Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan Vol. 49, No. 2, July – December, 2012. Prof Dr. Iqbal Chawla, Professor & Chairman, Department of History & Pakistan Studies University of Punjab, Lahore. Prelude to the Accession of the Kalat State to Pakistan in 1948: An Appraisal The recent movement of the ‘Baluch nationalist’ for the provincial autonomy, even few of them asking for self-determination, is causing alarm for the future integrity of state of Pakistan. The State of Pakistan is capable of dealing with it, but seems to be docile in fully appreciating the implications of the movement in the future history of the province, Pakistan and the region. It has become a burning issue and attracted the attention of the historians to dig out the origins and evolution of the unrest and anxiety in the Baluchistan. Critics of the view that the present uprising has had its origin in the freedom struggle for Pakistan as the one section of the Baluch society especially the Kalat State did not want to become part of Pakistan and rather had struggled to make it either part of India or Afghanistan or retain its independence. The accession of Kalat State to Pakistan on 27 March 1948 had not been approved by the state legislature and thereby it created a hot debate not only on the legality of the merger of the Kalat State but also of the province of the Baluchistan on the whole. Therefore, it is of massive noteworthy to investigate the origins of the dispute about the Baluchistan crisis which had actually started during the British period. Thus Balochistan, which was a Commissioner’s province and had no Legislative Assembly of its own, became a part of Pakistan, as the Electoral College constituted from members of the Shahi Jirgas and the Municipality of Quetta voted in favour of Pakistan on 30th June 1947. Although the province’s overwhelming Muslim majority and its geographical location in the South-West of India were factors which would have pointed in the direction of it becoming a part of Pakistan instead of India but a few rulers of the royal states, the Congress and the Afghanistan Government were active in creating all sorts of problems on that pathway for its expected union with Pakistan. Consequently, the Kalat State demanded complete independence thereby indicating that it had no intention of becoming a part either of Pakistan or India. In spite of disagreeing with this demand, the Government of Pakistan concluded a Standstill Agreement with Kalat on 4 August 1947. However, despite the different interpretations about the status of the Kalat State, its ruler, Khan Yar Muhammad Khan, informed the Government of Pakistan in March 1948 that he wanted his State to accede to 1 Pakistan, although this decision had not been approved by the state legislature. As a consequence, a heated debate arose, not only about the legality of the merger of the Kalat State but also of the province of the Baluchistan on the whole. Therefore, it is of considerable importance to investigate the origins of the dispute and debate about the present Baluchistan crisis which had actually started during the British period, and more importantly, the way it was handled during the implementation of the Mountbatten’s partition plan. Mountbatten, quite fairly and justly had adopted a ‘modus operandi’ which allowed the people of the province to decide their future freely and according to their conscience. He also was quite clear about the future of the royal states, and therefore, categorically denied the request of some of the rulers of the royal states to become independent of either India or Pakistan . There has been abundant literature on the Muslim struggle for independence in the Baluchistan and also on the struggle of the Baluch nationalists for the achievement of their political rights but historians have not thrown enough light on the role of Mountbatten in deciding the future of Baluchistan. Therefore, this paper attempts to investigate the views of Mountbatten on Muslim politics in India and also his policy to ascertain the will of the people of the province of Balochistan to join either India or Pakistan. It will also analyze his policy in determining the future of the royal states in Baluchistan. Sources This paper is based on a range of primary sources including the Mudie papers, the Prior Papers, held in the British Library, London. The interpretation is chiefly derived however from a close reading of the Mountbatten papers at the University of Southampton Review of Literature There are two narratives of historians about the merger of the Kalat State into Pakistan. One group of historians such as Inam –ul-HaqKausar,1 SharifulMujahid,2A. B. Awan3and Syed Iqbal Ahmed 4and others glorifies the role of 1 InamulHaqkausar, Pakistan Movement And Baluchistan (Quetta: Maktab-eShal, 1999) 2 Sharif-ul-Mujahid, “Quaid-iAzam and Baluchistan”, in Riaz Ahmad, ed., Baluchistan Through History (Islamabad: NIPS, 2008), 13. 3 A. B. Awan, Baluchistan Historical and Political Process(London: New Century Publishers, 1985) 4 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992) 2 the Baluchistan Muslim League in the achievement of Pakistan. They also highlight the role of important personalities including the Khan of Kalat in creating the urge for freedom and sentiments of two nation theory which resulted in the victory of the Muslim League in the Referendum in the Baluchistan. The second group of writers like Ahmad Yar Khan,Sherbaz Khan Mazari,5TahirBizenjo6and others, while agreeing with the undercurrent of the two-nation theory in the Baluchistan which brought about the Muslim League victory in the Referendum, disagrees that the Royal States especially the State of Kalat had the same feeling and sentiments. They believe that it was the wish of the people and the will of the Khan of Kalat to maintain the independent status of the state.Some of them also believe that it was part of ‘the great game’ to make the state of Kalat a part of Pakistan.7 However, the present author takes the position that neither the British Government nor the Government of Pakistan wished to make the Kalat State an independent country nor the Khan of Kalat wished so rather he concluded a stand still treaty which guaranteed almost the same status of the state that had been exercising during the British period. Background Balochistan, for centuries had loosely integrated into Iranian and Indian empires and thus remained as a buffer zone between the two great empires of the world, India and Iran. Although the area remained effectively autonomous; the first serious effort to unify the Balochistan into a compact country was made by Mir Chakar Khan Rind who established tribal confederacy in 14th century.8 It consisted of Makran, present day Balochistan, south Afghanistan, Sind and Punjab up to the South of Multan.9 He gave it the name of Balochistan.10Thereafter the confederacy began to divide into autonomous 5 Sherbaz KhanMazari;A Journey of Disillusionment( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 6 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch Thee Khan of Kalat,(Karachi: Royal Book, 1975) 7 TahirBazenjo,, Great Game Aur Balochistan(Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 2006). 8 Imtiaz Ali, 42 9 Fred Scholz, Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hindered Years ofBalochistan 1872-1972 (Karachi: OUP, 2002), 22 10 Inyat Allah Baloch, “The Baloch question in Pakistan and the right of self determination” in W. P. Zingal and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in the 8os:Ideology, Regionalism, Economy Foreign Policy (Lahore: Vanguard1985), 336 3 zones. Anyhow, Balochistan became a buffer zone between Iran and Mughal India.11 By the 1830s Baluchistan became strategically central area for the British who developed immense interests in the region because of the growing Russian expansionism in central Asia, Middle East and India.12 Henceforth, the British goal in Balochistan had been to pacify the Baloch Sardars in order to safeguard a free passage to Afghanistan and Iran. Anyhow in the later half of nineteenth century Balochistan had been subdued by the British and consequently the British rule, directly in the British Balochistan, and indirectly in the Royal states had been established. The British policy towards Balochistan13 can be divided into two phases: first phase covered the period from 1839 to 1876, and second phase lasted to 1876-1947.14 The British adopted a ‘close border’ policy to subjugate the Baluch Sardar and tribes on one hand and to guarantee its safe passage to Afghanistan to retain the Russian involvement in the area, anyhow it did not work well and was replaced in 1876 when Sandeman became the first Chief Commissioner of Balochistan.15 During the second phase the boundaries of the province Balochistan was demarcated with Afghanistan (Durand Line) and Iran (Gold Smith Line).16 During the Muslim freedom struggle for independence the public opinion in Baluchistan, or at least in cities such as Quetta and the small towns, was overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. The anti-Pakistan forces were comprised of the Hindu Congress, as everywhere else in India, and those Muslim Political parties which were directly or indirectly linked with it such as the Anjuman-e-Watan of Abdus Samad Achakzai, the National Party of Bizengo and the Maulvis of Jamiat-e-Ulema. Apparently it was a straightforward fight but turned out complicated owing to the considerable wire-pulling by the Khan of Kalat in addition to anti-Pakistan forces. 11 Inyat Allah Baloch, 336 During the 1st phase British wanted a safe passage for troops moving from Sind to Qandahar. In this connection a safe passage treaty was singed between Mir Mehrab Khan of Kalat and British in 1838. Nina Swilder, 178 13 Imtiaz Ali, 43 14 Ibid, 43-44 15 Sandaman had showed his skill in dealing with the Baloch in Dera Ghazi Khan which had been handed over to the province of the Punjab. Fred Scholz, 91 16 Durand line demarcated the boundary between Balochistan and Afghanistan. The length of the boundary to be fixed was some thing like 800 miles and the demarcation work continued for two years from April 1894 to May 1894. 16 The second boundary line which was drawn between Iran and Balochistan is known as Gold Smith line. Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan its strategic importance. (Karachi: Royal Book company, 1992), 83 12 4 Plethora of writing has been produced about the Muslim struggle for independence in the province of Baluchistan and therefore it suffices to say that this was the Muslim League under the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah which for some twenty years(1927-47) had strived for introducing reforms in Baluchistan and for bringing it at par with other provinces. After the Lahore Resolution in 1940, the demand for Pakistan had become very popular in Balochistan. The leaders of Balochistan Qazi Isa and others including the ruler of Kalat state, Ahmad Yar Khan played significant role in this connection. But the dilemma of the Congress party in Baluchistan was that it wanted the province to join India but composition of the population and the geographic location of the province made it impossible to undermine the popularity of Pakistan. Sensing clear defeat in the forthcoming referendum, the Congress attempted new options and therefore encouraged the provincialism and separatists elements in NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan. Khan of Kalat and the Princely Stats Since 1858 the British Government ruled India with two administrative systems. The provinces and territories directly under British colonial administration was about 60% of territory of the Indian Territory. Whereas 40% of the sub-continent included princely States, also called Native State or Indian State, were under direct treaty relations with British India. The British governed these States indirectly by an Indian ruler under form of indirect rule such as suzerainty or paramountcy. 17 Though these states were independent in their internal matters, but Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communications were controlled by British. There were 565 princely states till the partition of India in August 1947 and Kalat was one of them since 1876. During the British Raj Baluchistan did not enjoy the status of a province but it was put under the Chief Commissioner. It embraced four princely states namely: Makran, Kharan, Lasbela and Kalat. By 1876 Sir Robert Sandeman Chief Commissioner of Balochistan and others concluded treaties with the Khan of Kalat and brought his territories which included all four princely states of Bolan Pass, Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad under British suzerainty. Geo-strategically important state of Kalat was of massive worth for Pakistan because of its connection and boundary with Iran and Afghan. On Mountbatten’s arrival the position of the State of Kalat was as follows: though 17 Suzerainty as exercised (in the name of the British Crown) by the central government of British India under the Viceroy; the remaining approximately 500 states were dependents of the provincial governments of British India under a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Chief Commissioner (as the case might have been). 5 the Treaty of 1839 showed Kalat as owing allegiance to the rulers of Afghanistan, but by the Treaty of 18676 Kalat had come under the British Government which controlled its Defence, External Affairs and Communications. On one hand the Khan of Kalat lent great service in the creation of Pakistan and on the other, he wished to retain its independence. When partition of India came close, the Khan of Kalat approached the Cabinet Mission on March 24, 1946 claiming that Kalat was an independent state under the treaty of 1876 and no decision should be made about its future without consulting the Khan. He substantiated his arguments by drawing, parallels with the king of Nepal who had an independent status, diplomatic privileges and immunities by His majesty’s Government. Wavell, the Viceroy of India (October 1943- 20 March 1947) and Jawaharlal Nehru, as member of the External Affairs, disagreed with the Khan contentions and rejected his claim.18 Therefore, the future and fate of the princely states remained undecided in the Cabinet Mission plan. Although theoretically, the termination of Paramountcy in 1947 would leave the Indian States to accede to either of the Dominions, it had always been recognized that, in practice, this freedom would be exercised with due regard to the facts of geography and population. This was made clear by His Excellency the Governor General of India at the Conference which held with the representatives of the States on the 25th July. The Khan of Kalat showed concern about the announcement of the termination of Paramountcy and wanted a clear verdict that he could not get from the British Government despite his various efforts.19 3rd June Plan and renewed efforts of the Khan After the announcement of the June 3rd plan, Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India, decided suggesting the princely states adhere to one or the other of the Dominions only to the subjects of Defense, Communications and Foreign Affairs. He went on to argue that paramountcy would lapse with the transfer of power, and states would become independent de jure, but de facto very few were likely to benefit from it. He said that adherence to a Dominion was the only way of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the states. Mountbatten rejecting Khan’s claim advised him that although 18 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, p. 114 Reference your telegram No. 1298-p dated June 5th. August 15th has since been announced freely on the radio. Please confirm that Baluchistan States may be informed officially that Paramountcy will be lapse by that date. This information is essential to Kalat State for budget purpose. Baluchistan to Political India, 10th June 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/8 19 6 Kalat State had liberty of choice, it should associate with Pakistan on some terms. Yar Muhammad Khan, the Khan of Kalat, had claimed that (a) Kalat was not an Indian State and, as such, was outside the Cabinet Mission plan for the integration of the Indian States. (b) (b) At any rate, Kalat would attain independence and sovereign status after the 14th August, 1947. (c) (c) All regions which had gone under the control of the British in consequence of some treaty would return to Kalat on the lapse of sovereignty. (d) (d) Other Baluch regions like, Kharan, Las Bela and the Marri and Bugti areas were part of Kalat State and should revert to it after the departure of the British. After the announcement of the 3rd June Plan Khan of Kalat redoubled his efforts to reclaim its Leased Territory from the British. He was of the view that his position would be gravely weakened if his claim to leased areas was not accepted by Crown Representative before lapse of paramountcy. He demanded that he should be placed in possession of Nushki, Bolan and Nasirabad. However, he admitted however, that he was not, at present, in a position to undertake administration of Quetta but he would be prepared to accept temporary standstill agreements.20 The Political Department of Balochistan seemed quite keen to hand over the Leased territory to the Kalat State. Giving its opinion it stated: His Highness’s claims are incontrovertible and I see not difficulty in his undertaking administration of these areas by August 15th. I propose therefore, unless you instruct me to the contrary to proceed with arrangements for physical delivery of Nushki, Bolan and Nasirabad by that date and will endeavour to negotiate by that agreement for Quetta. 21 But Lord Mountbatten had made it crystal clear that the princely states will join either India or Pakistan, keeping in view their geographical location and population. Not only he had been showing great interest in the future of the princely states in India but also had concerns about the princely states and tribal areas linked with the federation of Pakistan. He had no doubt in his mind that these princely states and tribal areas, lying within the boundaries of Pakistan must go into Pakistan federation. 20 Baluchistan Ziarat to Polindia, 5th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/18 21 Baluchistan Ziarat to Polindia, 5th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/18 7 Making his views about the future of Princely states including the Kalat state, Mountbatten informed that the Union of India had reduced their demands in this respect to adherence only on the three main subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. Mountbatten, however, authoritatively asserted: The British Government had been very anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy would lapse and States would de jure become independent; but de facto, very few were likely to benefit from independence. Moreover, adherence to a Dominion Government would be the only method, in the future, of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the States. For Kalat, though there was complete liberty of choice, he could personally advise no course other than association on some terms with Pakistan.22 On 12th July, Mountbatten discussed with Jinnah and Liaquat about the future relations of the Government of Pakistan with the State of Kalat. Jinnah showed his willingness to start negotiation with the Kalat state on the basis of the three central subjects, Defence, External Affairs and Communication.23 In determining the future of princely states lying within the domain of Pakistan, Mountbatten decided to call the Round Table Conferences of the representatives of the Kalat State and the representative of the Government of Pakistan. Then, Mountbatten summoned the representatives of the Kalat State and the representative of the Government of Pakistan on 19 th July 1947 to hear their point of views on the claim.24 It was attended by Viceroy, Sardar Rab Nishtar, Minister of state and Tribes, Mohammad Aslam, Prime Minister of Kalat, and Sir Sultan Ahmad, the legal adviser to the Kalat State. Mountbatten explained to them that it was his desire, as Crown Representative, to settle all matters of potential dispute between the princely States and the two new Dominions by 15th August 1947. In his opening remarks Mountbatten said that the districts of Kalat which all concerned acknowledged to be directly administered by the Khan of 22 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 23 Record of the Viceroy’s Interview with Jinnah and Liaquat on 12 July 1947, Mountbatten Papers, D …. 24 Prior stated that a meeting between His Excellency and representatives of Kalat had been arranged for 3.pm. on Saturday, 19th July Viceroy directed the Reform Commissioner to arrange for Akhtar Hussain and Sir Conrad Corfield to prepare for him a brief for this meeting. Decided, if necessary, to have a brief interview with Sardar Nishtar prior to this meeting. Extract from Viceroy’s 58th Staff Meeting, 14th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/19 8 Makran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi and Dombi and Kaheri. He also told that the status of Kharan and Las Bela was disputed to the extent that the rulers thereof claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat. He did not try to engage into this debate as he thought this was a substance for future dialogue between the parties concerned. 25 Therefore, Mountbatten asked whether it was considered that Kalat’s status in relation to the Crown was that of an Indian States or different. Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan, representative of the Kalat State, contended that Kalat’s position was defined in the Treaty of 1876, according to which Kalat was an independent sovereign state in relations with the British Government, and did not rank as an Indian State. Mountbatten accepted that position for purpose of negotiation only. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar argued that he also would not contest it. Thus, Mountbatten, confining the debate on the specific topic on the Leased Territory, said that he understood that the four leased areas of Quetta, Nushki, Nasirababd and Bolan were to be the main subject of the present discussion. He explained that the claim that these areas should be returned to Kalat after the transfer of power was resisted by the representatives of the future Pakistan Government.26 Pakistan’s position was that their claim was based on the grounds that the successor authorities in India would, in relation to foreign States, inherit all Treaty obligations incurred on behalf of India, and that the Pakistan Government would be heir to the obligations (both burden and benefits) arising out of Treaties made with Kalat as they would be, for example, to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. Aslam Khan said that Kalat submitted that the leases clearly stated that whereas on the one side His Highness, his heirs and successors, were affected, the other party was the British Government alone. There was no provision for transfer of inheritance of the leases from the British, to which they were personal. 27 Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar said that he did not agree that these were “personal” agreements. Personal agreements were those which by their nature implied that only particular person was involved. Sir Sultan Ahmed said that, as he understood it, the word “personal” had a wider legal meaning. He gave his 25 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 26 Extract from Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 27 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 9 opinion that the rights and obligations arising out of the Treaty of 1876 could not be transferred to a successor Government. This Treaty had not been made by Kalat with the Government of India, but with the British Government as such. The Kalat representatives could not accept the legal position as understood by the representatives of Pakistan. Mountbatten said that he himself had also been advised that, according to international law, treaties such as this were not invalidated by a transfer of power, but were inherited by the successor authorities. Treaties with States over which the Crown had exercised paramountcy, on the other hand, lapsed. Particular provision was made for this in the Indian Independence Bill.28 Mountbatten suggested that if, after further discussion, there was no agreement between the interested parties on the legal position, the case might eventually be put before the Arbitral Tribunal. Sultan Ahmed suggested, and it was agreed, that the Khan of Kalat should first talk over the matter with Jinnah. Aslam Khan assured, anyhow, that if the eventual decision in this matter was in their favour, the Kalat representatives would still be willing to enter into negotiations on the future of Quetta and do their utmost to meet the Pakistan Government’s wishes in a reasonable manner but, with regard to the other three leased areas, they saw no reason why these would not return to Kalat without further discussion.29 Mountbatten, anyhow, pointed out that Nasirabad would be of no value if the irrigation supply was cut off. If Nasirabad was returned, some arrangements would have to be made in advance for the continuation of this supply. This was a question of mutual interest. Aslam Khan said that railway facilities could be used by Pakistan government in Nushki. Nishtar said that he did not consider that it would be in the interest of Kalat to have a common frontier with Afghanistan. Aslam Khan said that he believed that a vote taken among representatives of the leased areas on the issue of their joining Pakistan or going to Kalat would result in a decision in favour of the latter. A number of petitions to this effect had been received. He pointed out that previously the only issue had been as between Hindustan and Pakistan. Nishtar did not agree that such a vote was likely to have that result. He said that he considered it better, at the present meeting, not to go into the question of the petitions which had been made.30 Responding to Mountbatten’s contention Aslam Khan stated that the Khan of Kalat had deepest desire to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan. He 28 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 29 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 30 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 10 was prepared to come to an amicable settlement to mutual benefit. He had, in particular the highest respect for Mr. Jinnah.31 Sultan Ahmed said that he also understood that Jinnah wanted more time to study problems between Pakistan and Kalat; and the Kalat representatives felt that this time should be given. Jinnah had appeared very anxious that the correct decision should be reached and that he should not as yet realize the full complexity of the problem. Sultan suggested that if no agreement was reached on the legal question this would have to go before a Higher Tribunal for decision.32 In his concluding remarks, Mountbatten said that every effort should first be made to establish the legal position by agreement between the representatives of the two parties concerned. He suggested that Jinnah himself should not be brought into these particular discussions. Only in the event of failure to reach agreement between these representatives would the matter have to be referred to Jinnah.33 Mountbatten, however, argued that an immediate Standstill Agreement should be made between Pakistan and Kalat. The Kalat representatives agreed that this was necessary. Aslam Khan asked that a statement should be made declaring the recognition by the Crown Representative, as well as by the Government of Pakistan, of Kalat’s independent status. Mountbatten replied that the advice which he had received on this point from the Political Adviser precluded this; in any case a declaration by the Crown Representative would be of little value at the present time compared to one by the Pakistan Government.34 In the meantime, the Khan of Kalat, for some unknown reasons, had started playing the card of Afghanistan to raise his stock in his dealing with Pakistan.35 He informed Mountbatten that Jinnah had asked him whether Kalat 31 Extract from Viceroy’sMiscellenous Meeting, 19 th July 1947,Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/22 32 Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 33 Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 34 Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 35 Then Governor of Sind, Mudie observed, “I had a long talk with Khan of Kalat on the Afghan’s demand on HMG for the addition of certain territory was announced over the wireless. He had not heard it over the BBC, but knew all about it as the claims had been broadcast from Kabul, to which he apparently listens for about three weeks, to me, of course, he professed his desire to keep on good relations with Pakistan and to have nothing to do with the approaches of the Afghans, but his wife belongs, i believe, to the Afghan Royal family and i imagine that he would side with those that Afghan frighten him most. I do not blame him. He attributed the Afghan move to the Russians, but that may merely be a bargaining counter with Pakistan. If the Afghans follow up their claims the 11 would be willing to send representatives to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. To which he had replied that this was not possible because of the States’ independent status. But he had agreed with Jinnah that it was essential that a reasonable understanding should be reached between Pakistan and Kalat on Defence, External Affairs and Communication.36 Mountbatten asserted that agreement on the subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communication between Kalat and Pakistan was essential. He thought that, if legal opinion decided that the treaties made between British Government and Kalat would not be inherited by the Pakistan Government, a further decision would be necessary on the financial arrangements to be made in view of the fact that much capital had been sunk into construction at Quetta on the basis of a lease in perpetuity. It would presumably be necessary to obtain further legal opinion on this point also. With this Sultan agreed.37It was decided that a communiqué should be issued outlining the present stage of negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat. A first draft was made and agreed in principle at the meeting. This was also agreed to in principle by Jinnah and Liaquat, who entered at the end. Mountbatten asked Lord Ismay to clear it in detail with representatives of both parties.38 Draft Declaration result will almost certainly be unrest on the Western border of Sind.” Mudie to Mountbatten 9th July 1947Mountbatten Paper/MBI 292/55-6 36 Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 37 Mountbatten said that he had approved, and he understood that Sir Sultan Ahmed agreed (incidentally Sir Walter Monckton agreed also) that before the next series of meetings between the Khan of Kalat and Jinnah took place, a decision should be reached on the legal positions as to whether or not treaties made between the British government and Kalat would be inherited by the Pakistan Government. Jinnah had admitted Kalat’s claim to be an independent sovereign state of a status different from that of Indian States, and was prepared to negotiate in those terms. Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 38 Mountbatten said that since the last meeting with the Khan of Kalat he had spoken to Jinnah, Liaquat and Nishtar. Jinnah had explained that he was under such pressure of work at the present time that he had been unable to give his full consideration to the problems arising between Pakistan and Kalat; he was, however, willing and anxious to find an amicable solution. Jinnah had told the viceroy that he could rely on him to find, after 15th August, a solution which would suit both Kalat and Pakistan. It was his desire to live in peace and friendship with this large Muslim State. Viceroy’s Miscellanies Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 25th July 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 12 As a result of meetings between delegations from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided, over by the Crown Representatives, the following was the situation: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The Government of recognizes Kalat’s status as an independent sovereign status; this is different from that of Indian States. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not treaties made between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government. When this opinion has been received, further meetings will take place between the representatives of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat. Meanwhile a Standstill Agreement had been made between Pakistan and Kalat. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs.39 Lord Ismay sent to Jinnah and Ahmaed Yar Khan the draft communiqué that had been agreed in the last meeting on 25th July. Both of them suggested minor changes of words, 40but endorsed the communiqué. Thus a Round Table Conference was held on 4th August to finalize the future relations between the Government of Pakistan and the Kalat State. Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Khan of Kalat, Aslam Khan and Sir Sultan attended the conference. The Government of Pakistan recognized the special status of Kalat and thereby the head of Kalat and Pakistan Government signed on 4th August a stand still agreement which was declared on 11th August 1947. The communiqué was signed by Lord Mountbatten, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat. In fact, ‘Kalat State virtually became part and parcel of Pakistan even ten days before it came into existence, whereas other Indian States still undecided.’41 However, quite contrary to the Stand Still agreement, the Khan of Kalat declared independence of Kalat state without making any agreement with Pakistan on 15th August which had shocked Jinnah. When the Indian 39 Draft Communiqué, 4th August 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/27 Jinnah proposed the following amendments: Clause 1, after the word “sovereign state” add “as per treaties between the British Government and Kalat”. Clause 2, after “treaties” add “and agreements of leases” Clause 3, at the end add the words “Karachi”. Clause 5, after the words “discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat” add “at Karachi”. With regard to Kalat’s proposed amendment to clause 2 that “agreements of leases” should be substituted with for “treaties”, I suggest that after “treaties” be inserted the following words: “and agreements of leases” Jinnah to Ismay, 5 th August 1947, Mountbatten papers, MBI/D121/26. 41 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch Thee Khan of Kalat,(Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p. 119 40 13 Government refused to accept the request of Khan of Kalat for its merger, the Khan of Kalat acceded unconditionally and signed Instrument of Accession with Pakistan on 27th March 1948. It was quite contrary to the position of the State Legislature whom he had established in hurry to provide shield to his declaration of independence. Thenceforth, a debate was started about the legal position of the merger of the Kalat State into Pakistan. The present movement of Baloch nationalism somehow had genesis in the early history of Pakistan. Yar Muhammad Khan, then Khan of Kalat, in his autobiography has recorded, “Thus Kalat State virtually became part of parcel of Pakistan even ten days before it came into existence, whereas other Indian States still undecided.”42 But Khan of Kalat declared independence of Kalat state on 15th August without making any agreement on the terms and condition which he had accepted in the Round Table Conferences with Pakistan. But in few months later on 27th March 1948 the Khan of Kalat acceded unconditionally and signed Instrument of Accession which was quite contrary to the decision of the Kalat State parliament whom he had established in hurry to provide him shield to his declaration of independence. Thenceforth a debate was started about the legal position of the merger of the Kalat State into Pakistan. The present movement of Baloch nationalism somehow had genesis in the early history of Pakistan. Conclusion Baluchistan was a chief commissioner’s province in India which had tribal area as well as the princely states including the Kalat State. Khan of Kalat neither challenged British authority in Balochistan nor revolted against the British administration rather remained a tacit member of Chamber of Princely States. Anyhow, as the independence of India approached nearer the Khan of Kalat claimed the independence of state of Kalat which was accepted by Wavell, the British penultimate Viceroy nor Nehru, Congress leader and member of Foreign Affairs in the Interim Government of India. After the 3rd June announcement, the splinter groups were encouraged in Muslim majority provinces of India including the Balochistan to sabotage inclusion of the Balochistan into Pakistan. Likewise, the government of Afghanistan had laid claims on some parts of NWFP and Balochistan on the eve of the British transfer of power to India and Pakistan. So the case of Balochistan in teeth of such opposition was not much different from than that of other Muslim majority provinces where all sorts of hurdles existed on the road to the establishment of Pakistan and peaceful and orderly transfer of the British power 42 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch Thee Khan of Kalat,(Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p. 119 14 to India, for its fate was going to affect the over-all political settlement in the centre. In fact, Yar Muhammad Khan, the ruler of Kalat State, made two important claims in the dying days of the Raj. Firstly, he claimed to retain its status of independence after the termination of the British rule in India. Also he demanded the repossessions of the Leased Lands of Nushki, Bolan and Nasirabad, which it had leased to the British through different treaties and agreements. Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, made it abundantly clear that though theoretically, the termination of Paramountcy left the Indian States to accede to either of the Dominions, it had always been recognized that, in practice, this freedom would be exercised with due regard to the facts of geography and population. Making his views about the future of Princely states including the Kalat state, Mountbatten said that he also wished to discuss the future of Kalat and in this regard he called the meetings of the representatives of the Kalat State and the Government of Pakistan with a view to suggesting to them arrive at some settlement before the lapse of paramountcy. He informed that the Union of India had reduced their demands in this respect to adherence only on the three main subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. In the case of Pakistan, Jinnah was also prepared to negotiate on this basis. The British Government had been very anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy would lapse and States would de jure become independent; but de facto, very few were likely to benefit from independence. Moreover, it was deemed pertinent by the British Government that adherence to a Dominion Government would be the only method, in the future, of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the States. Mountbatten advised the representative of Kalat that there was no other course open for them than the association on some terms with Pakistan. He suggested that agreement on the three main subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications between Kalat and Pakistan was essential. He was unsure of the legal position of Leased Lands of Nushki, Bolan and Nasirabad and therefore refused to handover these states to the State of Kalat. Even though, he thought that, if legal opinion decided that the treaties made between British Government and Kalat would not be inherited by the Pakistan Government, a further decision would be necessary on the financial arrangements to be made in view of the fact that much capital had been sunk into construction at Quetta on the basis of a lease in perpetuity. It would presumably be necessary to obtain further legal opinion on this point also. Thus on 4th August a stand-still agreement was reached where the Pakistan Government recognized the independence of Kalat State with this understanding that at least an agreement on Defence, External Affairs and communication would be established soon and the Kalat state, if not de jure but 15 de facto, would be a part of Pakistan. Therefore recognizing this fact, Ahmad Yar writes in his autobiography that he was so happy that he said to Quaid-iAzam: “Sir it is due to my persuasion that the Baluch regions got merged with Pakistan ten days before its coming into existence”.43 In short, Mountbatten had been very anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy would lapse and States should de jure become independent; but de facto, should remain either within India or Pakistan. Mountbatten did not entertain the request of the Kalat State to either grant him complete independence and to hand over leased territories to Kalat State mainly because the legal opinion which he had sought from legal experts did not endorse it. In the same token, he was no way in favour of complete independence of Kalat, therefore wanted a stand-still agreement between Pakistan and Kalat State. He thought and Jinnah had agreed that only on the basis of three main subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications, Pakistan would be ready to make agreement with Kalat. He was successful in bringing the Government of Pakistan and the Kalat Government to arrive at some agreement on these points and thus a stand-still agreement between the state of Kalat and the Government of Pakistan was concluded on 4th August 1947. Thereby Mountbatten, as he did with other princely states, provided solid foundations not only by letting the British Balochistan to join Pakistan. Nonetheless, the present author believes that Mountbatten helped the Pakistan, of course, through democratic process, to inherit such geo-strategically important and rich in natural resources, the province of Balochistan, which is a great asset for Pakistan. Mountbatten turned down the demands of the Afghanistan Government on the certain areas of Balochistan. Yet, his decision not to allow the State of Kalat to ‘stand alone’ was, in fact, not only because of his strong conviction that the princely states should either join India or Pakistan, but also because of its geo-strategic location of the Kalat state, which would have been vulnerable in view of ‘growing cold war between the West and East’ and Russian irrendenta.44 In fact, Ahmad Yar Khan not only actively supported the Pakistan movement but also let the Muslim League and the Muslims of the Baluchistan, including in his own state, to work for the achievement of Pakistan. It is suffice to say that plethora of writings have been written about his role in the creation of Pakistan which made the work of Jinnah easier in Balochistan. Ahmad Yar Khan did not oppose the election of central legislature of India in Balochistan and as a result Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogezai who had full support of the Muslim League 43 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch Thee Khan of Kalat,(Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p.119 44 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch Thee Khan of Kalat,(Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p.119 16 got elected from Balochistan seat reserved for the Muslims. Though Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogezai fought election as an independent candidate but joined the Muslim League. Jogezai refused to take his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly of India which had made the case for Pakistan stronger as for as the wishes of the people of Balochistan was concerned. He neither registered nor raised any objections when the Shahi Jirga and Municipal Committee of the Quetta took part in a referendum and voted in favour of Pakistan. When the geo-strategic important province of the Balochistan was becoming a part of Pakistan through democratic procedure in which not only the main leaders of the Muslim League but also Khan of Kalat played key role in its creation, Ahmad Yar Khan did more harm than good due to his unclear vision and his contradictory claims and role in the independence of India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Ahmad Yar Khan was unclear about the status of Kalat State on eve of partition of India. A stand-still agreement between Pakistan and Kalat State had ensured the autonomous status of his state. But after the creation of Pakistan the Khan of Kalat made some adventures which invited him trouble. Firstly, contrary to the spirit and provision of the Stand Still agreement, the Khan declared independence on 15 August 1947. Secondly, he horridly created legislature to seek legal cover for his declaration of independence. Thirdly, he approached India for his state’s accession with India Union which put his position and the position of other princely states in a state of quandary. Finally, knowing the rulers Kharan, Makran and Lasbella states have joined Pakistan which had isolated the Kalat State from sea and from Iran; he also requested Jinnah to merge his state with Pakistan. Thus, he failed in his primary aim of achieving an independent Kalat in face of much larger realities which had emerged on 14-15 August 1947. As a ruler of Muslim Princely State, Ahmad Yar Khan had the power and privilege to declare its merger with Pakistan as had been done by the rulers of princely states in India in hundreds without consulting their legislatures or even Executives. Though Ahmad Yar Khan willingly and wisely requested to Pakistan for merger of his state but his unclear vision and unstable temperament caused a permanent confusion and misunderstanding between Baloch nationalists and Pakistan of the intentions of Pakistan government in merger of Kalat State. Jinnah did not force any princely state to merge it in Pakistan. However, Jinnah did not force any of the Pakistani princely states to merge into Pakistan as was happening in India at the bayonet rather princely states remained almost as independent as they had been during the British rule in India. But it was only because of geo-political and domestic changes that made Ahmad Yar Khan to requesting Jinnah to merge Kalat with Pakistan. As rule f business, these were the rulers of princely states in India who decided the fate of their states and this practice was also followed in Pakistan. Those states which refused in India were invaded and forcibly annexed into the Federation of India whereas Government of Pakistan under Jinnah and his aftermath did not carry out that policy of aggression and repression. 17