The European Public Sphere and the Deficit of Democracy

The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy Reiner Grundmann Abstract This chapter explores a threefold European deficit: a democratic deficit, a deficit in European identity, and a deficit in the European public sphere. It argues that although interests such as social movements have most leverage at the national level, since this is the level at which the media are largely organised, the emergence of distinctively 'European' issues such as BSE means that national cycles of media attention are becoming increas- ingly synchronised. This makes it more likely that a homogenisation of issues and opinion will occur at the European level. This would favour the eventual emergence of a supranational identity. The creation of a European public sphere through the synchronisation and homogenisation of cycles of media attention on contentious 'European' issues is a more realistic prospect than direct attempts to create a 'new European' identity through public education or the legal system. Introduction As several authors have remarked, the Europeati Union suffers frotn a lack of democracy. It has also been tioted that an important requirement for a European democracy would be the emergence of a European public. Today both requirements are absent. In this chapter I analyse the conditions under which a European public sphere could emerge. The chapter starts from the premise that a supra-national European government will not be a real option in the near future. As in the past, European integration will mean a cumbersome process entailing progress and backlash. Moves towards a supranationalist state are likely, but will be thwarted by tendencies opposing a further and substantial dissolution of national sovereignty. Main reasons for the problems of the supra- nationalist project are the strength of national identities and the weakness of a European identity, the deficit of democracy within e The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowiey Road. Oxford OX4 IJF. UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA. Reiner Grwidmann the EU and the corresponding lack of legitimation for European institutions. Under these conditions it is easy for enemies of further integration ('Eurosceptics') to mobilise public concern about a bureaucratic superstate located in Brussels. European integration theory has been largely dominated by inter- governmental and international relations approaches. The fascinat- ing question for some scholars in this speciality was and still is whether European integration can be best described as a supra- national (federal) state or as a result of intergovernmental bargain- ing. Others see the European Union as an institution sui generis which combines intergovernmentalism with supranationalism. Recent developments have recast this debate. The Maastricht refer- enda in France and Denmark, the discussion about a European Central Bank, and, closely connected to it, the introduction of a single European currency (the Euro) have raised crucial questions like: will European integration go any further? How is the deficit of democracy to be overcome? How can Europe gain in legitimacy? How is European citizenship to be defined? How is Europe to be defined? And, what does it mean to be a European? As the 'old-fashioned problems of democracy and identity' (Picht, 1993) are returning, even taking centre stage, the concerns of international relations appear to be less salient. It seems appropriate to shift the focus of attention to frameworks developed in sociology and comparative public policy The history of European integration and the institutional arrangements which have been created so far explain why we have a problem of democratic legitimation. And the dynamics of integration which involve more and more nations giv- ing up more and more parts of their sovereignty to Europe pose the question of what sort of polity should rep]ace the nation states. In this chapter I shall review the European integration literature with reference to democratic legitimation, questions of identity and the public sphere. There is a deficit in al! of the mentioned fields and I shall comment on all of them. However, in terms of identifying remedies, I shall limit myself to the exploration of the public sphere. Here I offer some speculations about the conditions under which a European public sphere could emerge. Data from a pilot study on the media discourse in three EU member states are presented. The hypothesis (or, rather, the speculation) is that pan-European issues will lead to a synchronisation of public attention across member states which is seen as a precondition for a homogenous European public sphere and hence for a European polity. The premise behind this reasoning is that the main task of European unification is the 126 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy creation of a legitimate leadership. A basic wisdom of political theory says that only those governments that can be thrown out of power by the electorate are legitimate. A homogenous public sphere is one of the main preconditions for this to happen.' The mass media have a crucial place in the process of political agenda setting (Iyengar, 1987). Political issues are mainly defined through mass media and public opinion is to a large degree influenced by the mass media. They are the mediating Hnlc between the citizens and the politicians in power. However, there are no European-wide mass media which inform all the European public simultaneously about the same issues as there are on the national level. The history of European integration is marked by an increase in the competence of European institutions but this is not paralleled by an equal increase in legitimation granted to them by the voters: there are no parties with a European wide range, there are no {or only a few) European political figures, and there is no European public sphere. To be sure, there are national public spheres (as there are national political parties (Bardi, 1996)) within Europe, but they remain segmented. A single European public sphere would have the function of selecting from among the multiplicity of possible politi- cal issues for Europe. Only under this condition could citizens choose political answers to these issues and, on this basis, elect their leaders (Reif. 1997). In the final analysis it is the voters who decide whether to confirm a government in power or whether to drive it out of power. I will tackle these issues in the following way. Eirst, I outline the historical roots of the current problem of democratic deficit within the EU. next, I will pay some attention to the research on 'European identity', discussing two main concepts and their implications, demos and ethnos. I will then single out the public sphere as the analytical level on which the problem will be located. Democratic participation leading to informed choices depends cru- cially on the interest, knowledgeability, and motivation of citizens. If they are not informed about specific political issues, this may result in a general lack of interest which borders on political apathy. If they are informed about, but not particularly interested in, these issues, they might well lend their diffuse support to politicians in power—for some time. However, this unconditional support may turn abruptly into specific opposition and thereby create severe crises. These crises are of a different and more hazardous nature than those on the national level: Whereas a national political system does not usually run into © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 127 Reiner Grundmann trouble when a government policy is disliked (it will at most result in the election of a new government), the EU as a whole comes under fire and is at risk of legitimacy crisis if a particular policy is perceived to be ineffective or wasteful. (Leonard, 1998: 30). Democracy It seems to be commonplace to note that the European Union suf- fers from a lack of democracy (Grimm, 1996; Lepsius, 1991; Reif, 1992; Scharpf, 1996; Weidenfeld, 1990). Somewhat more con- tentious is the issue of identifying prerequisites of a European democracy. Some see it in a common identity of their citizens, others in the emergence of a European public (see Deflem and Pampel, 1996; deLange, 1995; Delanty, 1995; Gerhards, 1993; Habermas, 1996; Reese-Schafer, 1997; Smith, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Today both requirements are absent. The state of democratic legiti- mation could be characterised by three factors: 1. The history of European integration is marked by a technocratic approach which was mainly set into motion by an elite. 'It was born in an era when public approval mattered relatively little and when the wider geo-political agenda was utterly dominated by the Cold War' It has been described by the same author as a 'benign technocratic conspiracy designed to bring about irre- versible integration' (Leonard, 1998: 17-18). The genesis of this process is closely associated with Jean Monnet. Without exagger- ation, Monnet can be described as one of the architects of the European Community. Hence, a 'certain saintliness' has been conferred upon him by advocates of European unity (Milward, 1984). Monnet proposed a specific method of integration, and set it into practice with the 'High Authority' of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It has been remarked that the institutions of the European Community are remarkably similar to those designed in 1950 for the ECSC (Pinder, 1985-6; Featherstone, 1994). It has also been noted that we are still today paying for his false departure of technocracy and elitism. In any case, the Commission today suffers from a weak and fragile democratic legitimacy. Monnet was committed to the idea of supranationalism and the principle of a High Authority reflected this view. In addition, Monnet adopted specific principles of public policy, as devel- 128 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy oped in France where the technocratic approach had always been strong {compared to countries like Britain). The High Authority was also operated in a corporatist style, 'a process marked by engrenage, involving networks of outside producer and interest groups. Specifically, it was the practice of consulting representa- tives of industry to work out the details of policy' (Featherstone, 1994: llS)."^ 'In a sense, Monnet considered the High Authority as the repository of the European General Will, with the evil governments merely the spokesmen for the selfish political wills. The Treaty, as administered by the High Authority, is the basic European consensus for progress, peace and federation', as Haas (1958: 456, orig. emph.) put it. To be sure, the Commission is not the exact copy of the High Authority. But it follows the same logic in that it is the driving force of integration. Monnet thought it 'wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a Community of which they had no practical experi- ence' (quoted in Featherstone, 1994: 159). He proposed to insert some democratic accountability, but the assembly he envisaged was rather weak. His plan did not foresee the Council of Ministers which clearly, for his taste, would have had too much power. 'In sum, for Monnet technocrats had to build Europe first, before the politicians and the people could get their hands on it' (Featherstone, 1994: 160). 2. The history of European integration is also marked by a permis- sive consensus or diffuse support (Almond, 1950; Easton, 1965; Key, 1961; Lindberg/Scheingold, 1970). Diffuse support denotes 'a reservoir of goodwill' and a commitment to an institution that is not contingent upon short-term satisfaction with policy out- puts ('specific support') (Gibson and Caldeira, 1998: 67).' The notion captures the fact that the general public is rarely attentive to, or informed about, the arcane details of highly technical and complex issues. But if the public becomes dissatisfied with the outcome of EU policies and blames their government for these EU policies, citizens can 'throw the scoundrels out": 'If the EU is blamed for economic conditions, excessive bureaucracy or extravagant agricultural spending, all governments may sink or swim together (Norris, 1997: 275).** In the beginning of the 1990s, the permissive consensus was eroded, as illustrated by the referendum of 1992 in Denmark which rejected the ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the referendum in France in the same year which accepted it only by a tiny majority. 3. The EU is also unpopular. It took quite some time for social © The Editorial Boardof The Sociological Review 1999 129 Reiner Grundmann scientists to realise that this is the case; they were surprised by the 'fury of Maastricht' {Gibson/Caldeira, 1998: 63). Among others, Leonard (1998) has given three interconnected reasons for the low popularity of the EU. Firstly, he notices that the EU's institu- tions are detached from people's everyday experience. Secondly, he sees that the priorities of EU policy-making are not those of most voters. Whereas they want jobs, less crime and protection for the environment, EU officials dedicate most of the time and money to EMU and Common Agricultural Policy.^ Thirdly, the benefits of the EU are spread unevenly within the member states. Most of the direct benefits go to minority groups such as farmers, declining industries and underdeveloped regions. There are also marked differences between how the benefits of the EU are per- ceived by EU officials and ordinary people, with variations between different social strata. The EU is perceived as a club in which more highly educated, professional people have more inter- est than other social strata (Leonard, 1998; 26-7). According to its original conception, the Commission was not supposed to enjoy democratic legitimacy: this was not seen as essential to the task at hand. However, with the process of integration, it is increasingly apparent that the Commission's role is undermined by this lack of public legitimacy. This affects its ability to exercise leadership on behalf of European unity (Eeatherstone, 1994: 163) The prospects for transnational European democracy therefore appear dim. How could more democratic control and legitimation be brought about? One could turn to the classic model of division of powers between legislative and executive or to direct election to the European Commission from the mass electorate. Or one could envisage the European Parliament having more power, electing and dismissing members to the Commission. However, in all cases, the prerequisite for accountability and transparency seems to be a politicisation of the decision-making process which at present is suf- focated by a rationale of consensus. Simply providing more information will not do for two reasons. Eirst, uninteresting information will not remedy the lack of transparency.^ Providing more of the same leads to information overload. This may create openness without transparency. Second, "filling an alleged informa- tion deficit will not necessarily restore confidence among people who mistrust political processes, for whatever reason' (Lodge, 1994: 130 © The Ediiorial Board ot The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the defieit ofdemoeracy 361). There are some quite sophisticated proposals in this respect, for example, Weiler's European public square ('Lexcalibur') which is a marketplace of information, placing the entire decision-making process of the Community on the Internet. This is not meant to introduce virtual government but to enhance the power of all actors by giving them more information: 'The most immediate direct bene- ficiaries of Euro governance on the Internet would in fact be the media, interested pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, and the like' (Weiler, 1997: 515). Realistically, this instrument is not open to ordinary citizens since most of the information will consist of tedious technical detail. It is up to the Euro-experts to select rele- vant pieces of information and make them public through the mass media. The public is unable to identify and recognise political leaders in the Commission. What is more, the public seems less concerned with the balance of power within European institutions (between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament) than between national governments and 'Brussels'. This is an important point to keep in mind. It has potentially far-reaching implications when applied to the search for solutions to the legitimacy crisis. I shall return to this point. For several reasons, the solution to this problem cannot be the replica of the nation states' solution on a larger scale (Delanty, 1998). The institutional design of the European Union does not allow for this simple and most obvious solution. The European Parliament does not have the powers of a national parliament and will not get them in the near future.^ The EP does not control European politicians, nor the budget, nor does it have legislative functions." The members of the Commission and the Council are not directly accountable to European voters. However, they are accountable to their national electorates. This provides the impor- tant link between Brussels and the voters in different member states. As Tarrow (1995) has shown in the case of social movements, these are important political actors seeking change who mainly pressurise their national governments. There is a well-known difference between the representation of diffuse and concentrated interests (Olson, 1965; Wilson. 1980; Vogel, 1993). While the latter are well organised by lobbying organisations represented in Brussels (Coen, 1998), the former are often not. They tend to use the 'tried and true techniques of domestic pressure and social protest.' For these groups, "peripheral protest becomes the functional equivalent of European interest representation. Therefore, . . . the national state © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review ! 999 131 Reiner Grundmann becomes a mediator between domestic constituents and European policy makers' (Tarrow, 1995: 243). It can be added that even in cases where there is interest representation at the European level (as is the case with environmentalist groups), direct protest still has an important place in political mobilisation. Since national channels of influence are still important and may, paradoxically, become even more important with more efforts at supranational integration, it is interesting to look at different insti- tutional designs in different European countries in order to identify different opportunities for democratic control. Germany and the UK are quite distinct in this respect. In Germany, EU policy is enacted behind closed doors, mainly on the cabinet level. The par- liament does not discuss these matters in a prominent way, although the second chamber (the representation of the Lander) seems to be more sensitive to the issue. In the UK, there is a special parliamen- tary commission which receives every European law-making pro- posal within 48 hours. Government has to comment on it within ten days. In many cases the responsible minister is invited in front of the parliamentary commission and instructed how to vote in Brussels (Schauer, 1992: 7: Senger/Etterlin, 1992). In Germany there is no systematic control of how parliamentary recommendations fare in Brussels. This might be read as a particular example of the permis- sive consensus which prevailed in Germany in the Kohl era. These examples all point to the importance of the national level. It seems as if in the absence of a powerful and functioning ('proper') European Parliament, democratic control has to be exercised by powerful institutions in the member states {parliaments, mass media). Different institutional designs on the national level can make a decisive difference on the European level. After the deficit of European democracy. I turn now to the sec- ond big deficit, the European deficit of identity. Identity There are two different concepts of the nation state which have been labelled 'Western' and 'Eastern' (Smith, 1997) and which corre- spond to the distinction between demos and ethnos. The Western concept stresses national territory, common institutions and a polit- ical community which binds citizens together [ius soli). The Eastern model is more focused on ethnic descent and cultural ties. Here, the element of folk culture, customs, rituals and religion are much more 132 ©The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy important (Smith, 1997: 324). Sometimes, the element of blood rela- tionship is added on to this view {ius sanguinis). If we were to go through this list, we might ask ourselves if there is a European terri- tory, or a European political community, if there exist common cus- toms, a common language or a common religion. Obviously, the elements of the 'Eastern' notion of nationhood are clearly lacking in the European Union.'' But what about the Western notion? WTiat about a common territory and a common political community? "Europe is not a continent—as in the ancient geographers' dream— but a sub-continent: a peninsula of the Eurasian land-mass', as Pocock (1997: 306) aptly observed. This raises thorny questions about demarcation and definition of political communities. Who is to be considered a European? Where should the limits of the Eastern extension of the EU lie? According to Anthony Smith, "national identifications possess distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They are vivid, accessible, well estab- lished, long popularised, and still widely believed . . . In each of these respects, "Europe" is deficient both as idea and as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past—a "prehistory" which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth' (Smith, 1997: 325). Smith expects strong ethnic sentiments to persist in many parts of the sub-continent, along with periodic revival of national identities, 'fuelled by the quest for ethnic traditions and cultural heritages of distinctive myths, memories and symbols' (Smith, 1997:327). One of the main reasons for the re-emergence of nationalist movements in post-industrial societies is the growing importance of means of communication and information. The mass media, telecommunications and computerised information lead, paradoxi- cally, to the emergence of smaller and denser networks made up of homogenous ethno-linguistic groups (Anderson. 1983). If applied to the European Union this would mean that because of its many lin- guistic and cultural differences a homogenous identity will not come forth {I will come back to the question if and how the concept of an 'imagined community" can be applied to Europe). Demarcations are vital to identity formation.'" But this is clearly a very contested and dangerous undertaking." Applied to Europe as a whole, the creation of'the other', of out-groups or outsiders, ie the negative definition of Europeanness (not Jewish, not Black, not Orthodox, not Muslim—but what about Greece and Turkey?) may well replace the more cumbersome process of building a positive European identity.'^ And there are some worrying examples from © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 133 Reiner Grundmann the recent past which point in this direction. Immigrants and guest- workers have been the target of intolerant and/or racist attacks. But where could Europe turn in order to create popular European myths and symbols? Common standards in education could be employed to this end, but only to a certain degree. They would dif- fer markedly as soon as one enters historiography. It is indeed hard to imagine a common European identity looking back at 'itself, writing its own, common history (Pocock, 1997). Again, it becomes plain that the variety of national identities remains a strong barrier towards further integration. As long as educational systems remain different in Europe and resist standardisation—which is not only highly probable in the foreseeable future, but also a declared inten- tion of the Maastricht Treaty—Europeans will differ in basic forms of thinking and behaviour. This variety certainly constitutes a major difficulty for European cooperation, where the intercultural problems of communication are often underestimated . . . " writes Picht convincingly (1993: 87). Picht proposes another solution, in which he envisages the emergence of a New European which 'has to be as sophisticated as the merchants and courtiers of the Renaissance or the multinational and multilingual inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe before Hitler and Stalin . . . He has to know foreign languages beyond the superficial and unreliable koine . . . ' (Picht, 1993: 87). This seems rather an exaggerated aspiration, overburdening the European citizen, possibly leading to an ever more pronounced elitism across Europe. The humanistic ideal of intercultural training is certainly valuable, especially with the aim of not rejecting one's own identity but confronting other identities in a fruitful fashion—as is Picht's intention. But this is an evaluative question which depends also on the degree of optimism one has. One could, with Anthony Smith, ask the rhetorical question: 'Has the long-standing German love affair with Italy made any difference to the intensity of German nationalism, in this or the last century? Or shall we rather agree with Karl Kautsky that the railways are the greatest breeder of national hatreds?' (Smith, 1997: 335). Leaving the ethnos strand of thought and entering the realm of demos gives us perhaps more possibilities in thinking about a European identity. These possibilities may be better in tune with the values of our time. First of all. it is obvious that the European 'pro- ject' is attractive for the young and mobile. The very notion of the 'project' makes this clear: it is a journey to an unknown destination and unknown ways of getting there (Weiler. 1993). Such an outlook resonates very much with prevalent ideas about a post-modern 134 ©The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy society. In fact, as Pocock has said, 'Europe'; could become 'the ideo- logy of a post-historical culture, in which varyingly affluent and vary- ingly alienated masses... float from one environment to another with no awareness of moving from one past, and one commitment to it, to another . . . The affluent populations wander as tourists—which is to say consumers of images—from one former historical culture to another, delightfully free trom the need to commit themselves to any, and free to criticise while determining for themselves the extent of their responsibility" (Pocock, 1997: 303-4, 312). The second reason is that people may have multiple identities. They can move between them according to different needs and con- texts. Sometimes these identities may be confiictual, but they may also be compatible with each other. Smith uses the term 'concentric identities' to describe the Catalan who is also a Spaniard and a European, or the Scot who is also British and European. Joseph Weiler criticised this notion on the grounds that it conceives of a European citizenship in the same way as we understand our national citizenship. He offers another version of multiple demoi, but one with several qualifications. Eirst, individuals are—as in Smith's version—invited to see themselves as belonging to two demoi. Second, the member state nationality and European citizen- ship are seen as interdependent: 'One cannot, conceptually and psy- chologically (let alone legally), be a European citizen without being a member state national.' And third, Weiler sees a civilisatory dimension in this: Tt is the acceptance by its members that, in a range of areas of public life, one will accept the legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by fellow European citizens in the realisation that in these areas preference is given to choices made by the outreaching, non-organic, demos, rather than by the inreaching one' {Weiler, 1997: 510). That this position advocates a more ambiguous notion of 'concentric identities' than Smith's is evident. However, one can have similar qualms about this proposal as about Picht's. Weiler's proposal, it appears to me, expects too much of citi- zens and thus runs the danger of overburdening them. However, Weiler is aware of this danger when he stresses the continuing signif- icance of the national level: 'Nationals of the member states are European citizens, not the other way round. Europe is "not yet" a demos in the organic national-cultural sense and should never become one' {Weiler, 1997: 511). In the next section, I finally address the last of the three areas of deficit: the public sphere. ©The Ediiorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 135 Reiner Grundmann The public sphere As has been emphasised by many authors, there is a remoteness, opaqueness and inaccessibility on European governance. 'The drama lies in the fact that no one accountable public authority has a handle on these regulatory processes—not the European Parliament, not the Commission, not even the governments, The press and other media, a vital estate in our democracies, are equally hampered' (Weiler, 1997: 512). In line with this view, the argument will be advanced that a homogenous European public sphere would be the precondition for a European polity, since it is the public which has the agenda setting function in a democracy and it is the voters that can throw a government out of office. It is therefore the public which selects politically relevant problems. There exist differ- ent national public spheres, but no common European political agenda and hence no requirement for politicians to perform accord- ing to the expectation of a 'European' constituency. My argument is based on the distinction between two avenues for the strengthening of the public sphere in Europe: on the one hand, the Europeanisation of national public spheres, and on the other hand the emergence of a transnational European public. The first amounts to a synchronisation, the second to a homogenisation of the national public spheres. The second is more ambitious and would probably follow a period after which national public spheres have become synchronised with regard to key political issues. This distinction would provide a tool which can be made operational for investigating empirical examples of transnational communication processes. Despite the increasing technical possibilities, there is no common European media system and it is doubtful if it can ever be estab- lished. The obstacles presented by heterogeneity of culture and lan- guage are too big (de Swaan, 1991; GroBe-Peclum, 1990). However, even the more modest synchronisation and homogenisation o( national public spheres is thwarted in many ways. One reason is to be found in the fact that news correspondents in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg have a primary interest in reporting for their home market. They thus select topics which relate mainly to the domestic policy questions in their home countries. These journalists are aligned nationally and not according to transna- tional political options (eg, left/right; pro-EU/contra-EU, market liberalisation/protectionism, ecology/economy). As a consequence, 136 ©The Editorial Board ofThe Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy a special type of information is selected from within the European power centre which then structures topics and evaluations within the public spheres of the member states. This information is regarded as relevant on the domestic policy agenda (Gerhards, 1993). It is questionable whether the reporting of politics can engen- der a specifically European identity (Bakir. 1996: 191). As the exam- ple of international news agencies shows, they place greater emphasis on their own domestic market even when selling these stories to foreign clients (Boyd-Barrett, 1981). Here we have yet another example ofthe importance ofthe domestic policy arena. On the level of the member states a similar process can be observed. Every member state pursues a national line even and especially where European policy is an issue in the national public debate. This factor together with the specific working of the corre- spondence system in Brussels (see last paragraph) seems to operate in a self-rein forcing manner. Both strengthen national discourses about Europe. What is more, every member state looks at Brussels ('at the EU') but no one sees her neighbouring country. There is no 'crossing of social circles' (Simmel). Apart from the elites, the broad public in the member states knows little or nothing about the public debates in the other member countries. Political issues which are sensitive to voting behaviour and which enter the agenda of all member states simultaneously could provide an opportunity to cross cut social circles. Only issues which are related to voting behaviour on the national level will make any impact on politicians acting in Brussels. National political party mobilisation is still para- mount. As Paul Taylor in his book on the EU, presenting evidence from poll data, has observed: 'The basis of political power in the European Union remained the national parties and the national constituency: there was no European-level constituency' (Taylor. 1996: 148). And Taggart wrote in the summary of his recent article on Euroscepticism: 'When parties compete on a European level, it is clear that domestic considerations take precedence over European ones'(Taggart, 1998:384). The introduction of the single currency and the BSE crisis are topics which have a transnational, European dimension and are still at the centre of debate within the member states. I suggest that such pan-European issues will lead to a synchronisation of national pub- lic spheres and thereby strengthen the transnational public sphere. It is in this sense that the coming of a European imagined commu- nity could be perceived.'^ e The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 137 Reiner Grundmann Empirical illustrations In what follows, I shall present some results of a small research pro- ject on transnational European media communication, as exempli- fied in the BSE crisis and the introductory steps towards a common European currency. I am interested in the question of how national publics perceive salient political issues in other member states. These issues are partly national in character in that they have a more immediate impact in one country compared to another. But they are also European in that they are subject to decision-making on the European level. Both dimensions make them an appropriate topic for news reporting and hence for an analysis of transnational communication patterns. However, a caveat seems in order. This exercise is purely illustrative, supposed to support my speculation about the development of the European public sphere. It should not be seen as an empirical test of hypotheses. Method I conducted a database research in the CD-Rom version of the Financial Times., Le Monde, and Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) for the years 1995-1998. The first search was for 'BSE' in the headlines of articles. In the case of the Financial Times, the terms 'BSE', 'CJD' and 'mad cow' were used, in the case of the FAZ 'BSE'. 'Creutzfeld' and 'Rinderwahnsinn'. In the case of Le Monde, the equivalent 'ESB" had to be replaced since there it is used as an acronym for a business organisation. The search was performed by using the terms 'vache folle' and 'Creutzfeld'. The second search was for 'Euro' in the headlines of articles in all three papers, exclud- ing hits for the 1996 Euro football tournament, other Euro-sport events and 'Euro-Disney'. Results (see Fig. I and 2) a) BSE During 1995. the topic BSE attracted scarcely any attention except for about eight articles per month at the end of 1995 in the Financial Times. An explosion of interest occurred in March 1996 in all three countries. Significant is the much higher level of attention in France where Le Monde had about sixty articles, compared to eleven and 138 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy nineteen in Germany and the UK respectively. In April 1996, atten- tion increased even further in France {reaching the level of one hun- dred articles, a record in the period under investigation) while Germany and the UK remained below twenty. In May, attention receded somewhat, in France to fifty, in the UK to eighteen, in Germany below five. June saw another peak in Germany (20) and France (98) while the UK reached the peak in September with 24 articles. By that time, Le Monde had dropped to the same number (24) while Germany had levelled off to six. Since then, attention has constantly decreased until the end of 1997. Britain shows a peak in the spring of 1998 stirred by the launch of the BSE Inquiry. b) Euro Despite the many peaks and valleys, there is a clear increase in attention which culminates in the summer of 1997, followed by another peak in spring 1998. Outstanding interest was shown in Germany in June 1997 {75 articles) and in France in April 1998 (107 articles) and in the UK in November and December 1998 {102 and 100 articles). What the data also shows is an increase in average attention, ranging from 4 articles per month (in all countries) in 1995, to 13 in 1996, to 30 in 1997, and to 48 in 1998. Discussion Both examples show an interesting pattern. There is a parallel rise in the level of attention across the three countries examined which we may describe generally as synchronisation. This synchronisation can take three forms, tight coupling, loose coupling, and hysteria. Tight coupling describes a common path of development, loose coupling denotes a delay or anticipation of the trend in the other two countries. Hysteria indicates a conspicuous overreaction of one country compared to the other two. a) Tight coupling. The line graph in Figure 1 {BSE from 1995 to 1998) shows a peak in attention which occurs in all three coun- tries in the period from March to September 1996. Figure 2 (Euro 1995-1998) clearly shows a constant rise from January 1995 to December 1998 although there is an overall lower interest in the UK in 1997 (which could be explained by the fact that the UK will not join the Euro in the first round and therefore sees less urgency in the topic). There are two periods of peak attention in June 1997 and April-May 1998. Both peaks are coinciding in all ©The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 139 Reiner Grundmann SSEinTIM,ins-1M LaMoidi—*—FU Figure 1 Eiireln-mi«,1M5-1)M •-•n UMBBt—*—FK Figure 2 140 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy three countries in a very clear manner as are the downward trends in August 1997 and July 1998. Other points of upward convergence occur in April and June 1997 and in April and December 1998. b) Loose coupling. The UK anticipates the other countries' public attention to the BSE crisis by three months (December 1995) which seems hardly surprising given the central role of this coun- try. This is also seen in the somewhat more pronounced reaction ofthe FT when compared to the FAZ. There are also instances where attention goes up in one country while going down in the other two, as seen in September 1996, August 1997, and March 1998 ( f r vs. FAZ and Le Monde on BSE). c) Hysteria. An interesting phenomenon occurs in periods of syn- chronisation where one of the three countries gives an unusual high priority to the relevant issue compared to the other two. For example, in Spring 1996 in France, there was an exceptional high attention to the BSE issue which was more than fivefold of that of the UK. What are the implications of these findings? First, the expectation of a synchronisation of public attention in the three countries was confirmed. However, there is an interesting cross-national attention cycle. France was especially interested in the BSE crisis in the UK, maybe because of her high dependence on British beef. And Britain became highly interested in the discussion about the Euro during the period of election ofthe first president of the European Central Bank in May 1998 where the two candidates (Duiseuberg and Trichet) stood for two distinct monetary pohcies (strong Euro vs. public spending). Since his term will last until a possible joining of the UK, the increased British interest in this debate seems natural. It even outplays the German attention in 1998. Second, it is not clear if there was a homogenisation in the attention cycle. This would only be verifiable by a content analysis of the articles. The analysis of this process lies beyond the scope of this article, it is the object of further research.'"* Conclusion In this article I have examined a threefold European deficit, a democ- ratic deficit, a deficit in European identity and a deficit in a European public sphere. All three are interlinked but they can be separated for analytical reasons. While I think that a common European identity is ©The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 141 Reiner Grundmann the least likely to emerge in the medium term, given all we know about cultural inertia, there is some potential with proposals regard- ing democratic reform. My own contribution has examined the prospects of a European public sphere. The starting point was that the national level is still the place where diffuse interests have most leverage, mainly because the media are still geared very much to national political attention. The next step in the argument was that the synchronisation of national cycles of attention is a precondition for their homogenisation. Seen from the perspective of the potential development of the European public sphere, the issues of democracy and identity can be reframed. Whereas a synchronised European public will facilitate legitimate decisions on a European level, a homogenised European public would favour the emergence of a supranational identity. This approach does not invoke problematic strategies of overburdening citizens as is likely if one attempts the cre- ation of a New European or tries to oblige them to obey suprana- tional law. The problem with the former is that it relies on romantic ideals of human development, the problem with the latter that it pre- supposes a universally informed citizenry which acts in an enlight- ened way Both assumptions are unrealistic. We must not forget that the main facet of democracy is that it gives the electorate the power to drive the existing government out of power. This will always hap- pen with respect to selected and salient issues which command the attention of large proportions of the population, no matter how well educated or how well informed they are on every detail of the politi- cal process. Therefore, it seems that the process of further integration and simultaneous attempts to reduce the above mentioned deficits can best be achieved by the transformation of the public sphere. However, this is a process which can be infiuenced only marginally from above (from 'Brussels').'^ Institutional constraints and oppor- tunities on the national level should not be underestimated. To be sure, political reforms within the EU, from above, may well make a difference. The extension of powers of the Presidency of the Commission is such a possibility.'^ However, it seems likely that such a move, too, will become one of the contested political goals which rises to prominence in the public spheres—thus fuelling the debate and controversy over the future of Europe. But in this process of open debate, more and more parts ofthe electorate in different mem- ber countries could come to see this debate as their common debate. In this sense they could imagine a European c/Community. 142 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999  The European public sphere and the deficit ofdemoeracy Notes 1 By homogenous I mean a public sphere in which the same issues are debated at the same time with a view to the same political decision process. 2 This technocratic approach was reflected by early scholarship on European Unification represented by Haas or Schmitter (Haas, 1958; Haas and Schmitter, 1964). Only later did they come to recognise the relevance of public participation {see Reif, 1993). 3 This attitude might be connected to the experience of the two great wars of this century. One of the major initial motivations for the founding of European insti- tutions was to exclude such a development in the future. As people with direct wartime experience become fewer, this motive recedes. 4 It was perhaps for this reason that the European Parliament was not courageous enough to dismiss the Commission in its first motion of mistrust in January 1999. It did so, however, on the second occasion. 5 According to official EU surveys, 92% see fighting unemployment as a priority, 89% poverty and social exclusion. 88% maintaining peace and security, 85% pro- tecting the environment (Eurobarometer. 48, quoted in Leonard. 1998: 66 fn 6). 6 Gronbech-Jensen (1998) distinguishes between three dimensions of transparency: decision-preparation, decision-taking and decision implementation. According to him the HU is not deficient in decision-preparation. As regards decision-taking, the EU is less transparent than the legislative bodies of the member states. And as regards decision implementation, 'the Community remains closed, at least com- pared to the Scandinavian member states" (Grenbech-Jensen, 1998: 198). 7 At the time of writing, it is not clear how much power the EP will have after the resignation of the Commission. 8 Lodge distinguishes between inter-institutional relations and the position of the Council. Her argument is that the Council accepted too much mainly unjustified criticism. The Commission became the usual scapegoat for government's wanton disregard of the fact that together, acting as the Council, they acted as the EC's legislature but not in a manner of the presumed openness characteristic of liberal democratic parliamentary regimes but of a closed, secretive, unaccountable sys- tem' (Lodge. 1994: 346), In Lodge's view, it is thus the Council, not the Commission, which is to blame. While this argument makes some valid points about tbe structure of the problem and the political motivations for blaming the Commission, it underestimates the Commission's role as a driving force in further unification. 9 It is noteworthy that Germany adheres to an Eastern conception of citizenship. However, at the time of writing, new legislation is being proposed. 10 'Each human being shares often highly contradictory identities and social roles as a member of his family, or rather his families, or his locality, of his professional, social political and religious adherences, of his region, of his nation and possibly by virtue of transnational links . . . They are bound together by the physical con- tinuity of life, by individual biographies . . . ' (Picht. 1993: 84). 11 'If the last 50 years of European history have taught us anything, it is the danger of searching for an identity against the "other", either within or outside European territory' (Leonard. 1998: 37). 12 'Christianity cannot occupy an exclusive place at the heart of a European identity both because large numbers of Europeans are not Christian, and because more ©The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 143 Reiner Grundmann than half of all Europeans think that formal religion no longer plays an impor- tant role in society" (Leonard, 1998: 38). 13 There are some signs that previous judgements which saw no mass media poten- tial in EU topics, apart from snide comments (Gerhards, 1993), are obsolete. On the contrary, one would expect that the issue will be high on the political agenda in the years to come. 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