however, it had become more and more clear
according to Berkouwer that this protection was unable to deal with the newly
emerged questions in an adequate way. Clearly, church dogma was formulated in
times in which the new problems caused by science lay beyond the horizon of the
church.53 So how does the Catholic Church come to terms with these problems? In
this connection, Berkouwer now points in a more positive way to Humani Generis:
though the dualistic tendency of this encyclical hampered its reception, by taking
evolutionary theory seriously “it wanted to make room for honest and
unprejudiced consideration of the new questions, acknowledging that these
cannot be answered a priorily from the perspective of church doctrine”. 54
Still, Berkouwer perceives a “remarkable difference” between Roman Catholic
theology and Reformation thought here, in that the latter from its very beginning
had allowed more space to a critical testing of human interpretations of Scripture
as they emerged in the faith tradition of the church. 55 In particular, the
Reformation did not recognize an infallible magisterium or an infallible dogma,
and Berkouwer thinks that this almost automatically led to a stronger
concentration on the soteriological scope of Scripture, which in turn largely
prevented the Reformation from taking Scripture as a source of science. Whereas
in Roman Catholicism retracting from earlier ecclesial statements often continued
to be a problem, Protestantism’s concentration on the clarity of Scripture’s
message helped it not to demand too much of Scripture nor to take its clarity at
face value.56 One can wonder, however, whether Berkouwer is not jumping to
conclusions here. As a matter of fact, whereas the Roman Catholic Church
50 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 286-290.
51 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 288.
52 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 302. In fact, as Berkouwer makes clear, this
transition itself cannot be explained without taking into account the result of
scientific discoveries, e.g. concerning the Unwelt of Old Testament Israel (301).
53 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 326.
54 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 327. Indeed, the acceptance of (large parts of)
evolutionary theory in Humani Generis was quite remarkable in light of earlier
rejections of evolution.
55 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 327; presumably, Berkouwer has in mind here
that e.g. patristic interpretations of the Bible were not taken for granted (or
harmonized with each other) in the Reformed tradition.
56 Berkouwer, Heilige Schrift 2, 327-328.
14
radically qualified its former rejection of evolutionary theory already in 1950,
many Protestant churches continue to have difficulties in coming to terms with
evolutionary theory up until today. 57 As is clear from a typically Protestant
phenomenon as young earth creationism, one important reason for these
difficulties is the attachment of many Protestants to a literalistic reading of the
first chapters of Genesis. As a result, whereas Galileo has been a Roman Catholic
trauma for many centuries, half a century after Berkouwer’s Holy Scripture
Darwin is still to a large extent a Protestant trauma.
5. Conclusion
It belongs to the standard perception of Berkouwer that he dodged the most
pressing issues raised by modern science in relation to Scripture and theology,
either because he was an irenic man or because he did not know how to deal
with them. Both conclusions are sometimes drawn, for example from the fact that
he dropped his original plan to include a volume on the doctrine of creation in his
Studies in Dogmatics. It also belongs to the standard perception of Berkouwer
that as a neo-Calvinist he went to great lengths to understand, appreciate and do
full justice to recent theological developments within Roman Catholicism. The
above analysis, however, gives us reason to slightly nuance and qualify both
aspects of this standard view of Berkouwer’s theological attitude.
First, it is true that Berkouwer never discussed the questions raised by modern
science with regard to biblical interpretation in a straightforward way. Indeed, he
saw reason to exercise caution when discussing the first chapters of Genesis. If
we carefully reconstruct his approach, however, especially as it was elaborated in
his thorough-going discussion in Holy Scripture, it turns out that he made some
crucial steps which clearly delineate the range of options available to Reformed
Christians who want to take science seriously. Berkouwer advocated a reading of
Genesis 1-3 that does full justice to its embeddedness in ancient near eastern
culture. He therefore rejected “a simplistic exegesis that glories in the literal
understanding of everything”58 and forcefully argued against a naïve approach of
the Bible that ignored the specific literary form and genre of its texts (thus
implicitly discarding young earth creationism). He also opposed all attempts to
read back the results of modern science into the text of Genesis, singling out for
criticism in this connection the so-called day-age view and other ‘concordist’
solutions. On the other hand, Berkouwer also repudiated the ‘everyman’
interpretation of Genesis 2-3, according to which the narrative highlights some
existential characteristics of the human condition. In his view, the structural and
temporal distinction between creation and fall is key to the message conveyed by
the text. The good creation of Genesis 1 and 2 is contrasted with the story of
human sin and guilt in Genesis 3, and unlike extra-biblical cosmogonies the
reality of human guilt is not evaporated. By reading the narratives in this way,
Berkouwer is able to tacitly endorse the results of modern (evolutionary) science
57 See e.g. Norman C. Nevin (ed.), Should Christians Embrace Evolution?
(Nottingham: IVP, 2009); Matthew Barrett & Ardel D. Caneday (eds.), Four Views
on the Historical Adam (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), to mention only a few
recent titles.
58 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 290.
15
while at the same time upholding the most essential Reformed theological
intuitions that are at stake: the sovereignty and goodness of God as creator and
the seriousness of human sin. In this way, the first chapters of the Bible set the
stage for the ensuing history of salvation.
Second, it is true that Berkouwer gives quite some attention to parallel
developments in Roman Catholic theology, appreciating what he sees as
‘convergences’ (but in fact describing these as Roman Catholic rapprochements
of classical Protestant points of view). His rendering of Roman Catholic
theological developments and discussions is particularly well-informed and
instructive. In his assessment of these developments and discussions, however,
we found that Berkouwer at least on one occasion is unduly critical, while being
far too optimistic about the possibilities of his own Protestant tradition to
adequately cope with the challenges of modern science. Therefore, in this respect
as well the picture we have of Berkouwer’s theological profile might become a bit
more nuanced.
16
