New Introduction to Atman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism

New Introduction The most serious objection to Kamaleswar Bhattacharya’s thesis that the Buddha did not deny the universal åtman may be put in the form of this question: Why, then, did Buddhists down through the ages think he did? Reply: Actually, they did not think this, as far as we can tell from their writings that refute the åtman and teach the anåtman or no-self doctrine. The idea of the åtman as the impersonal universal åtman did not become dominant in India until some time after the eighth century C.E. Before then, throughout the Buddhist period, the dominant idea of the åtman in India was that of a perma- nent personal åtman. Judging from their writings, the Indian Buddhist teachers from Någårjuna to Åryadeva to Asa∫ga to Vasubandhu to Bhavya to Candrakîrti to Dharmakîrti to ˛åntarakßita thought that the Buddha’s anåtman teaching was directed against a permanent personal åtman. The Question of Which Self Due to an unforeseen twist of history, we find ourselves today thinking that Buddhism with its anåtman doctrine denied an åtman that it apparently did not deny. When we think of the åtman, we usually think of a universal self that is impersonal and all-pervasive, the one self of all. This is the idea of the åtman that has become dominant in India during the last thousand years, under the influence of the Advaita Vedånta school of Hinduism. The åtman is there identified with brahman, the absolute reality, and is described as non- dual (advaita). So it is beyond subject-object duality, and hence beyond the reach of thought or speech, and it is beyond the ix x The Åtman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism pairs of opposites such as existence and non-existence, or eternal and non-eternal. Naturally, then, this is the åtman we think of when we hear of the Buddhist teaching of anåtman, no-self. However, this is not the idea of the åtman that prevailed in India throughout the Buddhist period; that is, up till about a thousand years ago. The åtman idea that was dominant in India during the Buddhist period was that of a permanent personal self. There was supposed to be something in an individual that explained the continuity of the sense of personal identity from youth to old age, and even from waking to sleeping to waking, and that persisted from life to life. This was the personal åtman. This personal åtman was usually held to be a kart®, a “doer” or “agent,” and/or a bhokt®, an “enjoyer” or “experiencer.” That is, according to different schools, it had at least some ability to act, and/or had some ability to experience the results of action. At the same time, it was regarded as being permanent. It is this permanent personal self that the Indian Buddhist teachers argued against in their refutations of the åtman. Their arguments were not directed against an impersonal universal åtman. The Buddha had taught anåtman, no-self, and this became one of the three defining characteristics of the Buddhist teachings, along with suffering, and impermanence. The Indian Buddhist teachers wrote that our clinging to the idea of a personal self is what binds us to the cycle of life and death, what causes us suffering. The idea of a permanent personal self is what they understood the anåtman teaching to refer to, as far as we can judge from their critiques of the åtman idea. When Vasubandhu wrote that you cannot achieve enlightenment if you believe in a self, it is not the impersonal universal åtman that he was talking about. He was critiquing the idea of an individual personal self, an idea that was held by numerous other Buddhists of the time, as well as by Hindus of the time. The one self of all that we now think of when we think of the åtman is an idea that had not yet come to dominate the Indian scene. New Introduction xi Indian Buddhist Teachers against Some Self The most influential Buddhist refutation of the åtman is probably that written in about the fourth century C.E. by Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu systematized the early Buddhist teachings in his Abhidharma-ko≈a in eight chapters, to which he added a supplementary ninth chapter on the “person” (pudgala). This refutation of the åtman devotes most of its space to refuting the person posited by the Buddhist Pudgalavådins (Våtsîputrîyas or Såµmatîyas). This person or self was held to be indeterminate (avaktavya), in that it is neither the five aggregates (skandha) nor is it other than them. Later in this chapter some space is given to refuting the non-Buddhist (tîrthika) ideas of the åtman, identified by the sub-commentator Ya≈omitra as those of Såµkhya, Vaiyåkaraña (the grammarians), and Vai≈eßika. One of these is the idea of a permanent kart®, “doer” or “agent,” and bhokt®, “enjoyer” or “experiencer” (p. 476, P. Pradhan Sanskrit edition). There is no mention of the Advaita Vedånta idea of an impersonal universal åtman. Preceding Vasubandhu by perhaps a couple of centuries, we have the brief examination of the åtman (and dharma-s) by Någårjuna in chapter 18 of his Müla-madhyamaka-kårikå, consisting of twelve verses. In this book, Någårjuna was primarily addressing the earlier schools of Buddhism in his attempt to establish the teachings of what later became known as Mahåyåna Buddhism. As may be seen by his use of the terms åtmîya, “pertaining or belonging to me,” mama, “of me, mine,” and ahaµkåra, “sense of I,” in verses 2-4 of this chapter, Någårjuna is here examining the idea of a personal self. This is confirmed by the four major Indian commentaries on Någårjuna’s text: the Akutobhayå incorrectly attributed to Någårjuna, and those by Buddhapålita, Bhavya or Bhå[va]viveka, and Candrakîrti. Although they bring in non-Buddhist ideas of the åtman, e.g., a kart®, doer and a bhokt®, enjoyer, these commentaries make no mention of the Advaita Vedånta idea of the one universal åtman. xii The Åtman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism Någårjuna’s disciple Åryadeva gave us a refutation of the åtman that is specifically directed at non-Buddhist (tîrthika) ideas of the åtman. This is chapter 10 of his Catu˙≈ataka, consisting of twenty-five verses, and there is a commentary by Candrakîrti on this book. Åryadeva critiques the Hindu Vai≈eßika, Såµkhya, and Nyåya ideas of the self, all ideas of a permanent personal self. Again, there is no mention of the Advaita Vedånta idea of an impersonal universal åtman. Contemporary with Vasubandhu we have a refutation of the åtman in the Yogåcåra-bhümi, written by Asa∫ga (so Tibetan tradition) or by Maitreya (so Chinese tradition). It is the segment on åtma-våda, the doctrine of the self, which is the fourth of sixteen segments on the doctrines of others, para-våda, found in the third section (including bhümi-s 3-5) of the Yogåcåra-bhümi (pp. 129-137, V. Bhattacharya Sanskrit edition). It begins by defining its subject as åtman (self) or sattva (living being) or jîva (individual soul) or poßa (man) or pudgala (person). Obviously, it is speaking of the doctrine of a personal self, not a universal self. The most important Buddhist refutation of the åtman for historical purposes is that by Bhavya in his Madhyamaka- h®daya, because it is the earliest text so far known that describes and critiques the Vedånta system by name. This text examines and critiques the various philosophical systems prevalent in India at that time, circa mid-sixth century C.E., so the Vedånta that he critiques preceded the Advaita Vedånta of ˛a∫karåcårya. Unexpectedly, much of Bhavya’s refutation of the åtman in the Vedånta chapter, chapter 8 consisting of 104 verses, is of an åtman that is a kart®, doer and a bhokt®, enjoyer. These are what Bhavya’s primary refutation of the åtman was directed against that he had already made earlier in this book, where he refuted the Såµkhya and Vai≈eßika ideas of the åtman (chapter 3 on reality, verses 94-98, and chapters 6 and 7 on the Såµkhya and Vai≈eßika philosophical systems). Apparently the åtman of the Vedånta known to Bhavya, although universal (i.e., eka, “one”), was yet a kart®, doer as in Vai≈eßika, and a bhokt®, enjoyer as in Såµkhya and Vai≈eßika. New Introduction xiii Bhavya’s refutation of the åtman idea of the Vedånta known to him hinges on the contradiction between it being posited as unitary (eka), illustrated by the simile of the space within a pot, and yet being a kart®, doer and a bhokt®, enjoyer. He wrote that without the false ideas of the åtman as a kart® and a bhokt®, the remaining Vedånta ideas of the åtman (some of which were appropriated from the Buddhists, such as that reality can only be beyond thought and speech, verses 85-86) are no different than the correct Buddhist ideas of svabhåva, an “inherent nature.” Thus, both the åtman and svabhåva are unborn (ajåta), one (eka), all-pervasive (sarvaga), permanent (nitya), imperishable (acyuta), supreme (para), and beyond thought and speech (verses 89-94, Chr. Lindtner Sanskrit edition). He then addresses the Vedåntins (verse 95), saying that if you, sirs, also intended such an åtman, there is no fault (nirdoßa) and it is logically appropriate (upapattika). So (verses 97-98) abandon your false ideas of an åtman, a kart® and a bhokt®, and come over to the Buddhist teachings. Where Någårjuna critiques the idea that the åtman is either the aggregates (skandha) or is other than the aggre- gates (Müla-madhyamaka-kårikå 18.1), some in our time have thought that by the latter alternative Någårjuna denied the Advaita Vedånta idea of the åtman, an impersonal universal åtman. None of the four major Indian commentaries thereon explain it in such a way. Bhavya explains an åtman other than the aggregates as the Vai≈eßika idea of the åtman as a perma- nent kart®, doer, and the Såµkhya idea of the åtman as a bhokt®, enjoyer. He did not mention the Vedånta idea of the åtman, which at that time apparently included these two ideas. Only later would we see the emergence of Advaita Vedånta in which these two ideas were rejected and only the ones accepted by Bhavya remained. Another Madhyamaka commentator, Candrakîrti, gave us a refutation of the åtman in his Madhyamakåvatåra, chapter 6, verses 120-165, with his own commentary thereon. He begins (verse 120) by saying that all afflictions and faults arise from sat-kåya-d®ß†i, the incorrect view of taking the xiv The Åtman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism perishable assemblage, i.e., the body, etc., to be an enduring self, so the åtman should be refuted. He then (verse 121) defines the åtman of the non-Buddhists, using the Hindu Såµkhya definition: it is a permanent self that is a bhokt®, enjoyer but not a kart®, doer. He says that other non-Buddhist ideas of the åtman are only small variations of this. Thus in his commentary on this verse he brings in the Vai≈eßika defini- tion of the åtman in full, in brief a kart® and a bhokt®, and at the very end he adds one sentence on the Veda-våda, i.e., Vedånta, idea of the self: the one self is differentiated in various bodies like the space in a pot. The clear implication is that in the Vedånta known to Candrakîrti, like in that known to Bhavya before him, the åtman, although one, was regarded as a kart®, doer and a bhokt®, enjoyer. That is, although ultimately uni- versal, it is still a personal åtman, not an impersonal åtman. Dharmakîrti, famous for his treatises on reasoning, has given critiques of the åtman in various parts of these, especially in his Pramåña-vårttika and his commentary on its Svårthånumåna section. Most of these have been conveniently gathered together in a 2013 book by Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié, Self, No-Self, and Salvation: Dharmakîrti’s Critique of the Notions of Self and Person. Like the other Indian Buddhist teachers, Dharmakîrti refutes the person (pudgala) posited by the Buddhist Pudgalavådins, and the Hindu Nyåya and Vai≈eßika and Såµkhya ideas of the åtman, a permanent personal self. He does not refer to the Advaita Vedånta idea of the impersonal universal åtman. The most extensive Buddhist refutation specifically of the åtman is that by ˛åntarakßita in his Tattva-saµgraha and the commentary thereon by his disciple Kamala≈îla, who are dated in the eight century C.E. ˛åntarakßita devoted verses 171-221 to a critique of the Nyåya and Vai≈eßika idea of the åtman, verses 222-284 to the Mîmåµså idea of the åtman, verses 285-310 to the Såµkhya idea, verses 311-327 to the Digambara Jaina idea, and only verses 328-335 to the Advaita [Vedånta] idea of the åtman. The Advaita idea here described is that the åtman is j∆åna, “knowledge, cognition,” or vij∆åna, New Introduction xv “consciousness,” which is one (eka) and permanent (nitya), and the world is a transformation of consciousness (vij∆åna- pariñåma). Of course, this is not the åtman idea of the Advaita Vedånta of ˛a∫karåcårya. For ˛a∫kara and his famous doc- trine of måyå, “illusion,” the world is not a transformation of consciousness. It is a superimposition of a false appearance on the one unchanging brahman, and the åtman is brahman. ˛åntarakßita and Kamala≈îla gave us the last major refu- tation of the åtman written by Indian Buddhist teachers, and they obviously wrote before the promulgation by ˛a∫karåcårya of the Advaita Vedånta idea of the impersonal universal åtman. ˛a∫karåcårya, who is usually dated in the eighth century C.E., formulated the Advaita Vedånta teachings on the basis of selected passages of the Upanißads. These taught that the åtman is brahman, the absolute reality, non-dual (advaita), one without a second, and ˛a∫kara attempted to show that this is the purport of all the Upanißads. This åtman is necessarily universal and impersonal; it cannot be individual or personal. It follows from this that the åtman cannot be a kart®, a “doer” or “agent,” or a bhokt®, an “enjoyer” or “experiencer.” Indeed, ˛a∫karåcårya, like the Indian Buddhist teachers, made the refutation of this idea of the personal self a central theme of his writings. At the beginning of his introduction to his most definitive work, the Brahma-sütra-bhåßya, he describes the problem of the (personal) self, “a natural human behaviour based on self-identification in the form of ‘I am this’ or ‘This is mine’.” At the conclusion of his introduction, after describ- ing how “one superimposes external characteristics on the Self,” he writes (as translated by Swami Gambhirananda): Thus occurs this superimposition that has neither beginning nor end but flows on eternally, that appears as the manifested universe and its apprehension, that conjures up agentship [kart®-tva] and enjoyership [bhokt®-tva], and that is perceived by all persons. In order to eradicate this source of evil and in order to acquire the knowledge of the unity of the Self, is begun a discussion (after the study) of all the Upanißads. xvi The Åtman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism In view of all the above, we can see why Kamaleswar Bhattacharya wrote near the end of his chapter 1 (p. 34): “Before stating that Buddhism has denied the åtman, modern authors should, therefore, have been precise as to which åtman is meant.” The question, “which atman?” pertains to the first part of his thesis, enunciated on the first page of his Preface: “the Buddha does not deny the Upanißadic åtman,” i.e., the universal åtman that Advaita Vedånta takes as the purport of all the Upanißads. That the Buddha did not deny the uni- versal åtman, is, I think, demonstrable. The Indian Buddhist teachers uniformly describe the åtman that they understood the Buddha to have denied as an enduring personal åtman, rather than an impersonal universal åtman. The Resulting Question The second part of Kamaleswar Bhattacharya’s thesis, “on the contrary, he indirectly affirms it, in denying that which is falsely believed to be the åtman,” is another question. If the Buddha’s denial of a permanent personal self was intended to indirectly affirm an impersonal universal åtman, we would expect to find at least some affirmations of a universal åtman in the Buddhist scriptures. We do find these, in a small num- ber of Buddhist scriptures, especially in the tathågata-garbha sütras. The tathågata-garbha sütras teach the tathågata-garbha, a buddha nature that is found in everyone. They openly equate this with the åtman, which they distinguish from the personal åtman by describing it as the perfection of åtman (åtma- påramitå). One of these tathågata-garbha sütras is the Mahåyåna Mahåparinirvåña-sütra, purporting to give the Buddha’s final teachings before he achieved parinirvåña, i.e., died. If the tathågata-garbha teaching was in fact the Buddha’s final view on this question, then his denial of a permanent personal self in his other scriptures would indeed indirectly affirm an impersonal universal åtman. An often-quoted passage from the La∫kåvatåra-sütra distinguishes the tathågata-garbha from the åtman taught by New Introduction xvii the non-Buddhists, and says that the teaching of the tathågata- garbha was used by the Buddhas to help those who are afraid of the no-self (nairåtyma) teaching. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya quotes this passage in full (pp. 193-196). He notes that the åtman it speaks of is there described as a kart®, doer. As was made clear by the refutations of the åtman written by the Indian Buddhist teachers, this is a personal åtman. This passage, then, distinguishes the tathågata-garbha from the permanent personal åtman taught by the non-Buddhists, not from the impersonal universal åtman that the Advaita Vedånta non-Buddhists would later promulgate. As for the suggestion that the tathågata-garbha teaching is only provisional, used to help those who are afraid of the no-self teaching, both the tathågata-garbha and the no-self teachings are referred to as skillful means in this passage. Different truths can be used as skillful means. In the whole rest of the La∫kåvatåra-sütra the tathågata-garbha teaching is presented as ultimate truth. The Buddhist teaching of no-self, anåtman or nairåtyma, certainly denies a permanent personal self, thus denying that which is falsely believed to be the åtman. That this indirectly affirms some reality, whatever it may be, is also stated by Någårjuna and elaborated by his four major Indian com- mentators. Någårjuna in his Müla-madhyamaka-kårikå 18.6 writes that both åtman and anåtman, and also neither åtman nor anåtman, were taught by the buddhas. Candrakîrti in his commentary thereon explains that just as the view of åtman is not reality (tattva), so also its opposite, the view of anåtman is not reality. Both are only views, which the best trainees leave behind. Någårjuna in the next verse begins his definition of reality, saying that the true nature (dharmatå) is beyond the range of thought and speech. The same is said in the Mahåparinirvåña-sütra, but is more specific at the end, bring- ing in the tathågata-garbha (Mark Blum translation, p. 160): “Whether one speaks of self, nonself, the denial of self, or the denial of nonself, one only renounces attachments [to those views], he does not renounce this view of self. This view of self I call ‘buddha-nature’.” xviii The Åtman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism Kamaleswar Bhattacharya in this book has gathered together considerable evidence that indirectly affirms an impersonal universal åtman, primarily from the Påli Buddhist canon. He did not draw this evidence from the tathågata-garbha sütras with their perfection of åtman (except by way of one long opening quote from the Ratna-gotra-vibhåga). In the end, the question of whether the Buddha indirectly affirmed the Upanißadic åtman is a matter for each person to decide by examining the evidence and choosing which teachings make the most sense to them. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya’s book gives us a choice that most people in our time did not think existed in Buddhism. Summing Up In this book, Kamaleswar Bhattacharya has provided us with a sustained argument for a position that only a small number of Buddhist scholars today are sympathetic with: “the Buddha does not deny the Upanißadic åtman.” While it, unlike others, has been taken seriously by Buddhist scholars (those who could read the French original), it has not convinced the majority of them. For this reason I have added this new introduction laying out the refutations of the åtman by the Indian Buddhist teachers, showing that a permanent personal åtman is what they thought the Buddha denied. We see everywhere in Buddhist writings published today, even by the best Buddhist scholars, the assumption that the Buddha denied the impersonal universal åtman. They have simply not taken account of the fact that the dominance of this idea in India did not occur until after the Buddhist period. It is my hope that the publication of this book in English translation will make it much more widely accessible. Perhaps now, after the author’s death, it will receive the attention it deserves. DAVID REIGLE