This paper analyzes the role of far right in the Ukrainian politics during the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas. The issue of the involvement of Ukrainian far right organizations in the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas have been politicized and polarized. Russian and separatist politicians and the media often presented the “Euromaidan” as a “fascist coup” and the Maidan government as a “fascist junta.” In contrast, the governments and the mainstream media in Western countries tended to present the role of the far right in the “Euromaidan” and in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically in the conflict in Donbas, as marginal. Previous academic studies generally reached similar conclusions. They focused on numerical strength and electoral support for the far right parties and ignored other aspects of influence of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi parties, specifically their role in the political violence, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas. However, the number of academic studies of the contemporary far right in Ukraine is generally limited. The research question is as follows: What is the role of the far right in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan”? This study analyzes the involvement of specific Ukrainian radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations in the “Euromaidan,” the Odesa massacre, and the war in Donbas, their performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and the 2015 local elections in Ukraine. The analysis focuses on major Ukrainian far right organizations, such as Svoboda (Freedom), the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly, the White Hammer, the UNA-UNSO, Bratstvo, and C14, and paramilitary formations or special police and National Guard units organized and controlled to various extent by them, such as the Azov regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. It uses various sources of data, such as online recordings of live broadcasts and videos of the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas, official database of court decisions in Ukraine concerning investigations of the involvement of the far right in major cases of political violence, video recordings of the Maidan massacre trial, information posted on websites and social media groups of far right organizations, and media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages. The study shows that the far right organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters, the post-Maidan governments, and in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. However, the analysis also shows that the far right organizations and football ultras played a key role during violent attacks, such as attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the parliament of Ukraine in January and on February 18, 2014. There is also various evidence of the Right Sector involvement in a violent attack of the Berkut police during its highly publicized dispersal of protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda and smaller organizations had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police on February 18-20, 2014. The study demonstrates that the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly/ Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of football ultras were involved in the Odesa massacre on May 2, 2014. This paper also shows that the far right organizations and their volunteer battalions and paramilitary units had a significant role in the civil war in Donbas but a comparably minor role in fighting with several regular Russian military units during direct military interventions by Russia in August 2014 and February 2015. Major implications of this study for the Ukrainian politics and the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine are discussed in the conclusion. This paper implies that the far right has significant but not dominant role in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan.” But far right organizations and their armed units had a key role in major cases of political violence during and after the “Euromaidan,” and they attained ability to overthrow by force the government of the one of the largest European countries.

This study examines the role of the far right in the Euromaidan in Ukraine, primarily in the Maidan massacre and other key cases of violence. The involvement of far-right organizations in these crucial events in the Ukrainian and world politics has been politicized and polarized in Ukraine, the West, and Russia. This study analyzes various data sources, such as online live streams and TV broadcasts, videos, broadcasts of the Maidan massacre trials, the database of court decisions in Ukraine, media reports, and field research on the Maidan. The findings reveal that radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters. However, the analysis shows that the far-right organizations and football ultras played a key role in political violence such as attempting to seize the presidential administration and the parliament. It reveals involvement of the Right Sector in violent clashes with the Berkut special police force during the highly publicized dispersal of Maidan protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda had crucial roles in the violent overthrow of the Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police.

The participation of far-right groups in the war in Ukraine has been highly publicized and raises questions about how those groups will evolve after the war, especially vis-à-vis the spread of their ideology. Reviewing their ideological and political direction in the post-conflict environment is the aim of this study. The authors investigate the Ukrainian far right phenomenon: what kind of movements there are, where they come from, and what their role in the conflict has been. This is followed by an assessment of what threat this poses in the broader strategic context of the war and after it will be over. The analysis brings forward two key points. First, groups like these are a product and exponent of political warfare by state actors, featuring as tools for covert action. Second, by incorporating such militias into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian government makes their radical attitudes diminish. Nationalism, even in the extreme spectrum of political ideology, could be a product of the war. Meeting the criteria for integration into the European Union is an important factor stimulating rule-based order and deradicalization processes. Although there are some potentially worrying implications stemming from the prestige gained by their combat record, the far right will therefore likely continue to remain a fringe phenomenon with small political impact.

A year and a half after the coup d’état, the Ukrainian revolution goes on. Studying the confrontation in the winter of 2013-2014 in the center of Kiev is a necessary, but an insufficient condition to understand the trends of the revolution. One should take into account the development of changes in the Ukrainian regime and society in dynamic that, besides economic and military aspects, has a very important ideological element. This expert report (June 2015) reflects the impact of racial nationalists and the respective ideology in post-Maidan Ukraine. The report defines radicals not only in terms of their participant in political movements and parties considered extremist (the Right Sector, Svoboda Party, and Social-National Assembly), but also on the bases of their statements and activities. Following the coup d’état, snap parliamentary and presidential elections, radicals integrated into the system of government bodies of the country thus gaining a significant influence mostly on law enforcement and defense (the Ministry of the Interior, Security Service of Ukraine and Armed Forces of Ukraine).

From the very beginning, the armed conflict that broke out in the Donbass in the spring of 2014 drew in right-wing radicals, on the Ukrainian as well as on the Russian side. Organised ultra-nationalist groups and individual activists established their own units of volunteers or joined existing ones. The ideology, political traditions and general track record of these right-wing extremists meant that it was both natural and inevitable that they would take an active part in the conflict. Yet the role of right-wing radicals on both sides has on the whole been exaggerated in the media and in public discussion. This article demonstrates that Russia’s use of right-wing radicals on the side of the “separatists” in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces had greater military and political repercussions than the involvement of Ukrainian far-right groups in the “anti-terrorist operation”. The general course of the conflict, meanwhile, caused the importance of far right-groups on both sides to decline.

Ukraine today faces a vicious circle of nationalist radicalization involving mutual reinforcement between far-right groups and the dominant oligarchic pyramids. This has significantly contributed to a post-Euromaidan domestic politics that is not unifying the country but creating divisiveness and damaging Ukrainian relations with its strategically important neighbors. The lack of a clear institutionalized political and ideological boundary between liberal and far-right forces lends legitimacy to the radical nationalist agenda. Moreover, the oligarchic groups exploit radicalizing nationalism not out of any shared ideology but because it threatens their interests less than the liberal reformers. Local deterrents are insufficient to counter the radicalizing trend; Ukraine's far right vastly surpasses liberal parties and NGOs in terms of mobilization and organizational strength. Western pressure is needed on influential Ukrainian figures and political parties in order to help shift Ukraine away from this self-destructive development.

The article discusses two far right movements that took part in the Ukrainian revolution in 2014. The author argues that, although the fact of the involvement of the far right in the revolution cannot be denied, the Russian media deliberately exaggerated this involvement to discredit the opposition to former President Viktor Yanukovych. Thus, the articles provides a more nuanced picture of the Ukrainian far right before, during and immediately after the revolution. This research draws on the interviews conducted by the author, video and photographic evidence, online and offline publications, results of public opinion polls, and secondary literature on the Ukrainian far right.

The mass protests of Ukrainian citizens and the ascendance of the new government in Kyiv were accompanied by an intense informational campaign, which had not always corresponded to the truth. In the terms of this campaign, Maidan's activists, the political opposition – and, correspondingly, the new government that was formed after the revolution ended in victory – were depicted as ultra-nationalistic, extremist, and xenophobic. Under these circumstances, it is extremely important for both Ukrainian citizens and foreign observers to understand the real role of national-radicals in the Maidan protests and the events which followed. Is it truth that the " banderovtsy " 2 made up the bulk of the protesters? Is the victory of the Maidan also the victory of the political ultra-right? What kind of future does the far right have in the new Ukrainian political reality?

This is an attempt of a systematic estimation of the far right participation in Maidan protests based on a unique dataset of protest events in Ukraine during President Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. The data presented contradict the thesis supported by most of the experts on Ukrainian far right that the far right did not play any crucial or even significant role in Maidan protests. The data indicate that the far right Svoboda party was the most active collective agent in Maidan protest events, while the Right Sector was the most active group in Maidan confrontation and violence. Protests with the participation of the far right were not isolated events on the margins of larger ‘peaceful and democratic’ protest. The data indicate the timing and location of the most intense far right activity, which has previously not received much attention. In general, it highlights the importance of the underestimated, but highly intense and large-scale, Maidan protests in Ukrainian regions beyond the events in Kiev city centre. Finally, it points to how far right participation in Maidan grew from the moderate opposition parties’ increasing cooperation with Svoboda.

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" ("Freedom"). "Svoboda" is Ukrainian National Radical Right extremistic political party which has gained a dramatical succеss on the parliament elections-2012. The report discusses the causes of the growing popularity of this political forse in the modern Ukrainian social context. The author makes a special emphasis on the anti-Semitic content of the "Svoboda" ideology. The rhetoric of its leaders and activists, including newly elected MPs, is analised in detail. The growing popularity of the political party which sistematically uses xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric, and welcomes the street violence against the political opponents, is of great concern in Ukrainian civil society and international community.

Ukraine has been viewed by some as having become a training ground, networking opportunity, and general hub for the far-right due to the conflict in the east of the country, which began in 2014. With this type of terrorism on the rise in the West and events like the storming of the US Capitol Building in January 2021 fresh in the memory, it should come as no surprise that any such possibilities will generate concern. To investigate the types and extent of the threats posed by participants in the Ukraine conflict, we scrutinise the activities of a few alumni that we know of to date, as well as highlighting neglected historical episodes of right-wing fighters. We make three arguments here based on occurrences so far. Firstly, we know little about far-right foreign fighters and more attention needs to be paid to historical instances of the phenomenon. Secondly, some limited but diverse threats have already arisen from the Ukraine conflict and others may emerge in the future, but it wou...

Recognize the problem that is neither a fiction of Russian propaganda, nor it can be reduced to the inevitable but temporary effects of the war. Ukrainian radical nationalists’ unique extra-parliamentary power, which is aggravated by their interpenetration with the law-enforcement and weak liberal civil society, present a real danger to human rights and political liberties in Ukraine. The far right contribute to self-destructive nationalist radicalization dynamics destabilizing the political regime in Ukraine which is especially dangerous on the eve of Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 with unpredictable results.

In this text I am briefly summarizing my recent studies on the role of radical nationalists in the Maidan protests. It is necessary to go to the roots of the denialist myth not only for the sake of academic truth but to expose certain parameters of ideological mobilizations that are usually ignored by commenters of post-Soviet politics, although they are becoming increasingly important for analysis of the emerging trends in Ukrainian civil society.

Thanks largely to the Kremlin’s information war, Ukraine’s ultranationalists have become global media stars of a sort, depicted in Western and other reports as key players in Ukraine’s third major political upheaval in less than a quarter-century. How do we explain the paradox of ultranationalist parties becoming involved in a protest movement whose thrust is toward greater integration between Ukraine and the European Union? And are the fears that swirl around these parties justified?

The major political forces in Ukraine do not have a well-articulated ideology. An analysis of the gradual emergence of the Svoboda (Freedom) party into the political mainstream since 2001 and as a contender in the October 2012 parliamentary elections reveals that this party is the flagship of core extreme right ideology.

The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of the far right (nationalist) as political actors in Russia and in Europe. Whereas the European far-right movements over the last years managed to achieve significant success turning into influential political forces as a result of surging popular support, in Russia the far-right organizations failed to become the fully-fledged political actors. This looks particularly surprising, given the historically deep-rooted nationalist tradition, which stems from the times Russian Empire. Before the 1917 revolution, the so-called «Black Hundred» was one of the major far-right organizations, exploiting nationalistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric, which had representation in the Russian parliament-The State Duma. During the most Soviet period all the far-right movements in Russia were suppressed, re-emerging in the late 1980s as rather vocal political force. But currently the majority of them are marginal groups, partly due to the harsh party regulation, partly due to the fact, that despite state-sponsored nationalism the position of Russian far right does not stand in-line with the position of Russian authorities, trying to suppress the Russian nationalists. This is sharply contrasting to the situation with the far right in Europe, which are more well-established and institutionalized as political actors, using conventional forms of political activity. However, despite development gap in comparison with the European counterparts, the Russian far right have obvious potential as political actors, which can be realized under certain circumstances, enabling them to play more significant in the political system of Russia.

This article provides an overview of recent activities of the far right in Russia (2004–2006) and shows how formal organisations of the far right interact with skinhead subcultures and local communities. It argues that government actions have facilitated an increase in recent far-right militancy (2004–2006) in Russia: the authorities have provided the far-right with political opportunities that their organisations use to coordinate further actions, recruit new members and gain visibility.

This chapter examines the dynamics of Russian nationalism’s radical wing from the beginning of Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency in 2008 to the war in Donbass region in 2014. Based on extensive research carried out by the SOVA centre, Verkhovsky’s analysis focuses on those nationalists who oppose the authorities – typically, those who attend the 4 November ‘Russian March’, with the exclusion of the national democrats. In exploring the subsequent evolution of the aggressive ultra-nationalism which emerged in the mid-2000s to promote a ‘White Power’ influenced model of an ethnically pure Russia in place of the lost empire, 2008 is first unpacked as the year in which racist violence peaked but improved law enforcement activity and political manipulation began to impact upon the movement. Verkhovsky then considers the radical nationalists’ fluctuating levels of engagement in political activities and in violence, and the dynamics of their relationship with the authorities, with the 2010 Manezh riot identified as the point at which the federal authorities were forced to elaborate statist nationalism as an alternative to ethnic nationalism. The anti-migrant campaign of 2013 is examined as a surprise lapse in this policy, which significantly inflamed ethnic tensions and generated radical nationalist activity in the form of quasi-legal raids on ‘illegal migrants’. Notwithstanding this surge in activity, Verkhovsky concludes that despite reasonably effective leaders and a variety of strategies for generating support (from raids and anti-paedophile campaigns to Kondopoga-type riots), the movement is unable to broaden its support base. Finally the author briefly summarises ultra-nationalist responses to the situation in Ukraine, provisionally concluding that once the Maidan anti-authorities protest escalated into armed conflict between ‘Russians’ and ‘Ukrainians’, the movement was divided over whether to support the separatists or oppose them. Verkhovsky provisionally concludes that although the Ukrainian situation has legitimized the use of force, it has not improved the radical nationalists’ prospects.

The article traces nationalist polarization and divergence within the Ukrainian new left in response to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests in 2013–2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The ideological left-wing groups in the protests were too weak to push forward any independent progressive agenda. Instead of moving the respective campaigns to the left, they were increasingly converging with the right themselves and degraded into marginal supporters of either pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian camps in the conflict. The liberal and libertarian left supported the Maidan movement on the basis of abstract self-organization, liberal values and anti-authoritarianism. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninists attempted to seize political opportunities from supporting more plebeian and decentralized Anti-Maidan protests and reacting to the far-right threat after the Maidan victory. They deluded themselves that Russian nationalists were not as reactionary as their Ukrainian counterparts and that the world-system crisis allowed them to exploit Russian anti-American politics for progressive purposes.

The crisis in Ukraine has been a truly divisive event. On almost all levels and aspects of the crisis we have witnessed, and continue to witness different understandings and, indeed, narratives of individual events, processes and the crisis in general. Several examples of such narratives stand out, for example, narratives on Crimea, MH17, and Donbas. Principally what we see is a narrative created and disseminated by Kyiv and the post-maidan government, and a (counter)narrative offered by the Ukrainian opposition, and the rebels in Donbas. Narratives also exist at the international, global level, with the United States and the European Union generally, though not quite always, supporting and promoting the Kyiv narrative, whilst Russia and some anti-western sympathisers, support the opposition/rebel narrative. It is also important to note that often the narrative does not start within Ukraine itself, but is created outside and then brought to Ukraine. One such narrative that exists at the local, national, and international level is that of fascism in post-maidan Ukraine. The different narratives on this have been very visible within media, but far less widely discussed than those of Crimea or MH17. The aim of this essay, therefore, is to put forward the main narratives on fascism in Ukraine, particularly supposed fascism in government. The essay seeks primarily to highlight the key narratives and the actors who create them, whilst some analysis of the validity and truth of the different narratives will also be offered, particularly analysing whether post-maidan Ukraine has indeed embraced fascist elements and personalities, what role such people play, and what does this mean for Ukraine.

Ukraine’s system of political parties has since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 featured a small number of far-right political parties. How strong is the Ukrainian far right movement today? How has the movement performed in the recent Ukrainian elections and which role does the movement play in the Ukrainian civil society?

Collective statement by experts on Ukrainian nationalism on the role of far right groups in Ukraine’s protest movement, and a warning about the Russian imperialism-serving effects of some supposedly anti-fascist media reports from Kyiv

In the context of the rise of radical right-wing parties in most European countries, the enduring absence of a far-right group in the Ukrainian parliament seems paradoxical. However, recent developments, namely the victory of the far-right ‘Freedom’ Party (All-Ukrainian Union ‘Freedom’, Vseukrayins’ke ob’’ednannya ‘Svoboda’) in the 2009 Ternopil regional elections seems to attest to the gradual revival of the radical right in Ukraine. The article considers the far-right legacy in Ukraine and the reasons why it failed in the post-Soviet period, and then focuses on the history of the Freedom Party and discusses its prospects at the national level.

This chapter presents a summary of analysis, evidence, and findings of a study of the “snipers’ massacre” of “Euromaidan” protesters and policemen on the Maidan in Ukraine on February 20, 2014. This mass killing was a turning point in the Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in a conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This massacre led to an overthrow of the government of Viktor Yanukovych and a Russian annexation in Crimea, a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, and Russian military intervention in support of separatists in these regions. The question is which side was involved in the “snipers’ massacre.” This study relies on rational choice and Weberian theories of rational action. It employs interpretative and content analyses of a large number of different sources. The analysis shows that armed groups of concealed Maidan shooters first killed and wounded policemen on the Maidan and then protesters. Armed groups of “snipers” and parts of leadership of the far right organizations, such as the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland, were involved in various capacities in the massacre. This mass killing was misrepresented by the media and the governments in Ukraine and the West.

Ukraine previously experienced significant regional political divisions, including separatism in Crimea and Donbas. However, in contrast to post-communist countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and former Yugoslavia, prior to 2014 Ukraine was able to avoid a war and a break-up. This study examines the role of separatists, the Yanukovych government, the Maidan opposition and the Maidan government, far-right organizations, Russia, the US, and the EU in the conflict in Donbas. It uses a specially commissioned survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2014 to analyse public support for separatism in Donbas, compared to other regions of Ukraine, and the major factors which affect such support. It concludes that all these actors contributed in various ways to the conflict in Donbas, which involved both a civil war and a direct Russian military intervention since August 2014. The study links this conflict to the 'Euromaidan', specifically, the government overthrow by means of the Maidan massacre, and the secession and Russia's annexation of Crimea. The KIIS survey shows that support for separatism is much stronger in Donbas compared to other regions, with the exception of Crimea, and that the break-up of Ukraine is unlikely to extend to its other parts.

This anthology was compiled as part of a project entitled “Confronting right-wing extremism by developing networks of exit-oriented assistance.” That project, in turn, is integral to the XENOS special program known as “exit to enter” which has received grants from both the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the European Social Fund.

The book describes the development of the Ukrainian radical nationalist groups from 1991 to the 2014 revolution, including the Right sector and Svoboda (Freedom) party (up to 2004 — the Social-National Party of Ukraine), discusses their ideology, psychology and methods of political struggle.

This article explores the reasons behind a dramatic rise in far-right violence in the late 2000s in Russia that has been attributed mainly to the actions of radicalized parts of a vast skinhead scene. Analysis of one of the most brutal far-right organizations disproves the notion that skinheads are incapable of developing more than “skin-deep ideologies” of racism without the help of politicians and that they merely engage in isolated and spontaneous attacks on victims. Instead, it argues that skinheads in the organization studied explicitly planned a broad terror campaign, ensuring the lethality and “interconnectedness” of the killings well in advance of carrying out most known deadly attacks.

This paper analyzes the involvement of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Nazi genocide during World War II in Ukraine. The issue of the political rehabilitation of these organizations became one of the central political issues in this post-Soviet state. The research question is whether leaders and members of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B) and the UPA were involved in the Nazi-led genocide. This article devotes particular attention to Volhynia where the UPA was established by the OUN-B in 1943. The study analyzes the biographies of 329 OUN-B and UPA leaders and documents concerning the OUN-B and the UPA, local police, and Nazi mass executions of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles from the State Archive of the Volyn Region, the State Archive of the Rivne Region, the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine in the Volyn Region, the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine, the National Archives in the US, and other archives. This paper shows that large proportions of leaders and members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army served in various police and militia formations, collaborated with security and intelligence agencies of Nazi Germany, and took part in the Nazi genocide, primarily in assisting roles during mass executions of Jews in the first two years of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.

The paper seeks to present a balanced, well documented and nuanced discussion covering the full range of positions of the Ukrainian left and activities in relation to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and the war. It covers all the major groups and parties who at least identify with the socialist and/or anarchist tradition: from ‘old left’ parties originating from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to ‘new left’ organisations, unions and informal initiatives that did not have any relation whatsoever to the CPSU. The paper gives a brief overview of the most important (and often still unresolved) questions about major political events in Ukraine starting from 2013. Then it describes and explains the positions and political activities of the various Ukrainian organisations on the left towards the Maidan uprising, the Anti-Maidan movement and the war in eastern Ukraine. The paper attempts to answer the following questions. How did different left wing organisations try to intervene in the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and how successful were their interventions? To what extent were they able to defend the left agenda against liberals and (both Ukrainian and Russian) nationalists? To what extent did they rather follow the agenda of their political opponents? What were the differences not only between the different left wing organisations but also between groups in Kiev and in the provinces? What was the real scale of repression by the new government and by the far right against various left wing organisations? To what extent did the repression specifically against the left or rather against separatist forces challenge the state’s integrity? What are the current prospects and opportunities for left wing politics now in Ukraine both in the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary spheres? Are there any prospects for a ‘left turn’ in the separatist republics? What political lessons should the European and the international left draw from the political events in the Ukraine and what were their results for the local left?

During and after Ukraine’s celebrated Euromaydan (literally: European Square) Revolution of 2013–2014, a whole number of novel Ukrainian political and societal phenomena emerged. One of the most intriguing was the relatively spontaneous and government-supported emergence of volunteer armed units from late spring 2014 onwards, in connection with the start of Russia’s covert paramilitary intervention in Eastern Ukraine. Among the most widely noted of these initially irregular detachments was the “Azov” battalion or regiment, named after the Azov Sea, created, in May 2014, by an obscure lunatic fringe group of racist activists. This paper briefly sketches the origins of Azov, biographies of some of its founders, and particulars of its creation, without touching upon such issues as Azov’s military performance, later integration into the National Guard under Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, and political development after 2014.

What has orientated parties such as Jobbik and Golden Dawn towards Moscow, and what are the implications for Russian foreign policy in the EU-peripheries of Central and Southeast Europe?

A common theme in historical and contemporary warfare is the role of militias. Militias, both pro-government and rebel, act beyond their sponsors or else they would be understood as part of the armies that go to war. We think of militias as being paramilitaries, para-meaning approximate but not collocated with the military. Paramilitaries are ordinarily recruited and resourced differently. They are also ordinarily tactically different, playing a role in front line warfare where the intensity may be high, but were the position is fast changing or distributed in local areas. As the conflict literature will show, militias, or paramilitaries, are a common feature of any conflict and thus it is no surprise that we see their use in Ukraine. For the conflict in Ukraine, we use the term paramilitaries to indicate those forces that are fighting at the front line for both the Kyiv government and rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk, with these being considered 'pro-Russian' and even include Russian citizens. Relying on the pro-government militias literature, we show how militias on both sides play an important role in the conflict but also pose the biggest threat to a sustainable peace.

This study analyzes policies and public attitudes concerning the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) after the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The issue of the political rehabilitation of these nationalist organizations, which relied on terrorism and were involved in Nazi genocide and ethnic cleansing of Poles during World War Two, became one of central political issues in this post-Soviet state. The question is which factors determine attitudes towards the OUN and the UPA in contemporary Ukraine. The hypothesis is that regional factors are the main determinants of the public opinion concerning these organizations. This paper uses analysis of historical studies and archival data to examine policies and controversies concerning the OUN and the UPA. It employs comparative and regression analyses of the 2009 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey to determine effects of regional factors, compared to other factors, such as ethnicity, language, and age, on attitudes towards the Stepan Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA. The paper shows that that regional factors and perceptions of the involvement of the Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA in mass murder are strongest predictors of views concerning these nationalist organizations.

Ukraine has experienced significant regional divisions concerning such issues as support for leading presidential candidates and political parties, foreign orientation, and attitudes towards major historical events since it became independent in 1991. Separatism in various forms manifested itself in Crimea in the first half of the 1990s and in Donbas and neighboring regions during the “Orange Revolution” in 2004. However, Ukraine was able until 2014 to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to such post-communist countries as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and former Yugoslavia. In 2014, Crimea seceded with help of Russian military intervention, and it was annexed by Russia. Pro-Russian separatists with direct involvement of large groups of armed Russians with indirect Russian government support seized power in most of Donbas and engaged in a violent conflict with pro-government forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (Donbas). The research question is as to why Ukraine has suffered a violent separatist conflict in Donbas. This study analyses the role of different actors and factors in the violent conflict in Donbas. This paper uses a brief survey, which was commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in the end of April and the beginning of May 2014, to analyze support for separatism in Donbas, compared to other regions of Ukraine, and major factors which affect such support. It compares the role of the Yanukovych and post-Yanukovych governments in Ukraine, the Russian and Western governments, political leaders of these countries, and Russian and Ukrainian paramilitary formations. This paper also compares the violent separatist conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions to other similar violent conflicts and to secessions of Transdniestria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Krajina in Croatia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and Kosovo in Serbia.

This paper analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and attitudes towards separatism and foreign policy orientation in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan,” which turned into a violent internal conflict and one of the biggest international conflicts involving Western countries and Russia. The research question is whether the regional divisions concerning domestic politics, separatism and foreign orientation have changed significantly in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the “Euromaidan” in 2014. This paper employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2012, 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, and the 2014, 2010, and 2004 presidential elections, to examine effects of historical legacies, ethnicity, language, age, and economic factors on regional support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. The study also analyses support for separatism in Crimea and Donbas after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.” It uses a brief survey, conducted for this study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April and May 2014, to examine determinants of pro-separatist attitudes. The paper also employs Razumkov Center and KIIS surveys to analyze changes in 2002-2014 in regional preferences for joining the European Union (EU), NATO, and a union with Russia. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards joining the EU, NATO, and a Russia-led union. After the “Euromaidan,” such divisions in foreign policy orientation and, to a lesser extent, support for presidential candidates and political parties remained. A significant rise in separatist sentiments helped to fuel separatist takeovers of power in Crimea and Donbas and Russian military intervention in these regions.