The evolution of world petroleum agreeme (4)

1 The current essay will consider whether the world petroleum agreements have changed in the past seventy years and whether the modern petroleum agreements differ from the original. Firstly the essay will attempt to elaborate the extent of the state territory. Clarifying up to what point a state can claim territorial sovereignty is vital, especially in the current case where the exploitation of natural resources. Therefore, the paper will consider the international instruments that provide for the nature of the territorial integrity. As soon as the matter of discussion concerns natural resources that can be found not only in land but also at the far seas it necessary to consider the existing international legal regime for the territorial sea. The next step will be to provide an outline of the existing world petroleum agreements and comment on their nature and features. Afterwards, the essay will attempt to illustrate the potential changes in the original petroleum agreements namely the Concessions and the Production Sharing Agreements. In order to provide an adequate answer and reach the right conclusions the paper will focus in the US and the Middle East and unravel if and how the fiscal agreements evolved thought the years and if there are modern models agreements at the current era. An essential factor in the oil and gas agreements is that of ownership: that is to say on what legal basis does government own petroleum in situ and control exploitation and production. As soon as, the drilling occurs both in shore and off- shore the issue of ownership concerns not only areas that can be described as territorial land but also territorial sea. ‘‘The geographical delimitation of territorial sovereignty for petroleum exploitation is a complex public international legal issue and beyond the scope of this book. Other than landlocked countries, the extent will include oil and gas beneath each of a country’s: Land territory, territorial sea appurtenant to such land, and the continental self ’’1 In terms of territorial land, states and nations have absolute sovereign rights over their natural resources are explicitly recognised in international instruments. The General Assembly Resolution 1803 refers to the resolutions being based on ‘‘the inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their natural interests ’’; Likewise , the Article 2 of General Assembly Resolution 3281 says that every ‘‘state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activity ’’; and the Energy Charter Treaty recognises ‘‘ state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy 1 Hammerson M, p.p. 36 2 resources. ’’2 Conversely, ‘‘the seabed and sub-strata of the sea from the low-water mark and extending for several miles is within the territorial sovereignty of the states under the provisions of UNCLOS 1982.Article 33 of UNCLOS 1982 also grants the coastal state control over a contiguous zone, being a zone not extending beyond 24 nautical miles form the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This contiguous zone allows the coastal state control over customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws.’’3 The realisation that underneath deep sea waters there are that hold valuable petroleum resources forced the authorities to pursue the adoption of legislative instruments that verify their control in high seas. The 1945 Truman Proclamation was the initial direct declaration of nation’s principal rights over its continental self. ‘‘In its recitals the proclamation refers to the ‘‘need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals’’ and notes that ‘‘resources underlie many parts of the continental shelf.’’ The recitals further state that: ‘‘the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental self by the coastal nation reasonable and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilize these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it.’’4 This was followed by similar claims by other states, all wishing to gain access to the oil and gas and mineral deposits believed to exist in the Shelf. By 1958, the practice of states had developed to such an extent that the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the Convention on the Continental Shelf (CSC 1958). For most purposes, this has now been superseded by Part VI of the 1982 Convention, although many of the two treaties’ provisions are similar in substance5. The Law of the Sea Convention 1982 recognises in article 77(2) that a coastal state has exclusive rights to explore and exploit the ‘natural resources’ of the shelf area. If the coastal state does not undertake such exploration or exploitation, then no other state may do so without its permission. Another feature of the 1982 Convention that must be discussed is the development of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).Although the EEZ has its origins in the Exclusive Fisheries Ibid, p.p. 37 Ibid,p.p.39 4 Ibid,p.p.41 5 Dixon,p.p.218 2 3 3 zones recognised as legitimate in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (UK v Iceland) 1974 ICJ Rep 3, its development was largely the result of negotiations at the Third UN Conference and its subsequent adoption in the national legislation of several states. In the Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia v Libya) 1982 ICJ Rep 18, the ICJ was clear that the concept of the EEZ had by then become rooted in customary law, and this was confirmed by the Tribunal in the Guinea/guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case 77 ILR 636 (1983)6. An EEZ supplies a coastal state with sovereign rights over all natural resources (e.g. fish, oil, gas, lobsters, crabs, etc) up to 200 miles. Broadly, ‘‘the EEZ is a belt of sea , adjacent o the coast, extending up to 200 miles from the baselines of the territorial sea (i.e 188 miles in width). Within this area, the coastal state is given ‘sovereign rights’ for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the living and non-living natural resources of the area. In addition, it is given certain rights to establish artificial islands, conduct research and utilise the superadjacent waters (LOS Art.56). Importantly, although the territorial sea ends at 12 miles, the 188 miles of the EEZ are not ‘high seas’. It seems that the waters of the EEZ are to be regarded as sui juris, wherein the coastal state has certain exclusive rights for the functional purpose of enjoying EEZ rights but where many of the freedoms of the high seas are preserved.’’7 Principally the petroleum fiscal agreements are divided in two main categories: the concessionary systems where private ownership allowed and the contractual systems where the state retains ownership.8 The major types of world petroleum agreements are: (1) the concessions (modern and traditional)- contractor owns the oil in the ground; (2) the production-sharing agreements (PSA’s)- contractor owns a share on the oil once it is out of the ground , (3) the joint ventures and (4) the service contracts – contractor receives a fee for getting the oil. The oldest form of petroleum contract is the concession. It was first developed during the oil boom in the United States in the 1800s. ‘‘The idea was then exported to oil producing countries around the world by International Oil Companies (IOC). These contracts are based much more on a "land ownership" concept of oil that is based on the American system of land ownership. In the United States, the landowner, generally speaking, has legal ownership Dixon, p.p.214. Ibid,p.p.215 8 see Junseog Yi, Metrits and Demerits of the Different Types o Petroleum Contracts, slide 9 6 7 4 rights of the earth directly below it (subsurface) and the sky above it. This would include oil if it was found below a private property owners land. Due to this historical origin, the concession similarly grants an area of land to a company, though typically only the subsurface rights to the land, and therefore, if that company finds oil below the surface, the company owns that oil. Under the concession the contractor will also have the exclusive right to explore within the concession area.’’9 Commenting upon the nature of the concession agreements Carlson writes ‘‘that on of the accepted elements in the definition of a concession agreement is that it involves an agreement by a state to grant a privilege to conduct an enterprise of some sort for a defined period. This agreement may be made pursuant to constitutional or legislative authority, but such is the nature of the enterprise which is desired to be established that it becomes essential to function through contract as well as through general rules of law. The legislative process can law down general rules of behaviour, behaviour, but consent or agreement on the part of an individual can never be established by legislative fiat.’’ 10 Carlson also notes that ‘‘such is the importance to the state of the particular right or privilege with which a concession agreement is concerned that simple reliance upon ownership to insure adequate development and use does not suffice. It becomes necessary to formulate the legal rights and obligations of the individual or corporate body as well as the rights and obligations of the state itself and to place these in the sphere of an enforceable contract. These rights and obligations in turn must be functionally defined so as to accomplish the objectives of the mutual enterprise in which the state and private party are interested. It is for this reason that the so-called discretionary quality of the concession agreement emerges, It falls in the area of discretion only because it is thereby possible to formulate and coordinate the objectives of the two parties to the arrangement and to impose enforceable obligations upon each so that their common ends will be reached. ’’11 What is apparent in relation to the concession agreements is that all of them share the same essential features. Para delineates them properly. In a con ‘‘a)The government grants the company an exclusive right to carry out exploration, development and hydrocarbon Open Oil, Oil Contracts: How to read them and understand them, p.p. 26 Carlston ,p.p. 621 11 Ibid, p.p.622. 9 10 5 production operations in a defined area for a limited period if time; b) The company acquires title to the bydrocarbons and is almost always free to dispose if them without further restriction; c)The company bears the financial and commercial risks associated with the undertaking; d)The company agrees to make certain payments (signature bonus, surface taxes, royalties, production taxes, etc.) to the government in return; e)The concessions are contracts with the state, though this does not in itself imply insulation from the state's general power to pass legislation overriding the terms of the contract.’’12 Separate kinds of agreements are namely the Production Sharing Contracts or PSCs and the Service Contracts. The PSA differs from the concession in the way that it does not grant the company ownership rights over the resource. Also the Government can take a greater interest in technology transfer, preparing for the eventual turning over of the resources to its bands. Further, unlike the concession, which grants the company rights over the resource for a specified period of time, the PSA grants the company an interest in the resource that is tied to the recouping of suck costs and , then of course, to the garnering of a profit. It may be useful for a host Government that is keen to encourage a company to undertake the risk of exploration. The company might find it more useful than a modern concession , for instance, in the situation in which a company is uncertain about its ability to recoup its sunk costs within the strictly definite time period provided for by the modern concession.’’ 13 Indonesia can be credited with the innovation of Production Sharing Contracts in 1966. The Indonesian government decided, as a 'nationalistic' move, to move away from concessioning to contracting. This was done so that the state retained ownership of the petroleum produced and only gave the international company the right to explore and take ownership (or legally speaking "title") to it once the petroleum was out of the ground. This innovation came about at the same time as many petroleum producing countries were gaining their independence and was part of the first wave of the so-called resource nationalism. Another key development during this time was the formation of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) that led to further "rebalancing" of government company relationships. Under a Service Contract, title does not transfer at all. Unlike a PSC, where the oil company is entitled to a share of any petroleum produced, under a Service Contract, the oil company is just paid a fee.’’14 The two main types of service contracts are the risk service contract and the pure Para (2004),p.p. 9 Likosky M, p.p.11 14 Supra note 9 12 13 6 service contracts. The risk contracts address a situation where a host Government is seeking to use private companies to bear the risk of exploitation. Two scenarios are envisioned; either commercially exploitable resources are identified or they not. If they are, then the company receives cash remuneration for its efforts in addition to a possible stake in the subsequent enterprise. If resources not found, then the company is out of pocket. A classical example is the Iran buy back model. In the year 1993, for the first time after the 1979 revolution, the 1993 Budget Act allowed the NIOC to have contracts of up to US $ 2.6 billions with competent foreign companies on a number of conditions. It was the Budget Act of 1994 that did in fact introduce the terminology and mechanism of buy-back contracts as the legitimate source of attracting investment. Buy back agreements, succinctly put, are risk service contracts by which oil, or money from oil sales, is paid to the foreign Company as remuneration fee.15 As specified by , ‘‘Note 29 of the Budget act , a maximum of US$ 3.5 billion dollars of foreign investment was allowed provided that it did not create any commitment for the government and state banks and all the instalments were to be paid out of the proceeds. This was a leap financially justified and constitutionally legitimate, as Budget Acts are validated by the Parliament.’’ 16The second most popular service contract is pure service contract where a company is brought in to perform a defined service and compensated accordingly. Unlike risk service contracts the host government shoulders all risks. Under this type of contract, the company also acquires an interest in the extracted resource.17 Another type of arrangement that is sometimes considered to be a fourth type of petroleum contract is the Joint Venture. This involves the state, through a national oil company, entering a partnership and working together with an oil company or companies. In this arrangement, it is the joint venture itself that is awarded rights to explore, develop, produce and sell petroleum. In reality it is rare to find any contract that fits entirely into one of the descriptions given above and is more likely to take elements from each.18 As Styles writes ‘‘ Joint Ventures allow oil companies to come together to mitigate their risks and share in the out-lays required for capital –intensive exploration, development and production activities. Joint venture’’ he continues ‘‘ also facilitate cost savings and economics of scale which enable the participating companies to operate with fewer employees, permit the elimination of duplicate facilities, equipment and functions and allow cost savings through bulk Shahri,p.p.121-122 Ibid,p.p.122 17 Likosky,14 15 16 18 Supra Note 9,p.p.27 7 purchases of suppliers and materials. The joint venture is also important in that it allows upstream oil and gas companies to manage their portfolio of assets in a manner that seeks a balance between minimising risk and maximising returns by allowing each company to invent in several deferent prospects for the same capital outlay ’’ 19 It must be argued , however, that the ‘‘JV agreements -contracts are not generally public and it is not possible to conclude that they look the same everywhere. Nonetheless, it is far to assume that the contents of JV contracts are shaped by political exigencies everywhere. Thus, when the host Government is in a strong negotiating position, the local partner may have greater rights than in a situation in which the local strength is limited. The politicized nature of these arrangements is evidenced by the recent controversy over the Russian Governments intervention in the Sakhalin-2 project, a JV among Shell, Mitsui (Japan) and Mitsubishi (Japan).20 By the 1950s there was a widely perceived need within the US oil industry for a standardised JOA which would minimise time spent in arguing over contractual matters. There soon developed a standardised US model form operating agreement: the American Association of Petroleum Landsmen’s Model Form Operating Agreement , also known as the AAPL Form 610 of 1956.21 It is a matter of fact that there has been an unprecedented evolution in the field of fiscal agreements. Many states departed from the notion of concession for regimes that favour absolute or partial state participation in the production exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. However that did not necessarily meant the complete eradication of certain forms of agreements such as the concessions and the production sharing agreements (PSA). Many of these agreements remain but they are transformed. Concessions , which where the first to be adopted in the US and in the Middle East exist even today but they bare names like the licence or lease. A general distinctive characteristic is that traditional concessions is simple agreement consisted of only royalty (12.5%) payment based on the tonnage of crude oil produced in very large area with unreasonably long period (50-60 years) while modern concessions grant a fixed period (exploration:3-5years , exploitation : Styles , The Joint Operating Agreements, Chapter 12 in Oil and Gas Law- Current Practice and emerging trents , Dundee University Press, 2011, p.p.359 20 Likosky M, p.p.13 21 Supra Note 16 , p.p. 360 19 8 30-40 years) and area and government revenue is deprived mainly from royalties (11.5 14.5%) and net income or taxes.22 Smith and Dzienkowski state ‘‘that modern concession, exemplified by the concession agreement developed by Abu Dhabi, grants ‘‘the exclusive rights to explore, search , and drill for , produce, store transport, and sell Petroleum ’’ within the designated concession acreage for a specified number of years. This period is generally far shorter that the period of early concessions. In some instances, however, countries wishing to encourage development of areas requiring expensive technology or presenting difficult engineering, meteorological, or geographical problems have granted terms approaching fifty years. In contrast, the United States oil and gas lease will last for so long as oil and gas is produced , deferring the lessor’s resumption of control indefinitely.’’23 Specifically, ‘‘in the USA the landowners, including the United States government, still rely exclusively upon private companies for the development of oil and gas reserves. The leases remain the only commonly used type of arrangement entered into between the parties.’’ 24 Smith and Dzienkowski point out that ‘‘unlike the earlier agreements, the modern concession contains clauses imposing a scheme of development based upon a monetary commitment for each year of the term. A company holding the concession is obligated to a work program and to the relinquishment of a portion of the acreage on a specified schedule. This scheme has a partial parallel in some modern oil and gas leases that incorporate provisions imposing some development obligations upon the lesee. Such provisions, often added to printed form leases by the lessor, are of two basic types. The retained acreage clause provides that a well will maintain the lease only as to a specified number of acres. The continuous drilling clause is a more complex provision that commits the lessee to a drilling program and terminates the lease as to undrilled acreage after a specified time period elapses. The use of such clauses is far from universal , however, and their scope is relatively limited when compared with the work programs imposed upon oil companies under modern concessions.’’ What the transformation of the concession in the last 70 years proves is that current era of the 21 century the attempt to provide differences between the fiscal agreements even the See Junseog Yi, Metrits and Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts, slide 6-7 Smith & Dzienkowski ,p.p.36 24 Ibid,p.p. 35 22 23 9 between the genuine contractual types and even categorize them as distinct types is challenging. What is more, the complexity of the oil and gas exploration and exploitation process implies the need for collaboration of the state with international oil companies which means that they need for harmonisation of duties and liabilities. Of coerce the parties to the agreement namely the state oil company and the multinational company or group of companies may agree to adopt the best type of agreement to fit a particular situation but that would be impossible without setting out the terms and conditions of their agreement. In every contractual relationship the involved parties, in most occasion, expressly settle the terms of the agreements which include provisions for issues of liability, risk allocation ect. The oil and gas commercial and contractual practise is not different. Clearly it is hard to clarify whether a petroleum agreement belongs to a certain type based on certain criteria. For instance, a production –sharing agreement is quite similar to a farmout transaction or carried interest agreement in the US. ‘‘There many forms of carried arrangements have developed to take advantage of the tax benefits of the poll –of-capital doctrine. In a typical farmout arrangement, a lessee contracts to transfer acreage to a company drills a well. Once payout occurs and the driller recovers all of the costs of drilling the well, the driller and the lessee share the proceeds of production according to a predetermined formula.’’25 The PSAs have common elements with the Risk Service Contracts. In both PSA and RSCs the FOCs remuneration depends on the production. Still, RSCs are different in that the FOC has no control or ownership which it would have had the contract been a PSA-RCSs are ‘ risk without title of oil’. The PSCs, on the other hand, guarantee that the FOC will receive its remuneration whether or not there is production. There is no exploration risk on the part of the FOC. The government or NOC bears all the risks. The RSCs and the PRCs are similar to each other with respect to control and ownership. Under the RSCs and the PSCs (collectively, SCs), the FOC has no control over operations and has no equity position (interest) in the venture. In contrast, under PSAs the FOC bears all exploration risks and has control over operations. It also shares the reward in the case of commercial discovery, while the NOC has full ownership of the oil and shares the rewards with no exploration risk. 26 25 26 Ibid,p.p.37-38 Al-Emadi. p.p.653 10 Similarities can be also found between Participation agreements and Joint Venture Agreements. Participation agreements had the spiritual and political support of the UN. Al- Emadi states that PA ‘‘were considered a triumph for the host state, especially when compared to CA’s, in that they increased government resources and over activities of the concession –holders. These agreements also provided the host state with modest access to the international oil market. Nonetheless, PA still fell short of fulfilling the host states’ desire for full sovereignty over its oil and gas resources; particularly the determination of the crude oil production rates and oil prices; and an increase in the production , operations, management and technical skills of its NOC and nationals. This shortcoming was attributable to the fact that ownership and management were still in the hands of the FOC’s because they held the majority interest in the concession company. In other words, Pas were concessions in new suit. If we add this fact to the Indonesian experience with Production Sharing Agreements, which provided more favourable terms to the host state, we might understand the reasons which led Iran to withdraw from the negotiation process and accepts Kuwait’s reservation on the 1972 General Agreement on Participation. Nevertheless, Pas were considered an achievement at that time given the circumstances, including the fact that host states had no unilateral right to amend their original CAs.’’27 A number of the elements of PAs are found in present-day JVCs mainly because the PAs set the foundations – concepts upon which the Joint Venture Contracts were built. Eventually the PA called for the formation of Joint Management Committee which is the responsible for, inter alia, capital expenditures, operational expenses, and controlling and monitoring the activities of exploration and development. The Executive Management Committee found in JVC operates in a quite common way. A second similarity is that the Operating Committee which is found in the PA and charged with the responsibility for conducting and coordinating petroleum operations is similar to that of the Operator in JVCs and JOAs. The difference between Pas and JVCs ‘‘was that PAs were more concerned with overall ownership than with technical expertise and effective control over operations, production, management and marketing skills and the associated risks. The principal concern of host states at that time was limited to receiving more immediate funds to meet their financial requirements. In other worlds Pas were concerned with form over substance. Finally, we 27 Al-Emadi, p.p.651 11 should emphasize the fact that Pas were the only mechanism, besides nationalization, to amend CAs at the time, while JVCs were initially utilized with the New Entracts.’’28 Joint Ventures are not only found in Participation agreements but also in PSAs. An example is the Azerbaijan contract which involves mixed corporate participation. Particularly, Article 1 Participating Interests, s.1.1 of the Final Consolidation 3/30/96 provides that the rights and obligations under this agreement of each of the contracting parties shall be held in the following respective percentage of Participating Interests as of the date this Agreements is executed: Contracting Parties/Percentage: SCA/10%, BP/25.5%,Elf/10%,Lukoil/10%, OIEC/10%,Statoil/25.5%,TPAO/9.0%,Total/100%. Like PSA, the JV arrangement puts a premium on technology transfer. The aim is to foster eventually genuine independence by the State-owned company. Inevitably, the prospect of independence runs counter to the interests of foreign companies. As a result, the extent of technology transfer built into the joint venture is negotiated and varies depending upon the bargaining strength of the national government.29 In relations to the statement it seems reasonable to argue that it is valid. It is true that many old agreements like Concessions , Production sharing agreements and participation agreements still remain in name but they are substantially different from their modern counterparts. The change in the concessions , especially in the Middle was made during the transition to participation which have taken place through the efforts of the OPEC countries which used a combination of cajolery , international political pressure , and threats of nationalisation. The success of this method of altering the original concession agreements was due in considerable part to oil companies’ fear. One of the successes of the OPEC renegotiations was that countries were able to share experiences and this sharing led in turn to more favourable contractual terms for all members. ‘‘Even when nationalization ultimately occurred, if the change was relatively gradual, the long-term effects were frequently not markedly different from those achieved in renegotiation. Although the companies do not like the loss of assets, they are more concerned about the loss of involvement in developing future reserves. The prospect of competitive binding and the sharing of their technology and information with the highest bidder frightens most multinational companies.’’30 Ibid, p.p.652 Likosky,p.p.14 30 Smith & Dzienkowski, p.p.45 28 29 12 In this essay it was demonstrated that Service Contracts and PSA came into existence after the disappearance of the classical Concession Agreements. However it became clear that the modern fiscal agreements have similarities with each other. This likeness is a result of the incorporation of certain contracts in the original agreements and the outbreak of the Joint Venture that provide the wider collaboration of state oil companies and multinational companies in the context of exploration and production. The contractual clauses may a) specify the percentages held in the enterprise by the contracting parties, b) set out reimbursement for sunk exploration costs, c) govern the discovery phase, d) set out specific terms governing the production phase, e) stipulate certain local content preferences, f) or require the company to keep certain records of its operations.31 To that extent, Al-Emadi rightfully states that ‘’all petroleum agreements serve the same purpose but they differ with respect to the ownership of oil and gas resources, the degree of control over operations, and the extent of the national oil company’s participation and /or the assumption of risk by each party to the contract. The joint venture is an association of persons engaging in a common undertaking to generate a product to be shared among the participants. Any joint venture will involve the variables of ownership, control over operations and risk.’’32 To conclude, the essay tested the validity of the statement that the original petroleum agreements that exist today in name, their modern counterparts are very different from the original texts. At first, the essay focused on the issue of territorial sovereignty. It was indicated that a state and especially a coastal state is empowered by international instruments to exploit natural resources not only in its land territory and the territorial sea but it can also exercise control upon natural resources in distance of up to 200 miles from its shores. Secondly, the essay described and defined the different kinds of agreements that are still dominant in the present day. Lastly the essay provided evidence that prove the transformation of the original petroleum agreements in the last 70 years and revealed that even though the agreements are described as Concessions, Production sharing Agreements or participation agreements they all have in the present day a different set of contractual terms from the original texts. It was also observed that this transformation was made not only because of the state or the companies’ need to adopt in challenging times for the industry but also because of the need to retain the profitable status in the business of oil and gas exploitation. That was the A detail analysis of the variety of contractual clauses is given by Likosky in pages 15 -18 of ‘‘Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industries’’ Transnational Corporations, Vol.18, No .1(April 2009). 31 32 Al-Emadi,p.p.667 13 main reason as stated above for the creation of mixed collaborations known as joint ventures and joint operation agreements which makes difficult and pointless to recognise and categorise the agreements. Based on the fact it was verified that the modern world petroleum fiscal agreements are actually unique and way different that the original texts. 14 Bibliography Books. Dixon, ‘‘Textbook on International Law’’,6th Ed. ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 Hammerson M, ‘‘Upstream Oil and Gas: Cases, Material and Commentary’’, Globe Business Publishing,2011 Para F, ‘‘Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum’’, London-New York: Tauris, 2004. Gordon G- Paterson J- Usenmez E (editors), ‘‘Oil and Gas LawCurrent Practice and Emerging Trends’’,2nd Ed Dundee: Dundee University Press: 2011. Journal Articles  Al-Emadi T, Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs) among Current Negotiated Petroleum Contracts: A Literature Review of JVCs Development, Concept and Elements, Geographical Journal of International Law: Summit, Vol.1 2010, p.p.645-667.  Carlston K, International Role of Concession Agreements, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.52, 1957, p.p. 618- 643.  Likosky M , ‘‘Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industries’’ Transnational Corporations, Vol.18, No .1, (April 2009), p.p.1-42.  Shahri N N, ‘‘Petroleum Legal Framework of History, Trends and Way Forward ’’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 8, No.1 (2010), p.p. 111-126.  Smith E & Dzienkowski J, ‘‘A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements ’’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No.13,(1989),p.p.13-46. Online Resources.  Open Oil, The Oil Contracts: How to read and understand them, ed. Version 1.1, 2012. Available at  Junseog Yi, Merits and Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts available at